The Comparative Performance of German Anti-Tank Weapons During World War II


by H.G. Gee

Foreword

This is a reprint of a British report, entitled Army Operational Research Group (AORG) Internal Memorandum No. 16: The Comparative Performance of German Anti-Tank Weapons During World War II. The report was prepared by H. G. Gee, and originally published in May 1950 in a limited edition. The original consisted of eighteen A4-size pages, was typewritten and mimeographed.

AORG Internal Memoranda “are informal descriptions of minor investigations which are not considered sufficiently comprehensive to warrant an official report but which nevertheless are considered worth recording for reference. These Memoranda are signed by the writers, and they cannot be considered as officially representing the views of Superintendent AORG or of the Scientific Adviser to the Army Council.”

We can be thankful that such reports, however unofficial they may have been, were done, since they provide us today with information that otherwise might not be easily obtained. We can also be thankful to Abe Flatau for providing us with a copy of the report from his personal collection. He obtained, many years ago, a photocopy of the original in the U.S. Army’s Military History Institute; apparently the previous holder of the original was the Library of the U.S. Army War College, whose rubber-stamped identification marking was on the cover (and dated 11 June 1959, apparently the date the original became part of that Library’s holdings). Possibly the previous owner of the document, according to another rubber-stamping, was the “ORO Library, C/Army”.

At some point during its wanderings through these various collections, the original document’s title was altered somewhat: a line was drawn through the word “Internal” and a hand-written capital “A” was added to the number, so that the new title would read “Army Operational Research Group Memorandum No. A16”. No indication as to why this was done, when it was done, or who made these changes. A minor detail, to be sure, but I felt it important to include this bit of information in case someone should encounter an altered original at some future date.

I hope you will find the information contained herein as interesting and informative as I did. It will prove useful to all manner of World War II historians, wargamers, and other buffs of such minutiae.

Merriam Press originally published this in book form in 1990, with a seventh edition released in 2013, which had ISBN 978-1490370972.

Abstract

The data which are recorded and discussed in this paper were intended for an historical aspect of a study into the “Operational Value of Anti-tank Mines.”

The paper is in two parts, namely:

The comparative performance of enemy weapons. This is an analysis and discussion of the data taken from nearly one hundred tank regiments in Europe and the Near East. The details of the loss of some 3,170 British tanks have been collected, and these are shown by causes for the three theatres, together with the personnel casualties in them.

An assessment of the number of enemy mines required to cause the loss of one British tank.

An estimate is made of the number of enemy mines laid in front of the British Army during the war, and this is related to the total tank losses for the same period.

The main conclusions are:

Tank losses due to mines (22 per cent) were generally less than those due to anti-tank guns (30 per cent) and tanks and self-propelled guns (39 per cent), nevertheless they were appreciable, amounting to between a quarter and one-fifth of the total losses.

The terrain of the theatre of operations would appear to influence the effectiveness of the mine. The differences between the tank losses due to mines in Italy, and the other two theatres, were statistically significant.

Out of every one hundred tanks lost in the three theatres of war, the losses which resulted from mines were ten to fifteen during periods of normal contact, and thirty to forty during large scale attacks against fortified positions.

So far as personnel casualties were concerned:

The ratio killed to wounded was 1:3.5 in mine tanks, and about 1:1 in tanks lost from other causes.

Percentage casualties in crews of mined tanks were about half those in tanks lost from other causes.

Nearly two thousand enemy mines were required to cause the loss of one British tank, on the assumption that equal numbers of mines went to each mile of the German front line.

Introduction

The data which are recorded and discussed in this paper were intended for an historical aspect of a study into the Operational Value of Anti-Tank Mines. Although, by considering British tank losses, a comparison is made between German anti-tank weapons in general, the emphasis is on the role played by the anti-tank mine during World War II.

