Aerial Combat Tactics

by Colonel Raymond F. Toliver, U.S. Air Force (Retired)

It has been said that aerial combat is the only remaining glamorous and chivalrous activity in warfare. Of course, this is not exactly true, but aerial combat does continue to captivate the imagination, perhaps to an extent far beyond its real importance. Air superiority is of para-mount importance in warfare, but actual air-to-air combat is only one of the factors involved in gaining and maintaining aerial superiority.

This work, however, deals with aerial combat tactics, and not with the multitude of other factors involved in air superiority. Therefore, with this nod of recognition to those “other factors,” we’ll push them over to the side and start the “bounce” on the target we are about to engage.

The nearest approximation to aerial combat is, in my opinion, auto racing. Flying the fighter airplane can be compared to driving the high-speed racer. Getting the fighter off the ground, around the pattern, and safely back to home plate, is about like driving the racer around the track at, say, 100 miles per hour. The similarity does not end there, however.

Add some more racers onto the track, and see who can get around first. Now you’ve added the element of competition, and it’s much like joining combat, like the so-called “dogfight” training. In an actual situation though, the similarity to auto racing ends, because the addition of missiles, machine guns, and the threat of mid-air collision makes the final outcome much more permanent and fearsome. The glamour of flying fighters quickly dissipates when a pilot sees an enemy missile or tracers whistling by within inches. “Sonofabitch! That guy’s shooting at me. A guy can get hurt in this game!” From that point in time, a fighter pilot forgets the glamour, and suddenly realizes how poorly trained he really is to cope with such a situation. Once he survives this first encounter, the pilot takes immediate interest in air tactics, becoming a highly motivated student of the art. His life is at stake and he knows it!

Going back to World War II, why should a pilot have waited to learn tactics until after he had been through his first combat? A number of factors created this situation, stemming from our World War I experiences, which were few, and only enough to convince our leaders that aerial combat was a dogfight, and that Americans, through our manifest destiny, I suppose, would always prevail. Furthermore, between the wars the United States developed the self-defending bomber—fast, agile and sturdy, so that, in their thinking, fighter-to-fighter combat was born, lived and died in World War I or shortly thereafter. General H. H. Arnold, our AAF leader in World War II, had been the proponent of the bomber between the wars.

It did not prove out that way in World War II, and it still has not worked out that way, even with the benefit of World War II, Korea, and Vietnam experiences. When enemy fighters show up, the bombers need fighters along to protect them.

But in 1941 through 1945 our pilots went to war with a lot of touch and go landings, a bit of formation flying, a smattering of air-to-ground gunnery, and a slight knowledge of the English “Vic” combat formation. The only other combat training was a small amount of “dogfighting.” That is defined as a rat race wherein you attempt to fly your airplane to a spot close behind your opponent, in his six o’clock position, and stay there. Of course, he tries the same thing and keeps you from accomplishing your goal.

There is nothing more terrifying than for a pilot to discover that an enemy fighter has gained the dominant position! Panic wells up—unjokingly referred to as a very high pucker factor—into your throat and before your very eyes. In fact, the reason we hear so little about it is that very few survived the ordeal.

The British, using their “Vic” of three airplanes system found that this formation degraded their maneuverability (although it increased their firepower) so they tried a three- and four-airplane in rail, echelon up or down formation. In this there was no one in a position to look behind tail-end Charlie, and the result was a very high mortality rate for anyone in that slot.

After much analysis, the RAF rather reluctantly followed the German lead, and switched to the “fluid-four” or “finger-four” flight, which had been developed during the Spanish Civil War. The finger-four is best illustrated if you hold your fingers of one hand out straight. The finger tips denote the relative positions of the fighter aircraft. The RAF taught this system to the U.S. Army Air Corps.

World War II had many versions of the “finger-four” or “fluid-four” attack system. The Germans, the Americans, the English and the Japanese all had varied applications. The Soviets were slow to adapt to it but after 1943 they, too, had recognized the advantage therein, and the Luftwaffe then had to work much harder for their kills.

