American and German Field Artillery in the Battle of the Bulge

Empty shell casings near gun section, Elsenborn Ridge, 1944.

by Charles P. Biggio Jr., Colonel USA Ret

Facts About the German 88

Accounts on the Battle of the Bulge remind us that many of the U.S. infantrymen who fought in the Bulge were woefully uninformed about the German Artillery — and his own artillery as well. This is not surprising, since the military training of most GIs had not included any formal instructions on the artillery weapons, organization, or tactics of the German or the American artillery.

What he picked up on his own about the artillery was sometimes misinformation based on myth, rumor, unreliable press articles, and "common knowledge." As a result, many infantrymen developed a distorted view of the artillery of the two nations. Often, these views exaggerated the power of the German weapons (especially the German 88mm gun) — and tended to disparage the American weapons as obsolete and qualitatively inferior to the Germans.

The purpose of this paper is to dispel some of those misperceptions — and to provide my fellow veterans with a factual account of the artillery of both sides in the Battle of the Bulge.

American Field Artillery in 1944: Obsolete or Modern?

Perhaps a brief review of the changes made in the U.S. Field Artillery between the Great Wars will best answer this question.

During World War I the artillery arm of the AEF was equipped entirely with French (mostly the famous French 75mm gun), and a few British pieces. At that time the French weapons were technologically superior and were plentiful.

After the war, the U.S. decided to equip its peacetime army with the French World War I weapons. However, even before the war ended, some American artillery officers found defects in the French guns — and the U.S. Field Artillery School at Fort Sill OK, took the lead in calling for the modernization of the U.S. Field Artillery — and the replacing of all foreign weapons with improved weapons of American design. In response, several War Department Boards examined the question — including, among other things, replacing the French 75 with a new 105mm howitzer as the main division artillery piece.

In the 1920s, progress on the modernization project was slow due to limited funds, pacifism, and conservative tendencies in the Army, and the availability of surplus weapons. Despite these obstacles some progress was made on designing a new 105mm howitzer and other weapons. In the 1930s, the Field Artillery School kept pushing for the new weapons and the pace of modernization increased despite the effects of the Great Depression. However, there was continued resistance from conservative senior officers to replacing the 75 with a 105 howitzer. As late as 1939, General George C. Marshall still opposed it because of the cost involved. Nevertheless, with encouragement from the artillery school, innovative Artillery and ordnance officers continued in the 30s to experiment with new gun designs — and by the end of the decade prototypes had been developed for the howitzers and guns which saw action in World War II. Also in the 1930s after much debate, a decision was made to begin motorizing the Field Artillery (which was horse-drawn) — and by the end of the decade 75 percent of the division artillery had been motorized.

In May 1940, the Germans easily defeated the French and British with a new type of mobile armored welfare — and including the 105mm howitzer as their main divisional artillery weapon. In June the U.S. War Department finally announced that the U.S. division artillery would be armed with the new 105mm howitzer and the 155mm howitzer. And in 1942, the decision was made to fully motorize the U.S. Field Artillery. When the first American combat troops landed in North Africa in Algeria in November 1942, the First U.S. Infantry Division was armed with the new 105mm howitzer M2A1 — and by the time the Division landed in Sicily in July 1943, it also had the new 155mm howitzer, M1. Moreover, all of the Division's artillery was motorized.

By the Battle of the Bulge (hereinafter referred to as the Bulge) in December 1944, all American artillery units had been equipped with new American weapons. The new weapons entered the service on the following dates:

105mm howitzer - November 1942

155mm howitzer - July 1943

155mm gun - December 1941

4.5-inch gun (originally of UK design)

90mm gun - 1943

8-inch howitzer - 1942

240mm howitzer - 1943

Self-Propelled:

105mm howitzer - 1943

155mm gun - 1944

Thus, in the space of just over two decades and against formidable obstacles, the U.S. Army had managed to replace all of its World War I artillery pieces with new, modern howitzers and guns — and to convert from horse-drawn to motorized artillery. Ian Hogg, the noted British expert on World War II artillery believes the U.S. was so successful with its weapon program because its total focus was on creating new weapons. In contrast the German designers tried to overhaul current service weapons while designing new ones — thus not giving full attention to the new ones.

The American artillery weapons in the Bulge were not retrograde pieces of World War I vintage, but were virtually new — and in fact newer than many of the comparable German weapons of that day. How these new American weapons compared in quality with like weapons in the German Army will be discussed later in this paper.

Artillery Weapons and Organization in the Bulge

In order to keep this article reasonably short — and to facilitate comparisons of the artillery of the two nations, the discussion will be limited to the artillery which participated in the Battle of Elsenborn; i.e., the artillery of 6th Panzer Army on the German side and the artillery of the opposing U.S. V Corps (-).

The Tactical Situation, Elsenborn Sector, as the Battle Begins on 16 December 1944

For his counteroffensive Hitler decided to attack with three Armies in the thinly held Belgian Ardennes. The main effort would be made on the right by the tank heavy 6th Panzer Army in the Elsenborn Sector between Monschau and Losheim — where the Germans expected to encounter only one Infantry Division (the 99th) and a light Cavalry Group. Sixth Panzer Army included four SS Panzer Divisions, four infantry divisions, and a large artillery force — supported by a parachute drop and Skorzeney's Special Operations Group. The four SS Panzer Divisions were charged with exploiting the gaps opened up by the infantry divisions — and making a lightning dash to the Meuse River, Liege, and Antwerp. They expected to easily penetrate the 99th's widely dispersed defenses.

Much to their surprise, the Germans soon learned that they had failed to detect the presence of a second infantry division (the 2nd Infantry Division) in the 99th's sector. Moreover, the Germans had not anticipated that the Americans could reinforce the area with two additional divisions (the 1st Infantry Division at Butgenbach and the 9th Infantry Division at Monschau) by 19 Dec.

The Germans and American Artillery "Order of Battle" — Elsenborn, 16 Dec. 1944

As the Battle of Elsenborn began on 16 Dec. 1944, the German artillery of 6th Panzer Army greatly outnumbered the guns of the opposing U.S. V Corps elements — 1,222 to 314. (Thus belying the myth that the American artillery always outnumbered the Germans.)

The division artillery of the Germans and the American infantry divisions were surprisingly similar — both in weapons and organization. Both opted for a 105mm howitzer as the main close support weapon and for a medium howitzer of about 150mm.

At the Corps level there were noticeable differences in both weapons and organization. The Germans had a greater variety of cannon (including some Russian) and a much larger number and variety of rockets and very heavy guns. Organizationally, the Germans had no Corps Artillery Headquarters as such — and their non-divisional artillery was grouped into Volks Artillery Korps (VAKs), Werfer Brigades, and very heavy batteries.

The German 88mm guns were obviously not the main close support weapon in the German Army — that function belonged to the 105mm howitzer. In the entire 6th Panzer Army there were only 216 towed 88s out of a total of 1,222 pieces — and most 88s were flak guns whose main mission was anti-aircraft defense. And note that there were no 88s in any of the German Infantry Divisions (VGDs).

One of the most notable advances in artillery weapons technology in World War II was the proximity fuse. In both of the Great wars, the fuses available for achieving air bursts were quit unsatisfactory — requiring daily registrations and settings at the guns. Needed, was a fuse that would explode the shell when it arrived in the proximity of the target — without registrations and individual settings. The U.S. put some of its best electronic and engineering experts on this very complicated problem. By 1944 the U.S. had built an operational proximity fuse for use against ground targets and the artillerymen called it Pozit or VT (variable time). It consisted of a tiny battery and a transmitter/receiver which sent and received electronic emissions until the shell reached the optimum distance from the target — at which instant it detonated the shell.

When the German offensive began on 16 December 1944, General Eisenhower quickly released the new fuse for use in the ETO — and at Elsenborn it was first used on 19 December at Monschau. The new fuse was employed tentatively at first because of fears that it would endanger friendly troops and aircraft. (It could not discriminate between friend and foe.) Therefore, the fuse was not fully exploited at Elsenborn during the Bulge. Nevertheless, the Pozit Fuse was one of the great technological achievements of World War II. (Note: Over the years, the U.S. Field Artillery resolved the safety problems and during the ongoing war in Iraq, the Pozit fuse has been used with excellent results.)

Quality of the Weapons: A Comparison

Since many Americans believe that the German artillery weapons firing at them were superior in quality to those of the Americans, we shall compare the close support weapons; that is, those guns which did most of the firing against enemy personnel — of both nations by assessing their respective characteristics.

