The German XIV SS Corps in November-December 1944

Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski at a map briefing.

by Von Dem Bach-Zelewski

This is the complete text of Manuscript #MS B-252 obtained from the National Archives, Washington, D.C.

On 8 November while I was on leave I was ordered to report to Heinrich Himmler, in his special train in the Black Forest, in order to take over a new corps which was about to be activated. On 10 November I presented myself in the special train, which was at Triberg in a railway tunnel. Himmler had been appointed commander in chief of the Army Group Upper Rhine which was about to be constituted.

Himmler explained to me, with the help of a situation map, the catastrophic situation of our collapsed front in Alsace-Lorraine.

I was ordered to build up, as the XIV. SS Corps, a new defensive front in the German West Wall, on the eastern bank of the Rhine.

The right corps limit ran past and included Graben-Bruchsal. I was to establish contact with the army of General der Panzertruppen Balck. On account of the retreating movement of the front which was still continuing, the point of main effort in building up the new defensive front, on my right wing, was in the bridgehead of Karlsruhe–Maximiliansau–Maxau, situated north of the West Wall and in the development of Karlsruhe as a strongpoint under a generalleutnant, whose name I cannot remember, as commanding officer.

As left corps limit the Leopold Canal, inclusive, was decided on. My left neighbor, linking up with the Swiss frontier was the XVIII. SS Corps, to be newly organized by Waffen-SS Generalmajor Reinefarth.

The smaller bridgeheads of Drusenheim, Gerstheim and Rhinau, to the west of the Rhine, which were still held by isolated units of company strength reinforced by “Volkssturm” were to be abandoned even on small pressure by the enemy; the larger bridgehead in the harbor area of Strassbourg manned by one replacement training battalion of the army from Stuttgart was to be held. Adolf Hitler had reserved for himself the right to authorize blowing up of the large bridges Strassbourg-Kehl.

In the new corps area at first only, the following troops were on hand: four replacement training battalions of the Army in the area Kehl–Oberkirch, under the command of Generalleutnant Seeger; Recruiting Area Headquarters Stuttgart; a fortress construction engineer battalion, and an anti-aircraft artillery battalion in the Maximilian-sau–Maxau bridgehead. I was to build up the rest of the front by committing the local “Volkssturm” and collect all the split-up parts of the army and its rear formations which were streaming back over the Rhine. At the end of November the remnants of the 9th Volksgrenadier Division, destroyed by the Americans at Zabern were also transferred to the area of Baden-Baden for reconstitution, and were subordinated to the XIV. SS Corps. By the energetic combing out of all villages for [cut-off] units, and individual stragglers, the reorganization of battalions and regiments with a strength of about 12,000 men was gradually achieved.

The corps command post was established at Baden-Baden, advance corps command posts prepared at Leibersdung, Memprechtshofen and Kehl.

The corps headquarters staff consisted mainly of the personnel of the former operational staff of the chief of the anti-partisan formations. Police Colonel Goltz became Chief of General Staff.

Between the end of November and the beginning of December 1944 the troops of the XIV. SS Corps were organized as follows:

Right Sector

Improvised divisional staff, division commander Colonel of the Army von Witzleben, bearer of the Knight’s Cross, command post at Malsch, advance command post at Hügelsheim.

Regimental staff of the Positional Regiment No. 1 under a Lieutenant Colonel of the Army at Welsch. Two “Volkssturm” battalions at Graben and Leopoldshafen, which achieved a certain military coherence through having skeleton of non-commissioned officers and enlisted men from permanent West Wall personnel. The fortress construction engineer battalion in the Maximiliansau–Maxau bridgehead was placed under Regiment No. 1 as 3rd Battalion, also the Maxau anti-aircraft artillery battalion. The combat commander of Karlsruhe was subordinated directly to the XIV. SS Corps.

Positional Regiment No. 2, regimental command post in the barracks of Rastatt, regimental commander a major of the Army. Subordinated to it was one replacement training battalion of the Army and a battalion composed of the supernumerary supply train members of the 9th Volksgrenadier Division. As 3rd Battalion the permanent “Volkssturm” with its post at Elchesheim. The only heavy armament was an improvised battery with captured Russian guns, and a 2-cm anti-aircraft battery dependent on cooperation with the Regiment No. 2.

Left Sector

Division Generalleutnant Seeger—previously staff of the training division at Stuttgart—divisional command post at Oberkirch.

The right regiment as Regiment No. 3 the SS Police Regiment No. 2 with two battalions, reinforced by one battalion of Customs Frontier Guard as 3rd Battalion. The regimental command post was at Memprechtshofen, one company was sent forward to Drusenheim to man the bridgehead. Police Regiment No. 2 had a heavy armament company of its own, and in addition, I placed an improvised anti-tank company under it. An artillery battalion with captured Russian guns was being constituted and trained in the regimental sector.

Positional Regiment No. 4 was in the Kehl sector, consisting of four replacement training battalions of the Recruiting Area Headquarters Stuttgart, regimental commander a particularly experienced major of the Army, regimental command post at Kehl. One battalion respectively at Kehl, Altenheim, Aünheim and as bridgehead unit in the harbor of Strassbourg. Four anti-tank guns in position on the bridges of Strassbourg, the bridges prepared for blasting and guarded by an engineer unit.

Positional Regiment No. 5 consisting of the Police School of Ettlingen and of two “Volkssturm” battalions, the regimental commander was the commandant of the police school, a lieutenant colonel of the police. The regimental command post was at Lahr, two bridgeheads in company strength at Gerstheim and Rhinau respectively.

In the area of Oberkirch–Kehl one improvised artillery battalion and two heavy railway guns in position subordinated directly to Division Seeger.

The combat commander of Offenburg, a brigadier general of the Army, was subordinated directly to the XIV. SS Corps.

Enemy pressure against the bridgehead of Strassbourg by continuous artillery fire and attacks by French infantry supported by tanks was very strong from the beginning. Our casualties, in the terrain which offered no cover and was overlooked by the enemy, were so considerable that the danger arose that a stronger attack by the enemy would allow the bridges to be captured intact.

On my urgent request to be allowed either to widen the bridgehead by way of attack or to evacuate it, I was finally authorized to evacuate and blast the bridges.

