Isoroku Yamamoto (April 4, 1884 – April 18, 1943) was a
Japanese Marshal Admiral and the commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet
during World War II until his death.
Yamamoto held several important posts in the Imperial
Japanese Navy, and undertook many of its changes and reorganizations,
especially its development of naval aviation. He was the commander-in-chief
during the decisive early years of the Pacific War and so was responsible for
major battles such as Pearl Harbor and Midway. He died when American
codebreakers identified his flight plans and his plane was shot down. His death
was a major blow to Japanese military morale during World War II.
Yamamoto was born Isoroku Takano in Nagaoka, Niigata. His
father was Sadayoshi Takano, an intermediate-rank samurai of the Nagaoka
Domain. “Isoroku” is an old Japanese term meaning “56”; the name referred to
his father’s age at Isoroku’s birth.
In 1916, Isoroku was adopted into the Yamamoto family
(another family of former Nagaoka samurai) and took the Yamamoto name. It was a
common practice for samurai families lacking sons to adopt suitable young men
in this fashion to carry on the family name, the rank and the income that comes
with it. In 1918 Isoroku married Reiko Mihashi, with whom he had two sons and
two daughters.
After graduating from the Imperial Japanese Naval Academy in
1904, Yamamoto served on the armored cruiser Nisshin during the Russo-Japanese
War. He was wounded at the Battle of Tsushima, losing two fingers (the index
and middle fingers) on his left hand, as the cruiser was hit repeatedly by the
Russian battleline. He returned to the Naval Staff College in 1914, emerging as
a Lieutenant Commander in 1916.
Yamamoto was part of the Japanese Navy establishment, who
were rivals of the more aggressive Army establishment, especially the officers
of the Kwantung Army. As such he promoted a policy of a strong fleet to project
force through gunboat diplomacy, rather than a fleet used primarily for
transport of invasion land forces, as some of his political opponents in the army
wanted. This stance led him to oppose the invasion of China. He also opposed
war against the United States partly because of his studies at Harvard
University (1919–1921) and his two postings as a naval attaché in Washington,
D.C. He learned to speak fluent English as a result. Yamamoto traveled
extensively in the United States during his tour of duty there, where he
studied American customs and business practices.
He was promoted to Captain in 1923. On April 13, 1924 at the
rank of captain, he was part of the Japanese delegation visiting the U.S. Naval
War College. Later that year, he changed his specialty from gunnery to naval
aviation. His first command was the cruiser Isuzu in 1928, followed by the
aircraft carrier Akagi.
He participated in the second London Naval Conference of
1930 as a Rear Admiral and the 1934 London Naval Conference as a Vice Admiral,
as the growing military influence on the government at the time deemed that a
career military specialist needed to accompany the diplomats to the arms
limitations talks. Yamamoto was a strong proponent of naval aviation, and
served as head of the Aeronautics Department before accepting a post as
commander of the First Carrier Division. Yamamoto personally opposed the
invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the subsequent land war with China (1937), and
the 1940 Tripartite Pact with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. As Deputy Navy
Minister, he apologized to United States Ambassador Joseph C. Grew for the
bombing of the gunboat USS Panay in December 1937. These issues made him a
target of assassination threats by pro-war militarists.
Throughout 1938, many young army and naval officers began to
speak publicly against Yamamoto and certain other Japanese admirals such as
Mitsumasa Yonai and Shigeyoshi Inoue for their strong opposition towards a
Tripartite pact with Nazi Germany for reportedly being against “Japan’s natural
interests.” Yamamoto himself received a steady stream of hate mail and death
threats from Japanese nationalists but his reaction to the prospect of death by
assassination was passive and accepting. The Admiral wrote:
To die for Emperor and Nation is the highest hope of a
military man. After a brave hard fight the blossoms are scattered on the
fighting field. But if a person wants to take a life instead, still the
fighting man will go to eternity for Emperor and country. One man’s life or
death is a matter of no importance. All that matters is the Empire. As
Confucius said, “They may crush cinnabar, yet they do not take away its color;
one may burn a fragrant herb, yet it will not destroy the scent.” They may
destroy my body, yet they will not take away my will.
The Japanese army, annoyed at Yamamoto’s unflinching
opposition to a Rome-Berlin-Tokyo treaty, dispatched military police to “guard”
Yamamoto; this was an attempt by the Army to keep an eye on him. He was later
reassigned from the Navy Ministry to sea as the Commander-in-Chief of the
Combined Fleet on (August 30, 1939). This was done as one of the last acts of
the then-acting Navy Minister Mitsumasa Yonai, under Baron Hiranuma’s
short-lived administration partly to make it harder for assassins to target
Yamamoto; Yonai was certain that if Yamamoto remained ashore, he would be
killed before the year (1939) ended.
