Modern warfare on a global scale involves not only Ground, Naval, and Air Forces but civilians of all walks of life. The danger zone of modern war is not restricted to battle lines and adjacent areas but extends to the innermost parts of a nation.
The development of air power has greatly lessened the value of natural barriers and static defense installations, for aircraft can deliver devastating blows at centers of population, industry, and government. The initial attack of Germany on Poland, 1 September 1939, and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941, that drew the United States into World War II were both aerial at-tacks. It is significant that the last important action of the war, the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, was also an air operation.
While it would not be true to say that World War II was won entirely by air power, it is true that American air power, supported by American industry and the American people, made a unique and positive contribution to victory. Air power shortened the war and was responsible for an enormous saving in American lives and in the material of warfare.
When the Japanese made their surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States was not as a nation prepared for war. But defeat there, was a signal for unprecedented effort. The Army Air For-ces, instrument of American air power, was developed into a destructive force unparalleled in history by hundred-fold expansion and development in the comparatively brief space of four years. Time was on our side—because our allies held the enemy in Europe until we were prepared to engage him. Space was on our side—because in 1941 the natural barrier of distance had not been overcome by our enemies as it has since been overcome by us, with our aircraft capable of flying 10,000 miles. Today Japanese and German cities lie in ruins, monuments to the destructiveness of air power and reminders that without adequate air power to protect them our own cities could become ruins in a future war.
Lessons of World War II
From the experience of World War II certain lessons are to be learned. Most important is the les-son that the only defense against attack by air power is superior air power. The peacetime mission of the Air Force is to achieve superiority for American air power and thereby to contribute to the security of the United States. Certain requirements essential to the success of that mission should become more generally appreciated.
Air power is not composed alone of the war-making components of aviation. It is the total aviation activity of a nation—civilian and military, commercial and private, potential as well as existing. It includes a nation’s ability to deliver cargo, people, destructive missiles, and war-making potential through the air to a desired destination to accomplish a desired purpose.
Military air power—or air force—is dependent upon the air potential provided by industry which, in turn, thrives best in an atmosphere of individual initiative and free enterprise. The remarkable development of American air power during World War II is a tribute to American industry and to American labor. At the present time plans for the defense of America include the prime requirement of industrial preparedness. Particularly would a vast expansion of the aviation industry in a time of war be a major necessity under present conditions of warfare.
An air force is also dependent upon science, upon scientific research and the application of its results, to advance theory, technical knowledge, and the material of aerial warfare. The rate of obsolescence of air force materiel is exceptionally rapid. Today as another essential of national defense we have an intensive program of scientific research and development.
A modern air force must have flexibility of basic structure, which will permit it to adapt itself successfully to the changes which are certain to come in the foreseeable future. Whatever its numerical size—and today it is about one-seventh of what it was on V-E Day, 1945—our Air Force must be second to none in range and striking power or in the efficiency of its organization. Experiences of World War II have suggested the basic organization of the peacetime Air Force which was effected within five months after the end of the war.
Above all, air leaders must have a clear understanding of the strategic concept of air power. The theory upon which we based our major air operations in World War II and on which are based all plans for our present and future defense was not new when first employed in the war. Its application, however, was new; and in the course of the war the original concept was greatly extended. Our strategic bombing attacks on our enemies so depleted their specific industrial and economic resources and so weakened the will of their people to resist that continued resistance became useless, perhaps impossible. Particularly as employed against Japan was the concept proved by the by results. Japan surrendered unconditionally with large armies undefeated and in control of nearly three million square miles of land populated by 500,000,000 people. The war was won without the necessity for an invasion.
If we remember these four years well enough, we shall determine with firmer resolve to maintain air power adequate to forbid aggression and to guard the peace that is priceless to the peoples of all the world.
General of the Army H. H. Arnold. |
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