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| Making
it tough for U-boats. Two days after the Neutrality Law was amended in
November 1941 the Navy was ready to place trained gun crews aboard
merchant ships. This prompt action was the result of a foresighted
training program initiated by the Navy eight months previously. Gun
crews consisted of from ten to twenty men, and they manned 3-inch to
5-inch guns, as well as heavy caliber machine guns. These Navy gun crews
effectively transformed merchantmen from sitting duck targets into
disagreeable wasps that could sting back. In order to train the men who
manned the guns of over 1300 merchant ships, Armed Guard schools were
established by the Navy. Basic courses were taught in regular,
anti-aircraft, and rapid fire guns. Operating pools for the personnel
were established in Brooklyn and San Francisco, where crews were
quartered and equipped between their long periods aboard ships away from
any central Navy facility. Here an Armed Guard crew mans and loads a
3-inch gun on a rain-swept deck in preparation for any U-boat ahead. |
U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command
World War II, like every other war which has ever been
fought, was in large part a battle of the logisticians. Other factors being
equal, the side usually wins which is able to get there first with the most men
and material. When the United States became involved in the titanic world
struggle, the odds were heavily stacked against her from the standpoint of
logistics. Not only did Germany have control of the resources and
communications of western Europe, her armies were also advancing deeply into
Russia and were threatening to spread through large parts of Africa. There was,
in fact, a grave danger that a union between Japanese and German forces might
take place somewhere in Asia and that Europe, Asia, and Africa might pass under
the effective control of the Axis before the resources of the Americas and of
the British Empire could be thrown against the victorious invaders. Never has
the United States faced such a threat to her national existence. Never had this
country faced so many well-nigh insuperable problems at one time.
Given such a crucial situation, the problem of moving vast
numbers of men and vast supplies of material across submarine infested waters
and against land based aircraft became as difficult as the problem of training
men and producing the weapons of war. Upon the success or failure of our
efforts to move men and goods across the oceans hinged the destiny of the
nation. The Chairman of the Maritime Commission has said that the merchant
marine did not win the war, but that without merchant shipping the Allies would
have lost. If the war gave merchant ships their greatest role in history, it
also gave the men who defended these ships against submarines and planes a
mission of supreme importance. This study describes the defense of merchant
ships by the Armed Guard of the United States Navy. It is as thrilling a story
of triumph over difficulties, of heroism, devotion to duty, sacrifice, and
courage as exists in the annals of the nation. This story, which for reasons of
military security was veiled in secrecy during the war, deserves to be told.
In this chapter, attention will be given to the men of the
Armed Guard, their training, and to the guns which were placed aboard merchant
ships. We shall see how the Navy which went to sea on merchant ships was
administered and learn something of the problems involved in training in four
brief years more men than were in the entire United States Navy in 1937. Later
chapters will describe the most important and spectacular clashes with the
enemy in the battle of the supply lines. We shall see men who had never been
near the ocean in mortal combat with the enemy after only a few brief months of
training. We shall follow them as they go down with their ships, their guns
still blazing, as they die in the sea or endure the tortures of hell for days
on life rafts. We shall see them as they defy all the laws of nature and remain
at general quarters beside their guns for unbelievable periods of time. We
shall see them as they return haggard and worn to the United States to take
other ships to the battle zones. We shall see them as happier days come and
better guns are placed on their ships. We shall see them as they convert Armed
Guard duty from the most hazardous duty afloat to the best duty in the Navy. We
shall see them as they finally reach a stage where submarines dare not surface
near merchant ships and where enemy pilots are courting almost certain death to
come within range of their anti-aircraft guns. This is a story of American
triumph over difficulties. It may not be true that the United States will ever
become a great seafaring nation, but it is certain that her citizens can and do
take to the sea when the defense of the country demands it.
