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Russian painting showing the Soviet victory over the Japanese during the Soviet invasion of Manchuria in August 1945. |
by Frank Aker III
The "mini-war" fought by Japan and the Soviet Union in the Far East in the summer of 1945 had its origins in long-standing grievances between the two powers. Because of these grievances each party to the war read the other's motives antagonistically.
For Japan, the war became a historic turning point in what had been a relatively successful seventy-year effort to establish the Japanese political and military dominion on the continent of Asia. For the Soviet Union, heir to the policies of the Czars, the war placed a capstone on the enduring Russian/Soviet "Drang nach Osten" that was designed to secure the empire's eastern flanks.
The history of the Japanese-Soviet rivalry over Manchuria and other regions of eastern Asia began with Japanese victories over Russian forces in 1875 and 1904-1905. Japan saw those wars as securing basic elements of the island nation's national goals. Japan had taken control of Manchuria, the Kurile Islands, strategic Port Arthur, and southern Sakhalin. The Japanese policy that sought development of continental resources had been launched.
Japan had not yet committed herself firmly to a policy of aggression. Rather, concepts of unformulated, or partially and inadequately enunciated. In the main, defensive operations on Japan's native soil were considered—and those only in the case of enemy attack. Yet Russia remained the primary threat in the Far East, in particular after the signature of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. As if to buttress growing Japanese fears, the first Soviet five-year plan called for development of the national defense forces and, simultaneously, of the vast economic resources of the Soviet Far East.
By 1928, Japan had begun to scrutinize seriously the possibility of a new military confrontation with the Soviet Union. Recrudescent Soviet power and the increasing capability of keeping it supplied proved to be vital factors to the swift Soviet defeat of the Chinese at Manchouli in 1929. Because the operation was exceptionally well executed, the Japanese awoke to the fact that they faced a new threat to continuation of their national Far Eastern policies. Northern Manchuria became the arena for bilateral military buildups, including elaborate complexes of forts. When, in 1934, Soviet bombers capable of striking Japan's home islands were stationed in the maritime province of Siberia, Japan began to think seriously of launching an all-out, pre-emptive war against the Soviets.
Two incidents fueled the fires of Japanese-Soviet rivalry. The two powers clashed first at Changkufeng (Lake Khassan) in 1938 and then at Nomonhan (Khalkin Gol) in 1939. The Nomonhan incident in particular gave the Japanese a taste of modern warfare that was not to be forgotten. Japan at once set about correcting military inadequacies as revealed in these clashes: principally, the Japanese began to build the Imperial Army's artillery muscle. But Japan, despite the evidence accumulated in the two clashes, refused to abandon the tradition of hand-to-hand combat, a tradition that had survived at least partly because Japan had not participated in the grinding inferno of trench warfare in World War I. The Chinese battlefields began to consume Japanese divisions at an increasing rate; almost at the same time the Soviets faced a similar situation at home as German troops invaded the Ukraine.
Japan and the Soviet Union signed their non-aggression pact in 1941. Japan inserted a clause providing that the Soviet Far Eastern bases would not be rented to the Allies. The two sides began a coy game of deception involving assignment of "skeleton" forces in the Far East. The game took a serious turn in the summer of 1942, however, when Japan launched a major build-up of the Kwantung Army. In Japanese strategy, this army was to begin operations against the Soviets at a moment whose exact timing would be determined by the outcome of the German summer offensive.
When the German offensive ended inconclusively, the Japanese had no alternative but to stand by the pact of 1941. A kind of peace settled over the disputed eastern frontier until the late summer of 1944. At that point, with the war going heavily in favor of the Allies, the Japanese felt new shock waves: Soviet denunciation of the non-aggression pact on the eve of the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, 6 November 1944, was taken correctly as a warning.
Shortly after the conclusion of the Yalta Conference in February 1945, the Soviets began to shift troops of their strategic reserve to the Far East. The units were commanded by Marshal Vasilevskiy. The Japanese tried to delay the inevitable by sending Ambassador Sato to Moscow to seek "clarification" of the Soviet action. Meanwhile, the battle-proven units of the Kwantung Army under General Yamada accelerated their defense preparations in Manchuria and Korea.
