Northrop XFT: American Prototype Fighter

The Northrop XFT was an American prototype fighter aircraft of the 1930s. A single engined low-winged monoplane, it was designed and built to meet a United States Navy order for an advanced carrier based fighter. It exhibited poor handling, and was rejected by the Navy, the single prototype being lost in a crash. A variant, the Northrop 3A, also was unsuccessful.

Development and Design

In the early 1930s, the United States Navy was interested in investigating the use of modern, monoplanes as fighter aircraft to replace the biplanes that equipped its fighter squadrons. In December 1932, it ordered the XF7B from Boeing, and based on the impressive performance of Northrop’s Gamma and Delta, both stressed skin monoplanes, placed an order with Northrop on May 8, 1933 for a single prototype fighter, designated XFT-1.

The resulting aircraft, which was designed by a team led by Ed Heinemann resembled a scaled-down Northrop Delta. It was a low-winged monoplane, of all-metal stressed skin construction. It had a fixed tailwheel undercarriage with its main gear fitted with streamlining trouser fairings. The pilot sat in an enclosed cockpit with a sliding canopy. It was powered by a single Wright R-1510 radial engine.

The XFT-1 first flew on January 16, 1934, being delivered to NAS Anacostia for evaluation by the Navy. While it was the fastest fighter yet tested by the U.S. Navy, its handling characteristics were poor. Although it was fitted with flaps to lower its landing speed, it was difficult to control at low speeds, and had poor forward visibility, major problems for an aircraft intended to operate off aircraft carriers. Its most serious problem, however, was its behavior when spinning, where the tail was subject to severe buffeting. In February 1934, test pilot Vance Breese landed the prototype XFT-1 without authorization at Glendale California at a Curtiss Wright Technical Institute location, and pictures of the XFT-1 were leaked to Janes AWA. It was fitted with a more powerful R-1510 engine in August 1934, but this did not improve performance, and it was returned to Northrop for more major modifications, being fitted with larger tail surfaces and a Pratt & Whitney R-1535 Twin Wasp Junior radial engine, being redesignated XFT-2.

The XFT-2 was redelivered to Anacostia in April 1936, where it was found that while its performance had only slightly improved, its handling was even poorer than before, and it was rejected by the U.S. Navy as unairworthy. It was ordered to be returned to Northrop, and ignoring instructions to ship the aircraft back to Northrop’s El Segundo factory, a test pilot attempted to fly the XFT-2 back to California, the aircraft entering a spin and crashing when crossing the Allegheny Mountains on July 21, 1936.

The design formed the basis of the Northrop 3A, almost identical to the XFT except for a retractable undercarriage, which first flew in 1935. It was another failure, having a tendency for unintentional spins. After the 3A and its test pilot, Lieutenant Frank Scare, disappeared without trace on a flight over the Pacific Ocean off California on 30 July 1935, Northrop abandoned the 3A project and sold its blueprints to Chance Vought Aviation.

Variants

XFT-1: Initial prototype of this naval fighter powered by a Wright Whirlwind radial.

Role: Fighter

Manufacturer: Northrop Corporation

First flight: 18 December 1933 at Los Angeles

Number built: 1

Developed from: Northrop Delta

Variants: Northrop 3A

Crew: one

Length: 21 ft 11 in (6.68 m)

Wingspan: 32 ft 0 in (9.75 m)

Height: 9 ft 5 in (2.87 m)

Wing area: 177 ft² (16.4 m²)

Empty weight: 2,489 lb (1,120 kg)

Loaded weight: 3,756 lb (1,704 kg)

Maximum takeoff weight: 4,003 lb (1,816 kg)

Powerplant: 1 × Wright R-1510-26 14-cylinder air cooled radial engine, 625 hp (466 kW)

Maximum speed: 235 mph (204 kn, 378 km/h) at 6,000 ft (1,380 m)

Range: 976 mi (849 nmi, 1,570 km)

Service ceiling: 26,500 ft (8,075 m)

Climb to 6,000 ft (1,830 m): 2.6 minutes

Guns: 2 × .30 in (7.62 mm) M1919 Browning machine guns

Bombs: 2 × 116 lb (53 kg) bombs

XFT-2: redesignated as the XFT-2 after some major modifications and fitting of a Pratt & Whitney R-1535 Twin Wasp Junior.

