The Impact of Barbarossa on the Soviet Air Force and the Resulting Commitment of United States Aircraft June-October 1941

By the time Germany invaded the Soviet Union, the Polikarpov I-153 Chaika (Russian "Seagull") was no longer a serious opponent for German fighters, although it remained a significant aircraft based on numbers alone. On 22 September 1941 there were 1,549 I-153s stationed in the Western Military Districts. More than 50% of these were destroyed on the ground or rendered unusable in the first few days of the conflict. The photograph shows two "Chaikas" found by advancing German forces. The fabric-covered areas of the aircraft were painted silver, while the metal panels were pale gray. Note the early-war version of the Soviet star with a narrow black outline and black circle in the center of the star. The fuselage star has been removed by a souvenir hunter.

by Richard C. Lukas

On 22 June 1941 Barba­rossa—the code name for the German invasion of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—ended the strained romance that began with the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and forced the Soviet Union into the anti-Axis camp. This article appraises an important aspect of American efforts to aid the Soviets during the critical months following the German invasion—by supplying military aircraft.

Despite warnings to Moscow from the United States and Great Britain of an impending German attack, Barbarossa caught the Soviet Union by surprise.[1]

On this occasion, declared Churchill, Stalin and his friends were "the most completely outwitted bunglers of the Second World War."[2] And in the post-Stalin era Soviet historians have come close to agreement with the capitalist critic.[3]

Soviet lack of readiness was immediately apparent in the disorganization at the front and in the destruction of hundreds of planes on cramped fields in Poland and the Baltic states.[4] Under these conditions, the Luftwaffe was able to inflict a gargantuan blow to Soviet air power during the early days of hostilities. The Luftwaffe executed Barbarossa with approximately 2,800 aircraft while the Soviet Air Force had 6,000-7,500 planes based in European Russia.[5] Despite its numerical preponderance, the Soviet Air Force was no match for the technically superior Luftwaffe. Not more than seventeen percent of the planes on the airfields, for example, were modern types capable of meeting the enemy effectively.[6]

The extent of the losses suffered by the Soviet Air Force remains debatable. Estimates vary on both sides. Cyrille Kalinov, an officer who held a responsible position which granted him access to the General Staff, estimated that his compatriots lost 3,000 aircraft during the early hours of the invasion.[7] However, a later Soviet study on World War II pointed out that losses on the first day of the conflict amounted to approximately 1,200 planes.[8] Soviet historians acknowledge the destruction of a large number of aircraft and agree, as Telpukhovskii puts it, that "enemy aviation seized command of the air."[9]

Nazi sources are in closer agreement on the losses. A study by the German Air Historical Branch estimated that by the second day of the invasion the Luftwaffe had destroyed 2,582 enemy aircraft.[10] The High Command placed the destruction at 3,630 aircraft for the period 22-28 June 1941.[11] Two weeks later, a German Armed Forces communiqué put Soviet losses to that point at 6,233.[12]

The magnitude of the reduction of Soviet airpower was made graver by the relatively minor punishment inflicted on the invaders. To be sure, the Moscow press maintained that the Luftwaffe lost more planes than the Soviet Air Force. This distortion is reflected in broadcasts immediately following the invasion. On 25 June 1941 the Moscow radio reported that in the period 22-24 June, the Soviet Air Force lost 374 aircraft to the Luftwaffe's 431. On 14 July it claimed that the campaign had cost Germany 2,300 aircraft as opposed to 1,500 Soviet planes.[13] After six weeks of war the Moscow radio curiously reported that the Soviets had destroyed over 6,000 enemy aircraft, more than twice the initial number of planes utilized by the Luftwaffe in the campaign. The cost to the Soviet Union, on the other hand, was placed at 4,000. In striking contrast to this contention, figures based on German records put Luftwaffe losses for June at 460 and for July, at 695.[14]

While the Luftwaffe delivered its blows against the enemy air force, German armies plunged deeply into the Soviet heartland. In the face of the onslaught the Russians evacuated hundreds of industrial plants to the Urals, western Siberia and Soviet Central Asia. The extent of the disruption to the economy is revealed by the admission that between June and November 1941 the gross industrial output of the Soviet Union declined by one-half.[15] As a consequence, serious deficiencies confronted the Soviet armed forces. The most critical of these was the condition of the air force, an "Achilles heel"[16] after the German avalanche. Little wonder, then, that the Soviet government placed the highest priority upon aircraft in its requests for aid from the United States and Great Britain.

Soviet requests for military aircraft came at a critical time for the United States. By June 1941 only nine months had elapsed since the United States began its rearmament program and only three months since the Lend-Lease Act was passed. The United States was still divided over the question of even assisting Great Britain. And after Barbarossa the White House was confronted with a vociferous segment of public opinion that hoped Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia would destroy each other. Although official American reactions to Soviet involvement in the war were cautious, the White House favored sending at least stopgap shipments of aircraft and other critical items to the new belligerent.