When the United States was suddenly called upon to arm vast
numbers of ships and to place men aboard to man these guns there were few
precedents of any value which could be called up for guidance. It is true that
in World War I some 384 merchantmen carried Navy personnel and guns, but this
program was so small as compared with arming 6,236 ships in World War II that
it offered little practical help. Besides, the records of World War I were not
readily available to those who were charged with arming merchant ships. It
might appear that the British program would serve as a useful patter in view of
the fact that the British had been arming merchant ships for a long time. But
the British Defensively Equipped Merchant Ship program (D.E.M.S.) was so
radically different from the program which the United States had to follow that
it could not be copied. British Navy personnel formed only a small portion of
the gunners and officers were assigned only to the larger transports. The
British depended largely on merchant seamen to man the guns on merchantmen, in
view of their comparatively large crews, whereas the United States supplied Navy
personnel to man all key positions, with assistance from the merchant crew in
passing ammunition, loading, and manning other less important stations. The
difference arose in part from the diverse nature of the maritime service in the
two countries. In Britain, all merchant sailors were registered under the
Universal Conscription Act of August, 1940, placed in seaman pools, and paid
both afloat and ashore. They were completely under the control of the Ministry
of Shipping and could be required to take gunnery training while in the pool
awaiting further assignment. When assigned a gunnery station, British seamen
received a shilling a day extra. The Master was in charge of the defense of the
ship. But on United States ships the defense of the ship was a responsibility
of the Armed Guard officer and his Navy gunners. The Armed Guard officer had
the status of a commanding officer in the United States Navy. The United States
was unable to assign prime responsibility for manning guns to merchant seamen,
for there was no control over them from the time they completed a voyage until
the agreed to sign on for another voyage, and, therefore, no means of forcing
them to take the required gunnery training. Every facility was offered the
merchant seaman while ashore to become proficient in gunnery, but the only
training of any importance took place under the direction of the Armed Guard
officers while at sea. There was a definite tendency on the part of merchant
seamen to stay away from Armed Guard Gunnery Schools in the United States.
The United States Navy was somewhat handicapped in preparing
to arm merchant ships by the Neutrality Act of 1936. Given such an act was the
law of the land it was not surprising that there was little far-sighted
planning and no realization of the magnitude which the problem would ultimately
assume. A few people were trained in gunnery beginning in the spring of 1941,
but the training program, even after the repeal on November 17, 1941 of Section
6 of the Neutrality Act, which prevented arming merchant ships, was wholly
inadequate in numbers of men trained. Little progress was made in developing
the vast administrative machinery necessary to handle the Armed Guard Service
until practically all authority was centered in the Arming Merchant Ship Section
in the Fleet Maintenance Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations on January 31, 1942. When CominCh assigned primary interest in
training to this same section on September 11, 1942 the Arming Merchant Ship
Section finally had almost absolute authority over every phase of the Armed
Guard Service. It, of course, delegated authority to make decisions on many
matters to other Bureaus and agencies in the Naval Establishment. For example,
questions concerning communications on merchant ships never came under the
cognizance of Op-23L, as the section came to be known in the Navy Department.
Op-23L gave general direction to the program. It formulated
doctrine and issued directives. It kept elaborate files and records. It worked
to improve training and to standardize all procedures in the Armed Guard
Service. It worked to overcome the shortage of guns and trained personnel. It
studies a multitude of devices and items of equipment and approved the good
while rejecting the bad. It was ever on the alert to catch matters which were
going wrong and to detect new trends in warfare. It was largely through it
efforts that the new Armed Guard Service became dynamic and was always
improving, even to the end of the war with Japan. Working closely with the Arming
Merchant Section was the Coordinator of Defense Installations on Merchant Ships
in the Maritime Commission. A vast number of agencies were involved in the
large and expensive program to arm and defend merchant ships. The Bureau of
Naval Personnel handled the assignment of personnel to Armed Guard duties and
had responsibilities with regard to preparing curricula for training, subject
to directives from the Chief of Naval Operations (Op-23L). The Bureau of Ships
and the Bureau of Ordnance supplied the guns and equipment for defense of
merchant ships, subject to directives from the Chief of Naval Operations. Much
of this material was to be returned to the Navy at the end of hostilities. The
Maritime Commission War Shipping Administration, under the direction of the
Coordinator of Defense Installations on Merchant Ships, had the responsibility
for the installation of defense items in collaboration with local naval
agencies at the yards. The Port Directors were entrusted with the execution of
directives from the Chief of Naval Operations (Op-23L) and played a large part
in the administration of the entire program. Theirs was the day-by-day
responsibility to see that each ship which left port was properly armed,
equipped, and manned with Armed Guards. They also arranged for necessary
repairs and for replenishment of material when ships returned from voyages.
Under the Port Directors, an efficient Armed Guard Inspection Service was
developed.