Northrop 3A: Further development of the FT as a land-based fighter, almost identical to the XFT except for retractable undercarriage.

Vought V-143: Development by Vought after the purchase of the Northrop 3A design.

Vought V-150: The V-143 fitted with a 525 hp (391 kW) R-1535.

Vought AXV: Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service designation of the V-143 evaluated in Japan.

 

Northrop XFT-1, BuNo 9400, 18 January 1934.

Northrop XFT-1.

Northrop XFT-2, 1936.

Northrop XFT-2, 1936.

Northrop XFT.

Northrop XFT-1.

Boeing XAT-15 Crewmaker: American Bomber Crew Trainer

The Boeing AT-15 was an American twin-engined bomber crew trainer designed and built by Boeing's Wichita Division. Only two prototypes, designated XAT-15, were built. Plans to build over 1,000 were cancelled on the United States' entry into the Second World War.

Development

One of the first projects for the former Stearman Aircraft Company which in 1939 had become the Wichita Division of Boeing was a twin-engined trainer for bomber crews. Designated X-120 by the company, two examples were ordered by the United States Army Air Corps as the XAT-15. The AT-15 was a high-wing cantilever monoplane with two wing-mounted Pratt & Whitney R-1340 Wasp radial engines. It had a retractable tailwheel landing gear and an extended glazed fuselage nose for the trainee bomb-aimer. Due to shortage of materials, the aircraft was built of welded steel tube covered with plywood, with wooden wings and tail unit. The two aircraft were delivered to the USAAC, but after the country's entry into the war a change in priorities resulted in the planned order for more than 1,000 aircraft not being placed.

Role: Bomber-crew trainer

National origin: United States

Manufacturer: Boeing Wichita

First flight: 1942

Primary user: United States Army Air Corps

Number built: 2

Length: 42 ft 4 in (12.90 m)

Wingspan: 59 ft 8 in (18.19 m)

Wing area: 457 sq ft (42.46 m2)

Empty weight: 10,640 lb (4,826 kg)

Gross weight: 14,355 lb (6,511 kg)

Powerplant: 2 × Pratt & Whitney R-1340-AN-1 Wasp radial piston engine , 600 hp (447 kW) each

Maximum speed: 207 mph (333 km/h, 180 kn)

Range: 850 mi (1,368 km, 740 nmi)

Service ceiling: 18,900 ft (5,760 m)

Armament:

4 x 0.3in (7.62mm) machine-gun

10 x 100lb (45kg) bomb

Operator

United States: United States Army Air Corps

Boeing Stearman XAT-15 trainer (41-23162), 1942. The name "Crewmaker" was never officially applied.

Boeing Stearman XAT-15 trainer (41-23162).

Boeing Stearman XAT-15 trainer (41-23162).

Boeing Stearman XAT-15 trainer (41-23162).

Boeing Stearman XAT-15 trainer (41-23162).

Boeing Stearman XAT-15 trainer (41-23162).

Boeing Stearman XAT-15 trainer (41-23162).

Boeing Stearman XAT-15 trainer.

A period advertisement by McDonnell featuring the Crewmaker, which the company was supposed to produce then.

Boeing Stearman XAT-15 trainer.

Boeing Stearman XAT-15 trainer.

The Lessons of Air Power by General of the Army H. H. Arnold

Modern warfare on a global scale involves not only Ground, Naval, and Air Forces but civilians of all walks of life. The danger zone of modern war is not restricted to battle lines and adjacent areas but extends to the innermost parts of a nation.

The development of air power has greatly lessened the value of natural barriers and static defense installations, for aircraft can deliver devastating blows at centers of population, industry, and government. The initial attack of Germany on Poland, 1 September 1939, and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941, that drew the United States into World War II were both aerial at-tacks. It is significant that the last important action of the war, the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, was also an air operation.