The War Department did not at first share this White House view. Since the fall of France, the Army Air Forces—better known as the AAF—were more intent, on satisfying the immediate needs of Britain, then battling for its very existence.[17] Furthermore, the War Department was acutely sensitive to the critical shortages of combat aircraft that had developed in the AAF. Finally, the Department, conditioned by gloomy reports predicting Soviet defeat, believed that the communist state was near collapse. Diversions of critically needed planes under such conditions, these officials believed, were wasteful as well as injurious to the AAF. Therefore, the first shipment of American aircraft to the Soviet Union was made against the strong opposition of the military.

As early as 23 June Acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles announced that Soviet resistance against Germany was to the benefit of American "defense and security."[18] President Roosevelt later confirmed this by offering aid to the Soviet Union if it would "reveal its needs."[19] On 26 June Constantine Oumansky, Moscow's ambassador, had his first interview with Welles since the outbreak of hostilities. Oumansky had been instructed not to raise the question of aid but to determine the attitude of the United States toward the new phase of the war. Welles dispelled any lingering Soviet doubts on the matter by stating that requests for assistance would receive prompt and favorable consideration. He also cited the friendly gestures by Washington in unfreezing Soviet assets in the United States and refusing to invoke a proclamation under the Neutrality Act.[20]

Four days after this clarification of policy, Oumansky presented Welles with a nine-point list of Soviet requests.[21] The list included huge quantities of military and industrial items. The response was no doubt encouraging to American authorities since it reflected Soviet determination to remain in the war. The first two requests in the list were especially significant. The Moscow government asked for 3,000 fighters and the same number of bombers.[22] (The magnitude of these requests supported the German claim that the Luftwaffe had rendered the Soviet Air Force virtually impotent.)

Oumansky was anxious that the United States dispatch some planes as soon as possible, and requested that a portion be flown via the Alaska-Siberia route, or Alsib as it was later known. Welles noted that:

… he [Oumansky] said he would like to mention, in the event the United States could make available some short-range bombers to Russia, the bombers could of course be flown from Alaska by way of the Aleutian Islands to Western Russia and that… the airfields in Siberia from the Pacific to Western Russia were in excellent condition and amply capable of taking care of any trans­continental flight that might be arranged for any bombers sent from here.[23]

When the President received the Soviet Ambassador, it was clear that Roosevelt intended to follow through on the formal assurances of support offered earlier. On 10 July he informed Oumansky that the United States would begin shipping supplies before 1 October.[24]

Meanwhile a temporary committee under the chairmanship of Charles P. Curtis Jr. processed Soviet requests.[25] They totaled almost $2,000,000,000, of which ninety-five percent related to aircraft and ordnance.[26] The President then centered responsibility for obtaining immediate and substantial shipments of aid to Russia in the Division of Defense Aid Reports, headed by Major General James H. Burns.[27] He was assisted by Colonel Philip R. Faymonville, an ordnance officer who once served as military attaché in Moscow.[28] In appointing Burns to handle the aid, the President explained: "It is of the utmost importance that these shipments go forward in time to reach their destination before the winter makes ocean and land transportation difficult."[29] Roosevelt apparently believed that supplies sent to Russia by the winter might help to inspire continued resistance. He also directed Burns to review the Soviet request with representatives from other agencies, if necessary, and submit within two days a list of items for immediate delivery.[30]

In response to the President's instructions, members of the Division of Defense Aid Reports, the Army-Navy Munitions Board Priorities Committee, the Department of State, the Army, and the Office of Production Management met and approved requests totaling $21,940,000 for various industrial items to be shipped on or before 1 October.[31]

But no action was taken on the aircraft and ordnance items. Burns told the President that "pursuit planes and bombers, which are considered by the Soviet Ambassador to be of prime urgency, are not included on the list, as these items are understood to be receiving the personal attention of Mr. Welles."[32] As the latter found out from the War Department, it was impossible for the United States to meet more than a small portion of the huge Soviet request for aircraft. Even the consideration of a token shipment—and the White House insisted upon some action—brought firm and unequivocal opposition from the War Department.

General George C. Marshall, the Chief of Staff, staunchly opposed sending planes in view of gaping security needs. He conveyed his views on the matter to Lieutenant General H. H. Arnold, Chief of the AAF. Marshall stated flatly that he was

… unalterably opposed to the release of any U.S. pursuit planes and light and medium bombers until we have first established units of these types in the Philippines for the security of the Fleet Anchorage, and the defense of the Islands. We have been trying for six months to meet the Navy's demands, and that of our Army Commander in the Philippines, that the obsolescent planes be replaced at the earliest possible moment with modern types. At the present moment, with Japan's known preparations to move South, the Philippines become of great strategic importance, as they constitute both a Naval and Air Base upon the immediate flank of the Japanese southern movement.[33]

But Marshall learned from Welles on the following day that the President had "ordered" a token release of P-40s and light bombers to the Soviets. The general promptly explained to the Assistant Secretary of War for Air, Robert A. Lovett, the reasons which prohibited a further drain of planes from the already weak AAF. He particularly emphasized the immediate need in the Philippines and in current maneuvers with the ground forces. In the latter case, he stated, "this is vitally important so far as the development of ground air teamwork is concerned, but it is possibly of even more pressing importance to meet the growing public pressure and criticism on this subject." He then pointed to the stress on allocating planes to Brazil and China. Marshall urged that the President receive "a complete picture of our present dilemma in this matter," and asked pointedly "are we to risk the Philippine situation or the Brazilian situation, or the clamor of the press in this country or the purely military requirements of training our own field forces in this country?"[34]