Yamamoto was promoted to Admiral on November 15, 1940. This,
in spite of the fact that when Hideki Tōjō was appointed Prime Minister on
October 18, 1941, many political observers thought that Yamamoto’s career was
essentially over. Tōjō had been Yamamoto’s old opponent from the time when the
latter served as Japan’s deputy navy minister and Tōjō was the prime mover
behind Japan’s takeover of Manchuria. It was believed that Yamamoto would be
appointed to command the Yokosuka Naval Base, “a nice safe demotion with a big
house and no power at all.” After the new Japanese cabinet was announced,
however, Yamamoto found himself left alone in his position despite his open
conflicts with Tōjō and other members of the army’s oligarchy who favored war
with the European powers and America. Two of the main reasons for Yamamoto’s
political survival were his immense popularity within the fleet, where he
commanded the respect of his men and officers, and his close relations with the
imperial family. He also had the acceptance by Japan’s naval hierarchy:
There was no officer more competent to lead the Combined
Fleet to victory than Admiral Yamamoto. His daring plan for the Pearl Harbor
attack had passed through the crucible of the Japanese naval establishment, and
after many expressed misgivings, his fellow admirals had realized that Yamamoto
spoke no more than the truth when he said that Japan’s hope for victory in this
[upcoming] war was limited by time and oil. Every sensible officer of the navy
was well aware of the perennial oil problems. Also, it had to be recognized
that if the enemy could seriously disturb Japanese merchant shipping, then the
fleet would be endangered even more.
Consequently, Yamamoto stayed in his post. With Tōjō now in
charge of Japan’s highest political office, it became clear the army would lead
the navy into a war about which Yamamoto had serious reservations. He wrote to
an ultranationalist:
Should hostilities once break out between Japan and the
United States, it would not be enough that we take Guam and the Philippines,
nor even Hawaii and San Francisco. To make victory certain, we would have to
march into Washington and dictate the terms of peace in the White House. I
wonder if our politicians (who speak so lightly of a Japanese-American war)
have confidence as to the final outcome and are prepared to make the necessary
sacrifices.
This quote was spread by the militarists, minus the last
sentence, where it was interpreted in America as a boast that Japan would
conquer the entire continental United States. The omitted sentence showed
Yamamoto’s counsel of caution towards a war that could cost Japan dearly.
Nevertheless, Yamamoto accepted the reality of impending war and planned for a
quick victory by destroying the US fleet at Pearl Harbor in a preventive strike
while simultaneously thrusting into the oil and rubber resource rich areas of
Southeast Asia, especially the Dutch East Indies, Borneo and Malaya. In naval
matters, Yamamoto opposed the building of the super-battleships Yamato and
Musashi as an unwise investment of resources.
Yamamoto was responsible for a number of innovations in
Japanese naval aviation. Although remembered for his association with aircraft
carriers due to Pearl Harbor and Midway, Yamamoto did more to influence the
development of land-based naval aviation, particularly the Mitsubishi G3M and
G4M medium bombers. His demand for great range and the ability to carry a
torpedo was intended to conform to Japanese conceptions of attriting the
American fleet as it advanced across the Pacific in war. The planes did achieve
long range, but long-range fighter escorts were not available. These planes
were lightly constructed and when fully fueled, they were especially vulnerable
to enemy fire. This earned the G4M the sardonic nickname “the Flying Cigarette
Lighter.” Yamamoto would eventually die in one of these aircraft.
The range of the G3M and G4M contributed to a demand for
great range in a fighter aircraft. This partly drove the requirements for the
A6M Zero which was as noteworthy for its range as for its maneuverability. Both
qualities were again purchased at the expense of light construction and
flammability that later contributed to the A6M’s high casualty rates as the war
progressed.
As Japan moved toward war during 1940, Yamamoto gradually
moved toward strategic as well as tactical innovation, again with mixed
results. Prompted by talented young officers such as Lieutenant Commander
Minoru Genda, Yamamoto approved the reorganization of Japanese carrier forces
into the First Air Fleet, a consolidated striking force that gathered Japan’s
six largest carriers into one unit. This innovation gave great striking
capacity, but also concentrated the vulnerable carriers into a compact target;
both boon and bane would be realized in war. Yamamoto also oversaw the
organization of a similar large land-based organization in the 11th Air Fleet,
which would later use the G3M and G4M to neutralize American air forces in the
Philippines and sink the British Force “Z.”
In January 1941, Yamamoto went even further and proposed a
radical revision of Japanese naval strategy. For two decades, in keeping with
the doctrine of Captain Alfred T. Mahan, the Naval General Staff had planned in
terms of Japanese light surface forces, submarines and land-based air units
whittling down the American Fleet as it advanced across the Pacific until the
Japanese Navy engaged it in a climactic “Decisive Battle” in the northern
Philippine Sea (between the Ryukyu Islands and the Marianas Islands), with
battleships meeting in the traditional exchange between battle lines.