The blasting of the bridges was accomplished without hindrance, the withdrawal of our infantry only in part as the enemy pressed forward energetically after the blasting detonations. Half of our infantry were able to cross in assault boats, the other half was taken prisoner.

In the course of further expansion by the enemy from Strassbourg to the north and south, the small bridgeheads at Drusenheim, Gerstheim and Rhinau were also given up on weak pressure from the enemy, and the bridges were blasted as had been ordered.

The French sentries and single American tanks guarding the west bank of the Rhine being very sure of victory and therefore rather careless, rendered possible the maintenance of our stationary patrols on the western bank of the Rhine during the whole period in the wooded and marshy terrain between the enemy sentries.

Distant reconnaissance patrols were sent forward every night far into the enemy’s rear, some of them stayed out for several days and advanced as far as Hagenau.

Therefore, our picture of the enemy’s situation, including American tank movements was complete, which fact was to be of inestimable service to me during our own attack in January 1945. On the other hand, the information available to the Commander-in-Chief Upper Rhine Army Group, was miserable and my patrol activity was really its only source. The reason for this was that during the precipitate withdrawal of the German troops from Alsace, the German High Command omitted leaving behind any experienced net of agents. Subsequent improvisations could not be successful as the psychological effect of the German reverse did not leave the Alsatian population prepared to cooperate in favor of the Germans.

Enemy patrol activity east of the Rhine could not be ascertained. From this and from the fact that there was no evidence anywhere of enemy work for the construction of ferries or bridges it was clearly to be concluded that the enemy had no intention of attacking in my sector.

Therefore, the guarding of our bank of the river could safely be left more and more to the “Volkssturm”; the military units on the other hand, could be carefully trained and equipped.

When the German offensive in the Ardennes had come to a standstill, Adolf Hitler called a meeting, for 28 December 1944 at the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief West of the Army, with commanders and commanding generals intended to lead a new attack.

Field Marshal von Rundstedt announced the assembled generals to Adolf Hitler, whereupon the latter began to speak. He at once confessed frankly that the offensive in the Ardennes had failed. Hitler attributed this failure of the German offensive not to enemy air supremacy, but above all to German mistakes. In very sharp and plain words he exposed the alleged German mistakes. Hitler saw the principle reason of our coming to a standstill in the over-motorization of the German formations. This over-motorization had crowded everything together on the few roads, an advance in developed formation and hopelessly obstructed the roads. Only because of this could the enemy air force have such a decisive effect. In practice what had happened, was that the infantry divisions which simply went on marching beside the roads when these were obstructed, advanced more quickly than the fully mechanized formations.

From the failure of the offensive, Hitler drew the following operational decision:

The conditions necessary to continue the western offensive on a large scale existed no more, especially as the Russian offensive might begin at any moment. But it would be a great mistake to change over now to rigid defense and thereby give full liberty of action to the Western Powers. In this case the western enemy would concentrate his main forces against the Ruhr District. In order to divert and split up these enemy forces, but also because a German defensive would hold down the same amount of our forces as attack, if not more, the attacks were to be continued, although with limited objectives.

For the first days of January, Hitler ordered, as the first such limited attack, that the Blaskowitz Army should start attacking from the area of Weissenburg in a west-southwesterly direction towards Wörth.

A few days after the beginning of the attack the XIV. SS Corps should form a bridgehead north of Strassbourg in order to draw the enemy reserves and by that to facilitate the advance of the Blaskowitz Army.

Under favorable circumstances the bridgehead of the XIV. SS Corps should aim at establishing contact with the Blaskowitz Army west of the forest of Hagenau.

After the issue of these orders by Hitler, Field Marshal von Rundstedt thanked him for his hard but just criticism and promised in the name of all generals present to take Hitler’s instructions to heart and to do his utmost in the coming battles.

Two days before, the XIV. SS Corps received orders to attack and form the bridgehead on 5 January 1945. Choice of the terrain of attack and the time left to me. Only the following were given to me in addition by the Army Group: an assault gun battalion, an anti-tank battalion, and material for the construction of one heavy and two light ferries. I had to organize the other attack groups from my improvised formations, including the 9th Volksgrenadier Division which had only been reconstituted up to forty per cent.

Considering the strained overall situation, however, the equipment of my unit with weapons, ammunition, motor vehicles and also with motor fuel could still be designated as being satisfactory. This had been achieved less by regular supply on the part of the Army Group than by meticulously picking up of all irregular reserves in the form of isolated troops and supply formations from the collapsed Alsace-Lorraine front, who had quartered independently in my sector.

My work of building up was very much facilitated in this case by the endeavors, which had become more and more pronounced during the whole war, of all formations to hoard their own “black” material and even personnel reserves, as they could rely less and less on the legal means of supply; in the end it was only success that counted and after a success nobody asked how the unit had been able to reorganize itself again so quickly for action. The formations concerned seldom ventured to complain of a confiscation as they were convinced themselves of the illegality of their “black” stocks.

As an assembly area, the XIV. SS Corps decided on the region between Freistett and Lichtenau. The bridgehead was to be in the area of Drusenheim, Offendorf and Gambsheim. I had chosen this region because the bank of the Rhine on this side was wooded and thus, by providing camouflage for the assembly position and above all for the construction of ferries, offered the possibility of surprise even in face of the strong enemy air reconnaissance; the western bank of the Rhine was especially favorable for the first critical days in the creation of the bridgehead, because here the wooded area was, in addition, traversed by a number of creeks to the Rhine. This seemed to me the removal of any danger of the bridgehead being destroyed by the enemy tank attack which was to be expected immediately, before a sufficient number of armor-piercing weapons had crossed. The two ferries were my most vulnerable spots in face of the enemy air superiority. Therefore, in the first few days, only the hours of darkness and in the early morning mist it would be suitable to operate the ferries.

For reasons of security I had the rumor spread among the population by alleged quartering of officers, that the “Volkssturm” would soon be relieved by GHQ troops in the line of concrete fortifications. The ferry construction took place only at night, the assembly areas were not occupied until the last night.

The corps command post was transferred forward to Memprechtshofen, the command post of the 9th Volksgrenadier Division to Scherzheim.

