Organization and Commitment of Special Cavalry Brigade ‘Model’ Near Olenino in the Rzhev Sector During the Spring and Summer of 1942 with the Mission to “Fight and Advance in Any Type of Terrain”

by Generalleutnant Karl-Friedrich von der Meden

This is a reprint of MS #D-132, originally prepared for Office of the Chief Historian, Headquarters European Command, U.S. Army

Introduction

Elements of the enemy armies which had broken through the German lines during the winter and had gradually been reinforced (altogether about 60,000 men in infantry, cavalry, and armored units) had gained a firm foothold in the vast, inaccessible primeval forests and swamps between Rzhev and Bely. Here, to the rear of the German Ninth Army these enemy units forced the German troops to fight on two fronts, and tied down strong German forces. At the same time these enemy units threatened the German Ninth Army and its supply lines to an ever-increasing extent. The enemy units were supplied over a road which ran through Nelidovo and bypassed Bely to the north.

On 2 July, in order to liquidate this menace and to regain full freedom of action, the German Ninth Army launched a concentric counterattack. A carefully planned and aggres­sive battle of encirclement now began and lasted eleven days. In difficult forest fighting the Russians were driven from their deeply echeloned positions. The enemy was crowded into a small area and the bulk of his force was annihilated. The German commander had recognized the enemy’s plan to break the German front of encirclement which had just been formed northeast of Bely, by simultaneous attacks from inside and outside the pocket to enable the surrounded Russian units to escape through this gap. The quick German advance through the Obsha River Valley had frustrated this plan. The enemy units were split along the Obsha River and surrounded in two pockets. All Russian attempts to break out of the encirclement, as well as the enemy’s attacks from the outside against the encircling forces to the northeast of Bely, were repelled. Strong strategic reserves moved up by the enemy in forced marches from the area around Ostashkov by way of Nelidovo arrived too late.

Since the terrain consisted partly of swamps and large swampy forests, the German Ninth Army ordered the activation of a cavalry brigade which was to be organized to fight in every type of terrain and under all weather conditions. The brigade had to be able to advance through even the deepest mud. I was appointed to command this brigade and was directly subordinated to the German Ninth Army. The cavalry brigade was activated in the area around Olenino under the personal direction of the army commander.

As I have pointed out in the preceding paragraph, the army commander wanted the brigade to be able to fight and advance in any terrain and in any weather. The brigade was assured of all possible support in men, arms, and equipment.

The question now presented itself where the brigade would obtain its men and equip­ment. It was evident that only those officers and men who were experienced with Russian warfare and terrain could be assigned to this special unit. In addition, they had to be experienced cavalrymen. Only tough, brave, and healthy soldiers who felt a close kinship with nature could be used for this mission; it was no job for soldiers who were used to garrison life. Replacements from the western theater or the zone of the interior were there­fore out of the question because the German troops stationed in western Europe had been softened by the easy occupation life, while the troops from the training camps at home lacked combat experience. Even though these recruits had been trained for warfare in Russia, they still were incapable of enduring the physical hardships which the Russian theater imposed on the individual. The high standard of living in western Europe initially rendered the men useless for fighting in Russia. Every unit commander realized that the difference between warfare in western Europe and Russia was enormous.

The commander of the German Ninth Army, General Model, therefore decided to pull out the reconnaissance battalion from each of the eight divisions under his command and place them at the disposal of the newly formed brigade. This was a very satisfactory solution for the brigade, but it was hard on the infantry divisions, for the reconnaissance battalions were valuable combat units and were greatly missed by their parent divisions.

Organization of the Brigade

A.   A headquarters staff with one signal com­munication troop.

B.   Three cavalry regiments, each consisting of one or two mounted troops and three to four bicycle troops. Altogether, the regiment consisted of five troops. Heavy machine guns had been distributed to each troop. The mounted troops of the regiments could be combined into a complete cavalry regiment within a few hours. Each section within the troop was equipped with two light machine guns.

Each troop consisted of twelve sections and was thus equipped with twenty-four light machine guns; in addition, it also had two heavy machine guns.

The three mounted regiments within the brigade thus disposed over thirty heavy and seventy-two light machine guns.

The officers and men were, as far as possible, equipped with submachine guns.