The capitulation of Germany in 1945 led Japanese intelligence to draft a new estimate of the situation on their continental Far Eastern frontier. Among other things, the Japanese concluded that the Soviets would "try to extend their influence into Manchuria and China, taking advantage of the war in the Pacific … The [Soviets] would use their armed forces against Japan … whenever the Soviet authorities [felt] that a Japanese surrender [was] imminent. In terms of seasonal conditions, it was imperative to be on the alert around September, when the weather grew cold … The [Soviets], however, have made such great sacrifices in their war with Germany (fifteen million dead) that they will adopt a waiting policy … for the chance to overrun Manchuria … at minimum sacrifice."
A war in the east, the Japanese also reasoned, would give Stalin the opportunity to win back what the Czars had lost. The stakes would be even higher because of the industry that the Japanese had developed in Manchuria.
Japanese war strategy then evolved out of Imperial orders "to defend the Japanese territory of Korea." Yamada and his generals believed their best strategy would be to withdraw, utilizing the cover of delaying actions in the mountains, to the central Manchurian plain. There, by concentrating around the Changchung–Mukden–Harbin axis, they could threaten Soviet supply routes and prepare for a counterattack against exposed Soviet forces in the west of Manchuria. Failing such a plan, the Kwantung Army would withdraw to a pre-pared mountain redoubt area extending from Liaoyang, north of Port Arthur, across the North Korean mountain range. From here prolonged guerrilla operations could be conducted.
On the Soviet side, official strategy concentrated on the huge 3,100-mile geographical salient formed by the massive bulk of Manchuria. A double-pincer attack went into the planning stage. One pincer would move from the east, the other from the west with the single objective of isolating the Kwantung Army outside Korea. The China Expeditionary Force would also be isolated and Japanese supply lines would be threatened.
The United States upset the Far Eastern plans of both adversaries. First, an atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on 6 August 1945. Then, her hand forced, the Soviet Union prematurely declared war on Japan on 8 August. Finally, the U.S. dropped a second atomic bomb on Nagasaki on 9 August.
The Japanese government released news of its tentative acceptance of the Potsdam ultimatum on 10 August. But the Soviet advance in Manchuria was already 24 hours old. The opposing forces deployed approximately the following numbers and units:
Kwantung Army
Commanded by General Yamada
thirty-one divisions
eleven brigades
1,040,000 men
5,360 artillery pieces
1,155 armored fighting vehicles
1,800 aircraft
First Area Army
Under General Kita and responsible for the East Manchurian Region. The First Area Army consisted of the Fifth Army and the Third Army.
Thirty-fourth Army
Under Lieutenant General Kushibuchi and responsible for north Korea.
Fourth Army
Under Lieutenant General Uemura and responsible for the North Manchurian Region.
Third Area Army
Under General Ushirku and responsible for the South and West Manchurian Regions. The Third Area Army consisted of the Thirtieth Army and the Forty-fourth Army.
Seventeenth Army
Under Lieutenant General Kozuki and responsible for Korea.
First and Second Air Armies
Under direct Kwantung Army command.
Sungari River Flotilla
Under direct Kwantung Army command.
In addition to these forces, Japanese units in border areas were authorized to assist if the situation warranted. Reinforcements were to be expected primarily from the Fifth Area Army under General Higuchi and elements of the China Expeditionary Army.
The Soviet Far East Stavka
Commanded by Marshal Vasilevskii.
eighty divisions
twenty-nine brigades
four tank corps
1,500,000 men
26,000 artillery pieces
5,500 armored fighting vehicles
3,900 aircraft
First Far East Army
Under General Metetskoy and responsible for the East Manchuria and North Korean fronts. It consisted of the 1st Army, 3rd Army, 5th Army, 25th Army, 34th Army, and the 35th Army.
Second Far East Army
Under General Purkayev and responsible for the Northern Manchurian front. It consisted of the 2nd Army and the 15th Army.
Zabaikal Area Army (Trans-Baikal Army)
Under General Malinovsky and responsible for the West Manchurian and Inner Mongolian fronts. The Zabaikal Army consisted of the 6th Guards Tank Army, the 17th Army, the 36th Army, the 39th Army, and the 53rd Army, and the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army.
Far East Air Force
Under Marshal Novikov.
Soviet Pacific Fleet and Amur Flotilla
Under Admiral Kuznetsov.