A special combat team was formed under the command of Captain of Armored Troops von Lüttichau, and an infantry battalion and an anti-tank battalion were subordinated to him in addition to his assault gun battalion. This combat team particularly was to bear the main weight of all attacks. The assembled two improvised infantry regiments were to be committed, according to their fighting qualities, only for the defense of the bridgehead.

The attack took place in the earliest morning twilight. The infantry battalion von Lüttichau and an infantry regiment crossed over in assault boats. After firing a few shots the enemy sentries retired immediately into the nearest villages and alerted the single American tanks standing there. These at once started counterattacking in small groups but they soon stuck fast among the mass of water-filled ditches. As we succeeded before it became real light, in ferrying across an 8.8-cm anti-aircraft artillery battalion and an anti-tank company, the small bridgehead was secured for the first twenty-four hours.

Simultaneously, with this main attack, a combat team composed only of an improvised infantry regiment and “Volkssturm” without heavy weapons under Colonel von Witzleben had, in order to create a diversion, started an attack in assault boats from the area of Hügelsheim against Fort Louis and Neuhausel. I had given Colonel von Witzleben a free hand to evacuate the enemy bank again immediately in case the enemy should counterattack. Surprisingly enough, the troops in Beinheim, Neuhausel, Fort Louis and Stattmatten, consisting only of French infantry, evacuated these places after a short engagement giving the impression that these villages in the outpost area of the Maginot Line had been occupied only by French rebels.

I ordered Colonel von Witzleben to prepare the occupied localities for defense, to resist weaker attacks and to send reconnaissance patrols forward towards the Maginot Line.

In the main bridgehead the combat team of von Lüttichau succeeded within the first five days in occupying the villages of Herrlisheim, Ottendorf and Gambsheim against strong enemy resistance and thereby decisively enlarged the bridgehead.

In the next few days the villages did change hands again many times, as our infantry’s morale could not stand up to the American tank attacks. Our infantry losses were considerable, especially in prisoners, but von Lüttichau’s combat team always succeeded in recapturing the villages again.

The combat team took several hundred prisoners and was able to report in the first few days the disabling of twenty-two enemy tanks; altogether, during the first three weeks, the disabling of forty-eight enemy tanks.

As the enemy resistance in this main bridgehead was obviously stiffening, reconnaissance by the northern combat team of von Witzleben showed that there the American forces were only just beginning in the occupation of the Maginot Line and the relief of the French forces. I proposed in higher headquarters that we should take the fortifications of the Maginot Line west of Fort Louis, by bringing up a strong combat formation and thus gain the Maxau–Maximilian­sau–Lauterbourg–Seltz–Drusenheim road as a supply route on the western bank, to relieve the inadequacy of the ferrying operations.

My proposal was accepted, and the 10th Parachute Division was added to the XIV. SS Corps.

The newly activated 10th Parachute Division, under the command of Generalmajor Schulz, was inspired with an offensive spirit which was seldom still to be found in the year of 1944.

Its aggressive spirit was ample compensation for its lack of combat experience. With hard fighting, the villages of Roppenheim, Röschwoog, Aünheim and Dalhunden were taken, and the Maginot Line was thus pierced.

These successes induced the higher command to put the SS armored division “Frundsberg” under the command of SS-Brigadeführer Harmel into the bridgehead of Herrlisheim–Gambsheim, by the road now cleared from Lauterbourg via Seltz, then on the Rhine dam east of Drusenheim.

While the SS panzer division prepared for the attack against Bischwiller, Kurtzenhausen und Weyersheim, the 10th Parachute Division took Forstfeld, Kauffenheim, Leutenheim and Soufflenheim in a speeding advance, took several hundred American prisoners, among them a battalion staff and an American colonel and finally in combined action with the 9th Volksgrenadier Division, captured the strong point Drusenheim, stubbornly defended by American tanks, in house-to-house fighting at night.

This was the situation when I was ordered to the east with my corps headquarters staff, to take over the X. SS Corps in Pomerania.

General der Panzertruppen Decker took over my formation on the Upper Rhine. I was finally relieved by him on 25 January 1945.

Obergruppenführer der Waffen-SS und General der Polizei Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, 1943. In December 1944 he became commander of the XIV SS Corps in the Baden-Baden region and between 26 January and 10 February 1945 of the X SS Corps in Pomerania, where his unit was annihilated after less than two weeks. He then commanded from 17 February 1945, the Oder Corps under Army Group Vistula. After the war in Europe ended, Bach-Zelewski went into hiding and tried to leave the country. US military police arrested him on 1 August 1945.

 

General der Panzertruppen Hermann Balck, 1943. In September 1944 Balck was transferred from 4th Panzer Army in Poland to the Western Front to command Army Group G in relief of General Johannes Blaskowitz in the Alsace region of France. Balck was unable to stop the Allied advance under General George S. Patton, and in late December he was relieved of command of Army Group G and placed in the officer reserve pool. By the intervention of General Heinz Guderian he was transferred to command the reconstituted 6th Army in Hungary, which also had operational control of two Hungarian armies. Balck's unit surrendered to the U.S. XX Corps in Austria on 8 May 1945.

General der Panzertruppe Karl Decker. Decker was appointed commander of the XXXIX Panzer Corps that was attached to the 3rd Panzer Army and promoted to General der Panzertruppe on 1 January 1945. After his unit was relocated to the Western Front, his corps fought the Americans at Uelzen and in the Alsace. Here the 5th Panzer Army was subordinated to Army Group B. Decker committed suicide on 21 April 1945 after the defeat and encirclement of the Army Group in the Ruhr Pocket in April.

SS-Gruppenführer Heinz Reinefarth. In November 1944, Reinefarth was given command over the XIV SS Corps on the Upper-Rhine and in December 1944 over the XVIII SS Corps in the central Oder river area. Between January and March 1945, he commanded the defence of "Festung Küstrin" (Kostrzyn nad Odrą). He declined to defend it to the last man and Hitler found fault with the way he withdrew his troops. Himmler, acting on Hitler's order, had Reinefarth arrested at the end of March 1945. Later he was sentenced to death by a military court. However, the sentence was not carried out, and he continued to command those of his troops that managed to leave the fortress. He moved his troops to the west and surrendered to the British.