A vast network of training activities prepared Armed Guards
for their duties. There were three basic Armed Guard Schools for most of the
war. They were located at Little Creek (later moved to Shelton) Virginia; San
Diego, California; and Gulfport, Mississippi. Prior to the establishment of the
last mentioned school in the fall of 1942, training had been given at an Armed
Guard School at Chicago, Illinois. This school was closed because winter
conditions on the Great Lakes were not suited to training. Near each Armed
Guard School was an anti-aircraft firing range where Armed Guards were given
actual firing experience. These ranges were located at Dam Neck, Virginia;
Shell Beach, Louisiana; and Pacific Beach, California. Firing ships were also
employed to give practical training to Armed Guards. Schools to give refresher
training, especially in anti-aircraft gunnery, were established at New York,
New Orleans, San Francisco (Treasure Island), and Seattle. Armed Guards at
these schools for a day or so of refresher training were given firing practice
at anti-aircraft ranges at Lido Beach, New York; Shell Beach, Louisiana; Point
Montara, California; and Pacific Beach, Washington.
What type of men were brought into the Armed Guard Service?
The men of the Armed Guard came from all walks of life. Their most common
characteristic, perhaps, was that few of them had ever been on the ocean. Since
there was an urgent need for large numbers of men to man the guns on merchant
ships, the Navy took all officers and enlisted men who could be spared from
combatant ships and other activities and made them into Armed Guards. It was a
terrific gamble on the ability of the Navy to develop a training program which
could turn men out for combat duty at a fast pace and on the ability of these
men, many of whom had never seen the ocean, to take to the sea under the most
trying conditions. Men who had been living quiet and normal lives as farmers,
bankers, merchants, writers, lawyers, school teachers and factory workers found
themselves in mortal combat with the enemy after only a few months in the Navy.
Men who had never done more serious shooting than at ducks and quail soon found
themselves bringing down German planes and firing heavy guns at submarines.
One requisite of Armed Guards was that they be in good
physical condition. They must have good eyes, ears and teeth. They must be able
to swim. But above all they must be people who had their hearts in their work,
who loved their country and were willing to sacrifice even their lives for it
if necessary. The Armed Guards was no place for the ne'r-do-well, the malcontent,
or the loafer. For months Armed Guards lived aboard ship with highly paid merchant
seamen. They must be able to get along with men whose highest form of
discipline probably came from the regulations of their labor unions. Officers
who served as commanding officers in charge of Armed Guard crews were expected
to have the usual traits of leadership expected of all naval officers who wear
the uniform of the United States Navy. But experience soon indicated that a
certain ability to get along with Masters of ships was an important
characteristic. Emphasis soon shifted away from the procurement of the very
young officer and especially of the person who knew or thought he knew too much
about running merchant ships. The ideal Armed Guard officer was a tactful
person who could look after the interests of his men and at the same time keep
relations smooth between the between the Navy complement and the Master,
officers and crew of the merchant ship. He was a man who could get along with
people who were under great mental strain and who could win their confidence.
His relations with his gunners was close. He was a kind of doctor, chaplain and
commanding officer at the same time. The highly nervous individual did not last
in the Armed Guard. Neither did the troublemaker nor the officer who had too
exalted an idea of the scope of his duties and the privileges which the uniform
of the United States Navy conferred upon him. The calm, but not necessarily
brilliant, individual often made a much better officer than the erratic and
highly intelligent man who cracked in a crisis.
When officers and enlisted men completed their basic
training they were assigned to one of three Armed Guard Centers. These were
located at Brooklyn (Atlantic), New Orleans (Gulf), and Treasure Island
(Pacific). From the Centers the men were assigned to ships. The final
complement for a ship armed with a 5"/38 dual purpose stern gun, a
3"/50 AA gun, and eight 20mm machine guns was set at one officer and 24
gunners, plus normally about three communications men for a total of 28 Armed
Guards. This armament was accepted as standard for ships which were going to
combat zones in World War II. It goes without saying that many ships went out
in the early days with less than the armament desired and with smaller Armed
Guard crews. Shortages in officers and men were met by rapid increases in the
training program and at times by sending petty officers out in charge of the
smaller gun crews on ships operating in the less dangerous areas. Not until
early 1945 was the shortage in guns entirely overcome. But the Navy made every
effort to give every ship the best possible protection.
The Centers were the wartime duty stations of Armed Guard
when they were not at sea. They handled the records, mail, and pay accounts of
Armed Guards. They administered discipline, furnished recreation and additional
training, and attended to the health and legal problems of Armed Guards.