Lovett took the matter of aircraft for the Soviet Union to Welles, pointing out that the United States was allocating half of its combat aircraft to Britain and China. In July, the Assistant Secretary said, the British would receive more combat planes than the AAF. This, in fact, had been the general trend since the previous summer. Furthermore, he pointed out, there were other serious obstacles in the path of fulfilling the Soviet requests. He denied the feasibility of ferrying planes via Alaska and Siberia which Oumansky had earlier suggested to Welles. He noted that special intermediate fields would be needed due to the limited range of the fighters. He also called attention to the rugged territory which had to be traversed and the lack of meteorological and communication facilities along the route. By the time these planes arrived, Lovett told Welles, they would need a major overhaul and their value to the Russians would be extremely doubtful. Moreover, a token force would have "an effect exactly the reverse of what would be hoped for," since "the Russians might reasonably wonder why the greatest industrial country in the world could only deliver a mere handful of planes."[35]

The facts, Lovett implied, spoke for themselves and he advised that the project in its existing form be abandoned. As an alternative, he suggested that the Soviets get planes from the British who might release some Lockheed Hudson bombers (A-29s) on contract in the United States. As for fighters, P-40s already in England could be sent directly to Archangel or via the Middle East. Since American aircraft resources "had been stretched to the breaking point," Lovett proposed that the British divert some of the planes which had been built for them in the United States. After hearing this analysis, Welles agreed to suggest to the President that a definite decision on aircraft requests be deferred until the problem could be discussed with the Soviet Military Mission, then on its way to Washington.[36]

To the President the question was not whether the planes came from British contract aircraft in the United States or from AAF sources. He simply wanted planes sent in order to substantiate verbal assurances of American support. In the days that followed, he overrode the opposition of his military advisers and ordered some immediate aid. These decisions were conveyed in broad terms to the Soviet Ambassador toward the end of July. During an interview with Welles on 24 July in which Oumansky complained "vehemently" and "in rather unmeasured terms" about the many delays in respect to the promised assistance, Welles revealed the President's decision that "a number" of Lockheed Hudson bombers be made available to the Soviet Union. The planes were to be flown, as Oumansky had earlier suggested, via Alaska and Siberia. Welles went on to say that "the President had likewise directed that at least a squadron of P-40 pursuit planes be made available for the Soviet Union." The problem, however, was to determine how the fighters were to be sent. Welles advised withholding this decision until the arrival of the Military Mission, which could resolve the question in meetings with American aviation experts.[37]

On 31 July Colonel General Philip I. Golikov, Chief of the Soviet Military Mission; his assistant, Major General Alexander K. Repin; and Ambassador Oumansky saw the President.[38] Oumansky pointed out that he had not received a reply to the request for supplies which he had made almost one month earlier. The President, embarrassed by this revelation, promptly announced that two hundred P-40s had been approved for the Soviet Union. He said that fifty of the planes in the United States on British contract could be diverted and the remainder, already in Britain, could be shipped from there..[39] Actually, Roosevelt's announcement was belated: Churchill had told Stalin a week earlier that Britain was sending these fighters.[40] Since the planes had been produced in the United States, the first shipment became something of a joint Anglo-American affair.

During his meeting with the Mission, the President also questioned the feasibility of ferrying fighters across Siberia where, he said, there were inadequate airfields. The Soviets promptly denied this and confidently assured Roosevelt that the planes could make the trip. The President suggested the alternative that it might be more efficient if the two hundred fighters were sent to Vladivostok. This would enable the Soviets to transfer two hundred planes from the Far East to the German front. The visitors appeared to favor the idea. Before the interview was over, Roosevelt called attention to the shortage of spare parts in the United States but assured the Mission that every effort would be made to help in the matter.[41]

During an interview with Colonel Faymonville on the following day, Roosevelt pointed out that if the Soviets wanted the fighters sent via the Pacific, they would have to come from the United States. It was virtually impossible, he said, to ship the P-40s already in Britain back to the United States for reshipment; if other American sources were unavailable, then most of the planes would have to come from the AAF.[42] He reaffirmed this when Wayne Coy was appointed to expedite the Soviet supply program: "It is ridiculous to bring any [fighters] back from England by stealing through the submarine zone, but we should expedite two hundred of them from here."[43]

As was to be expected, the President's pronouncement did not please the War Department. Sending two hundred fighters to the Soviet Union would strip the continental United States of serviceable planes. Marshall informed the President that fifty-nine P-40s in the United States on British order were being prepared for delivery to Alaska where Soviet pilots and mechanics would be trained and then ferry the planes to Siberia. Marshall implied that if the balance of 141 P-40s were to come from those in service in the United States in order to meet the President's pledge of two hundred fighters, this would leave only eight serviceable P-40s in the United States.[44] Roosevelt's solution was obviously unrealistic and, as subsequent events revealed, this drastic measure was to prove unnecessary.

