 |
| Pattern
of vapor trails left by British and German aircraft after a dogfight on
18 September 1940. Imperial War Museum photo H 4219. |
The Battle of Britain (German: Luftschlacht um England,
lit. 'air battle for England') was a military campaign of the Second World War,
in which the Royal Air Force (RAF) and the Fleet Air Arm (FAA) of the Royal
Navy defended the United Kingdom against large-scale attacks by Nazi Germany's
air force, the Luftwaffe. It was the first major military campaign fought
entirely by air forces. It takes its name from the speech given by Prime
Minister Winston Churchill to the House of Commons on 18 June, 1940: "What
General Weygand called the 'Battle of France' is over. I expect that the Battle
of Britain is about to begin."
The Germans had rapidly overwhelmed France and the Low
Countries in the Battle of France, leaving Britain to face the threat of
invasion by sea. The German high command recognized the difficulties of a
seaborne attack while the Royal Navy controlled the English Channel and the
North Sea. The primary objective of the German forces was to compel Britain to
agree to a negotiated peace settlement.
The British officially recognize the battle's duration as
being from 10 July until 31 October 1940, which overlaps the period of
large-scale night attacks known as the Blitz, that lasted from 7 September 1940
to 11 May 1941. German historians do not follow this subdivision and regard the
battle as a single campaign lasting from July 1940 to May 1941, including the
Blitz.
In July 1940, the air and sea blockade began, with the
Luftwaffe mainly targeting coastal-shipping convoys, as well as ports and
shipping centers such as Portsmouth. On 16 July, Hitler ordered the preparation
of Operation Sea Lion as a potential amphibious and airborne assault on
Britain, to follow once the Luftwaffe had air superiority over the Channel. On
1 August, the Luftwaffe was directed to achieve air superiority over the RAF,
with the aim of incapacitating RAF Fighter Command; 12 days later, it shifted
the attacks to RAF airfields and infrastructure. As the battle progressed, the
Luftwaffe also targeted factories involved in aircraft production and strategic
infrastructure. Eventually, it employed terror bombing on areas of political
significance and on civilians.
In September, RAF Bomber Command night raids disrupted the German preparation
of converted barges, and the Luftwaffe's failure to overwhelm the RAF forced
Hitler to postpone and eventually cancel Operation Sea Lion. The Luftwaffe
proved unable to sustain daylight raids, but their continued night-bombing
operations on Britain became known as the Blitz.
Germany's failure to destroy Britain's air defenses and
force it out of the conflict was the first major German defeat in the Second
World War.
Background
Strategic bombing during World War I introduced air attacks
intended to panic civilian targets and led in 1918 to the merger of the British
army and navy air services into the Royal Air Force (RAF). Its first Chief of
the Air Staff, Hugh Trenchard, was among the military strategists in the 1920s,
like Giulio Douhet, who saw air warfare as a new way to overcome the bloody
stalemate of trench warfare. Interception was expected to be nearly impossible,
with fighter planes no faster than bombers. Their slogan was that the bomber
will always get through, and that the only defense was a deterrent bomber force
capable of matching retaliation. Predictions were made that a bomber offensive
would quickly cause thousands of deaths and civilian hysteria leading to
capitulation. However, widespread pacifism following the horrors of the First
World War contributed to a reluctance to provide resources.
Developing Air Strategies
Germany was forbidden a military air force by the 1919
Treaty of Versailles, and therefore air crew were trained by means of civilian
and sport flying. Following a 1923 memorandum, the Deutsche Luft Hansa airline
developed designs for aircraft such as the Junkers Ju 52, which could carry
passengers and freight, but also be readily adapted into a bomber. In 1926, the
secret Lipetsk fighter-pilot school began training Germans in the Soviet Union.
Erhard Milch organized rapid expansion, and following the 1933 Nazi seizure of
power, his subordinate Robert Knauss formulated a deterrence theory
incorporating Douhet's ideas and Tirpitz's "risk theory". This
proposed a fleet of heavy bombers to deter a preventive attack by France and
Poland before Germany could fully rearm. A 1933–34 war game indicated a need
for fighters and anti-aircraft protection as well as bombers. On 1 March 1935,
the Luftwaffe was formally announced, with Walther Wever as Chief of Staff. The
1935 Luftwaffe doctrine for "Conduct of Air War" (Luftkriegführung)
set air power within the overall military strategy, with critical tasks of
attaining (local and temporary) air superiority and providing battlefield
support for army and naval forces. Strategic bombing of industries and
transport could be decisive longer-term options, dependent on opportunity or
preparations by the army and navy. It could be used to overcome a stalemate, or
used when only destruction of the enemy's economy would be conclusive. The list
excluded bombing civilians to destroy homes or undermine morale, as that was
considered a waste of strategic effort, but the doctrine allowed revenge
attacks if German civilians were bombed. A revised edition was issued in 1940,
and the continuing central principle of Luftwaffe doctrine was that destruction
of enemy armed forces was of primary importance.
The RAF responded to Luftwaffe developments with its 1934
Expansion Plan A rearmament scheme, and in 1936 it was restructured into Bomber
Command, Coastal Command, Training Command and Fighter Command. The last was
under Hugh Dowding, who opposed the doctrine that bombers were unstoppable: the
invention of radar at that time could allow early detection, and prototype
monoplane fighters were significantly faster. Priorities were disputed, but in
December 1937, the Minister in charge of Defence Coordination, Sir Thomas
Inskip, sided with Dowding that "The role of our air force is not an early
knock-out blow" but rather was "to prevent the Germans from knocking
us out" and fighter squadrons were just as necessary as bomber squadrons.
The Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) gave the Luftwaffe Condor
Legion the opportunity to test air fighting tactics with their new aeroplanes.
Wolfram von Richthofen became an exponent of air power providing ground support
to other services. The difficulty of accurately hitting targets prompted Ernst
Udet to require that all new bombers had to be dive bombers, and led to the
development of the Knickebein system for night time navigation. Priority was
given to producing large numbers of smaller aeroplanes, and plans for a
long-range, four-engined strategic bomber were cancelled.
First Stages of the Second World
War
The early stages of the Second World War saw successful
German invasions on the continent, aided decisively by the air power of the
Luftwaffe, which was able to establish tactical air superiority with great
effectiveness. The speed with which German forces defeated most of the defending
armies in Norway in early 1940 created a significant political crisis in
Britain. In early May 1940, the Norway Debate questioned the fitness for office
of the British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain. On 10 May, the same day
Winston Churchill became British Prime Minister, the Germans initiated the
Battle of France with an aggressive invasion of French territory. RAF Fighter
Command was desperately short of trained pilots and aircraft. Churchill sent
fighter squadrons, the Air Component of the British Expeditionary Force, to
support operations in France, where the RAF suffered heavy losses. This was
despite the objections of its commander Hugh Dowding that the diversion of his
forces would leave home defenses under-strength.
After the evacuation of British and French soldiers from
Dunkirk and the French surrender on 22 June 1940, Hitler mainly focused his
energies on the possibility of invading the Soviet Union. He believed that the
British, defeated on the continent and without European allies, would quickly
come to terms. The Germans were so convinced of an imminent armistice that they
began constructing street decorations for the homecoming parades of victorious
troops. Although the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, and certain
elements of the British public favored a negotiated peace with an ascendant
Germany, Churchill and a majority of his Cabinet refused to consider an
armistice. Instead, Churchill used his skilful rhetoric to harden public
opinion against capitulation and prepare the British for a long war.
The Battle of Britain has the unusual distinction that it
gained its name before being fought. The name is derived from the This was
their finest hour speech delivered by Winston Churchill in the House of Commons
on 18 June, more than three weeks prior to the generally accepted date for the
start of the battle:
...
What General Weygand called the Battle of France is over. I expect that the
battle of Britain is about to begin. Upon this battle depends the survival of
Christian civilization. Upon it depends our own British life and the long
continuity of our institutions and our Empire. The whole fury and might of the
enemy must very soon be turned on us. Hitler knows that he will have to break us
in this island or lose the war. If we can stand up to him, all Europe may be
free and the life of the world may move forward into broad, sunlit uplands. But
if we fail, then the whole world, including the United States, including all
that we have known and cared for, will sink into the abyss of a new Dark Age
made more sinister, and perhaps more protracted, by the lights of a perverted
science. Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duties, and so bear ourselves
that, if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last for a thousand years, men
will still say, "This was their finest hour". — Winston Churchill
German Aims and Directives
From the outset of his rise to power, Adolf Hitler expressed
admiration for Britain, and throughout the Battle period he sought neutrality
or a peace treaty with Britain. In a secret conference on 23 May 1939, Hitler
set out his rather contradictory strategy that an attack on Poland was
essential and "will only be successful if the Western Powers keep out of
it. If this is impossible, then it will be better to attack in the West and to
settle Poland at the same time" with a surprise attack. "If Holland
and Belgium are successfully occupied and held, and if France is also defeated,
the fundamental conditions for a successful war against England will have been
secured. England can then be blockaded from Western France at close quarters by
the Air Force, while the Navy with its submarines extend the range of the
blockade."
When war commenced, Hitler and the OKW (Oberkommando der
Wehrmacht or "High Command of the Armed Forces") issued a series of
directives ordering, planning and stating strategic objectives. "Directive
No. 1 for the Conduct of the War", dated 31 August 1939, instructed the invasion
of Poland on 1 September as planned. Potentially, Luftwaffe "operations
against England" were to:
dislocate
English imports, the armaments industry, and the transport of troops to France.
Any favourable opportunity of an effective attack on concentrated units of the English
Navy, particularly on battleships or aircraft carriers, will be exploited. The
decision regarding attacks on London is reserved to me. Attacks on the English
homeland are to be prepared, bearing in mind that inconclusive results with
insufficient forces are to be avoided in all circumstances. —"Directive
No. 1 for the Conduct of the War". Berlin. 31 August 1939.
Both France and the UK declared war on Germany; on 9
October, Hitler's "Directive No. 6" planned the offensive to defeat
these allies and "win as much territory as possible in the Netherlands,
Belgium, and northern France to serve as a base for the successful prosecution
of the air and sea war against England". On 29 November, OKW
"Directive No. 9 – Instructions For Warfare Against The Economy Of The
Enemy" stated that once this coastline had been secured, the Luftwaffe
together with the Kriegsmarine (German Navy) was to blockade UK ports with sea
mines. They were to attack shipping and warships and make air attacks on shore
installations and industrial production. This directive remained in force in the
first phase of the Battle of Britain. It was reinforced on 24 May during the
Battle of France by "Directive No. 13", which authorised the
Luftwaffe "to attack the English homeland in the fullest manner, as soon
as sufficient forces are available. This attack will be opened by an
annihilating reprisal for English attacks on the Ruhr Basin."
By the end of June 1940, Germany had defeated Britain's
allies on the continent, and on 30 June the OKW Chief of Staff, Alfred Jodl,
issued his review of options to increase pressure on Britain to agree to a
negotiated peace. The first priority was to eliminate the RAF and gain air
supremacy. Intensified air attacks against shipping and the economy could
affect food supplies and civilian morale in the long term. Reprisal attacks of
terror bombing had the potential to cause quicker capitulation, but the effect
on morale was uncertain. On the same day, the Luftwaffe Commander-in-Chief,
Hermann Göring issued his operational directive: to destroy the RAF, thus
protecting German industry, and also to block overseas supplies to Britain. The
German Supreme Command argued over the practicality of these options.
In "Directive No. 16 – On preparations for a landing
operation against England" on 16 July, Hitler required readiness by
mid-August for the possibility of an invasion he called Operation Sea Lion,
unless the British agreed to negotiations. The Luftwaffe reported that it would
be ready to launch its major attack early in August. The Kriegsmarine
Commander-in-Chief, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, continued to highlight the
impracticality of these plans and said sea invasion could not take place before
early 1941. Hitler now argued that Britain was holding out in hope of
assistance from Russia, and the Soviet Union was to be invaded by mid 1941.
Göring met his air fleet commanders, and on 24 July issued "Tasks and
Goals" of firstly gaining air supremacy, secondly protecting invasion forces
and attacking the Royal Navy's ships. Thirdly, they were to blockade imports,
bombing harbors and stores of supplies.
Hitler's "Directive No. 17 – For the conduct of air and
sea warfare against England" issued on 1 August attempted to keep all the
options open. The Luftwaffe's Adlertag campaign was to start around 5 August,
subject to weather, with the aim of gaining air superiority over southern
England as a necessary precondition of invasion, to give credibility to the
threat and give Hitler the option of ordering the invasion. The intention was
to incapacitate the RAF so much that the UK would feel open to air attack, and
would begin peace negotiations. It was also to isolate the UK and damage war
production, beginning an effective blockade. Following severe Luftwaffe losses,
Hitler agreed at a 14 September OKW conference that the air campaign was to
intensify regardless of invasion plans. On 16 September, Göring gave the order
for this change in strategy, to the first independent strategic bombing
campaign.
Negotiated Peace or Neutrality
Hitler's 1925 book Mein Kampf mostly set out his hatreds: he
only admired ordinary German World War I soldiers and Britain, which he saw as
an ally against communism. In 1935 Hermann Göring welcomed news that Britain,
as a potential ally, was rearming. In 1936 he promised assistance to defend the
British Empire, asking only a free hand in Eastern Europe, and repeated this to
Lord Halifax in 1937. That year, von Ribbentrop met Churchill with a similar proposal;
when rebuffed, he told Churchill that interference with German domination would
mean war. To Hitler's great annoyance, all his diplomacy failed to stop Britain
from declaring war when he invaded Poland. During the fall of France, he
repeatedly discussed peace efforts with his generals.
When Churchill came to power, there was still wide support
for Halifax, who as Foreign Secretary openly argued for peace negotiations in
the tradition of British diplomacy, to secure British independence without war.
On 20 May, Halifax secretly requested a Swedish businessman to make contact
with Göring to open negotiations. Shortly afterwards, in the May 1940 War
Cabinet Crisis, Halifax argued for negotiations involving the Italians, but
this was rejected by Churchill with majority support. An approach made through
the Swedish ambassador on 22 June was reported to Hitler, making peace
negotiations seem feasible. Throughout July, as the battle started, the Germans
made wider attempts to find a diplomatic solution. On 2 July, the day the armed
forces were asked to start preliminary planning for an invasion, Hitler got von
Ribbentrop to draft a speech offering peace negotiations. On 19 July Hitler
made this speech to the German Parliament in Berlin, appealing "to reason
and common sense", and said he could "see no reason why this war
should go on". His somber conclusion was received in silence, but he did
not suggest negotiations and this was perceived as being effectively an
ultimatum by the British government, which rejected the offer. Halifax kept
trying to arrange peace until he was sent to Washington in December as
ambassador, and in January 1941 Hitler expressed continued interest in
negotiating peace with Britain.
Blockade and Siege
A May 1939 planning exercise by Luftflotte 3 found that the
Luftwaffe lacked the means to do much damage to Britain's war economy beyond
laying naval mines. Joseph Schmid, in charge of Luftwaffe intelligence,
presented a report on 22 November 1939, stating that, "Of all Germany's
possible enemies, Britain is the most dangerous." This "Proposal for
the Conduct of Air Warfare" argued for a counter to the British blockade
and said "Key is to paralyse the British trade". Instead of the
Wehrmacht attacking the French, the Luftwaffe with naval assistance was to
block imports to Britain and attack seaports. "Should the enemy resort to
terror measures – for example, to attack our towns in western Germany"
they could retaliate by bombing industrial centers and London. Parts of this
appeared on 29 November in "Directive No. 9" as future actions once
the coast had been conquered. On 24 May 1940 "Directive No. 13" authorized
attacks on the blockade targets, as well as retaliation for RAF bombing of
industrial targets in the Ruhr.
After the defeat of France, the OKW felt they had won the
war, and some more pressure would persuade Britain to give in. On 30 June, the
OKW Chief of Staff Alfred Jodl issued his paper setting out options: the first
was to increase attacks on shipping, economic targets and the RAF: air attacks
and food shortages were expected to break morale and lead to capitulation.
Destruction of the RAF was the first priority, and invasion would be a last
resort. Göring's operational directive issued the same day ordered the
destruction of the RAF to clear the way for attacks cutting off seaborne
supplies to Britain. It made no mention of invasion.
Invasion Plans
In November 1939, the OKW reviewed the potential for an air-
and seaborne invasion of Britain: the Kriegsmarine was faced with the threat
the Royal Navy's larger Home Fleet posed to a crossing of the English Channel,
and together with the German Army viewed control of airspace as a necessary
precondition. The German navy thought air superiority alone was insufficient;
the German naval staff had already produced a study (in 1939) on the
possibility of an invasion of Britain and concluded that it also required naval
superiority. The Luftwaffe said invasion could only be "the final act in
an already victorious war."
Hitler first discussed the idea of an invasion at a 21 May
1940 meeting with Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, who stressed the difficulties and
his own preference for a blockade. OKW Chief of Staff Jodl's 30 June report
described invasion as a last resort once the British economy had been damaged
and the Luftwaffe had full air superiority. On 2 July, OKW requested
preliminary plans.
In Britain, Churchill described "the great invasion
scare" as "serving a very useful purpose" by "keeping every
man and woman tuned to a high pitch of readiness". Historian Len Deighton
stated that on 10 July Churchill advised the War Cabinet that invasion could be
ignored, as it "would be a most hazardous and suicidal operation".
On 11 July, Hitler agreed with Raeder that invasion would be
a last resort, and the Luftwaffe advised that gaining air superiority would
take 14 to 28 days. Hitler met his army chiefs, von Brauchitsch and Halder, at
the Berchtesgaden Obersalzberg on 13 July where they presented detailed plans
on the assumption that the navy would provide safe transport. Von Brauchitsch
and Halder were surprised that Hitler took no interest in the invasion plans,
unlike his usual attitude toward military operations, but on 16 July he issued
Directive No. 16, ordering preparations for Operation Sea Lion.
The navy insisted on a narrow beachhead and an extended
period for landing troops; the army rejected these plans: the Luftwaffe could
begin an air attack in August. Hitler held a meeting of his army and navy
chiefs on 31 July. The navy said 22 September was the earliest possible date
and proposed postponement until the following year, but Hitler preferred
September. He then told von Brauchitsch and Halder that he would decide on the
landing operation eight to fourteen days after the air attack began. On 1
August, he issued Directive No. 17 for intensified air and sea warfare, to
begin with Adlertag on or after 5 August, subject to weather, keeping options
open for negotiated peace or blockade and siege.