In addition, each bicycle troop disposed over two horse-drawn vehicles of the locally used type (so-called “Panje” vehicles) per section. These vehicles carried ammunition, baggage, food, and occasionally the bicycles. Naturally, these vehicles were pulled exclu­sively by Panje horses, since only these were able to keep moving in the terrain which they had known since birth. The mounted troops retained their German horses.

The brigade now met the requirement “to keep moving through any terrain” since the horses and Panje vehicles were in fact able to keep moving even in the most adverse terrain.

In addition, the brigade disposed over an engineer company, a medical company and two supply columns; one of the latter was motorized, while the other was horse-drawn.

C.   On hard-surface roads and in regular terrain, as far as the latter existed in Russia at all, the brigade adopted the following formations:

The mounted regiments were on horseback or on bicycles; supplies were carried by motor vehicles.

The engineers were on bicycles.

The signal troop was horse-drawn and in part motorized.

The medical company was horse-drawn.

D.   For the muddy season, swamps, swampy forests and small rivers:

The mounted regiments were on horseback, the bicycle troops on foot, with arms, ammuni­tion, food and the most necessary baggage on Panje vehicles (two per section).

The engineers had the same formation as the bicycle troops.

The remaining units retained their regular formation.

E.    Tanks and anti-tank weapons were to be attached to units according to the latter’s missions and the terrain. Artillery likewise was to be attached to the brigade whenever the situation called for it. The artillery was one of the German weak points in this opera­tion; this circumstance, however, could not be changed for various important reasons. The regiments only had light infantry howitzers which had been assigned to them. There were six of these light infantry howitzers per regiment. For special missions in the event of a deep penetration or breakthrough, the brigade was assured of additional infantry and artillery units to protect its flanks.

F.    Upon completion of four to six weeks’ training and integration of the different units, the brigade was committed south of Olenino along the Luchesa River east of Luchesa. The brigade was to attack southward from this location during Operation Seydlitz.

A larger road, the so-called Rollbahn (road designated as a main axis of motorized transportation), led from Olenino southward along the Luchesa River. Actually, this Roll­bahn was only an unimproved, somewhat widened country road. At particularly wet and swampy spots short stretches had been converted into a corduroy road. Only the Luchesa Valley was free of woods to a width of one to three miles. Aside from this valley, the road was bordered on both sides by large, swampy forests, which were occasionally separated by clearings of varying size. In addition, the woods were traversed by small, swampy creeks. Statements by the native population and map information had given the German command a precise picture of the Russian rear area. After breaking through the Russian positions at the edge of the woods, the brigade had to count on swampy woods approximately 10 miles in depth, which did not contain any roads.

I have not mentioned in this study whether the attack was launched on the left or the right flank. In any event, this information should hardly interest the reader. The sole purpose of this study is to record the exper­iences of a unit which was organized for a specific mission.

On the brigade’s right a panzer division had been committed with orders to thrust beyond Luchesa to the south on both sides of the aforementioned Rollbahn. This division faced a very difficult task, since the Russians correctly assumed that the German main effort would be centered in this sector. Aerial reconnaissance and statements by Russian deserters had provided the German command with the intelligence that strong enemy fortifications (obstacles and anti-tank positions) had been constructed along the Rollbahn. To the east and west of the road which led southward, the enemy positions were less strongly fortified, but extensively protected by mine fields, traversed only by a few lanes. The Russians considered it fairly improbable that an attack on a larger scale would take place east of Luchesa. This belief on their part was apparently strengthened by the fact that they were also familiar with the swampy forest on the German side of the front. They could expect with certainty that the German units would not be able to move tanks through this terrain to the line of depar­ture. The Russians also believed that a German tank attack through the open terrain, then through the Luchesa River and the mine fields would be doomed to failure.

The brigade moved into its positions ap­proximately ten days prior to the attack. Intensive reconnaissance of the intermediate terrain was conducted with the help of ex­perienced tankers. Here the advantage already made itself felt that the brigade was composed of battle-hardened and experienced reconnais­sance battalions. Almost every officer and man was an experienced combat soldier who had participated in at least two or three campaigns and who was well familiar with the terrain and the peculiarities of warfare in Russia. Every man in the regiments was a tough soldier. The men were used to hard­ships and not dependent on good food and other comforts; furthermore, in their peacetime training, they had specialized in reconnaissance. The success of the German operation was not long delayed. Within the shortest possible time I had obtained a complete picture of the enemy positions, the intermediate terrain, and the terrain directly behind the German positions. This picture indicated that an attack with tank support was quite feasible after the necessary preparations.