When, in 1939 and 1940, against English Spitfire and Hurricane opposition, the Germans realized that they could not continue to accept the losses they were experiencing, Galland and Mölders put their thinking processes to work. The Me 109 (Bf 109) was faster and could climb faster, too, yet the Spitfires were chewing them up. So the Luftwaffe went to hit and run tactics, using the “finger-four” formations to perfection. This reversed the loss rate … but the Battle of Britain was over, and on 21 June 1941, they were all on the Eastern Front taking on another enemy.

Against the Soviets, the Luftwaffe pilots applied all the knowledge and experience they had gained on the Western Front. The “finger-four” worked beautifully, and hundreds of MiGs, Yaks and Ilyushins splattered to the ground. The Soviet “Stormovik” proved to be the hardest nut to crack. Flying below 3,000 feet, and sometimes just above the ground, protected by thick armor plate, the Il-2 came near being the enigma of the Luftwaffe. However, it wasn’t long before the German pilots discovered that the best tactic was to get close behind and below the Il-2, and shoot up the oil cooling radiator. Once this was hit, the Il-2 was a cripple that would soon have to land, usually with a dead engine. The wooden propeller of the Il-2 was also vulnerable, but the machine gained the reputation of being a flying tank.

Against the Japanese, after Pearl Harbor, we Americans experienced the Me 109/Spitfire dilemma, as the English and Germans had. Our P-40s were faster but less maneuverable, while the Zeros were slower but very maneuverable. We suffered some losses before General Claire Chennault, the U.S. Army Air Corps champion of fighter tactics between the wars (and later head of the original Flying Tigers) decided that hit and run was the only answer to the Zero. This tactic changed the air battle around. The Japanese began to lose Zeros at an alarming rate and this never stopped until the war’s end in 1945.

A fairly accurate guesstimate, as good as anyone else’s anyway, is that about eighty per cent of the pilots/aircraft shot down in World War II aerial combat, never saw their conqueror. It was the same in World War I, in Korea, and no doubt applied in Vietnam. Therefore we can safely assume that the best combat tactic is to pussyfoot unseen upon your enemy, establish yourself and your gun platform in the correct place behind your quarry, and fire away at the target before he sees you and takes evasive action.

There are two points to remember, however. Be sure to shoot straight and hit him, because at the precise moment of firing, your opponent will suddenly realize you’re there, and you’ll have a real tiger by the tail beginning then! The other thing to remember is that your enemy will have had a buddy someplace nearby, and if you quickly check behind you at the six o’clock position, you’ll probably find him closing rapidly. So you have only a split second to fire and break away. This is where six .50-caliber guns with their inherit rapid rates of fire, come in handy.

That takes care of the eighty per cent (or plus) of aerial kills. It’s the other twenty per cent that come harder. Factors which influence decisions in these cases include the sun position, altitude, turning ability, dive speeds and differential excess power factors (you must know the areas in the flight envelope of your fighter wherein you have advantages in turn or speed over your opponent, and how much, etc.). Also, you must consider whether you want to get into a turning dogfight or not, and if you do, can you hack a one-on-one fight? You’ll always lose your wingman after the initial bounce and turn, so be prepared to go it alone until you get released by your opponent, and can get back to the stipulated rendezvous point. Most of the turning fights in World War II ended up as draws, and those that didn’t often ended up with the superior pilot being shot down … he was winning against one enemy airplane, but the enemy’s buddy was there, too, and forgotten for just a moment.

Let me give you an example: Günther Rall, the third-ranking ace of World War II (275 aerial victories), was probably the best in a dogfight of all German fighter aces. He had one major deficiency, though, which allowed Erich Hartmann (352 victories) and Gerhard Barkhorn (301 victories) to surpass him in total kills. Rall was a great competitor and honestly believed he was the world’s greatest fighter pilot. He would have proven that a fact had he not spent so much time in hospitals after being seriously wounded on three of the many times he was shot down. Although he was in the war for over five years, he was only able to fly for about two years, due to a broken back and other wounds. The risk of exposure to injury, death, or just being shot down is probably ten to fifty times higher in a dogfight than it is in a high-speed one-pass hit and run bounce.