Independent Air Attack
Under the continuing influence of the 1935 "Conduct of
the Air War" doctrine, the main focus of the Luftwaffe command (including
Göring) was in concentrating attacks to destroy enemy armed forces on the
battlefield, and "blitzkrieg" close air support of the army succeeded
brilliantly. They reserved strategic bombing for a stalemate situation or
revenge attacks, but doubted if this could be decisive on its own and regarded
bombing civilians to destroy homes or undermine morale as a waste of strategic
effort.
The defeat of France in June 1940 introduced the prospect
for the first time of independent air action against Britain. A July
Fliegercorps I paper asserted that Germany was by definition an air power:
"Its chief weapon against England is the Air Force, then the Navy,
followed by the landing forces and the Army." In 1940, the Luftwaffe would
undertake a "strategic offensive ... on its own and independent of the
other services", according to an April 1944 German account of their
military mission. Göring was convinced that strategic bombing could win
objectives that were beyond the army and navy, and gain political advantages in
the Third Reich for the Luftwaffe and himself. He expected air warfare to
decisively force Britain to negotiate, as all in the OKW hoped, and the
Luftwaffe took little interest in planning to support an invasion.
Opposing Forces
The Luftwaffe faced a more capable opponent than any it had
previously met: a sizeable, highly coordinated, well-supplied, modern air
force.
Fighters
The Luftwaffe's Messerschmitt Bf 109E and Bf 110C fought
against the RAF's workhorse Hurricane Mk I and the less numerous Spitfire Mk I;
Hurricanes outnumbered Spitfires in RAF Fighter Command by about 2:1 when war
broke out. The Bf 109E had a better climb rate and was up to 40 mph faster in
level flight than the Rotol (constant speed propeller) equipped Hurricane Mk I,
depending on altitude. The speed and climb disparity with the original
non-Rotol Hurricane was even greater. By mid-1940, all RAF Spitfire and
Hurricane fighter squadrons converted to 100 octane aviation fuel, which
allowed their Merlin engines to generate significantly more power and an
approximately 30 mph increase in speed at low altitudes through the use of an
Emergency Boost Override. In September 1940, the more powerful Mk IIa series 1
Hurricanes started entering service in small numbers. This version was capable
of a maximum speed of 342 mph (550 km/h), some 20 mph more than the original
(non-Rotol) Mk I, though it was still 15 to 20 mph slower than a Bf 109
(depending on altitude).
The performance of the Spitfire over Dunkirk came as a
surprise to the Jagdwaffe, although the German pilots retained a strong belief
that the 109 was the superior fighter. The British fighters were equipped with
eight Browning .303 (7.7mm) machine guns firing bullets, while most Bf 109Es
had two 20mm cannons firing explosive shells, supplemented by two 7.92mm
machine guns.
The 20mm cannons were much more effective than the .303; during the Battle it
was not unknown for damaged German bombers to limp home with up to two hundred
.303 hits. At some altitudes, the Bf 109 could out climb the British fighter.
It could also engage in vertical-plane negative-g maneuvers without the engine
cutting out because its DB 601 engine used fuel injection; this allowed the 109
to dive away from attackers more readily than the carburetor-equipped Merlin. On
the other hand, the Bf 109E had the disadvantage of a much larger turning
circle than its two foes. In general, though, as Alfred Price noted in The
Spitfire Story:
...
the differences between the Spitfire and the Me 109 in performance and handling
were only marginal, and in a combat they were almost always surmounted by
tactical considerations of which side had seen the other first, which had the
advantage of sun, altitude, numbers, pilot ability, tactical situation,
tactical co-ordination, amount of fuel remaining, etc.
The Bf 109E was also used as a Jabo (jagdbomber,
fighter-bomber) – the E-4/B and E-7 models could carry a 250 kg bomb underneath
the fuselage, the later model arriving during the battle. The Bf 109, unlike
the Stuka, could fight on equal terms with RAF fighters after releasing its
ordnance.
At the start of the battle, the twin-engined Messerschmitt
Bf 110C long-range Zerstörer ("Destroyer") was also expected to
engage in air-to-air combat while escorting the Luftwaffe bomber fleet.
Although the 110 was faster than the Hurricane and almost as fast as the
Spitfire, its lack of maneuverability and acceleration meant that it was a
failure as a long-range escort fighter. On 13 and 15 August, thirteen and
thirty aircraft were lost, the equivalent of an entire Gruppe, and the type's
worst losses during the campaign. This trend continued with a further eight and
fifteen lost on 16 and 17 August.
The most successful role of the Bf 110 during the battle was
as a Schnellbomber (fast bomber). The Bf 110 usually used a shallow dive to
bomb the target and escape at high speed. One unit, Erprobungsgruppe 210 –
initially formed as the service test unit (Erprobungskommando) for the emerging
successor to the 110, the Me 210 – proved that the Bf 110 could still be used
to good effect in attacking small or "pinpoint" targets.
The RAF's Boulton Paul Defiant had some initial success over
Dunkirk because of its resemblance to the Hurricane; Luftwaffe fighters
attacking from the rear were surprised by its unusual gun turret, which could
fire to the rear. During the Battle of Britain, it proved hopelessly
outclassed. The Defiant, designed to attack bombers without fighter escort,
lacked any form of forward-firing armament, and the heavy turret and second
crewman meant it could not outrun or outmaneuver either the Bf 109 or Bf 110.
By the end of August, after disastrous losses, the aircraft was withdrawn from
daylight service.
Bombers
The Luftwaffe's primary bombers were the Heinkel He 111,
Dornier Do 17, and Junkers Ju 88 for level bombing at medium to high altitudes,
and the Junkers Ju 87 Stuka for dive-bombing. The He 111 was used in greater
numbers than the others during the conflict, and was better known, partly due
to its distinctive wing shape. Each level bomber also had a few reconnaissance
versions accompanying them that were used during the battle.
Although it had been successful in previous Luftwaffe
engagements, the Stuka suffered heavy losses in the Battle of Britain,
particularly on 18 August, due to its slow speed and vulnerability to fighter
interception after dive-bombing a target. As the losses went up Stuka units,
with limited payload and range in addition to their vulnerability, were largely
removed from operations over England and diverted to concentrate on shipping,
until eventually re-deployed to the Eastern Front in 1941. For some raids they
were called back, such as on 13 September to attack Tangmere airfield.
The remaining three bomber types differed in their
capabilities; the Dornier Do 17 was both the slowest and had the smallest bomb
load; the Ju 88 was the fastest once its mainly external bomb load was dropped;
and the He 111 carried the largest, internal, bomb load. All three bomber types
suffered heavy losses from the home-based British fighters, but the Ju 88 had
significantly lower loss rates due to its greater speed and its ability to dive
out of trouble (it was originally designed as a dive bomber). The German bombers
required constant protection by the Luftwaffe's insufficiently numerous fighter
force. Bf 109Es were ordered to support more than 300–400 bombers on any given
day. Later in the conflict, when night bombing became more frequent, all three
were used. Due to its smaller bomb load, the lighter Do 17 was used less than
the He 111 and Ju 88 for this purpose.
On the British side, three bomber types were mostly used on
night operations against targets such as factories, invasion ports and railway centers;
the Armstrong Whitworth Whitley, the Handley-Page Hampden and the Vickers
Wellington were classified as heavy bombers by the RAF, although the Hampden
was a medium bomber comparable to the He 111. The twin-engined Bristol Blenheim
and the obsolescent single-engined Fairey Battle were both light bombers; the
Blenheim was the most numerous of the aircraft equipping RAF Bomber Command,
and was used in attacks against shipping, ports, airfields and factories on the
continent by day and by night. The Fairey Battle squadrons, which had suffered
heavy losses in daylight attacks during the Battle of France, were brought up
to strength with reserve aircraft and continued to operate at night in attacks
against the invasion ports, until the Battle was withdrawn from UK front-line
service in October 1940.
Pilots
Before the war, the RAF's processes for selecting potential
candidates were opened to men of all social classes through the creation in
1936 of the RAF Volunteer Reserve, which "... was designed to appeal, to
... young men ... without any class distinctions ..." The older squadrons
of the Royal Auxiliary Air Force did retain some of their upper-class
exclusiveness, but their numbers were soon swamped by the newcomers of the
RAFVR; by 1 September 1939, 6,646 pilots had been trained through the RAFVR.
By mid-1940, there were about 9,000 pilots in the RAF to man
about 5,000 aircraft, most of which were bombers. Fighter Command was never
short of pilots, but the problem of finding sufficient numbers of fully trained
fighter pilots became acute by mid-August 1940. With aircraft production
running at 300 planes each week, only 200 pilots were trained in the same
period. In addition, more pilots were allocated to squadrons than there were
aircraft, as this allowed squadrons to maintain operational strength despite
casualties and still provide for pilot leave. Another factor was that only
about 30% of the 9,000 pilots were assigned to operational squadrons; 20% of
the pilots were involved in conducting pilot training, and a further 20% were
undergoing further instruction, like those offered in Canada and in Southern
Rhodesia to the Commonwealth trainees, although already qualified. The rest
were assigned to staff positions, since RAF policy dictated that only pilots
could make many staff and operational command decisions, even in engineering
matters. At the height of the fighting, and despite Churchill's insistence,
only 30 pilots were released to the front line from administrative duties.
For these reasons, and the permanent loss of 435 pilots
during the Battle of France alone along with many more wounded, and others lost
in Norway, the RAF had fewer experienced pilots at the start of the Battle of
Britain than the Luftwaffe. It was the lack of trained pilots in the fighting
squadrons, rather than the lack of aircraft, that became the greatest concern
for Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding, commander of Fighter Command. Drawing from
regular RAF forces, the Auxiliary Air Force and the Volunteer Reserve, the
British were able to muster some 1,103 fighter pilots on 1 July. Replacement
pilots, with little flight training and often no gunnery training, suffered
high casualty rates, exacerbating the problem.
The Luftwaffe, on the other hand, were able to muster a
large number (1,450) of experienced fighter pilots. Drawing from a cadre of
Spanish Civil War veterans, these pilots already had comprehensive courses in
aerial gunnery and instructions in tactics suited for fighter-versus-fighter
combat. Training manuals discouraged heroism, stressing the importance of
attacking only when the odds were in the pilot's favor. Despite the high levels
of experience, German fighter formations did not provide a sufficient reserve
of pilots to allow for losses and leave, and the Luftwaffe was unable to
produce enough pilots to prevent a decline in operational strength as the
battle progressed.
International Participation
Allies
About 20% of pilots who took part in the battle were from
non-British countries. The Royal Air Force roll of honor for the Battle of
Britain recognizes 595 non-British pilots (out of 2,936) as flying at least one
authorized operational sortie with an eligible unit of the RAF or Fleet Air Arm
between 10 July and 31 October 1940. These included 145 Poles, 127 New
Zealanders, 112 Canadians, 88 Czechoslovaks, 10 Irish, 32 Australians, 28
Belgians, 25 South Africans, 13 French, 9 Americans, 3 Southern Rhodesians and
individuals from Jamaica, Barbados and Newfoundland. "Altogether in the
fighter battles, the bombing raids, and the various patrols flown between 10
July and 31 October 1940 by the Royal Air Force, 1495 aircrew were killed, of
whom 449 were fighter pilots, 718 aircrew from Bomber Command, and 280 from
Coastal Command. Among those killed were 47 airmen from Canada, 24 from
Australia, 17 from South Africa, 30 from Poland,
20 from Czechoslovakia and six from Belgium. Forty-seven New Zealanders lost
their lives, including 15 fighter pilots, 24 bomber and eight coastal aircrew.
The names of these Allied and Commonwealth airmen are inscribed in a memorial
book that rests in the Battle of Britain Chapel in Westminster Abbey. In the
chapel is a stained glass window which contains the badges of the fighter
squadrons which operated during the battle and the flags of the nations to
which the pilots and aircrew belonged. These pilots, some of whom had to flee
their home countries because of German invasions, fought with distinction.
The No. 303 Polish Fighter Squadron was the highest-scoring
fighter squadron of the Battle of Britain, even though it joined the fray two
months after the battle had begun. "Had it not been for the magnificent
material contributed by the Polish squadrons and their unsurpassed
gallantry," wrote Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding, head of RAF Fighter
Command, "I hesitate to say that the outcome of the Battle would have been
the same."
Axis
At the urging of Italian dictator Benito Mussolini, an
element of the Italian Royal Air Force (Regia Aeronautica) called the Italian
Air Corps (Corpo Aereo Italiano or CAI) took part in the later stages of the
Battle of Britain. It first saw action on 24 October 1940 when a force of Fiat
BR.20 medium bombers attacked the port at Harwich. The CAI achieved limited
success during this and subsequent raids. The unit was redeployed in January
1941, having claimed to have shot down at least nine British aircraft. This was
inaccurate and their actual successes were much lower.
Luftwaffe Strategy
The indecision of OKL over what to do was reflected in
shifts in Luftwaffe strategy. The doctrine of concentrated close air support of
the army at the battlefront succeeded against Poland, Denmark and Norway, the
Low Countries and France but incurred significant losses. The Luftwaffe had to
build or repair bases in the conquered territories, and rebuild their strength.
In June 1940 they began regular armed reconnaissance flights and sporadic
Störangriffe, nuisance raids of one or a few bombers by day and night. These
gave crews practice in navigation and avoiding air defenses and set off air
raid alarms which disturbed civilian morale. Similar nuisance raids continued
throughout the battle, into late 1940. Scattered naval mine-laying sorties
began at the outset and increased gradually over the battle period.
Göring's operational directive of 30 June ordered the
destruction of the RAF, including the aircraft industry, to end RAF bombing
raids on Germany and facilitating attacks on ports and storage in the Luftwaffe
blockade of Britain. Attacks on Channel shipping in the Kanalkampf began on 4
July, and were formalized on 11 July in an order by Hans Jeschonnek which added
the arms industry as a target. On 16 July, Directive No. 16 ordered
preparations for Operation Sea Lion and on the next day the Luftwaffe was
ordered to stand by in full readiness. Göring met his air fleet commanders and
on 24 July issued orders for gaining air supremacy, protecting the army and
navy if the invasion went ahead and attacking Royal Navy ships and continuing
the blockade. Once the RAF had been defeated, Luftwaffe bombers were to move
forward beyond London without the need for fighter escort, destroying military
and economic targets.
At a meeting on 1 August the command reviewed plans produced
by each Fliegerkorps with differing proposals for targets including whether to
bomb airfields but failed to decide a priority. Intelligence reports gave
Göring the impression that the RAF was almost defeated, so that raids would
attract British fighters for the Luftwaffe to shoot down. On 6 August he finalized
plans for Adlertag (Eagle Day) with Kesselring, Sperrle and Stumpff; the
destruction of RAF Fighter Command in the south of England was to take four
days, with lightly escorted small bomber raids leaving the main fighter force
free to attack RAF fighters. Bombing of military and economic targets was then
to systematically extend up to the Midlands until daylight attacks could
proceed unhindered over the whole of Britain.
Bombing of London was to be held back while these night time
"destroyer" attacks proceeded over other urban areas, then, in the
culmination of the campaign, a major attack on the capital was intended to
cause a crisis, with refugees fleeing London just as Operation Sea Lion was to
begin. With hopes fading for the possibility of invasion, on 4 September Hitler
authorized a main focus on day and night attacks on tactical targets, with London
as the main target, which became known as the Blitz. With increasing difficulty
in defending bombers in day raids, the Luftwaffe shifted to a strategic bombing
campaign of night raids aiming to overcome British resistance by damaging
infrastructure and food stocks, though intentional terror bombing of civilians
was not sanctioned.
Regrouping of Luftwaffe in
Luftflotten
The Luftwaffe regrouped after the Battle of France into
three Luftflotten (Air Fleets) opposite Britain's southern and eastern coasts.
Luftflotte 2 (Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring), was responsible for the
bombing of south-east England and the London area. Luftflotte 3
(Generalfeldmarschall Hugo Sperrle) concentrated on the West Country, Wales,
the Midlands and north-west England. Luftflotte 5 (Generaloberst Hans-Jürgen
Stumpff) from his headquarters in Norway, attacked the north of England and
Scotland. As the battle progressed, command responsibility shifted, with
Luftflotte 3 taking more responsibility for the night bombing and the main
daylight operations fell upon Luftflotte 2.
Initial Luftwaffe estimates were that it would take four
days to defeat RAF Fighter Command in southern England. This would be followed
by a four-week offensive during which the bombers and long-range fighters would
destroy all military installations throughout the country and wreck the British
aircraft industry. The campaign was planned to begin with attacks on airfields
near the coast, gradually moving inland to attack the ring of sector airfields
defending London. Later reassessments gave the Luftwaffe five weeks, from 8
August to 15 September, to establish temporary air superiority over England.
Fighter Command had to be destroyed, either on the ground or in the air, yet
the Luftwaffe had to preserve its strength to be able to support the invasion;
the Luftwaffe had to maintain a high "kill ratio" over the RAF
fighters. The only alternative to the goal of air superiority was a terror
bombing campaign aimed at the civilian population but this was considered a
last resort and it was forbidden by Hitler. The Luftwaffe kept broadly to this
scheme but its commanders had differences of opinion on strategy. Sperrle
wanted to eradicate the air defense infrastructure by bombing it. Kesselring
championed attacking London directly, either to bombard the British government
into submission or to draw RAF fighters into a decisive battle. Göring did
nothing to resolve this disagreement between his commanders and gave only vague
directives during the initial stages of the battle, apparently unable to decide
upon which strategy to pursue.
Tactics
Fighter Formations
Luftwaffe formations employed a loose section of two (called
Rotte [pack]), based on a leader (Rottenführer) followed at a distance of about
200 m (220 yd) by his wingman, Rottenhund pack dog or Katschmarek, the turning
radius of a Bf 109, enabling both aircraft to turn together at high speed. The
Katschmarek flew slightly higher and was trained always to stay with his
leader. With more room between them, both could spend less time maintaining
formation and more time looking around and covering each other's blind spots.
Attacking aircraft could be sandwiched between the two 109s. The formation was
developed from principles formulated by the First World War ace Oswald Boelcke
in 1916. In 1934 the Finnish Air Force adopted similar formations, called
partio (patrol; two aircraft) and parvi (two patrols; four aircraft), for
similar reasons, though Luftwaffe pilots during the Spanish Civil War (led by
Günther Lützow and Werner Mölders, among others) are generally given credit.