The Canadian Army in the Normandy Assault

Canadian troops disembark from landing craft in an orderly manner onto the beachhead in Normandy.

by C. P. Stacey

The Normandy landings of June 1944 were one of the most decisive operations of the Second World War and, indeed, one of the most significant in modern military history. The invasion of Northwest Europe marked the beginning of the final phase of the war with Germany and led, less than a year later, to the final German collapse. Canadian forces played an important part in the operation, which was tremendously complicated and on a vast scale.

Development of the Plan

In the summer of 1940 British forces were expelled from the continent of Europe, and Britain and the Commonwealth were thrown back on the defensive. The entry of the United States into the war late in 1941 made it possible to accelerate planning for a return to the continent, and American strategists were anxious to invade Northwest Europe at the earliest possible date. During 1942, however, neither trained divisions nor landing craft were available in sufficient numbers to launch such an operation successfully, even though hard-pressed Russia was urgently demanding a “Second Front” in the west. Instead, available forces were diverted to North Africa where victory was achieved in 1943.

At the Casablanca Conference in January 1943 the decision was taken that the build-up of men and material for an assault upon Northwest Europe should be resumed. Lieutenant-General F. E. Morgan, a British officer, was appointed “Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (Designate)” in March, and under him an Anglo-American planning staff began work on a broad operational plan for the great invasion. The target date for the operation was 1 May 1944.

The first task facing the COSSAC planners was the selection of the area to be assaulted. Command of the sea enabled the Allies to strike almost anywhere, but short-range fighter aircraft based on England could maintain command of the air only over the enemy-held coastal sector between Flushing and Cherbourg. Study of the beaches on this coast soon narrowed the choice to two main areas: the Pas de Calais (Strait of Dover) and that from Caen to Cherbourg. Although direct assault on the Cotentin peninsula would bring the Allies the valuable port of Cherbourg, this area lacked suitable airfields and might become a dead end since the enemy could hold the neck of the peninsula with relatively light forces. The Pas de Calais offered a sea crossing of only 20 miles, good beaches, a quick turn-around for shipping and optimum air support; here, however, the German defenses were at their most formidable. This left only the Bay of the Seine, where defenses were light and the beaches of high capacity and sheltered from the prevailing winds. Its distance from the south of England would make air support less easy but the terrain, especially southeast of Caen, was suitable for airfield development. Therefore the Caen area was selected for the initial assault, the intention being to expand the foothold into a “lodgment area” to include Cherbourg and the Brittany ports.

It had long been believed that the immediate capture of a major port was essential to the success of an invasion operation; but the Dieppe raid had shown how difficult such capture was likely to be, and experience in the assault on Sicily had encouraged Allied planners to rely on the possibility of maintaining an invasion force over open beaches. In the English Channel, however, it is always necessary to count on the possibility of bad weather; and with this in view General Morgan reported that in the absence of a major port it would be necessary to improvise sheltered water somehow. He recommended that two artificial ports be made by sinking blockships. This was the origin of the famous “Mulberry” harbor.

The availability of landing craft would limit the size of the assaulting force, and General Morgan had been told that he must plan on the basis of an assault by three divisions. He aimed to land these on a front of roughly 35 miles from Caen to Grandcamp, with three tank brigades and an extra infantry brigade following on the same day. A similar shortage of transport aircraft determined that only two-thirds of an airborne division (although two had been made available) could be dropped; its main object was to be the capture of Caen. Assuming the best possible weather conditions the fifth day after the assault would find nine Allied divisions, with a proportion of armor, in the bridgehead. It was hoped that by D-plus-14 about eighteen divisions would have been landed, Cherbourg captured and the bridgehead expanded some 60 miles inland from Caen. On this basis General Morgan completed an outline plan during July 1943, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved it at the Quebec Conference in August.

No Supreme Commander had yet been appointed; but in December 1943 General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the American officer who had been commanding the Allied forces in the Mediterranean, was named to this post. His ground commander for the assault phase was to be the Commander-in-Chief, 21st Army Group, General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery. Both these officers were convinced that under the COSSAC plan the initial assaulting forces were too weak and committed on too narrow a front. On his arrival in London the Supreme Commander approved changes suggested by General Montgomery; subsequently these were ratified by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. To enable more landing craft to be available from production, the target date was put back to 31 May; subsequently a simultaneous landing which had been planned for the south coast of France was postponed until August. This made it possible to increase the initial assault force to five divisions supported by two follow-up divisions pre-loaded on landing craft.

The front to be assaulted was widened. On the west, it now included the beaches beyond the Vire estuary on the Cotentin peninsula, behind which it was planned to drop two American airborne divisions to speed the capture of Cherbourg; eastward it was extended somewhat to facilitate the seizure of Caen and the vital airfields in its vicinity. A British airborne division was to be dropped here to seize the crossing over the river Orne. The D-Day objectives on the British flank included Caen and Bayeux; on the American side the plan was to penetrate to the vicinity of Carentan. Thereafter, as reported later by the Supreme Commander,

...our forces were to advance on Brittany with the object of capturing the ports southward to Nantes. Our next aim was to drive east on the line of the Loire in the general direction of Paris and north across the Seine, with the purpose of destroying as many as possible of the German forces in this area of the west.

The immediate purpose, however, and the one we are concerned with here, was the establishment of bridgeheads, connected into a continuous lodgment area, to accommodate follow-up troops. This initial assault phase was known by the code name NEPTUNE. The great liberation operation as a whole was called OVERLORD. General Eisenhower’s international headquarters, which absorbed the COSSAC organization, became known as SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force).

The Enemy Situation

Allied intelligence had been able to provide a picture of German dispositions in the west which proved, in the main, to be accurate. By 3 June enemy strength in the Low Countries and France had been increased to some sixty divisions. This included troops on the Biscay coast and the Riviera. All these formations were under the Commander-in-Chief West, Field Marshal von Rundstedt. Army Group “B,” commanded by Field Marshal Rommel, included the Fifteenth Army, covering the Pas de Calais, where most German strategists believed invasion would come, and the somewhat smaller Seventh Army in Normandy and Brittany. The divisions holding the beach defenses were not of high category and had limited transport. Thus German plans to defeat invasion in the north were chiefly built around seven panzer or panzergrenadier divisions which were held in reserve. The plans have usually been considered a compromise between the views of Rundstedt, who favored defense in depth supported by strong mobile reserves and those of Rommel, who believed that the place to defeat invasion was on the beaches and therefore favored placing the reserves close up to the coast.

