[There are 113 photographs in the Rosie the Riveter Album in my "World War II In View" Flickr collection.]
by Eleanor F. Straub
When the classic work on the history of women comes to be written," Max Lerner mused in 1943, "the biggest force for change in their lives will turn out to have been war." With its female welders, bellhops, and taxi drivers, the American home front during World War II seemed to offer abundant proof for such a statement. The average American woman became a cultural heroine, a symbol of American determination to win a war that few understood. Sensing that the public identified with Rosie the Riveter and her sisters in the war, the information and image-making centers of the nation—Washington, Hollywood, and Madison Avenue—deluged the home front with a steady stream of material glamorizing, examining, glorifying, and exhorting the American woman. A whole genre of literature on women's participation was spawned, most of it echoing the theme that "housekeeping as usual ended in America on the day of Pearl Harbor." The message that women were vital to victory was drilled into the public mind by advertisers, journalists, and public officials. To describe the contribution of the nation's women, a new word, womanpower, crept into the popular vocabulary.
A loosely defined term, womanpower described efforts as diverse as halting careless talk and operating a fifteen-ton crane. At one time or another during the war, the success of virtually every home front campaign was deemed to depend on the nation's women. Keeping the home fires burning World War II style demanded far more than writing letters and knitting sweaters; it required, as one advertiser phrased it, for a woman to be "Betsy Ross, Barbara Fritchie and Molly Pitcher, reborn… A real fighting American." Nevertheless, soliciting women's aid in maintaining the nation's health through proper nutrition, in collecting tin cans, waste fats, and silk hosiery, in selling bonds, in fighting inflation, and in doing volunteer work of all sorts was in reality an expansion of war tasks that had been delegated to women in earlier conflicts.
A new element in the World War II appeal was the extent to which womanpower was described in terms of full-time paid work. Potential Rosie the Riveters were courted, cajoled, and flattered in an attempt to induce women to accept war jobs. The agency coordinating the government's publicity program, the Office of War Information, encouraged the media to create a " sense of urgency" in women in order to convince them that "women must work as men must fight."
Calls to action formed an important element in the wartime public relations program directed at women, but praise was an equally prominent feature. Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman paid tribute to the "grand job" and "untiring efforts" of American women. Manpower Commissioner Paul V. McNutt lauded women workers as the "real heroines of this war." Songwriters concurred in these sentiments and penned paeans of praise to "Rosie the Riveter," "Woman Behind the Man Behind the Gun," "The Lady at Lockheed," and "The Janes Who Make the Planes." Although a few voices suggested women had not fully entered the war effort and expressed concern over high rates of absenteeism and the increase in juvenile delinquency, for the most part the American woman's war image remained untarnished.
The home front heroines often did not articulate their feelings about the war in abstract or patriotic terms. Instead, their efforts were explained in a personal way, as a desire "to help bring Harry back" or to have a hand in hurting the Axis. The average woman held an essentially negative view of the conflict and saw it as a matter of production and military strategy rather than a contest of values and ideas. Yet, the government and the media reminded her that she had a special stake in an Allied victory for neither Germany nor Japan was noted for generosity to women.
A more positive approach was generally preferred, however, and the argument was couched in terms of what American women stood to gain as a result of their participation. A few writers explicitly linked the concepts of fighting for democracy abroad and full status for women at home, but rejections of feminism as unnecessary were equally common. Susan B. Anthony warned that "unless you accept us as equals we might as well elect to sit this war out." But former ambassador to Norway Florence Jaffray Harriman applauded the fact that unlike World War I, during which "we had to give part of our time to getting the vote, now we can give all our time to finding jobs and doing them." Most Americans simply took it for granted that the war was changing women's status in the direction of greater equality. Beneath the continual flurry of reports of women doing new jobs, the statements that women were vital to victory, and the lavish praise bestowed on their contribution lay the almost universal assumption that there must be some broader meaning to the experience. Surely such things demonstrated, as one journalist wrote, that "the theory that woman's proper place was in the home has gone long since."
The rhetoric and ballyhoo about women in the war reflected the important changes that were occurring. Rosie the Riveters had increased the female labor force from thirteen million in 1940 to over nineteen million in 1944. Of equal significance, a large part of the gain came from the ranks of middle class, middle-aged, married women, a group that overwhelmingly had been housewives. War had forced a re-orientation of attitude toward women upon the federal government. Rosie was no longer simply a housewife but a consumer and more significantly a potential member of the labor force. Greater attention was now directed to recruitment, training, labor standards, job discrimination, wages, day care, and community facilities for women. Although women workers and their problems had existed for decades, only after Pearl Harbor did the government and the public become fully aware of them.