Operation Seydlitz was scheduled for 2 July 1942. For the attack the cavalry brigade was attached to a panzer division which ad­joined its right flank.

In a conference prior to the attack the brigade requested a tank company. This request was granted, and fourteen tanks were attached to the brigade.

The brigade was ordered to sweep through the ten miles of forest and, if possible, to halt the supply traffic along the Rollbahn leading from north to south in case the main body of the panzer division was unable to advance.

Six artillery batteries and one tank company with fourteen tanks were attached to the brigade for the execution of this mission.

The infantry division which adjoined the brigade’s left flank was not to jump off until 3 July, after the initial attack had been suc­cessful. Consequently, for the first day of the attack, the brigade’s left flank was to be exposed. In our estimation, however, this did not entail any risk since in the swampy, wooded terrain a small covering force could give adequate protection. The first difficulties arose when the fourteen tanks had to be moved up to the line of departure through the swampy forests.

Forty-eight hours before the beginning of the attack one company of engineers with power saws was sent out into the woods. A route leading to the assembly area had been previously reconnoitered. Along the edge of the woods or at clearings the engineers had to fell trees at intervals of about one yard, so that the trees fell on open ground along a stretch leading through the assembly area. In this manner a tank path could be established within a very short time and with relatively little effort, which was in effect a corduroy road with about one-yard-wide gaps. Few branches had to be cut off the trees. For obvious reasons this road could only be used by a limited number of tanks and tracked vehicles.

A few hours after the engineers had gone to work the tanks started to move into their assembly area in daylight. This was possible because the wooded terrain afforded sufficient cover. The noise of the tanks was drowned by harassing fire and low-flying reconnaissance aircraft. All tanks arrived at their destination without incident. Mine-clearing squads were assigned to each tank and ordered to ride on the tanks. These squads consisted exclusively of men who were experienced in the detection and removal of land mines.

Commitment of the Brigade

The attack was started at 0300 on 2 July. During the artillery preparation the tanks started out together with the cavalry troops. Their movements were favored by a heavy fog which covered the river valley.

They crossed most of the intervening terrain without encountering resistance. A ford across the Luchesa River which had been reconnoitered in advance was found to be quite adequate for the fourteen tanks. Enemy mine fields were immediately recognized by the experienced tankers and engineers, and the lanes leading through the fields was found and widened. The tanks and cavalry suddenly rose in front of a completely surprised enemy. In one sweep the first and second lines were overrun and great confusion seized the Russians. The tanks now had accomplished their mission. They could not penetrate any farther in the enemy-held forest without sufficient reconnaissance and additional prep­aration, and were therefore ordered to halt and stay in reserve. By then the cavalry had penetrated the enemy lines to a depth of three to four miles. The situation on the right was entirely different. Here the panzer division was to advance along the Rollbahn. In this sector, the Russians were prepared for an attack. The German tanks ran into deeply echeloned anti-tank defenses which were camouflaged with the usual Russian skill. The infantry also could not make headway and suffered heavy casualties in the forest fighting. The entire operation seemed in danger of bogging down.

The brigade’s left flank was protected by one company of infantry. This covering force was to protect the brigade’s left flank for twenty-four hours, since the division adjoining the left flank was also scheduled to attack at 0300.

At noon the brigade received orders to pivot toward the west with all available forces and to attack the Rollbahn from the east. One regiment turned to the right and thrust toward the Rollbahn through primeval forest swamps. At times the men sank almost up to their knees. Direction had to be maintained by compass.

The troops performed seemingly impossible feats, and the surprise attack was a full suc­cess, thanks primarily to the excellent caliber of the officers and men. By nightfall the regiment controlled a stretch of the Rollbahn, the pressure on the panzer division subsided, and the enemy was in an untenable position.

The Panje supply columns were able to move through the swamps and bring rations and ammunition to the completely exhausted men. From the regimental commander down to the lowliest private of the cavalry regiments an almost impossible mission had been accomp­lished. Only the careful selection of personnel and the composition of the cavalry brigade had made this possible. When the attack con­tinued in the early morning, hardly any re­sistance was encountered; however, the physical requirements were extraordinarily high since the men had to traverse six miles of wooded swamps. Before noon the brigade emerged from the forest and a few hours later the first heavy equipment arrived. The terrain ahead extended over a wide area and Russian columns, single vehicles, and single individuals could be seen moving about in wild disorder. It was obvious that the enemy command had lost control over its troops. The front of the Russian Thirty-ninth Army had collapsed and the German divisions were advancing everywhere.