Hitler’s “Atlantic Wall,” though he had ordered its construction in 1942, was still far from completion as 1944 opened. Attention had been directed mainly to the ports and the Pas de Calais. After Rommel’s Army Group “B” took over the coast early in the year the defenses of other areas began to be reinforced with underwater obstacles, mines and more concrete; but in June much still remained to be done. The garrison of the assault area was also somewhat reinforced; in mid-March a good German field division appeared in the American sector. One coastal division manned almost the whole of the beaches allotted for British and Canadian assault; however, one panzer division was actually in the Caen area and two others were within a few hours’ march.

The Final Preparations

Since the middle of 1943 the air assault by RAF Bomber Command and the U.S. Eighth Air Force against German war industry (particularly aircraft production) had been gaining momentum and, at the same time, decimating the enemy fighter force which tried to oppose this strategic bombing. About three months before D-Day the air forces also began to strike at the French and Belgian railways systems to reduce enemy mobility all over Northwest Europe. Somewhat later still attacks began on tunnels and bridges with the purpose of isolating the battlefield from the rest of France.

The Seine bridges were particularly heavily hit. Those over the Loire were, with a few exceptions, left alone until after D-Day. As the Seine bridges would have been equally important had the Allies landed in the Pas de Calais, these attacks did not give the plan away.

Attacks upon enemy airfields within a radius of 130 miles from the assault area began by D-minus-21, to force the removal of German fighters to more distant bases. In order to delude the enemy, however, only a part of the bombing effort was expended against the intended assault area; the Pas de Calais and other possible landing areas continued to receive attention.

These preliminary air operations had a vital effect upon the great Allied enterprise. To them must be attributed the almost total failure of the German Air Force either to attack the great pre-invasion concentrations of men and material in southern England or to offer opposition to the actual assault. “Our D-Day experience,” General Eisenhower wrote later in his report, “was to convince us that the carefully laid plans of the German Command to oppose OVERLORD with an efficient air force in great strength were completely frustrated by the strategic bombing operations. Without the overwhelming mastery of the air which we attained by that time our assault against the continent would have been a most hazardous, if not impossible undertaking.”

It was essential to mislead the Germans as to the time and place of the Allied attack. Elaborate security precautions, including the prohibition of travel out of Britain and event the denial to ambassadors of the use of uncensored diplomatic bags, were taken to prevent information reaching the enemy; and a cover plan was adopted to encourage him to think that the Allies were going to attack the Pas de Calais. As part of this, Canadian formations were moved into the Dover area. Arrangements were made for naval and air diversions in the Channel to give the same impression.

The administrative preparations required were enormous. It was planned to land more than 175,000 men and more than 20,000 vehicles and guns in the first two days; and the requirements of the invading force in ammunition, food and supplies of every sort would be great from the beginning and would increase steadily as more troops landed. Since every unit and every item had to have a place in some ship or craft, and such a place as would enable it to perform it assigned function on the other side, very detailed administrative orders were required. To protect the camps and the depots near the embarkation ports, special air precautions and a special deployment of anti-aircraft guns were necessary; however, as previously mentioned, the anticipated enemy air attacks did not come.

The Plan of Assault

The greatest lesson drawn from the Dieppe raid of 1942 had been the necessity of overwhelming fire support for any opposed landing on a fortified coast; and the 3rd Canadian Division, in a series of exercises with the Royal Navy, had helped to work out a “combined fire plan” suitable for the task. As used on D-Day, the plan was as follows. During the night before the assault, the RAF Bomber Command attacked the ten main coastal batteries that could fire on our ships. Immediately before the landings, the U.S. Eighth Air Force attacked the beach defenses. In each case, over one thousand aircraft were used. While the Eighth was attacking, medium, light and fighter-bombers were also in action. Naval gunfire began at dawn, the bombarding force including five battleships, two monitors, nineteen cruisers and numerous destroyers; naval rockets increased the storm just before the first troops touched down, and small craft gave close gunfire support. In addition, the Army made its own contribution; its self-propelled guns fired on enemy strongpoints from their tank landing craft.

Many special devices, and particularly special armored vehicles, had been developed to assist the assault. Notable among them were the AVREs (Assault Vehicles, Royal Engineers)—tanks mounting “petards” for hurling heavy demolition charges—and the “DD” or amphibious tanks, capable of swimming in from landing craft offshore. These two types of vehicles were to lead the assault, landing before the first infantry. A night landing had been discussed, but the Navy considered daylight essential to enable it to land the troops at the correct points and to increase the accuracy of the bombardment. The landing was therefore planned for soon after dawn. It was necessary that it should take place at a period of relatively low but rising tide, so that the beach obstacles would be exposed and the landing craft would not become stranded; and for the airborne operations during the night before the assault moonlight was desirable. The necessary combination of conditions would exist on 5 June and the two following days, and the 5th was accordingly designated D-Day.

D-Day: The Assault

As 5 June approached everything seemed ready. The Allied Expeditionary Force had thirty-seven divisions available—and others would move direct from the United States to France once ports had been captured. Under General Montgomery’s headquarters, the First U.S. Army was to assault on the right and the Second British Army on the left. The 5th U.S. Corps planned to use a regimental combat team of each of its two divisions on Omaha Beach, while the 7th U.S. Corps attacked Utah Beach with one division. In the British sector, the 30th Corps was on the right, with one division assaulting; on the left was the 1st Corps with two divisions. One of these was the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, on Juno Beach; though the First Canadian Army had been designated a “follow-up” formation, Canada would be represented in the first landing by this division, supported by the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade. On its right was the 50th (Northumbrian) Division, on Gold Beach, and on its left the 3rd British Division on Sword Beach. British Commandos and American Rangers were given subsidiary objectives along the coast. The 6th British Airborne Division had the airborne task on the eastern flank and the 82nd and 101st U.S. Airborne Divisions those in the west.