Since this article focuses mainly on the close support weapons, only the principle light and medium pieces of the divisional artillery will be considered.

There was not much difference in the quality of the divisional weapons of the two sides. The American pieces have the edge in shell power, range, elevation, and transport — while the German weapons were slightly lighter (desirable for close support missions) and had more on-carriage traverse. In many cases the American weapon was as good as its counterpart in the German Army — and in some cases was better. The notion that the American guns/howitzers of the division artillery were somehow inferior to those of the Germans in the Bulge is without merit.

Three Basic Artillery Functions

A significant aspect of the American artillery's performance in the Ardennes (and elsewhere) was not so much in the number of its tubes, but in its excellence in performing the three basic functions of the field artillery: shoot, move, and communicate.

The "Shoot" or Gunnery Function

The Americans called the shooting aspect of their mission gunnery. This function involved all of the activities incident to placing artillery fire on the target. Gunnery in World War II was the area where the American artillery made its most significant contribution — and particularly its use of massed fires.

Massed Fires

As a result of experiences in World War I, the major powers had seen the need to improve their abilities to mass the fires of their division artillery. However, most nations were bounded by tradition and habit and were slow to make the necessary changes to bring this about. Only the U.S. was willing to make a clean break with the past and to restructure its entire artillery command and control structure in pursuit of a mass fire capability. Leading the way for the Americans was the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, where in the 1920s a group of farsighted, innovative young officers became convinced that achieving such a capability should be a top priority. After much deliberation, they decided that in order to mass the fires of a division it would be necessary to make two major structural changes.

First, fire control within the battalion would have to be centralized at battalion headquarters rather than remain decentralized to the firing batteries. Hence the battalion commander would exercise fire control instead of the firing battery commanders. This idea caused great dismay among older artillery officers who liked the old arrangement and adamantly opposed diluting the authority of the firing battery commander. Despite high-level opposition to their ideas well into the 1930s, the officers at Ft. Sill knew that centralization was key to their success — so insisted on this change.

Secondly, to provide the battalion commander with the means to control the fires of the three batteries, Ft. Sill created a fire direction center (FDC) on the battalion staff to be manned by highly trained gunnery experts. All requests for fire would be funneled to the FDC where they would be processed, and fire commands relayed directly to the firing battery exec at the howitzer position. By 1934 Ft. Sill had developed a prototype FDC and in 1940 an innovative new graphical firing table was invented to help the FDC speed up its calculations.

With war looming in 1941, the war department finally approved the FDC system for the divisions — and FDCs were installed throughout the artillery. Refinements in the system continued to be made at Ft. Sill and in the units from 1941 to 1943. One of the most notable refinements was the time-on-target (TOT) mission in which not only are all batteries concentrated on one target, but the projectiles are programmed to arrive at the target at nearly the same moment. Hence, enemy personnel in the open are engulfed before they can take cover.

Subsequent combat operations proved the value of the massed fire and TOT techniques. In the Bulge, American divisions had no problem massing the fires of their 48 organic pieces of artillery. Although the massing of fires was normally limited to the fires of one division, at Elsenborn, by 20 December there were four divisions defending the critical hinge of the northern shoulder. The V Corps Artillery Commander, Brig. Gen. Helmick, seized the moment and authorize the 2nd Division Artillery to coordinate the fires of all four divisions. On 22 December, the fires of three divisions (129 available guns) were massed by the 2nd Infantry Division on a single target. (It never became necessary during the battle to mass the fires of all four divisions.) On the 22nd, the 2nd Division fired 63 TOTs — mostly with 44 guns per mission.

The distinguished military historian, Trevor N. Dupuy believed that the U.S. FDC system was perhaps the most important reason why the U.S. artillery, by the end of World War II was "best in the world."

The Germans too were aware of the advantages of massed fires and tried to develop a capability during the Russian campaign. By February of 1944, their system had failed and they decided to design a new one. The new system involved a "fire control battery" to be attached to and to control the fires of each Volks Artillery Korps (VAKs). This system got its first test in the Bulge but ran into problems at the start. For example, there was only one fire control battery available in the 6th Panzer Army during the entire campaign — and it was not particularly effective. It was readily apparent to experienced American artillerymen that the Germans at Elsenborn were not massing their fires effectively in support of their attacks.

Air Observation

Another aspect of the gunnery was observation. Artillery fire is most accurate when it can be adjusted to the target by a trained observer. To ensure that they had good observation during World War II, armies employed both ground and air observers. Air observation had the advantage of being able to see deeper into enemy lines (and better detect targets like enemy artillery) — but the disadvantage of being limited by the weather. An artillery air observation capability was desired by all armies of that period.

In June 1942, the War Department decided that the field artillery should have an air observation capability, and two Piper Cub planes were authorized at battalion and higher levels.

In the Bulge, whenever the weather permitted, the American artillerymen made maximum use of their observation planes — with excellent results. German General Thoholte later noted that American artillery directed by air observation was "exceptionally good" and fire directed by air observation "usually knocked out" its target.

On the German side at Elsenborn, the situation was quite different because they no longer could fly cub planes in daylight because of U.S. air superiority. Therefore, the artillery of 6th Panzer Army had no air observation capability in the Battle of the Bulge.

Mobility

In addition to being able to shoot, the field artillery must be capable of moving — and mobility was especially desired for the close support units of the division artillery. Mobility is required not only to transport the howitzers from one position to the next — but also to resupply the units with ammunition, fuel, and food. As noted earlier, howitzers are not much use if they cannot be supplied with ammunition.

In World War I, field artilleries were horse-drawn. In the 1920s the reformers at Fort Sill began urging that the U.S. Field Artillery be motorized. Despite considerable opposition to the idea, by 1935 the U.S. Army had begun to replace its horses with trucks. When the Germans demonstrated in 1940 what could be accomplished with highly mobile forces, the U.S. Army accelerated the pace of its motorization. By 1942, all American field artillery units had been fully motorized.

At Elsenborn, the excellent mobility of the artillery of the 99th and the 2nd Infantry Divisions enable them to minimize their losses when Col. Peiper's Panzers broke through on their right flank.

The mobility of the German artillery was quite another story. Americans have been led to believe by World War II film documentaries that the whole German Army in the Bulge was highly mobile. However, in the 1930s, the Germans had decided not to motorize the infantry divisions. Hence, for most of World War II the artillery of the German infantry divisions was horse-drawn. In 1944, some of the light battalions were provided with captured and other vehicles — but the 150mm howitzer units remained horse-drawn and about half of the light battalions of the VAKs. Some units resorted to using a single prime mover for every three or four pieces.

In the Bulge, an acute shortage of gasoline further reduced the mobility of the German artillery. Because of the lack of transport and fuel, the German field artillery was not able to keep up with the advancing Panzers. For example, it took the 388th VAK four days to move its six battalions to the next position — a distance of only 12 miles. And only about half of the German Corps Artillery was able to follow in the wake of the offensive.

During the offensive, both armies at Elsenborn faced problem of re-supplying their firing batteries with ammunition — the Germans because of transport and fuel shortages, and the Americans because their main supply route was cut early — and their ammunition dump was endangered and evacuated. The Germans were unable to solve their ammo re-supply problems — while the Americans, thanks to their superior mobility, were able to solve theirs quite handily.

Communications

To perform its shooting (gunnery) function the field artillery must be able to communicate with higher, lower, and supported units. When the FDC system was being developed it became evident that in order to exercise the control necessary to mass fires the FDC would have to be provided with an elaborate, redundant, and reliable communication network involving the forward observers, FDC, and the gun batteries. Moreover, it should be an independent artillery system which did not rely on the infantry for wire links.

In World War II the primary means of communications was by phones — field wire in the infantry divisions. Radio was considered a "back up" means. During the Bulge, the American communication system generally performed well. During the first few days, there were some disruptions to wire lines cut by shell fire — but these were usually repaired with dispatch.

Regarding German artillery communications during the Bulge not much information is available at the division level. We do know that the senior artillery officer of 6th Panzer Army did not have independent artillery wire/radio links to his subordinate units — such as the system available to his counterpart in U.S. V Corps, Brig. Gen. Helmick.

The German 88mm Gun

Introduction

The German 88mm gun is the best known artillery weapon of World War II. American combat veterans of the ETO have strong feelings about this particular weapon because they firmly believe that the 88 was the artillery piece that did most of the firing against them. Veterans tend to describe the 88 as a "super gun" "terrifying," "pervasive," and "scourge of the battlefield." By the Battle of the Bulge, the 88s had attained an almost mythical aura with the GIs and almost all German incoming artillery rounds, regardless of caliber, were referred to as "88s" by the troops.