Correctly pointing out this plan had never worked even in
Japanese war games, and painfully aware of American strategic advantages in
military productive capacity, Yamamoto proposed instead to seek a decision with
the Americans by first reducing their forces with a preventive strike, and
following it with a “Decisive Battle” fought offensively, rather than
defensively. Yamamoto hoped, but probably did not believe, if the Americans
could be dealt such terrific blows early in the war, they might be willing to
negotiate an end to the conflict. As it turned out, however, the note
officially breaking diplomatic relations with the United States was delivered
late, and he correctly perceived the Americans would be resolved upon revenge
and unwilling to negotiate. At the end of the attack upon Pearl Harbor, upon
hearing of the mis-timing of the communiqué breaking diplomatic relations with
the United States earlier that day, it is reputed Yamamoto said, “I fear all we
have done today is to awaken a great, sleeping giant and fill him with a
terrible resolve.”; however, there is no documented evidence the statement was
made.
The Naval General Staff proved reluctant to go along and
Yamamoto was eventually driven to capitalize on his popularity in the fleet by
threatening to resign to get his way. Admiral Osami Nagano and the Naval
General Staff eventually caved in to this pressure, but only insofar as
approving the attack on Pearl Harbor.
The First Air Fleet commenced preparations for the Pearl
Harbor Raid, solving a number of technical problems along the way, including
how to launch torpedoes in the shallow water of Pearl Harbor and how to craft
armor-piercing bombs by machining down battleship gun projectiles.
As Yamamoto had planned, the First Air Fleet of six carriers
commenced hostilities against the Americans on December 7, 1941, launching 353
aircraft against Pearl Harbor in two waves. The attack was a complete success
according to the parameters of the mission which sought to sink at least four
American battleships and prevent the U.S. Fleet from interfering in Japan’s
southward advance for at least six months. American aircraft carriers were also
considered a choice target, but these were not in port at the time of the
attack.
In the end, five American battleships were sunk, three were
damaged, and eleven other cruisers, destroyers and auxiliaries were sunk or
seriously damaged. The Japanese lost only 29 aircraft, while 74 were damaged
from anti-aircraft fire from the ground. The damaged aircraft were disproportionately
dive and torpedo bombers, seriously impacting available firepower to exploit
the first two waves’ success, so the commander of the First Air Fleet, Naval
Lieutenant-General Chuichi Nagumo, withdrew. Yamamoto later lamented Nagumo’s
failure to seize the initiative to seek out and destroy the American carriers,
absent from the harbor, or further bombard various strategically important
facilities on Oahu. Nagumo had absolutely no idea where the American carriers
might be, and remaining on station while his forces cast about looking for them
ran the risk of his own forces being found first and attacked while his
aircraft were absent searching. In any case, insufficient daylight remained
after recovering the aircraft from the first two waves for the carriers to
launch and recover a third before dark, and Nagumo’s escorting destroyers
lacked the fuel capacity for him to loiter long. Much has been made of
Yamamoto’s hindsight, but (in keeping with Japanese military tradition not to
criticize the commander on the spot) he did not punish Nagumo in any way for
his withdrawal.
On the strategic level, the attack was a disaster for Japan,
rousing American passions for revenge due to it being a “sneak attack.” The
shock of the attack coming in an unexpected place, with such devastating
results and without the expected “fair play” of a declaration of war galvanized
the American public’s determination to avenge the attack. When asked by Prime
Minister Fumimaro Konoe in mid-1941 concerning the outcome of a possible war
with the United States, Yamamoto made a well-known and prophetic statement: If
ordered to fight, “I shall run wild considerably for the first six months or a
year, but I have utterly no confidence for the second and third years.” His
prediction would be vindicated as Japan easily conquered territories and
islands for the first six months of the war until it suffered a shattering
defeat at the Battle of Midway on June 4–7, 1942, which ultimately tilted the
balance of power in the Pacific towards the U.S.
As a strategic blow intended to prevent American
interference in the Dutch East Indies for six months, the Pearl Harbor attack
was a success, but unbeknownst to Yamamoto, it was a pointless one. The U.S.
Navy had abandoned any intention of attempting to charge across the Pacific
towards the Philippines at the outset of war in 1935 (in keeping with the
evolution of War Plan Orange). In 1937, the U.S. Navy had further determined
even fully manning the fleet to wartime levels could not be accomplished in less
than six months, and myriad other logistic assets needed to execute a
trans-Pacific movement simply did not exist and would require two years to
construct after the onset of war. In 1940, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations,
Admiral Harold Stark had penned a Plan Dog memorandum, which emphasized a
defensive war in the Pacific while the U.S. concentrated on defeating Nazi
Germany first, and consigned Admiral Husband Kimmel’s Pacific Fleet to merely
keeping the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) out of the eastern Pacific and away
from the shipping lanes to Australia. Moreover, it is in question whether the
U.S. would have gone to war at all had Japan only attacked British and Dutch
possessions in the Far East.
With the American Fleet largely neutralized at Pearl Harbor,
Yamamoto’s Combined Fleet turned to the task of executing the larger Japanese
war plan devised by the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy General Staff. The
First Air Fleet proceeded to make a circuit of the Pacific, striking American,
Australian, Dutch and British installations from Wake Island to Australia to
Ceylon in the Indian Ocean. The 11th Air Fleet caught the American 5th Air
Force on the ground in the Philippines hours after Pearl Harbor, and then
proceeded to sink the British Force “Z” (battleship HMS Prince of Wales and
battlecruiser HMS Repulse) underway at sea.