The campaign lasted two weeks and a few hours. It began at 0100 hours, 9 August, with the initial Soviet attack. On the eastern border the Japanese Third and Fifth Armies engaged the Soviet First Far East Army. But the attempt to stem the invasion proved fruitless as the Red Army troops gained ground in every sector. Advance Soviet units reached the Mutanching Plain by 11 August before they could be slowed.
In other areas the Japanese had occasion to resort to heroic measures to halt or delay the Soviet conquest of Manchuria. The Japanese Fourth Army held along the Amur River against attacks launched by the inexperienced Soviet Second Far East Army. But the Soviet Zabaikal Area Army began to breach the mountain gaps defended by the Japanese Third Area Army. In desperation, the Japanese Second Air Army Suicide Division sent its planes against the main Soviet armored thrust, halting at least temporarily the Red Army advance. In battles on the islands north of Japan the Imperial Army employed tactics learned in the years-long Pacific island warfare against the United States. These battles proved costly for the Soviets vis-à-vis the territorial gains.
With the arrival of reinforcements from the China Expeditionary Army, the Kwantung Army planned a counterattack against the western elements of the Zabaikal Area Army. On the eve of the 19 August attack, however, General Yamada received a cease-fire order delivered personally by a member of the Japanese royal family. Loyal to the Emperor to the end, the Japanese laid down their arms.
The Soviets now had free rein to overrun Manchuria, north Korea, Sakhalin, and the Kurile Islands. Vasilevskiy sent parachute units to seize important cities, airports, and other important centers of industry and communications. The paratroopers ranged far ahead of the land units in an effort to forestall other Allied actions and claims. Vasilevskiy also ordered that all Japanese troops be rounded up and disarmed, to be held for later use as hostages.
The casualties of the mini-war were reported in the Japan Statistical Yearbook 1949: 7,483 Japanese were reported killed while the Soviets claimed killed in action losses totaling 8,219. Unofficial Japanese estimates came closer to 10-12,000 when the island fighting is included. The Soviets had said they took 594,000 prisoners in the days and weeks after the surrender.
General Yamada, commander of the Japanese Manchurian forces in this twilight struggle that seemed like a postscript to the great struggles of World War II, was tried as a war criminal after war's end, and was convicted. He was released in 1956 as a good will measure.
"As the sun rises, so must it set."
Addenda on Soviet Forces
The combat strength of the Soviet forces in the Far East on 9 May 1945 totaled 1,185,085 personnel, 20,695 guns and mortars (excluding 50-mm mortars), 2,338 tanks and assault guns, and 4,314 combat aircraft.
Men and materiel transferred from Europe to the Far East between May and 8 August 1945 totaled 403,355 men, 180,616 rifles and carbines, 82,977 submachine guns, 10,623 light and heavy machine guns, 7,137 guns and mortars, 2,119 tanks and assault guns, 17,374 trucks, 1,482 tractors and prime movers, and 36,280 horses.
The composition of the Transbaikal Army Group on 9 August 1945 included four combined arms armies, one tank army, one air defense army, one cavalry-mechanized group, eight rifle corps, three mechanized and tank corps, thirty rifle and motorized rifle divisions, five cavalry divisions (including four divisions of the Mongolian People's Republic), two tank divisions, two fortified areas, twenty rifle, motorized rifle, mechanized and tank brigades (including one armored brigade of the Mongolian People's Republic), ten rifle, motorcycle, tank and assault gun regiments (including one tank regiment of the Mongolian People's Republic), two artillery divisions, three anti-aircraft artillery divisions, fifteen independent artillery brigades, thirty-six independent artillery regiments, and seven engineer brigades. The group had a total of 654,040 men, of which 416,000 were in combat units, 283,608 rifles and carbines, 117,447 submachine guns, 19,603 light and heavy machine guns, 1,751 tanks, 665 assault guns, 1,360 45- and 57-mm anti-tank guns, 3,075 76-mm and larger field artillery pieces, 3,922 mortars, 583 multiple rocket launchers, and 601 anti-aircraft guns.