Everything was ready—except the weather. On 4 June the meteorological report was so discouraging that General Eisenhower decided to postpone the operation for twenty-four hours. Next day, although conditions were still very far from ideal, the meteorologists predicted a temporary improvement; and on this basis the Supreme Commander took the heavy responsibility of deciding that the operation would proceed on the morning of the 6th.

Operation NEPTUNE began shortly before midnight, when the RAF commenced to pound the coastal batteries. Soon after midnight the men of the three airborne divisions began to land in Normandy. All were much more widely scattered than had been planned, but were nevertheless able to carry out their essential tasks, protecting the flanks of the seaborne landings and spreading confusion among the enemy. On the British side the 6th Airborne Division (which included a Canadian battalion) seized bridges over the Orne and the nearby canal intact, captured a coastal battery and carried out demolitions to cover this flank. With the coming of daylight the great bombardment of the beach defenses began. Clouds forced the U.S. heavy bombers to do without direct observation, and their anxiety to avoid hitting the Allied landing craft resulted in many bombs coming down too far inland. The naval bombardment likewise scored direct hits on only a small proportion of the enemy positions. Yet this terrific pounding of the whole defense area had a powerful morale effect on the Germans, and there is no doubt that it went far to enable the Allied troops to breach the Atlantic Wall at a much lower cost in casualties than had been expected. At many points Allied units got ashore without coming under really heavy fire, although fierce fighting was required afterwards to reduce strongpoints which the bombardment had not destroyed.

The roughness of the sea somewhat upset the timetable. Some of the craft carrying the special armor were late, some of the DD tanks could not be launched, and the infantry themselves were delayed in landing. Yet in general the attack went well, and before the morning was far advanced the Allied troops were pushing inland, by-passing the strongpoints that still held out. Nevertheless, stubborn German resistance kept them from attaining their final D-Day objectives before evening at any point, except for a few Canadian tanks that reached them and then withdrew. The situation was worst in the Omaha area, where there were German field troops and a steep coast. For two days the Americans had to fight desperately to keep a foothold, and casualties here were three times what they were elsewhere. The Canadian division had 335 fatal casualties on D-Day, somewhat fewer than had been expected.

The Allies had achieved strategic and even tactical surprise; that is, not only had the German high command had no time to reinforce the threatened area, but even the units holding it had no warning until the Allies bombardment opened. However, the German reaction was rapid, even though there was delay in getting Hitler’s permission to move some of the reserve panzer divisions. A tank counterattack on D-Day, although beaten back, helped to prevent the 3rd British Division from getting Caen. The next morning the 50th Division took Bayeux, and the 3rd Canadian Division got its right brigade on to the final objective (the Caen-Bayeux road and railway)—the first brigade in the Second Army to do so; but the left brigade was struck by one of the reserve panzer divisions and driven back. The Germans regarded the Caen area from the beginning as the point of greatest danger and the pivot of their defense in Normandy. By throwing their reserves in piecemeal in that area as they came up, they temporarily stabilized the situation there; but they were never able to build up a striking force equal to delivering a large-scale counteroffensive and really threatening the Allied bridgehead. The movement of their reserves was most seriously hampered by the havoc which the air forces had wrought upon their communications, and by continuing air attacks; while the Allies, their sea communications protected by their navies and air forces, poured men and material into the bridgehead, hampered only by unseasonable bad weather. Above all, the Germans had been deceived into the belief that the main Allied attack was still to come—in the Pas de Calais; and there the Fifteenth Army, whose infantry divisions might have turned the scale in Normandy, sat idle while the British and American bridgehead was steadily built up.

Consolidation of the Bridgehead

The days following D-Day were spent in linking the various Allied footholds into a continuous and secure lodgment area. With good naval and air support, the hard-pressed Americans on Omaha gradually deepened their penetration and on 9 June they were able to take the offensive effectively. By that time the bridgeheads were linked up all along the front of assault except for a gap between the two American sectors near Carentan. Contact was made across this the next day, and after stiff fighting Carentan itself was captured on 12-13 June. On the British front the Germans went on throwing in fierce local armored attacks; on 8 June, for instance, the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade beat off a serious threat and continued to hold its position on the final D-Day objective. Caen remained in German hands, but the eastern flank of the bridgehead, though much more contracted than had been planned, was secure.

By 12 June the first phase of Operation OVERLORD had been successfully completed. The Allies had established a firm foothold on the continent. Some 325,000 men, 55,000 vehicles and 105,000 tons of stores had already been brought ashore. The construction of the artificial harbors, on a more elaborate plan than that projected by COSSAC, was well advanced. The Germans’ plan of defense had failed; they had not driven the invaders into the sea, and had now to prepare for their inevitable attempt to break out from the bridgehead.

Comments

By 1944 the western democracies, unprepared when war broke out, had built up their strength to the point where they could challenge the enemy with confidence. It seemed clear, however, that the only way of obtaining a rapid decision was by defeating the main German armies on a European battlefield. The necessary preliminary to this was the crossing of the Channel and the establishment of a bridgehead, carried out in the teeth of strong defenses and an experienced and determined enemy. This was such a hazardous operation that many good judges on the Allied side felt very uncertain about the outcome. That the invasion succeeded was due to the fact that the Allies were able to mobilize sea, land and air power on a vast scale, but even more to the fact that as a result of remarkably skillful and thorough planning they were able to use that power to the best advantage.

Every one of the accepted principles of war is illustrated in Operation NEPTUNE. Eisenhower was told to enter Europe and “undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces.” The special aim in the assault phase was “to secure a lodgment on the continent from which further offensive operations can be developed.” These great simple objectives were never lost sight of and formed the foundation of the whole plan, a good example of sound selection and maintenance of the aim. The ultimate object was achieved eleven months after D-Day.

It is clear that the achievement of surprise played a very great part in the initial success. The enemy was completely deceived as to the Allied intentions, and continued to grope in the dark long after D-Day. This helped the Allies to effect a destructive concentration of force at the decisive point, while great German forces elsewhere waited for attacks that never came. The related principle of economy of effort, the result of “balanced employment of forces” and “judicious expenditure of all resources,” is equally clearly illustrated.