Under Yamamoto’s able subordinates, Naval
Lieutenant-Generals Jisaburō Ozawa, Nobutake Kondō and Ibō Takahashi, the
Japanese swept the inadequate remaining American, British, Dutch and Australian
naval assets from the Dutch East Indies in a series of amphibious landings and
surface naval battles that culminated in the Battle of the Java Sea on February
27, 1942. Along with the occupation of the Dutch East Indies came the fall of
Singapore (February 15, 1942), and the eventual reduction of the remaining
American-Filipino defensive positions in the Philippines on the Bataan
peninsula (April 9, 1942) and Corregidor island (May 6, 1942). The Japanese had
secured their oil- and rubber-rich “Southern Resources Area.”
By late March, having achieved their initial aims with
surprising speed and little loss (albeit against enemies ill-prepared to resist
them), the Japanese paused to consider their next moves. Yamamoto and a few
Japanese military leaders and officials waited, hoping that the United States
or Great Britain would negotiate for an armistice or a peace treaty to end the
war in their favor. But when the British, as well as the Americans, expressed
no interest in negotiating with Japan for any cease fire, the Japanese thoughts
turned to securing their newly seized territory and acquiring more with an eye
toward attempting to force one or more of their enemies out of the war.
Competing plans were developed at this stage, including
thrusts to the west against India, the south against Australia and the east
against the United States. Yamamoto was involved in this debate, supporting
different plans at different times with varying degrees of enthusiasm and for
varying purposes, including “horse-trading” for support of his own objectives.
Plans included ideas as ambitious as invading India or
Australia, or seizing Hawaii. These grandiose ventures were inevitably set
aside as the army could not spare enough troops from China for the first two
(which would require a minimum of 250,000 men), nor shipping to support the
latter two. (Shipping was allocated separately to IJN & IJA, and jealously
guarded.) Instead, the Imperial General Staff supported an army thrust into
Burma in hopes of linking up with Indian Nationalists revolting against British
rule, and attacks in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands designed to imperil
Australia’s sea line of communication with the United States. Yamamoto agitated
for an offensive decisive battle in the east to finish off the American fleet,
but the more conservative Naval General Staff officers were unwilling to risk
it.
On April 18, in the midst of these debates, the Doolittle
Raid struck Tokyo and the surrounding areas, galvanizing the threat posed by
the American aircraft carriers in the minds of staff officers, and giving
Yamamoto an event he could exploit to get his way as further debate over
military strategy came to a quick end. The Naval General Staff agreed to
Yamamoto’s Midway (MI) Operation, subsequent to the first phase of the
operations against Australia’s link with America, and concurrent with their own
plan to seize positions in the Aleutian Islands.
Yamamoto rushed planning for the Midway and Aleutians
missions, while dispatching a force under Naval Major-General Takeo Takagi,
including the Fifth Carrier Division (the large, new carriers Shōkaku and
Zuikaku), to support the effort to seize the islands of Tulagi and Guadalcanal
for seaplane and aeroplane bases, and the town of Port Moresby on Papua New
Guinea’s south coast facing Australia.
The Port Moresby (MO) Operation proved an unwelcome setback.
Although Tulagi and Guadalcanal were taken, the Port Moresby invasion fleet was
compelled to turn back when Takagi clashed with an American carrier task force
in the Battle of the Coral Sea in early May. Although the Japanese sank the
American carrier USS Lexington and damaged the USS Yorktown (CV-5), the
Americans damaged the carrier Shōkaku so badly that she required dockyard
repairs, and the Japanese lost the light carrier Shoho. Just as importantly,
Japanese operational mishaps and American fighters and anti-aircraft fire
devastated the dive bomber and torpedo plane formations of both Shōkaku’s and
Zuikaku’s air groups. These losses sidelined Zuikaku while she awaited
replacement aircraft and aircrews, and saw to tactical integration and
training. These two ships would be sorely missed a month later at Midway.
Yamamoto’s plan for Midway Island was an extension of his
efforts to knock the U.S. Pacific Fleet out of action long enough for Japan to
fortify her defensive perimeter in the Pacific island chains. Yamamoto felt it
necessary to seek an early, offensive decisive battle.
This plan was long believed to have been to draw American
attention—and possibly carrier forces—north from Pearl Harbor by sending his
Fifth Fleet (two light carriers, five cruisers, 13 destroyers, and four
transports) against the Aleutians, raiding Dutch Harbor on Unalaska Island and
invading the more distant islands of Kiska and Attu.
While Fifth Fleet attacked the Aleutians, First Mobile Force
(4 carriers, 2 battleships, 3 cruisers, and 12 destroyers) would raid Midway
and destroy its air force. Once this was neutralized, Second Fleet (1 light
carrier, 2 battleships, 10 cruisers, 21 destroyers, and 11 transports) would
land 5,000 troops to seize the atoll from the American Marines.