The paper is in two parts, conforming with the sources of information from which the data were extracted, namely:

The comparative performance of enemy weapons. This is an analysis and discussion of the data taken from nearly one hundred tank regiments in Europe and the Near East, as follows:

Forty-one in BLA [British Liberation Army] for the period July 1944 to April 1945 inclusive,

Twenty-seven in BNAF [British North African Forces] for period March 1941 to May 1943 inclusive,

Twenty-nine in Italy for period September 1943 to April 1945 inclusive.

Tank losses from various causes are shown for the three theatres, together with the personnel casualties in these tanks.

An assessment of the number of enemy mines required to cause the loss of one British tank.

An estimate is made of the number of enemy mines laid in front of the British Army during the war, and this is related to the total tank losses for the same period. The data were taken from official German statistics showing the production and front consumption of Teller mines between September 1939 and November 1944.

To avoid confusion between personnel and tank casualties, the latter, when destroyed or damaged, are termed tank losses.

The Comparative Performance of Enemy Weapons

General

During the extraction of data from war diaries, all information relating to the destruction or damage of British tanks by enemy anti-tank weapons was recorded under the following headings:

number of tanks destroyed and damaged,

cause of loss in (a),

casualties to personnel in tanks,

delay caused by anti-tank defences,

any other relevant data.

In this way details of the loss of some 3,710 British tanks from all causes have been collected, and these have been analyzed below. The proformae upon which the data were recorded are available, but they are not reproduced here for the sake of brevity.

An attempt was made to discriminate between destroyed and damaged tanks within the following definitions:

     (a) destroyed tanks consisted of ‘Y’ and ‘Z’ casualties,[1] those which were not recoverable, and those recorded as losses but without any further detail;

     (b) damaged tanks were those which suffered minor damage, such as a track off, and which were not in use for the remainder of the action.

Tanks which were damaged, but which were returned fit on the same day have not been counted as losses.

Comparative Performance of Enemy Weapons as Shown by British Tank Losses

Table 1 below gives the percentage British tank losses attributed to the various enemy anti-tank weapons in the three theatres of operation. The values have been extracted from the data contained in the proformae. An overall mean value has been included, and this has been broken down into percentages of destroyed and damaged tanks.

Table 1: British Percentage Tank Losses

 

Mines

Anti-tank Guns

Tank

Self-propelled Gun

Bazooka

Other
Causes

Totals

NW Europe
(1,305 tanks)

22.1%

22.7%

14.5%

24.4%

14.2%

2.1%

100%

Italy
(671 tanks)

30%

16%

12%

26%

9%

7%

100%

North Africa
(1,734 tanks)

19.5%

40.3%

38.2%

nil

nil

2%

100%

Mean values

22.3%

29.8%

25.3%

13.5%

6.1%

3%

100%

Breakdown of mean values

(a)
Destroyed

20.3%

29%

24.4%

12.7%

5.4%

91.8%

(b)
Damaged

2%

0.8%

0.9%

0.8%

0.7%

5.2%

It is suggested that:

since the recording of the extent of damage to tanks in the war diaries was far from satisfactory, the ratio destroyed : damaged should be treated with reserve.

because of the close similarity between the tank and self-propelled gun, these values should be considered together. On numerous occasions in the war diary accounts, some doubt existed as to whether a kill should be attributed to one or other of these weapons.

From the table it will be seen that, as would be expected, tank losses varied with the intensity of the enemy anti-tank measures. Thus, in North Africa, the enemy tanks and anti-tank guns, which out-gunned the British tanks during 1941 and the greater part of 1942, accounted for forty per cent and thirty-eight per cent respectively of the total losses; from the war diaries it would appear that the enemy had no self-propelled guns in this theater. In Italy and Northwest Europe, where the gun performance of both sides was more equal, there was a decrease in the percentage losses due to tanks and anti-tank guns. It is to be noted that the combined figures for tanks and self-propelled guns were about the same in all theatres, that is approximately thirty-eight per cent.