Where could a better example of cooperation be found than in NEPTUNE? The victory won on the coast of lower Normandy was the result of the efforts of the three fighting services of three different nations, working smoothly in combination under a Supreme Commander acknowledged to have a special genius for coordination. The point does not require to be labored. “Goodwill and the desire to cooperate” paid their usual dividends, on this as on lesser occasions.

Similarly, it is clear that the Allied victory was largely a triumph of administration. To get the invading force to France, and to maintain it when there, required, as has been seen, extraordinarily thorough administrative planning and a tremendous mobilization of human and material resources. The prefabricated harbors, brought across the Channel and assembled on the invasion coast, may stand as symbols of the administrative ingenuity which made such a great contribution to this epoch-making victory.

Other principles can be briefly dealt with. Offensive action speaks for itself. NEPTUNE is the very embodiment of it. As for maintenance of morale, only troops of high morale could have carried out the task, for it was actually more formidable in prospect than it turned out to be in reality; on the other hand, the famous Atlantic Wall once broken, success, as always, encouraged the Allied troops to push on to further victories. Security of the base and the lines of communication was well provided for by the navy, the air forces and the anti-aircraft gunners; however, as it turned out, the enemy was in no state to threaten them. Similarly, flexibility was less important in this operation in that the plan as written succeeded so well; it appears chiefly in the use of those very flexible weapons, naval and air power, to support the troops ashore at any point during the bridgehead campaign where they found themselves hard pressed.

Bibliography

American Forces in Action Series: Omaha Beachhead (6 June-13 June 1944). Washington, 1945.

—: Utah Beach to Cherbourg (6 June-27 June 1944). Washington, 1947.

W. F. Craven and J. L. Cate. The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. III. Chicago, 1951.

General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower. Crusade in Europe. New York, 1948.

—. Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force, 6 June 1944 to 8 May 1945. London and Washington, 1946.

Major General Sir Francis de Guingand. Operation Victory. London, 1947.

Gordon A. Harrison. Cross-Channel Attack (United States Army in World War II: The European Theater of Operations). Washington, 1951.

Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery. Normandy to the Baltic. London, 1947.

Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Morgan. Overture to Overlord. London, 1950.

Colonel C. P. Stacey. The Victory Campaign (Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, Vol. III). Ottawa, 1960.

The Allied commanders from left, General Omar Bradley, Admiral Bertram Ramsey, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight D Eisenhower, General Sir Bernard Montgomery, Air Chief Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory, and Lieutenant-General Walter Bedell Smith. These men were responsible for the success of Operation 'Overlord', but there were differences about how it could be best achieved.

 

Map of Allied concentration and routes, June 6, 1944.

Juno and Gold Beaches, June 6, 1944.

The Defenses of Juno Beach. This 1:25,000 scale map shows the landing area of 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, and the intense machine guns, anti-tank positions, bunkers and trenches the Canadians had to fight through.

Map of North Shores and Queen's Own Rifles (3rd Canadian Infantry Division) landings at St. Aubin-sur-mer and Bernieres-sur-mer on Juno Beach (Nan Beach). 

Map of Regina Rifles, Royal Winnipeg Rifles, and Canadian Scottish (3rd Canadian Infantry Division) landings at Courseulles-sur-Mer on Juno Beach (Mike Beach).

Map of 3rd Canadian Infantry Division front line positions at midnight June 6.

German Forces and Defenses: 716th Infantry Division Area, June 6, 1944.

Map of 3rd Canadian Infantry Division landings on Juno Beach showing D-Day objectives ("Yew", "Elm", "Oak" ) and front line at midnight June 6. 

Map of 3rd Canadian Infantry Division landings on Juno Beach showing D-Day objectives ("Yew", "Elm", "Oak" ) and advance of 1st Hussars, Fort Garry Horse and Sherbrooke Fusiliers tank regiments.

"Preparations for D-Day" (Southampton Water, Hampshire, England, UK, 1944). Richard Ernst Eurich’s (1903-1992) enigmatic composite painting of land and naval forces massing off the South Coast before D-Day gives an impression of brooding calm before the storm. The dark belt of trees across the center of the painting obscures the transition from land to sea. The roads end in barriers of smoke or barbed wire and the only way forward is into the unknown, through the huge jaw-like hold-doors of the central ship. Camouflage netting, smoke screening and the camouflaged shipping all contribute to the sense of secrecy and hidden strength conveyed by the painting. Eurich was a marine painter living near Southampton and was very familiar with this part of the coast, overlooking the Isle of Wight. He was a salaried war artist with an honorary commission of Captain in the Royal Marines and would have been able to paint from his own observations. His wartime style has been compared to the sixteenth century Flemish painter Pieter Breughel whose work shows a similar attention to distant detail and purposeful activities. Indeed, the gaping ship’s doors seem to echo Breughel’s Mouth of Hell, making a visual equation between war and hell which agrees with Eurich’s Quaker background and beliefs. (Imperial War Museum Art.IWM ART LD 4587)

Canadian soldiers study a German plan of the beach for the D-Day landing operations in Normandy on June 6, 1944.

Overhead aerial of 'Nan Green' Beach JUNO Area and Strongpoint 9785 (Widerstandsnest 29), east of the River Seulles at Courseulles-sur-Mer. This position was defended by 6th Company of the German 736th Grenadier Regiment, and was captured by the Regina Rifles and the 1st Hussars of 7th Canadian Brigade, after heavy fighting on 6 June. Note the scattered stakes and 'Hedgehog' obstacles on the beach.

Troops of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division going ashore from assault landing craft at East Wittering, Sussex, during Exercise FABIUS III, April 23 to 7 May 1944.

HMCS Prince Henry Anchored in Greenock; May 1944.

Assault landing craft leaving HMCS Prince Henry during a training exercise in May 1944.

Assault landing craft leaving HMCS Prince Henry during the same training exercise in May 1944.

Assault landing craft leaving HMCS Prince Henry during the same training exercise in May 1944.

Infantrymen going ashore from the HMCS Prince Henry, June 6, 1944.

