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| Three Fairey Battles of No. 103 Squadron RAF overfly Betheniville, watched by ground crew servicing K9408 'PM-N', another aircraft of the Squadron. (Imperial War Museum C1061) |
The RAF Advanced Air Striking
Force (AASF) comprised the light bombers of 1 Group RAF Bomber Command, which
took part in the Battle of France during the Second World War. Before
hostilities began, it had been agreed between the United Kingdom and France that
in case of war, the short-range aircraft of Bomber Command would move to French
airfields to operate against targets in Nazi Germany. The AASF was formed on 24
August 1939 from the ten squadrons of Fairey Battle light bombers of 1 Group
under the command of Air Vice-Marshal Patrick Playfair and was dispatched to
airfields in the Rheims area on 2 September 1939.
The AASF was answerable to the Air
Ministry and independent of the British Expeditionary Force. For unity of
command, the AASF and the Air Component of the BEF (Air Vice-Marshal Charles
Blount), came under the command of British Air Forces in France (Air
Vice-Marshal Arthur Barratt) on 15 January 1940. Using the bombers for attacks
on strategic targets in Germany was set aside due to Anglo-French reluctance to
provoke German retaliation and attacks on German military forces and their
communications were substituted.
The Battle of France began with
the German invasion of the Low Countries on 10 May 1940. The Battle squadrons
suffered 40 per cent losses on 10 May, 100 per cent on 11 May and 63 per cent
on 12 May. In 48 hours the number of operational AASF bombers fell from 135 to
72. On 14 May the AASF made a maximum effort, 63 Battles and eight Bristol
Blenheims attacked targets near Sedan. More than half the bombers were lost,
bringing AASF losses to 75 per cent. The remaining bombers began to operate at
night and periodically by day, sometimes with fighter escorts.
From 10 May to the end of the
month, the AASF lost 119 Battle crews killed and 100 aircraft. Experience,
better tactics and periods of bad weather from 15 May to 5 June led to losses
of 0.5 per cent, albeit with a similar reduction in effectiveness. On 14 June,
the remaining Battles returned to Britain; the Hurricane squadrons returned on
18 June and rejoined Fighter Command. The AASF was dissolved on 26 June, the
Battles returning to 1 Group, Bomber Command, to prepare for operations against
a German invasion, along with the rest of the Royal Air Force.
Once British rearmament began, the
air policy of the British government was to have air defenses sufficient to
defeat an attack and an offensive force equal to that of the Luftwaffe. With no
land border to defend, British resources had been concentrated on radar
stations, anti-aircraft guns and increasing the number of the most modern
fighter aircraft. If Germany attacked, the British intended to take the war to
the Germans by attacking strategically important targets with its heavy
bombers, types unsuitable for operations in direct support of land forces.
Implementation of the policy required a considerable number of first-class
fighter aircraft to defeat an attacker and bombers to destroy ground targets.
In 1938 the RAF expansion program
was intended to provide means for the air defense of Britain and for
counter-offensive operations against Germany. Army co-operation received few
resources and no plans were made for RAF participation in mass land operations
or the dispatch abroad of large expeditionary air forces. The Western Plan was
devised by the Air Ministry for mobilization and the deployment of squadrons to
their wartime airfields. Provision was made for the immediate dispatch of an
Advanced Air Striking Force of ten squadrons to France, followed by a second
echelon of ten more. Refueling facilities were also planned for other
squadrons, the arrangements for transport and servicing being coordinated with
the army; thought was also given to basing squadrons in Belgium if it was
invaded by Germany.
In February 1939, the British
Cabinet had authorized joint planning with the French and preferably with
Belgium and the Netherlands in case of war with Germany, Italy and Japan. Two
weeks before the first meeting, Germany occupied the rump of Czechoslovakia;
war preparations took on a new urgency and staff conversations began on 29
March 1939. Agreement was reached with France to base the AASF on French
airfields but only to bring them closer to their intended targets in Germany,
until longer-range types became available. French strategy emphasized the
defense of the national territory and Allied efforts were expected to give
equal emphasis but the British refused to stake everything on the success of a
defensive campaign against the Germans in France. The different circumstances
of the two countries led the French to rely on a mass land army, with air
defense a secondary concern, the Armeé de l'Air was hampered in the late 1930s
by the slow progress of its re-equipment, lacking anti-aircraft guns,
sufficient fighter aircraft and the means to detect and track enemy aircraft.
Observation services relied on civilian telephones and in October 1939, the
Armeé de l'Air had only 549 fighters, 131 of which were considered anciens
(obsolete).
Lack of aircraft led the French to
advocate a bombing policy of tactical co-operation with the armies, attacking
German forces and communications in the front line, rather than the strategic
bombing of Germany, for fear of retaliation. From the spring of 1939,
arrangements were made for the reception of the AASF, the defense of British
bases in France, bombing policy in support of ground forces confronting a
German attack in the Benelux countries, and operations against the Luftwaffe. A
supply of British bombs was dumped near Reims, disguised as a sale to the Armeé
de l'Air. Discussion of strategic air operations against the German war economy
was delayed because the British did not expect to begin such operations as soon
as war was declared and because the French had no bombers capable of them. In
the last days of peace, the Cabinet limited air bombardment strictly to
military objectives which were narrowly defined and a joint declaration was
issued concerning the policy of following of the rules of war pertaining to
poison gas, submarine warfare and air attacks on merchant ships to avoid
provoking the Germans while the Anglo-French air forces were being built up.
On 24 August 1939, the British
government gave orders for the armed forces partially to mobilize and on 2
September No. 1 Group RAF (Air Vice-Marshal Patrick Playfair) sent its ten
Fairey Battle day-bomber squadrons to France according to plans made by the
British and French earlier in the year. The group was the first echelon of the
AASF and flew from RAF Abingdon, RAF Harwell, RAF Benson, RAF Boscombe Down and
RAF Bicester. Group headquarters became the AASF when the order to move to
France was received and the home station HQs became 71, 72 and 74–76 Wings. The
Bristol Blenheims of No. 2 Group RAF were to become the second echelon as 70,
79 and 81–83 Wings, flying from RAF Upper Heyford, RAF Wattisham, RAF Watton,
RAF West Raynham and RAF Wyton; 70 Wing with 18 and 57 squadrons was converting
from Battles to Blenheims and intended for the Air Component once the
re-equipment was complete. On 3 September, as the British government declared
war on Germany; the AASF Battle squadrons were getting used to their French
airfields, which were somewhat rudimentary compared to their well-developed
Bomber Command stations, some having to wait for the French to deliver aviation
fuel.
Strategic bombing operations did
not take place as the Luftwaffe and Allied strategic bombers observed a tacit
truce. The French tried to divert German resources from their Invasion of
Poland with the Saar Offensive (7–16 September), in which the Battle squadrons
were to participate. The main Luftwaffe bases were too far inside Germany but airstrips,
supply dumps and reserves would be well within the range of the Battles. The
British and French governments feared that they had more to lose by courting
German retaliation but this deprived the Battle squadrons of a chance to test
their equipment and tactics. The preparations did establish that Battles would
attack targets within 10 mi (16 km) of the front line, including fleeting
opportunities, much against the wishes of Group Captain John Slessor, a former
Director of Plans at the Air Ministry, who stressed that the Battle crews were
not trained for close support. Other officers thought that "...it is about
as far as the Battle will be able to get with a return ticket". Playfair
had the fuselage fuel tank removed from AASF Battles and the bomb bays were to
be modified to carry 40 lb (18 kg) anti-personnel bombs, once the equipment
arrived in November.
Neither the French nor the British
wanted the AASF to sit idle and the Battles began to conduct
"high-altitude", formation, photographic reconnaissance sorties, to
map the German front line but the Battle had a service ceiling of only 25,000
ft (7,600 m) and needed to be much lower for formation flying. Battle sorties
began on the morning of 10 September, three aircraft of 150 Squadron flying
inside Allied lines and photographing obliquely. On 19 September the Battles
began to fly beyond the front line, 10 mi (16 km) at first, then 20 mi (32 km).
Playfair, mindful of the risk, tried to time sorties to coincide with French
fighter operations in the vicinity and wanted close escorts if German fighters
were around. Three Battles from 103 Squadron and three from 218 Squadron
reconnoitered on 17 September, the Battles encountering intermittent
anti-aircraft fire (FlaK). Bad weather led to a two-day lull, then on 20
September, three Battles from 88 Squadron west of Saarbrücken were attacked by
three Messerschmitt Bf 109Ds, which shot down two of the Battles, whose
defensive fire was ineffective. One Battle pilot crash-landed and his aircraft
caught fire, killing the observer and gunner; the other Battle crashed the same
way and the third Battle was hit in its fuel tanks and incinerated the crew.
Playfair concluded that Battles
should receive an escort anywhere near the front line but the Air Ministry
rejected the claim that more fighters were necessary and he had to ask the
French instead. The Chief of Staff of the French Air Force (Chef d'état-major
de l'Armée de l'air), Général d'Armée Aérienne Joseph Vuillemin, was short of
fighters but promised to help, provided the British helped themselves. At a
meeting on 28 September, the British representative repeated the claim that
tight formation-flying and collective firepower obviated the need for escorts
and Vuillemin cancelled French co-operation. Two days later, five Battles from
150 Squadron on reconnaissance near Saarbrücken and Merzig, were attacked by
eight Bf 109Es. The Battles closed up but four were shot down, most in flames.
The surviving Battle pilot ran for home and crashed on landing but saved his crew.
The squadron immediately fitted its aircraft with an extra rear-facing gun in
the bomb-aiming position against attacks from below and behind; in England the
Air Ministry blamed the Battle, rather than faulty tactics and equipment and
declared it obsolete. For protection against fighter attack, 85 lb (39 kg) of
armor for each aircraft was rushed to France and 15 and 40 squadrons returned
to Britain to convert to Blenheims, being replaced by 114 and 139 squadrons
which were already flying the type.
In England, discussions for a
second-generation Battle took place and the AASF was ordered to train Battle
crews for low-level tactical operations to avoid the Bf 109s. The crews
practiced attacks on road vehicles from as low as 50 ft (15 m) and some
rehearsals had fighter escorts, a new task given to the AASF Hurricane
squadrons. Air Chief Marshal Robert Brooke-Popham, having been dug out of
retirement, inspected the RAF in France and organized a meeting with Fairey,
the Air Ministry and crews from 150 Squadron, to discuss protection against
ground fire. Fairey considered that the Battle was already at its maximum
weight and that self-sealing fuel tanks and armor could be added only by
reducing the bomb load or range. No one in Britain knew that the Battles in France
had already had their fuselage fuel tanks removed, which had saved 300 lb (140
kg). Fairey suggested a ventral machine-gun [40 lb (18 kg)], crew armor [100 lb
(45 kg)], safer fuel tanks [100 lb (45 kg)], armor around the rear gunner [25
lb (11 kg)] and another 80 lb (36 kg) of ventral (underside) armor. Only the 25
lb (11 kg) armor plate for the rear gunner needed to be manufactured and the
extra armor was ordered to France as soon as possible.
Battle fuel tanks were to be given
the French Semape coating, which easily plugged holes from rifle-caliber
bullets and also gave some protection from 20 mm (0.79 in) cannon fire. Semape
would use up the 100 lb (45 kg) allotted for fuel tank protection and was still
under test but 26 lb (12 kg) of armor plates were added to the rear of the
tanks against hits from behind. On 18 December, twenty-two Vickers Wellington
medium bombers were sent to attack German ships in the Battle of the Heligoland
Bight and eighteen were lost, many shot down in flames; some of those not shot
down ran out of fuel from punctured fuel tanks. The fitting of self-sealing
tanks became a crisis measure for Bomber Command and took precedence over the
Battle modification, especially as their existing tanks had been armored
against hits from behind and the conversion was put back to March 1940. The
extra armor decided on in September was apparently sent to France but never
fitted to the Battles.
Operational instructions issued by
BAFF included a warning that
Bomber aircraft have proved extremely useful in support of an advancing
army, especially against weak anti-aircraft resistance, but it is not clear
that a bomber force used against an advancing army well supported by all forms
of anti-aircraft defence and a large force of fighter aircraft, will be
economically effective.
The RAF had tried to improve the
performance of its aircraft; streamlining the Blenheim had added 15 mph (24
km/h) to its speed. To remedy the vulnerability of Battles to attacks from
below, a rear-facing machine-gun was fitted to the bomb-aimer's position but
"...it needed a contortionist to fire it....",
To enable the gunner to fire backwards behind the tail, the gun swivels
on a mounting fixed in the bombing aperture and is made capable of firing
upside down, being provided with extra sights which will work in this position.
The gunner wears a special harness enabling him to assume an almost upside-down
position. — Bomber Command HQ Record Book
Fairey designed a well in the
floor of the bomb aiming position for the gunner to lie prone facing the rear
but the change would need three months for development and testing. With 500
Battles in storage, the modifications could be done at Fairey and the aircraft
swapped with those in France without interfering with AASF operations but the
idea was shelved.
To speed production of new
aircraft, a review was held to strip existing machines of superfluous equipment
and the committee suggested that for tactical bombing, the Battle autopilot [80
lb (36 kg)], night flying gear [44 lb (20 kg)], bomb sight [34 lb (15 kg)] and
the navigator–bomb-aimer [200 lb (91 kg)] could be dispensed with, saving 358
lb (162 kg), which would allow the fitting of more forward-firing guns with no
net increase in weight. The Air Ministry prevaricated and the equipment was not
removed, the Ministry even deprecating the use of the existing forward-firing
gun, which was supposed to be reserved for engagements with German fighters,
not for strafing unless circumstances were exceptional.