In MORU Report No. 19 it was found that in a sample of 650 American First Army tanks lost in Northwest Europe, nineteen per cent was attributable to mines. This figure accords quite well with the twenty-two per cent out of 1,305 British tank losses in Table 1 above.

It will be seen that the tank losses due to mines were fairly consistent in each theatre, for it may be noted that:

in Italy the type of terrain, with its numerous streams and defiles, aided in the increased effectiveness of the mine (see below);

in North Africa the overall value of 19.5 per cent was made up of an increasing set of figures, for in 1941 the tank losses due to mines were 10.7 per cent, in 1942 this value was 21.5 per cent and in 1943 a maximum value of 24.4 per cent was reached.

The X2 test, which was applied to the numbers of tank losses due to mines in each theatre showed that:

There was a significant difference between the value for Italy, and those for the other two theatres.

There was no significant difference between the values for North Africa and Northwest Europe.

Of the damaged tanks, the highest percentage value was attributable to mines, and the highest proportion (0.7 per cent in 5.4 per cent) is to be found in the bazooka category.

It is concluded that:

Tank losses due to mines (twenty-two per cent) were generally less than those caused by anti-tank guns (thirty per cent) and tanks plus self-propelled guns (thirty-nine per cent), nevertheless, they were applicable, amounting to nearly one-quarter of the total losses.

The terrain of the theatre of operations would appear to influence the effectiveness of the mine. The difference between the tank losses due to mines in Italy, and the other two theatres were statistically significant.

Graphical Representation of Losses Due to Mines

On the graph at Appendix A, the monthly percentage tank losses due to mines have been plotted between June 1941 and the end of the war. The marked variations which will be noticed are strongly related to the type of opposition which was being encountered. In North Africa for instance, the highest losses were recorded during the breaching of the Mareth Line, the advance through the four enemy minefields at Alamein, and during the withdrawal in July 1942, when the Allied armour was forced back upon uncharted minefields.

In Italy, with its terrain differing so greatly from that of North Africa, the highest losses were not recorded during the breaching of defensive lines, but during the periods of normal pursuit through the defiles and across the numerous streams. The lower percentage losses during the Gustav and Gothic assaults would appear to be caused by increases from other sources, that is, because of the concentrations of enemy armor and anti-tank guns encountered in these instances.

The graph for Northwest Europe conforms closely with the type of fighting, and the preparedness of the enemy. The winter operations were the most costly in mined tanks, when set piece attacks were staged against enemy defensive lines.

Generally it would appear that, the percentage losses due to mines were:

ten to fifteen during normal contact,

thirty to forty during large-scale attacks against fortified positions.

Personnel Casualties

Casualties to personnel in tanks were recorded, and these have been analyzed in Table 2 below, which shows the percentage casualties to crews caused by various anti-tank weapons. As an example, a total of 127 killed and wounded were recorded to 103 cases in which Sherman tanks were mined. Since there were five men in the crew of the Sherman, we have 127 casualties out of a total of 5 × 103 = 515 men, and this represents a 24.6 per cent casualty rate.

Table 2: Percentage Personnel Casualties in Different Tanks

Type of tank

Mines

Anti-tank Guns

Tanks

Self-propelled Gun

Bazooka

Sherman

24.6%

41.4%

60.5%

54.3%

44.7%

Churchill

14.7%

45%

46.7%

30%

14.7%

Stuart

34.6%

29.8%

51.7%

*

*

Crusader

*

38.5%

41.7%

 

 

Cromwell, Valentine,

Matilda, Grant

17.4%

34.4%

28.6%

*

*

Mean values

21.8%

40%

46.4%

48.4%

38.6%

Breakdown of mean values

Killed

4.8%

18%

21.8%

20.4%

18%

Wounded

17%

22%

24.6%

28%

20.6%

The entries made in the body of the table are based upon samples of thirty or more tank losses. Samples smaller than thirty have been omitted, and such omissions are shown by an asterisk. The mean values are based on the totals of all samples, however small.