During his interview with Faymonville on 1 August the President also expressed his desire that a token shipment of heavy bombers, either B-17s or B-24s, be supplied to the Soviet Union. He suggested ten per month—five from the United States and five from Britain.[45] When Marshall heard of this, he promptly informed Secretary Stimson of the critical situation with respect to heavy bombers. He explained that of the two types there were only forty B-17s in service and possibly only one B-24. Of the B-17s, nine were to go to Hawaii to replace an equivalent number leaving for Manila. This left thirty-one heavy bombers in commission to train 150 crews then in ranks or due to report by the end of the following month. Even if a greater number had been available, Marshall pointed out that it would take at least two to three months to train the crews. The situation with respect to medium bombers was somewhat more promising—fifty B-25s and twelve B-26s were in service. The problem that plagued other types of aircraft was true of the mediums—the shortage of spare parts.[46] In the face of these revelations, the President dropped the idea of sending heavy bombers and instead reverted to his original suggestion of sending another type. It was decided to send five B-25s along with the P-40s to Soviet crews due to arrive in Alaska.[47]

As these plans were set in motion, the War Department still lacked information that the British had definitely agreed as mentioned earlier to divert to the Soviets the P-40s on British order in the United States. Of greater significance was the fact that these fighters had been wired for British radios which would have normally been installed there. Now with the impending transfer of planes in Alaska, British radios would have to be immediately dispatched to the United States for installation.[48] Prompt action was necessary since Soviet pilots were expected at Fairbanks about 11 August.[49]

No sooner were plans initiated to transfer the planes in Alaska than Oumansky informed American representatives that his government had revised the plan. The Ambassador announced on 5 August that the P-40s should be crated and shipped to Archangel. Moreover, Soviet bomber pilots would now come to the United States by way of the Atlantic, and, after training, would fly the B-25s via Newfoundland and Iceland. Stimson and Oumansky confirmed the new arrangements by an exchange of letters.[50] Commenting upon the use of the Alaska-Siberia route that Oumansky had originally suggested, Stimson wrote to the Soviet ambassador:

It is further understood that in order to anticipate the possibility of future movements by air through Siberia, that you would undertake to secure and present to the War Department full information on all airports, including weather and communication facilities, across Siberia.[51]

This was the first serious American effort to secure information about Siberian facilities in order to plan for future aircraft deliveries via Alaska. Stimson's effort would fail however.

But the first shipment of planes to Russia required still further negotiations. The War Department learned that the Soviet government had reverted to its earlier plan of sending air crews to the United States via Siberia and Alaska for training in American bombers.[52] The progress of two aircraft carrying the thirty-eight member group across Siberia and Alaska was carefully reported to Washington. Finally, on 31 August Soviet crews arrived at Nome,[53] thus completing the first flight during the war across the route which was used a year later to ferry Lend-Lease aircraft.

The Soviet contingent, headed by General Michael Gromov, trained at Spokane, Washington.[54] Gromov com­plained about several features of these planes and asked for heavy bombers instead.[55] But the requirements of the AAF and RAF and the nature of Soviet air strategy militated against allocating the latter[56] and Gromov eventually accepted the B-25s. But the crews did not fly them home. Both the bombers and fighters were shipped by water.[57] Thus it was in October that the first American planes were sent to the Soviet Union. In the end the method was by ship and the route was the North Atlantic.

One aspect of the initial shipment of planes caused particular and continuous concern. That was the inadequacy of spare parts. On various occasions the Soviets had been informed of the critical shortage of these. But their representatives complained to the President who promptly instructed Stimson to take corrective action:

In my opinion, failure to make this shipment complete, in such a way as to be immediately serviceable and effective for combat operations abroad would entirely defeat the purpose for which this shipment is being made.

In view of this situation, it is my desire that every consideration be given to sending with the airplanes the requisite supplies and equipment from existing stocks in amounts approaching as nearly as possible those which would be required for our own forces operating under similar conditions.[58]

Stimson conveyed the President's remarks to Arnold who explained that available spare parts and tools had been or were in the process of being shipped. "All of the facilities of the War Department," he said, "were placed at their [Soviet] disposal to assist them in every way possible."[59] Stimson related Arnold's analysis to the President, concluding with remarks which illustrated the critical nature of the problem:

I trust that you will agree, after examining the above facts, that we have taken such steps as are possible at this time to meet the request from the Soviet government, which has come at a time when, largely as a result of urgent British demands for Middle East use, there are no spares in existence.[60]

Marshall's reaction was less restrained. He told Stimson:

In the first place our entire Air Corps is suffering from a severe shortage in spare parts of all kinds. We have planes on the ground because we cannot repair them. As a matter of fact, we have been forced for the time being to take about one-fifth of the new planes to provide parts for older planes that we are keeping in the air.