On 11 October, Luftwaffe Dornier Do
17 bombers begin to cross the lines at high altitude and one flew at 20,000 ft
(6,100 m) over the 1 Squadron AASF fighter base at Vassincourt, only to be shot
down near Vausigny. The two Hawker Hurricane fighter squadrons (67 Wing) were
part of the AASF to provide fighter protection for their bases, with another
squadron of Hurricanes in England made available as a reinforcement. The second
echelon squadrons of 2 Group, with seven Blenheim squadrons and two Armstrong
Whitworth Whitley medium bomber squadrons, stood ready to move to France if the
Germans attacked. At 10:00 a.m., on 8 November 73 Squadron shot down a Do 17,
its first victory of the war. To counter the high-flying Dorniers, seven
fighter sectors were established on 21 November in Zone d'Opérations Aériennes
Nord (ZOAN, "Air Zone North") and Zone d'Opérations Aériennes Est
(ZOAE, "Air Zone East") and on 22 November, 1 Squadron shot down two
Do 17s in the morning, a Hurricane force-landing after being hit in the engine
and early in the afternoon, three Hurricanes over Metz shared a Heinkel He 111
with the Armée de l'Air, one Hurricane being damaged in a collision with a
French fighter; 73 Squadron claimed two Dorniers shot down and one damaged,
shared with French fighters. For most of December, flying was washed out by bad
weather but on 21 December, two Hurricanes shot down a Potez 637 over
Villers-sur-Meuse, with only one survivor. The next day, five Bf 109s bounced
three 73 Squadron Hurricanes and shot two down.
On the declaration of war, the Air
Component had come under the command of Lord Gort the Commander-in-Chief of the
BEF and the AASF remained under Bomber Command control but based with the Armée
de l'Air. Thought had been given to liaison and Air Missions had been installed
in the main Allied headquarters but training exercises showed that
communication was inadequate. In January 1940, command of the AASF and the Air
Component was unified under Air Marshal Arthur Barratt as Air Officer
Commanding-in-Chief British Air Forces in France (BAFF), the Air Component
being detached from the BEF while remaining under its operational control and
Bomber Command losing the AASF, since the Battle would not be used for
strategic bombing. Barratt was charged with giving "full assurance"
to the BEF of air support and to provide the BEF with
...such bomber squadrons as the latter may, in consultation with him,
consider necessary from time to time. — Air Ministry
Since the British held only a
small part of the Western Front, Barratt was expected to operate in the context
of the immediate needs of the Allies. In France the new arrangement worked well
but the War Office and the Air Ministry never agreed on what support should be
given to the Field Force of the BEF. When Air Marshal Charles Portal replaced
Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt as AOC-in-C Bomber Command on 3 April, he prevented the
second echelon of the AASF from going to France, with the agreement of Cyril
Newall, the Chief of the Air Staff. Portal took the view that fifty Blenheims
attempting to attack an advancing army, using out of date information, could
not achieve results commensurate with the expected losses. On 8 May he wrote,
I am convinced that the proposed employment of these units is
fundamentally unsound, and if it is persisted in it is likely to have
disastrous consequences on the future of the war in the air.
The airfields occupied by the
first echelon were still being equipped for operations and would become
dangerously congested if the second echelon arrived. Barratt questioned the
wisdom of an assumption that because the AASF was behind the Maginot Line,
mobility was less important than that of the Air Component and approval was
eventually given to make the AASF semi-mobile. Motorization came too late and
the AASF had to beg, steal or borrow French vehicles when squadrons changed
base; by late April, the AASF strength had risen to 6,859 men.
|
AASF Squadrons
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|
Aircraft
|
Squadron
|
|
In France
|
(first echelon)
|
|
Battle
|
12, 15, 40 88, 103, 105
142, 150, 218, 226
|
|
Blenheim IV
|
114, 139
(from December 1939)
|
|
Hurricane
|
1, 73
(501 from 11 May 1940)
|
|
In England
2 Group
|
(second echelon)
|
|
Blenheim IV
|
21, 82, 107, 110
|
|
4 Group
|
|
|
Whitley
|
77, 102
|
|
Losses
|
(sources vary)
|
|
AASF
|
Battle:.....137
Blenheim: 37
Total: 174
|
|
2 Group
|
Blenheim: 98
|
|
Total losses
|
272
|
More flying was possible in
January but the air forces spent most of February on the ground, with many of
the aircrews on leave. The weather became much better for flying and on 2 March
a Dornier was shot down by two 1 Squadron Hurricanes, one of the British pilots
being killed while attempting a forced landing after being hit in the engine by
return fire; next day, British fighters shot down a He 111. On 3 March, two 73
Squadron pilots escorting a Potez 63 at 20,000 ft (6,100 m) spotted seven He
111s 5,000 ft (1,500 m) higher and gave chase, only to be attacked by six Bf
109s. A Bf 109 overshot one of the Hurricanes, which fired on it as it drew
ahead. The Bf 109 fell, leaving a trail of black smoke, the eleventh victory
for the squadron. The Hurricane was hit by the third Bf 109 and the pilot only
just managed to reach a French airfield and make an emergency landing. On the
morning of 4 March, a 1 Squadron Hurricane shot down a Bf 109 over Germany and
later, three other Hurricanes of the squadron attacked nine Messerschmitt Bf
110s north of Metz and shot one down. On 29 March, three Hurricanes of 1
Squadron were attacked by Bf 109s and Bf 110s over Bouzonville, a Bf 109 being
shot down at Apach and a Bf 110 north-west of Bitche; a Hurricane pilot was
killed trying to land at Brienne-le-Château.
Most Luftwaffe incursions in April
were the usual reconnaissance flights but larger formations of fighters
patrolled the front line and formations of up to three Luftwaffe squadrons
(Staffeln) flew at high altitude as far as Nancy and Metz. Reconnaissance
aircraft began to cross the front line in squadron strength to benefit from
greater firepower on the most dangerous part of the journey, before dispersing
towards their objectives. Hurricanes shot down a Bf 109 on 7 April at
Ham-sous-Varsberg and on 9 April, when the Germans began the invasion of
Denmark and Norway (Operation Weserübung), Bomber Command aircraft were
diverted to operations in Scandinavia and the Battle squadrons took over
leaflet raids over Germany by night; no aircraft were lost. The situation was
unchanged until the night of 9/10 May, when the heavy artilleries of the German
and French armies began reciprocally to bombard the Maginot and Siegfried
lines. In early May, the AASF had 416 aircraft; 256 light bombers, 110 of the
200 serviceable bombers being Battles. The Armée de l'Air had fewer than a
hundred bombers, 75 per cent of which were obsolescent. The Luftwaffe in the
west had 3,530 operational aircraft, including about 1,300 bombers and 380 dive
bombers.
Battle of France (Fall Gelb)
10 May 1940
As dawn broke, German bombers
made a coordinated, hour-long attack on 72 airfields in the Netherlands,
Belgium and France, inflicting severe losses on the Belgian Air Component
(Belgische Luchtmacht/Force aérienne belge) and the Royal Netherlands Air Force
(Koninklijke Luchtmacht). The Luftwaffe bombers flew in formations of three to
thirty Heinkel 111, Dornier 17 or Junkers 88s but had least effect on the
British and French airfields, over which British and French fighters
intercepted the German raiders. Nine British-occupied bases were attacked to
little effect. Hurricanes of 1 Squadron at Vassincourt patrolled the Maginot
Line from 4:00 a.m. and shot down a He 111 for one Hurricane damaged. At 5:30
a.m. A Flight shot down a Do 17 near Dun-sur-Meuse for one Hurricane
crash-landed.
At Rouvres, two 73 Squadron
Hurricanes attacked three bombers over the airfield, damaging one for a
Hurricane forced down damaged. At 5:00 a.m. four Hurricanes attacked eleven Do
17s near the airfield, one Hurricane landing in flames with a badly burned
pilot and one Hurricane returning damaged. More Hurricanes were scrambled and
shot down two Do 17s; a He 111 was shot down soon afterwards. Orders to 73
Squadron led to it moving back from its forward airfield to its base in the
AASF area around Reims. From England, 501 Squadron with Hurricanes, landed at
Bétheniville to join the AASF and went into action within the hour against
forty He 111 bombers. A transport aircraft ferrying pilots and ground crews of
the squadron crashed on landing; three pilots were killed and six injured.
The AASF bomber squadrons
remained on the ground waiting for orders but the bombing policy established by
Grand Quartier Général (GQG, French supreme headquarters) did not require the
British to obtain permission. At Chauny, Barratt and d'Astier discussed
reconnaissance reports and Barratt ordered the AASF into action. A German
column had been reported in Luxembourg by a French reconnaissance aircraft
several hours earlier. The French bomber squadrons received orders and
counter-orders; some were sent to make low-level demonstrations to reassure
French troops and were intercepted by German fighters. The AASF squadrons had
been on stand-by since 6:00 a.m., one flight in each squadron at thirty
minutes' readiness and the other at two hours' notice. Barratt called General
Alphonse Georges, commander of the Théâtre d’Opérations du Nord-Est
(North-eastern Theatre of Operations) to tell him that the AASF would commence operations
but it took until 12:20 p.m. to give the order to attack. Thirty-two Battles
from 12, 103, 105, 142, 150, 218 and 226 squadrons flew at low altitude, in
groups of two to four bombers, to attack German columns.
The first wave of eight Battles
had support from five 1 Squadron and three 73 Squadron Hurricanes, sent to
patrol over Luxembourg City and clear away German fighters. The two fighter
formations were not coordinated and had only vague orders; the three 73
Squadron Hurricanes attacked a force of unescorted German bombers and were
bounced by German fighters before they made contact with the Battles. At least
one Hurricane was shot down; the 1 Squadron pilots saw what was happening but
were too low to help. The Battles hedge-hopped towards the target and evaded
the German fighters but were well inside the range of German ground fire. Two
Battles of 12 Squadron attacked at 30 ft (9.1 m) and one was shot down as it
approached the target. The second aircraft strafed the column with its forward
firing machine-gun and bombed; neither side could miss and the Battle
crash-landed in a field. Another twelve Battles were shot down and most of the
rest were damaged.
In the afternoon, a second raid
by 32 Battles flying at 250 ft (76 m) was intercepted by Bf 109s and ten were
shot down by fighters and ground fire. During the day, AASF and Air Component
Hurricanes claimed sixty Luftwaffe aircraft shot down, sixteen probables and
twenty-two damaged. The AASF Hurricanes had flown 47 sorties and been
provisionally credited with shooting down six bombers for five Hurricanes shot
down or force-landed in a 1999 analysis by Cull et al. No aircraft From Bomber
Command in England appeared because the British state was preoccupied with a
change in government. Barratt requested support and during the night, Bomber
Command sent 36 Wellington bombers to attack Waalhaven and eight Whitleys from
77 and 102 squadrons bombed transport bottlenecks into the southern Netherlands
at Geldern, Goch and Aldekirk; Rees and Wesel over the German border also being
raided.
11 May 1940
As Blenheim crews of 114 Squadron
at Vraux were preparing to take off to attack German tank columns in the
Ardennes, nine Dornier 17s appeared at treetop height and bombed them,
destroying several Blenheims, damaging others and causing casualties. From 9:30
to 10:00 a.m., eight Battles in two flights of two sections each from 88 and
218 squadrons took off to raid German troop concentrations near Prüm 10 mi (16
km) over the border in the Rhineland, where two panzer divisions had begun
their westwards advance the day before and were already past Chabrehez, 20 mi
(32 km) inside Belgium. From Reims, the Battles had to make a 60 mi (97 km)
flight diagonally across the front. The raid was the first by 88 Squadron whose
flights flew 300 yd (270 m) apart to give the Germans no time to react. The
Battles received constant small-arms fire at the vicinity of Neufchâteau, 50 mi
(80 km) from Prüm, for the rest of the run in.
An aircraft from the second
section force-landed near Bastogne, two more were lost near St Vith and the
surviving aircraft had aviation fuel sloshing around the cockpits. The pilot
turned back and attacked a column in a narrow valley at Udler, 15 mi (24 km)
short of Prüm but the bomb-release gear had been damaged and they did not drop;
the Battle managed to return and land at Vassincourt; the four Battles from 218
Squadron disappeared. An attack planned for the afternoon was cancelled because
of the dusk and because Barratt wanted to conserve his aircraft. The Belgian
government appealed to the Allies to destroy the Albert Canal bridges around
Maastricht but the Germans had already installed many anti-aircraft guns there.
Six Belgian Battles out of nine from Aeltre were shot down around noon along
with two of the six fighter escorts, the three survivors causing no damage.
Six Blenheims from 21 Squadron
and six from 110 Squadron in Britain attacked next from 3,000 ft (910 m). As
the bombers approached they met massed anti-aircraft fire and broke formation
to attack from different directions, only to spot Bf 109s and form up again.
Four Blenheims were shot down, the rest were damaged and no bomb hit the
target. Ten modern French LeO 451s from GB I/12 and II/12, escorted by M.S. 406
fighters, attempted the first French bombing raid of the battle and set fire to
some German vehicles but failed to hit the bridges. The Morane pilots attacked
the German fighters and claimed five Bf 109s for four Moranes; one LeO 451 was
shot down and the rest so badly damaged that they were out of action for
several days. During the night of 11/12 May, Barratt called on Bomber Command
to attack transport targets around München-Gladbach; Whitleys from 51, 58, 77
and 102 squadrons, with Handley Page Hampdens from 44, 49, 50, 61 and 144 squadrons
sent 36 bombers but five Hampdens returned early and only half the remainder
claimed to have bombed the target. A Whitley and two Hampdens were shot down,
the Hampden crews, minus a pilot, making their way back to Allied lines. AASF,
Air Component and 11 Group Hurricane pilots claimed 55 German aircraft and
French fighter pilots in the RAF area claimed another 15; analysis by Cull et
al. in 1999 attributed 34 Luftwaffe aircraft destroyed or damaged to Hurricane
pilots.