The Rotte allowed the Rottenführer to concentrate on shooting down aircraft but
few wingmen had the chance, leading to some resentment in the lower ranks where
it was felt that the high scores came at their expense. Two Rotten combined as
a Schwarm, where all the pilots could watch what was happening around them.
Each Schwarm in a Staffel flew at staggered heights and with about 200 m (220
yd) between them, making the formation difficult to spot at longer ranges and
allowing for a great deal of flexibility. By using a tight
"cross-over" turn, a Schwarm could quickly change direction.
The Bf 110s adopted the same Schwarm formation as the 109s
but were seldom able to use this to the same advantage. The Bf 110's most
successful method of attack was the "bounce" from above. When
attacked, Zerstörergruppen increasingly resorted to forming large defensive
circles, where each Bf 110 guarded the tail of the aircraft ahead of it. Göring
ordered that they be renamed "offensive circles" in a vain bid to
improve rapidly declining morale. These conspicuous formations were often
successful in attracting RAF fighters that were sometimes "bounced"
by high-flying Bf 109s. This led to the often repeated misconception that the
Bf 110s were escorted by Bf 109s.
Higher-level Dispositions
Luftwaffe tactics were influenced by their fighters. The Bf
110 proved too vulnerable against the nimble single-engined RAF fighters and
the bulk of fighter escort duties devolved to the Bf 109. Fighter tactics were
then complicated by bomber crews who demanded closer protection. After the
hard-fought battles of 15 and 18 August, Göring met his unit leaders. The need
for the fighters to meet up on time with the bombers was stressed. It was also
decided that one bomber Gruppe could only be properly protected by several
Gruppen of 109s. Göring stipulated that as many fighters as possible were to be
left free for Freie Jagd ("Free Hunts": a free-roving fighter sweep
preceded a raid to try to sweep defenders out of the raid's path). The Ju 87
units, which had suffered heavy casualties, were only to be used under favorable
circumstances. In early September, due to increasing complaints from the bomber
crews about RAF fighters seemingly able to get through the escort screen,
Göring ordered an increase in close escort duties. This decision shackled many
of the Bf 109s to the bombers and, although they were more successful at
protecting the bombers, casualties amongst the fighters mounted, primarily
because they were forced to fly and maneuver at reduced speeds.
The Luftwaffe varied its tactics to break Fighter Command.
It launched many Freie Jagd to draw up RAF fighters. RAF fighter controllers
were often able to detect these and position squadrons to avoid them, keeping
to Dowding's plan to preserve fighter strength for the bomber formations. The
Luftwaffe also tried using small formations of bombers as bait, covering them
with large numbers of escorts. This was more successful, but escort duty kept
the fighters tied to the slower bombers making them more vulnerable.
By September, standard tactics for raids had become an
amalgam of techniques. A Freie Jagd would precede the main attack formations.
The bombers would fly in at altitudes between 5,000 and 6,000 m (16,000 and
20,000 ft), closely escorted by fighters. Escorts were divided into two parts
(usually Gruppen), some operating close to the bombers and others a few hundred
yards away and a little above. If the formation was attacked from the
starboard, the starboard section engaged the attackers, the top section moving
to starboard and the port section to the top position. If the attack came from
the port side the system was reversed. British fighters coming from the rear
were engaged by the rear section and the two outside sections similarly moving
to the rear. If the threat came from above, the top section went into action
while the side sections gained height to be able to follow RAF fighters down as
they broke away. If attacked, all sections flew in defensive circles. These
tactics were skillfully evolved and carried out and were difficult to counter.
Adolf Galland noted:
We
had the impression that, whatever we did, we were bound to be wrong. Fighter
protection for bombers created many problems which had to be solved in action.
Bomber pilots preferred close screening in which their formation was surrounded
by pairs of fighters pursuing a zigzag course. Obviously, the visible presence
of the protective fighters gave the bomber pilots a greater sense of security.
However, this was a faulty conclusion, because a fighter can only carry out
this purely defensive task by taking the initiative in the offensive. He must
never wait until attacked because he then loses the chance of acting. We
fighter pilots certainly preferred the free chase during the approach and over
the target area. This gives the greatest relief and the best protection for the
bomber force.
The biggest disadvantage faced by Bf 109 pilots was that
without the benefit of long-range drop tanks (which were introduced in limited
numbers in the late stages of the battle), usually of 300 L (66 imp gal; 79 US
gal) capacity, the 109s had an endurance of just over an hour and, for the
109E, a 600 km (370 mi) range. Once over Britain, a 109 pilot had to keep an
eye on a red "low fuel" light on the instrument panel: once this was
illuminated, he was forced to turn back and head for France. With the prospect
of two long flights over water and knowing their range was substantially
reduced when escorting bombers or during combat, the Jagdflieger coined the
term Kanalkrankheit or "Channel sickness".
Intelligence
The Luftwaffe was ill-served by its lack of military
intelligence about the British defenses. The German intelligence services were
fractured and plagued by rivalry; their performance was "amateurish".
By 1940, there were few German agents operating in Great Britain and a handful
of attempts to insert spies into the country were foiled.
As a result of intercepted radio transmissions, the Germans
began to realize that the RAF fighters were being controlled from ground
facilities; in July and August 1939, for example, the airship Graf Zeppelin,
which was packed with equipment for listening in on RAF radio and RDF
transmissions, flew around the coasts of Britain. Although the Luftwaffe
correctly interpreted these new ground control procedures, they were
incorrectly assessed as being rigid and ineffectual. A British radar system was
well known to the Luftwaffe from intelligence gathered before the war, but the
highly developed "Dowding system" linked with fighter control had
been a well-kept secret. Even when good information existed, such as a November
1939 Abwehr assessment of Fighter Command strengths and capabilities by
Abteilung V, it was ignored if it did not match conventional preconceptions.
On 16 July 1940, Abteilung V, commanded by Oberstleutnant
"Beppo" Schmid, produced a report on the RAF and on Britain's
defensive capabilities which was adopted by the frontline commanders as a basis
for their operational plans. One of the most conspicuous failures of the report
was the lack of information on the RAF's RDF network and control systems capabilities;
it was assumed that the system was rigid and inflexible, with the RAF fighters
being "tied" to their home bases. An optimistic (and, as it turned
out, erroneous) conclusion reached was:
D.
Supply Situation... At present the British aircraft industry produces about 180
to 300 first line fighters and 140 first line bombers a month. In view of the
present conditions relating to production (the appearance of raw material
difficulties, the disruption or breakdown of production at factories owing to
air attacks, the increased vulnerability to air attack owing to the fundamental
reorganisation of the aircraft industry now in progress), it is believed that
for the time being output will decrease rather than increase. In the event of
an intensification of air warfare it is expected that the present strength of
the RAF will fall, and this decline will be aggravated by the continued
decrease in production. — Abteilung V Intelligence Appreciation of the RAF
("Appendix 4").
Because of this statement, reinforced by another more
detailed report, issued on 10 August, there was a mindset in the ranks of the
Luftwaffe that the RAF would run out of frontline fighters. The Luftwaffe
believed it was weakening Fighter Command at three times the actual attrition
rate. Many times, the leadership believed Fighter Command's strength had
collapsed, only to discover that the RAF were able to send up defensive
formations at will.
Throughout the battle, the Luftwaffe had to use numerous
reconnaissance sorties to make up for poor intelligence. Reconnaissance
aircraft (initially mostly Dornier Do 17s, but increasingly Bf 110s) proved
easy prey for British fighters, as it was seldom possible for them to be
escorted by Bf 109s. Thus, the Luftwaffe operated "blind" for much of
the battle, unsure of its enemy's true strengths, capabilities, and
deployments. Many of the Fighter Command airfields were never attacked, while
raids against supposed fighter airfields fell instead on bomber or coastal defense
stations. The results of bombing and air fighting were consistently
exaggerated, due to inaccurate claims, over-enthusiastic reports and the
difficulty of confirmation over enemy territory. In the euphoric atmosphere of
perceived victory, the Luftwaffe leadership became increasingly disconnected
from reality. This lack of leadership and solid intelligence meant the Germans
did not adopt a consistent strategy, even when the RAF had its back to the
wall. Moreover, there was never a systematic focus on one type of target (such
as airbases, radar stations, or aircraft factories); consequently, the already
haphazard effort was further diluted.
Navigational Aids
While the British were using radar for air defense more
effectively than the Germans realized, the Luftwaffe attempted to press its own
offensive with advanced radio navigation systems of which the British were
initially not aware. One of these was Knickebein ("bent leg"); this system
was used at night and for raids where precision was required. It was rarely
used during the Battle of Britain.
Air-Sea Rescue
The Luftwaffe was much better prepared for the task of
air-sea rescue than the RAF, specifically tasking the Seenotdienst unit,
equipped with about 30 Heinkel He 59 floatplanes, with picking up downed
aircrew from the North Sea, English Channel and the Dover Straits. In addition,
Luftwaffe aircraft were equipped with life rafts and the aircrew were provided
with sachets of a chemical called fluorescein which, on reacting with water,
created a large, easy-to-see, bright green patch. In accordance with the Geneva
Convention, the He 59s were unarmed and painted white with civilian
registration markings and red crosses. Nevertheless, RAF aircraft attacked
these aircraft, as some were escorted by Bf 109s.
After single He 59s were forced to land on the sea by RAF
fighters on 1 and 9 July, a controversial order was issued to the RAF on 13
July; this stated that from 20 July, Seenotdienst aircraft were to be shot
down. One of the reasons given by Churchill was:
We
did not recognise this means of rescuing enemy pilots so they could come and
bomb our civil population again ... all German air ambulances were forced down
or shot down by our fighters on definite orders approved by the War Cabinet.
The British also believed that their crews would report on
convoys, the Air Ministry issuing a communiqué to the German government on 14
July that Britain was
unable,
however, to grant immunity to such aircraft flying over areas in which
operations are in progress on land or at sea, or approaching British or Allied
territory, or territory in British occupation, or British or Allied ships.
Ambulance aircraft which do not comply with the above will do so at their own
risk and peril.
The white He 59s were soon repainted in camouflage colors
and armed with defensive machine guns. Although another four He 59s were shot
down by RAF aircraft, the Seenotdienst continued to pick up downed Luftwaffe
and Allied aircrew throughout the battle, earning praise from Adolf Galland for
their bravery.
RAF Strategy
The Dowding System
During early tests of the Chain Home system, the slow flow
of information from the CH radars and observers to the aircraft often caused
them to miss their "bandits". The solution, today known as the
"Dowding system", was to create a set of reporting chains to move
information from the various observation points to the pilots in their fighters.
It was named after its chief architect, "Stuffy" Dowding.
Reports from CH radars and the Observer Corps were sent
directly to Fighter Command Headquarters (FCHQ) at Bentley Priory where they
were "filtered" to combine multiple reports of the same formations
into single tracks. Telephone operators would then forward only the information
of interest to the Group headquarters, where the map would be re-created. This
process was repeated to produce another version of the map at the Sector level,
covering a much smaller area. Looking over their maps, Group level commanders
could select squadrons to attack particular targets. From that point, the
Sector operators would give commands to the fighters to arrange an
interception, as well as return them to base. Sector stations also controlled
the anti-aircraft batteries in their area; an army officer sat beside each
fighter controller and directed the gun crews when to open and cease fire.
The Dowding system dramatically improved the speed and
accuracy of the information that flowed to the pilots. During the early war
period, it was expected that an average interception mission might have a 30%
chance of ever seeing their target. During the battle, the Dowding system
maintained an average rate over 75%, with several examples of 100% rates –
every fighter dispatched found and intercepted its target. In contrast,
Luftwaffe fighters attempting to intercept raids had to randomly seek their
targets and often returned home having never seen enemy aircraft. The result is
what is now known as an example of "force multiplication"; RAF
fighters were as effective as two or more Luftwaffe fighters, greatly
offsetting, or overturning, the disparity in actual numbers.
Intelligence
While Luftwaffe intelligence reports underestimated British
fighter forces and aircraft production, the British intelligence estimates went
the other way: they overestimated German aircraft production, numbers and range
of aircraft available, and numbers of Luftwaffe pilots. In action, the
Luftwaffe believed from their pilot claims and the impression given by aerial
reconnaissance that the RAF was close to defeat, and the British made strenuous
efforts to overcome the perceived advantages held by their opponents.
It is unclear how much the British intercepts of the Enigma
cipher, used for high-security German radio communications, affected the
battle. Ultra, the information obtained from Enigma intercepts, gave the
highest echelons of the British command a view of German intentions. According
to F.W. Winterbotham, who was the senior Air Staff representative in the Secret
Intelligence Service, Ultra helped establish the strength and composition of
the Luftwaffe's formations, the aims of the commanders and provided early
warning of some raids. In early August it was decided that a small unit would
be set up at FCHQ, which would process the flow of information from Bletchley
and provide Dowding only with the most essential Ultra material; thus the Air
Ministry did not have to send a continual flow of information to FCHQ,
preserving secrecy, and Dowding was not inundated with non-essential
information. Keith Park and his controllers were also told about Ultra. In a
further attempt to camouflage the existence of Ultra, Dowding created a unit
named No. 421 (Reconnaissance) Flight RAF. This unit (which later became No. 91
Squadron RAF), was equipped with Hurricanes and Spitfires and sent out aircraft
to search for and report Luftwaffe formations approaching England. In addition,
the radio listening service (known as Y Service), monitoring the patterns of
Luftwaffe radio traffic contributed considerably to the early warning of raids.
Tactics
Fighter Formations
In the late 1930s, Fighter Command expected to face only
bombers over Britain, not single-engined fighters. A series of "Fighting
Area Tactics" were formulated and rigidly adhered to, involving a series
of maneuvers designed to concentrate a squadron's firepower to bring down
bombers. RAF fighters flew in tight, v-shaped sections ("vics") of
three aircraft, with four such "sections" in tight formation. Only
the squadron leader at the front was free to watch for the enemy; the other
pilots had to concentrate on keeping station. Training also emphasized by-the-book
attacks by sections breaking away in sequence. Fighter Command recognized the
weaknesses of this structure early in the battle, but it was felt too risky to
change tactics during the battle because replacement pilots – often with only
minimal flying time – could not be readily retrained, and inexperienced pilots
needed firm leadership in the air only rigid formations could provide. German
pilots dubbed the RAF formations Idiotenreihen ("rows of idiots")
because they left squadrons vulnerable to attack.
Front line RAF pilots were acutely aware of the inherent
deficiencies of their own tactics. A compromise was adopted whereby squadron
formations used much looser formations with one or two "weavers"
flying independently above and behind to provide increased observation and rear
protection; these tended to be the least experienced men and were often the
first to be shot down without the other pilots even noticing that they were
under attack. During the battle, 74 Squadron under Squadron Leader Adolph
"Sailor" Malan adopted a variation of the German formation called the
"fours in line astern", which was a vast improvement on the old three
aircraft "vic". Malan's formation was later generally used by Fighter
Command.
Squadron- and Higher-level Deployment
The weight of the battle fell upon 11 Group. Keith Park's
tactics were to dispatch individual squadrons to intercept raids. The intention
was to subject incoming bombers to continual attacks by relatively small
numbers of fighters and try to break up the tight German formations. Once
formations had fallen apart, stragglers could be picked off one by one. Where
multiple squadrons reached a raid the procedure was for the slower Hurricanes
to tackle the bombers while the more agile Spitfires held up the fighter
escort. This ideal was not always achieved, resulting in occasions when
Spitfires and Hurricanes reversed roles. Park also issued instructions to his
units to engage in frontal attacks against the bombers, which were more
vulnerable to such attacks. Again, in the environment of fast-moving,
three-dimensional air battles, few RAF fighter units were able to attack the
bombers from head-on.
During the battle, some commanders, notably Leigh-Mallory,
proposed squadrons be formed into "Big Wings," consisting of at least
three squadrons, to attack the enemy en masse, a method pioneered by Douglas
Bader.
Proponents of this tactic claimed interceptions in large
numbers caused greater enemy losses while reducing their own casualties.
Opponents pointed out the big wings would take too long to form up, and the
strategy ran a greater risk of fighters being caught on the ground refueling.
The big wing idea also caused pilots to over claim their kills, due to the
confusion of a more intense battle zone. This led to the belief big wings were
far more effective than they actually were.
The issue caused intense friction between Park and
Leigh-Mallory, as 12 Group was tasked with protecting 11 Group's airfields
whilst Park's squadrons intercepted incoming raids. The delay in forming up Big
Wings meant the formations often did not arrive at all or until after German
bombers had hit 11 Group's airfields. Dowding, to highlight the problem of the
Big Wing's performance, submitted a report compiled by Park to the Air Ministry
on 15 November. In the report, he highlighted that during the period of 11
September – 31 October, the extensive use of the Big Wing had resulted in just
10 interceptions and one German aircraft destroyed, but his report was ignored.
Post-war analysis agrees Dowding and Park's approach was best for 11 Group.
Dowding's removal from his post in November 1940 has been
blamed on this struggle between Park and Leigh-Mallory's daylight strategy. The
intensive raids and destruction wrought during the Blitz damaged both Dowding
and Park in particular, for the failure to produce an effective night-fighter defense
system, something for which the influential Leigh-Mallory had long criticized
them.
Bomber and Coastal Command Contributions]
Bomber Command and Coastal Command aircraft flew offensive
sorties against targets in Germany and France during the battle. An hour after
the declaration of war, Bomber Command launched raids on warships and naval
ports by day, and in night raids dropped leaflets as it was considered illegal
to bomb targets which could affect civilians. After the initial disasters of
the war, with Vickers Wellington bombers shot down in large numbers attacking
Wilhelmshaven and the slaughter of the Fairey Battle squadrons sent to France,
it became clear that they would have to operate mainly at night to avoid
incurring very high losses. Churchill came to power on 10 May 1940, and the War
Cabinet on 12 May agreed that German actions justified "unrestricted
warfare", and on 14 May they authorized an attack on the night of 14/15
May against oil and rail targets in Germany. At the urging of Clement Attlee,
the Cabinet on 15 May authorized a full bombing strategy against "suitable
military objectives", even where there could be civilian casualties. That
evening, a night time bomber campaign began against the German oil industry,
communications, and forests/crops, mainly in the Ruhr area. The RAF lacked
accurate night navigation and carried small bomb loads. As the threat mounted,
Bomber Command changed targeting priority on 3 June 1940 to attack the German
aircraft industry. On 4 July, the Air Ministry gave Bomber Command orders to
attack ports and shipping. By September, the build-up of invasion barges in the
Channel ports had become a top priority target.