He cited the earlier meetings during which the Soviets had been informed of the shortage and left no doubt about his irritation. "If any criticism is to be made in this matter," he stated, "in my opinion it is that we have been too generous, to our own disadvantage." Marshall added that he questioned the release of the planes themselves "even more when it only results in criticism. The President should have it clearly pointed out to him," the Chief of Staff advised, "that Mr. Oumansky will take everything we own if we submit to his criticisms."[61]

By the time the stopgap shipment of planes was completed, American policy had evolved to the point of planning a long range program of American assistance to the Soviet Union. On 2 August Secretary Welles had announced America's intention "to give all economic assistance practicable for the purpose of strengthening the Soviet Union in its struggle against armed aggression." This decision was supported by presidential adviser Harry Hopkins who, after meetings with Stalin late in July, reported favorably on Soviet "deter­mi­nation to win"—a matter of considerable concern in Washington and London. Hopkins later gave his report to Roosevelt at the Atlantic Conference where the President and Prime Minister Churchill formally proposed a conference of British, American, and Soviet representatives in Moscow to deal with the implementation of long term aid.[62]

The decision to move from stopgap arrangements to a long term program of assistance was endorsed in principle by military planners. More optimistic about the struggle in the Soviet Union than in early summer, they now emphasized the importance of its role in the war and the need for direct encouragement of its resistance.[63]

But the decision to initiate long term aid intensified the problem of allocation and complicated the expansion of the AAF. In response to a Presidential directive in August, the Air War Plans Division prepared a study, known as AWPD/2, which recommended a distribution of American aircraft through June 1942 among three principal claimants—the AAF, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. This study revealed the problems involved in arriving at an equitable allocation of aircraft from American production without injuring the basic defense requirements of the United States.

Although the latter called for twenty-seven heavy bombardment groups and thirty-three pursuit groups, they could not be met because of production problems and British and Soviet needs. In reality, the AAF would be able to equip at the time only eight heavy and ten medium bombardment groups and twenty-three pursuit groups. Out of an estimated production of 14,802 tactical planes up to June 1942, the AAF recommended the distribution: AAF, 5,094; Great Britain, 7,534; and the Soviet Union, 1,163. The remainder of the planes to go to other nations. Greater allocations to foreign countries, Arnold warned, "must be taken with cognizance of the risk to the security of the United States, in [the] event of an Axis victory."[64]

The proposed allocations to the Soviet Union later underwent modifications in London where Anglo-American representatives worked out final details before the high-level supply meeting convened in Moscow at the end of September. The representatives agreed to increase the Russian share of American production from 1,163 to 1,800 tactical aircraft. After the discussions Lord William Beaverbrook and Averill Harri­man headed an Anglo-American mission to Moscow where the hosts again strongly emphasized the priority of aircraft in their requests for aid.[65] On 1 October 1941 Harriman, Beaverbrook, and Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov signed the Moscow Protocol. The United States agreed to provide a monthly total of one hundred fighters and one hundred bombers through June 1942. Britain agreed to provide two hundred fighters per month. The combined commitment for a nine month period totaled 3,600 planes.[66]

In summary, aircraft occupied a priority position in Soviet requests for aid from the United States after the outbreak of Russo-German hostilities. After the United States declared its willingness to assist the Kremlin, Soviet representatives lost little time in presenting a request for 6,000 planes. Little appreciated by the Soviets was the critical shortage of all types of aircraft and spare parts which also existed in the United States, a fact which forced the White House to offer only a token number of planes in the first shipment to the Soviet Union. Even this produced serious disagreement between the White House and the War Department, a dialogue which starkly revealed the gloomy aircraft situation in the AAF and the difficulty of meeting American pledges of assistance. The Chief of Staff, General Marshall, dramatically underscored the desperate condition of the AAF when he pointed out that a diversion of two hundred fighters from air force units to the Soviets—considered at one point by the President—would leave only eight serviceable P-40s to defend the continental United States. After considerable effort to harmonize American policy trends with the needs of the air establishment, a War Department proposal was finally accepted as the most realistic method of expediting the first shipment of aircraft to the Soviets—diverting fighters originally contracted by the British in the United States. These and a few bombers which could be provided from American sources constituted a stopgap shipment.

The initial aircraft sent to the Soviets also raised serious problems regarding the provision of spare parts and the mode and route of delivering the planes. Although at one time they wanted planes flown across Alaska and Siberia (Alsib), the Soviets suddenly rejected this plan in favor of water transport by ship to Archangel, a route that became the principal avenue of delivering American aircraft until Alsib was developed later in the war.

By the time these solutions were found, United States policy had advanced from stopgap arrangements to a long term program, climaxed by the Moscow Protocol. This added larger dimensions to the problem of establishing priorities for dispatching critically needed military aid. And the difficulties and delays involved in determining the mode and route of delivering the aircraft, first experienced during the stopgap phase, were to be greatly magnified. Churchill aptly summed up the meaning of American and British aircraft commitments to the Soviet Union in 1941 when he told Harry Hopkins: "There is no disguising the fact however that they make grievous inroads into what is required by you for expanding your forces and by us for intensifying our war effort."[67]

---

[1]     Message, Cordell Hull to Laurence Steinhardt, 4 March 1941; Memo of conversation by Welles, 20 March 1941, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, Volume I: General, The Soviet Union (Washington, 1958), pages 714, 723. (Hereafter cited as Foreign Relations, 1941, I.) For an account of British warnings to Russia, see Winston S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance (Boston, 1950), pages 358, 360. The unpublished material for this article came primarily from the U.S. Air Force Historical Archives, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama (USAF/HA) and the World War II Records Division, National Archives (WWIIRD/NA). In addition, several important documents under the control of the Department of State were consulted in the National Archives (DS/NA).