12 May 1940
At 7:00 a.m., nine Blenheims of
139 Squadron flew from Plivot to attack a German column near Tongeren but were
intercepted by fifty Bf 109s and lost seven aircraft, two of the crews
returning on foot after crash-landing. At Amifontaine, 12 Squadron was briefed
for an attack on the bridges near Maastricht with six Battles. After the fate
of the Belgian Battles the day before, the commander asked for volunteers and
every pilot stepped forward; the six crews on standby were chosen. Two Blenheim
squadrons were supposed to attack Maastricht at the same time as a diversion
and twelve Hurricane squadrons were flying in support but half of these were
operating to the north-west and the others were only flying in the vicinity,
except for 1 Squadron, which was to sweep ahead to clear away German fighters.
Three Battles of B Flight were to
attack the bridge at Veldwezelt and three from A Flight the bridge at
Vroenhoven. Two Battles of A Flight took off at 8:00 a.m. and climbed to 7,000
ft (2,100 m); 15 mi (24 km) short of Maastricht, the aircraft received
anti-aircraft fire, surprising the crews with the extent of the German advance.
The Hurricane pilots saw about 120 German fighters above them and attacked;
three Bf 109s and six Hurricanes were shot down. During the diversion, A Flight
dived over the Maastricht−Tongeren road towards the Vroenhoven bridge covered
by three Hurricanes; a Bf 109 closed on the leading aircraft, then veered off
towards the second Battle, which hid in a cloud. The Battles dived from 6,000
ft (1,800 m) and bombed at 2,000 ft (610 m), both being hit in the engine, one
Battle came down in a field, the crew being captured. The second Battle crew,
having shaken off the Bf 109, saw bombs from the first Battle explode on the
bridge and hit the water and the side of the canal. The pilot turned away
through a web of tracer from ground fire and was hit by a Bf 109, then the rear
gunner damaged the German fighter. The port fuel tank caught fire, the pilot
ordered the crew to parachute and then noticed that the fire had gone out. The
pilot nursed the bomber home but ran out of fuel a few miles short and landed
in a field; the observer got back to Amifontaine but the gunner was taken
prisoner.
Five minutes later, B Flight
attacked the bridge at Veldwezelt, having flown over Belgium in line astern at
50 ft (15 m). One Battle was hit and caught fire before the target, bombed and
crashed near the canal; the pilot, despite severe burns, saving the crew who
were taken prisoner. A second Battle was hit, zoomed while on fire, dived into
the ground and exploded, killing the crew. The third Battle made a steep turn
near the bridge then dived into it, destroying the west end. German engineers
began immediately to build a pontoon bridge and as they worked, 24 Blenheims
from 2 Group in England attacked the bridges at Maastricht; ten were shot down.
At 1:00 p.m. 18 Breguet 693s from GA 18 with Morane 406 fighter escorts,
attacked German tank columns in the area of Hasselt, St Trond, Liège and
Maastricht, losing eight bombers. Twelve LeO 451s attacked columns around
Tongeren, St Trond and Waremme at 6:30 p.m. and survived, despite most being
damaged. Late in the afternoon, fifteen Battles flew against German troops near
Bouillon and six were shot down. During the night, forty Blenheims of 2 Group
flew in relays against the Maastricht bridges with few losses.
At daybreak, the AASF intervened
against the German advance towards Sedan for the first time, three Battles of
103 Squadron attacking a bridge over the Semois, the last river east of the
Meuse. The Battles flew very low and all returned. At about 1:00 p.m. three
more Battles of 103 squadron attacked the bridge from 4,000 ft (1,200 m) and
were intercepted by Bf 110s. The Battles dived and hedge hopped to evade the
fighters, bombing a pontoon bridge next to the ruins of the original one from
20 ft (6.1 m) and escaped. At about 3:00 p.m. three Battles of 150 Squadron
bombed German columns around Neufchâteau and Bertrix, east of Bouillon. One
Battle was hit and crashed in flames but the other two bombed from 100 ft (30
m) and got away. At 5:00 p.m. three 103 Squadron Battles and three from 218
Squadron attacked in the vicinity of Bouillon, the Battles from 103 Squadron
flew individually at low altitude and those of 218 Squadron flew in formation
at 1,000 ft (300 m). General cover was provided by the Hurricanes of 73
Squadron but they claimed only a Henschel Hs 126 reconnaissance aircraft. Two
218 Squadron Battles were shot down and the low-level attack by 103 Squadron
cost two more, the squadron having decided to dispense with the navigator for
tactical operations by day.
The surviving crew of 103
Squadron had also protected themselves by attacking a German tank column west
of the target and running for home, according to the original AASF intention of
attacking the first German troops encountered. Barratt had decided that the
Battles should attack from a higher altitude to reduce losses from ground fire
but Playfair took the view that the new policy would not put the Battles out of
range of German anti-aircraft guns. The results of the operations on 12 May
gave no conclusive evidence that low attacks were more dangerous. In the sixty
sorties since 10 May the Battle squadrons had lost thirty aircraft and in the
evening Barratt was ordered to conserve his force until the climax of the
battle. In emergencies, the AASF was supposed to maintain a tempo of two-hourly
attacks but this proved impossible; Playfair was ordered to rest the Battle
squadrons on 13 May. By the end of the day, the AASF had been reduced to 72
serviceable bombers. AASF and Air Component Hurricanes were confronted by more
Bf 109s over the front line, which shot down at least six of the twelve
Hurricanes lost. The two Hurricane forces claimed 60 Luftwaffe aircraft shot
down, probables or damaged, 27 being attributed to them in a 1999 analysis.
13 May 1940
Fifty miles north of the AASF
bases, opposite the Meuse, the crisis of the battle of France was beginning but
the Allied commanders still took the threat in the Low Countries more
seriously. Four Battles of 76 Wing (12, 142 and 226 squadrons) received orders
to attack German forces around Wageningen, about 250 mi (400 km) away but the
raid was cancelled because of poor weather. Later on, seven Battles of 226
Squadron were sent to attack German columns near Breda, 200 mi (320 km)
distant, despite the target being closer to 2 Group in England. No German
columns were found; the Battles demolished a factory to block the road and
returned safely. Information about the situation on the Meuse began to arrive
and AASF HQ began to consider a contingency plan to evacuate to fields further
south. During the evening a French pilot saw Germans crossing the Meuse at
Dinant and landed at the 12 Squadron base, which was the closest, quickly to
attack the German crossing but Playfair and Barratt refused to allow it.
Pressure on the British air commanders increased during the night when
Billotte, the commander of Groupe d'armées 1 (1st Army Group), told Barratt and
d'Astier that "victory or defeat hinges on the destruction of those
bridges".
The Germans had bridgeheads on
the west bank of the Meuse and were building pontoon bridges to get tanks
across; Barratt and d'Astier were told to make an immediate maximum effort.
Unlike the permanent bridges attacked on 12 May, the German defenses at Sedan
were not organized, pontoon bridges were more vulnerable and the river was much
closer to the AASF airfields, commensurately further from Luftwaffe bases.
French bombers made two attacks during the day and overnight the French bombed
German rear areas as the Blenheims of 2 Group attacked the Maastricht bridges
and railways at Aachen and Eindhoven. Ten Hurricanes were lost on 13 May, six
to German fighters for a claim of five Bf 109s and five Bf 110s, double the
number eventually attributed to AASF and Air Component Hurricanes. Total claims
were 37 German aircraft shot down, probables or damaged and 21 recognized in a
1999 analysis. The Hurricane squadrons in France lost 27 fighters shot down, 22
to German fighters, seventeen pilots being killed and five wounded. The
Hurricane pilots claimed 83 German aircraft shot down, probables or damaged,
later reduced to 46.
14 May 1940
At dawn, six Battles from 103
Squadron attacked the pontoon bridges over the Meuse at Gaulier north of Sedan;
all of the Battles returned and some of the pontoons may have been damaged. At
7:00 a.m., four Battles attacked and returned safely. French apprehensions
about the situation grew so intense that the Armée de l'Air decided to use
obsolete Amiot 143 bombers and Barratt agreed to make a maximum effort.
Hurricane squadrons from the north were to reinforce the AASF but still only to
fly in the general area of the Battles, along with French fighters. After a
second attack from the French-based bombers, 2 Group were to attack from
England. At 9:00 a.m. eight Breguet 693s with fifteen Hurricane and fifteen
Bloch 152 fighter escorts, attacked German tanks at Bazeilles and the pontoons
between Douzy and Vrigne-sur-Meuse, against scattered anti-aircraft and fighter
opposition; all the Breguets returned. Just after noon, eight LeO 451s and 13
Amiot 143s, also with fifteen Hurricane and fifteen Bloch 152 fighter escorts,
attacked the same targets; three Amiots and a LeO were shot down. From 3:00
p.m. to 3:45 p.m. 45 Battles attacked the bridges and 18 Battles with eight
Blenheims went for German columns. Some Battles flew higher, reducing the risk
of hits by ground fire but became more vulnerable to fighters.
Five Battles from 12 Squadron dive-bombed
a crossroads at Givonne against intense small-arms fire; two managed to bomb
but only one Battle returned. Eight Battles from 142 Squadron flew in pairs to
attack pontoon bridges from low level, with bombs fuzed for an eleven-second
delay. The pairs were intercepted by German fighters; four Battles were shot
down, at least two by fighters. Six Battles of 226 Squadron tried to dive-bomb
bridges at Douzy and Mouzon against ground fire. One aircraft was damaged and
turned back; three more Battles were shot down. Seven of eleven 105 Squadron
Battles were lost, one Battle landing at a nearby friendly airfield and another
crash-landing. Four Battles of 150 Squadron were shot down by Bf 109s and eight
from 103 Squadron bombed the Meuse crossings at very low altitude or in dives.
Three of the Battles were hit but made it back to Allied areas before
crash-landing, all but one pilot surviving and returning to base. Ten of eleven
Battles from 218 Squadron were shot down and of the ten Battles from 88 Squadron,
four against bridges and six to bomb columns between Bouillon and Givonne, nine
returned. The operation was the costliest to the RAF of its kind in the war; 35
Battles and been lost from the 63 that attacked, along with five of the eight
Blenheims. The survivors were too damaged to form a second wave. The afternoon
attacks had met a much more effective defense than those in the morning and
flying higher over German ground fire had only brought the Battles closer to
German fighters. The German XIX Corps reported constant air attacks, which
delayed the crossing of German tanks to the west bank of the Meuse.
Every serviceable French bomber
had flown and since 10 May, the Armeé de l'Air had lost 135 fighters, 21
bombers and 76 other aircraft. Six Battle crews returned on foot through
German-held territory but 102 aircrew had been killed or captured and more than
200 Hurricanes had been lost in four days. As night fell, 28 Blenheims of 2
Group attacked the bridges and seven were shot down, two coming down behind Allied
lines. In Britain, Air Marshal Hugh Dowding, the Air Officer Commanding RAF
Fighter Command, was heard by the War Cabinet. Having already been ordered to
send another 32 Hurricanes to France, Dowding urged that French requests for
another ten fighter squadrons be refused. The Air Staff took the losses as
proof that tactical operations were not worth the cost, despite it working so
well for the Luftwaffe and judged the Battle to be obsolete, despite the
Blenheim, German Junkers Ju 87s and the new French Breguet 693 bombers
suffering just as many losses when not escorted by fighters. Playfair and
Barratt appealed for more fighters and got a few, despite calls from everywhere
for more. Barratt demanded that no more Battles be sent to France without self-sealing
tanks, until then the Battles would fly at night, except for crews with
insufficient training in night operations or in dire emergency. The AASF and
Air Component Hurricane squadrons lost 27 aircraft, 22 to German fighters, 15
pilots being killed and four wounded; another two pilots had been killed and
one wounded by German bombers or ground fire. The Hurricane squadrons claimed
83 German aircraft shot down, probables or damaged and a 1999 analysis
attributed 46 German aircraft shot down or damaged to British fighters.
15-16 May 1940
After the AASF losses from 10 to
14 May, attacks on the Meuse bridgeheads on 15 may were made by Bomber Command
squadrons based in England. German mobile forces broke out of the bridgehead at
Sedan and at 11:00 a.m. twelve Blenheims from 2 Group attacked German columns
around Dinant as 150 French fighters patrolled in relays. The RAF sent another
sixteen Blenheims escorted by 27 French fighters at 3:00 p.m. to attack bridges
near Samoy and German tanks at Monthermé and Mezières, from which four
Blenheims were lost. On the night of 15/16 May around twenty Battles flew and
attacked targets at Bouillon, Sedan and Monthermé for no loss but cloud cover
made navigation and target finding difficult; fires were seen but no-one claimed
great results. Night raids were suspended because Barratt expected the Germans
to wheel south behind the Maginot Line and ordered the Battle squadrons to
retire to bases around Troyes in southern Champagne, where during the Phoney
War, the army and the RAF had prepared many airfields and several grass
airstrips.