But did these beliefs represent an accurate assessment of the 88 as a field artillery weapon — or were they an exaggeration of its role as an anti-personnel weapon?

The following is my attempt to answer this question — and hopefully, to provide some interesting facts about the 88s to my fellow veterans:

Development of the 88mm FLAK gun

In 1925, the German Luftwaffe anticipated the need for a heavy anti-aircraft gun. Because of restrictions of the Versailles Treaty, the first gun was not produced until 1933 as the 88mm Flak 18. As war loomed in the mid-30s's, efforts were made continually to upgrade the Flak 88s — and new models were introduced in 1936, 1939, and 1942. As anti-aircraft guns, these weapons were placed under the Luftwaffe — with the mission of defending against enemy aircraft in both the Homeland and on the battlefields. During World War II the Germans built about 18,000 88s.

The 88mm Flak 18: Entered the service in 1933. The gun featured a single-tube barrel on a pedestal, and an ingenious semi-automatic breech and a cruciform platform carriage.

The 88mm Flak 36: Entered the service in 1936. Because of flaws in the Flak 18, the Germans redesigned the weapon and produced the Flak 36. This gun had a new three-piece barrel so the section near the chamber could be replaced separately. The basic mounting was changed from an octagonal to a square shape — and the piece was provided a new carriage.

The 88mm Flak 37: Entered the service in 1939. It employed a new improved data transmission system for finer control. And a simpler barrel construction of only two segments.

The 88mm Flak 41: Entered the service in 1942. This version of the Flak 88 was designed to enhance the weapon's capability as an anti-aircraft weapon by significantly increasing its maximum range. The Flak 41 could reach almost 9,000 feet higher than the Flak 37. It also had improved ballistics, an increase in the rate of fire, a new, longer tube, and new mounting and ammunition.

Uses of the FLAK Guns: 1936 to 1945

The Flak 18 was originally built to be an anti-aircraft gun and initially that was its only function. However, during the Spanish Civil War in 1936-37 it was discovered that the 88 could be used effectively as an anti-tank gun. However, it was not till 1941-42 that Rommel fully exploited its anti-tank capability with great success in the North African campaign. There, the treeless, flat terrain was ideal for the high velocity, flat trajectory weapon. Another advantage was that the Germans had many 88s while the Allies had no comparable heavy anti-tank gun. This disparity — plus German propaganda, helped trigger the "myth of the 88s."

The Flak 36 also was basically an anti-aircraft gun — but by the time it came on line, it was seen as a multiple purpose gun; that is, both as an anti-aircraft and anti-tank/field gun. However, during the invasion of Belgium and France in 1940 the flak guns were used mostly as anti-aircraft weapons — and only occasionally for anti-tank and anti-pillbox purposes.

The Flak 37 was a modification of the 36. By this time it was anticipated that large numbers of Flak 88s would be needed to defend the Homeland — and to provide the field units with both aircraft and tank defenses. In 1943, during the large tank battles in Russia, the Germans made good use of their 36s and 37s as heavy anti-tank weapons. And again when the Allies landed in Normandy, the Flak 88s were in great demand both as anti-aircraft and as anti-tank/field guns. During the Battle of the Bulge, when the weather cleared on 24 Dec., German armored formations looked to the Flak 88s to protect them from Allied planes which had air superiority. In addition, some anti-tank missions were fired — and a lesser number of close support missions. In the Bulge the German Flak 88 still greatly outnumbered the American heavy anti-aircraft guns. The excellent new 90mm gun performed the same multiple tasks as the Flaks — but were much fewer in number.

The Flak 41 had been built primarily to improve the anti-aircraft defense of key installations in the Homeland — and they were used for that purpose. Only a few of the Flak 41s ever saw action with the ground forces — and those were rarely used in the anti-tank/field role in the Bulge.

Development of the 88mm PAK Gun

As early as 1941 the German Army began expressing a requirement for an 88mm gun which would be used exclusively as a heavy anti-tank/field gun — with no anti-aircraft capability. Krupp came up with an excellent gun — the 88mm Pak 43 which entered the service in 1943. The next year a new version was available, the Pak 43/41 — and it was a superior anti-tank weapon. In the Battle of the Bulge two units of the 6th Panzer Army were equipped with the 43/41. The 388 VAK had one battalion of 18 guns — and the 683 Panzer Jaeger Abt had 36. The hilly, broken terrain of the Ardennes was not ideal for the employment of a heavy anti-tank gun like the deserts of North Africa had been, or the plains of Russia. Moreover, there were too few 43/41s to make much difference in the Bulge.

In summary, in the Battle of the Bulge the Germans employed two different types of towed 88s — a Flak and a Pak. The Flag guns were by far the more numerous and the gun performed three roles on the battlefield: anti-aircraft, anti-tank, and close support. As an anti-aircraft gun it was a good weapon. As an anti-aircraft gun it was superior. And as a close support gun it was only fair (as compared to the 105mm howitzer). The Paks were strictly anti-tank/field guns and were a superior anti-tank weapon. A late entry in the war, the Paks participated in the Bulge, but in limited numbers.

The Myth of the 88

The myth was born in North Africa with Rommel's great success with the 88 as an anti-tank gun. At that time the Germans had plenty 88s while the U.S. and the UK had no comparable heavy anti-tank gun. German propaganda publicized it as an all-conquering super-weapon. The U.S. and UK infantrymen somehow came to believe the 88 was a major threat not only to tanks but to the infantry as well. In 1943 reports from the big tank battles in Russia extolled the prowess of the 88s as the only anti-tank gun that could stop the new Russian T-34 tank. By the Bulge in 1944, most U.S. combat infantrymen were fully persuaded that the 88 was their main nemesis on the battlefield — and they invariably yelled "88s" upon hearing an incoming round. Ian Hogg, the noted English expert on the artillery of World War II, noted this tendency in his book on the German artillery of World War II. And I personally noticed it as a forward observer at Elsenborn.

Myth vs. Reality

Did the myth represent the truth about the 88s threat to the infantry? Was the 88 the main anti-personnel artillery piece in the German Army? The role of firing against opposing front line troops was the responsibility of the German Division artillery — which included several light battalions mostly of 105mm howitzers, a medium battalion, and an anti-aircraft battalion. The Panzer division's anti-aircraft element included a heavy 88 battalion which occasionally fired anti-personnel missions. But in the Panzer divisions there were about twice as many 105 howitzers as there were 88s. In 1944, the German Infantry (Volksgrenadier) Division had no heavy anti-aircraft unit and there was not a single 88 gun in the entire division in the Bulge.

Conclusions

The U.S. Field Artillery in World War II

There is no merit to the allegations that the U.S. Field Artillery fought World War II with obsolete weapons of inferior quality. All of the American howitzers and guns were virtually new and compared quite favorably with those of the Germans — and they were more highly motorized. In the area of artillery technology, the American proximity fuse was an achievement unmatched by the Germans, though the Germans were ahead in missile technology.

In the area of artillery operations, the Americans were noticeably more effective at controlling the fires of the artillery by mastery of the massed fire techniques.

The German 88s

Early in the war, the American infantry was misled into believing the 88 was more dangerous to men in the front lines than was actually the case. A myth developed and spread widely — and by the Battle of the Bulge, the U.S. infantrymen were persuaded that just about every artillery round fired at them were 88s. Actually, the 105mm howitzer was the German's main anti-personnel weapon — and fired many more rounds at the infantry than did the 88s — and with a larger shell.

Acknowledgements

My deep gratitude goes to the following for their assistance: Richard C. Anderson Jr., Danny Parker, Dan Rosen, Sue Thompson, Margaret A. Weaver, Ian Hogg, Boyd Dastrup, Rich Boyland, Dan Crowley, Charles Biggio III, and Lt. Gen. (USA-Ret) David E. Ott.

A 105mm howitzer from the 2nd Infantry Div. provides support during December 1944.

8-inch howitzer in action during the Bulge.

A 105mm howitzer section during the Bulge, 591st Field Artillery Battalion, 106th Infantry Division.

155mm Long Tom gun firing during the Battle of the Bulge.

White phosphorus shells fired on German positions during the Bulge.

155mm battery during the Battle of the Bulge.

8 inch howitzer on the move during the Bulge.

No matter what your job, it was dangerous. Artillery battalion mess sergeant lies dead after a German barrage, April 1945.