In conclusion, only a pilot who has been in aerial combat knows that terrible feeling of panic when he suddenly realizes that his enemy has gained the dominant position, and has him boresighted. It is a panic which jumbles the thinking processes completely, and he who can regain control will, most likely, do the right thing and live to fight another day.

 

The Thach Weave.

Tactical formations for Japanese Navy fighters.

Rule number five in Dicta Boelcke, a set of rules laid down by First World War flying ace Oswald Boelcke, says that “In any form of attack it is essential to assail your enemy from behind.” In other words, sneak up behind your opponent and blow him out of the sky before he has a chance to react.

Fighter plane contrails mark the sky over Task Force 58, during the "Great Marianas Turkey Shoot" phase of the battle, 19 June 1944. Photographed from on board USS Birmingham (CL-62). (Battle of the Philippine Sea, June 1944.)

German propaganda photo purporting to show a Spitfire I flying very close to a Dornier 17Z. The inboard position of the upper wing roundels on the Spitfire strongly suggests this was a repainted captured Spitfire or a photo-reconnaissance model, at least one of which was captured in France.

Pattern of condensation trails left by British and German aircraft after a dogfight during the Battle of Britain, 18 September 1940.

A still from camera gun film shows tracer ammunition from a Supermarine Spitfire Mark I of No. 609 Squadron RAF, flown by Flight Lieutenant J. H. G. McArthur, hitting a Heinkel He 111 on its starboard quarter. These aircraft were part of a large formation from KG 53 and KG 55 which attacked the Bristol Aeroplane Company's works at Filton, Bristol, just before midday on 25 September 1940. No. 609 Squadron were based at Middle Wallop, Hampshire.

A Navy Hellcat toting a drop tank shoots down a Mitsubishi A6M Zero. The term “dogfight” was first used in World War I. In the century plus since airplanes first took to the skies to do combat, the term “dissimilar aircraft maneuvering” or DACM, “hassling,” “furball” and “three-dimensional knife fight” have all been used to define a battle between two or more flying machines.

U.S. Army Air Force Curtiss P-40F Warhawk fighters on a training flight out of Moore Field, near Mission, Texas, in 1943. The lead aircraft in a formation of P-40s is peeling off for an "attack" in a practice flight at the Army Air Forces advanced flying school. Selected aviation cadets were given transition training in these fighter planes before receiving their pilot's wings.

A B-25 Mitchell bomber being pursued by an A6M3 Zero, in a mock simulation of combat during the 2012 Arctic Thunder Air Show, at Elmendorf Air Force Base, 30 July 2012.

This is a picture tracking bullet holes on Allied planes that encountered German anti-aircraft fire in World War II. At first, the military wanted to reinforce those areas, because obviously that's where the ground crews observed the most damage on returning planes. Until Hungarian-born Jewish mathematician Abraham Wald pointed out that this was the damage on the planes that made it home, and the Allies should armor the areas where there are no dots at all, because those are the places where the planes won't survive when hit. This phenomenon is called survivorship bias, a logic error where you focus on things that survived when you should really be looking at things that didn't.

Tactical formations for Japanese Navy fighters.

Finger-four squadron formation.

Tactical formations for Japanese Navy fighters.

The basic Thach Weave, executed by two wingmen. To defeat the Thach weave, the Japanese pilots had to avoid the temptation of chasing the enemy into the weave and getting shot by the wingman. Instead, they had to maneuver to turn to shoot instead at the American wingman or twist away to snipe at the enemy on the sides or turn so that they can shoot at the Americans as they crisscrossed with each other. They had to have tremendous situational awareness and not be target fixated.

A P-47 Thunderbolt in combat with a German Me 110.

Lt. Comdr "Jimmy" John S. Thach. Thach had developed a beam weave tactic before the Pearl Harbor raid when he read USN Intelligence reports on the Zero, developing the tactic months before American fighter pilots encountered the Zero. It was a beam defensive tactic. It involved two fighter planes doing a weave loop and enabling their team mate to shoot at the pursuing enemy (if the enemy unwisely pursued).

Japanese fighter tactics against B-29s.

Deflection table.

Vic squadron formation.