Special attention was given to the matter of furnishing proper foul and cold
weather clothing and recreational equipment for use of Armed Guards.
In the standardization of procedures and training the Arming
Merchant Ships Section received special help from the Armed Guard Gunnery
School at New York and the Armed Guard School at Shelton. The Bureau of
Aeronautics gave valuable aid in the development of many synthetic training
devices. Before the war was over a man could walk into a gunnery school and
experience all realities of battle without actually meeting the enemy. Of great
help in the development of the Armed Guard Service and in the long and
complicated quest for standardization were the visits of personnel from various
Armed Guard activities to Washington and other Armed Guard establishments.
Outstanding Armed Guard officers who had been in especially heavy engagements
with the enemy were brought to Washington to give information on the latest
enemy tactics. Such men were also made instructors in the schools. In no branch
of the Naval Service was combat experience for instructors emphasized more than
in the Armed Guard.
Armed Guards studied many subjects. But the primary emphasis
was on shooting planes and submarines. They also learned something of
seamanship and many officers studied simple navigation. Part of the Armed
Guards on each ship eventually had training in firefighting. Armed Guards, in
fact, established a fine record in fighting fires on ships, although this was
not a prime responsibility. Recognition of aircraft was naturally stressed and
the fire control record of Armed Guards was on the whole a very fine one.
Many defense installations were tried during the war. Among
the most successful were degaussing ships against magnetic mines and smoke
floats for hiding ships from view of attacking aircraft. Barrage balloons and
kites were also used with some success in the European and Mediterranean
theaters as protection against low-flying aircraft. Crew quarters for Armed
Guards, magazines for stowing ammunition, lifesaving equipment, special gun foundations
and armor protection for guns were other important defense items. Facilities
were provided for blacking out every ray of light on merchant ships. Special
provisions were made for tankers to fuel escorts at sea and to supply them with
depth charges. This meant that escorts had unlimited cruising range and
unlimited supplies of depth charges to drop on lurking submarines. Special
protection for sea valves on merchant ships, closure of tonnage openings and
extension of watertight bulkheads were also very important installations which
saved many ships to fight again. There were a number of other special
installations, but those enumerated above were the most important.
Figures compiled by the Maritime Commission and by the
Arming Merchant Ship Section in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
give a comprehensive picture of the importance of the Armed Guard in World War
II. When the war began the United States had only about 1,340 cargo ships and
tankers. When the war ended the fleet of merchant ships controlled by the War
Shipping Administration numbered 4,221 with a deadweight tonnage of 44,940,000
tons. Up to VJ day 733 merchant ships of over 1000 gross tons were lost,
according to figures of the Maritime Commission. The Navy armed 6,236 to the
end of World War II. Of this number 4,870 were United States flag ships; 244
were United States owned but under foreign flag; the rest were foreign owned
and foreign flag ships. Armed Guards were placed aboard nearly all of the 5,114
United States owned and United States flag ships. They were placed aboard a few
allied ships which were foreign flag and foreign owned but only in exceptional
circumstances. Of the United States flag or United States owned ships which
were armed (and most of which were supplied with an Armed Guard crew) 569 were
lost. The total losses of all merchant ships armed with Navy guns ran to 710.
These figures are substantially complete as of August 12, 1946. It will be seen
that of the ships which were supplied with Armed Guards a little better than
ten percent were lost from all causes.
This vast fleet of merchant ships carried the materials
needed for victory to all parts of the world. Between December 7, 1941 and the
surrender of Japan 268,252,000 long tons of cargo left United States ports.
About three fourths of this cargo was carried in ships controlled by the War
Shipping Administration. Imports during the war ran to 70,652,000 tons of dry
cargo and 35,118,000 tons brought back in tankers. A large part of this cargo
was brought in on ships defended by Armed Guards.
From the outbreak of war to November 30, 1945 over seven
million Army personnel and more than one hundred and forty-one thousand
civilians were transported overseas. Many were carried in Army and Navy
transports. Many were carried in merchant ships. The Armed Guard defended the
merchant ships and the Army transports. During the same period almost four and
a quarter million personnel were returned to the United States.