On 7 September, the government issued a warning that the
invasion could be expected within the next few days and, that night, Bomber
Command attacked the Channel ports and supply dumps. On 13 September, they
carried out another large raid on the Channel ports, sinking 80 large barges in
the port of Ostend. 84 barges were sunk in Dunkirk after another raid on 17
September and by 19 September, almost 200 barges had been sunk. The loss of
these barges may have contributed to Hitler's decision to postpone Operation
Sea Lion indefinitely. The success of these raids was in part because the
Germans had few Freya radar stations set up in France, so that air defenses of
the French harbors were not nearly as good as the air defenses over Germany;
Bomber Command had directed some 60% of its strength against the Channel ports.
The Bristol Blenheim units also raided German-occupied
airfields throughout July to December 1940, both during daylight hours and at
night. Although most of these raids were unproductive, there were some
successes; on 1 August, five out of twelve Blenheims sent to attack Haamstede
and Evere (Brussels) were able to destroy or heavily damage three Bf 109s of
II./JG 27 and apparently kill a Staffelkapitän identified as a Hauptmann
Albrecht von Ankum-Frank.
Two other 109s were claimed by Blenheim gunners.
Another successful raid on Haamstede was made by a single Blenheim on 7 August
which destroyed one 109 of 4./JG 54, heavily damaged another and caused lighter
damage to four more.
There were some missions that produced an almost 100%
casualty rate amongst the Blenheims; one such operation was mounted on 13
August 1940 against a Luftwaffe airfield near Aalborg in north-eastern Denmark
by 12 aircraft of 82 Squadron. One Blenheim returned early (the pilot was later
charged and due to appear before a court martial, but was killed on another
operation); the other eleven, which reached Denmark, were shot down, five by
flak and six by Bf 109s. Of the 33 crewmen who took part in the attack, 20 were
killed and 13 captured.
As well as the bombing operations, Blenheim-equipped units
had been formed to carry out long-range strategic reconnaissance missions over
Germany and German-occupied territories. In this role, the Blenheims again
proved to be too slow and vulnerable against Luftwaffe fighters, and they took
constant casualties.
Coastal Command directed its attention towards the protection
of British shipping, and the destruction of enemy shipping. As invasion became
more likely, it participated in the strikes on French harbors and airfields,
laying mines, and mounting numerous reconnaissance missions over the enemy-held
coast. In all, some 9,180 sorties were flown by bombers from July to October
1940. Although this was much less than the 80,000 sorties flown by fighters,
bomber crews suffered about half the total casualties borne by their fighter
colleagues. The bomber contribution was, therefore, much more dangerous on a
loss-per-sortie comparison.
Bomber, reconnaissance, and antisubmarine patrol operations
continued throughout these months with little respite and none of the publicity
accorded to Fighter Command. In his famous 20 August speech about "The
Few", praising Fighter Command, Churchill also made a point of mentioning
Bomber Command's contribution, adding that bombers were even then striking back
at Germany; this part of the speech is often overlooked, even today. The Battle
of Britain Chapel in Westminster Abbey lists in a roll of honor, 718 Bomber
Command crew members, and 280 from Coastal Command who were killed between 10
July and 31 October.
Bomber and Coastal Command attacks against invasion barge
concentrations in Channel ports were widely reported by the British media
during September and October 1940. In what became known as 'the Battle of the
Barges' RAF attacks were claimed in British propaganda to have sunk large
numbers of barges, and to have created widespread chaos and disruption to
German invasion preparations. Given the volume of British propaganda interest
in these bomber attacks during September and earlier October, it is striking
how quickly this was overlooked once the Battle of Britain had been concluded.
Even by mid-war, the bomber pilots' efforts had been largely eclipsed by a
continuing focus on the Few, this a result of the Air Ministry's continuing valorization
of the ″fighter boys″, beginning with the March 1941 Battle of Britain
propaganda pamphlet.
Air-Sea Rescue
One of the biggest oversights of the entire system was the
lack of adequate air-sea rescue organization. The RAF had started organizing a
system in 1940 with High Speed Launches (HSLs) based on flying boat bases and
at some overseas locations, but it was still believed that the amount of
cross-Channel traffic meant that there was no need for a rescue service to
cover these areas. Downed pilots and aircrew, it was hoped, would be picked up
by any boats or ships which happened to be passing by. Otherwise, the local
life boat would be alerted, assuming someone had seen the pilot going into the
water.
RAF aircrew were issued with a life jacket, nicknamed the
"Mae West," but in 1940 it still required manual inflation, which was
almost impossible for someone who was injured or in shock. The waters of the
English Channel and Dover Straits are cold, even in the middle of summer, and
clothing issued to RAF aircrew did little to insulate them against these
freezing conditions. The RAF also imitated the German practice of issuing
fluorescein. A conference in 1939 had placed air-sea rescue under Coastal
Command. Because pilots had been lost at sea during the "Channel
Battle", on 22 August, control of RAF rescue launches was passed to the
local naval authorities and 12 Lysanders were given to Fighter Command to help
look for pilots at sea. In all, some 200 pilots and aircrew were lost at sea
during the battle. No proper air-sea rescue service was formed until 1941.
Phases of the Battle
The battle covered a shifting geographical area, and there
have been differing opinions on significant dates: when the Air Ministry
proposed 8 August as the start, Dowding responded that operations "merged
into one another almost insensibly", and proposed 10 July as the onset of
increased attacks. With the caution that phases drifted into each other and
dates are not firm, the Royal Air Force Museum states that five main phases can
be identified:
26 June – 16 July: Störangriffe
("nuisance raids"), scattered small scale probing attacks both day
and night, armed reconnaissance and mine-laying sorties. From 4 July, daylight
Kanalkampf ("the Channel battles") against shipping.
17 July – 12 August: daylight
Kanalkampf attacks on shipping intensify through this period, increased attacks
on ports and coastal airfields, night raids on RAF and aircraft manufacturing.
13 August – 6 September: Adlerangriff
("Eagle Attack"), the main assault; attempt to destroy the RAF in
southern England, including massive daylight attacks on RAF airfields, followed
from 19 August by heavy night bombing of ports and industrial cities, including
suburbs of London.
7 September – 2 October: the Blitz
commences, main focus day and night attacks on London.
3–31 October: large scale night bombing
raids, mostly on London; daylight attacks now confined to small scale
fighter-bomber Störangriffe raids luring RAF fighters into dogfights.
Small Scale Raids
Following Germany's rapid territorial gains in the Battle of
France, the Luftwaffe had to reorganize its forces, set up bases along the
coast, and rebuild after heavy losses. It began small scale bombing raids on
Britain on the night of 5/6 June, and continued sporadic attacks throughout
June and July. The first large-scale attack was at night, on 18/19 June, when
small raids scattered between Yorkshire and Kent involved in total 100 bombers.
These Störangriffe ("nuisance raids") which involved only a few
aeroplanes, sometimes just one, were used to train bomber crews in both day and
night attacks, to test defenses and try out methods, with most flights at
night. They found that, rather than carrying small numbers of large high
explosive bombs, it was more effective to use more small bombs, similarly
incendiaries had to cover a large area to set effective fires. These training
flights continued through August and into the first week of September. Against
this, the raids also gave the British time to assess the German tactics, and
invaluable time for the RAF fighters and anti-aircraft defenses to prepare and
gain practice.
The attacks were widespread: over the night of 30 June
alarms were set off in 20 counties by just 20 bombers, then next day the first
daylight raids were carried out during 1 July, on both Hull in Yorkshire and
Wick, Caithness. On 3 July most flights were reconnaissance sorties, but 15
civilians were killed when bombs hit Guildford in Surrey. Numerous small
Störangriffe raids, both day and night, were made daily through August,
September and into the winter, with aims including bringing RAF fighters up to
battle, destruction of specific military and economic targets, and setting off
air-raid warnings to affect civilian morale: four major air-raids in August involved
hundreds of bombers; in the same month 1,062 small raids were made, spread
across the whole of Britain.
Channel Battles
The Kanalkampf comprised a series of running fights over
convoys in the English Channel. It was launched partly because Kesselring and
Sperrle were not sure about what else to do, and partly because it gave German
aircrews some training and a chance to probe the British defenses. Dowding
could provide only minimal shipping protection, and these battles off the coast
tended to favor the Germans, whose bomber escorts had the advantage of altitude
and outnumbered the RAF fighters. From 9 July reconnaissance probing by Dornier
Do 17 bombers put a severe strain on RAF pilots and machines, with high RAF
losses to Bf 109s. When nine 141 Squadron Defiants went into action on 19 July
six were lost to Bf 109s before a squadron of Hurricanes intervened. On 25 July
a coal convoy and escorting destroyers suffered such heavy losses to attacks by
Stuka dive bombers that the Admiralty decided convoys should travel at night:
the RAF shot down 16 raiders but lost 7 aircraft. By 8 August 18 coal ships and
4 destroyers had been sunk, but the Navy was determined to send a convoy of 20
ships through rather than move the coal by railway. After repeated Stuka
attacks that day, six ships were badly damaged, four were sunk and only four
reached their destination. The RAF lost 19 fighters and shot down 31 German
aircraft. The Navy now cancelled all further convoys through the Channel and
the cargo was sent by rail. Even so, these early combat encounters provided
both sides with experience.
Main Assault
The main attack upon the RAF's defenses was code-named
Adlerangriff ("Eagle Attack"). Intelligence reports gave Göring the
impression that the RAF was almost defeated, and raids would attract British
fighters for the Luftwaffe to shoot down. The strategy agreed on 6 August was
to destroy RAF Fighter Command across the south of England in four days, then
bombing of military and economic targets was to systematically extend up to the
Midlands until daylight attacks could proceed unhindered over the whole of
Britain, culminating in a major bombing attack on London.
Assault on RAF: Radar and Airfields
Poor weather delayed Adlertag ("Eagle Day") until
13 August 1940. On 12 August, the first attempt was made to blind the Dowding
system, when aircraft from the specialist fighter-bomber unit Erprobungsgruppe
210 attacked four radar stations. Three were briefly taken off the air but were
back working within six hours. The raids appeared to show that British radars
were difficult to knock out. The failure to mount follow-up attacks allowed the
RAF to get the stations back on the air, and the Luftwaffe neglected strikes on
the supporting infrastructure, such as phone lines and power stations, which
could have rendered the radars useless, even if the lattice-work towers
themselves, which were very difficult to destroy, remained intact.
Adlertag opened with a series of attacks, led again by Erpro
210, on coastal airfields used as forward landing grounds for the RAF fighters,
as well as 'satellite airfields'
including Manston and Hawkinge. As the week drew on, the airfield attacks moved
further inland, and repeated raids were made on the radar chain. 15 August was
"The Greatest Day" when the Luftwaffe mounted the largest number of
sorties of the campaign. Luftflotte 5 attacked the north of England. Raiding
forces from Denmark and Norway, which believed Fighter Command strength to be concentrated
in the south, ran into resistance which was unexpectedly strong. Inadequately
escorted by Bf 110s, Bf 109s having insufficient range to escort raids from
Norway, bombers were shot down in large numbers. North East England was
attacked by 65 Heinkel 111s escorted by 34 Messerschmitt 110s, and RAF Great
Driffield was attacked by 50 unescorted Junkers 88s. Out of 115 bombers and 35
fighters sent, 75 planes were destroyed and many others were damaged beyond
repair. Furthermore, due to early engagement by RAF fighters, many of the
bombers dropped their payloads ineffectively early. As a result of these
casualties, Luftflotte 5 did not appear in strength again in the campaign.
18 August, which had the greatest number of casualties to
both sides, has been dubbed "The Hardest Day". Following this
grinding battle, exhaustion and the weather reduced operations for most of a
week, allowing the Luftwaffe to review their performance. "The Hardest
Day" had sounded the end for the Ju 87 in the campaign. This veteran of
Blitzkrieg was too vulnerable to fighters to operate over Britain. Göring
withdrew the Stuka from the fighting to preserve the Stuka force, removing the
main Luftwaffe precision-bombing weapon and shifting the burden of pinpoint
attacks onto the already-stretched Erpro 210. The Bf 110 proved too clumsy for
dogfighting with single-engined fighters, and its participation was scaled
back. It would be used only when range required it or when sufficient
single-engined escort could not be provided for the bombers.
Göring made yet another important decision: to order more
bomber escorts at the expense of free-hunting sweeps. To achieve this, the
weight of the attack now fell on Luftflotte 2, and the bulk of the Bf 109s in
Luftflotte 3 were transferred to Kesselring's command, reinforcing the fighter
bases in the Pas-de-Calais. Stripped of its fighters, Luftflotte 3 would
concentrate on the night bombing campaign. Göring, expressing disappointment
with the fighter performance thus far in the campaign, also made sweeping
changes in the command structure of the fighter units, replacing many
Geschwaderkommodore with younger, more aggressive pilots such as Adolf Galland
and Werner Mölders.
Finally, Göring stopped the attacks on the radar chain.
These were seen as unsuccessful, and neither the Reichsmarschall nor his
subordinates realized how vital the Chain Home stations were to the defense
systems. It was known that radar provided some early warning of raids, but the
belief among German fighter pilots was that anything bringing up the
"Tommies" to fight was to be encouraged.
Raids on British Cities
On the afternoon of 15 August, Hauptmann Walter
Rubensdörffer leading Erprobungsgruppe 210 mistakenly bombed Croydon airfield
(on the outskirts of London) instead of the intended target, RAF Kenley. German
intelligence reports made the Luftwaffe optimistic that the RAF, thought to be
dependent on local air control, was struggling with supply problems and pilot
losses. After a raid on Biggin Hill on 18 August, Luftwaffe aircrew said they
had been unopposed, the airfield was "completely destroyed", and
asked, "Is England already finished?" In accordance with the strategy
agreed on 6 August, defeat of the RAF was to be followed by bombing military
and economic targets, systematically extending up to the Midlands.
Göring ordered attacks on aircraft factories on 19 August
1940. Sixty raids on the night of 19/20 August targeted the aircraft industry
and harbors, and bombs fell on suburban areas around London: Croydon, Wimbledon
and the Maldens. Night raids were made on 21/22 August on Aberdeen, Bristol and
South Wales. That morning, bombs were dropped on Harrow and Wealdstone, on the
outskirts of London. Overnight on 22/23 August, the output of an aircraft
factory at Filton near Bristol was drastically affected by a raid in which Ju
88 bombers dropped over 16 long tons (16 t) of high explosive bombs. On the
night of 23/24 August over 200 bombers attacked the Fort Dunlop tyre factory in
Birmingham, with a significant effect on production. A bombing campaign began
on 24 August with the largest raid so far, killing 100 in Portsmouth, and that
night, several areas of London were bombed; the East End was set ablaze and
bombs landed on central London. Some historians believe that these bombs were
dropped accidentally by a group of Heinkel He 111s which had failed to find
their target and overshot Rochester and Thameshaven; this account has been
contested as being three separate drops that night.
More night raids were made around London on 24/25 August,
when bombs fell on Croydon, Banstead, Lewisham, Uxbridge, Harrow and Hayes.
London was on red alert over the night of 28/29 August, with bombs reported in
Finchley, St Pancras, Wembley, Wood Green, Southgate, Old Kent Road, Mill Hill,
Ilford, Chigwell and Hendon.
Attacks on Airfields from 24 August
Göring's directive issued on 23 August 1940 ordered
ceaseless attacks on the aircraft industry and on RAF ground organization to
force the RAF to use its fighters, continuing the tactic of luring them up to
be destroyed, and added that focused attacks were to be made on RAF airfields.
From 24 August onwards, the battle was a fight between
Kesselring's Luftflotte 2 and Park's 11 Group. The Luftwaffe concentrated all
their strength on knocking out Fighter Command and made repeated attacks on the
airfields. Of the 33 heavy attacks in the following two weeks, 24 were against
airfields. The key sector stations were hit repeatedly: Biggin Hill and
Hornchurch four times each; Debden and North Weald twice each. Croydon,
Gravesend, Rochford, Hawkinge and Manston were also attacked in strength.
Coastal Command's Eastchurch was bombed at least seven times because it was
believed to be a Fighter Command aerodrome. At times these raids caused some
damage to the sector stations, threatening the integrity of the Dowding system.
To offset some losses, some 58 Fleet Air Arm fighter pilot
volunteers were seconded to RAF squadrons, and a similar number of former
Fairey Battle pilots were used. Most replacements from Operational Training
Units (OTUs) had as little as nine hours flying time and no gunnery or
air-to-air combat training. At this point, the multinational nature of Fighter
Command came to the fore. Many squadrons and personnel from the air forces of
the Dominions were already attached to the RAF, including top-level commanders
– Australians, Canadians, New Zealanders, Rhodesians and South Africans. Other
nationalities were also represented, including Free French, Belgian and a
Jewish pilot from the British mandate of Palestine.
They were bolstered by the arrival of fresh Czechoslovak and
Polish squadrons. These had been held back by Dowding, who thought non-English
speaking aircrew would have trouble working within his control system, but
Polish and Czech fliers proved to be especially effective. The pre-war Polish
Air Force had lengthy and extensive training, and high standards; with Poland
conquered and under brutal German occupation, the pilots of No. 303 (Polish)
Squadron, which became the highest-scoring Allied unit, were experienced and
strongly motivated. Josef František, a Czech regular airman who had flown from
the occupation of his own country to join the Polish and then French air forces
before arriving in Britain, flew as a guest of 303 Squadron and was ultimately
credited with the highest "RAF score" in the Battle of Britain.
The RAF had the advantage of fighting over home territory.
Pilots who bailed out after being shot down could be back at their airfields
within hours, and aircraft low on fuel or ammunition could be immediately
re-equipped. One RAF pilot interviewed in late 1940 had been shot down five
times during the Battle of Britain, but was able to crash-land in Britain or
bail out each time. For Luftwaffe aircrews, a bailout or crash landing in
England meant capture – in the critical August period, almost as many Luftwaffe
pilots were taken prisoner as were killed – while parachuting into the English
Channel often meant drowning. Morale began to suffer, and Kanalkrankheit
("Channel sickness") – a form of combat fatigue – began to appear
among the German pilots. Their replacement problem became worse than the
British.