The composition of the 1st Far Eastern Army Group on 9 August 1945 included four combined arms armies, one air defense army, nine rifle corps, one mechanized or tank corps, thirty-one rifle and motorized rifle divisions, one cavalry division, twelve fortified areas, fourteen rifle, motorized rifle, mechanized and tank brigades, fifteen rifle, motorcycle, tank and assault gun regiments, five anti-aircraft artillery divisions, twenty-six independent artillery brigades, fifteen independent artillery regiments, and eight engineer brigades. The group had 586,589 men, of which 404,056 were in combat units, 294,826 rifles and carbines, 120,291 submachine guns, 25,789 light and heavy machine guns, 1,201 tanks, 659 assault guns, 1,539 45- and 67-mm anti-tank guns, 3,743 76-mm and larger field artillery pieces, 4,879 mortars, 516 multiple rocket launchers, and 504 anti-aircraft guns.
The composition of the 2nd Far Eastern Army Group on 9 August 1945 included three combined arms armies, one air defense army, two rifle corps, eleven rifle and motorized rifle divisions, six fortified areas, twelve rifle, motorized rifle, mechanized and tank brigades, four rifle, motorcycle, tank and assault gun regiments, one anti-aircraft artillery division, two independent artillery brigades, twenty-six independent artillery regiments, and three engineer brigades. The group had 337,096 men, of which 238,926 were in combat units, 158,451 rifles and carbines, 54,197 submachine guns, 12,564 light and heavy machine guns, 752 tanks, 528 assault guns, 808 45- and 57-mm anti-tank guns, 1,604 76-mm and larger field artillery pieces, 2,829 mortars, 72 multiple rocket launchers, and 1,280 anti-aircraft guns.
The composition of the Pacific Fleet on 8 August 1945 included two cruisers, eleven destroyers, two torpedo boats, nineteen escort ships, seventy-eight submarines, ten minelayers, fifty-two minesweepers, forty-nine submarine chasers, and 204 torpedo cutters.
The composition of the Amur Flotilla on 8 August 1945 included nine gunboats, fifty armored cutters, one minelayer, twelve minesweepers, forty-three minesweeper cutters, one net layer, five floating anti-aircraft batteries, fifteen hydrogliders, three patrol boats, three floating bases, and one command and staff ship.
Soviet Air Force
The Twelfth Air Army (Transbaikal Army Group) was composed of three fighter air divisions, two ground attack air divisions, six bomber air divisions, two transport air divisions, and one independent air regiment, with a total of 499 fighters, 197 ground attack aircraft, 440 bombers, forty reconnaissance aircraft, and 189 transport aircraft. They flew 2,361 combat and 3,167 non-combat (including transport, communication, evacuation) sorties. Ammunition expenditure amounted to 710.7 tons of bombs, 14,746,000 gun rounds and 42,134,000 machine gun rounds. They transported 7,200 men, 2,456.5 tons of fuel, 172.3 tons of ammunition, and 671.3 tons of miscellaneous supplies.
The Ninth Air Army (1st Far Eastern Army Group) was composed of three fighter air divisions, two ground attack air divisions, three bomber air divisions, and four independent air regiments. Aircraft totaled 536 fighters, 193 ground attack, 352 bombers, sixty-two reconnaissance, thirty-five aerial spotters, and fifteen transports. They flew 4,442 combat and 2,329 non-combat (including transport, communication, evacuation) sorties. Ammunition expenditure totaled 1,032.6 tons of bombs, 221,730,000 gun and 574,635,000 machine gun rounds. They transported 2,487 men, 90.5 tons of fuel, 75.3 tons of ammunition, and 132.8 tons of miscellaneous supplies.
The Tenth Air Army (2nd Far Eastern Army Group) was composed of three fighter air divisions, two mixed air divisions, two ground attack air divisions, one bomber air division, and five independent air regiments. Aircraft totaled 823 fighters, 178 ground attack, 198 bombers, forty reconnaissance, thirty-nine aerial spotters, and twenty-four transports. They flew 3,297 combat and 1,323 non-combat (including transport, communication, evacuation) sorties. Ammunition expenditure totaled 340.3 tons of bombs, 79,494,000 gun and 179,085,000 machine gun rounds. They transported 6,810 men, 230 tons of fuel, 301.7 tons of ammunition, and 691.9 tons of miscellaneous supplies.
The Aviation of the Pacific Fleet was composed of one fighter air division, one mixed air division, one ground attack air division, one bomber air division, one torpedo bomber air division, and six independent air regiments. Aircraft totaled 461 fighters, 194 ground attack, 312 bombers, 138 torpedo bombers, and eighty-four reconnaissance. They flew 3,049 combat and 608 non-combat (including transport, communication, evacuation) sorties. Ammunition expenditure totaled 689.5 tons of bombs, 45,109,000 gun and 227,843,000 machine gun rounds.