[2]     Churchill, The Grand Alliance, page 353.

[3]     B. S. Telpukhovskii, Velikaia Otechestvennaia Voina Sovetskogo Soiuza, 1941-1945: Kratkii Ocherk (Moscow, 1959), page 39; Institut Marksizma-Leninizma, Istoriia Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny Sovetskogo Soiuza, 1941-1945 v Shesti Tomakh, Volume II: Otrazhenie Sovetskim Narodom Verolomnogo Napadeniia Fashistskoi Germanii na SSR. Sozdanie Uslovii Ilia Korennogo Pereloma v Voine, Iiun 1941 g.—Noiabr 1942 g. (Moscow, 1961), page 10.

[4]     General Alexei Markoff, :How Russia Almost Lost the War," The Saturday Evening Post, CCXXII (13 May 1950), page 175; Herbert J. Rieckhoff, "A German View of the Soviet Air Force," Military Review, XXIX (April 1949), page 77.

[5]     Great Britain, Air Ministry, The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force, 1933 to 1945, Air Ministry Pamphlet No. 248, 1948, page 165; U.S. Department of the Army, The German Campaign in Russia: Planning and Operations, 1940-1942, DA Pamphlet No. 20-261a, German Report Series, 1955, page 24; Walter Schwabedissen, The Russian Air Force in the Eyes of German Commanders, USAF Historical Studies No. 175, USAF Historical Division, Research Studies Institute, Air University, 1960, pages 17-18. Some sources placed Russian aircraft strength well over the 10,000 mark. See Schwabedissen, The Russian Air Force, page 19; Memo with report entitled "U.S.S.R. Aircraft Strength and Production," Colonel R. C. Jacobs, Jr., for Brigadier General A. C. Wedemeyer, 7 May 1943, File: ABC 452.1, WPD, WDGS, in WWIIRD/NA.

[6]     Telpukhovskii, Velikaia Otechestvennaia, pages 40-41.

[7]     Cyrille D. Kalinov, Les Marechaux Sovietques vous parlent (Paris, 1950), pages 34-35.

[8]     Institut Marksizma-Leninizma, Istoriia Velikoi, page 16.

[9]     Telpukhovskii, Velikoi Otechestvennaia, page 41.

[10]    Great Britain, Air Ministry, translator, "A Survey of German Air Operations, 1939-1944," prepared by the German Air Historical Branch, 8th Abteilung, 21 September 1944, page 6, File: 512.621/VII/28, in USAF/ HA.

[11]    Schwabedissen, The Russian Air Force, page 55.

[12]    U.S. Department of the Army, The German Campaign in Russia, page 48.

[13]    Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, Transcripts of Monitored Foreign Broadcasts, Records Group RG 262, Boxes 426-27, in National Archives.

[14]    U.S. Department of the Army, "Air Staff Post Hostilities Intelligence: Requirements on German Air Force, Section II: Appendices. Appendix 17," page 17, File: 519.601 B-2, in USAF/HA.

[15]    Nikolai A. Voznesensky, The Economy of the USSR During World War II (Washington, 1948), pages 22, 25.

[16]    An apt term used by Ivan Krylov, Soviet Staff Officer (New York, 1951), page 259.

[17]    U.S. Army Air Forces, Army Air Forces Statistical Digest: World War II (second printing; Washington, 1945), pages 127-28.

[18]    Welles’ statement is contained in message, Welles to Steinhardt, 23 June 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, I, pages 767-68; and in William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Undeclared War, 1940-1941 (New York, 1953), page 541.

[19]    Langer and Gleason, op.cit., page 541.

[20]    Memo of conversation by Welles, 26 June 1941; message, Steinhardt to Hull, 29 June 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, I, pages 769-70, 774.

[21]    Memo of conversation by Welles, 30 June 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, I, pages 779-80.

[22]    Memo, Curtis for Welles, 18 July 1941, File: 861.24/517 3/4, in DS/NA.

[23]    Memo of conversation by Welles, 3 July 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, I, pages 786-87.

[24]    Memo of conversation by Welles, 10 July 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, I, pages 788-89.

[25]    Memo, Curtis for Acheson and Welles, 30 June 1941, with enclosed memo, same date, File: 861.24/516 1/2, in DS/NA.

[26]    U.S. Civilian Production Administration, Industrial Mobilization for War: History of the War Production Board and Predecessor Agencies, 1940-1945, Volume I: Program and Administration (Washington, 1947), pages 130-31.

[27]    Letter, Roosevelt to Burns, 21 July 1941, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Volume II: The Call to Battle Stations, compiler Samuel I. Rosenman (New York, 1950), page 419.

[28]    Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Lend-Lease: Weapon for Victory (New York, 1944), page 122.

[29]    Letter, Roosevelt to Burns, 21 July 1941, The Public Papers, page 419.

[30]    Ibid.

[31]    Letter, Burns to Roosevelt, 23 July 1941, File: FW 861.24/517 2/4, in DS/NA.

[32]    Ibid.