During the war years, women, like American society as a whole, witnessed a transformation with important repercussions. Nevertheless, the period cannot be seen merely as a story of progress or liberation for women because too many issues remained unsettled. The image projected by the government and the popular media—smiling lady riveters and flattering praise from important officials—obscures the complexities that make a simple balance sheet of women's wartime gains and losses impossible to construct.
Total war created unprecedented opportunity for women, but a number of elements limited their participation in the struggle and lessened the war's impact on their status in American society. These factors are well illustrated by the problems women faced in securing a voice in government policy, particularly in the area that affected them most, the mobilization of workers for war production.
Prior to Pearl Harbor labor supply questions received scant attention from government planners. As late as December 1941 over five million Americans were unemployed, hence the feeling persisted that the nation had almost endless reserves of labor. The federal machinery created to equip the United States for defense—first the National Defense Advisory Commission (NDAC), then the Office of Production Management (OPM), and finally the War Production Board (WPB)—faced problems of materials, contract allocation, and transportation that loomed far more threatening than those of manpower. Sidney Hillman, who headed the Labor Division of each of these agencies, had led an uphill battle against official apathy. American entrance into the war ended one and a half years of defense preparations, but the government still lacked even the preliminary outlines of a manpower program.
At the beginning of the war, the upward revision of production goals awakened interest in labor supply matters. Pressure was exerted for the creation of a separate manpower agency, a drive that in April 1942 resulted in the creation of the War Manpower Commission (WMC) with Paul V. McNutt at the helm. The problems the WMC encountered in its three and a half year existence deserve mention, for they add perspective to an evaluation of the government's policy to mobilize women.
Although originally hailed as a manpower czar, McNutt lacked the authority necessary to develop a sound manpower program. No statutory basis for WMC efforts existed; few penalties were available to ensure compliance. The WMC faced the task of coordinating the work of government agencies eager to defend their own jurisdictions. Since the creation of an independent Selective Service System in 1940, manpower had been divided into two distinct spheres, military and civilian. Additionally, a number of federal agencies—the Civil Service Commission, the Department of Agriculture, the Office of Defense Transportation, the Maritime Commission, and the Railroad Retirement Board—maintained labor supply functions throughout the war. Such fragmentation made an integrated mobilization program impossible. The WMC's operating arm, the United States Employment Service (USES), was poorly equipped for its wartime tasks. Created during the depression to refer workers to relief projects, it lacked the confidence of many employers and government officials. The USES had been under state control until 1941; once federalized, the loyalty of its employees remained divided between Washington and the state capitals. Most importantly, the agency was virtually powerless to compel modification of hiring practices, and the agency was unable to accelerate the entrance of women and minority groups into war industries.
To fill the gap between its responsibilities and its meager powers, the WMC turned to non-governmental channels, labor-management cooperation. One of McNutt's first official acts was the creation of a Management-Labor Policy Committee (MLPC). Originally conceived as an advisory group whose members served as individuals, it soon became the most important organ in the WMC. In December 1942 Executive Order 9279 required McNutt to consult with it on all major decisions; the following March the MLPC was reorganized so that its members directly represented the major management, labor, and agricultural organizations in the United States. For the remainder of the war, the committee served a vital function through enlisting support for WMC programs and thereby aiding the translation of policy into action. This labor-management approach, however, lost sight of the interests of those segments of the population such as women who were not represented in its councils.
In 1943 a manpower crisis became a reality, and local stabilization plans that combined recruiting, utilization studies, and controls over hiring were developed. While such measures met the immediate need, the bumbling, haphazard nature of the manpower program remained obvious. An easy target for attack, the WMC was maligned until V-J Day for creating a "manpower muddle" and forming the worst administrative failure of the war. Within this inadequate labor supply framework, questions regarding women were decided, and womanpower policy naturally reflected the handicaps of the manpower program as a whole.