M7 Self-propelled 105mm ("Priest") near La Gleize, Belgium during the Battle of the Bulge.

Captured German 88mm Gun.

M1 155mm towed gun being set up for firing during the Bulge, December 1944.

Corporal Tony D'addio of Battery D, 460th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion labors to sight in a 75mm pack howitzer outside the Belgian town Logbierme, Belgium, December 18, 1944.

Abandoned artillery position of the U.S. Army during the Battle of the Bulge. The St. Vith area, Belgium, December 1944.

Gunners of the 244th Field Artillery Battalion fire a captured 88mm gun, 26 December 1944. American forces captured dozens of German artillery pieces.

 

Battle of the Bulge

Soldiers of the 325th Glider Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division of the US Army, photographed walking through the fog to a new position, in Ardennes, Belgium, on 20 December 1944.

by Major General James Gavin, U.S. Army

The 82nd Airborne Division, still awaiting reinforcements and much re-supply at its base camps in the general area of Rheims, France, moved 150 miles with its first combat elements going into position in less than twenty-four hours and the entire division closing in a new combat area in less than forty hours from the time of the initial alert. It fought, stopped, and held against the best divisions the German leader, Field Marshal Von Rundstedt, could pit against it, protecting the north shoulder of the Allied line, preventing the German breakthrough from turning north to Liege, Belgium, and providing a safe area through which trapped Allied units could withdraw from the breakthrough area. This it did despite the fact that its lines at times stretched more than 25,000 yards. Then, turning to the offense, the division set the pace for other units, forcing the enemy back through his famed Siegfried Line.

Men fought, at times, with only rifles, grenades and knives against German armor. They fought with only light weapons in waist-deep snow, in blizzards, in near zero temperatures and in areas where heavy forestation and the almost total lack of roads presented problems that only men of stout hearts and iron determination could overcome.

The battles of "The Bulge," ranking on a par with the brightest victories in the division's history, also proved again that planes and materiel are important but the most important essential of all is a fighting heart, a will to win. To the troopers of the line goes full credit for the brilliant record they made in the name of the 82nd Airborne Division.

The 82nd Airborne Division was located at Camps Suippes and Sissonne, France, undertaking normal ground divisional training when, on 17 December 1944, first orders were received to move to the east. At about 1930 hours, while at dinner with the staff, I received a phone call from Colonel Eaton, Chief of Staff, XVIII Corps (Airborne). He stated that he had just received a call from SHAEF to the effect that the situation on the front to the east appeared to be critical; that the airborne divisions were to be prepared to move twenty-four hours after daylight the following day; that the Corps Commander, General Ridgway, was in England and could not be contacted immediately. I instructed Colonel Eaton to issue orders to the commanding general of the 101st Airborne Division, Brigadier General McAuliffe, to prepare immediately for movement in accordance with the SHAEF estimate, twenty-four hours after daylight. I assembled my staff in the division war room at 2000 hours. I had listened to a radio news broadcast at 1800 hours and was aware of the fact that a German penetration was being made in the direction of St. Vith.

The division was ready for a quick move, since, because of our past usual quick commitments, we have maintained a high degree of readiness as a standard operating procedure. A basic load of ammunition was in the hands of each regiment, complete in all respects. Two "K" and two "D" rations for the division were at hand and could be distributed in a matter of hours. All weapons, uniforms and equipment were up to an operating standard. The staff assembled at 2000 hours when the initial directive was issued that started their planning.

I called General March at Camp Suippes at about 1945 hours, giving him the situation and alerting him for the move. Unit commanders at Camp Sissonne were assembled with the staff in the war room at 2100 hours when the situation was outlined to them and a tentative plan for the movement to Bastogne issued. At about 2130 hours I received a call from the Chief of Staff, XVIII Corps (Airborne), who said the corps had orders to move without delay in the direction of Bastogne where further orders would be received. He also said that corps was to be attached to the First United States Army. After further discussion, I decided that the 82nd Airborne Division would move approximately one hour after daylight and move in the direction of Bastogne. The 101st Airborne Division was to move at 1400 hours, 18 December, also in the direction of Bastogne. At that time Oise Base Section was devoting all its efforts to pulling in all transportation off the roads to provide the necessary lift for both divisions.

At 2330 I left with my G-1, Lieutenant Colonel Alfred W. Ireland, and my Aide, Captain Hugo V. Olson, for the command post of the First United States Army at Spa. The drive was very difficult due to the general conditions of the roads, rain and fog, and the absence of bridges on a number of important highways. I reported to General Hodges in person at about 0900 hours 18 December. At that time the situation appeared rather vague. The first reports of enemy contact at Stavelot were just coming in. It was reported that an enemy force at Stavelot had driven our troops across the river and had succeeded in capturing and destroying a large map supply. They apparently blew the bridge upon driving out our forces. The situation south and west of Stavelot was unknown except that the enemy had evidently overrun our front positions. There appeared to be a large force of U.S. troops centered on St. Vith. There also appeared to be a large pocket of the 106th Division surrounded in the Eifel.

After some staff discussion, the Commanding General, First U. S. Army, decided to attach the 82nd Airborne Division to V Corps. It was to close in an area in the vicinity of Werbomont. The 101st Airborne Division was to be attached to VIII Corps and would assemble in the vicinity of Bastogne. I placed a request with the First U. S. Army for tanks, tank destroyers, 4.2's [mortars] and medium artillery, and left the command post for Werbomont. At this time there was considerable movement west of service and command installations in and around Spa. It was apparently being evacuated.

I arrived at Werbomont at approximately mid-afternoon and immediately made a reconnaissance of the entire area. It offered excellent defensive possibilities, being the dominant terrain for many miles from the crossroads at Werbomont. At about 1600 hours I contacted an engineer platoon at the bridge at Hablemont. The bridge was prepared for demolition and they reported the Germans were in the immediate vicinity, coming over the main highway from Trois Ponts. At that time a number of civilians were very excitedly moving west on the Trois Ponts–Werbomont road. They all stated that the Germans had passed Trois Ponts and were "coming this way." I made a reconnaissance down the valley from Hablemont to the Ambléve River but encountered no enemy or any indication of his whereabouts. One bridge was still intact at Forge and was not prepared for demolition. Upon returning to Hablemont I asked the lieutenant at that bridge about it, but he appeared to be fully occupied with the means at his disposal of blowing the bridge at Hablemont. At about 1630 hours I left for Bastogne to meet General McAuliffe.

I reported to the VIII Corps command post in Bastogne and had a short conversation with General Middleton and talked to his G-2 and G-3. At that time the corps command post was preparing to move. The situation was very vague. The 28th Division officers present seemed to feel that their division had been overrun, although they were uncertain of its whereabouts. I met General McAuliffe, gave him his orders that he was to assemble in Bastogne, reporting to the corps commander of the VIII Corps, and I left, moving north and passing through Houffalize shortly after dark. I arrived in Werbomont at approximately 2000 hours, and about that time the first large group of 82nd vehicles started arriving.

A command post was established and troops disposed as rapidly as they arrived. Drivers and troops were very tired, having by this time been up for two nights. All during the night the staff worked on closing the vehicles into the Werbomont area. About two hours after daylight, 19 December, the division closed in that area.

In the meantime the first enemy contact was made at Hablemont. A road block of the 30th Division was contacted by a German armored reconnaissance party at about 1900 hours on the 18th. I visited the locality at daylight on 19 December and found about five armored vehicles, armored cars and self-propelled guns knocked out, with several German dead lying about the road. About a platoon of 2nd Battalion, 119th Infantry, was present. They reported that all of their road block party proper, despite having knocked out the German reconnaissance party, had either been killed or captured or had moved east. It appeared quite clear that this was a reconnaissance party of a German armored column that had been endeavoring to move from Trois Ponts to Werbomont and had succeeded in crossing the river at Forge. The Hablemont bridge was blown. At daylight, 19 December, it was learned that the north-south road from Bastogne to Werbomont had been cut by the Germans in the vicinity of Houffalize. The depth of this penetration was unknown, but there were rumors from truck drivers that the Germans were on the road in the vicinity of Hotton.

At 1100 hours, 19 December, orders were received to dispatch one infantry battalion and one platoon of tank destroyers to the area north of Hotton to block and clear all approaches from Hotton to the north, northwest and northeast. Permission was later obtained from the corps commander to send the battalion to Barvaux.