The Armed Guards played an important part in defending ships
which cost $22,500,000,000 to build and operate. The value of the cargo which
they defended cannot be estimated in dollars. Upon the safe arrival of this
cargo depended the future of every American and of the world. Total costs of
the Armed Guard program have not been figured, but it seems fairly certain that
it ran to more than two billion dollars. Training and maintaining a group of
men larger than the entire United States Navy in 1937 and supplying more than
53,000 guns and many other defense items naturally costs much money. But the
Armed Guard Service paid such high dividends in ships and cargo saved that its
cost may be termed nominal.
Armed Guards won glory for themselves on every ocean. Up to
the time this was written (August, 1946) 8,033 had received decorations or
commendations. This figure includes 5 Navy Crosses, 2 Legions of Merit, 75
Silver Stars, 24 Navy and Marine Corps Medals, 54 Bronze Stars, 563
commendations by the Secretary of the Navy, 2,778 commendations by the Bureau
of Naval Personnel, and 4,533 entries in service records. About 36,240
operation and engagement stars have been authorized for Armed Guards to date
and this figure may run even higher eventually. In addition, 9,882 men have
been authorized to wear the Philippine Liberation Ribbon and 4,031 have been
authorized to wear stars on this ribbon. Five destroyer escorts, one destroyer
and a transport have been named for Armed Guard officers who were heroes in
combat. These ships are the USS Borum [DE-790], named for LT (jg) John R. Borum
who served on the SS Brilliant; the USS Brennan [DE-13], named for ENS John J.
Brennan who served on the SS Otho; the USS Herzog [[DE-178], named for LT (jg)
William R. Herzog who served on the SS Pan New York; the USS Hunter Marshall
[APD-112], named for ENS Hunter Marshall who served on the SS Merrimack; the
USS Kenneth M. Willett [DE-354], named for ENS Kenneth M. Willett who served on
the SS Stephen Hopkins; the USS Vesole [DD-878], named for ENS Kay K. Vesole
who served on the SS John Bascom; and the USS Walsh [APD-111], named for LT
(jg) Patrick J. Walsh who served on the SS Patrick J. Hurley.
The war took a terrible toll of merchant seamen and Armed
Guards. But the situation was never as bad as the "Sighted Sub, Glub,
Glub" slogan would indicate. The Maritime Commission indicates that 5,638
merchant seamen and officers are dead and missing from World War II and that
581 were made prisoners. Armed Guard dead and missing out of 144,970 in the
service numbered 1,810, of which 1,683 were definitely killed and 127 were
missing. Prisoners of war numbered 27, of which 14 were recovered.
In the files of the Arming Merchant Ship are reports of some
1,966 air attacks and 1,024 submarine attacks. Some of these reports cover more
than one contact with the enemy. It is obvious that several Armed Guards often
reported the same attack. Figures for planes destroyed can never be exact, but
467 ships participated in destroying planes and these ships were credited with
477 destroyed, 66 probably destroyed, and 315 assists in destroying planes.
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| Naval Armed Guard. Merchant ship crew and Naval Armed Guard practice operating a 20-millimeter gun aboard ship. White canvas bag beneath magazine is to catch the empty shells. U.S. Navy photograph, now in the collections of the National Archives 80-G-7696. |
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| Naval Armed Guard. Crew man anti-aircraft guns as convoy reach dangerous waters. Note the ships of the convoy dotting the horizon, December 1941. . Official U.S. Navy Photograph, now in the collections of the National Archives 80-G-405293. |
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| Naval Armed Guard. Naval Armed Guard crew on a United Nations merchant ship having winter gun practice, 1942-43. This shows the trainer sighting the target. Official U.S. Navy Photograph, now in the collections of the National Archives 80-G-40573. |
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| S.S. JOHN MASON Naval Armed Guard Unit. Photographed during the period 15 March 1944--17 January 1045, while commanded by Lieutenant Junior Grade F. B. Hyatt, USNR. US Naval History and Heritage Command NH 95923. |
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| The crew members of the SS Joel R. Poinsett (USN Armed Guard Unit – Atlantic) dated April 10, 1944 after she split in two during a storm on March 4, 1944. She broke in two during a storm 400 miles off the coasts of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland. All of the crew managed to escape with no deaths or injuries. A telegram dated February 17, 1944 sent from Stephens reads: “All well and safe. Please don’t worry. All my love.” US Naval History & Heritage Command 2016.48. |
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| A 5”/38cal Gun that was installed on Liberty ships for the Armed Guard crews. |
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| Aerial view of a convoy, 3 May 1944. |