In theory a thoroughgoing mobilization program required no special policies for women, but at least one government official, Mary Anderson of the Women's Bureau of the Department of Labor, realized the pitfalls inherent to such an approach. As she later recalled, during World War II there was a "great tendency among government officials… to speak about 'the people' as a whole, but when they spoke of 'the people' they meant the men." This propensity to assume that the interests of the two groups were synonymous provides a clue to the cause of the government's failure to utilize women effectively in World War II
Seventy years old in 1940, Anderson could look back on over twenty years of government service, first in the Ordnance Department, then in the Women in Industry Service, and finally as director of the Women's Bureau since its creation in 1920. A grandmotherly appearance belied the energy, dedication to improving the lot of working women, and penchant for bluntness in the face of bureaucratic red tape that characterized her war activities. As the predecessor to the Women's Bureau, the Women in Industry Service had attempted to increase industrial opportunity for women and promote appropriate labor standards during World War I. With this backlog of experience, the Women's Bureau seemed the obvious source of information on women in the present crisis.
After the outbreak of war in Europe, the bureau had kept a close watch on domestic developments, fearful that the economic upturn would herald a new attack on hard won protective legislation for women. Furthermore, a rising tide of proposed measures restricting the rights of married women to employment during 1939 and 1940 posed another cause for concern. The Women's Bureau with its advisory committee began as early as September 1939 to develop policies to preserve standards and to press for "suitably qualified women on all boards and commissions appointed to cope with the present economic situation."
The creation of the NDAC in May 1940 marked the beginning of active preparations for defense. Less than a month later, Anderson assembled a labor advisory committee to formulate guidelines for the use of women in defense industries. Released on 24 July 1940, the committee's recommendations formed the first statement on labor policy issued by any federal agency during the World War II period. The proposals contained in this document—jobs adapted to physical capabilities, safety standards, suitable working conditions, and maintenance of protective legislation—became a standard part of Women's Bureau pronouncements for the next five years.
Anderson concurrently began efforts to secure a voice for her agency in the defense program. In June 1940 she visited Hillman, the NDAC Labor Division head, to offer the services of the Women's Bureau. She also suggested that he name a female adviser to have charge of women's questions. At their 28 June meeting, the Women's Bureau Labor Advisory Committee backed her personal request with a resolution to Hillman. At the time Anderson was optimistic of success, and she wrote Mary Van Kleeck that Hillman was "perfectly willing to do so if I can find a woman who will integrate the working woman and the Women's Bureau in the defense program.
Such hopes were soon dashed for subsequent conversations with Hillman revealed that he was not yet convinced of the need for a female assistant. Instead, on the advice of his head of training, he had decided a female research aide would suffice. Undaunted, the Women's Bureau held a conference in November that once again passed resolutions calling for wider and wiser use of women in the defense program. Thus armed, Anderson trekked over to Hillman's office, this time with three women unionists in tow to urge recognition of the conference proposals and the appointment of a woman. At a NDAC Labor Division meeting the next week, she made a final, futile plea for action.
Meanwhile the Women's Bureau embarked on studies of safety standards, plant facilities, and work clothing for women and began investigations of defense industries such as airplane manufacturing in which few women were currently employed. In early 1941 Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins persuaded Undersecretary of War Robert B. Patterson to refer questions on women's employment and requests for exemptions from state labor laws to Anderson. Later that year, Hillman informed Perkins that while the OPM had no funds for the Women's Bureau, he recognized the increasing importance of its work. Hoping for a larger appropriation to expand the agency's field of activity, Anderson testified confidently in 1941 before a Senate committee that the Women's Bureau was "officially recognized by the War Department, the Navy, and the OPM as the one agency working with women." Beneath this official optimism, however, was a growing sense of frustration. Writing of her problems in June 1941, she confessed: "Even now, when we are in an unlimited emergency and our work has practically doubled, we have been unable to get any material increase in appropriation… Most men never think that women can do anything but housekeeping and should not do anything else even though they are calling upon them every day to enter defense industries."
During the summer and fall of 1941, Anderson participated on the OPM's National Labor Supply Committee, where she felt "women had very little chance to be even thought of, both from the training point of view and employment." Preoccupied with questions of military recruitment and male production workers, the body finally expressed interest in women in December 1941 when a subcommittee composed of Anderson, Thelma McKelvey of the OPM, and Nelle Miles of the USES was appointed. The women drafted a statement emphasizing the need to protect labor standards, open training to women, press for equal pay policies, and consider an immediate voluntary inventory of women available for war work. After some delay the report was accepted, but war and the OPM's rapid demise meant it was to have little effect. After predicting for two years that officials would regret their failure to plan for women, Anderson began to see her prophecy fulfilled. It became increasingly evident that women indeed would be the margin of victory as the press proclaimed, and the lack of an adequate mobilization program for women caused serious problems. By the spring of 1942 no work on the subject of women had been done by any federal agency that went much beyond the June 1940 recommendations of the Women's Bureau Labor Advisory Committee. A call for protection of standards and a plea for women in policy-making positions, such was the yield of defense period planning for women.