The Aviation of the North Pacific Fleet was composed of one mixed air division five independent air regiments. Aircraft totaled 178 fighters, forty-six ground attack, sixty-two bombers, and thirty-one reconnaissance. They flew 881 combat sorties.
Theater and Field Commanders of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Far East, August 1945
Note: The rosters for the Fronts, Pacific Navy, and Amur Flotilla are only partial listings.
High Command of Soviet Forces in the Far East
Commander-in-Chief: Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevskii.
Military Council Member: Lt. Gen. I. V. Shikin.
Chief of Staff: Col. Gen. S. P. Ivanov.
Chief, Operational Division: Lt. Gen. M. M. Potapov.
Acting Chief, Intelligence: Maj. Gen. S. M. Chuvyrin.
Commander, Artillery: Artillery Marshal M. N. Chistiakov.
Commander, Armored and Mechanized Forces: Col. Gen. of Tank Forces M. D. Solomatin.
Commander, Air Forces: Chief Air Marshal A. A. Novikov.
Chief, Engineering Forces: Col. Gen. of Engineers K. S. Nazarov.
Chief, Communications Troops: Col. Gen. of Communications Troops N. D. Psurtsev.
Chief, Rear Services: Col. Gen. V. I. Vinogradov.
Transbaikal Front
Commander: Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ia. Malinovsky.
Military Council Member: Lt. Gen. A. N. Tevchenkov.
Military Council Members: Maj. Gen. K. L. Sorokin.
Chief of Staff: Army Gen. M. V. Zakharov.
Chief, Operational Division: Lt. Gen. N. O. Pavlovskii.
Chief, Intelligence: Maj. Gen. P. A. Popov.
Chief, Political Administration: Lt. Gen. K. A. Zykov.
Commander, Artillery: Col. Gen. of Artillery N. S. Fomin.
Commander, Armored and Mechanized Forces: Col. Gen. of Tank Forces A. V. Kurkin.
Chief, Communications Administration: Col. Gen. of Communication Troops A. I. Leonov.
Chief, Rear Services: Col. Gen. V. I. Vostrukov.
Commander, 17th Army: Lt. Gen. A. I. Danilov.
Commander, 36th Army: Lt. Gen. A. A. Luchinskii.
Commander, 39th Army: Col. Gen. I. I. Liudnikov.
Commander, 53rd Army: Col. Gen. I. M. Managarov.
Commander, 6th Guards Tank Army: Col. Gen. of Tank Forces A. G. Kravchenko.
Commander, 12th Air Army: Air Marshal S. A. Khudiakov.
Commander, Transbaikal PVO Army: Maj. Gen. of Artillery P. F. Rozhkov.
Commander, Mechanized Cavalry, Group of Soviet-Mongolian Forces: Col. Gen. I. A. Pliev.
First Far Eastern Front
Commander: Marshal of the Soviet Union K. A. Meretskov.
Military Council Member: Col. Gen. T. F. Shtykov.
Military Council Member: Maj. Gen. K. S. Grushevoi.
Chief of Staff: Lt. Gen. A. N. Krutikov.
Chief, Operational Division: Maj. Gen. V. Ia. Semenov.
Chief, Intelligence: Col. Ia. N. Ishchenko.
Chief, Political Administration: Maj. Gen. K. F. Kalashnikov.
Commander, Artillery: Col. Gen. of Artillery G. E. Degtiarev.
Commander, Armored and Mechanized Forces: Lt. Gen. of Tank Forces I. V. Kononov.
Chief, Engineering Troops: Col. Gen. of Engineers A. F. Khrenov.
Chief, Communications Administration: Lt. Gen. of Communications Troops D. M. Dobykin.
Chief, Rear Services: Maj. Gen. I. K. Nikolaev.
Commander, 1st Red Banner Army: Col. Gen. A. P. Beloborodov.
Commander, 5th Army: Col. Gen. N. I. Krylov.
Commander, 25th Army: Col. Gen. I. M. Christiakov.
Commander, 35th Army: Lt. Gen. N. D. Zakhvataev.
Commander, 9th Air Army: Col. Gen. of Air Force I. M. Sokolov.