Amid confusion cause by Luftwaffe
attacks on the airfields and roads full of troops and refugees, the squadrons
began to retire, many of the Battle squadrons being out of action during the
moves, which turned out to be unnecessary when the Germans drove west instead
of south. The AASF had been deemed a static unit, protected by the Maginot Line
and was 600 lorries short of even its slender establishment of vehicles. The
AASF was fortunate that the Germans went west and there was time to fetch most
of the equipment, using 300 new lorries from the US, loaned by the French, at
the behest of the Air Attaché in Paris. Drivers were rushed by air from Britain
but were ignorant of the vehicles, the locations of AASF bases and of France;
someone loaded the starting handles, jacks and tools onto a lorry bound for the
west coast, under the impression that they were superfluous spare parts. BAFF
losses since 10 May stood at 86 Battles, 39 Blenheims, nine Westland Lysander
army co-operation aircraft and 71 Hurricanes; Bomber Command had lost 43
aircraft, mainly from 2 Group. The AASF and Air Component Hurricanes suffered
21 losses, half to Bf 110s and three to Bf 109s; five pilots were killed, two
taken prisoner and four were wounded. The Hurricane pilots claimed fifty German
aircraft, later reduced to 27 in a 1999 analysis by Cull, Lander and Weiss. On
16 May, 103 Squadron moved south with full bomb loads to be ready as soon as
they reached their new airfields but the squadron was not called on and the
other squadrons seemed more intent on settling in, despite the disaster on the
Meuse.
17 May 1940
The nine surviving Blenheims of
114 and 139 squadrons were transferred to the Air Component, reducing the AASF
to six Battle and three Hurricane squadrons; for the next five days the AASF
flew few missions, most of those at night. The AASF withdrew 105 and 218
squadrons and their remaining aircraft, transferring crews to the other
squadrons; 218 Squadron aircraft flying a few sorties before the change. The
six squadrons sent away as much superfluous equipment as possible to become
more mobile. In March, 98 Squadron had been based at Nantes as a reserve and
sent crews and machines to the active squadrons; a shortage of gunners led to
pilots substituting for gunners on occasion.
Bomber Command sent twelve
Blenheims of 82 Squadron, 2 Group, to attack German troops at Gembloux; ten
were shot down by Bf 109s, an eleventh by ground fire and the twelfth Blenheim
was damaged but returned to base. As the French armies and the BEF in the north
retreated, the most exposed Air Component squadrons were withdrawn westwards
and land line communication with BAFF HQ, south of the German advance, was cut.
No Hurricane pilots of the AASF and Air Component were killed but a minimum of
16 Hurricanes were shot down and one pilot taken prisoner. AASF, Air Component
and 11 Group squadrons claimed 55 Luftwaffe aircraft shot down, probables or
damaged, later reduced to 28 by Cull et al.
18 May 1940
On 18 May, the Battle squadrons
were on stand-by but only 103 Squadron flew operations. Targets around St
Quentin were bombed but low-level attacks were abandoned and with no escorts,
the Battles flew in ones and twos, as fast as possible, trusting the maneuverability
of the Battle rather than formation flying to evade fighters, despite being 100
mph (160 km/h) slower. The Battles flew at 8,000 ft (2,400 m) and attacked in a
shallow dive, dropping bombs with instantaneous fuses at 4,000 ft (1,200 m),
all the Battles returning safely. At least of 33 Hurricanes were shot down,
most by German fighters. Seven pilots were killed, five made prisoners of war
and four were wounded. Half of the Hurricane claims were against bombers and
many Bf 110 fighters were shot down. The AASF and Air Component Hurricane
squadrons claimed 97 German aircraft shot down, probables or damaged, later
reduced by Cull et al. to 46.
19 May 1940
On 19 May the German advance in
the north led to the Air Component squadrons retiring to English bases. The
AASF had 12, 88, 103, 142, 150, 218 and 226 squadrons available. D'Astier tried
to support a counter-attack near Laon but the AASF HQ was out of touch and
Barratt knew nothing about it, except that German forces were west of the
Montcornet–Neufchâtel road. Reconnaissance reports showed Barrett that to the
east, more German troops were north of Rethel, a threat to the AASF bases
further south. All but 226 Squadron was ordered make another maximum effort by
day against anything they saw on the roads between Rethel and Montcornet. The
wrong orders reached 88 Squadron which attacked around Hirson an important
point on the German drive west and 142 Squadron attacked targets far to the
west around Laon, near the French counter-attack, unlike the Rethel area, which
was on the fringe of the offensive and only occupied by screening forces. Six
Battles of 150 Squadron attacked road columns near Fraillicourt and Chappes,
against intense anti-aircraft fire, one Battle being shot down and two making
emergency landings at the nearest Allied airfield.
The crews of 218 Squadron bombed
tanks and lorries near Hauteville and Château-Porcien, in shallow dives from
7,000 to 6,000 ft (2,100 to 1,800 m), bombing from 4,000 to 2,000 ft (1,220 to
610 m). Plenty of targets were found by 88 Squadron, which with 218 Squadron,
lost no aircraft. Three Battles from 142 Squadron were shot down west of Laon
and of six Battles sent by 12 Squadron north or Rethel, which found only one
column to bomb, two were lost, one to a Bf 109. Six Battles sent by 103
Squadron bombed targets near Rethel and all came home. The raids did nothing
assist the French counter-attack. The Germans had passed beyond the terrain
bottlenecks further east. Six Battles out of 36 had been lost, an 18 per cent loss
rate, which was a considerable improvement on the 50 per cent rate from 10 to
15 May but still unsustainable. Barratt concluded that night operations were
the only way to save the Battle force from destruction. AASF and Air Component
Hurricanes claimed 112 Luftwaffe aircraft shot down, probables or damaged
(later reduced to 56) for a loss of 22 Hurricanes shot down and 13
force-landed, 24 to Bf 109s, which suffered 14 losses to the Hurricanes. Eight
fighter pilots were killed, seven were wounded and three taken prisoner.
20-21 May 1940
On 20 May, 73 Squadron flew one
patrol, 1 and 501 squadrons being rested and no claims or losses were recorded
for the AASF Hurricanes. The commander of 1 Squadron asked for the relief of
tired pilots and eight were immediately dispatched, three arriving the same
day. Twelve Hurricanes were shot down, at least seven by ground fire while
strafing, three pilots being killed and one captured. AASF and Air Component
pilots claimed forty aircraft shot down, probables or damaged, reduced by Cull
et al. to 18. During the night of 20/21 May, 38 Battles were sent to bomb
communications around Givet, Dinant, Fumay, Monthermé and Charleville-Mézières.
Misty conditions around the Meuse led to few of the Battle pilots claiming hits
on anything and one aircraft was lost.
Delays caused to the German
advance in these areas could have no effect on the beginning of the Battle of
Arras 100 mi (160 km) to the west. On 21 May the AASF and Air Component
Hurricanes claimed four German aircraft, three of which were recognized by Cull
et al. for the loss of three Hurricanes, one pilot killed, one taken prisoner
and one returned unhurt. The AASF bombers resumed daylight operations and 33
Battles, in small flights, attacked German columns near Reims, indirectly
supported by 26 Hurricanes in the area. Attacks near Le Cateau and St Quentin
could have been on French troops by mistake; poor air reconnaissance made it
difficult to find German forces or their objectives.
21-22 May 1940
By 21 May only some Lysanders of
4 Squadron, attached to the BEF HQ, were all that remained of the Air Component
in France. The pilots of the three AASF Hurricane squadrons were exhausted;
most of those of 1 Squadron was replaced and 73 Squadron pilots were given
notice of their replacement; the 501 Squadron pilots, having been in France
only since 10 May, had to remain. Hurricane reconnaissance sorties discovered
the German advance from Cambrai on Arras and the ground control organization at
Merville ordered the Hurricanes that were airborne to strafe them. When fighter
squadrons on escort or fighter patrol turned for home, they began to use up
their ammunition on ground targets. The fighters still attacked in tight
formations and in fifty ground strafing sorties by the various British fighter
forces in France, six Hurricanes were shot down and three pilots killed. With
another French counter-attack due on 22 May, the British government demanded a
greater effort from the RAF and during the night of 21/22 May, 41 Battles were
prepared for raids on the Ardennes.
After 12 Battles had taken off,
the Air Ministry cancelled the operation in favor of operations the next day
around Amiens, Arras and Abbeville against German tanks. Barratt's better
judgment since tanks were small targets and the Battles would have to attack at
low altitude. The patrol area was too far west to assist a French
counter-attack south from Douai on Cambrai but might have had an effect on
operations on the right flank of the BEF. The weather remained poor and after
several aircraft took off, the raid was cancelled. Tanks were seen around
Doullens, Amiens and Bapaume and one was claimed for the loss of one Battle and
three damaged. Night operations by the AASF Battles against the Meuse crossings
had suffered few losses but their training in night flying during the spring
could not overcome the inherent difficulty of night navigation and
target-finding. During the night of 22/23 May, 103 Squadron was sent to bomb
Trier on the German–Luxembourg border.
23 May 1940
Uncertainty about supporting an
Allied attack south or a retreat north, led to a dawn attack by the Battles of
88 Squadron around Douai and Arras being cancelled. To prevent an Allied
retreat to Dunkirk being cut off, bombing of German forces to the north-west of
Arras was substituted. The new raid was cancelled too and 88 Squadron flew no
operations. In the evening, 12 Squadron sent four Battles against German tanks
on the Arras–Doullens road but the weather deteriorated and only two of the
bombers found the target; all four aircraft returned. Four Battles from 150
Squadron made dive-bombing attacks on German tanks at the exit of the village
of Ransart and vehicles in a stand of trees further south. One pilot dropped
his bombs then strafed another column that appeared, despite considerable
anti-aircraft fire; the four Battles survived despite all being met with ground
fire. During the night of 23/24 May, 37 Battles bombed targets at Monthermé and
Fumay. Hurricane squadrons of the AASF and Fighter Command engaged Bf 109s in
northern France, claiming six fighters for the loss of ten Hurricanes.
24 May 1940
No Battle sorties were flown in
daylight on 24 May but 73 Squadron Hurricanes from Gaye, near Paris, claimed
one Luftwaffe aircraft for the loss of two aircraft and one pilot severely
burned. During the night of 24/25 May 41 Battles attacked railway sidings at
Libramont, supply dumps at Florenville and the roads through Sedan, Fumay,
Givet and Dinant with 20 lb (9.1 kg) incendiary, 40 lb (18 kg) anti-personnel
and the usual 250 lb (110 kg) bombs. AASF night sorties equaled the number
flown by the Armée de l'Air but the Battles were not built for night
operations, despite night flying training; the limited view from the observer
compartment left the occupant unable to help with target finding. Long-range
night sorties were extremely difficult and attacks on the Meuse crossings from
the AASF bases around Troyes required a 100 mi (160 km) cross-country flight.
The Allied retreats towards the Channel and North Sea coasts had multiplied the
number of supply routes open to the German armies, making attacks on the Meuse
crossings less effective.
25 May 1940
During the night of 24/25 May,
Frankfurt, 100 mi (160 km) over the German border, was attacked by 88 Squadron,
a 250 mi (400 km)-flight of dubious relevance to the fighting in France and
Belgium. During the day, about ten Battles from various squadrons attacked
German columns on the Abbeville–Hesdin road for the loss of one aircraft, the
crew managing to return on foot. A Do 17 was claimed by 73 Squadron for the
loss of a Hurricane and the capture of the pilot. The code-breakers at
Bletchley Park in Britain decrypted a Luftwaffe signal received at 1:30 p.m.,
that revealed a conference of Luftwaffe commanders to be held on the next day
at the HQ of Fliegerkorps VIII at 9:00 a.m. in Roumont Château, near Libramont
in southern Belgium. The commanders were to arrive at Ochamps airfield nearby,
at 8:30 a.m. The Air Ministry received the information in the early hours of 25/26
May and signaled the news to the AASF HQ at 2:40 a.m., sending more
intelligence at 5:15 a.m.
26 May 1940
Playfair passed orders to attack
the château to 103, 142 and 150 squadrons at 7:30 a.m. At 9:00 a.m. fourteen
Battles set off for the target supported by Hurricanes of 1 and 73 squadrons.
The Battles flew in pairs and the leader of the two aircraft from 150 Squadron
lost touch with the other Battle after flying into a storm and descending to
5,000 ft (1,500 m). The crew eventually found the château, dive-bombed from
3,000 ft (910 m) and were attacked by four Bf 110s. The pilot tried to hedge
hop out of danger and as the Bf 110s gave chase, the pilot fired at a German
aircraft he had spotted landing on an airstrip ahead. The Battle was hit on the
armor fitted to resist fighter attack and the robust structure of the airframe
protected the crew; the pilot only had to force-land after the engine was hit.
The pilot escaped but the navigator and gunner were taken prisoner. Most of the
rest of the Battles found the target through the stormy weather and damaged the
building but inflicted no casualties; a second Battle was lost. No more
operations in daylight took place until 28 May.
27-31 May 1940
The Battles were grounded by bad
weather on the night of 26/27 May but thirty-six Battles attacked German
targets on the night of 27/28 May and a fire was reported after bombing near
Florenville in Belgium. The weather grounded most of the Battles on the nights
of 28/29, 29/30 and 30/31 May. On 28 May, the AASF Battles began attacks to
obstruct the massing of German forces on the Somme and Aisne rivers and the
bridgeheads that the Germans had established over the Somme. The Battles used
'40 lb' (17.5 kg) General Purpose bombs during the day for the first time,
which could be dropped from lower altitudes and were better suited to hit
dispersed troops and vehicles. Six Battles from 226 Squadron attempted to
dive-bomb targets around Laon but failed because of low cloud; three tried to
bomb targets through gaps in the clouds and three returned with their loads.