Assessment of Attempt to Destroy the RAF
The effect of the German attacks on airfields is unclear.
According to Stephen Bungay, Dowding, in a letter to Hugh Trenchard
accompanying Park's report on the period 8 August – 10 September 1940, states
that the Luftwaffe "achieved very little" in the last week of August
and the first week of September. The only Sector Station to be shut down
operationally was Biggin Hill, and it was non-operational for just two hours.
Dowding admitted that 11 Group's efficiency was impaired but, despite serious
damage to some airfields, only two out of 13 heavily attacked airfields were
down for more than a few hours. The German refocus on London was not critical.
Retired Air Vice-Marshal Peter Dye, head of the RAF Museum,
discussed the logistics of the battle in 2000 and 2010, dealing specifically
with the single-seat fighters. He said that not only was British aircraft
production replacing aircraft, but replacement pilots were keeping pace with
losses. The number of pilots in RAF Fighter Command increased during July,
August and September. The figures indicate the number of pilots available never
decreased: from July, 1,200 were available; from 1 August, 1,400; in September,
over 1,400; in October, nearly 1,600; by 1 November, 1,800. Throughout the battle,
the RAF had more fighter pilots available than the Luftwaffe. Although the
RAF's reserves of single-seat fighters fell during July, the wastage was made
up for by an efficient Civilian Repair Organisation (CRO), which by December
had repaired and put back into service some 4,955 aircraft, and by aircraft
held at Air Servicing Unit (ASU) airfields.
Richard Overy agrees with Dye and Bungay. Overy says that
only one airfield was temporarily put out of action and "only" 103
pilots were lost. British fighter production, not counting repaired aircraft,
produced 496 new aircraft in July, 467 in August, and 467 in September,
covering the losses of August and September. Overy indicates the number of
serviceable and total strength returns reveal an increase in fighters from 3
August to 7 September, 1,061 on strength and 708 serviceable to 1,161 on
strength and 746 serviceable. Moreover, Overy points out that the number of RAF
fighter pilots grew by one-third between June and August 1940. Personnel
records show a constant supply of around 1,400 pilots in the crucial weeks of
the battle. In the second half of September it reached 1,500. The shortfall of
pilots was never above 10%. The Germans never had more than between 1,100 and
1,200 pilots, a deficiency of up to one-third. "If Fighter Command were
'the few', the German fighter pilots were fewer".
Other scholars assert that this period was the most
dangerous of all. In The Narrow Margin, published in 1961, historians Derek
Wood and Derek Dempster believed that the two weeks from 24 August to 6
September represented a real danger. According to them, from 24 August to 6
September 295 fighters had been totally destroyed and 171 badly damaged,
against a total output of 269 new and repaired Spitfires and Hurricanes. They
say that 103 pilots were killed or missing and 128 were wounded, a total
wastage of 120 pilots per week out of a fighting strength of just under 1,000,
and that during August no more than 260 fighter pilots were turned out by OTUs,
while casualties were just over 300. A full squadron establishment was 26
pilots, whereas the average in August was 16. In their assessment, the RAF was
losing the battle. Denis Richards, in his 1953 contribution to the official
British account History of the Second World War, agreed that lack of pilots,
especially experienced ones, was the RAF's greatest problem. He states that
between 8 and 18 August 154 RAF pilots were killed, severely wounded, or
missing, while only 63 new pilots were trained. Availability of aircraft was
also a serious issue. While its reserves during the Battle of Britain never
declined to a half dozen planes as some later claimed, Richards describes 24
August to 6 September as the critical period because during these two weeks
Germany destroyed far more aircraft through its attacks on 11 Group's southeast
bases than Britain was producing. Three more weeks of such a pace would indeed
have exhausted aircraft reserves. Germany had also suffered heavy losses of
pilots and aircraft, hence its shift to night-time attacks in September. On 7
September RAF aircraft losses fell below British production and remained so
until the end of the war.
Day and Night Attacks on London: Start
of the Blitz
Hitler's "Directive No. 17 – For the conduct of air and
sea warfare against England" issued on 1 August 1940, reserved to himself
the right to decide on terror attacks as measures of reprisal. Hitler issued a
directive that London was not to be bombed save on his sole instruction. In preparation,
detailed target plans under the code name Operation Loge for raids on
communications, power stations, armaments works and docks in the Port of London
were distributed to the Fliegerkorps in July. The port areas were crowded next
to residential housing and civilian casualties would be expected, but this
would combine military and economic targets with indirect effects on morale.
The strategy agreed on 6 August was for raids on military and economic targets
in towns and cities to culminate in a major attack on London. In mid-August,
raids were made on targets on the outskirts of London.
Luftwaffe doctrine included the possibility of retaliatory
attacks on cities, and since 11 May small-scale night raids by RAF Bomber
Command had frequently bombed residential areas. The Germans assumed this was
deliberate, and as the raids increased in frequency and scale the population
grew impatient for measures of revenge. On 25 August 1940, 81 bombers of Bomber
Command were sent out to raid industrial and commercial targets in Berlin.
Clouds prevented accurate identification and the bombs fell across the city,
causing casualties among the civilian population as well as damage to
residential areas. Continuing RAF raids on Berlin led to Hitler withdrawing his
directive on 30 August, and giving the go-ahead to the planned bombing
offensive. On 3 September Göring planned to bomb London daily, with General
Albert Kesselring's enthusiastic support, having received reports the average
strength of RAF squadrons was down to five or seven fighters out of twelve and
their airfields in the area were out of action. Hitler issued a directive on 5
September to attack cities including London. In a widely publicized speech
delivered on 4 September 1940, Hitler condemned the bombing of Berlin and
presented the planned attacks on London as reprisals. The first daylight raid
was titled Vergeltungsangriff (revenge attack).
On 7 September, a massive series of raids involving nearly
four hundred bombers and more than six hundred fighters targeted docks in the
East End of London, day and night. The RAF anticipated attacks on airfields,
and 11 Group rose to meet them, in greater numbers than the Luftwaffe expected.
The first official deployment of 12 Group's Leigh-Mallory's Big Wing took
twenty minutes to form up, missing its intended target, but encountering
another formation of bombers while still climbing. They returned, apologetic
about their limited success, and blamed the delay on being scrambled too late.
The German press jubilantly announced that "one great
cloud of smoke stretches tonight from the middle of London to the mouth of the
Thames." Reports reflected the briefings given to crews before the raids –
"Everyone knew about the last cowardly attacks on German cities, and
thought about wives, mothers and children. And then came that word
'Vengeance!'" Pilots reported seeing ruined airfields as they flew towards
London, appearances which gave intelligence reports the impression of
devastated defenses. Göring maintained that the RAF was close to defeat, making
invasion feasible.
Fighter Command had been at its lowest ebb, short of men and
machines, and the break from airfield attacks allowed them to recover. 11 Group
had considerable success in breaking up daytime raids. 12 Group repeatedly
disobeyed orders and failed to meet requests to protect 11 Group airfields, but
their experiments with increasingly large Big Wings had some success. The
Luftwaffe began to abandon their morning raids, with attacks on London starting
late in the afternoon for fifty-seven consecutive nights.
The most damaging aspect to the Luftwaffe of targeting
London was the increased distance. The Bf 109E escorts had a limited fuel
capacity, giving them only a 660 km (410-mile) maximum range solely on internal
fuel, and when they arrived had only 10 minutes of flying time before turning
for home, leaving the bombers undefended. Its eventual stablemate, the
Focke-Wulf Fw 190A, was flying only in prototype form in mid-1940; the first 28
Fw 190s were not delivered until November 1940. The Fw 190A-1 had a maximum
range of 940 km (584 miles) on internal fuel, 40% greater than the Bf 109E. The
Messerschmitt Bf 109E-7 corrected this deficiency by adding a ventral
centre-line ordnance rack to take either an SC 250 bomb or a standard 300-litre
Luftwaffe drop tank to double the range to 1,325 km (820 mi). The ordnance rack
was not retrofitted to earlier Bf 109Es until October 1940.
On 14 September, Hitler chaired a meeting with the OKW
staff. Göring was in France directing the decisive battle, so Erhard Milch deputized
for him. Hitler asked "Should we call it off altogether?" General
Hans Jeschonnek, Luftwaffe Chief of Staff, begged for a last chance to defeat
the RAF and for permission to launch attacks on civilian residential areas to
cause mass panic. Hitler refused the latter, perhaps unaware of how much damage
had already been done to civilian targets. He reserved for himself the power to
unleash the terror weapon. Instead, political will was to be broken by
destroying the material infrastructure, the weapons industry, and stocks of
fuel and food.
On 15 September, two massive waves of German attacks were
decisively repulsed by the RAF by deploying every aircraft in 11 Group. Sixty
German and twenty-six RAF aircraft were shot down. The action was the climax of
the Battle of Britain.
Two days after this German defeat Hitler postponed
preparations for the invasion of Britain. Henceforth, in the face of mounting
losses in men, aircraft and the lack of adequate replacements, the Luftwaffe
completed their gradual shift from daylight bomber raids and continued with
nighttime bombing. 15 September is commemorated as Battle of Britain Day.
Night Time Blitz, Fighter-bomber Day
Raids
At the 14 September OKW conference, Hitler acknowledged that
the Luftwaffe had still not gained the air superiority needed for the Operation
Sea Lion invasion. In agreement with Raeder's written recommendation, Hitler
said the campaign was to intensify regardless of invasion plans: "The
decisive thing is the ceaseless continuation of air attacks." Jeschonnek
proposed attacking residential areas to cause "mass panic", but
Hitler turned this down: he reserved to himself the option of terror bombing.
British morale was to be broken by destroying infrastructure, armaments
manufacturing, fuel and food stocks. On 16 September, Göring gave the order for
this change in strategy. This new phase was to be the first independent
strategic bombing campaign, in hopes of a political success forcing the British
to give up. Hitler hoped it might result in "eight million going mad"
(referring to the population of London in 1940), which would "cause a
catastrophe" for the British. In those circumstances, Hitler said,
"even a small invasion might go a long way". Hitler was against
cancelling the invasion as "the cancellation would reach the ears of the
enemy and strengthen his resolve".,
On 19 September, Hitler ordered a reduction in work on Operation Sea Lion. He
doubted if strategic bombing could achieve its aims, but ending the air war
would be an open admission of defeat. He had to maintain the appearance of
concentration on defeating Britain, to conceal from Joseph Stalin his covert
aim to invade the Soviet Union.
Throughout the battle, most Luftwaffe bombing raids had been
at night. They increasingly suffered unsustainable losses in daylight raids,
and the last massive daytime attacks were on 15 September. A raid of 70 bombers
on 18 September also suffered badly, and day raids were gradually phased out
leaving the main attacks at night. Fighter Command still lacked any effective
capacity to intercept night-time raiders. The night fighters, mostly Blenheims
and Beaufighters, at this time lacked airborne radar and so could not find the
bombers. Anti-aircraft guns were diverted to London's defenses, but had a
much-reduced success rate against night attacks.
From mid September, Luftwaffe daylight bombing was gradually
taken over by Bf 109 fighters, adapted to take one 250 kg bomb. Small groups of
fighter-bombers would carry out Störangriffe raids escorted by large escort
formations of about 200 to 300 combat fighters. They flew at altitudes over
20,000 feet (6,100 m) where the Bf 109 had an advantage over RAF fighters,
except the Spitfire.,
The raids disturbed civilians, and continued the war of attrition against
Fighter Command. The raids were intended to carry out precision bombing on
military or economic targets, but it was hard to achieve sufficient accuracy
with the single bomb. Sometimes, when attacked, the fighter-bombers had to
jettison the bomb to function as fighters. The RAF was at a disadvantage and
changed defensive tactics by introducing standing patrols of Spitfires at high
altitude to monitor incoming raids. On a sighting, other patrols at lower
altitude would fly up to join the battle.
A Junkers Ju 88 returning from a raid on London was shot
down in Kent on 27 September resulting in the Battle of Graveney Marsh, the
last action between British and foreign military forces on British mainland
soil.
German bombing of Britain reached its peak in October and
November 1940. In post-war interrogation, Wilhelm Keitel described the aims as
economic blockade, in conjunction with submarine warfare, and attrition of
Britain's military and economic resources. The Luftwaffe wanted to achieve
victory on its own and was reluctant to cooperate with the navy. Their strategy
for the blockade was to destroy ports and storage facilities in towns and
cities. Priorities were based on the pattern of trade and distribution, so for
these months, London was the main target. In November their attention turned to
other ports and industrial targets around Britain.
Hitler postponed the Sealion invasion on 13 October
"until the spring of 1941". It was not until Hitler's Directive 21
was issued, on 18 December 1940, that the threat to Britain of invasion finally
ended.
During the battle, and for the rest of the war, an important
factor in keeping public morale high was the continued presence in London of
King George VI and his wife Queen Elizabeth. When war broke out in 1939, the
King and Queen decided to stay in London and not flee to Canada, as had been
suggested.
George VI and Elizabeth officially stayed in Buckingham Palace throughout the
war, although they often spent weekends at Windsor Castle to visit their
daughters, Elizabeth (the future queen) and Margaret. Buckingham Palace was
damaged by bombs which landed in the grounds on 10 September and, on 13
September, more serious damage was caused by two bombs which destroyed the
Royal Chapel. The royal couple were in a small sitting room about 80 yards from
where the bombs exploded. On 24 September, in recognition of the bravery of
civilians, King George VI inaugurated the award of the George Cross.
Attrition Statistics
Overall, by 2 November, the RAF fielded 1,796 pilots, an
increase of over 40% from July 1940's count of 1,259 pilots. Based on German
sources (from a Luftwaffe intelligence officer Otto Bechtle attached to KG 2 in
February 1944) translated by the Air Historical Branch, Stephen Bungay asserts
German fighter and bomber "strength" declined without recovery, and
that from August–December 1940, the German fighter and bomber strength declined
by 30 and 25 per cent. In contrast, Williamson Murray argues (using
translations by the Air Historical Branch) that 1,380 German bombers were on
strength on 29 June 1940, 1,420 bombers on 28 September, 1,423 level bombers on
2 November and 1,393 bombers on 30 November 1940. In July–September the number
of Luftwaffe pilots available fell by 136, but the number of operational pilots
had shrunk by 171 by September. The training organization of the Luftwaffe was
failing to replace losses. German fighter pilots, in contrast to popular
perception, were not afforded training or rest rotations, unlike their British
counterparts. The first week of September accounted for 25% of Fighter
Command's and 24% of the Luftwaffe's overall losses. Between the dates 26
August – 6 September, on only one day (1 September) did the Germans destroy
more aircraft than they lost. Losses were 325 German and 248 British.
Luftwaffe losses for August numbered 774 aircraft to all
causes, representing 18.5% of all combat aircraft at the beginning of the
month. Fighter Command's losses in August were 426 fighters destroyed,
amounting to 40 per cent of 1,061 fighters available on 3 August. In addition,
99 German bombers and 27 other types were destroyed between 1 and 29 August.
From July to September, the Luftwaffe's loss records
indicate the loss of 1,636 aircraft, 1,184 to enemy action. This represented
47% of the initial strength of single-engined fighters, 66% of twin-engined
fighters, and 45% of bombers. This indicates the Germans were running out of
aircrew as well as aircraft.
Throughout the battle, the Germans greatly underestimated
the size of the RAF and the scale of British aircraft production. Across the
Channel, the Air Intelligence division of the Air Ministry consistently
overestimated the size of the German air enemy and the productive capacity of
the German aviation industry. As the battle was fought, both sides exaggerated
the losses inflicted on the other by an equally large margin. The intelligence
picture formed before the battle encouraged the Luftwaffe to believe that such
losses pushed Fighter Command to the very edge of defeat, while the exaggerated
picture of German air strength persuaded the RAF that the threat it faced was
larger and more dangerous than was the case. This led the British to the
conclusion that another fortnight of attacks on airfields might force Fighter
Command to withdraw their squadrons from the south of England. The German
misconception, on the other hand, encouraged first complacency, then strategic misjudgment.
The shift of targets from air bases to industry and communications was taken
because it was assumed that Fighter Command was virtually eliminated.
Between 24 August and 4 September, German serviceability
rates, which were acceptable at Stuka units, were running at 75% with Bf 109s,
70% with bombers and 65% with Bf 110s, indicating a shortage of spare parts.
All units were well below established strength. The attrition was beginning to
affect the fighters in particular. By 14 September, the Luftwaffe's Bf 109
Geschwader possessed only 67% of their operational crews against authorized
aircraft. For Bf 110 units it was 46 per cent; and for bombers it was 59 per
cent. A week later the figures had dropped to 64 per cent, 52% and 52 per cent.
Serviceability rates in Fighter Command's fighter squadrons, between 24 August
and 7 September, were listed as: 64.8% on 24 August; 64.7% on 31 August and
64.25% on 7 September 1940.
Due to the failure of the Luftwaffe to establish air
supremacy, a conference assembled on 14 September at Hitler's headquarters.
Hitler concluded that air superiority had not yet been established and
"promised to review the situation on 17 September for possible landings on
27 September or 8 October. Three days later, when the evidence was clear that
the German Air Force had greatly exaggerated the extent of their successes
against the RAF, Hitler postponed Sea Lion indefinitely."
Propaganda
Propaganda was an important element of the air war which
began to develop over Britain from 18 June 1940 onwards, when the Luftwaffe
began small, probing daylight raids to test RAF defenses. One of many examples
of these small-scale raids was the destruction of a school at Polruan in
Cornwall, by a single raider. Into early July, the British media's focus on the
air battles increased steadily, the press, magazines, BBC radio and newsreels
daily conveying the contents of Air Ministry communiqués. The German OKW communiqués
matched Britain's efforts in claiming the upper hand.
Central to the propaganda war on both sides of the Channel
were aircraft claims, which are discussed under 'Attrition statistics' (above).
These daily claims were important both for sustaining British home front morale
and persuading America to support Britain, and were produced by the Air
Ministry's Air Intelligence branch. Under pressure from American journalists
and broadcasters to prove that the RAF's claims were genuine, RAF intelligence
compared pilots' claims with actual aircraft wrecks and those seen to crash
into the sea. It was soon realized that there was a discrepancy between the two,
but the Air Ministry decided not to reveal this. In fact, it was not until May
1947 that the actual figures were released to the public, by which time it was
no longer important. Many people refused to believe the revised figures,
including Douglas Bader.