[33]    Memo, Marshall for Arnold, 16 July 1941, File: 400.3295, AG, in WWIIRD/NA.

[34]    Memo, Marshall for Lovett, 18 July 1941, File: 400.3295, AG, in WWIIRD/NA. Several types of planes will be mentioned in connection with the aid program to the Soviet Union in this article. The planes can be divided into two categories—fighters, also known as pursuits, and bombers. The latter were modified by the words "light," "medium," and "heavy" which distinguished the aircraft according to weight, range, and altitude. The P-40 (fighter), A-20 (light bomber) and B-25 (medium bomber) were the main types of aircraft that the United States sent to the Soviets during World War II.

[35]    Memo, Lovett for Stimson, 21 July 1941, File: 400.3295, AG, in WWIIRD/NA.

[36]    Ibid.

[37]    Memo of conversation by Welles, 24 July 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, I, page 797.

[38]    Golikov, a skillful military leader, commanded an army in the Battle of Moscow in the winter of 1941.

[39]    Memo, Brigadier General Sherman Miles for Marshall, 1 August 1941, containing the report of Captain T. L. Crystal who was present at the meeting, File: 19776 to 20150, OCS, in WWIIRD/NA.

[40]    Message, Churchill to Stalin, 25 July 1941, Churchill, The Grand Alliance, page 386.

[41]    Memo, Miles for Marshall, 1 August 1941, File: 19776 to 20150, OCS, in WWIIRD/NA.

[42]    Notes on Remarks of the President at Conference Held, 1 August 1941, signed Marshall, File: 19776 to 20150, OCS, in WWIIRD/NA. During a cabinet meeting on the same day, Roosevelt expressed his concern to Stimson over the delay in sending supplies to Russia. After Stimson remarked that all he knew about Russian supplies was a request for planes, Roosevelt snapped: "Get ‘em, even if it is necessary to take them from [U.S.] troops." Quoted in Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, pages 560-61.

[43]    Memo, Roosevelt for Coy, 2 August 1941, quoted in Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, page 561.

[44]    Memo, Marshall for Roosevelt, 2 August 1941, File: 091 Russia, ASWA, in WWIIRD/NA.

[45]    Notes on Remarks of the President at Conference Held, 1 August 1941. See note 42.

[46]    Memo, Marshall for Stimson, 1 August 1941, File: 19776 to 20150, OCS, in WWIIRD/NA.

[47]    Meeting in General Marshall’s Office, 1 August 1941, File: 091 Russia, ASWA, in WWIIRD/NA; message, AG to CG, 4th Army, 2 August 1941, File: 580.7, AG, in WWIIRD/NA.

[48]    Memo, Marshall for Roosevelt, 2 August 1941. See note 44.

[49]    Letter, Stimson to Oumansky, 4 August 1941, File: 19776 to 20150, OCS, in WWIIRD/NA.

[50]    Letter, Stimson to Oumansky, 5 August 1941, File: 21276 to 21350, OCS, in WWIIRD/NA; letter, Oumansky to Stimson, 11 August 1941, File: 452, AG, in WWIIRD/NA. In reply to Stimson, Oumansky referred to Stimson’s letter of 8 August which appears to be a later draft of the message of 5 August.

[51]    Letter, Stimson to Oumansky, 5 August 1941.

[52]    Memo, Lieutenant Colonel McDonald for Lovett, 29 August 1941, File: 400.336 Russia, ASWA, in WWIIRD/NA; paraphrase of radiogram, Moscow, No. 16, from Major Ivan Yeaton, File: 4557 to 49 Russia, WPD, WDGS, in WWIIRD/NA.

[53]    Message, AG to CG, Alaskan Defense Command, 27 August 1941; message, Major General S. B. Buckner to AG, 3 September 1941, File: 580.7, AG, in WWIIRD/NA.

[54]    Letter, Brigadier General John B. Brooks to Chief, AAF, with enclosures A and B, 1 October 1941, File: 145.95, WP-III-C-4, western Russia, September 1941-December 1942, Book I, in USAF/HA.

[55]    Memo for Arnold, 9 September 1941, File: 167.6-39, Russia, in USAF/HA.

[56]    Letter, Stimson to Oumansky, 10 September 1941, File: 167.6-39, Russia, in USAF/HA; memo, Arnold for Marshall, 9 September 1941, File: 145.82-2, in USAF/HA.

[57]    For Soviet-American negotiations on the B-25 aircraft, see memo, Colonel B. E. Myers for Lovett, 6 October 1941 and letter, Lovett for Stettinius, 6 October 1941, File: 400.3295, ASWA, in WWIIRD/NA. For American exports of planes to northern Russia, see "Status of Airplanes Shipped to USSR as of February 17, 1942," File: 452.1, Deliveries of Planes to Russia, OPD, ASF, in WWIIRD/NA.

[58]    Letter, Roosevelt to Stimson, 27 August 1941, File: 167.6-39, Russia in USAF/HA.

[59]    Memo, Arnold for Stimson, 28 August 1941, File: 167.6-39, Russia, in USAF/HA.

[60]    Letter, Stimson to Roosevelt, undated, File: 167.6-39, Russia, in USAF/HA.