Six more 226 Squadron Battles
were later sent to bomb roads into Amiens and Péronne; one Battle returned
early after a window panel blew out and the others used steep or shallow
dive-bombing attacks against German troops and transport. After bombing, the
pilots used their forward-firing guns to strafe every German column they saw,
one pilot taking five minutes to exhaust his ammunition; a Battle received
damage but all returned. Day sorties were also flown by 103 Squadron on the
roads into Abbeville, one Battle being severely damaged. Since 14 May the
Battles had flown about 100 sorties by day for a loss of nine aircraft, a
considerable reduction in the rate of loss, despite the lack of self-sealing
fuel tanks, un-armored engines and no close fighter escorts. The weather
prevented night sorties on 26/27 May but on the night of 27/28 May, 36 Battles
flew and fires were reported in Florenville; no other effect being reported by
the crews. Few sorties were flown on the nights of 28/29, 29/30 and 30/31 May
because of bad weather. Since 10 May, the AASF had lost more than 119 aircrew
killed and 100 Battles.
Fall Rot
1-4 June 1940
Operations in May proved the
French right about the lack of fighters in the AASF. Fighter sweeps and patrols
in the general area of Battle operations had proved futile and Barratt judged
that day bombers needed close escort by fighters if they were to survive. From
20 May, Blenheims flying from Britain had received escorts and losses were
drastically reduced; the AASF Battles needed similar protection from more than
three fighter squadrons. Barratt informed the Air Ministry that either the
fighters should be reinforced or the bombers returned to Britain. Given the
desperate situation in France, returning the AASF was unthinkable; Barrett said
that fighter reinforcements were needed immediately, not as a panic measure
once the German offensive resumed. The British government and the Air Staff
refused to weaken British air defenses and not even the AASF fighter losses
were replaced. Barrett decided to limit daylight Battle sorties to the number
that the Hurricanes could escort and keep the rest on night raids. The build-up
in the bridgeheads over the Somme at Péronne, Amiens and Abbeville continued,
making German intentions obvious.
The AASF bombers were used to
interrupt the German preparations on the night of 31 May/1 June but some
Battles were sent to attack the Rhine bridges near Mainz, about 100 mi (160 km)
east of the Meuse; military traffic over the Rhine could have no influence on
the battle soon to begin. The night bombing operations were also disrupted by
the move of the Battle squadrons from their airfields around Troyes to Tours,
150 mi (240 km) west of Paris, 200 mi (320 km) from the nearest German forces
and 300 mi (480 km) from targets in the Ardennes. The Battles of 12 Squadron
moved from Échemines to Sougé then had to use Échemines as an advanced base.
During the move, 103 and 150 squadrons flew several sorties against targets in
the Ardennes and Germany and on the night of 3/4 June 12 Squadron sent five
sorties to attack rail lines near Trier. On 4 June, the Battle squadrons were
stood down for maintenance and to "settle in"; Fall Rot (the German
offensive) began the next day.
5 June 1940
The German offensive over the
Somme and Aisne rivers began with attacks from the three Somme bridgeheads but
made only slow progress. The AASF had only 18 operational Hurricanes, which
were used to protect Rouen, not the Battles, which had not flown in daylight since
28 May. With the French sending every aircraft that could fly, Barratt returned
the Battles to day operations. At 7:30 p.m. eleven Battles of 12 and 150
squadrons flew to Échemines and then attacked German columns on the
Péronne–Roye and Amiens–Montdidier roads, although many crews failed to find
targets and some mistakenly attacked French tanks near Tricot, 25 mi (40 km)
behind the French front line; when French fighters arrived, the Battles flew
away. The AASF used Échemines and other airfields as advanced bases for day and
night operations, despite complaints that their facilities were inadequate and
that Échemines had recently been in use as a main base. The German armies
managed to enlarge the Somme bridgeheads by nightfall and during the night, Battles
attacked the airfield near Guise but eleven were sent to attack targets in the
Ardennes, which was of no help to the French armies.
6 June 1940
The three AASF fighter squadrons
were brought up to strength, although this was still inadequate; a deputation
from the 51st (Highland) Division even went to BAFF HQ to demand more
protection. Nine Battles escorted by a flight of 73 Squadron Hurricanes flew
from Échemines at 4:30 p.m. against German columns on the Ham–Péronne road and
others bombed tanks and vehicles between Péronne and Roye. Bf 109s got past the
Hurricanes and attacked two Battles, which survived. Raids that night were made
closer to the front line, where they might have immediate effect and the pilots
flew lower. After the first take-off attempt at 11:45 p.m. and a second try at
1:15 a.m. were interrupted by German air raids, Battles from Harbouville
attacked a Somme bridge north of Abbeville, roads out of the town and roads out
of Amiens. As the Battles returned, several were damaged by another German
raid. At Échemines, twelve Battles set forth to bomb airfields and other
targets near Laon, Guise ad St Quentin, one pilot claiming hits on a fuel dump.
7 June 1940
The French defense of the
Abbeville bridgehead began to collapse and 22 Battles attacked German columns
between the Abbeville–Blangy-sur-Bresle road and Poix. The aircraft bombed from
2,000 to 3,000 ft (610 to 910 m) to evade ground fire, despite having an escort
of only a flight of 73 Squadron Hurricanes, the escorts flying close to the
bombers. When escorted, the Battles flew to the target in formation, attacked
singly then ran for home. When there were no escorts, the Battles flew alone or
in pairs, relying on their maneuverability to escape from fighters, their
targets being close enough to the front line to give them a chance of escaping;
several Battles survived fighter attacks but three were shot down. In the first
three days of Fall Rot the Battles flew 42 day sorties for a loss of three
aircraft, despite their lack of self-sealing fuel tanks, armor against ground
fire and the small number of escorts. The reduction in losses was marked but 17
French day bomber groups had managed to fly 300 sorties over the same period;
Barrett remained reluctant to risk more Battles in daylight.
8 June 1940
As the French armies resisted the
German offensive from the Somme bridgeheads, reconnaissance aircraft returned
with evidence of an imminent German attack over the Aisne, to the east of
Paris. During the night of 7/8 June, eight Battles attacked the Laon–Soissons
road after German tanks were reported there. The battle at the Somme
bridgeheads retained its priority because the French defenses north of Amiens
began to collapse (Poix having been lost on the evening of 7 June). The AASF
fighters was reinforced by 17 Squadron and 242 Squadron from England. At 1:30
p.m. twelve Battles attacked German columns in the area of Abbeville, Longpré,
Poix and Aumale, escorted by seven Hurricanes; three Battles were shot down. At
3:30 p.m. another eleven Battles attacked, despite the Hurricane escorts not
arriving; the pilots reported that German tank and lorry columns were 5 mi (8.0
km) long and one Battle was lost. As one pilot returned, he saw a formation of
Ju 87s, dived through and damaged one Stuka with his forward-firing gun, before
the Bf 109 escorts intervened. The Battle gunner was wounded but claimed a Bf
109 and the pilot made an emergency landing south of Paris; another Battle
pilot engaged a Junkers Ju 88 bomber.
9 June 1940
During the night of 8/9 June,
several Battles bombed the Somme river crossings at Amiens and Abbeville and
seven sorties were flown against the forests around Laon, north of the Aisne,
where German troops were thought to be hiding. During the day, an attack on
German tank, artillery and troop columns near Argueil was planned but the
diversion of the Hurricanes to protect the 51st (Highland) Division led to the
operation being cancelled. The expected German offensive over the Aisne began
against determined French resistance but on the Channel coast the Germans had
broken through. During the night of 9/10 June, ten Battles were sent to bomb
bridges and roads at Abbeville and Amiens; nine more, using the staging post of
Échemines airfield, attacked targets around Laon, dropping incendiary bombs on
Forêt de Saint-Gobain to the north-west, to flush out German troops thought to
be using it for cover; lorries driving south with their lights on were also
attacked.
10 June 1940
In the afternoon, twelve Battles
attacked German units close to Vernon on the Seine, about half-way between
Paris and Rouen; one Battle being shot down and another damaged, thought to
have been hit by a Hurricane. Later, twelve Battles attacked German motorized
columns near Vernon, the Seine bridge at Pont Saint-Pierre and a bridge further
south. Despite all of the Hurricanes being sent to cover the evacuation from Le
Havre, no Battles were lost. Fifteen Battles returned to the targets after dark
and seven were sent to attack the Meuse crossings.
11 June 1940
The speed of the German advance
made the use of forward airfields like Échemies as staging posts redundant and
at dawn, twelve Battles bombed crossings over the Seine to the south of Les
Andelys. Around noon, six Battles with fighter escort bombed more bridges in the
area and in the afternoon sixteen escorted Battles made similar attacks. After
a request from the French naval commander of Le Havre to attack tanks thought
to be close to the port, six Battles with escorts tried to attack the tanks but
found only a couple of armored vehicles and attacked them. It turned out that
the tanks had reached the coast and turned north to cut off the French IX Corps
and the 51st (Highland) Division. The Battles had managed a minimum of 38
sorties for a loss of two or three aircraft. Another 24 Battles were to
continue the attacks downstream of Rouen that night but only five took off due
to inclement weather.
12 June 1940
At dawn, nine Battles bombed the
roads around Les Andelys, north of the Seine, for no loss. In the afternoon, twelve
Battles bombed a concentration of vehicles blocked at the Pont de l'Arche
railway bridge south of Le Manoir, forcing German engineers repairing it to
flee for cover, also for no loss. An attack on pontoon bridges south of Les
Andelys was thought to have failed in poor visibility, for one Battle lost and
one damaged. Fifteen Battles were sent out to the roads around Les Andelys that
night but only seven reached the target in more poor weather.
13 June 1940
At dawn six battles flew an armed
reconnaissance around Vernon and Évreux, again in poor weather, which made it
impossible for fighters to escort the Battles, difficult for the crews to see
targets and for German fighters to intercept them; there were no losses. Later
operations by 150 and 142 squadrons flew in such bad weather that two of the
seven Battles turned back. No fighters were able to escort the Battles but four
were shot down by Bf 109s. During the afternoon, the French armies east of
Paris tried to retreat from the Aisne to the Marne but two armies diverged and
German armored columns rushed through the gap, overtaking some of the
retreating French troops past Montmirail towards the Seine. At 3:00 p.m. twelve
Battles attacked German columns south of the town and lost one Battle. So many
German tanks and vehicles were seen that a maximum effort was made by 26
Battles without fighter escort, except for some French fighters which were busy
protecting French bombers. The British bombers were engaged by German fighters
and massed anti-aircraft fire; six Battles were shot down, four by fighters.
Paris was declared an open city and with the end of hostilities likely,
preparations to evacuate the AASF continued as the Battle squadrons fought on
without fighter escorts.
14–26 June 1940
Fighter operations were still
hampered by bad weather and escorting the Battles was made more difficult by a
disorganized retirement of the fighter squadrons to other airfields. Ten
Battles tried to attack German columns near Évreux but could not find them in
the bad weather and two Battles reconnoitering near Paris spotted two Bf 109s
on Le Coudray airfield, south of Paris, which had just been evacuated. During
the afternoon, nine Battles attacked woods around Évreux and the airfield, two
of the three bombers from 12 Squadron being shot down. Orders arrived from
Britain during the evening for the Battle squadrons to return and the AASF
bombers prepared to make a final attack at dawn. Ten Battles of 150 Squadron,
with Hurricane escorts, took off to attack targets around Évreux again, then
landed at Nantes, the first stage of their departure from France; the other
squadrons managed twelve sorties and took the same route back; about sixty
Battles returning to Britain. The remaining AASF Hurricanes began operations to
cover evacuations from ports on the French Atlantic coast. Nantes, Brest and St
Nazaire were defended by 1, 73 and 242 squadrons, St Malo and Cherbourg by 17
and 501 squadrons flying from Dinard in Brittany and later the Channel Islands.
On 18 June, 1 and 73 squadrons, the first to France in 1939, were the last to
leave, although many unserviceable Hurricanes and those without fuel were
abandoned, not all of them being destroyed. AASF headquarters was disbanded on
26 June 1940.
Aftermath
Analysis
Fighters
Flying Officer Paul Richey of 1
Squadron told a staff officer from AASF HQ that
We're operating in penny packets and are always hopelessly inferior in
numbers to the formations we meet. My humble opinion is that we should not
operate in formations less than two squadrons strong on bomber cover.
and in 1999, Cull et al. wrote
that Hurricane tactics in France were inept, the fighters being sent into
action in threes or sixes against far larger Luftwaffe formations. Fighter
pilots had been trained to attack bombers over England, beyond the range of
German single-engined fighter escorts and formation flying received more
emphasis than observation, dog-fighting and gunnery.
Experience gained during the
Phoney War was not generally applied; some Hurricane pilots enjoyed great
success but the Hurricane squadrons suffered needless casualties for lack of
training and leadership. The use of tight formations meant that Hurricane
pilots seldom saw the aircraft that shot them down. Few squadron commanders
flew on operations and some were flagrantly incompetent. Flying from improvised
and unprotected airstrips, rather than the airfields enjoyed by the Fighter
Command squadrons in Britain, reduced the number of serviceable aircraft. Most
Hurricane engagements took place against bombers, reconnaissance aircraft and
the twin-engined Bf 110 heavy fighter, inferior in maneuverability but present
in much greater numbers. The Hurricanes made bomber escorts necessary but
suffered disproportionate losses when they met Luftwaffe Bf 109s which used
stalking tactics, attacking unseen out of the sun rather than dog-fighting.
|
AASF
Hurricane Squadron Claims
|
|
Claims
|
1 Sqn
|
73 Sqn
|
501 Sqn
|
Total
|
|
Confirmed
|
63
|
33
|
32
|
128
|
|
Probable
|
11
|
7
|
1
|
19
|
|
Losses
|
|
|
|
|
|
Hurricanes
|
21
|
15
|
6
|
42
|
|
Killed
|
2
|
3
|
2
|
7
|
|
PoW
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
|
Wounded
|
4
|
4
|
0
|
8
|
Bombers
According to Greg Baughen (2016)
on 10 May, the Fairey Battle had been a disaster as a tactical bomber; when
flying high, they were shot down by fighters and when low, by anti-aircraft
fire. With fuel for a range of 1,000 mi (1,600 km) in un-armored and
non-self-sealing tanks, carrying a navigator in a cabin with a poor view
outside, the Battle was highly unsuitable for short-range, low altitude,
tactical attacks. Extra armor and self-sealing fuel tanks had been delivered to
France but not fitted. The crews lacked experience and at first may have taken
too long to bomb, sometimes attacking over flat ground, which gave a good view
of the target and an equally good view of the aircraft from the ground. With
more experience, pilots used ground features for cover and made shorter approach
runs. The German invasion demonstrated that RAF crews were not sufficiently
equipped or trained for daylight tactical operations and army support; during
the Battle of Arras (21 May) the BEF had received no air cover.