The place of the Battle of Britain in British popular memory
partly stems from the Air Ministry's successful propaganda campaign from July
to October 1940, and its praise of the defending fighter pilots from March 1941
onwards. The pamphlet The Battle of Britain sold in huge numbers
internationally, leading even Goebbels to admire its propaganda value. Focusing
only upon the fighter pilots, with no mention of RAF bomber attacks against
invasion barges, the Battle of Britain was soon established as a major victory
for Fighter Command. This inspired feature films, books, magazines, works of
art, poetry, radio plays and MOI short films.
The Air Ministry also developed the Battle of Britain Sunday
commemoration, supported a Battle of Britain clasp for issue to the pilots in
1945 and, from 1945, Battle of Britain Week. The Battle of Britain window in
Westminster Abbey was also encouraged by the Air Ministry, with Trenchard and
Dowding, now lords, on its committee. By July 1947 when the window was unveiled,
the Battle of Britain had already attained central prominence as Fighter
Command's most notable victory, the fighter pilots credited with preventing
invasion in 1940. Although given widespread media coverage in September and
October 1940, RAF Bomber and Coastal Command raids against invasion barge
concentrations were less well-remembered.
Aftermath
The Battle of Britain marked the first major defeat of
Germany's military forces, with air superiority seen as the key to victory.
Pre-war theories had led to exaggerated fears of strategic bombing, and UK
public opinion was buoyed by coming through the ordeal. For the RAF, Fighter
Command had achieved a great victory in successfully carrying out Sir Thomas
Inskip's 1937 air policy of preventing the Germans from knocking Britain out of
the war.
The battle also significantly shifted American opinion.
During the battle, many Americans accepted the view promoted by Joseph Kennedy,
the American ambassador in London, who believed that the United Kingdom could
not survive. Roosevelt wanted a second opinion, and sent William "Wild
Bill" Donovan on a brief visit to the UK; he became convinced the UK would
survive and should be supported in every possible way. Before the end of the
year, American journalist Ralph Ingersoll, after returning from Britain,
published a book concluding that "Adolf Hitler met his first defeat in
eight years" in what might "go down in history as a battle as
important as Waterloo or Gettysburg". The turning point was when the
Germans reduced the intensity of daylight attacks after 15 September. According
to Ingersoll, "[a] majority of responsible British officers who fought
through this battle believe that if Hitler and Göring had had the courage and
the resources to lose 200 planes a day for the next five days, nothing could
have saved London"; instead, "[the Luftwaffe's] morale in combat is
definitely broken, and the RAF has been gaining in strength each week."
Both sides in the battle made exaggerated claims of numbers
of enemy aircraft shot down. In general, claims were two to three times the
actual numbers. Postwar analysis of records has shown that between July and
September, the RAF claimed 2,698 kills, while the Luftwaffe fighters claimed
3,198 RAF aircraft shot down. Total losses, and start and end dates for
recorded losses, vary for both sides. Luftwaffe losses from 10 July to 30
October 1940 total 1,977 aircraft, including 243 twin- and 569 single-engined
fighters, 822 bombers and 343 non-combat types. In the same period, RAF Fighter
Command aircraft losses number 1,087, including 53 twin-engined fighters. To
the RAF figure should be added 376 Bomber Command and 148 Coastal Command
aircraft lost conducting bombing, mining, and reconnaissance operations in defense
of the country.
Stephen Bungay describes Dowding and Park's strategy of
choosing when to engage the enemy whilst maintaining a coherent force as
vindicated; their leadership, and the subsequent debates about strategy and
tactics, had created enmity among RAF senior commanders and both were sacked
from their posts in the immediate aftermath of the battle. All things
considered, the RAF proved to be a robust and capable organization that was to
use all the modern resources available to it to the maximum advantage. Richard
Evans writes:
Irrespective
of whether Hitler was really set on this course, he simply lacked the resources
to establish the air superiority that was the sine qua non [prerequisite] of a
successful crossing of the English Channel. A third of the initial strength of
the German air force, the Luftwaffe, had been lost in the western campaign in
the spring. The Germans lacked the trained pilots, the effective fighter
aircraft, and the heavy bombers that would have been needed. — Evans,
Richard J. "Immoral Rearmament". The New York Review of Books, No.
20, 20 December 2007.
The Germans launched some spectacular attacks against
important British industries, but they could not destroy the British industrial
potential, and made little systematic effort to do so. Hindsight does not
disguise that the threat to Fighter Command was very real, and for the
participants it seemed as if there was a narrow margin between victory and
defeat. Nevertheless, even if the German attacks on the 11 Group airfields
which guarded southeast England and the approaches to London had continued, the
RAF could have withdrawn to the Midlands out of German fighter range and
continued the battle from there. The victory was as much psychological as
physical. Writes Alfred Price:
The
truth of the matter, borne out by the events of 18 August, is more prosaic:
neither by attacking the airfields nor by attacking London, was the Luftwaffe
likely to destroy Fighter Command. Given the size of the British fighter force
and the general high quality of its equipment, training and morale, the
Luftwaffe could have achieved no more than a Pyrrhic victory. During the action
on 18 August, it had cost the Luftwaffe five trained aircrew killed, wounded or
taken prisoner, for each British fighter pilot killed or wounded; the ratio was
similar on other days in the battle. And this ratio of 5:1 was very close to
that between the number of German aircrew involved in the battle and those in
Fighter Command. In other words, the two sides were suffering almost the same
losses in trained aircrew, in proportion to their overall strengths. In the
Battle of Britain, for the first time during the Second World War, the German
war machine had set itself a major task which it patently failed to achieve,
and so demonstrated that it was not invincible. In stiffening the resolve of
those determined to resist Hitler the battle was an important turning point in
the conflict.
Some historians are more cautious in assessing the
significance of Germany's failure to knock Britain out of the war. Bungay
writes, "Victory in the air achieved a modest strategic goal, for it did
not bring Britain any closer to victory in the war, but merely avoided her
defeat." Overy says, "The Battle of Britain did not seriously weaken
Germany and her allies, nor did it much reduce the scale of the threat facing
Britain (and the Commonwealth) in 1940/41 until German and Japanese aggression
brought the Soviet Union and the United States into the conflict."
The British victory in the Battle of Britain was achieved at
a heavy cost. Total British civilian losses from July to December 1940 were
23,002 dead and 32,138 wounded, with one of the largest single raids on 19 December
1940, in which almost 3,000 civilians died. With the culmination of the
concentrated daylight raids, Britain was able to rebuild its military forces
and establish itself as an Allied stronghold, later serving as a base from
which the liberation of Western Europe was launched.
Memorials and Cultural Impact
Winston Churchill summed up the battle with the words,
"Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so
few". Pilots who fought in the battle have been known as The Few ever
since, at times being specially commemorated on 15 September, "Battle of
Britain Day". On this day in 1940, the Luftwaffe embarked on their largest
bombing attack yet, forcing the engagement of the entirety of the RAF in defense
of London and the South East, which resulted in a decisive British victory that
proved to mark a turning point in Britain's favor. Within the Commonwealth,
Battle of Britain Day has been observed more usually on the third Sunday in
September, and even on the 2nd Thursday in September in some areas in the
British Channel Islands.
Plans for the Battle of Britain window in Westminster Abbey
were begun during wartime, the committee chaired by Lords Trenchard and
Dowding. Public donations paid for the window itself, which replaced a window
destroyed during the campaign, this officially opened by King George VI on 10
July 1947. Although not actually an 'official' memorial to the Battle of
Britain in the sense that government paid for it, the window and chapel have
since been viewed as such. During the late 1950s and 1960, various proposals
were advanced for a national monument to the Battle of Britain, this also the
focus of several letters in The Times. In 1960 the Conservative government
decided against a further monument, taking the view that the credit should be
shared more broadly than Fighter Command alone, and there was little public
appetite for one. All subsequent memorials are the result of private
subscription and initiative, as discussed below.
There are numerous memorials to the battle. The most
important ones are the Battle of Britain Monument in London and the Battle of
Britain Memorial at Capel-le-Ferne in Kent. As well as Westminster Abbey, St
James's Church, Paddington also has a memorial window to the battle, replacing
a window destroyed during it. There is also a memorial at the former Croydon
Airport, one of the RAF bases during the battle, and a memorial to the pilots
at Armadale Castle on the Isle of Skye in Scotland, which is topped by a raven
sculpture. The Polish pilots who served in the battle are among the names on
the Polish War Memorial in west London.
There are also two museums to the battle: one at Hawkinge in
Kent and one at Stanmore in London, at the former RAF Bentley Priory.
In 2015 the RAF created an online 'Battle of Britain 75th
Anniversary Commemorative Mosaic' composed of pictures of "the few" –
the pilots and aircrew who fought in the battle – and "the many" –
'the often unsung others whose contribution during the Battle of Britain was
also vital to the RAF's victory in the skies above Britain', submitted by
participants and their families.
Other post-war memorials include:
Battle of Britain Class steam
locomotives of the Southern Railway
Battle of Britain Memorial Flight
Battle of Britain Memorial,
Capel-le-Ferne
Battle of Britain Monument, London
Kent Battle of Britain Museum
Polish War Memorial
Spirit of the Few Monument
The battle was the subject of the film Battle of Britain
(1969), starring Laurence Olivier as Hugh Dowding and Trevor Howard as Keith
Park. It also starred Michael Caine, Christopher Plummer and Robert Shaw as
squadron leaders. Former participants of the battle served as technical
advisers, including Adolf Galland and Robert Stanford Tuck.
In the 2001 film Pearl Harbor, American participation in the
Battle of Britain was exaggerated, as none of the "Eagle Squadrons"
of American volunteers saw action in Europe before 1941.
As of 2003, a Hollywood film named The Few was in
preparation for release in 2008, based on the story of real-life US pilot Billy
Fiske, who ignored his country's neutrality rules and volunteered for the RAF.
Bill Bond, who conceived the Battle of Britain Monument in London, described a
Variety magazine outline of the film's historical content as "Totally
wrong. The whole bloody lot."
The 1941 Allied propaganda film Churchill's Island was the
winner of the first Academy Award for Documentary Short Subject.
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(1998). Hurricane Aces 1939–1940 (Aircraft of the Aces). Botley, Oxford, UK:
Osprey Publishing.
Holmes, Tony
(2007), Spitfire vs Bf 109: Battle of Britain, Oxford: Osprey
Huntley, Ian
D., Fairey Battle, Aviation Guide 1. Bedford, UK: SAM Publications, 2004.
Jones, Robert
C. (1970). Camouflage and Markings Number 8: Boulton Paul Defiant, RAF Northern
Europe 1936–45. London: Ducimus Book Limited.
Lloyd, Sir Ian;
Pugh, Peter (2004). Hives and the Merlin. Cambridge: Icon Books.
Mason, Francis
K., Hawker Aircraft since 1920. London: Putnam, 1991.
McKinstry, Leo
(2010). Hurricane: Victor of the Battle of Britain. Hodder & Stoughton.
Molson, Kenneth
M. et al., Canada's National Aviation Museum: Its History and Collections.
Ottawa: National Aviation Museum, 1988.
Moyes, Philip,
J. R., "The Fairey Battle." Aircraft in Profile, Volume 2 (nos. 25–48).
Windsor, Berkshire, UK: Profile Publications, 1971.
Parry, Simon
W., Intruders over Britain: The Story of the Luftwaffe's Night Intruder Force,
the Fernnachtjager. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Books, 1989.
Price, Alfred
(1996), Spitfire Mark I/II Aces 1939–41 (Aircraft of the Aces 12), London:
Osprey Books
Price, Alfred
(2002), The Spitfire Story: Revised second edition, Enderby, Leicester, UK:
Silverdale Books
Sarkar, Dilip
(2011). How the Spitfire Won the Battle of Britain. Amberley Publishing
Limited.
Scutts, Jerry,
Messerschmitt Bf 109: The Operational Record. Sarasota, Florida: Crestline
Publishers, 1996.
Ward, John
(2004). Hitler's Stuka Squadrons: The JU 87 at War 1936–1945. MBI Publishing
Company LLC.
Warner, G
(2005), The Bristol Blenheim: A Complete History (2nd ed.), London: Crécy
Publishing
Weal, John
(1999), Messerschmitt Bf 110 'Zerstōrer' Aces of World War 2, Botley,
Additional References
Addison, Paul
and Jeremy Crang. The Burning Blue: A New History of the Battle of Britain.
London: Pimlico, 2000. I
Bergström,
Christer. Barbarossa – The Air Battle: July–December 1941. London: Chevron/Ian
Allan, 2007.
Bergström,
Christer. The Battle of Britain – An Epic Battle Revisited. Eskilstuna: Vaktel
Books/Casemate, 2010.
Bishop,
Patrick. Fighter Boys: The Battle of Britain, 1940. New York: Viking, 2003. Penguin
Books, 2004. As Fighter Boys: Saving Britain 1940. London: Harper Perennial,
2004.
Brittain, Vera.
England's Hour. London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2005
Campion, Garry
(2008), The Good Fight: Battle of Britain Wartime Propaganda and The Few (First
ed.), Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan
Campion, Garry
(2015), The Battle of Britain, 1945–1965: The Air Ministry and the Few,
Palgrave Macmillan
Cooper,
Matthew. The German Air Force 1933–1945: An Anatomy of Failure. New York:
Jane's Publishing Incorporated, 1981.
Craig, Phil and
Tim Clayton. Finest Hour: The Battle of Britain. New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2000.
Cumming,
Anthony J. The Royal Navy and The Battle of Britain. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval
Institute Press, 2010.
Fiedler,
Arkady. 303 Squadron: The Legendary Battle of Britain Fighter Squadron. Los
Angeles: Aquila Polonica, 2010.
Fisher, David
E. A Summer Bright and Terrible: Winston Churchill, Lord Dowding, Radar and the
Impossible Triumph of the Battle of Britain. Emeryville, CA: Shoemaker &
Hoard, 2005.
Foreman, John
(1988), Battle of Britain: The Forgotten Months, November And December 1940,
New Malden: Air Research Publications
Gaskin,
Margaret. Blitz: The Story of 29 December 1940. New York: Harcourt, 2006.
Gretzyngier,
Robert; Matusiak, Wojtek (1998). Polish Aces of World War 2. London: Osprey.
Haining, Peter
(2005). The Chianti Raiders: The Extraordinary Story of the Italian Air Force
in the Battle of Britain. Pavilion Books.
Haining, Peter.
Where the Eagle Landed: The Mystery of the German Invasion of Britain, 1940.
London: Robson Books, 2004.
Halpenny, Bruce
Barrymore. Action Stations: Military Airfields of Greater London v. 8.
Cambridge, UK: Patrick Stephens, 1984.
Harding,
Thomas. "It's baloney, say RAF aces". The Telegraph, 24 August 2006.
Hough, Richard.
The Battle of Britain: The Greatest Air Battle of World War II. New York: W.W.
Norton, 1989. I
James, T.C.G.
The Battle of Britain (Air Defence of Great Britain; vol. 2). London/New York:
Frank Cass Publishers, 2000.
James, T.C.G.
Growth of Fighter Command, 1936–1940 (Air Defence of Great Britain; vol. 1).
London; New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000.
James, T.C.G.
Night Air Defence During the Blitz. London/New York: Frank Cass Publishers,
2003.
McGlashan,
Kenneth B. with Owen P. Zupp. Down to Earth: A Fighter Pilot Recounts His
Experiences of Dunkirk, the Battle of Britain, Dieppe, D-Day and Beyond.
London: Grub Street Publishing, 2007.
March, Edgar J.
British Destroyers; a History of Development 1892–1953. London: Seely Service
& Co. Limited, 1966.
Olson, Lynne;
Cloud, Stanley (2003). A Question of Honor: The Kościuszko Squadron: Forgotten
Heroes of World War II. New York: Knopf. NB: This book is also published under
the following title: For Your Freedom and Ours: The Kościuszko Squadron –
Forgotten Heroes of World War II.
Mason, Francis
K. "Battle over Britain". McWhirter Twins Ltd. 1969. A day by day
accounting of RaF and Luftwaffe losses.
Prien, Jochen
and Peter Rodeike.Messerschmitt Bf 109 F, G, and K: An Illustrated Study.
Atglen, Pennsylvania: Schiffer Publishing, 1995.
Ray, John
Philip (2003). The Battle of Britain: Dowding and the First Victory, 1940.
Cassell.
Ray, John
Philip. The Battle of Britain: New Perspectives: Behind the Scenes of the Great
Air War. London: Arms & Armour Press, 1994. London: Orion Publishing, 1996.
Rongers, Eppo
H. De oorlog in mei '40, Utrecht/Antwerpen: Uitgeverij Het Spectrum N.V., 1969
Townsend,
Peter. Duel of Eagles (new edition). London: Phoenix, 2000.
Wellum,
Geoffrey. First Light: The Story of the Boy Who Became a Man in the War-Torn
Skies Above Britain. New York: Viking Books, 2002. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley &
Sons, 2003. London: Penguin Books, 2003.
Zaloga, Steven
J.; Hook, Richard (1982). The Polish Army 1939–45. London: Osprey.
 |
| A
German Luftwaffe Heinkel He 111 bomber flying over Wapping and the Isle
of Dogs in the East End of London at the start of the Luftwaffe's
evening raids of 7 September 1940. Imperial War Museum photo C5422. |
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| X4382,
a late production Spitfire Mk I of 602 Squadron flown by P/O Osgood
Hanbury, Westhampnett, September 1940. RAF Official photo. |
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| Heinkel He 111 bombers during the Battle of Britain. Imperial War Museum photo MH6547. |
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| South
African Adolph "Sailor" Malan led No. 74 Squadron RAF and was, at the
time, the RAF's leading ace. Imperial ar Museum CH 12661. |
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| 126
German aircraft or "Adolfs" were claimed by Polish pilots of 303
Squadron during the Battle of Britain. Polish Institute and Sikorski
Museum London photo. |
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| Hermann Göring, the commander of the Luftwaffe. Bundesarhiv photo Bild 102-13805. |
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| Hugo Sperrle, the commander of Luftflotte 3. Bundesarchiv photo Bild 146-1987-121-30A. |
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| Adolf
Galland, the successful leader of III./JG 26, became
Geschwaderkommodore of JG 26 on 22 August. Bundesarhiv photo Bild
146-2006-0123. |
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| Commander-in-Chief, Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding. Imperial War Museum photo D 1417. |
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| 10 Group Commander, Sir Quintin Brand, 1941. |
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| 11 Group Commander, Keith Park. Imperial War Museum photo CM 3513. |
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| 12 Group Commander, Trafford Leigh-Mallory. Imperial War Museum photo CH 11943. |
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| 13 Group Commander, Richard Saul. Imperial War Museum photo CH 3193. |
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| RAF
and Luftwaffe bases, group and Luftflotte boundaries, and range of
Luftwaffe Bf 109 fighters. Southern part of British radar coverage:
radar in North of Scotland not shown. |
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| Spitfire
Mark IA, X4474 ‘QV-I’, of No. 19 Squadron RAF, taking off from
Fowlmere, Cambridgeshire, with Sergeant B J Jennings at the controls.