The decision of the commander of the German Ninth Army, to organize a brigade which could advance through swamps and which was composed of selected officers and men for this special mission had been fully successful.

Even though Operation Seydlitz would presumably have been successful even without the cavalry brigade, it would have involved a much greater loss in men and equipment.

During the eleven days of the operation 50,000 prisoners, 230 tanks, 760 artillery pieces, and thousands of small arms were captured. The situation of Ninth Army had been improved by the elimination of Russian forces in its rear. The army rear area was safe except for partisan activities.

Conclusion

The composition of the brigade proved to be effective. The proper training for such a special mission requires from six to eight weeks with troops already experienced in Russian warfare. Before the attack the units must be in their jump-off positions long enough, at least for two weeks, in order to become well-acquainted with terrain conditions through intensive reconnaissance. All intelligence and reconnaissance information must be care­fully checked because the slightest inaccuracy can result in failure in this type of terrain.

Preliminary training in teamwork between cavalry and armor is of definite advantage. In an attack over this kind of terrain it may occasionally happen that the cavalry advances too fast. In that case the tanks must radio the cavalry to slow down because terrain difficulties prevent them from keeping up.

Portable radio sets are not always reliable because of the density of the forest, and telephone communications had to be used extensively. For that reason each regiment must carry more than the customary quantity of cable.

If possible, each officer and enlisted man should be equipped with a submachine gun.

Rations should be concentrated; the lighter they are, the better. The American combat ration (K ration) would be well suited, particu­larly since it is also protected against moisture.

It would be advantageous to equip the troops with rubber boots, and impregnated raincoats, camouflage jackets and windbreak­ers, because dew causes a high degree of moisture in the underbrush. Camouflage covers for steel helmets are essential and camouflage in general is of utmost importance.

Combat vehicles must carry sufficient tools since in this kind of operation the vehicles often have broken wheels and axles.

The commissioned and non-commissioned officers must be versatile and able to make quick decisions and improvise. Every officer must be able to act independently and ready to assume responsibility. Detailed inquiries addressed to higher echelons cause delays and unfavorable developments which can usually be avoided. Leaders with good common sense and a portion of recklessness are best suited for such special assignments. The schol­arly type of officer who relies chiefly on maps is completely out of place.

In general, it may be said that the composi­tion and equipment of the cavalry brigade proved effective for the special mission of attacking and advancing through marshy forests and along muddy paths.

 

The Battle of the Scheldt, 1944

by C. P. Stacey

The Scheldt Estuary operations made a vital contribution to Allied victory in the Second World War. They provided logistical facilities essential to the final assault on Germany. By the early autumn of 1944 the Allied Expedi­tionary Force in northwest Europe was in serious administrative difficulties. Following its victory in Normandy and rapid pursuit of the enemy across France and Belgium, its lines of communication were stretched to the breaking point. It was still dependent on supplies landed in the original bridgehead in Normandy, and the long haul from the beaches there almost to the German frontier placed such a strain on transport resources that not enough fuel was reaching the front to keep all the Allied armies moving.

The problem could only be solved by acquir­ing large port facilities closer to the front. Antwerp, the greatest port in northwest Europe, capable of bringing in 30,000 tons a day, was captured undamaged by the British 11th Armored Division on 4 September; but the Germans still held both banks of the River Scheldt between Antwerp and the sea, and the port could not be used until they were dislodged. They fully realized how important their positions were to the security of the Fatherland, and the First Canadian Army’s task in evicting them turned out to be very hard.

The clearing of the Estuary was carried out by the 2nd Canadian Corps, employing four divisions (one of which was armored) and a commando brigade. The Royal Navy and Royal Air Force both played vital parts. Five water-borne assault landings were made. For the first time in history large-scale inunda­tions produced by aerial bombing were used to harass an enemy’s troops in battle.