[61]    Memo, Marshall for Stimson, 29 August 1941, File: 21276 to 21350, OCS, in WWIIRD/NA.

[62]    Letter, Welles to Oumansky, 2 August 1941; message, Hopkins to Roosevelt, 1 August 1941; message, Hull to Steinhardt, 18 August 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, I, pages 814, 816, 822-23.

[63]    Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York, 1948), page 417; Military Intelligence Estimate G-2, Washington, D.C., 5 September 1941, in U.S. Congress, Pearl Harbor Attack: Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 79th Congress, 1st and 2nd Sessions, 1946, Part 14, pages 1349-50.

[64]    Air War Plans Division, "AWPD/2," File: 145.82-2, in USAF/HA.

[65]    Major General James E. Chaney, "Report of Special Mission to USSR on Allocation of Aircraft from U.K. and U.S. Production, September 16 to October 10, 1941," File: 178.104, in USAF/HA.

[66]    U.S. Department of State, Soviet Supply Protocols (Washington, n.d.), page 3.

[67]    Churchill, The Grand Alliance, page 469.

Operation Barbarossa: Russian and German planes destroyed on the ground. In the front Russian Polikarpov UTI-4 a two seater training version of I-16 Soviet fighter. In the back a plane with German markings is likely a Henschel Hs 126. 22 June 1941.

Operation Barbarossa: Destroyed Russian Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-3.

German officers inspect a Soviet I-16 fighter destroyed on the ground during the first days of Operation Barbarossa.

Soviet I-16 Type 29 fighter destroyed during first few days of Operation Barbarossa is inspected by a German officer.

Curtiss Tomahawks of the 126 IAP getting ready for another combat mission

Curtiss Tomahawk II (AH965) of the 126 IAP flown by Lt. S.G. Ridnyi, Moscow area, December 1941.

The same aircraft (at right in the background) as in the previous photo in provisional winter camouflage.

Curtiss P-40E of the 29 IAP of the Karelian Front during 1943.

Curtiss P-40M Kittyhawk (43-5540), USSR, White 281.

Curtiss P-40K Kittyhawk, USSR, 7CHF, IAP, White 96, Black Sea Fleet.

Curtiss P-40M Kittyhawk (43-5998), White 11, reserve aircraft, 1945.

North American B-25 Mitchell (44-31162) in Soviet markings.

North American B-25 Mitchells in Soviet markings ready for Russian crews to fly the bombers to the Soviet Union.

U.S. planes stand ready to be picked up at Abadan Field, Iran, which in the rainy season was reported as being the “damnedest gumbo you ever saw.” Five principal types of aircraft were delivered to Russia, three of which are shown here. Of the total, about 20% were P-40s, 25% P-39s, 49% A-20s, 5% B-25s and 1% AT-6s.

Russian pilots arrive by plane at Abadan, Iran, to take over U.S. planes. On the homeward trip, pilots landed at Tehran, where a large number of Russians were stationed. At Abadan there were only a few Russian officials, mostly inspectors.

Soviet airmen stand on a street corner in Alaska, likely in Fairbanks.

Allied aircrews pose for a picture somewhere in the wilds of Alaska.

American and Soviet airmen pose during a game of billiards. This photo was taken in Alaska during American-Soviet lend-lease operations.

A Soviet officer stands at the post tent at Galena Air Station, Alaska.

Lend-lease B-25s and P-39s on the runway at Ladd Field, Alaska, prior to testing by the Soviet Purchasing Commission, September 1942.

USAAF and Soviet Air Force officers in front of Bell P-63 Kingcobra which was the 5,000th airplane delivered via the ALSIB [Alaska-Siberia] Route. Ladd Field, Alaska, 10 September 1944. Wartime censorship meant that the ALSIB route and the Soviet soldiers stationed at Ladd Field were not publicly discussed until the summer of 1944. However, in towns along the way, the operation was common knowledge. The Soviet pilots stayed at Ladd Field until the end of World War II. In that time, the United States delivered almost 8,000 planes to the Soviet Union.

USAAF airman painting over the US white star on an aircraft with the red star, the emblem of the Soviet Union, before leaving for the Soviet Union.

Bell P-39 Airacobras (44-3719 in foreground) with wing guns removed and Soviet stars on the fuselage. Soviet pilots would remove the two wing-mounted machine guns and keep the nose-mounted guns and cannon to improve the aircraft's roll rate. "I liked the Cobra, especially the Q-5 version," recalled Soviet P-39 pilot Nikolai Golodnikov. "It was the lightest version of all Cobras and was the best fighter I ever flew."

Soviet ace Aleksandr Pokyrshkin with his P-39 Airacobra.

In late 1941, the Soviet Union received ten North American Mustang Mk. Is from the Royal Air Force. Acquired by the RAF for use as tactical reconnaissance and fighter-bomber in early 1941, the British sent the Mk. Is to the Soviet Union (along with Hawker Hurricanes and Curtis P-40 Warhawks) in late 1941 and early 1942 in an attempt to strengthen the aerial arm of the Soviet military after the major losses suffered by the VVS and VMF (Soviet Air Force and Navy) during Operation Barbarossa.