During the battle 19 Squadron was part of the Duxford Wing. Imperial War
Museum photo CH 1451. |
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| Pilots
of 'B' Flight, No. 32 Squadron relax on the grass at Hawkinge in front
of Hurricane Mk I P3522, GZ-V, during the Battle of Britain. From left
to right: Pilot Officer R F Smythe; Pilot Officer K R Gillman; Pilot
Officer J E Procter; Flight Lieutenant P M Brothers; Pilot Officer D H
Grice; Pilot Officer P M Gardner and Pilot Officer A F Eckford. All
survived the war except Keith Gillman who was posted missing 25 August
1940. Imperial War Museum photo HU 54418. |
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| A Bristol Blenheim Mk IV of 21 Squadron. RAF photo. |
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| German invasion barges waiting at Boulogne Harbour, France during the Battle of Britain. Imperial War Museum photo MH 6657. |
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| German Heinkel He 111 bombers over the English Channel in 1940. Bundesarchiv photo Bild 141-0678. |
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East Coast Chain Home radar operators. Imperial War Museum photo CH 15176.
Chain
Home: CH receiver room at an East Coast station, showing one of the two
RF7 Receivers (left) and the Mark 3 Console (right) in use. This is
typical of late-war CH stations, which had been semi-automated through
the use of an analog computer referred to as the "fruit machine".
On
the left, the radar operator's hand is resting on the goniometer
control, which allowed her to change the sensitive direction of the
receiver in order to determine the bearing of the target. An additional
control set an electronic pointer on the display, the "strobe", to lie
over a selected target. When both the direction and range were selected,
a button was pushed to send this information electrically to the fruit
machine.
The fruit machine then applied a number of calculations
to these measures to correct for known oddities of the receiver system
and geography of the local site, then translated these corrected range
and direction measures into map grid references using basic
trigonometry. Operators on the right would use this information to
develop "tracks" for various targets, updating them on the board hanging
from the right wall (only the back can be seen here). Telephones were
used to send this information to the various control stations in the
reporting chain. |
_Squadron_RAF_in_front_of_Hawker_Hurricane_Mk_I_at_Duxford,_Cambridgeshire,_7_September_1940._CH1299.jpg) |
| Czechoslovak
pilots of No. 310 (Czechoslovak) Squadron RAF and their British flight
commanders grouped in front of Hawker Hurricane Mark I, P3143 'NN-D', at
Duxford, Cambridgeshire. They are (standing, left to right); Pilot
Officer S Janduch, Sergeant J Vopalecuy, Sergeant R Puda, Sergeant K
Seda, Sergeant B Furst and Sergeant R Zima: (sitting, left to right);
Pilot Officer W Goth, Flight Lieutenant J Maly, Flight Lieutenant G L
Sinclair, Flying Officer J E Boulton, Flight Lieutenant J Jeffries (who
commanded the Squadron in January-June 1941, having changed his name by
deed poll to Latimer), Pilot Officer S Zimprich, Sergeant J Kaucky,
Flight Lieutenant F Rypl, Pilot Officer E Fechtner and Pilot Officer V
Bergman. Imperial War Museum photo CH 1299. |
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| Squadron Leader B J E 'Sandy' Lane, the Commanding Officer of No. 19 Squadron RAF (facing camera), relaxes with some of his pilots in the Squadron crew room at Manor Farm, Fowlmere, Cambridgeshire. Imperial War Museum photo CH 1461. |
_Squadron_RAF_with_one_of_their_Hawker_Hurricanes,_October_1940._CH1535.jpg) |
| A group of pilots of No 303 Polish Fighter Squadron RAF walking toward the camera from a Hawker Hurricane after, purportedly, returning from a fighter sortie. Left to right, in the front row are; Pilot Officer Mirosław Ferić, Flight Lieutenant John A Kent (Commander of 'A' Flight), Flying Officer Bogdan Grzeszczak, Pilot Officer Jerzy Radomski, Pilot Officer Witold Łokuciewski, Pilot Officer Bogusław Mierzwa (obscured by Łokuciewski), Flying Officer Zdzisław Henneberg, Sergeant Jan Rogowski and Sergeant Eugeniusz Szaposznikow. In the centre, to the rear of this group, wearing helmet and goggles is Flying Officer Jan Zumbach. Imperial War Museum photo CH 1535. |
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| Pilots of No. 66 Squadron at Gravesend, September 1940. Imperial War Museum photo HU 104508. |
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| Calais, September 1940. Göring giving a speech to pilots about the change in tactics: to bomb London instead of the airfields. Still from news footage. |
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| View along the River Thames in London towards smoke rising from the London docks after an air raid during the Blitz. September 7, 1940. US National Archives and Records Administration (NAID) 541917. |
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| Members of the London Auxiliary Firefighting Service. Over 500 firemen and members of the London Auxiliary Fire Fighting Services, including many women, combined in a war exercise over the ground covered by Greenwich (London) Fire Station. Circa July 1939. US National Archives and Records Administration (NAID) 541893. |
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| Observer Corps spotter on the roof of a building in London. St. Paul's Cathedral is in the background (Observer Corps aircraft spotter on the roof of a building in London during the Battle of Britain, with St. Paul's Cathedral in the background.) US National Archives and Records Administration (NAID) 541899. |
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| A still from camera gun footage taken from a Supermarine Spitfire Mark I of No. 609 Squadron RAF flown by Pilot Officer R.F.G. Miller, showing a Heinkel He 111 of KG 53 or KG 55 taking hits in the port engine from Miller's machine guns. The aircraft was one of a force which bombed the Bristol Aeroplane Company's factory at Filton, Bristol. Miller was killed two days later when he collided head on with a Messerschmitt Me 110 of III/ZG 26 over Cheselbourne, Dorset. Imperial War Museum photo CH 1830. |
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| A still from camera gun film shows tracer ammunition from a Supermarine Spitfire Mark I of No. 609 Squadron RAF, flown by Flight Lieutenant J H G McArthur, hitting a Heinkel He 111 on its starboard quarter. These aircraft were part of a large formation from KG 53 and KG 55 which attacked the Bristol Aeroplane Company's works at Filton, Bristol, just before midday on 25 September 1940. No. 609 Squadron were based at Middle Wallop, Hampshire. Imperial War Museum photo CH 1823. |
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| A wartime poster quoting Churchill's words on the pilots of the Battle of Britain. Imperial War Museum photo PST 14972. |
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| War poster entitled 'Back Them Up!' produced by the British Government during the Second World War. Posters such as these were used to promote and maintain morale among the civilian population, especially in times of crisis such as during the Battle of Britain and the Blitz. |
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New Zealander Alan Deere (sixth from left) pictured with Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding and other Royal Air Force (RAF) Battle of Britain fighter pilots outside the Air Ministry in London, 14 September 1942. The photograph was taken to commemorate the second anniversary of RAF Fighter Command’s most successful day of the campaign.
Left to right: Sqn Ldr AC Bartley (British); Wg Cdr DFB Sheen (Australian); Wg Cdr IR Gleed (British); Wg Cdr M Aitken (British); Wg Cdr AG Malan (South African); Sqn Ldr AC Deere (New Zealander); Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding; Flt Off EC Henderson (in front, to Dowding's left); Flt Lt RH Hilary (British); Wg Cdr JA Kent (Canadian); Wg Cdr CBF Kingcome (British); Sqn Ldr DH Watkins (British); and WO RH Gretton (British). |
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| A common sound at fighter airfields in England in 1940 was the ringing of the ‘scramble’ bell. This was rung when incoming Luftwaffe (German Air Force) raids were identified by ground-based radar stations. The pilots then ran to their aircraft and got airborne as quickly as possible to attack the approaching fighters and bombers. |
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| A German Heinkel He 111 medium bomber pictured flying over Belgium, September 1940. This aircraft is from Kampfgeschwader 53 (KG53) – a Luftwaffe (German air force) bomber wing known as the 'Legion Condor'. Based in Belgium with Luftflotten 2 (Air Fleet 2), KG53 carried out raids over Britain from July 1940 to May 1941. |
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| A formation of Heinkel He 111 bombers viewed through the gun camera of an attacking Royal Air Force (RAF) fighter. |
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John Mansbridge's portrait, Air Vice-Marshal Keith Park, 1940.
Keith Rodney Park was a decorated First World War fighter pilot who carved out a prestigious career in the Royal Air Force (RAF). In 1940 he played a pivotal role in the defence of London and south-east England during the Battle of Britain. |
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| Examples of German incendiary bombs that were dropped by the Luftwaffe on London to create a firestorm and so devastate the city. |
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Renowned wartime surgeon Sir Archibald McIndoe (left) toasts a former patient and his bride on their wedding day. The photograph was taken in England in August 1947.
McIndoe maintained regular contact with airmen he treated during the Second World War, especially in his role as president of the 'Guinea Pig Club'. The club was formed by some of his patients in June 1941 to help pass the time during their long reconstructive treatments. They chose the title 'Guinea Pig Club' as a reference to the experimental nature of the treatments they were receiving. The club even had its own song - the Guinea Pig Anthem:
We are McIndoe’s army,
We are his Guinea Pigs.
With dermatomes and pedicles,
Glass eyes, false teeth and wigs.
And when we get our discharge
We’ll shout with all our might:
“Per ardua ad astra”
We’d rather drink than fight
John Hunter runs the gas works,
Ross Tilley wields the knife.
And if they are not careful
They’ll have your flaming life.
So, Guinea Pigs, stand steady
For all your surgeon’s calls:
And if their hands aren’t steady
They’ll whip off both your ears
We’ve had some mad Australians,
Some French, some Czechs, some Poles.
We’ve even had some Yankees,
God bless their precious souls.
While as for the Canadians -
Ah! That’s a different thing.
They couldn’t stand our accent
And built a separate Wing
We are McIndoe’s army,
(As first verse)
Sung to the tune Aurelia by Samuel Sebastian Wesley (1864)
To be eligible for the club, members had to be serving airmen who had gone through at least ten surgical procedures. Along with aircrew patients, membership was extended to the medical staff that treated them at the Queen Victoria Hospital in East Grinstead, Sussex.
By the end of the war the club had 649 members. The majority were British but there were also New Zealanders, Canadians, Australians, Americans, French, Russians, Czechs and Poles. During the Battle of Britain, most of the members were fighter pilots but by end of the war, the vast majority were from RAF Bomber Command.
After the war the club provided a support network for its members and reunions were regularly held for 60 years until 2007. The last president of the club was Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh. |
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Flight Lieutenant Wilfrid Clouston (right) and Squadron Leader BJE 'Sandy' Lane of No. 19 Squadron in front of a Supermarine Spitfire at Fowlmere airfield near Cambridge, September 1940.
Wilfrid Greville Clouston was one of the first New Zealand air aces of the Second World War. He survived the Battle of Britain only to spend the majority of the war in a Japanese prisoner of war camp. |
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The reluctant celebrity: New Zealand fighter ace Alan Deere is greeted enthusiastically by female workers at the HMV Gramophone Factory in London. HMV produced radar and communications equipment during the Second World War.
Alan Christopher Deere is possibly New Zealand’s most famous Second World War fighter pilot. He was also one of the luckiest, surviving several near-death experiences to become one of the outstanding pilots of the Battle of Britain. |
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Eric Henri Kennington's portrait of Pilot Officer M J Herrick, DFC, 1941.
Michael James Herrick was one of five brothers to serve during the Second World War (three of whom died flying in the RAF). He flew with distinction during the Battle of Britain and in the Pacific before being killed on air operations over Denmark. |
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| View of St. Paul’s Cathedral during the Blitz. |
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| English children in a trench during an air attack. |
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| Firefighters of Yarmouth, England, battle the flames that followed a German bombing raid in April 1941. |
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| Civilians take refuge in a London subway during an air raid. |
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| The Church of Saint Mary Le Bow in London after a night raid by German bombers. |
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| Night incendiary bombs turn a London stationery store into a walled pyre. |
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| Morning: a sentry fire pump soaks down the still-smoldering London rubble. |
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| Bomb which hit the Balham Road, London, blasted the facades off four stores and engulfed a double-deck bus in its huge crater. |
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| The debris of St. Thomas's Hospital, London, the morning after receiving a direct hit during the Blitz, in front of the Houses of Parliament and Big Ben. 1940. The “Blitz” was the sustained strategic bombing of Britain by Nazi Germany between 7 September 1940 and 10 May 1941, during the Second World War. The city of London was bombed by the Luftwaffe for 76 consecutive nights and many towns and cities across the country followed. More than one million London houses were destroyed or damaged, and more than 40,000 civilians were killed, half of them in London. |
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| People sheltering in a tube train and on the platform at Piccadilly Tube Station, London, during an air raid. 1940. |
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| A milkman delivering milk in a London street devastated during a German bombing raid. Firemen are dampening down the ruins behind him. 1940. |
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| A scene in central London, the morning after a bomb raid. 1940. |
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| A fireman attempts to check the flames from a gas explosion, after an air raid in Central London the previous night. 1940. |
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| A view of devastation around St Paul's Cathedral in the City. Circa 1940. |
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| A homeless boy points out his bedroom to his friends, after his home had been wrecked during a random bombing raid in an eastern suburb of London. 1940. |
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| East Londoners are made homeless during German air raids on London. Circa 1940. |
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| Londoners shelter from air raids in an underground station. 1940. |
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| With blackout in effect, this was London by moonlight, 1940. |
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| London by moonlight, 1940. |
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| London by moonlight, 1940. |
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| London by moonlight, 1940. |
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| London by moonlight, 1940. |
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| Churchill inspects bomb damage in London during the Blitz, September 1940. |
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| London's children sent to the country out of reach of the Blitz of 1940. |
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| Londoners taking shelter in an underground train tunnel during the "Blitz", London, England, United Kingdom, 8 October 1940. |
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| Another view of the double-decker bus in a bomb crater as seen in a previous photo, London, September 1940. |
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| Children of an eastern suburb of London, who have been made homeless by German bombings, sit outside the wreckage of what was their home, September 1940. |
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| Firefighters put out a blaze caused by a round of German bombings in London, 1941. |
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| Another view of the double-decker bus in a bomb crater as seen in two previous photos, London, September 1940. |
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The captured Messerschmitt Bf 110 S9+CK, on display outside Finsbury Town Hall, Garnault Place in October 1940.
The aircraft seen on display at Garnault Place, Bf 110 S9 + CK, was originally part of a large German attack during the Battle of Britain that took place on 15th August 1940. The Luftwaffe had put together a force of 1120 aircraft to attack the airfields and airfield installations of Fighter Command, from Newcastle in the north to the Solent in the south. German aircraft came from airfields in Norway, Denmark and France.
The Bf 110 S9 + CK was one of 16 fighter-bombers from 2 Staffel Erprobungsgruppe 210 (2./Erp.Gr.210) that took off from Calais-Marck airfield in Northern France. It was piloted by Oberleutnant Alfred Habisch and crewed by Radio Operator Unteroffizier Ernst Elfner. They targeted the airfield at Martlesham Heath in Suffolk and destroyed some workshops and the officers mess. Two hangers were seriously damaged and the attack also ruptured the water mains and disrupted telecommunications.
The aircraft of 2./Erp.Gr.210 then went on towards London, escorted by 8 Messerschmitt Bf 109s. Their target was Kenley but, flying into the low setting sun, they mistook the South London airfield of Croydon which was a civil airport being used by the RAF as the target. As they commenced their bombing run, Hurricanes from 32 Squadron Biggin Hill and 111 Squadron Croydon arrived on the scene. While the Bf 109 escort departed and escaped largely ignored by the Hurricanes, the German fighter-bombers, led by Hauptmann Walter Rubensdorffer released their payload of bombs on the buildings below.
The suburb of Croydon shook as explosions shattered the airfield. Surrounding houses were damaged as blast waves tore holes in walls and one house had its roof lifted. The blasts were felt as far away as Woolwich and the Houses of Parliament in Central London. It’s not known if Rubensdorffer was aware that Croydon was a suburb of London. At this time, Hitler’s explicit orders were that London, including its dockland area and suburbs, were not to be attacked or bombed. Anyone violating this order would be court-martialed if they survived such an attack. Rubensdorffer would never find out if he would be court-martialed for what became the first ever bombing raid on London in WW2. His crippled aircraft crashed as he tried to guide it back to base after the attack, killing both himself and his crewman.
While being chased by the Hurricanes of 32 and 111 Squadrons as they tried to escape, the Bf 110s actually flew over the airfield at Kenley that had been their intended target. One by one they were hit and had no time to go into their defensive circle pattern, their only means of defense against the British fighters. Some tried to keep altitude and head for home, others became victims of the chasing fighters and crashed into the heavily populated suburbs around Croydon and Purley. The Bourjois Perfume Factory in Croydon sustained a direct hit. Sixty people died and over 180 were injured. A number of the German aircraft also came down in the fields of Kent and Sussex, of which S9 + CK was one, coming down at Hawkhurst in Kent. Others struggled to make it back to their base in France with many crashing into the Channel.