Background of the Battle

Although the administrative significance of Antwerp was fully recognized, operations to open the port were postponed while Field Marshal Montgomery’s 21st Army Group made a bold attempt to thrust across the lower Rhine before the Germans could recover themselves after the Normandy defeat (unfor­tunately, the Germans were becoming quite well recovered from this defeat and sketchy spy and partisan reports stated this, but Allied intelligence did not believe it). But the great combined airborne-ground operation called Market-Garden failed of its main objective, and on the night of 25-26 September, the remnants of the British 1st Airborne Division were withdrawn across the Neder River from their precarious foothold near Arnhem. There­after the opening of Antwerp was given first priority. While Arnhem fighting was in pro­gress, General Eisenhower and Field Marshal Montgomery had been arguing over strategy, the latter emphasizing strongly what he con­sidered the importance of concentrating the available administrative resources on his own front in the north for a blow at the great Ruhr industrial area. Montgomery be­lieved seriously that he could end the war before the end of 1944, but without the port of Antwerp this was an impossibility. To use Antwerp, the Scheldt had to be cleared and Montgomery wasted precious time arguing with Eisenhower. On 22 September Eisenhower sent Montgomery a letter which concluded:

No one is more anxious than I to get to the Ruhr quickly. It is for the cam­paign from there onward deep into the heart of Germany for which I insist all other troops must be in position to support the main drive. The main drive most logically go by the North. It is because I am anxious to organize that final drive quickly upon the capture of the Ruhr that I insist upon the im­portance of Antwerp. As I have told you I am prepared to give you everything for the capture of the approaches to Antwerp, including all the air forces and anything else you can support.

During September, Lieutenant-General Henry D. G. Crerar’s First Canadian Army was occupied with clearing the Channel ports. By 1 October it had captured Le Harve, Dieppe, Boulogne, Calais and Ostend. All these ports were so badly damaged that it took weeks to get them to work, and then their capacity was limited. The importance of Antwerp was more and more evident.

The task of opening the Scheldt was for­mally assigned to the First Canadian Army on 14 September. On the 15th, General Crerar allotted the operation to the 2nd Canadian Corps, commanded by Lieutenant-General G. G. Simonds. The task before the Corps commander was formidable. The West Scheldt, a winding channel, extends some 50 miles from Antwerp to the sea. It was heavily mined throughout its length. Along the south side the enemy still held a large bridgehead, pro­tected on the most of its land front by the Leopold Canal. On the north stood the fortified island of Walcheren, joined by a causeway to the long peninsula of South Beveland, above which the right bank of the Scheldt was also in enemy hands almost to Antwerp. Most of the land about the estuary was reclaimed ground, low-lying tilled fields, cut by ditches and dikes and easily flooded. Nearly all of Walcheren and much of South Beveland lay so low that, if the seaward dikes were broken, inundation would result.

General Simonds’ appreciation of 21 Sep­tember envisaged airborne and waterborne attacks upon Walcheren following heavy air bombardment. He recommended that Wal­cheren be flooded by bomber attacks upon the sea dikes. He proposed that the 2nd Cana­dian Infantry Division should push northward from Antwerp to cut off South Beveland and exploit the land approach to Walcheren via South Beveland as far as possible. The clearing of the bridgehead south of the Scheldt he assigned to the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division.

The Army commander agreed that the Walcheren dikes should be breached, provided that this was technically feasible and the higher authorities concurred. Army engineers expressed the view that breaching the dikes was impracticable, and an officer from the RAF Bomber Command who attended a con­ference at Army Headquarters on 23 September was not prepared to commit himself on the question. General Simonds, after considering the matter again, was still of the opinion that the attempt should be made; and Army Headquarters recommended the plan to the 21st Army Group, which supported it. The RAF, while not guaranteeing success, was willing to try. At this point illness forced General Crerar to hand over the Army tempo­rarily to General Simonds. Major-General Charles Foulkes took over the 2nd Canadian Corps.

Supreme Headquarters had refused an airborne operation against Walcheren, the terrain being considered unsuitable. But the Supreme Commander now authorized the flooding operation. On 3 October Bomber Command made the experiment at Westkapelle, and the dike was successfully breached. The previous day General Simonds had issued his directive. It required the 1st British Corps (now in the Antwerp area and attached to the First Canadian Army) to use the 2nd Canadian Division to close the eastern end of the South Beveland isthmus. The 2nd Cana­dian Corps would clear the area south of the Scheldt and subsequently capture South Beveland and Walcheren.