The attacks on 14 May were
catastrophic and the Air Staff claimed that the losses suffered by the AASF
showed that tactical air support was not a feasible operation of war. The
ministry claimed that the Battle was obsolete, rather than in need of more armor,
self-sealing tanks, guns and fighter support. After the war, German officers
said that day bombing caused them many delays and that they had not noticed the
British night bombing offensive against the Ruhr. The AASF had made a start on
becoming a flexible tactical air force; daylight operations by the Battles had
more effect on the German offensive than Wellington bombers flying by night.
Sending low-performance aircraft over the battlefield might seem suicidal but
slow biplanes like Dutch Fokker C.X bombers, the German Henschel Hs 123
dive-bomber/close support aircraft and British Hawker Hector army co-operation
aircraft had been used in 1940 for ground attacks at low altitude. Against the
ragged forward edge of advanced forces, with ill-organized anti-aircraft
defenses, such slow, light and highly-maneuverable aircraft could hit targets
and escape.
Command
By 19 May, the lack of
centralized command made Allied problems much worse; in the north the BEF
commanded the Air Component, in the south, the AASF flew in support of the army
but the BAFF HQ had to move south to Coulommiers, separating it from the ZOAN HQ.
The Air Ministry continued its strategic bombing campaign, Fighter Command was
preoccupied by the air defense of Britain, 2 Group was commanded jointly by
Bomber Command and BAFF and the French command structure was similarly
fragmented. After Dunkirk, Barratt realized that the AASF, down to six Battle
squadrons, needed more than its three Hurricane squadrons for day operations.
Barratt offered the Air Ministry the choice of a better-balanced force or the
withdrawal of the AASF to Britain. If more fighters were to be sent to France
it was vital that they be dispatched promptly, not after the Allies had been
forced into another retreat. The Cabinet discussed the situation on 3 June; 323
Hurricanes had been lost in May, 226 new ones had been delivered and Fighter
Command had 500 operational aircraft but the Cabinet refused to increase the
three AASF fighter squadrons.
The Air Staff found it difficult
to explain away the success of Luftwaffe tactical operations but claimed that
Luftwaffe air superiority was due to the advance of the German armies and that
it was unworkable for armies in retreat, which became a self-fulfilling
prophecy. After the Battle of France, the Air Ministry continue to define air
superiority as the possession of more bombers than an opposing air force,
despite the period from 1939 to late 1940 exploding many interwar theories of
warfare. Land battles had not resembled those of the First World War and
bombers had not ended wars in a few weeks. The Air Staff emphasized the value
of ground strafing, which had been demonstrated by the Hurricane squadrons of
the AASF and the Air Component, rather than bombing in support of the army.
Casualties
The Battle squadrons suffered a
40 per cent loss on 10 May, 100 per cent on 11 May and 63 per cent on 12 May.
In 48 hours the number of operational AASF bombers fell from 135 to 72. On 14
May the AASF made a maximum effort, sending 63 Battles and eight Blenheims to
attack targets near Sedan; more than half were lost, cumulative AASF losses
reaching 75 per cent. In three weeks more than 100 Battles had been shot down
and 119 aircrew killed. The remaining bombers began to operate mostly at night
and from 15 May to 5 June losses fell to 0.5 per cent, albeit with much reduced
bombing accuracy. In 2017, Greg Baughen wrote that an Air Ministry study
estimated that from 5 to 15 June, the AASF Battles had flown 264 day sorties
for a loss of 23 aircraft, a 9 per cent rate. Although the loss of RAF records
during the débâcle made totals unreliable, the loss rate was probably the same
and while high, the losses contrasted favorably with the 50 per cent rate from
10 to 15 May. Blenheim losses averaged 7 per cent but from 20 May, when they
received escorts, the rate fell to 5 per cent, Martin Maryland bombers of the
Armée de l'Air had a loss rate of 4 per cent, the lowest of the Allied day
bombers. In the ten days from the beginning of Fall Rot until the return of the
Battle squadrons to Britain, the 2 Group Blenheims flew 473 sorties and the
Armée de l'Air 619, the 264 Battle sorties contributing 20 per cent of the
total, a considerable achievement for six squadrons. From 10 May to 24 June the
AASF lost 229 aircraft and the Air Component another 279. In five weeks, the
RAF lost 1,500 men killed, wounded and missing and 1,029 aircraft.
Subsequent Operations
Back in Britain, the surviving
AASF aircrew were sent on leave; as BAFF had been dissolved, the bomber
squadrons reverted to 1 Group, Bomber Command and the Hurricanes to Fighter
Command. The Air Ministry contemplated how to use the Battle crews but Bomber
Command wanted nothing to do with army support. Despite the losses in France,
there were more than 300 Battles in storage and it was in production as a
trainer. The two Battle squadrons withdrawn when the AASF was reduced in size
converted to Blenheims but 98 Squadron, despite a grievous loss of personnel,
was reformed with Battles. The RAF set up 67 Group to defend Northern Ireland
with 88 and 226 squadrons; 98 Squadron was chosen to go to Iceland for coastal
reconnaissance. Playfair advocated the use of Battles as night bombers, noting
the improvement in accuracy when crews flew low but against an invasion,
waiting until dark would be impossible. On 5 July, 1 Group, based at Hucknall,
with the four remaining Battle squadrons, their 45 Battles and 55 crews at RAF
Binbrook and RAF Newton, was declared operational for emergencies. For the rest
of the summer the Battle squadrons stood by in case of invasion, later joined
by the Polish 300 Ziemi Mazowieckiej, 301 Ziemi Pomorskiej, 304 Ziemi Śląskiej
and 305 Ziemi Wielkopolska bomber squadrons.
References
Baughen, Greg (2016). The RAF in
the Battle of France and the Battle of Britain: A Reappraisal of Army and Air
Policy 1938–1940. Stroud: Fonthill Media.
Baughen, G. (2017). The Fairey
Battle: A Reassessment of its RAF Career. Stroud: Fonthill Media.
Bond, B.; Taylor, M. D., eds.
(2001). The Battle for France & Flanders Sixty Years On (1st ed.).
Barnsley: Leo Cooper.
Buckley, John. "The Air War
in France". In Bond & Taylor (2001).
Cornwell, P. D. (2007). Ramsay,
W. G. (ed.). The Battle of France Then and Now: Six Nations Locked in Aerial
Combat, September 1939 to June 1940. Old Harlow: Battle of Britain
International.
Cull, B.; et al. (1999) [1995].
Twelve Days: The Air Battle for Northern France and the Low Countries, 10–21
May 1940, As Seen Through the Eyes of the Fighter Pilots Involved (pbk. repr.
ed.). London: Grub Street.
Ellis, Major L. F. (2004) [1953].
Butler, J. R. M. (ed.). The War in France and Flanders 1939–1940. History of
the Second World War United Kingdom Military Series (facs. repr. Naval &
Military Press, Uckfield ed.). London: HMSO.
Jackson, R. (1974). Air War over
France 1939–40 (1st ed.). London: Ian Allan.
Jackson, R. (2001) [1972]. Before
the Storm: The Story of Bomber Command 1939–42 (Cassell Military Paperbacks,
London ed.). London: Arthur Barker.
Richards, D. (1974) [1953]. Royal
Air Force 1939–1945: The Fight At Odds. Vol. I. London: HMSO.
Richards, D. (2001) [1995]. RAF
Bomber Command in the Second World War: The Hardest Victory (pbk. Classic
Penguin, London ed.). New York: W. W. Norton.
Thorburn, G. (2013). Bomber
Command 1939–1940: The War Before the War. Barnsley: Pen & Sword.
The Rise and Fall of the German
Air Force (Public Record Office War Histories ed.). Richmond, Surrey: Public
Record Office (Air Ministry). 2001 [1948].
Webster, C.; Frankland, N. (2006)
[1961]. The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany 1929–1945: Preparation.
History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series. Vol. I (pbk.
repr. Naval & Military Press, Uckfield ed.). London: HMSO.
Further Reading
Bond, Brian (1980). British
Military Policy between the Two World Wars. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Butler, James (1971) [1957].
Grand Strategy: September 1939 – June 1941. History of the Second World War
United Kingdom Military Series. Vol. II (2nd ed.). HMSO.
Powell, M. L. (2014). Army
Co-operation Command and Tactical Air Power Development in Britain 1940–43: The
Role of Army Co-operation Command in Army Air Support (PhD thesis). Birmingham
University. pp. 71–103.
Richey, P. H. M. (2002) [1941].
Fighter Pilot: A Personal Record of the Campaign in France 1939–1940 (repr.
Cassell Military Paperbacks ed.). London: Batsford.
Terraine, J. (1998) [1985]. The
Right of the Line: The Royal Air Force in the European War 1939–1945 (repr.
Wordsworth Editions, Ware ed.). London: Hodder and Stoughton.
Royal Air Force Order of Battle,
France, May 10, 1940
Please note that this OB is based on two sources which cannot quite agree. Squadrons for which no aircraft type is given only appear in source (1) while
Squadrons that only appears in source (2) are indicated so.
Air Officer Commanding in Chief: Air
Marshall A.S. Barrat
Senior Air Staff Officer: Air Vice-Marshall D.C.S. Evill
Headquarters (North): Group Captain
S.C. Strafford
Headquarters (East): Squadron Leader R. Cleland
Air
Component
|
Air Component Headquarters
|
|
Unit
|
Aircraft
|
Total
|
Avail.
|
Base
|
Commander
|
|
HQ Air Component
|
-
|
-
|
-
|
|
Air Vice-Marshall
C.H.B. Blount
|
No 14 Group
|
Unit
|
Aircraft
|
Total
|
Avail.
|
Base
|
Commander
|
|
HQ No. 14 Group
|
-
|
-
|
-
|
|
Group Captain P.F.
Fullard
|
|
60 (Fighter) Wing
|
|
Unit
|
Aircraft
|
Total
|
Avail.
|
Base
|
Commander
|
|
HQ 60 Wing
|
|
|
|
|
Wing Commander J.A.
Boret
|
|
85 Squadron
|
Hurricane Mk I
|
|
|
Lille-Seclin
|
|
|
87 Squadron
|
Hurricane Mk I
|
|
|
Senon
|
|
|
61 (Fighter) Wing
|
|
Unit
|
Aircraft
|
Total
|
Avail.
|
Base
|
Commander
|
|
HQ 61 Wing
|
|
|
|
|
Wing Commander R.Y.
Eccles
|
|
607 Squadron
|
Hurricane Mk I
Gladiator
|
|
|
Vitry-en-Artois
|
|
|
615 Squadron
|
Hurricane Mk I
Gladiator
|
|
|
A flight : Le Touquet
B flight : Abbeville
|
|
|
63 (Fighter) Wing - created on 10 May 1940
|
|
Unit
|
Aircraft
|
Total
|
Avail.
|
Base
|
Commander
|
Notes
|
|
HQ 63 Wing
|
|
|
|
|
?
|
only mentioned in
source (2)
|
|
3 Squadron
|
Hurricane Mk I
|
|
|
Merville
|
|
|
|
79 Squadron
|
Hurricane Mk I
|
|
|
Merville
|
|
|
|
70 (Bomber Reconnaissance) Wing
|
|
Unit
|
Aircraft
|
Total
|
Avail.
|
Base
|
Commander
|
|
HQ 70 Wing
|
|
|
|
|
Wing Commander W.A.
Opie
|
|
18 Squadron
|
Blenheim Mk V
|
|
|
|
|
|
57 Squadron
|
Blenheim Mk V
|
|
|
|
|
|
52 (Bomber) Wing
|
|
Unit
|
Aircraft
|
Total
|
Avail.
|
Base
|
Commander
|
Notes
|
|
HQ 52 Wing
|
|
|
|
|
Wing Commander A.F.
Hutton
|
|
|
53 Squadron
|
Blenheim Mk IV
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
55 (?) Squadron
|
|
|
|
|
|
source (2) says 59
Squadron
|
|
50 (Army Co-operation) Wing
|
|
Unit
|
Aircraft
|
Total
|
Avail.
|
Base
|
Commander
|
|
HQ 50 Wing
|
|
|
|
|
Group Captain A.R.
Churchman
|
|
4 Squadron
|
Lysander
|
|
|
|
|
|
13 Squadron
|
Lysander
|
|
|
|
|
|
16 Squadron
|
Lysander
|
|
|
|
|
|
51 (Army Co-operation) Wing
|
|
Unit
|
Aircraft
|
Total
|
Avail.
|
Base
|
Commander
|
Notes
|
|
HQ 51 Wing
|
|
|
|
|
Wing Commander A.H.