Habisch and Elfner both survived the crash and were captured by the local Home Guard. Elfner suffered a bullet wound to his right hand. Both crewmen were eventually shipped off as POWs to Canada. Their aircraft, still mostly intact, was later displayed outside various locations, including Finsbury Town Hall, as part of a ‘Victory Tour’ during the Battle of Britain. It was then shipped to the USA on the SS Montanan in April 1941 and passed to the Vultee Aircraft Corporation for evaluation. |
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| Pattern of exploding flak and tracers over London during the Battle of Britain. |
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| Boulton Paul Defiant of No. 264 Squadron RAF based at Kirton-in-Lindsey, Lincolnshire, July 1940. |
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| RAF aircraftman guard the remains of Dornier Do17Z-2 (F1+HT) of 9/KG76 shot down during the low-level attack on Kenley aerodrome, 18 August 1940. The aircraft crashed in Golf Road, Kenley at 1.20pm. |
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| Dornier Do 17Z-2 (F1+DT) of 9/KG 76 crashed at Leaves Green, Kent on August 18, 1940 after attacking RAF Kenley. Note that the Swastika on the aircraft’s fin has already been removed by souvenir hunters. |
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| Hawker Hurricanes during the Battle of Britain. |
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| Scramble! Royal Air Force (RAF) fighter pilots race toward their aircraft on 25 July 1940, after the ringing of the 'scramble bell' warned of an approaching enemy formation. Fighter Command's success in the Battle of Britain depended on the early warnings provided by coastal radar stations, and on their pilots' ability to reach the optimum altitude to attack the oncoming Luftwaffe (German air force) bombers. Imperial War Museum photo HU 49253. |
.jpg) |
| Hawker Hurricanes of No. 85 Squadron RAF, October 1940. Imperial War Museum photo CH 1500. |
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| Pilots of No. 19 Squadron at Fowlmere, August 1940. From left: Flight Lieutenant Brian 'Sandy' Lane; Sergeant Jack Potter; Sergeant Bernard 'Jimmy' Jennings; Pilot Officer Raymond Aeberhardt; Flight Sergeants George 'Grumpy' Unwin and Harry Steere; Pilot Officer Frank 'Fanny' Brinsden; Flying Officer Jack 'Farmer' Lawson; Flying Officer Leonard Haines; Pilot Officer Arthur Vokes; Flight Lieutenant Wilf Clouston; Flying Officer Eric Thomas. Behind them is the operations hut mounted on a trailer. Note that some of the pilots are wearing Canadian khaki drill overall blouses. Also, Clouston has a Luftwaffe lifejacket. Imperial War Museum photo HU 27861. |
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| Bombs falling away from a Junkers Ju-87 Stuka dive-bomber. The photograph appears to have been taken from a following aircraft. Imperial War Museum photo GER 18. |
.jpg) |
| Two airmen of the Polish Air Force Depot at RAF Blackpool receiving instruction on the controls of an aircraft, probably a Vickers Wellington medium bomber, during ground training at Squires Gate aerodrome, 27 August 1940. Imperial War Museum photo CH 1150. |
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| Spitfire pilots of No. 610 Squadron relaxing between sorties at 'A' Flight dispersal at Hawkinge, 29 July 1940. Imperial War Museum photo HU 1062. |
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| Surrounded by his captors, a Luftwaffe bomber crewman is given a drink of water after baling out of his aircraft. Caption dated 30 August 1940. Imperial War Museum photo KY 10265. |
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| Spitfires of No. 610 Squadron, based at Biggin Hill, flying in 'vic' formation, 24 July 1940. N3289 DW-K and R6595 DW-O nearest. Imperial War Museum photo CH 740. |
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| A CH (Chain Home) Radar Station on the East Coast by William Thomas Rawlinson, oil on canvas, 1946. Imperial War Museum photo Art.IWM ART LD 5735. |
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| Chain Home: airmen and WAAF operators at work in the wooden Receiver hut at Ventnor CH, Isle of Wight, during the Battle of Britain. Imperial War Museum photo C 1868. |
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| Chain Home: airmen and WAAF operators at work in the wooden Receiver hut at Ventnor CH, Isle of Wight, during the Battle of Britain. Imperial War Museum photo CH 1296. |
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| Interior of the Sector 'G' Operations Room at Duxford, September 1940. The callsigns of fighter squadrons controlled by this sector can be seen on the wall behind the operator sitting third from left. The fighter controller is sitting fifth from the left, and on the extreme right, behind the Army liaison officer, are the R/T operators in direct touch with the aircraft. Imperial War Museum photo CH 1401. |
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| WAAF telephone operators in the Sector 'G' Operations Room at RAF Duxford, receiving reports of enemy aircraft plots from Observer Corps posts, September 1940. Imperial War Museum photo CH 1404. |
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| Hermann Goering addressing a group of German pilots before their sortie over England, September 1940. Imperial War Museum photo MH 13382. |
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| Squadron Leader Douglas Bader (front center) with pilots of No. 242 Squadron grouped around his Hurricane at Duxford, September 1940. Imperial War Museum photo CH 1413. |
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| Pilots of No. 19 Squadron standing in the back of a lorry at Fowlmere, September 1940. The pilots are, from left to right, P/O Arthur Vokes, Sgt David Cox, F/Sgt George Unwin, P/O Richard Jones, Sgt Bernard Jennings, P/O Dennis Parrott, unknown, unknown. Imperial War Museum photo CH 1397. |
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| Pilots of No. 19 Squadron RAF stage a mock 'scramble' from the back of a truck at Fowlmere near Duxford, September 1940. Imperial War Museum photo CH 1398. |
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| Hurricane pilots of No. 310 (Czechoslovak) Squadron at Duxford, 7 September 1940. In the background is Hawker Hurricane Mk I P3143 'NN-D'. Imperial War Museum photo CH 1299. |
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| 'The Big Wing': Formations of Hurricanes climb through the clouds 'to intercept an enemy formation reported heading for London', September 1940. Imperial War Museum photo CH 1429. |
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| A group of pilots of No. 19 Squadron discuss a recent sortie by Manor Farm at Fowlmere, September 1940. Left to right: Sergeant David E Lloyd , Flight Sergeant George 'Grumpy' Unwin, Flight Lieutenant Cyril Arthur Jones, Flying Officer Hugh 'Cocky' Dundas (of No. 616 Squadron RAF), Flight Sergeant Harold Steere, and Squadron Leader Brian 'Sandy' Lane, the Squadron's CO. Flight Sergeant Unwin's pet German Shepherd 'Flash' can be seen to the left. Imperial War Museum photo CH 1370. |
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| Pilots of No. 19 Squadron RAF eat lunch in the Officers' Mess at Fowlmere, the satellite airfield to Duxford in Cambridgeshire, September 1940. Imperial War Museum photo CH 1460. |
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| Spitfire pilots of No. 19 Squadron relax between sorties outside their crew room at Manor Farm, Fowlmere, September 1940. Left to right: Pilot Officer Wallace 'Jock' Cunningham, Sub-Lieutenant Arthur 'Admiral' Blake of the Fleet Air Arm and Flying Officer Frank Brinsden, with pet spaniel. Imperial War Museum photo CH 1459. |
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| Armourer Fred Roberts re-arms Spitfire Mk Ia X4474 QV-I of No. 19 Squadron at Fowlmere, September 1940. The pilot, seated in his cockpit, is Sergeant Bernard Jennings. Imperial War Museum photo CH 1458. |
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| Original wartime caption: His Majesty congratulates Flying Office D.S.G. Honor, upon whom was conferred the D.F.C. Imperial War Museum photo CH 1952. |
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| Pilots of No. 19 and No. 616 Squadrons pose alongside a Spitfire at Fowlmere, 21 September 1940. Sitting on wing (left to right) are Squadron Leader Brian 'Sandy' Lane (CO 19 Sqn), Flight Sergeant George 'Grumpy' Unwin and Francis Brinsden (with 'Flash' the Alsatian and 'Rangy' the Spaniel). Front row (left to right) are Sergeant Bernard 'Jimmy' Jennings, Flight Lieutenant Colin MacFie (616 Sqn), Squadron Leader Howard Burton (CO 616 Squadron) and Pilot Officer Philip Leckrone (616 Sqn). Imperial War Museum photo CH 1400. |
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| Hawker Hurricanes of No. 85 Squadron in formation, seen from below, October 1940. Imperial War Museum photo CH 1500. |
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| The cockpit of a captured Heinkel He 111 undergoing examination, 2 October 1940. Imperial War Museum photo HU 104726. |
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| Locals watch as troops and police inspect Messerschmitt Bf 109E-1 (W.Nr. 3367) "Red 14" of 2./JG52, which crash-landed in a wheatfield at Mays Farm, Selmeston, near Lewes in Sussex, 12 August 1940. Its pilot, Unteroffizier Leo Zaunbrecher, was captured. Imperial War Museum photo HU 50153. |
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| Flight Lieutenant Peter Townsend of No. 43 Squadron ('The Fighting Cocks') with his ground crew seated on the wing of his Hurricane at Wick, Scotland, April 1940. Imperial War Museum photo CH 87. |
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Observer Corps operating the recording instrument. Imperial War Museum photo CH 1273.
The Observer Corps provided vital information about incoming German raids. A chain of coastal radar stations was used to plot the raids but, in 1940, they were unable to track aircraft inland and manual tracking was needed. The Observer Corps was largely made up of volunteers, who mostly trained themselves in aircraft recognition and how to estimate their height. When the war broke out, there were 30,000 observers and 1,000 observation posts, which were manned continuously. Their information was sent first to an Observer Corps Centre, and then on to Group and Sector Station Operations Rooms. The system worked well in good weather but the observers struggled in rain or low cloud.
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| The Women's Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF): Aircraftwomen learning how to handle a barrage balloon at the training station at Cardington. Imperial War Museum photo CH 7346. |
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Gunners of 177 Heavy Battery, Royal Artillery, man an anti-aircraft Lewis gun at Fort Crosby near Liverpool, England, 1 August 1940. This operation formed part of British preparations to repel the threatened German invasion of 1940. Imperial War Museum photo H 2695.
The Army’s Anti-Aircraft (AA) Command operated searchlights and anti-aircraft guns against incoming German raids. AA Command was a crucial part of the Dowding System and was in constant contact with the RAF. Anti- aircraft guns shot down approximately 300 Luftwaffe aircraft during the Battle of Britain. Searchlights were mainly used to help anti-aircraft guns take accurate aim at night but they could also be used to help damaged bombers navigate in the dark on their return. On hearing a code word, every searchlight near a damaged aircraft shone its beam vertically and then horizontally towards the nearest airfield to guide the bomber safely to land. It’s estimated that 3,000 aircraft were helped in this way. |
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| Armourers replenish the ammunition in Hawker Hurricane Mk I P3143 'NN-D' of No. 310 (Czechoslovak) Squadron at Duxford, September 1940. Left to right: Jindrich Prokop, an unidentified British corporal and Vladimir Masek. Imperial War Museum photo CH 1297. |
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| A member of staff at a technical college preparing to remove the 'Mickey Mouse' staffel emblem from the rear fuselage of a shot-down Messerschmitt Bf 109E4, 'Red 2', of 3./LG 2, 2 October 1940. Imperial War Museum photo HU 88420. |
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| Schoolgirls sitting on the wing of a Heinkel He 111 bomber which crashed near their farmhouse. Imperial War Museum photo HU 106837. |
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Battle of Britain by Paul Nash, oil on canvas, 1941. Imperial War Museum photo Art.IWM ART LD 1550.
Paul Nash's description of the painting, written for the War Artist's Advisory Committee: 'The painting is an attempt to give the sense of an aerial battle in operation over a wide area and thus summarises England's great aerial victory over Germany. The scene includes certain elements constant during the Battle of Britain - the river winding from the town and across parched country, down to the sea; beyond, the shores of the Continent, above, the mounting cumulus concentrating at sunset after a hot brilliant day; across the spaces of sky, trails of airplanes, smoke tracks of dead or damaged machines falling, floating clouds, parachutes, balloons. Against the approaching twilight new formations of Luftwaffe, threatening...' The painting majestically reveals the possibilities of art engaged with history. Its ambition and the scale of the setting immediately impress; we look down on a huge swathe of the English Channel and France beyond. Produced at the time of the battle, the painting encapsulates its scale and importance. However, this is not just an image of modern warfare, with its violence and destruction, or even an iconic victory; it is also a restatement of the value of art and the defeat of Nazism. Nash, a fierce critic of the way that fighting on the Western Front of the First World War had been conducted, was immediate and steadfast in his revulsion towards Nazi Germany and its culture. In the painting, defences rise up as if out of the very landscape of England to meet the fascistic machines of war; the regimented patterns of the Luftwaffe are broken and defeated by Allied fighter planes, they form great flower-like shapes in the sky, before plummeting into the very earth that has defeated them. Richard Seddon, pupil of Nash, viewed this work at Nash's Oxford studio. He advised Nash to include more black smoke trails and painted an example on the canvas. When the painting was exhibited in London, Seddon's black trail was still visible on the canvas. Margaret Nash presented Seddon with a 19th-century lithograph of a storm in Paris which Nash adapted to form the composition of the Battle of Britain. Nash delivered the work to the Committee in October and it went on display at the National Gallery in January 1942.
Paul Nash was one of Britain's best-known artists at the time of the Second World War. As a former official war artist he was a logical choice to fulfill the role again, particularly as a patriot who believed in utilising fine art for propaganda. Battle of Britain demonstrates this aspect of Nash's outlook. It presents an epitome of RAF Fighter Command's successful struggle against the Luftwaffe in 1940. RAF fighters sweep along the English Channel to break up advancing Luftwaffe formations in a summer sky filled with vapour trails, parachutes, balloons and cloud. The painting is an imaginative summary of the event rather than a literal one; Nash favours symbolism and allegory over factual accuracy. The barrage balloons and aircraft seen from above are not in proportion to the shadowy suggestions of vulnerable cities below. Geographically the painting suggests the Thames estuary, with the Channel and France beyond, but again the emphasis is on imaginative visualisation. |
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| RAF personnel inspecting Heinkel He 111P (coded G1+FA) of Stab/KG 55 which was brought down at Hipley in Hampshire, 12 July 1940. It has been camouflaged to prevent the Luftwaffe attempting to destroy the remains. The bomber was shot down by 'B' Flight of No. 43 Squadron over Southampton Water. Imperial War Museum photo HU 72438. |
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| Hawker Hurricane Mk I P3522 of No. 32 Squadron, flown by Pilot Officer Rupert Smythe, taxying at Hawkinge, 29 July 1940. Imperial War Museum photo HU 54417. |
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| Hawker Hurricanes of No. 17 Squadron taxiing at Debden, July 1940. The foreground aircraft (YB-C) was flown by the CO, Squadron Leader Harold 'Birdy' Bird-Wilson, who was shot down on 24 September, flying P3878 YB-W. Imperial War Museum photo HU 54517. |
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| Boulton Paul Defiant Mk I of No. 264 Squadron being refueled by an Albion AM463 3-Point Refueller, Kirton in Lindsey, July 1940. Imperial War Museum photo HU 104453. |
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| Supermarine Spitfire Mk I R6800 LZ-N, flown by the CO of No. 66 Squadron, Sqn Ldr Rupert Leigh, running up its engine at Gravesend, September 1940. Imperial War Museum photo HU 104503. |
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| An RAF airmen points out bullet holes in the fuselage of a crashed Dornier Do 17Z, 1940. Imperial War Museum photo PL 8096. |
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| Supermarine Spitfire Mk Ia P9368 'QV-K' of No. 19 Squadron being rearmed between sorties at Fowlmere, September 1940. Imperial War Museum photo CH 1367A. |
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| Ground staff re-arm a Spitfire at Biggin Hill, September 1940. Imperial War Museum photo HU 104499. |
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| Three Hurricanes of No. 257 Squadron landing at Martlesham Heath, November 1940. The aircraft in the centre is being flown by the CO, Squadron Leader Roland Robert 'Bob' Stanford Tuck. Imperial War Museum photo CH 1673. |
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| A still from camera-gun film taken from a Spitfire flown by the CO of No. 609 Squadron, Squadron Leader H S Darley, as he opens fire amongst a formation of Heinkel He 111s of KG 55 which have just bombed the Supermarine aircraft works at Woolston, Southampton, 26 September 1940. Imperial War Museum photo CH 1829. |
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| An RAF airman inspects the wreckage of an Italian Fiat BR.20 bomber of the Corpo Aereo Italiano, which crash-landed at Bromeswell, near Woodbridge in Suffolk during the Regia Aeronautica's only major daylight raid of the Battle of Britain, 11 November 1940. The Italian formation, comprising a dozen BR.20 bombers and their escorts making towards Harwich, was intercepted by Hurricanes of Nos. 17, 46 and 257 Squadrons. The enemy force suffered heavy losses, at no cost to the RAF, and similar daylight raids were not repeated. Imperial War Museum photo CH 1677. |
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| Army officers inspect the wreckage of Messerschmitt Bf 109E-1 (W.Nr. 3367) 'Red 14' of 2./JG52, which crash-landed in a wheatfield at Mays Farm, Selmeston, near Lewes in Sussex, 12 August 1940. Its pilot, Unteroffizier Leo Zaunbrecher, was captured. Imperial War Museum photo HU 73928. |
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| Crew members of a Luftwaffe Heinkel He 111 bomber discussing their aims over a map, leaning on the elevator of their aircraft, 1940. Note a camera operator with his equipment. Imperial War Museum photo HU 76019. |
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| Nine pilots of the Luftwaffe Jagdgeschwader 53 (JG 53) "Pik-As" fighter wing with their mascot dogs in front of one of their Messerschmitt Bf 109 planes, 1940. Imperial War Museum photo HU 76052. |
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| Leutnant Karl Heinz Thurz at the controls of a Heinkel He 111 H2 bomber, 1940. Thurz flew with a weather reconnaissance unit (Grossraum Wettererkundungsstaffel or 'Wekusta' for short) based at Oldenburg near Bremen. On 17 January 1941 his aircraft was shot down by RAF Hurricanes and crashed on Fair Isle, in the Shetland Islands, Scotland. Thurz and two of his crew survived. Two other men were killed. Imperial War Museum photo HU 23746. |
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| German fighter ace Werner Molders (right) talking with Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering during the Battle of Britain, 1940. Imperial War Museum photo HU 4481. |
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| Major Werner Mölders and Major Adolf Galland, two leading fighter aces of the Luftwaffe during the Battle of Britain, in conversation with Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering (center) on the French coast, 1940. Imperial War Museum photo HU 76020. |
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| Prototype of the Fuze extractor, design 1, invented by F/Lt E L Moxey GC (who was killed by a bomb at Biggin Hill in August 1940). The bomb shown is a German 250Kg SC with two fuze pockets. Imperial War Museum photo HU 44027. |
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