The 2nd Division Pushes North

The 2nd Canadian Infantry Division moved northward from the Antwerp area on 2 October, crossing the Dutch border on the 5th. On the 7th the division reverted to the control of the 2nd Canadian Corps. As the 1st British Corps had directed its main thrust north­eastward from Antwerp, the division’s right flank was exposed. It now encountered fierce enemy opposition in the area of Woensdrecht, a village blocking the entrance to the isthmus of South Beveland, and the advance was checked. Very bitter fighting followed. On the 10th the 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade temporarily cut one isthmus; on the 16th an attack by the same brigade secured a tenuous hold on Woensdrecht; but the situation was still very insecure. The Germans had committed here on 12 October one of their “fire brigades,” “Battle Group Chill” (also known as the 85th Infantry Division), whose backbone was a regiment of hard-fighting paratroopers.

At the same time, the operation against the bridgehead south of the Scheldt was also meeting heavy opposition and moving slowly. There was now a change of policy on the part of the high command. So far, it would seem, both Eisenhower and Montgomery had hoped that the 21st Army Group could open the Scheldt without abandoning operations which the Second British Army was conducting against the enemy bridgehead remaining west of the Maas—i.e., east of the salient created by Market-Garden. It was now evident that this could not be done. On 13 October, Eisenhower sent a strong directive to Mont­gomery emphasizing the extreme importance of being able to use Antwerp soon, and offering assistance in troops and supplies for the pur­pose. Eisenhower wrote that if after receiving his views, Montgomery still regarded them as unsatisfactory, then an issue would exist that would have to be settled by higher autho­rity. Only then, on 16 October, did Montgomery, reluctant still, force his attention away from the Ruhr and issue a new directive to his Army commanders, closing down all operations except those directed towards the Scheldt to provide a logistical base for operations to come. The Second Army was to take over the right portion of the Canadian Army’s line and push westward; the Canadian Army, with more troops available, was to clear the country north of the South Beveland isthmus.

These new orders soon transformed the situation. The 1st British Corps was now given the whole of the 4th Canadian Armored Division (of which some elements had already been operating on the right of the 2nd Division) and also the 104th U.S. Infantry Division; and it proceeded to push northward. On the 22nd the armored division captured Esschen and attacked toward Bergen-op-Zoom, which fell on the 27th. With the capture of Esschen, the right flank was secure. On the 23rd, the 2nd Division attacked north of Woensdrecht, making only limited advances, but next day operations went better; the vigorous action of the 4th Armored Division to the east had caused the enemy to retire. The way into South Beveland was open.

On 20 October, Montgomery sent a personal note to Simonds acknowledging a copy of his latest directive. He wrote:

I think everything you are doing is excellent. And your troops are doing wonders under the most appalling conditions of ground and weather. I doubt if any other troops would do it so well, and I am very glad the Cana­dians are on the business. Please tell all your chaps how pleased I am with their good work.

Operation Switchback: The Breskens Pocket

On 6 October the 3rd Canadian Division com­menced Operation Switchback, attacking the German pocket south of the West Scheldt at the point where the Leopold Canal diverges from the Canal de Derivation de la Lys. The Leopold Canal was a formidable obstacle, about 60 feet wide and with steep banks. Inundations to the north of the canal left only a narrow strip of land where we could develop our bridgehead. The 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade made a sudden assault sup­ported by Wasps—flame-throwing carriers. The attack was made through the 4th Canadian Armoured Division, which put in two diver­sionary attacks, one on either side of the bridgehead. After acquiring a shallow foothold the attack bogged down in the face of strong opposition. General von Zangen, commanding the German Fifteenth Army in the Netherlands, had allotted an efficient formation, the 64th Infantry Division, to the defense of what the Germans called “Scheldt Fortress South.” This formation now held the 7th Brigade’s bridgehead to narrow limits.

An amphibious assault was now made against the rear of the pocket. The 9th Bri­gade’s assault force embarked at Ghent in Buffalos (Landing Vehicles, Tracked) and sailed down the canal leading to Terneuzen. At 2:00 a.m. on 9 October they set off across the Braakman inlet,[1] supported by fire from artillery of the 4th Canadian Armoured Divi­sion. Both attacking battalions got ashore near Biervliet quickly and reorganized against slight opposition. By 9:00 a.m. a bridgehead 1,500 yards deep had been established and soon the reserve battalion was landed, advanc­ing to Hoofdplaat.