The seizure of Midway was expected to draw the American
carriers west into a trap where the First Mobile Force would engage and destroy
them. Afterward, First Fleet (1 light carrier, 7 battleships, 3 cruisers and 13
destroyers), in conjunction with elements of Second Fleet, would mop up
remaining American surface forces and complete the destruction of the Pacific
Fleet.
To guard against mischance, Yamamoto initiated two security
measures. The first was an aerial reconnaissance mission (Operation K) over
Pearl Harbor to ascertain if the American carriers were there. The second was a
picket line of submarines to detect the movement of the American carriers
toward Midway in time for First Mobile Force, First Fleet, and Second Fleet to
combine against it. In the event, the first was aborted and the second delayed
until after American carriers had sortied.
The plan was a compromise and hastily prepared (apparently
so it could be launched in time for the anniversary of Tsushima), but appeared
well thought out, well organized, and finely timed when viewed from a Japanese
viewpoint. Against four carriers, two light carriers, 11 battleships, 16
cruisers and 46 destroyers likely to be in the area of the main battle the
Americans could field only three carriers, eight cruisers, and 15 destroyers.
The disparity appeared crushing. Only in numbers of carrier decks, available
aircraft, and submarines was there near parity between the two sides. Despite
various frictions developed in the execution, it appeared—barring something
extraordinary—Yamamoto held all the cards.
The Americans were able to learn of the Japanese plans
thanks to code breaking of Japanese naval code D (known to the U.S. as JN-25).
As a result, Admiral Chester Nimitz, the Pacific Fleet commander, was able to
circumvent both of Yamamoto’s security measures and position his outnumbered
forces in the exact position to conduct a devastating ambush. By Nimitz’s
calculation, his three available carrier decks, plus Midway, gave him rough
parity with Nagumo’s First Mobile Force.
Following a nuisance raid by Japanese flying boats in May,
Nimitz dispatched a minesweeper to guard the intended refueling point for
Operation K near French Frigate Shoals, causing the reconnaissance mission to
be aborted and leaving Yamamoto ignorant of whether Pacific Fleet carriers were
still at Pearl Harbor. (It remains unclear why Yamamoto permitted the earlier
attack, and why his submarines did not sortie sooner, as reconnaissance was
essential to the success of MI.) He also dispatched his carriers toward Midway
early, and they passed the intended picket line force of submarines en route to
their station, negating Yamamoto’s back-up security measure. Nimitz’s carriers
positioned themselves to ambush the Kido Butai (Striking Force) when it struck
Midway. A token cruiser and destroyer force was sent toward the Aleutians, but
otherwise Nimitz ignored them. On June 4, 1942, days before Yamamoto expected
them to interfere in the Midway operation, American carrier-based aircraft
destroyed the four carriers of the Kido Butai, catching the Japanese carriers
at an especially vulnerable moment.
With his air power destroyed and his forces not yet
concentrated for a fleet battle, Yamamoto attempted to maneuver his remaining
forces, still strong on paper, to trap the American forces. He was unable to do
so because his initial dispositions had placed his surface combatants too far
from Midway, and because Admiral Raymond Spruance prudently withdrew to the
east in a position to further defend Midway Island, believing (based on a
mistaken submarine report) the Japanese still intended to invade. Not knowing
several battleships, including the powerful Yamato, were on the Japanese order
of battle, he did not comprehend the severe risk of a night surface battle, in
which his carriers and cruisers would be at a disadvantage. However, his move
to the east did avoid the possibility of such a battle taking place. Correctly
perceiving he had lost and could not bring surface forces into action, Yamamoto
aborted the invasion of Midway and withdrew. The defeat marked the high tide of
Japanese expansion.
Yamamoto’s plan for MI has been the subject of much
criticism. Many commentators state it violated the principle of concentration
of force, and was overly complex. Others point out similarly complex Allied
operations (such as Operation MB8) that were successful, and note the extent to
which the American intelligence coup derailed the operation before it began.
Had Yamamoto’s dispositions not denied Nagumo adequate pre-attack
reconnaissance assets, both the American cryptanalytic success and the
unexpected appearance of Fletcher’s carriers would have been irrelevant.
The Battle of Midway solidly checked Japanese momentum, but
the IJN was still a powerful force and capable of regaining the initiative.
They planned to resume the thrust with Operation FS aimed at eventually taking
Samoa and Fiji to cut the American life-line to Australia. This was expected to
short-circuit the threat posed by General Douglas MacArthur and his American
and Australian forces in New Guinea. To this end, development of the airfield
on Guadalcanal continued and attracted the baleful eye of Yamamoto’s opposite number,
Admiral Ernest King.
To prevent the Japanese from regaining the initiative, King
ramrodded the idea of an immediate American counterattack through the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. This precipitated the American invasion of Guadalcanal and
beat the Japanese to the punch, with Marines landing on the island in August
1942 and starting a bitter struggle that lasted until February 1943 and
commenced a battle of attrition Japan could ill afford.
Yamamoto remained in command as Commander-in-Chief, retained
at least partly to avoid diminishing the morale of the Combined Fleet. However,
he had lost face as a result of the Midway defeat and the Naval General Staff
were disinclined to indulge in further gambles. This reduced Yamamoto to
pursuing the classic defensive Decisive Battle strategy he had attempted to
overturn.