During the afternoon of 19 December, information and orders were received from Headquarters, XVIII Corps (Airborne), which had been established about one mile north of Werbomont, that the First Army was to hold along the general line Stoumont–Stavelot–Malmédy and counterattack in the direction of Trois-Ponts to halt the enemy's advance to the northwest. The XVIII Corps (Airborne) assumed command of the sector generally south of the Ambléve River to include Houffalize.

In compliance with instructions received from corps headquarters, the 504th Parachute Infantry advanced and seized the high ground northwest of Rahier, and the 505th Parachute Infantry advanced and seized the high ground in the vicinity of Haut-Bodeux. The 508th Parachute Infantry sent one company to the crossroads one mile east of Bra. The regiment, less one company, occupied the high ground in the vicinity of Chevron. The 325th Glider Infantry remained at Werbomont, having sent the third battalion to the vicinity of Barvaux and one company to the crossroads at Manhay. Those dispositions were consolidated during the night of 19-20 December, and patrols pushed to the front to gain contact with the enemy.

Shortly after daylight, 20 December, I met Colonel Reuben Tucker, 504th commanding officer, in the town of Rahier, at which time he had just received intelligence from civilians to the effect that approximately 125 vehicles, including approximately thirty tanks, had moved through the town the afternoon before, moving in the direction of Cheneux.

The information appeared to be reliable. It posed some interesting problems. It appeared that the Germans had given up hope of crossing the creek obstacle at Hablemont with their heavy armor and had turned to the main road through Stoumont–La Glieze. If this were the case, the seizure of the bridge over the Ambléve River at Cheneux was imperative if their further movement was to be blocked.

I ordered Colonel Tucker to move into the town of Cheneux without delay and, conditions permitting, to seize the bridge. It was imperative that the bridge be seized. If 125 armored vehicles engaged the 504th in the country around Rahier, we were in for some anxious moments, but we had come a long way to find the German and we had beaten, in the past, better units than these appeared to be, even with our limited means. There was but one thing to do, and that was to close with the enemy as rapidly as possible and destroy him by any means possible. But the seizure of the bridge was imperative.

Initial contact was made at the western exit of Cheneux by a patrol which had been sent from Rahier by the first battalion of the 504th. They fired on a German motorcyclist who was accompanied by a small patrol. Contact was first made on the ridge one-half mile west of Cheneux. This small patrol was followed by approximately a company of Germans moving along the ridge. They were engaged at once and a heavy fight took place, lasting all day long. This German force, we know now, was the advance guard of a reinforcement battalion of the 1st SS Panzer Division. The 1st Battalion of the 504th drove them back into Cheneux, the battalion commander setting up his command post in a building in the western limits of Cheneux on the main road during the hours of darkness of the first night. During the day, firing could be heard and some vehicular movement could be observed in the direction of La Gleize.

I went to the 505th Parachute Infantry where I found that they had contacted some engineers who remained in Trois Ponts. They had occasionally been under fire, but no major German force had moved through the town. All civilians in these northern regimental areas reported that many Germans and much armor had passed through. The situation south of the 505th in the direction of Vielsalm was vague. Reconnaissance was pushed in that direction.

On the afternoon of 20 December at about 1600 hours I was called to Headquarters, XVIII Corps (Airborne), to receive orders for an advance to the Vielsalm–Hebronval line. In the meantime, contact had been established with a German SS force, later identified as the 1st SS Panzer Division at Cheneux. First contacts indicated that they were well equipped and reasonably trained troops who would give us a good fight. It was with some difficulty that our first prisoners were taken. At about 1630, prior to leaving the division advance command post, which was now established at Hablemont, I had all unit commanders assembled, including the battalion commanders of the 508th. It was felt that speed was vital and if we were to move to Vielsalm with the mission to be assigned us by XVIII Corps (Airborne), we had to move without delay, regardless of conditions of light or darkness.

At corps headquarters I received information that they were advancing to the southeast and establishing an active defense along the line Vielsalm–Hebronval–Laroche; that this division, 82nd Airborne, would establish a defensive line from contact with the 30th Division, in the vicinity of La Glieze, to Cheneux–Trois-Ponts–Grant Halleux–Vielsalm–Salmchateau–Hebronval. Contact was to be immediately established with units reportedly cut off in the area of Vielsalm–St. Vith. The 3rd Armored Division was on our right and was to hold the sector from Hebronval west.

Orders to accomplish this were issued at the division command post at Hablemont shortly before dark, 20 December. Units moved promptly and by daylight were on their objectives, well organized and prepared to defend. Regiments were in the line in the order, left to right: 504th, 505th, 508th, 325th. One battalion of the 325th was held in division reserve in the vicinity of La Vaux. The division forward command post was established in the town of Lierneux at the railroad crossing on the northern edge of the town.

In Vielsalm, contact was made with General Hasbrouck who had established the command post of the 7th Armored Division in the town. The division was then fighting around St. Vith. West of Vielsalm, General Jones had established the command post of the 106th Division at Renceveaux. From a visit to both of these officers, I learned that the 7th Armored Division, except for battle losses, was intact and fighting with unit integrity. The 106th Division appeared to be rather badly chewed up and had but one regiment, the 424th Infantry, remaining, with some division artillery and divisional units. There were also present a regiment of the 28th Division, the 112th Infantry, in addition to a number of corps and larger units such as medium artillery.

On the left of the division very heavy fighting was taking place in the vicinity of Cheneux, where the German 1st SS Panzer Division was making a desperate and all-out effort to drive out the 1st Battalion of the 504th. Further south at Trois Ponts, and extending down to Grand Halleux, determined, apparently well planned and executed attacks were being made with increasing strength against the very thinly held front of the 505th. On the south, the 508th and the 325th had no contact with the enemy. The division reconnaissance platoon was pushed south. Information available indicated that the Germans were moving in great strength to the west, having passed Houffalize, and were moving towards the Meuse River. The 3rd Armored Division, which was supposed to be on the division's right, could not be contacted. I believe that on this date a reconnaissance party may have established contact.

On 21 December, I visited the command posts of the 7th Armored and 106th Divisions with the corps commander of XVIII Corps (Airborne), General Ridgway. The situation in the vicinity of St. Vith appeared to be critical. The town was being overwhelmingly attacked in several directions, and there appeared to be little prospect of preventing its being cut off. The corps commander informed me that his original plan was for the 30th Division to attack south from Stavelot to relieve the situation at St. Vith and for the 3rd Armored to attack on the right of the 82nd so as to drive in the Germans moving to the west. On this date, 21 December, however, only the narrow neck of land from Vielsalm to Salmchateau, held by the 82nd Airborne Division, connected the St. Vith forces with remaining forces of the First Army. Its retention would be decisive.

The fighting at Cheneux was increasing in bitterness. On this date the first battalion of the 504th, assisted by a company of the 3rd Battalion of that regiment, made a final, all-out assault on the Germans in that town and in close hand-to-hand fighting, many of the parachute troops jumping aboard the German half-tracks and knifing the Germans at their posts, the Germans were driven back across the Ambléve River and our troops seized the bridge. In this attack we destroyed a considerable amount of armor and killed and captured many Germans from the 1st SS Panzer Division.

Farther to the south and east, the 505th Parachute Infantry was having very hard fighting with the remainder of the 1st SS Panzer Division. The 505th had initially sent a covering force east of the Salm River in the vicinity of Trois Ponts. Through sheer weight of numbers this small force was finally driven to the river line where it held. Being very much overextended, the regiment managed to hold by diagnosing or estimating the point of German main effort from time to time and then marshaling all available infantry as quickly as possible, beating off the attack at that point. This process was repeated, where necessary, day and night until finally the German attacks waned in their intensity about 23 December.

The 508th Parachute Infantry on the Vielsalm–Salmchateau front was without enemy contact except for patrols. The 325th Glider Infantry, aided by the division reconnaissance platoon, had established contact with enemy forces several miles south of their front lines.

On 21 December, I was instructed by the corps commander to make a reconnaissance of the divisional area with a view to withdrawing, after the extrication of the St. Vith forces, to a suitable defensive position that would tie in with the divisions on my right and left. To date, no firm contact had been established with the 3rd Armored Division. The merits of the present defensive position were discussed, and it was agreed that the Thier-du-Mont line offered splendid defensive possibilities, provided it could be continued on our right. As well as I could determine, however, there were no friendly troops except light reconnaissance elements west of Hebronval.