The attack over the Braakman had met with so much success that it was now decided to reinforce there instead of on the Leopold Canal as previously planned. The 3rd Division’s reconnaissance regiment was sent over on the 11th, followed by the 8th Brigade. The enemy had now moved up forces to face this threat at his left rear; the going became tougher. On the 14th troops of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division succeeded in crossing the Leopold near Watervliet and near the head of the Braakman, making it possible to send supplies and artillery by road into Scheldt Fortress South. The 8th and 9th Bri­gades advanced slowly westward against opposition.

On the 16th resistance before the 7th Brigade suddenly slackened. At last light on the 18th the brigade was relieved by the 157th Brigade of the 52nd (Lowland) Division. The 157th pushed forward and on the 19th made contact with the force that had crossed the Braakman.

The 3rd Division now moved to cut the German forces off from the Scheldt. The 9th Brigade captured Breskens on the 22nd in the face of heavy enemy artillery fire, particularly from Flushing. The Germans’ communications with Walcheren were virtually severed. Next day the 9th Brigade swung southwestward and captured Schoondijke. After taking Fort Frederik Hendrik this forma­tion was withdrawn into reserve and the 7th Brigade struck out westward, capturing Cad­zand on the 29th. The 8th Brigade meanwhile had shifted southward, relieving the 157th. Sluis fell on 1 November. On the same day the German divisional commander was captured near Knocke-sur-Mer. The 8th Brigade cleared westward along the Leopold Canal and on 3 November opposition was at an end in Scheldt Fortress South. Operation Switchback was over.

Operation Vitality: South Beveland

Meanwhile, on 24 October the 4th Brigade had led the advance west down the isthmus of South Beveland, thus beginning Operation Vitality. The entire German force west of the isthmus consisted of the weak 70th Infantry Division,[2] less one grenadier regiment with some other troops and naval coast artillery units. To dislodge enemy rearguards from the line of the Beveland Canal, Simonds mounted another amphibious operation. Carried in some 120 tracked landing craft, the 156th Infantry Brigade of the 52nd Division crossed from Terneuzen on the night of 25-26 October, landing in South Beveland. A good bridgehead was immediately established. On the 26th the 6th Brigade attacked towards the Beveland Canal. One battalion reached the canal late on the 27th after wading waist-deep water, and seized a bridgehead on the far side. Another gained a crossing in the middle of the isthmus. By the 29th the 2nd Division had two brigades over the canal. The 157th Brigade, which had landed in the 156th Brigade’s bridgehead on the West Scheldt, moved on the southern flank. Goes fell on the 29th, and by the 30th the 5th Brigade had a battalion within two miles of the causeway leading to Walcheren.

The 4th Brigade now put in a night attack, clearing the eastern end of the causeway.

The Lowland Division came up on the left and by morning of 31 October the German hold on South Beveland was ended. The cause­way, however, was strongly defended. On the afternoon of the 31st the 5th Brigade took over from the 4th and attempted to cross the 1,100 yard cratered, fire-swept roadway to Walcheren. The leading troops finally forced their way across and gained a precarious foothold, which was lost and then restored. The decision was now made to relieve the brigade with the 157th Brigade, and the 2nd Canadian Division was withdrawn for rest. Meanwhile, troops of the 2nd Division’s reconnaissance regiment captured the island of North Beveland on 2 November. The attack on Walcheren had already begun.

Operation Infatuate: Walcheren

Like a half-drawn cork in the very mouth of the Scheldt River, the island of Walcheren is roughly rectangular in shape, about ten miles long by eight miles broad. The village of Westkapelle lies at the westerly corner, the port of Flushing at the southerly one. The island is low-lying, most of it below mean sea level. Only the coastal strip of dunes on the northwest and southwest sides, and the eastern-most section of the island, are higher than the sea.

The island was heavily fortified. There were coast-defense guns up to 8.7-inch including a dozen 5.9-inch. The island was garrisoned by remnants of a German division and other elements of the German Fifteenth Army, the total being estimated at between 6,000 and 7,000 (to the surprise of the Allies, the number of prisoners taken exceeded the number of German troops estimated to be on Wal­cheren). In the period 3-17 October the heavy bombers of the RAF made four heavy attacks on the sea dikes of Walcheren, breaching them in four places and allowing the sea to pour in. These bombers did not wipe out the defensive positions but put most of the island waist-deep in water, making operations all the more difficult. The island was now like an immersed saucer with only the rim showing.