The naval and land battles at Guadalcanal caught the
Japanese over-extended and attempting to support fighting in New Guinea while
guarding the Central Pacific and preparing to conduct Operation FS. The FS
operation was abandoned and the Japanese attempted to fight in both New Guinea
and Guadalcanal at the same time. Already stretched thin, they suffered
repeated setbacks due to a lack of shipping, a lack of troops, and a disastrous
inability to coordinate Army and Navy activities.
Yamamoto committed Combined Fleet units to a series of small
attrition actions across the south and central Pacific that stung the
Americans, but suffered losses he could ill afford in return. Three major
efforts to carry the island precipitated a pair of carrier battles that
Yamamoto commanded personally at the Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz Islands in
September and October, and finally a wild pair of surface engagements in
November, all timed to coincide with Japanese Army pushes. The timing of each
major battle was successively derailed when the army could not hold up its end
of the operation. Yamamoto’s naval forces won a few victories and inflicted
considerable losses and damage to the U.S. Fleet in several naval battles around
Guadalcanal which included the battles of Savo Island, Cape Esperance, and
Tassafaronga, but he could never draw the Americans into a decisive fleet
action. As a result, the Japanese Navy’s strength began to bleed off.
There were severe losses of carrier dive-bomber and
torpedo-bomber crews in the carrier battles, emasculating the already depleted
carrier air groups. Japan could not hope to match the United States in
quantities of well-trained replacement pilots, and the quality of both Japanese
land-based and naval aviation began declining. Particularly harmful, however,
were losses of numerous destroyers in the unsuccessful Tokyo Express supply
runs. The IJN already faced a shortage of such ships, and these losses further
exacerbated Japan’s already weakened commerce defense. With Guadalcanal lost in
February 1943, there was no further attempt by the Japanese navy to seek a
major battle in the Solomon Islands against the U.S. fleet, although smaller
attrition battles continued. Yamamoto shifted the load of the air battle away
from the depleted carrier air wings to land-based naval air forces.
To boost morale following the defeat at Guadalcanal,
Yamamoto decided to make an inspection tour throughout the South Pacific. On
April 14, 1943, the US naval intelligence effort, code-named “Magic,”
intercepted and decrypted a message containing specific details regarding
Yamamoto’s tour, including arrival and departure times and locations, as well
as the number and types of aircraft that would transport and accompany him on
the journey. Yamamoto, the itinerary revealed, would be flying from Rabaul to
Balalae Airfield, on an island near Bougainville in the Solomon Islands, on the
morning of April 18, 1943.
U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered Secretary of the
Navy Frank Knox to “Get Yamamoto.” Knox instructed Chief of Naval Operations
Admiral Ernest J. King of Roosevelt’s wishes. Admiral King telephoned Admiral
Chester W. Nimitz at Pearl Harbor. This mission would be Top Secret and Urgent.
Admiral Nimitz consulted Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., Commander, South
Pacific, then authorized a mission on April 17 to intercept Yamamoto’s flight
en route and shoot it down. A squadron of USAAF Lockheed P-38 Lightning
aircraft were assigned the task as only they possessed the range to intercept
and engage. Select pilots from three units were informed that they were
intercepting an “important high officer” with no specific name given.
On the morning of April 18, despite urgings by local
commanders to cancel the trip for fear of ambush, Yamamoto’s two Mitsubishi G4M
bombers, used as fast transport aircraft without bombs, left Rabaul as
scheduled for the 315 mi (507 km) trip. Sixteen Lightnings intercepted the
flight over Bougainville and a dogfight ensued between them and the six
escorting Mitsubishi A6M Zeroes. First Lieutenant Rex T. Barber engaged the
first of the two Japanese transports which turned out to be T1-323 (Yamamoto’s
aircraft). He targeted the aircraft with gunfire until it began to spew smoke
from its left engine. Barber turned away to attack the other transport as
Yamamoto’s plane crashed into the jungle.
The crash site and body of Yamamoto were found the next day
in the jungle north of Buin, Papua New Guinea, by a Japanese search and rescue
party, led by army engineer, Lieutenant Hamasuna. According to Hamasuna,
Yamamoto had been thrown clear of the plane’s wreckage, his white-gloved hand
grasping the hilt of his katana, still upright in his seat under a tree.
Hamasuna said Yamamoto was instantly recognizable, head dipped down as if deep
in thought. A post-mortem of the body disclosed that Yamamoto had received two
0.50-caliber bullet wounds, one to the back of his left shoulder and another to
his left lower jaw that exited above his right eye. The Japanese navy doctor
examining the body determined that the head wound killed Yamamoto. The more
violent details of Yamamoto’s death were hidden from the Japanese public; the
medical report was whitewashed, changed “on orders from above,” according to
biographer Hiroyuki Agawa.
His staff cremated his remains at Buin, and the ashes were
returned to Tokyo aboard the battleship Musashi, Yamamoto’s last flagship.