I objected to the withdrawal, but the corps commander explained that, regardless of my wishes in the matter, it might be necessary to require the division to withdraw. It was quite evident at this time that if a major German attack developed from the south, threatening the right of the division, its continued occupation of the salient extending out to Vielsalm would be costly in life and to no advantage after the extrication of the St. Vith forces. It was emphasized by the corps commander that it was absolutely necessary to secure properly the withdrawal of the St. Vith forces by holding and defending our present positions.

A reconnaissance was undertaken and at its completion it was quite clear that there was but one reasonably good defensive position, and that it was the Trois-Ponts–Basse–Bodeux–Bra–Manhay line. At the direction of the corps commander, a reconnaissance was also made of a position farther to the rear, generally along the Cheneux–Rahier–Chevron–Werbomont line. On 22 December, I went to Manhay where I met General Rose, commanding the 3rd Armored Division. He stated that he was covering a concentration of other forces and that his front was so extended that he could not occupy and hold in strength the terrain west of Hebronval.

From my viewpoint, it was obvious that the loss of Regne–Lierneux ridge would result in the complete neutralization of the defensive capabilities of the right portion of the division sector. This ridge dominated the entire road out from Vielsalm to Bra. This was the only road not south of the Trois Ponts–Werbomont road. In addition, all of the division's installations and division artillery were located in the Lierneux–Goronne–Vielsalm valley. Accordingly, orders were issued to the 325th Glider Infantry to extend its right flank and seize and hold Regne and the ridge extending north therefrom. This ridge had to be held at any cost.

On the afternoon of 22 December, an enemy force of approximately one hundred vehicles of all types, preceded by about twenty-five tanks, advanced north through Ottre. The tanks entered Joubieval. They were permitted to close up, then brought under devastating artillery fire. Artillery observers who remained on the outpost line on the ridge immediately north of Ottre kept the column under close observation and put very effective fire on it. This unit was later identified as a portion of the 21st SS Panzer Division. At 1700, 22 December, the outpost of the 325th was forced to withdraw. The enemy build-up was increasing in intensity on our southern front.

At the direction of the division commander, the division engineer conducted a thorough study and reconnaissance of the southern portion of the division sector. It became clearly evident that the Germans could not bring armor to bear against the sector anywhere between Salmchateau and the Fraiture crossroads except by bringing it up the Petite–Langlir road. If the Petite–Langlir bridge could be blown, he would be incapable of bringing armor to bear anywhere within this 10,000 yard gap without approaching up the main road towards Salmchateau, which was well covered.

The possibility of canalizing his armored attack was obvious, and steps were taken to take advantage of this. Early on 22 December, orders were issued to the engineer battalion to move without delay and prepare the Petite–Langlir bridge for demolition and to destroy it upon hostile threat. Thorough and detailed preparations were made, possibly too thorough, because as the demolition party moved south from Ottre it encountered a large group of German vehicles coming northward. The Germans had the bridge. This was at about 1400 hours. Evidently thoroughness in preparation had cost us the bridge.

During the nights of 22-23 December an engineer patrol, led by Major J. C. H. Lee, Jr., made its way behind the enemy lines to the bridge over the creek south of Petite–Langlir and destroyed the bridge while it was actually being used by German vehicles. They displayed unusual gallantry and perseverance in the performance of their task.

In the following twenty-four hours, enemy pressure built up in intensity all along the southern front. It was easily handled south of Thier-du-Mont. The enemy, however, showed promise of getting entirely out of hand on the right, apparently wide open beyond Regne. Returning to the left flank, the German forces appeared to be cut off in the vicinity of La Gleize but were fighting a very intense engagement with the 30th Division on our left. Their occasional isolated efforts to cross the Ambléve River were easily dealt with by small patrols from the 504th Parachute Infantry.

I therefore ordered the release of the division reserve battalion of the 325th to the regimental commander of that regiment and ordered one battalion of the 504th, and 2nd Battalion, to move at once to the ridge 5,000 yards southwest of Lierneux. These troops went into position during daylight of 23 December. On this date the enemy attacked in considerable strength and overran the town of Regne. The 325th was ordered to counterattack and retake the town. The retention of this ridge was most vital if the division was to accomplish its mission of extricating the St. Vith forces. Supported by attached armor, and with unusual gallantry and élan, the 325th attacked and retook the town and held it until later ordered to withdraw.

It was on this occasion that the regimental adjutant of a regiment of the 2nd SS Panzer Division was captured with the orders for the advance of the following day. In the confusion, incident to the retaking of the town by the 325th, he had been sent forward by his regimental commander to learn the true situation. During his reconnaissance, he found himself aboard a motorcycle sidecar in the outskirts of Regne when our troops were retaking the town. He was captured with the town and had the orders on his person. They proved to be of great value, since they gave us definite information of the enemy's intentions for the following several days.

It was becoming increasingly evident that the German was determined to ultimately reach Werbomont and move north towards Aywaille and Liege. Colonel Billingslea, commanding officer of the 325th Glider Infantry, was ordered to extend his right flank to include the Fraiture ridge. No firm contact with the 3rd Armored Division on our right appeared possible.

The Fraiture crossroads began to assume increasing importance. Inquiry was made on several occasions of the commanding general of XVIII Corps (Airborne) as to what was being done to insure its retention. On 22 December, I made a personal reconnaissance from Ievigne to Fond de la Justice to Manhay. Quite a number of armored vehicles were in the vicinity of Manhay, and some were on the ridge one and a half miles south thereof. The 3rd Armored Division command post was in Manhay. A conversation with the division commander made it apparent that they were incapable of committing sufficient strength to the crossroads to guarantee its retention by our troops.

From my viewpoint, its loss would mean that German armor which we had successfully turned back from Trois Ponts to Regne, with the aid of both terrain and a very active defense, would bypass the division and occupy the Lierneux–Regne ridge mass, thus preventing us from accomplishing our present mission of covering the withdrawal of the St. Vith troops. I accordingly ordered Colonel Billingslea to again extend his right flank and to include in his defensive organization the crossroads southwest of Fraiture. This he did by sending Company F, under the command of Captain Woodruff, to the area. The situation all along the southern front was becoming critical when I visited the battalion commanders of the 325th several times during the period 22-24 December. On the afternoon of 23 December, at about 1700 hours, I checked the dispositions along the Fraiture ridge. At this time, riflemen were scattered 100 to 200 yards apart. There was a little anti-tank defense, and the possibility of defending the ridge against a major German attack appeared nothing less than fantastic. On the other hand, nothing could be spared from the other fronts, since the situation was much the same in other sectors, although the threat was not as great. The attacks of the 1st SS Panzer Division on our left began to wane.

On the afternoon of 23 December, at about 1730 hours, I arrived at the command post of Captain Gibson in the town of Fraiture. It was then under heavy mortar fire. A considerable volume of small arms fire could be heard to the south and west. SCR-300 contact was made with Captain Woodruff at the crossroads. He stated that he was under terrific attack which was completely engulfing his small unit. I moved on foot from Fraiture towards the crossroads and managed to reach the edge of the woods several hundred yards beyond the town.

It was clearly evident that the attack at the crossroads was an all-out affair of great magnitude. As it developed, it was the attack of a regiment of the 2nd SS Panzer Division supported by attached armor, attacking with the mission of driving up the main highway to Werbomont. The one company was soon completely overrun. During the hours of darkness, in desperate, close-quarters fighting, Captain Woodruff managed to extricate about forty men. They accounted for many Germans in fighting their way out, and rejoined their battalion commander in the vicinity of Fraiture.

At this point it was evident that there was nothing to prevent the German forces from entering the rear of the division area, which was now closely engaged along its entire 25,000-yard front.

I moved to the command post of the reserve battalion in the region southwest of Lierneux, arriving there at about dark. I issued verbal orders to the battalion commander, Major Wellems, outlining the situation to him and directing him to secure the right flank as far west as Malemore. I then moved without delay via Tri le Chesling to Manhay, the command post of the 3rd Armored Division. Here I found one MP on duty at the crossroads and the town completely abandoned. I then moved without delay to corps headquarters to explain the situation to them and obtain further assistance in holding the main highway which was out of my sector, but the retention of which was necessary to the accomplishment of my mission.

By telephone, Colonel Tucker was told to be prepared to move the 504th regimental headquarters and one battalion to the vicinity of Lansival where be would take over the sector to the right of the division. Two tank destroyers were moved southwest of the division command post at Bra to give it some protection from the direction of Manhay. I returned to the Division command post at Bra at approximately 2200. Upon my arrival there I learned by telephone from corps that Manhay had fallen to the German attacking forces. There seemed to be some doubt about this, however, and due to the darkness and confusion it was impossible to determine exactly where anyone was. All units were informed of the situation and efforts made to get units under control and have the situation in hand so as to be able to engage the German forces on reasonably favorable terms at daylight.