The Women's Bureau worked assiduously for recognition of women's interests throughout the war, but the agency increasingly operated on the fringes of power. It investigated ways to expand the use of women in industry, made suggestions on working conditions and community facilities, publicized women's needs and contributions, published pamphlets and bulletins relating to employment in wartime industries, and serviced requests from women's groups, unions, and government agencies. Yet it had little role in the actual development of policy; none in enforcement. The experience of the Women's Bureau during the defense and early war periods—the resolutions that never became operational, the inability to generate official interest—mirrors the difficulties faced by other groups concerned with government policy toward women throughout the war.
Pearl Harbor awakened interest in women's role in the war, and an immediate national inventory of women available for war work was proposed. Thelma McKelvey of the WPB testified before the Tolan Committee in February 1942 that compulsory registration might prove necessary. In March a Republican legislator in New York introduced a resolution in the state legislature in favor of registration; a month later it passed the upper house without debate. The AFL, CIO, and women's organizations endorsed the idea. Magazines demanded it, claiming that "only subservience to an outworn tradition… prevents us from taking these essential steps while there is yet time." Polls revealed the broad support behind the proposal, indicating between sixty-six and eighty percent of the public in favor. Action appeared imminent in April 1942 when the president admitted registration plans were under consideration and Eleanor Roosevelt announced her support of the measure. In retrospect this outpouring in favor of the registration of women seems to be a response to helplessness. With the war going badly on the battlefronts and in the absence of a definite man- or womanpower program, the need to do something concrete found expression in the national registration idea. In such an atmosphere government planning for women began to take place.
The suggestion that an advisory committee of women could serve a useful function in the manpower program was made as early as 4 March 1942, when the USES Labor Market staff investigated the idea as a way "to counteract irresponsible publicity concerning needs for women workers." USES estimates showed no general demand for women workers likely before 1943; hence immediate registration appeared premature. On the recommendation of the Labor Market staff, the women on the Federal Advisory Council of the Social Security Board assembled on 16 April to draw up a public announcement "to lessen the present ill-considered demand for all-out registration of women for war work." The creation of the WMC that same week, however, delayed release of the statement. In early May the registration idea was finally shelved when McNutt revealed that no such step would be taken in the near future.
Public speculation on registration continued, but by the summer of 1942 the focus of attention shifted from the subject of policy to the question of policy makers. Prominent individuals and women's organizations demanded representation of women in the war agencies, especially in the WMC. Meanwhile, the Manpower Commission was examining how women could be integrated into the agency's program. A summary of staff discussions in mid-July indicated that agreement had been reached that no separate women's division should be created and that it was "particularly important that women be used on the promotional or selling side of the program needed to get more women into industry." Opinion remained divided on the means of accomplishing this goal, but suggestions included appointing women to the MLPC and setting up a separate women's advisory committee. The discussions are especially revealing in light of later WMC actions toward women, for they indicate that even at this early date the agency was most interested in using women in a public relations capacity rather than in policy making.
Anderson, the National Women's Trade Union League, and the National Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs united in an effort to have women named to the MLPC in recognition of its rapidly growing importance in the WMC. The MLPC, however, refused any part of such a plan, and the women reduced their demands to a separate women's committee. Anderson insisted that any women's group must have real duties and not merely "sit in the corner," and she later insisted WMC officials had assured her that the women's committee chairman would be a voting member of the MLPC. Whether or not such a promise was made is open to question; at any rate, the Women's Advisory Committee (WAC), which McNutt appointed on 31 August 1942, received only the right to be an observer on the MLPC.