Yamamoto was given a full state funeral on June 5, 1943, where he received,
posthumously, the title of Marshal and was awarded the Order of the
Chrysanthemum (1st Class). He was also awarded Nazi Germany’s Knight’s Cross of
the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords. Part of his ashes were buried in the
public Tama Cemetery, Tokyo, and the remainder at his ancestral burial grounds
at the temple of Chuko-ji in Nagaoka City. He was succeeded as
commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet by Admiral Mineichi Koga.
The wreck of the aircraft that carried Yamamoto remains as a
tourist attraction in the Bougainville jungle near Moila Point, a few
kilometers off the Panguna-Buin road. Signposts can be found near the village
of Aku, 24 km outside Buin. A path to the wreck has been cut through the
jungle, an hour’s walk from the road. Other artifacts from the crash site,
including the outer wing panel and the Admiral’s seat, are at the Isoroku
Yamamoto Memorial Hall and Museum in Nagaoka, Niigata, Japan.
Yamamoto practiced calligraphy. He and his wife, Reiko, had
four children: two sons and two daughters. Yamamoto was an avid gambler,
enjoying Go, shogi, billiards, bridge, mah jong, poker, and other games that
tested his wits and sharpened his mind. He frequently made jokes about moving
to Monaco and starting his own casino. He enjoyed the company of geisha, and
his wife Reiko revealed to the Japanese public in 1954 that Yamamoto was closer
to his favorite geisha Kawai Chiyoko than to her, which stirred some
controversy. After his death, his funeral procession passed by Kawai’s quarters
on the way to the cemetery.
Decorations
The Breast Star of the Order of the Chrysanthemum
Grand Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun Paulownia
Blossoms
Grand Cordon of the Order of the Sacred Treasure
Order of the Golden Kite (1st class)
Order of the Golden Kite (2nd class)
Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords
Yamamoto’s Career
Promotions
Midshipman—November 14, 1904
Ensign—August 31, 1905
Sublieutenant—September 28, 1907
Lieutenant—October 11, 1909
Lieutenant Commander—December 13, 1915
Commander—December 1, 1919
Captain—December 1, 1923
Rear Admiral—November 30, 1929
Vice Admiral—November 15, 1934
Admiral—November 15, 1940
Marshal-Admiral—April 18, 1943 (posthumous)
In Popular Culture
Since the end of the Second World War, a number of Japanese
and American films have depicted the character of Isoroku Yamamoto.
One of the most notable films is the 1970 movie Tora! Tora!
Tora!, which stars Japanese actor Sô Yamamura as Yamamoto, who states after the
attack on Pearl Harbor, "I fear that all we have done is to awaken a
sleeping giant and fill him with a terrible resolve", attributed to
Yamamoto in Tora! Tora! Tora! (1970), in reference to the attack on Pearl
Harbor. However, there is no evidence that Yamamoto said this in reality.
The first film to feature Yamamoto was Toho's 1953 film
Taiheiyô no washi, (later released in the United States as Eagle of the
Pacific), in which Yamamoto was portrayed by Denjirô Ôkôchi.
The 1960 film The Gallant Hours depicts the battle of wits
between Vice-Admiral William Halsey, Jr. and Yamamoto from the start of the
Guadalcanal Campaign in August 1942 to Yamamoto's death in April 1943. The
film, however, portrays Yamamoto's death as occurring in November 1942, the day
after the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, and the P-38 aircraft that killed him as
coming from Guadalcanal.
In Daiei Studios's 1969 film Aa, kaigun (later released in
the United States as Gateway to Glory), Yamamoto was portrayed by Shôgo
Shimada.
Professional wrestler Harold Watanabe adopted the villainous
Japanese gimmick of Tojo Yamamoto in reference to both Yamamoto and Hideki Tojo
Award-winning Japanese actor Toshiro Mifune (star of The
Seven Samurai) portrayed Yamamoto in three films:
Rengō Kantai Shirei Chōkan: Yamamoto Isoroku (1968, later
released in Canada and the United States as Admiral Yamamoto),
Gekido no showashi 'Gunbatsu' (1970, lit. "Turning
Point of Showa History: The Militarists"), and
Midway (1976, where all of the Japanese scenes had English
dialogue).
A fictionalized version of Yamamoto's death was portrayed in
the Baa Baa Black Sheep episode "The Hawk Flies on Sunday", though
only photos of Yamamoto were shown. In this episode, set much later in the war
than in real life, the Black Sheep, a Marine Corsair squadron, joins an army
squadron of P-51 Mustangs. The Marines intercepted fighter cover while the army
shot down Yamamoto.
In Shūe Matsubayashi's 1981 film Rengō kantai (lit.
"Combined Fleet", later released in the United States as The Imperial
Navy), Yamamoto was portrayed by Keiju Kobayashi.