At about daylight, XVIII Corps (Airborne) made available to me Combat Command B of the 9th Armored Division under the command of General Hoge, which had been withdrawn from the St. Vith area. General Hoge reported to my command post at about 0700. At about 0545, 24 December, Colonel Tucker was ordered to leave the smallest possible force in the northern sector and to move south to Bra by motor without delay. He had been given a warning order about twenty-four hours earlier. At 0645 the 505th was ordered to regroup one battalion, the 2nd, and have it prepared to move in division reserve without delay, warning orders having been given them to prepare for this prior to this time.

At 0820 verbal orders were issued to General Hoge to hold Malempre until further orders, to contact the 504th on his left and the 7th Armored on his right. The 7th Armored had been recommitted by XVIII Corps (Airborne), down the main road towards Manhay. Combat Command B, 9th Armored Division, and the 7th Armored Division were practically exhausted from the past week's fighting. They were very short of infantry, and, in the opinion of General Hoge, Combat Command B was incapable of a sustained defense or offense. However, Malempre had to be held and appropriate orders were issued.

At 1315 hours, General Hoge reported to me that he was holding Malempre. The situation in that sector, however, still appeared confused. This was further added to by the presence in the area of German troops wearing American uniforms and using American armor. It would appear certain that the Germans were fighting in Manhay, that they held the ridge south and east of Manhay, that we held Malempre and that we held Fraiture. Between Malempre and Fraiture, the 2nd Battalion of the 504th Parachute Infantry was fighting in the woods. This battalion, a veteran, experienced outfit, had as clear a picture as could be expected of the situation. Numerous Germans were endeavoring to attack through the woods to the northeast between Malempre and Fraiture. There was much close, bitter fighting and the Germans were very roughly handled by Major Wellem's battalion. He finally succeeded in stabilizing his position and containing the Germans, although his frontage was very great, particularly for the wooded sector in which he was fighting. The Germans were well equipped and armed and were fighting with unusual esprit. They were from the 2nd SS Panzer Division.

During the day of 24 December, Colonel Tucker brought up his full regiment, less one battalion which he had left at Cheneux to contain the forces north of the river. That battalion was charged with holding the Ambléve River line from immediately north of Trois Ponts to where contact was established with the 30th Division in the vicinity of La Gleize, a frontage of approximately 12,000-15,000 yards, much of it closely wooded country and broken up terrain. However, since the situation was so critical on the right, and the German attack had apparently been beaten off on the left, no other course of action appeared practicable at the moment. The 505th appeared to have all it could do to continue to hold the Trois Ponts–Grand Halleux line and the 508th was becoming heavily engaged on the Vielsalm–Salmchateau–Joubieval line.

In accordance with the warning order given me by the corps commander, similar warning orders were given to unit commanders to be prepared to withdraw, if necessary, to the Trois Ponts–Erria–Manhay line. Early on 24 December, therefore, they were directed to make small unit reconnaissance of the defensive positions. Sectors were allotted and missions assigned. A conference was held at headquarters, XVIII Corps (Airborne), at about 1330 hours, 24 December, at which time orders were issued for the voluntary withdrawal to the corps defensive position. Division plans were completed and orders issued during the afternoon to effect the withdrawal starting after darkness.

I was greatly concerned with the attitude of the troops toward the withdrawal, the division having never made a withdrawal in its combat history. The German was using every artifice conceivable to create doubt and confusion in the minds of American fighting units. He was using our arms, equipment and vehicles, frequently leaving their own abandoned and disabled at bottlenecks on the roads. False messages were being used, and Germans in American officers' uniforms were known to be in the rear areas. One trooper, who later was recaptured, was captured by Germans in American uniforms in the vicinity of Tri le Chesling. All of these factors made the prospects of a withdrawal most unpleasant. On the 24th, I published a memorandum to be read to the troops, emphasizing the dangers in the operation with which we were confronted, and I spent from early evening until after midnight visiting the troops of all battalions.

In all of the operations in which we have participated in our two years of combat, and they have been many of multitudinous types, I have never seen a better executed operation than the withdrawal on Christmas Eve. The troops willingly and promptly carried into execution all the withdrawal plans, although they openly and frankly criticized it and failed to understand the necessity for it. But everybody pitched in, and the withdrawal went smoothly.

Christmas Eve was a very cold, bright moonlight night. The enemy was closely engaged with us on the entire front from Trois Ponts to Malempre, but there was in no locality any feeling of unusual pressure being exerted against us. All unit commanders, down to platoon leaders, I believe, I felt that they had the situation well under control. The rear area, except for some medium artillery which had been abandoned in fields off the main roads, was completely cleared of the St. Vith pocket forces.

The withdrawal started shortly after dark. Covering shells were to be withdrawn at four a.m. The 307th Airborne Engineer Battalion supported the withdrawal by blowing bridges over the Salm River, laying minefields and establishing roadblocks. This worked very well on the right with the 504th and the 325th. The 508th was attacked in great force and had some close and intense fighting at the bridges over the Salm River before it finally withdrew. Its shell on Thier-du-Mont was apparently cut off, but finally made its way back under the command of Major Taylor without the loss of a single man. All the troops, except for the shell, were in the valley in the vicinity of Gorronne where I saw them about 2200 hours, and everything was going smoothly.

At about 2300 hours I passed through St. Jacques on the way to the 505th Parachute Infantry command post, which was at Dairomont. At St. Jacques, I met a platoon in a deployed formation moving north. They said they believed that there was a large force of Germans in the area and that they were looking for them. I went to the regimental command post. Here an unusual situation was becoming apparent. Earlier in the night a report was received from vehicle drivers that while driving their jeeps on a road in the vicinity of Basse–Bodeux they observed troops wearing full field equipment walking in the woods towards the east. These troops hit the ground and took cover, generally acting very evasive. Later in the night a lineman, checking his lines, had his jeep shot up by what he guessed were German troops in the rear area. This accounted for the platoon that I had met at St. Jacques being on its mission of clearing Germans from the rear area.

I talked to the regimental commander about the situation, and be believed that at this time a force of approximately 500 Germans were somewhere in the regimental rear area moving to the east. Their presence could hardly be accounted for unless they had escaped from the La Gleize–Stoumont pocket. At first, we did not believe that there were German troops in the area, but piecing together all available intelligence seemed to establish the fact unmistakably. At this time, the regiment was under some pressure along the river line and had left a company in three platoon positions at the most likely crossing sites as a shell to cover the withdrawal of the regiment, which was now taking place. After discussing the situation for some time with the regimental commander, it was decided that the withdrawal would continue as planned; that by daylight the 505th would be on its defensive position with the area to its front wired and mined, and that it would be prepared to defend that position at all costs in coordination with the units on its right and left. This made it impractical for the regimental commander to divert any of his forces to a task of searching for the Germans. Orders were issued to proceed to new positions as previously planned and to be on the alert for loose German forces.

Several hours before daylight, one platoon positioned north of Grand Halleux was attacked by a German force of great strength. A heavy fight ensued. A number of Germans were killed and wounded, as well as troopers of the division. Among those captured was an American major of the U.S. 30th Infantry Division. He had been captured in earlier fighting at La Gleize, and the force that was accompanying him when captured was a force of approximately 500-800 Germans endeavoring to withdraw to their own lines east of the Salm River. During their withdrawal, they were rather well chewed up, but they nevertheless succeeded in reaching their lines except for several killed and captured. On 25 December, we realized that we had just succeeded in withdrawing through a hostile withdrawing force, which was a rather novel maneuver.

At daylight, 25 December, all regiments were on their positions, mining and wiring were under way, and all troops were dug in. Communications were being laid under great difficulty, because of the mountainous terrain, particularly in the 504th and 508th sectors. At daylight, I joined Major Gerard, commanding a battalion of the 325th in the town of Tri le Chesling on our right flank. Its occupation, in which contact was established with infantry of the 7th Armored Division on our right, finally buttoned up our defense. Contact was already established with the 30th Division on our left.

About two days after occupying this position, an attack was made by the 62nd Volksgrenadier Division on our left and the 9th SS Panzer Division on our center. The 62nd Volksgrenadier Division in all of its operations proved to be of very poor quality and not well trained. They consistently lost patrols by having them destroyed by our outposts and they appeared to be very vulnerable to our own patrols.