WMC Administrative Order No. 22 vested broad responsibility in the WAC to initiate studies and advise the WMC on "matters of major policies concerning the activities and responsibilities of the Commission, particularly as they affect women and the contribution women can make in the successful prosecution of the war." Despite the wide latitude given the WAC, some WMC officials had serious reservations about the body. Staff members later alleged McNutt had opposed a women's committee, partly from a distaste for feminism, partly from the WMC's bad experience with local enrollment campaigns that women on the staff had promoted. Nevertheless, with the announcement on 4 September 1942, of the committee and its membership, the organizational framework of government policy was complete. A combination of ill-advised publicity and the need to counteract it, pressure from women's groups, and WMC failures with its early womanpower activities had led to the establishment of an official body to represent women's interests in the manpower program.
The WAC assembled for its first meeting on 1 October 1942. Anderson attended the session and pronounced the group "a mighty fine lot of women, some of the best in the country." Still skeptical of WMC motives, however, she added, "It will be interesting to see if those boys over there will let them do anything." At first it seemed that WMC intentions were honorable, for the committee at once began to work on a general statement on recruiting, training, and employing women that the WMC promptly accepted. In the next few months the WAC also formulated and secured WMC adoption of a policy statement on the employment of youth, a revision of WMC policy on day care, and a procedure on planning and conducting enrollment campaigns for women. In March 1943 a WAC statement on community facilities was approved and sent to the WMC field staff.
Committee members and outside observers quickly recognized that such recommendations would prove worthless unless implemented. In December 1942 representatives of thirteen major women's organizations drafted a statement to McNutt declaring that "incorporating the knowledge and contribution of women into policy-making groups has not yet been satisfactorily accomplished." At their January meeting the WAC took essentially the same position. Chairman Margaret A. Hickey reported that she had informally urged the appointment of a woman to one of two executive posts open in the WMC, and the WAC backed her request with a resolution to McNutt. In February the WAC learned that Charlotte Carr, the former secretary of labor and industry for the state of Pennsylvania, had been named assistant to the deputy chairman. The expected fruits of such an appointment—closer liaison between the WAC and WMC and translation of policies into action—were never reaped. Caught in a WMC reorganization, Carr soon found herself without duties and resigned.
In January the WAC had sought to strengthen women's voice in the WMC in a second way through the appointment of women to management-labor committees being formed on the local and regional levels. Chairman Hickey presented the request to the MLPC and was encouraged by the interest with which the labor members had greeted the idea. When the proposal was not executed as expected, the WAC renewed the request. The women learned in April that the MLPC had proposed the creation of separate women's advisory committees at the local level instead.
Tiring of the indifferent treatment they felt WAC demands received, the women expanded their request to include full voting status for Hickey on the national MLPC. WAC relations with the MLPC further deteriorated when Hickey was denied admission to an MLPC emergency meeting. McNutt perhaps sensed a storm brewing in the WAC, for in May he made one of his rare appearances at their meetings. Relaying the MLPC's unanimous decision against granting Hickey a vote, he attempted to smooth the committee's ruffled feathers by assuring them their advice was valuable and their status equivalent to the MLPC. The women found the suggestion of equality absurd; in staff, budget, and functions the MLPC contrasted sharply with the ineffectual WAC. The committee refused to budge from the position that women needed representation on national and local management-labor committees. The next day the WAC met again to mull over its grievances and decided that a careful evaluation of the WAC's position was in order. One member had already resigned in April, having concluded that the WAC's "very existence and status are humiliating to women." The remainder of the committee sent confidential statements on the present impasse to Hickey that revealed widespread dissatisfaction among the members. Mandelle B. Bousfield and Elisabeth Christman suggested resigning in protest as a possible course of action, and the letters were laced with comments about WMC apathy, failure to seek advice, and use of the committee as a "mere paliative [sic] to women."
At their June meetings the women held an off-the-record executive session where a motion to revise the order creating the WAC was passed. In its new form the WAC charter would require McNutt to submit all major manpower questions, not simply women's issues, to the WAC for approval. On 6 July 1943, the committee sent a confidential statement to McNutt that detailed WAC grievances. This report forms the most thorough critique of government policy toward women written during the war. In strong terms it "unreservedly" criticized the WMC's failure to develop an integrated program of recruiting, training, and utilizing women. Additionally, it severely chastised the commission for ignoring the WAC. The women demanded appointment of liaison personnel in all WMC divisions and the naming of an executive assistant responsible for implementation of WAC policies.