Infantrymen going ashore from the HMCS Prince Henry, June 6, 1944.

The same landing craft and infantry as seen in the previous photo now going ashore.

Personnel of Royal Canadian Navy Beach Commando "W" landing on Mike Beach, Juno sector of the Normandy beachhead, France; July 8, 1944.

Operation NEPTUNE. Canadian infantrymen of the North Shore (New Brunswick) Regiment disembark from a Landing Craft Assault [LCA] onto 'Nan Red' Beach, JUNO Area, at la Rive, near St Aubin-sur-Mer, at about 8.05 am on 6 June 1944, while under fire from German troops in the houses facing them.

Operation NEPTUNE. Canadian infantrymen of the North Shore (New Brunswick) Regiment disembark from a Landing Craft Assault [LCA] onto 'Nan Red' Beach, JUNO Area, at la Rive, near St Aubin-sur-Mer, at about 8.05 am on 6 June 1944, while under fire from German troops in the houses facing them.

Canadian troops of the North Shore (New Brunswick) Regiment, 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade, 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, disembark from an LCA (Landing Craft Assault) onto Nan Red beach, Juno area, near St Aubin-sur-Mer, at about 8.00am on 6 June 1944, while under fire from German troops in the houses facing them.

Canadian troops of the North Shore (New Brunswick) Regiment, 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade, 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, disembark from an LCA (Landing Craft Assault) onto Nan Red beach, Juno area, near St Aubin-sur-Mer, at about 8.00am on 6 June 1944, while under fire from German troops in the houses facing them.

Vertical aerial photograph of the landings on Mike beach, Juno area, at Courselles-sur-Mer, 6 June 1944.

Vertical aerial photograph of the landings on Mike beach, Juno area, to the west of Courselles-sur-Mer, 6 June 1944.

LCI(L)s (Landing Craft Infantry Large) about to disembark troops of 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade onto Nan White beach, Juno area, at Bernieres-sur-Mer, late morning, 6 June 1944.

Watching from the HMCS Prince David, as the assault craft heads ashore, June 6, 1944.

A German machine gun nest along the Atlantic Wall, background, was captured by Canadian troops on June 8, 1944, following the D-Day invasion.

Private D. D. Martin on sentry duty along the Normandy beachhead on June 10, 1944.

Infantrymen of Le Régiment de la Chaudière resting behind a Universal Carrier in a low ground position along the Normandy beachhead in June 1944.

(Left to Right) Lieutenant E. M. Peto, Company Sergeant-Major Charlie Martin and Rifleman N. E. Lindenas, preparing to lay a minefield in Bretteville-Orgueilleuse, France, June 20, 1944.

View looking east along 'Nan White' Beach, showing personnel of the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade (Stormont, Dundas, and Glengarry Highlanders) landing from LCI(L) 299 of the 2nd Canadian (262nd RN) Flotilla. These are second wave troops going ashore at Bernières-sur-Mer, Normandy, France, 6 June 1944. The 260th Flotilla of infantry landing craft was assigned to Juno Beach. Two Canadian destroyers, HMCS Algonquin and HMCS Sioux, made themselves very useful in the early landing phases, with HMCS Algonquin shelling and destroying an enemy artillery position.  The 29th Canadian Torpedo Boat Flotilla had the role of intercepting coastal trade and enemy warships operating in the landing zone.

Troops of 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade disembarking with bicycles from LCI(L)s (Landing Craft Infantry Large) onto Nan White beach, Juno area, at Bernieres-sur-Mer, shortly before midday, 6 June 1944.

A Sherman tank of the 27th Canadian Armoured Regiment (Sherbrooke Fusiliers), supporting 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade, comes ashore on Nan White beach, Juno area, near Bernieres-sur-Mer, 6 June 1944. Beach Group personnel can be seen constructing trackways over the sand, and an armored bulldozer is partly visible on the right.

Troops and landing craft occupy a Normandy beach shortly after the D-Day landing. The bombardment of the beaches began at 6 a.m. on June 6, 1944, and within hours soldiers from Canada had established the beachhead at Juno Beach and the German defenses were shattered.

Canadian Tank Destroyer crews removing the waterproofing kits from their tanks after landing in Normandy, June 1944.

Mike Beach, Juno, with a tracked 40-mm Bofors AA Gun and an A Squadron, 6 CAR, DD tank with floatation kit collapsed, on the Normandy beachhead, 7 June 1944.  The organization chart of the 22nd Armoured Regiment (CGG) had the CO's control party; HQ Squadron with 2 halftracks, 4 scout cars in Intercommunication Troop, 11 Stuart tanks in Recce Troop, and 7 Crusader III AA Mk. II tanks.  As the war progressed, the size of the recce troops expanded.  Some had up to 13 cars by the end, with the AA vehicles being used for recce, as there was no Luftwaffe to defend against.

Canadian tanks firing into German positions in Normandy, 8-9 June 1944.

Canadian soldiers guard German prisoners captured on the Normandy beachhead.

The German Army was comprehensively defeated in Normandy, its losses compounded by Hitler's refusal to allow his generals to conduct an orderly withdrawal. Allied delay in closing the Falaise-Argentan pocket allowed many German troops to escape, but around 400,000 were killed, wounded or captured during the campaign.

Canadian troops land at Juno Beach, Courseulles-sur-Mer, Normandy, on June 6, 1944.

Canadian infantry going ashore during the Normandy invasion.

Canadian infantrymen landing on a beach in Normandy.

Canadian soldiers in amphibious tank arriving in Normandy, June-July 1944.

Unfurling of the Canadian flag at 1st Canadian Army Headquarters on Dominion Day; the first time that the Canadian flag flew on French soil after D-Day. Normandy, France, 29 June 1944.

RSM Rutherford raising the first Canadian flag to fly in Caen, France, 11 July 1944.

Caen was a key objective for D-Day, but the city was not completely liberated until 18 July. It suffered considerable damage from bombing raids and naval bombardment. The bulk of the city was destroyed and 2,000 civilians killed before the campaign ended. Image: "Caen" by Stephen Bone, war artist, in chalk, 7 August 1944. (Imperial War Museum Art.IWM ART LD 4367)