Flower
|
|
|
2 Squadron
|
Lysander
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
26 Squadron
|
Lysander
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
81 (C) Squadron
|
Dragon
|
|
|
|
|
Communications
Squadron
|
Advanced
Air Striking Force
|
Advanced Air Striking Force Headquarters
|
|
Unit
|
Aircraft
|
Total
|
Avail.
|
Base
|
Commander
|
|
HQ Air Component
|
-
|
-
|
-
|
|
Air Vice-Marshall P.H.L. Playfair
|
|
67 (Fighter) Wing
|
|
Unit
|
Aircraft
|
Total
|
Avail.
|
Base
|
Commander
|
Notes
|
|
HQ 67 Wing
|
|
|
|
|
Wing Co. C. Walter
|
|
|
1 Squadron
|
Hurricane Mk I
|
12
|
|
Wassincourt
|
|
|
|
73 Squadron
|
Hurricane Mk I
|
12
|
|
Rouvre
|
|
|
|
212 Squadron
|
|
|
|
|
|
Photographic Recce
Squadron. Only mentioned in source (1)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
501 Squadron
|
Hurricane Mk I
|
12
|
|
Bethenville
|
|
Arrived 10 May 1940.
Only mentioned in source (2)
|
|
No. 71 (Bomber) Wing
|
|
Unit
|
Aircraft
|
Total
|
Avail.
|
Base
|
Commander
|
|
HQ 71 Wing
|
|
|
|
|
Air Commodore R.M.
Field
|
|
105 Squadron
|
Fairey Battle
|
16
|
|
Villeneuve
|
|
|
114 Squadron
|
Blenheim Mk IV
|
16
|
|
Condé
|
|
|
139 Squadron
|
Blenheim Mk IV
|
16
|
|
Plivot
|
|
|
150 Squadron
|
Fairey Battle
|
16
|
|
Ecury
|
|
|
75 (Bomber) Wing
|
|
Unit
|
Aircraft
|
Total
|
Avail.
|
Base
|
Commander
|
Notes
|
|
HQ 75 Wing
|
|
|
|
|
Group Captain A.H.
Wann
|
|
|
88 Squadron
|
Fairey Battle
|
16
|
|
Mourmelon
|
|
|
|
103 Squadron
|
Fairey Battle
|
16
|
|
Betheniville
|
|
|
|
208 Squadron
|
Fairey Battle
|
16
|
|
Auberive
|
|
source (2) gives 218
Squadron instead
|
|
76 (Bomber) Wing
|
|
Unit
|
Aircraft
|
Total
|
Avail.
|
Base
|
Commander
|
|
HQ 76 Wing
|
|
|
|
|
Group Captain H.S.
Kerby
|
|
12 Squadron
|
Fairey Battle
|
16
|
|
Amifontaine
|
|
|
142 Squadron
|
Fairey Battle
|
16
|
|
Berry-au-Bac
|
|
|
226 Squadron
|
Fairey Battle
|
16
|
|
Reims
|
|
|
Unit
|
Aircraft
|
Total
|
Avail.
|
Base
|
Commander
|
Notes
|
|
98 Squadron
|
Fairey Battle
|
|
|
Nantes
|
|
Acted as a reserve for
Fairey Battle squadrons. Only mentioned in source (2)
|
Sources
(1) The
War in France and Flanders, L.F. ELLIS, London: Her Majesty's Stationery
Office, 1953. SO Code: No. 63-111-2-2*
(2) La
campagne de France (1e partie): La bataille du Nord, Batailles Aériennes
no. 7 Jan-Feb-Mar 1999
 |
| Air Vice Marshal Patrick Playfair, AOC 1 Group, Bomber Command/AASF (17 February 1938 – 27 June 1940) photographed at RAF Headquarters in France. (Imperial War Museum C76) |
 |
| A Fairey Battle light bomber. |
 |
| Three Fairey Battle bombers of No 218 Squadron over France. K9325 (rear) shot down at St Vith, crew captured, K9324 (center) survived campaign, K9353 (near) shot down over Luxembourg, 12 May, crew killed. (Imperial War Museum C447) |
 |
| Three Battle Mark Is, K9353 HA-J, K9324 HA-B and K9325 HA-D, of No. 218 Squadron RAF, based at Auberives-sur-Suippes, in flight over northern France. K9325 went missing during an attack on enemy troops near St Vith on 11 May 1940, and K9353 was shot down north of Bouillon the following day. K9324 survived the Battle of France to serve with the RAAF until 1944. (Imperial War Museum C2116) |
 |
| Fairey Battles of No 218 Squadron, Royal Air Force on patrol in France. These aircraft were regarded as being advanced when they first went into service in 1937, but in May 1940 they were too slow and lightly armored and consequently suffered heavy losses in the Battle for France. (Imperial War Museum C454) |
 |
| Observer facing forward with a Mk VII bombsight. (RAF Bomber Command pamphlet released during World War II) |
The Course Setting Bomb Sight, labeled as a Mk. IX but
likely a Mk. VII, installed in the bottom of a Fairey Battle light bomber [see
previous photo]. The bomb aimer is sighting through the backsights (white rings
just in front of him) and past the foresights (white pinheads just visible
against the armored cable running on the bulkhead, looking like a cable clip).
He holds the bomb release switch in his right hand, and would press the button
when the target passes through the line defined by the two sets of sights.
This image shows a number of the main features of the
sight. At the rear of the device, near the bottom of the image, is the vertical
cylinder of the compass assembly. The horizontal metal section in front of the
compass assembly, roughly triangular, is the "airspeed drum", used to
set the aircraft's airspeed via the large knob on the right side of the case,
directly under the bomb aimer's hand. Extending from the front of the airspeed
drum is the airspeed bar and windspeed assembly. In this case the airspeed has
been set to its minimum value, so the windspeed assembly is lying directly
against the housing and is not clearly visible. This also explains the almost
vertical angle formed between the sights; with this airspeed setting the bombs
would not travel forward very far during the drop. Looking carefully, one can
see the "wind bar" at the top of the windspeed assembly, the black
metal bar lying almost at right angles to the rest of the bomb sight. Turning
the wind speed knob on the end of the bar (not visible here, it's on the other
side of the bar) would push the entire drift bar to the right to dial-in
increasing correction for a wind blowing from the right side of the aircraft.
The long striped wires above this assembly form the drift bar, which indicates
which direction the aircraft should fly to correct for wind drift. In this case
the drift bar is pointed very slightly to the bomb aimer's left, accounting for
a wind from port.
Secondary details are also visible. The grey disk on
the bottom of the compass assembly is the compass corrector, which reduces the
effect of stray magnetic fields from the aircraft body. The small grey knob
directly above the airspeed setting knob is used to set the "trail", the
distance that the bomb will fall behind the aircraft when it reaches terminal
velocity. Just to the right of this (in the photograph) is a large horizontal
ring that makes up the moving target assembly (or "fourth vector").
To the right of the air speed drum are two of three silver colored bolts of the
flexible mounting system, which is used to level the bombsight prior to use.
The small beads used for timing can just be seen on the drift wires. At the
front, on the very top-right of the image, is the scale on the auxiliary drift
bar, which is used to make quick measurements of wind drift.
The Battle was supplied with a number of different
bombsights for use at different altitudes. They could be exchanged by
unscrewing the silver knob on the right side of the photo just to the right of
the windspeed assembly, and then sliding the entire bombsight and mounting up
and out.
The original label on this photograph states that the
bombsight is a Mk. IX model. However, this model was designed for high-speed
aircraft like the B-25 and Mosquito. It is much more likely that this is a
mis-labeled Mk. VII, the primary pre-war model that would have equipped the
Battle in service. The differences between the two models are largely limited
to the scales on the drift and height bars to account for faster speeds and
higher altitudes. The two are identical to the eye.
 |
| The commander of the AASF, Air Vice Marshal Patrick Playfair (left), on a tour of RAF units in France with Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril Newall, Chief of the Air Staff (third left). (Imperial War Museum C83) |
 |
| Air Officer Commander-in-Chief Air Marshal A S Barratt, Air Officer Commanding British Air Forces in France and Air Vice-Marshal P H L Playfair, Air Officer Commanding the Advanced Air Striking Force, photographed together for the first time while inspecting No. 73 Squadron RAF at Rouvres. (Imperial War Museum C1133) |
 |
| Hawker Hurricane Mark I, N2358 'Z', of No. 1 Squadron RAF is refueled while undergoing an engine check at Vassincourt. (Imperial War Museum C1234) |
 |
| The Commanding Officer of No. 501 Squadron RAF, surrounded by some of his pilots at Betheniville. Left to right; Pilot Officer K N T Lee, Flying Officer M F C Smith (killed in action the following day), Squadron Leader A V Clube (CO), Sergeant D A S McKay, Sergeant P C P Farnes and Sergeant J H "Ginger" Lacey. (Imperial War Museum C1685) |
 |
| Hurricane pilots of No 73 Squadron entertain a Greek newspaper correspondent at their base at Rouvres, December 1939. (Imperial War Museum C179) |
 |
| Sir Kingsley Wood, Secretary of State for Air, accompanied by Air Vice-Marshal P H L Playfair, Air Officer Commanding the Advanced Air Striking Force (left) , passes the boiler and bath quarters of an RAF unit billeted in France. (Imperial War Museum C18) |
 |
| An engine tent is erected around the engine of a Bristol Blenheim Mark IV of No. 139 Squadron RAF at Betheniville to protect it from the weather. (Imperial War Museum C525) |
 |
| Ground crew servicing the starboard engine of a Bristol Blenheim Mark IV of No. 139 Squadron RAF, covered with camouflage netting and snow, at Betheniville. (Imperial War Museum C536) |
 |
| Airmen wheel away a mobile petrol unit after refueling a Bristol Blenheim Mark IV of No. 139 Squadron RAF in the snow at Betheniville. Note the attempt to camouflage the aircraft with cut spruce saplings. (Imperial War Museum C584) |
 |
| King George VI watching bombs being hand-winched into the bomb-bays of a Fairey Battle, during his tour of the Western Front. (Imperial War Museum C63) |
 |
| Three Bristol Blenheim Mark IVs of No. 59 Squadron RAF take off from Poix. (Imperial War Museum C1166) |
 |
| Blenheim Mark IV, L8756 ‘XD-E’ of No. 139 Squadron RAF, based at Plivot, France, in flight over northern France. Mid-April 1940. (Imperial War Museum C1309) |
 |
| Blenheims of No 139 Squadron, Royal Air Force, part of the Advanced Air Striking Force, in flight over France during an unescorted aerial photography mission. (Imperial War Museum C1311) |
 |
| Three Bristol Blenheim Mark IVs of No. 139 Squadron RAF based at Plivot, flying eastwards over Northern France to survey enemy fortifications. (Imperial War Museum C1308) |
 |
| Two Bristol Blenheim Mark IVs of No. 139 Squadron RAF based at Plivot, in flight over northern France. (Imperial War Museum C1350) |
 |
| Fairey Battle with partially blacked canopy from the No. 142 Squadron RAF (QT-H originally with portion of H painted over to change to QT-I). The bent propeller probably suggests a forced gear-up landing. Possibly at Vigneux-Hocquet. Photo taken May 20, 1940. (Helmut Linder) |
 |
| The same Battle now with German soldiers posing for a photograph. |
 |
| Bristol Blenheim Mark IVs of No. 139 Squadron RAF about to take off from Betheniville on reconnaissance sorties. (Imperial War Museum C352) |
 |
| Ground crew working on a Fairey Battle of No. 218 Squadron at Auberive-sur-Suippes. Note the attempt to camouflage the site with cut fir saplings. (Imperial War Museum C1058) |
 |
| Mechanics service the Rolls Royce Merlin engine of a Fairey Battle of No. 142 Squadron RAF at Berry-au-Bac. (Imperial War Museum C398) |
 |
| French Lioré et Olivier LeO 451 bomber. |
 |
|
French Breguet 690, photographed in July 1939. (L'Aerophile
magazine July 1, 1939)
|
 |
|
German Henschel Hs 126 A-0 (D-OAAV, Werk Nr. 126 3002)
reconnaissance plane.
|
 |
|
1934 photo of a French Amiot 143. This type was thrown into
the battle to destroy the Meuse bridges. (L'Aerophile magazine August 1934)
|
 |
|
Fairey Battles bombing a column of German horse-drawn
transport near Dunkirk. (Imperial War Museum C1737)
|
 |
| View from the rear gunner's position as Fairey Battles bomb a German column near Dunkirk. (Imperial War Museum C1738) |
 |
| Wreckage of a Fairley Battle shot down by the Wehrmacht, France, in May 1940. |
 |
| A sergeant air-gunner mans his .303 Vickers K-type gas-operated machine gun from the rear cockpit of a Fairey Battle of No. 103 Squadron RAF at St-Lucien Ferme near Rheges. Note the unofficial flight and squadron pennant flying from the radio mast. (Imperial War Museum C1653) |
 |
| Mechanics of No. 226 Squadron RAF overhaul the engines of their Fairey Battles in a hangar at Reims. (Imperial War Museum C1126) |
 |
| Officers of No. 103 Squadron RAF lined up in front of a Fairey Battle at Betheniville. They are, (left to right): Squadron Leader H G Lee (wounded, 9 June), Pilot Officer V Cunningham (killed, 14 May), Flying Officer J R Hayes, Flying Officer G B Morgan-Dean (killed, 12 May), Flying Officer D D A Kelly, Flying Officer T B Fitzgerald, Pilot Officer T Pugh, Flight Lieutenant J A Ingram (commander, 'A' Flight), Pilot Officer Taylor (Equipment Officer), Wing Commander T C Dickens (Commanding Officer), Flight Lieutenant C E R Tait (commander, 'B' Flight), Flying Officer "Doc" Mahon (Medical Officer), Flying Officer A L Vipan, Flying Officer W Rayne, Flying Officer Rhys Price (Officer i/c Servicing Flight), Flying Officer M C Wells (prisoner of war, 10 May), Flying Officer MacDonald (Intelligence Officer), Flying Officer J N Leyden (prisoner of war, 26 May), Pilot Officer E E Morton (killed, 12 May), Pilot Officer K J Drabble (killed, 10 May), Flight Lieutenant Fallowfield (Intelligence Officer) and Pilot Officer J C F Hayter. (Imperial War Museum) |
 |
| Fairey Battle, K9204 'QT-Q', of No. 142 Squadron RAF, in a camouflaged 'hide' at Berry-au-Bac. K9204 survived the Battle of France, eventually joining the RCAF in 1941 as a training aircraft (2100). (Imperial War Museum C401) |
 |
| Bristol Blenheim Mk I. |
 |
| Bristol Blenheim Mark IV, N6227 'XD-M', of No. 139 Squadron RAF, undergoes an engine overhaul at Plivot. Note the armorer (foreground) who has just removed the forward-firing .303 machine gun from its mounting in the port wing for examination. (Imperial War Museum C1348) |
 |
Bristol Blenheim being serviced.