In August, Executive Director Lawrence Appley responded to the committee's charges. He promised to seek the WAC's advice on matters concerning women and vowed to keep the committee informed on general policy. He reported, however, the WMC's rejection of the committee's concrete demands. The WMC would appoint no special personnel to look after women's interests, and it would not delay manpower matters until the WAC was consulted.
The storm over the WAC's place in the manpower program ended with a whimper. At best it had defined the positions of the parties involved. One WAC member reported that the committee was "now an integral part of WMC, after a determined stand by its members," but only in a very narrow sense could the women claim victory. The situation remained virtually unchanged; WAC recommendations continued to be ignored, its advice rarely sought.
In August 1944 Hickey suggested the WAC dissolve, indicating her intentions to resign in October. The members pressed her to reconsider and agreed among themselves that the WAC should continue to function as a link with women's organizations. The WMC executive director added his opinion that the committee's existence remained necessary to aid in "creating a public psychology conducive to the most effective prosecution of the war." The committee's response to Hickey's proposal reveals the extent to which the women had accepted the limitations of working within the WMC and had surrendered their demand for a policy-making role.
In the final analysis the WAC was reduced to a publicity organ. With speeches, press releases, and articles, the members helped to acquaint the public with the need for womanpower and the problems of the working woman. Through its contacts with women's organizations, the committee found a means to relay its recommendations to the local level. The WAC did not succeed in formulating policy for women workers or in integrating women into the government's policy-making positions. Consequently, complaints about the "cold-shouldering of women… in the war effort" continued. The National Federation of Business and Professional Women, for example, in July 1943 found that only eight of the 641 top officials in the war agencies were female. The members of the WAC were seldom blamed for this state of affairs; the problems they faced in the WMC were only too apparent. In evaluating the attempt of the women to influence manpower policy, however, three additional factors deserve consideration.
Interested in a wide variety of issues—day care, youth, community facilities, older women, part-time employment, agriculture, and training—the WAC spread itself thin and could not effectively influence policy in any of these areas. Much of their meeting time was taken up by outside speakers, leaving them with little opportunity to develop thorough programs. Had the committee been willing to narrow its vision and push consistently for one or two measures, greater success might have been achieved. A second handicap was the WAC's inability to rally outside support for its policies. The frequent reminders of the equal status of the WAC and the MLPC failed to mention the key difference between the groups—the MLPC members each had a constituency that they could mobilize. Most of the women on the WAC were leaders in national women's organizations, but they served as individuals. Conceivably a WAC organized along lines similar to the MLPC would have proved more forceful. The nonpartisan character of most women's organizations and the fact that the majority of women were affiliated with no national group, however, indicates that such a change would not have significantly strengthened the WAC's position. The simple truth remained that women were in no sense a power bloc capable of influencing government policy.
Finally, the attitude of the WAC merits attention. It would be wrong to cast the committee as a valiant band of feminists fighting for recognition against a hostile, male-dominated war agency. There was no such fervor or unity of views in the WAC, and the women were frequently at pains to deny any feminist leanings. In January 1943 when the WAC was attempting to secure the appointment of a woman to a WMC executive position, for example, one member felt compelled to state, "It isn't as feminists that we go out for key positions … but as women who recognize that it is necessary for the furtherance of the war effort." The Women's Bureau in 1952 studied the WAC's efforts to give women a voice in the war program and concluded that on all counts except publicity the committee accomplished little. Nevertheless, the bureau praised the committee for proving that "it could quietly go about its business, without offending propriety or tradition." No evidence indicates that a more avowedly feminist stance would have improved the WAC's record, but in hewing a middle course, the committee undoubtedly made it easier for the WMC to ignore its presence.
In mobilizing women into the "arsenal of democracy," the most striking feature of government policy was the extent to which there was none. Unlike Great Britain, where women's role in the war was guided by parliamentary legislation, womanpower policy in the United States could never be defined by a body of laws, rules, or regulations. A combination of elements prevented American women from having a voice in manpower policy: the inability of women to function successfully as a pressure group, the government's failure to anticipate how sweeping a mobilization would be necessary, the tendency to confront problems from a management-labor perspective, and the determination to protect the social status quo. These same factors influenced the government's response to nearly every aspect of women's war participation: recruiting, day care, equal pay, and demobilization. Instead of policy, a mosaic of experiments, makeshifts, and temporary expedients emerged. The induction of six million women into America's war production machine occurred as a response to an urgent, immediate situation with scant attention paid to its long-range consequences and possibilities.