Commander, Maritime PVO Army: Lt. Gen. of Artillery A. V. Gerasimov.
Commander, Chuguev Operational Group: Maj. Gen. V. A. Zaitsev.
Second Far Eastern Front
Commander: Army Gen. M. A. Purkaev.
Military Council Member: Lt. Gen. D. S. Leonov.
Military Council Member: Maj. Gen. V. N. Kudriavtsev.
Chief of Staff: Lt. Gen. F. I. Shevchenko.
Chief, Operational Division: Maj. Gen. A. K. Kazakovtsev.
Chief, Intelligence: Maj. Gen. N. S. Sorkin.
Chief, Political Administration: Maj. Gen. P. T. Lukashin.
Commander, Artillery: Lt. Gen. of Artillery M. A. Parsegov.
Commander, Armored and Mechanized Forces: Maj. Gen. of Tank Forces N. N. Radkevich.
Chief, Engineering Troops: Lt. Gen. of Engineers M. I. Moley.
Chief, Communications Administration: Maj. Gen. of Communications Troops A. F. Novinitskii.
Chief, Rear Services: Lt. Gen. D. I. Andreev.
Commander, 2nd Red Banner Army: Lt. Gen. of Tank Forces M. F. Terekhin.
Commander, 15th Army: Lt. Gen. S. K. Mamonov.
Commander, 16th Army: Maj. Gen. L. G. Cheremisov.
Commander, 10th Air Army: Col. Gen. of Air Force P. F. Zhigarev.
Commander, Kamchatka Defense District: Maj. Gen. A. R. Gnechko.
The Pacific Navy
Commander: Admiral I. S. Iumashev.
Military Council Member: Lt. Gen. of Coastal Service S. E. Zakharov.
Military Council Member: Secretary, Maritime Party Kraikom N. M. Pegov.
Chief of Staff: Vice Adm. A. S. Frolov.
Chief, Political Administration: Maj. Gen. of Coastal Service A. A. Murav'ev.
Chief, Coastal Defense: Lt. Gen. S. I. Kabanov.
Commander, Air Force: Lt. Gen. of Air Force P. N. Lemeshko.
Commander, PVO: Maj. Gen. V. V. Suvorov.
Chief, Rear Services: Engr. Rear Adm. N. P. Dubrovin.
Commander, PVO Corps: Maj. Gen. A. Z. Dushnin.
Commander, North Pacific Fleet: Vice Adm. V. A. Andreev.
The Red Banner Amur Flotilla
Commander: Rear Adm. N. V. Antonov.
Military Council Member: Rear Adm. M. G. Iakovenko.
Chief of Staff: Captain 1st Rank A. M. Gushchin.
Ranking Officers of the Soviet General Staff and Command in 1945 Credited with Major Involvement in Planning the Far East Campaign
General A. I. Antonov—Chief of the General Staff since February 1945: "Leading role."
General S. M. Shtemenko—Chief, Operational Division, General Staff: "Leading role."
Marshal A. M. Vasilevskii—Chief of the General Staff until February 1945: "Most active and creative participant in developing the plans for military actions in the Far East" since end of April 1945.
Major General N. A. Lomov—In the Far East as General Staff's Far Eastern division chief until mid-1943; thereafter in the Operational Division of the General Staff: "Central figure."
Lieutenant General F. I. Shevchenko—Mid-1943 assigned to be Chief of Staff, Far Eastern Front; until then Chief, Far Eastern Division of the General Staff.
Marshal K. A. Meretskov—Until March 1945 Commander of the Karelian Front; thereafter turns to planning Far East operations on the First Far Eastern Front. Among his staff, singles out Maj. Gen. of Rear Services I. K. Nikolaev as key figure.
Marshal R. Ia. Malinovsky—From mid-June 1945 actively involved in developing plans for operations of the main campaign effort as Commander of the Transbaikal Front.
Army General M. V. Zakharov—From mid-June 1945 actively involved in developing plans for operations of the main campaign effort as Chief of Staff of the Transbaikal Front.
Lieutenant General N. O. Pavlovskii—Chief, Operational Division, Transbaikal Front.
General A. V. Khrulev—Chief of Rear Services, Red Army.