The 9th SS Panzer Division appeared to be much better equipped and better trained. They launched an attack up the main axis from Lierneux to Hablemont, hitting the 508th and 504th in a coordinated effort that was characterized by great dash and courage. The 3rd Battalion of the 508th was completely overrun. The men remained, however, manning their positions in the houses and foxholes. The battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Mendez, obtained the use of the reserve company of the 2nd Battalion of the 508th on his left, counterattacked with great gallantry and determination, and drove the 9th SS Panzer from his positions, restoring his main line of resistance (MLR). The storm troopers' losses were extremely heavy. From one field alone, sixty-two bodies were later removed.

On interrogation, some of the storm troopers stated that they had been accustomed to attacking with such dash and élan, yelling and firing their weapons, and the usual reaction of the enemy was to break and run as the storm troopers closed with them. They were frankly surprised to find troops who would man their positions after being overrun. The unit of the 9th SS attacking the 504th after overrunning the outpost of the 2nd Battalion of that regiment, were stopped and driven back. They told an identical story of their attack technique.

This ended all offensive efforts of the German forces in the Battle of the Bulge. About a week later the division attacked, completely overrunning the 62nd Volksgrenadier Division and the 9th SS Panzer Division, and capturing 2,500 prisoners, including five battalion commanders. It regained its former position on the Thier-du-Mont heights.

From here, the division withdrew to a rest area from which it was later committed to the attack east of St. Vith, attacking through deep snow over thickly wooded mountains and overrunning a considerable group of German defensive forces in a constant day and night attack lasting for six days. Ultimately they drove into the Siegfried Line to seize Udenbreth and the ridge extending south.

This attack was the most arduous in the division's history and, at its end, probably the most bitterly fought, but the division once again entered Germany and the seizure of Udenbreth placed the First U.S. Army in a position to attack down ridge lines all the way to Bonn.

From here, the division moved to the Hürtgen sector where, as a member of XVIII Corps (Airborne) and later III Corps, it participated in the advance to the Roer River. Except for extensive minefields, extremely difficult road conditions and hostile artillery fire, the operation was not too difficult. The division arrived on the Roer River and had completed detailed plans for a river crossing and the seizure of Nideggen east of the river when it was withdrawn on 17 February and returned to the Sissonne-Suippes, France, area.

The Ardennes Counteroffensive: The German Plan, December 1944. (Click to enlarge.)

Bastogne, 19-23 December 1944. (Click to enlarge.)

Wacht am Rhein, 16-25 December 1944. This map shows the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes and the position of the 82nd Airborne Division (and other Allied units) along the northern shoulder of the bulge created in the American lines. (U.S. Army Center of Military History) (Click to enlarge.)

The Ardennes Counteroffensive, 3-28 January 1945. (Click to enlarge.)

Major General James Gavin, commanding the 82nd Airborne Division, visits the 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment at Erria, Belgium, during the Battle of the Bulge.

Major General James Gavin, commanding the 82nd Airborne Division.

MajGen Matthew Ridgway, CO, U.S. XVIII Abn Corps and MajGen James Gavin, 82nd Abn Div, at Remonchamps towards the end of the Ardennes battle. Ridgway is carrying the two grenades, which were his 'trademark' in action from Normandy right through to the end in Korea.

Major General Matthew B. Ridgway, Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, and Major General James M. Gavin, Commanding General, 82nd Airborne Division, Ardennes (Bulge). January 1945.

Major General James M. Gavin, Commanding General, 82nd Airborne Division, in front of the Division Command Post, at Bra-sur-Lienne, Belgium. 22-24 December 1944.

Troops of the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment travel a snow-covered fire break in the woods as they move forward in the Ardennes region in Belgium, on Jan. 28, 1945.

Battle of the Bulge tanks and infantrymen of the U.S. Army’s Company G, 740th Tank Battalion, 504th Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division, push through the snow toward their objective near Herresbach, Belgium, January 1945.

Troops of the 82nd Airborne Division advance in a snowstorm behind a M4 medium tank in a move to attack Herresbach, Belgium. 340th Tank Battalion, Headquarters Company, 3rd Battalion, 504th Parachute Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division. 28 January 1945.

A tank of the 740th Tank Battalion attached to the 82nd Airborne Division moves towards its objective at Herresbach during the Allied counterattack, 25 December 1944-28 January 1945.

Service Company, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, vehicles stuck in the snow, Bulge. January 1945.

American troops the 82nd Airborne Division drag a heavily loaded ammunition sled through the snow, as they move for an attack on Herresbach, Belgium on 28 January 1945.

82nd Airborne machine gun post. Note M2 machine gun in ground defense role with M1919 and spare barrel.

This M1919 Light Machine Gun team belonged to the 82nd Airborne Division’s 325th Glider Infantry Regiment. The photo was taken at Odrimont, Belgium a couple weeks after the Battle of Cheneux on January 6, 1945.

Airborne troops load a shell into a 75mm pack howitzer M8, Battle of the Bulge, December 1944. Between 16 December and 27 December 1944, First Army artillery units fired more ammunition than at any other time during the war except during the Normandy campaign. An average of over eight hundred weapons fired over 750,000 shells.

A gun crew from Battery B, 376th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, loads their 75mm pack howitzer during fighting in Ardennes. (US National Archives)

A typical snow covered entrenchment in the Ardennes area December 1944.

After three hours of guard duty at an outpost, Private First Class Vernon Haught, a glider infantryman with the 325th Glider Infantry Regiment, looks forward to finding a warm place to get some rest on 6 January 1945. Haught’s quote, “I’m the 82nd Airborne and this is as far as the bastards are going!” during the Battle of the Bulge lives on in the lore of the 82nd Airborne Division. (US National Archives)

After holding a woodland position all night near Wiltz, Luxembourg, against German counter attack, three men of B Company, 101st Engineers, emerge for a rest on 14 January 1945. (US National Archives and Records Administration, cataloged under the National Archives Identifier (NAID) 531349)

Chow is served to American Infantrymen on their way to La Roche, Belgium.

A paratrooper of the 82nd Airborne Division leads a column of German prisoners past a disabled Sturmgeschütz IV in the Ardennes during the Battle of the Bulge.

Sergeant Charles J. Ten Barges of the 325th Glider Infantry Regiment guards a captured SS soldier who is using a light-colored blanket as winter camouflage on 7 January 1945. (US National Archives)

Germans captured by troops of the 82nd Airborne Division are lined up at the side of a snowy road near Hierlot, Belgium. (Imperial War Museum EA 48952)

A paratrooper from the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment searches German prisoners for weapons before they enter a prisoner of war stockade. (US National Archives)

American M36 tank destroyers move forward during heavy fog to stem German spearhead near Werbomont, Belgium, 20 December 1944. Werbomont, 703rd Tank Destroyer Battalion, 82nd Airborne Division. (U.S. Army photo)

Column of "GOYAs," 551st Parachute Infantry Battalion, on the road en route to Ster, Belgium, 21 December 1944.

Chaplain (Capt.) Joseph P. Kenny, 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment, holds mass for men of the 3rd Battalion before they depart for the field in Belgium on 6 January, 1945. (U.S. Army Signal Corps photo)

A bazooka team from the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment in position during the Bulge, December 22, 1944.

A Catholic chaplain holds a brief service for soldiers of Company D, 2nd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, as they move up to relieve 1st Battalion at Cheneux, 22 December 1944. (US National Archives)

Paratroopers of 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment pass by an abandoned 57mm antitank gun in the streets of Cheneux  on 22 December 1944. (US National Archives)

While digging in on front line positions just outside of Bra, Belgium, soldiers of Company H, 3rd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division, met a patrol of German Waffen-SS troopers who were on reconnaissance. In the resulting clash several of the Germans were killed but one Waffen-SS trooper was captured and brought back into American lines. 25 December 1944. Soldier on left in photo, leading the patrol, is Lt. Richard G. LaRiviere, from Chicopee, Massachusetts.

An infantryman of the 82nd Airborne Division ventures cautiously across exposed land at the Allied front lines near Bra, Belgium on December 24, 1944.

57mm anti-tank gun of the 80th Airborne Anti-tank Battalion, in action during the Battle of the Bulge, Belgium. December 1944.

Men of the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, I Company (?), brewing coffee in the railroad pit, near Rochelinval, Belgium on 21 December 1944.

German POWs captured by the 82nd Airborne Division in Belgium. (US National Archives and Records Administration, cataloged under the National Archives Identifier (NAID) 195467)