The first waterborne attack in Operation Infatuate, the assault on Walcheren, went in against Flushing before daylight on 1 Novem­ber, when the 4th Commandos crossed the West Scheldt from Breskens following a bomb­ing attack by the RAF. German gunfire de­stroyed nineteen out of twenty-five landing craft, killing and wounding 382 men. Three hundred guns, including those of two Canadian Army Groups Royal Artillery, hammered German defenses in the town from across the West Scheldt. The commandos were soon ashore and in possession of a bridgehead. The 155th Infantry Brigade now sent a battalion across to assist in clearing Flushing. Next morning the rest of the brigade crossed over and one battalion advanced toward Middelburg. On the 3rd the headquarters of the Flushing garrison was captured, after an advance through deep flood waters; and by nightfall the city was clear.

The climax of the Walcheren operation came at Westkapelle. Soon after first light on 1 November a seaborne attack was delivered at that point. The assault force, consisting of units of the 4th Commandos under command of the 2nd Canadian Corps, a naval bombarding force and a support squadron, approached the island from the west. When the support squadron, made up of twenty-seven landing craft armed with guns, rockets and smoke projectors, deployed five miles from shore it was im­mediately engaged by every German battery within range and began to suffer heavy losses. Four hours later nine craft had been lost and eleven were more or less badly damaged by gunfire. There were 372 casualties among the crews. Their gallantry and their sacrifices had purchased victory. British tactical investi­gators later came to the conclusion that the landing would have failed but for two facts: the German batteries fired at the craft that were firing at them, not at the personnel carriers; and one of the 5.9-inch batteries ran out of ammunition at a critical moment.

It had been planned that close air support would be given by fighter-bombers and rocket-firing Typhoons immediately before and after H-hour. Bad flying weather, however, prevented the fighter-bombers from taking off. It also interfered with air spotting for the naval bombardment ships, the aircraft being fog-bound in England. Fortunately, the Typhoons were able to come into action against the German defenses just as the first assault landing craft touched down on each side of the gap in the dike. One Commando landed, seized the town and nearby battery and advanced northeast­wards. Another Commando, landing south of the gap, went on to the southeast along the dunes. During the next two days good progress was made in both directions.

The last landing on Walcheren was made on the eastern side south of the causeway, where the 156th Brigade sent a battalion across on the night of 2-3 November. Using assault boats and wading in the salt marshes, this unit established a secure bridgehead by nightfall. Next day another battalion fol­lowed and the troops at the west end of the causeway began to advance. On 6 November Middelburg fell to troops advancing from Flushing and the German general surrendered. By the 7th only the northern coast remained to be cleared. On the morning of the 8th German resistance on Walcheren came to an end. The fighting on Walcheren was done by British units, but medical service was provided by a unit of the Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps.

Both Naval and Army authorities blamed the heavy losses in the Westkapelle assault on the limited scale of bomber effort employed against the German batteries. It is true that many Allied air officers were reluctant to divert forces to these targets from the offen­sive against the German industrial complex; but a considerable number of attacks were actually made on Walcheren. It was particularly unfortunate that bad weather compelled the air force to cancel the attacks which had been planned for 31 October (D minus one).

The effect of the flooding—which, of course, meant much misery for the population of Walcheren—merits a word. While the Ger­man coastal batteries were on high ground and were not directly affected (though many of the anti-aircraft positions were put out of action), they were isolated by the waters, their communications were seriously interfered with and the German defense generally was greatly harassed. The attackers on the other hand were offered the advantage of being able to use amphibious vehicles throughout (not having to transport land vehicles for use on Walcheren) and thanks in part to these the operations went faster than those south of the Scheldt.

During the operations of the First Canadian Army from 1 October to 8 November, 41,043 German prisoners were taken, and the enemy suffered correspondingly heavy losses in killed and wounded. Commonwealth casualties ex­ceeded 27,000 men (more than the total number of Allied casualties sustained in the invasion of Sicily in 1943).

With the clearing of Walcheren the Germans no longer commanded the sea approach to Antwerp. However, the West Scheldt was thickly sown with mines which the Navy had to clear (sixteen sweepings were required before the channel was finally usable). Not until 28 November did the first Allied convoy arrive in the port. But with cargo ships unload­ing at Antwerp a firm logistical foundation at last existed for the final drive into Germany.