In the 1993 OVA series Konpeki no Kantai (lit. Deep Blue
Fleet), instead of dying in the plane crash, Yamamoto blacks out and suddenly
wakes up as his younger self, Isoroku Takano, after the Battle of Tsushima in
1905. His memory from the original timeline intact, Yamamoto uses his knowledge
of the future to help Japan become a stronger military power, eventually
launching a coup d'état against Hideki Tōjō's government. In the subsequent
Pacific War, Japan's technologically advanced navy decisively defeats the
United States, and grants all of the former European and American colonies in
Asia full independence. Later on, Yamamoto convinces Japan to join forces with
the United States and Britain to defeat Nazi Germany.
In Neal Stephenson's 1999 book Cryptonomicon, Yamamoto's
final moments are depicted, with him realizing that Japan's naval codes have
been broken and that he must inform headquarters.
In the 2001 film Pearl Harbor, Yamamoto was portrayed by
Oscar-nominated Japanese-born American actor Mako Iwamatsu. Like Tora! Tora!
Tora!, this film also features a version of the sleeping giant quote.
In the 2004 anime series Zipang, Yamamoto (voiced by Bunmei
Tobayama) works to develop the uneasy partnership with the crew of the JMSDF
Mirai, which has been transported back sixty years through time to the year
1942.
In the Axis of Time trilogy by author John Birmingham, after
a naval task force from the year 2021 is accidentally transported back through
time to 1942, Yamamoto assumes a leadership role in the dramatic alteration of
Japan's war strategy.
In The West Wing episode "We Killed Yamamoto", the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff uses the assassination of Yamamoto to
advocate for another assassination.
In Douglas Niles' 2007 book MacArthur's War: A Novel of the
Invasion of Japan (written with Michael Dobson), which focuses on General
Douglas MacArthur and an alternate history of the Pacific War (following a
considerably different outcome of the Battle of Midway), Yamamoto is portrayed
sympathetically, with much of the action in the Japanese government seen
through his eyes, though he could not change the major decisions of Japan in
World War II.
In Toei's 2011 war film Rengō Kantai Shirei Chōkan: Yamamoto
Isoroku (Blu-Ray titles:- English "The Admiral"; German "Der
Admiral"), Yamamoto was portrayed by Kōji Yakusho. The film portrays his
career from Pearl Harbor to his death in Operation Vengeance
In Robert Conroy's 2011 book Rising Sun, Yamamoto directs
the IJN to launch a series of attacks on the American West Coast, in the hope
the United States can be convinced to sue for peace and securing Japan's place
as a world power; but cannot escape his lingering fear the war will ultimately
doom Japan.
In the 2019 motion picture Midway, Yamamoto is portrayed by
Etsushi Toyokawa.
Sources
Agawa, Hiroyuki; Bester, John (trans.). The Reluctant
Admiral. New York: Kodansha, 1979. A definitive biography of Yamamoto in
English. This book explains much of the political structure and events within
Japan that led to the war.
Coetzee, Daniel; Eysturlid, Lee W. (2013). Philosophers of
War: The Evolution of History's Greatest Military Thinkers [2 Volumes]: The
Evolution of History's Greatest Military Thinkers. ABC-CLIO.
Davis, Donald A. Lightning Strike: The Secret Mission to
Kill Admiral Yamamoto and Avenge Pearl Harbor. New York: St. Martin's Press,
2005.
Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese
Navy, 1941–1945. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1978.
Evans, David C. and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics,
and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy 1887–1941. Annapolis, Maryland:
Naval Institute Press, 1997.
Glines, Carroll V. Attack on Yamamoto (1st edition). New
York: Crown, 1990. Glines documents both the mission to shoot down Yamamoto and
the subsequent controversies with thorough research, including personal
interviews with all surviving participants and researchers who examined the
crash site.
Lundstrom, John B. The First Team: Pacific Naval Air Combat
from Pearl Harbor to Midway. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1984.
Miller, Edward S. War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to
Defeat Japan, 1897–1945. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1991.
Peattie, Mark R. Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air
Power, 1909–1941. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2002.
Prados, John. Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of
American Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II. Annapolis,
Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2001.
Prange, Gordon. At Dawn We Slept. New York: Penguin Books,
1982.
Ugaki, Matome; Chihaya, Masataka (trans.). Fading Victory:
The Diary of Admiral Matome Ugaki, 1941–45. Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1991. Provides a high-level view of the war from the Japanese
side, from the diaries of Yamamoto's Chief of Staff, Admiral Matome Ugaki.
Provides evidence of the intentions of the imperial military establishment to
seize Hawaii and to operate against Britain's Royal Navy in the Indian Ocean.
Translated by Masataka Chihaya, this edition contains extensive clarifying
notes from the U.S. editors derived from U.S. military histories.
Parillo, Mark (2006). "The United States in the
Pacific". In Higham, Robin; Harris, Stephen (eds.). Why Air Forces Fail:
the Anatomy of Defeat. The University Press of Kentucky.
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| Isoroku Yamamoto. | |
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| Photo of damage to Japanese armored cruiser Nisshin after one of its guns burst during the Battle of Tsushima in May 1905. The explosion injured future Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. |
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| Isoroku Yamamoto, future commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet with his lifelong friend Teikichi Hori as young officers of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Yamamoto holds the rank of Lieutenant-commander in this image. Dating it between 1915-1919. |