|
 |
| Bristol Blenheim Mark IV, L8760 'XD-D', of No. 139 Squadron RAF taxies to a halt at Betheniville after a sortie. (Imperial War Museum C346) |
 |
| Bomb-trolleys loaded with 250-lb GP bombs and attendant armorers being towed out by tractor to Fairey Battles at Betheniville prior to a sortie to the bombing practice range at Moronvilliers. Behind them, Battle, K9408 'PM-N', of No. 103 Squadron RAF is prepared for a flight. (Imperial War Museum C1071) |
 |
| Fairey Battles of No. 88 Squadron RAF being prepared for action on the snow-covered airfield at Mourmelon-le-Grand. (Imperial War Museum C583) |
 |
| A Fairey Battle Mark I of No. 226 Squadron RAF being prepared for a night flight at Reims-Champagne in 42.5 degrees of frost. (Imperial War Museum C556) |
 |
| Armorers unloading 250-lb GP bombs from a trolley in front of a Fairey Battle of No. 226 Squadron, in the snow at Reims-Champagne. (Imperial War Museum C604) |
 |
| A Fairey Battle of No. 226 Squadron RAF takes of from the snow-covered airfield at Reims-Champagne. (Imperial War Museum C605) |
 |
| Ground crews attempting to start the engine of a Fairey Battle of No. 226 Squadron RAF in the cold weather at Reims-Champagne. (Imperial War Museum C606) |
 |
| Fairey Battles of No. 226 Squadron RAF undergoing servicing on the flight line at Reims-Champagne. The aircraft on the right, K9183 'MQ-R', was shot down by ground aircraft fire while attacking enemy columns south-west of Luxembourg on 10 May 1940. Its pilot died of his wounds, but the other two crew members survived. (Imperial War Museum C1115) |
 |
| Airmen of No. 226 Squadron RAF present cheerful faces for the photographer while pushing one of their Fairey Battles through the snow to its hangar at Reims. (Imperial War Museum C783) |
 |
| Three Fairey Battles of No. 88 Squadron RAF based at Mourmelon-le-Grand, flying in 'vic' formation over the snow-covered French countryside. Another 'vic' of Battles can be seen at extreme upper right. (Imperial War Museum C598) |
 |
| Fairey Battles of No. 88 Squadron RAF based at Mourmelon-le-Grand, fly in formation with Curtiss Hawk 75s of 1e escadrille GC 1/2 of the French Air Force. (Imperial War Museum C651) |
 |
| A Hawker Hurricane Mark I flown by Flight Lieutenant J "Ian" Scoular, commander of 'B' Flight, No. 73 Squadron RAF, being refueled and re-armed between sorties at Reims-Champagne. (Imperial War Museum C1551) |
 |
| A Fairey Battle is refueled from a petrol tanker on a snow-covered airfield in France. (Imperial War Museum C788) |
 |
| Fairey Battle aircrew walk to their aircraft on a snow-covered airfield. They wear a mixture of flying clothing including 1930 Pattern, and Irvin, flying suits. (Imperial War Museum C366) |
 |
| Six Fairey Battles of No. 88 Squadron RAF based at Mourmelon-le-Grand, flying in starboard echelon formation over the snow-covered French countryside. (Imperial War Museum C601) |
 |
| The Royal Air Force in France 1939 - 1940: A mechanic at work on a snow covered Fairey Battle fighter bomber during the winter of 1939 - 1940. (Imperial War Museum C284) |
 |
| Ground crew use a combination of netting and frames of tree branches in an attempt to camouflage Fairey Battle, L4937, of No. 142 Squadron RAF on the snow-bound airfield at Berry-au-Bac. (Imperial War Museum C755) |
 |
| Pilots of No. 607 Squadron RAF are briefed on the day's patrol route by their Commanding Officer, Squadron Leader L E Smith (second left), at Mourmelon-le-Grand. Behind them is one of the Squadron's Gloster Gladiators, shortly to be relinquished in favor of Hawker Hurricanes. (Imperial War Museum C909) |
 |
| Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril Newall inspecting a Fairey Battle aircraft in France. Air Commodore Lord Londonderry is looking on whilst Air Vice-Marshal Patrick Playfair, the Commander of the Advanced Air Striking Force, is to be seen on the right. (Imperial War Museum C92) |
 |
| The Royal Air Force in France 1939 - 1940: A Fairey Battle fighter bomber at a forward airfield in France. (Imperial War Museum C174) |
 |
| Fairey Battle fighter bomber at a snow covered airfield in France during the winter of 1939 - 1940. (Imperial War Museum C299) |
 |
| Fairey Battle crews of No. 12 Squadron RAF check their maps on the snow-covered airfield at Amifontaine. (Imperial War Museum C356) |
 |
| A crew tent and Fairey Battles of No. 12 Squadron RAF on a snow covered airfield at Amifontaine. (Imperial War Museum C357) |
 |
| The pilot of a Fairey Battle, wearing a Type B helmet and Irvin flying suit on a snow-covered airfield in France. (Imperial War Museum C361) |
 |
| Gracie Fields entertaining RAF personnel in France, December 1939. (Imperial War Museum C209) |
 |
| A French schoolboy listens to the volunteer band of No. 71 Wing RAF as it practices in a courtyard at Rouvres. (Imperial War Museum C343) |
 |
| Radio operators of No. 73 Squadron RAF at work in a mobile receiving station at Rouvres. (Imperial War Museum C741) |
 |
| A replacement Rolls Royce Merlin engine being fitted into a Hawker Hurricane Mark I of No. 73 Squadron RAF at Rouvres. (Imperial War Museum C880) |
 |
| A corporal runs to a waiting car with a magazine of undeveloped film from an F.24 aerial camera, just handed over by the aircrew of a Bristol Blenheim Mark IV of No. 139 Squadron RAF at Betheniville, after a photo-reconnaissance sortie. (Imperial War Museum C118) |
 |
| Mechanics of No. 73 Squadron RAF rest in an underground shelter on the airfield at Rouvres. (Imperial War Museum C175) |
 |
| Officers of No. 73 Squadron RAF eating in their mess dining room, on the ground floor of the Mairie at Rouvres. (Imperial War Museum C187) |
 |
| Airmen serving with No. 71 Wing RAF asleep in their billet in Betheniville. (Imperial War Museum C342) |
 |
| Armorers load a 250-lb GP bomb into the outboard port wing-cell of a Fairey Battle of No. 103 Squadron RAF at Betheniville. (Imperial War Museum C1070) |
 |
| The crew of Fairey Battle, K9273 'HA-R', of No. 218 Squadron RAF, walk from their aircraft at Auberive-sur-Suippes on returning from a sortie. (Imperial War Museum C1081) |
 |
| Four pilots of No. 1 Squadron RAF study a German 7.9mm machine gun outside the Mairie at Neuville-sur-Ornain, which served as the Officers' Mess while the Squadron was based at Vassincourt: (left to right) Flying Officer P H M Richey, Squadron Leader P J H 'Bull' Halahan (Officer Commanding No. 1 Squadron), Sergeant A V 'Darkie' Clowes, Flight Lieutenant P R Walker. Richey, Clowes and Walker were credited with victories in the Squadron's first aerial combats of the war with enemy fighters, on 29 March 1940. (Imperial War Museum (C1111) |
 |
| Airmen loading fresh oxygen cylinders into a Fairey Battle of No. 226 Squadron RAF at Reims-Champagne. (Imperial War Museum C1121) |
 |
| The film magazine from an F.24 aerial camera is handed over to a sergeant photographer for processing at a Mobile Darkrooms at the Headquarters of No. 71 Wing RAF, Bétheniville. (Imperial War Museum C120) |
 |
| A photographer makes contact prints from exposures on aerial camera film in a Mobile Darkrooms tender at the Headquarters of No. 71 Wing RAF, Bétheniville. (Imperial War Museum C121) |
 |
| A photographer shows developed film from a Type F.24 aerial camera to the sergeant in charge of the Photography Section, outside a Mobile Darkrooms tender at the Headquarters of No. 71 Wing RAF, Bétheniville. (Imperial War Museum C122) |
 |
| Three Hawker Hurricane Mark Is of No. 73 Squadron RAF, based at Rouvres, simulate an attack in line astern on the photographer's aircraft. (Imperial War Museum C1288) |
 |
| Sergeant Pilots G F Berry and R A Albonico of No. 1 Squadron RAF, outside the church at Neuville-sur-Ornain. Albonico was shot down and captured on 18 May 1940, but Berry served with the Squadron throughout the Battles of France and Britain, before being killed in action on 2 September 1940. (Imperial War Museum C1299) |
 |
| A pilot and navigator of No. 139 Squadron RAF, seated in the cockpit of their Bristol Blenheim Mark IV at Plivot. (Imperial War Museum C1317) |
 |
| The bomb-aimer of a Bristol Blenheim Mark IV of No. 139 Squadron RAF mans his position behind the Mark IXA Course-setting Bombsight in the nose of aircraft, at Plivot. (Imperial War Museum C1319) |
 |
| Dinner hour in the Airmen's Mess of No. 73 Squadron RAF at Rouvres, situated in a large room in the rear of one of the village's cafes on Grand Rue. (Imperial War Museum C1330) |
 |
| Officer pilots of No. 139 Squadron RAF relax outside their crew tent at Plivot. (Imperial War Museum C1349) |
 |
| Anglican Chaplains meet to discuss future programs for RAF personnel in France, under the chairmanship of A H Paget-Wilkes (third left), Senior Church of England Chaplain to the Advanced Air Striking Force. (Imperial War Museum C1412) |
 |
| Interior of a bombed hangar at Mourmelon-le-Grand after a heavy German attack on the airfield on 14 May 1940. The remains of a Miles Magister and at least two Fairey Battles, belonging to No. 88 Squadron RAF, can be seen in the wreckage. (Imperial War Museum C1534) |
 |
| The Commanding Officer of No. 73 Squadron RAF, Squadron Leader J W C "Hank" More (back to camera) having just landed, confers with his pilots outside the Squadron's Operations Building at Reims-Champagne after a series of dogfights with German aircraft. Facing More, in the white roll neck jumper, is Flying Officer E J "Cobber" Kain. To Kain's right, and slightly behind him, stands Flying Officer N "Fanny" Orton. To Orton's right and slightly obscured by More, is Flying Officer H G "Ginger" Paul, and to More's left is Sergeant T B G "Tich" Pyne. who was killed in action on 14 May 1940. Also killed on 14 May was Pilot Officer V D M Roe, standing on Kain's left. (Imperial War Museum C1548) |
 |
| Flying Officers N "Fanny" Orton and E J "Cobber" Kain of No. 73 Squadron RAF, standing by a Hawker Hurricane Mark I, between sorties, at Reims-Champagne. Orton left France with at least fifteen victories and Kain with seventeen. (Imperial War Museum C1564) |
 |
| Pilots of No. 73 Squadron RAF grouped round the Duty Office dugout at Rouvres. Standing in the dugout entrance, wearing a balaclava, is Pilot Officer E J "Cobber" Kain, later to achieve distinction as the first Allied 'ace' of the War. The officers grouped around him are (clockwise from Kain): Flying Officer R E Lovett, Pilot Officer P V Ayerst, Pilot Officer J G "Tubs" Perry, Flying Officer N "Fanny" Orton, Pilot Officers G F Brotchie, A B "Tommy" Tucker, "Smooth" Holliday. Holliday's left can be seen the head of a Greek journalist who was visiting the Squadron. Standing in a line on the roof are (left to right): Sergeants R M Perry, L J W "Humph" Humphris, B Speake, D A Sewell, G H Phillips, J Winn, Pilot Officer E "Henry" Hall (Squadron Adjutant), Sergeants C N S Campbell, S G Stuckey. Sgts Perry and Winn became the Squadron's first casualties when they were both shot down and killed north-east of Metz on 22 December 1939 by Messerschmitt Bf 109s of III/JG53. (Imperial War Museum C173) |
 |
| Officers of No. 88 Squadron RAF relaxing in the lounge of their mess at Mourmelon-le-Grand. (Imperial War Museum C891) |
 |
| A salvo of high-explosive bombs launched from RAF bombers hit a German mechanized column in the village of Marke, south west of Courtrai, Belgium. (Imperial War Museum C1668) |
 |
| Front line May 10–16, 1940. |
 |
| Front line May 16–21, 1940. |
 |
| Fall Rot June 5–12, 1940. |
 |
| Fall Rot June 13–25, 1940. |