Prisoners of War and Materiel Captured by the Soviet Forces, August 1945
The Transbaikal Army Group captured 220,135 men, 480 tanks, 860 artillery pieces, 1,022 mortars, 9,456 submachine and machine guns, 712 cars and trucks, 502 aircraft, 578,146 artillery and mortar shells, and 233 depots.
The 1st Far Eastern Army Group captured 107,891 men, 120 tanks, 705 artillery pieces, 1,117 mortars, 2,532 submachine and machine guns, 1,417 cars and trucks, 359 aircraft, and 441 depots.
The 2nd Far Eastern Army Group captured 265,964 men, eighty-six tanks, 271 artillery pieces, fifteen assault guns, 335 mortars, 1,111 submachine and machine guns, 192 cars and trucks, 195,960 artillery and mortar shells, and forty-three depots.
The totals captured were: 593,990 men 686 tanks, 1,836 artillery pieces, fifteen assault guns, 2,474 mortars, about 300,000 rifles, 13,099 submachine and machine guns, 2,321 cars and trucks, 861 aircraft, 774,106 artillery and mortar shells, and 717 depots.
Composition and Strength of Japanese Forces, 8 August 1945
The Kwantung Army was composed of three army groups, seven armies (or equivalents), thirty-one infantry divisions, ten infantry brigades, two tank brigades, three independent infantry and marine regiments, and two air armies, with 1,040,000 men, 1,155 tanks, 5,360 guns, 25 ships (Sungari Flotilla), and 1,800 aircraft.
The Manchoukuo Army was composed of one army, two infantry divisions, two cavalry divisions, twelve infantry brigades, four independent cavalry regiments, with 170,000 men, 800 guns and mortars, and one hundred aircraft.
The Inner Mongolian Army was composed of one army, and four infantry divisions, with 44,000 men, and forty guns and mortars.
The Army Group Suiyuan was composed of one army, five cavalry divisions, and two cavalry brigades, with 66,000 men and sixty guns and mortars.
The Southern Sakhalin Group was composed of one infantry division with 20,000 men, and 120 guns and mortars.
The Kurile Islands Group was composed of two infantry divisions, one infantry brigade, one independent infantry regiment, and one independent tank regiment, with 80,000 men, sixty tanks, 320 guns and mortars, and seven aircraft.
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Map showing the Soviet invasion plan for Manchuria. |
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Pacific Fleet marines are hoisting the banner in Port Arthur. |
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Russian artillery firing on Japanese positions, Manchuria, August 1945. |
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Russian artillery firing on Japanese positions near Hailar, Manchuria, August 1945. |
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Russian tank crew resting, Manchuria, August 1945. |
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T-34/85 tanks in northeastern China, August 1945. |
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Red Army forces crossing the Greater Khingan Range during the Soviet invasion of Manchuria, 1945. |
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Soviet troops with Chinese civilians, northeastern China, August-September 1945. |
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Soviet troops flying the red flag atop the train station at Harbin, Songjiang, China, circa August 20, 1945. |
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Another view of Soviet troops in front of the train station at Harbin, Songjiang, China, August 20, 1945. |
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Soviet troops by the Songhua River in Harbin, China, August-September 1945. |
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Soviet soldiers with captured Japanese flags. |
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Japanese Ha-go and Chi-ha tanks of the 11th Japanese Tank Regiment on Shumshu Island during the surrender. |
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A battered Type 97 "Chi-ha" tank of the 11th Japanese Tank Regiment on Shumshu Island. |
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Soviet Marines with a Japanese "Ha-go" tank on the island of Shumshu. |
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Captured on the island of Shumshu a Japanese amphibious tank Type 2 "Ka-mi." |
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Japanese Type 95 Ha-go tanks being examined by Soviet troops after the surrender in September 1945. |
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Japanese prisoners under Soviet guard, Manchuria, late September 1945. |
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A Japanese soldier surrendering to Russians, Manchuria, August 1945. |
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Japanese soldiers surrendering their weapons, northeastern China, August-September 1945. |
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Soviet soldier with Japanese POWs in Manchuria. As the Soviets retreated, they would take hundreds of thousands of POWs with them. |
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Soviet troops in northern Korea, October 1945. |
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Obverse of the Soviet medal "For Victory Over Japan." About 1,831,000 Soviet personnel have been awarded the medal since 30 September 1945. |
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Reverse of the Soviet medal "For the Victory over Japan." |
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Certificate for the Soviet medal "For the Victory over Japan." |