While it would not be true to say that World War II was won entirely by air power, it is true that American air power, supported by American industry and the American people, made a unique and positive contribution to victory. Air power shortened the war and was responsible for an enormous saving in American lives and in the material of warfare.

When the Japanese made their surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States was not as a nation prepared for war. But defeat there, was a signal for unprecedented effort. The Army Air For-ces, instrument of American air power, was developed into a destructive force unparalleled in history by hundred-fold expansion and development in the comparatively brief space of four years. Time was on our side—because our allies held the enemy in Europe until we were prepared to engage him. Space was on our side—because in 1941 the natural barrier of distance had not been overcome by our enemies as it has since been overcome by us, with our aircraft capable of flying 10,000 miles. Today Japanese and German cities lie in ruins, monuments to the destructiveness of air power and reminders that without adequate air power to protect them our own cities could become ruins in a future war.

Lessons of World War II

From the experience of World War II certain lessons are to be learned. Most important is the les-son that the only defense against attack by air power is superior air power. The peacetime mission of the Air Force is to achieve superiority for American air power and thereby to contribute to the security of the United States. Certain requirements essential to the success of that mission should become more generally appreciated.

Air power is not composed alone of the war-making components of aviation. It is the total aviation activity of a nation—civilian and military, commercial and private, potential as well as existing. It includes a nation’s ability to deliver cargo, people, destructive missiles, and war-making potential through the air to a desired destination to accomplish a desired purpose.

Military air power—or air force—is dependent upon the air potential provided by industry which, in turn, thrives best in an atmosphere of individual initiative and free enterprise. The remarkable development of American air power during World War II is a tribute to American industry and to American labor. At the present time plans for the defense of America include the prime requirement of industrial preparedness. Particularly would a vast expansion of the aviation industry in a time of war be a major necessity under present conditions of warfare.

An air force is also dependent upon science, upon scientific research and the application of its results, to advance theory, technical knowledge, and the material of aerial warfare. The rate of obsolescence of air force materiel is exceptionally rapid. Today as another essential of national defense we have an intensive program of scientific research and development.

A modern air force must have flexibility of basic structure, which will permit it to adapt itself successfully to the changes which are certain to come in the foreseeable future. Whatever its numerical size—and today it is about one-seventh of what it was on V-E Day, 1945—our Air Force must be second to none in range and striking power or in the efficiency of its organization. Experiences of World War II have suggested the basic organization of the peacetime Air Force which was effected within five months after the end of the war.

Above all, air leaders must have a clear understanding of the strategic concept of air power. The theory upon which we based our major air operations in World War II and on which are based all plans for our present and future defense was not new when first employed in the war. Its application, however, was new; and in the course of the war the original concept was greatly extended. Our strategic bombing attacks on our enemies so depleted their specific industrial and economic resources and so weakened the will of their people to resist that continued resistance became useless, perhaps impossible. Particularly as employed against Japan was the concept proved by the by results. Japan surrendered unconditionally with large armies undefeated and in control of nearly three million square miles of land populated by 500,000,000 people. The war was won without the necessity for an invasion.

If we remember these four years well enough, we shall determine with firmer resolve to maintain air power adequate to forbid aggression and to guard the peace that is priceless to the peoples of all the world.

General of the Army H. H. Arnold.

 

Gen. Henry H. Arnold (center), Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, and Col. Ariel W. Nielsen (left), Commanding officer of the 350th Fighter Group, 22nd Tactical Air Command, fighter arm of the 12th Air Force, confer with Brig. Gen. Robert S. Israel Jr., Commanding General of the 62nd Wing, while on an inspection tour of one of the fighter bases in the Mediterranean Theater of operations.

Lt. Gen. Henry "Hap" Arnold, commanding general of the Army Air Forces, addresses four flying schools, the largest group of aviation cadets ever gathered, in December 1942. He promised to boost U.S. aerial combat capability to ten times that of Axis forces.