From the table it will be seen that:

in tanks which were mined, for every two men killed, seven were wounded. In all other cases the ratio is approximately one to one;

percentage casualties to personnel in mined tanks was roughly half those in tanks knocked out by other causes.

Minefield Obstructions

Little data was obtained relating to the use of artificial devices such as Dragon’s Teeth and anti-tank ditches. If regiments encountered such obstacles, the trouble they caused must have been so slight that it did not warrant special mention. The anti-tank ditches in the Reichswald area were about the only instances recorded, and these seem to have caused little difficulty to a special ‘Breaching Force’. Generally it would appear that the bogging of tanks was a far greater hindrance than any artificial devices.

Twenty-two instances were recorded in which the times were given for delays, due to minefields, to tank elements ranging from a brigade to a tank troop. These twenty-two events give on the average a time hold-up of 15.3 hours per regiment per event. In addition there were twenty occasions when regiments were delayed or stopped in their advance by mines, and on four of these occasions the delay was stated to be considerable.

Conclusions

The following are the main conclusions:

Tank losses due to mines (twenty-two per cent) were generally less than those due to anti-tank guns (thirty per cent) and tanks plus self-propelled guns (thirty-nine per cent), nevertheless they were appreciable, amounting to between a quarter and one-fifth of the total losses;

The terrain of the theatre of operations would appear to influence the effectiveness of the mine. The differences between the tank losses due to mines in Italy, and the other two theatres were statistically significant;

Out of every one hundred tanks lost in the three theatres of operation, the losses which resulted from mines were ten to fifteen during periods of normal contact, and thirty to forty during large-scale attacks against fortified positions;

So far as personnel casualties were concerned:

The ratio killed to wounded was 1:3.5 in mined tanks, and about 1:1 in tanks lost from other causes.

Percentage casualties in the crews of mined tanks were about half those in tanks lost from other causes.

An Assessment of the Number of Enemy Mines Required to Cause the Loss of One British Tank

General

The two tables at Appendix B were extracted from captured German statistics, they cover the period September 1939 to November 1944 inclusive, and show:

the front consumption of Teller mines,

the numbers of unassembled Teller mines ready for delivery to ordnance stores from the Ordnance Branch of the War Ministry.

In what follows, use is only made of the figures for the front consumption (Table 1, Appendix B). The second table is mainly included here for the purpose of recording the data, although on comparing it with Table 1, Appendix B, the difference between delivery from ordnance and consumption is shown.

Allocation of Mines to the Various Fronts

As will be seen in Appendix B the front consumption of mines is given as a monthly total for all theatres in which the Germans were operating. Since the records give no indication of the proportion which went to the different fronts, it has been necessary to estimate these. This has been done:

by taking the average length of British front throughout the war as a proportion of the average length of front maintained by the enemy,

thence assuming that equal numbers of mines were distributed per mile of front.

The lengths of front in Italy, North Africa, Northwest Europe and in the Russian campaign were determined as closely as possible for their relevant periods of activity. This information was obtained at three-monthly intervals from the ‘Times’ over the period June 1941 to May 1945 inclusive. The approximate lengths of front in miles are shown in Appendix C where it will be seen that on average, the British contained about one-tenth of the total German front. During this period also, the enemy consumption of Teller mines was 13,189,955; thus it is estimated that about one tenth of this number, or 1,653,500 mines were used on the British sectors.

The Number of Mines Per Tank Lost

Table 3 below shows the numbers and percentages of tank losses due to mines on the British fronts in each theatre, the latter being expressed as percentage of the total German front. The number of mines per mined tank are also given, calculated from the estimated number of mines per theatre and the tank losses.

Table 3: The Number of Mines Per Tank Lost

Theatre

Number of tanks mined

Percentage of total tank
losses

Front
percentage of total

Estimated number of mines on front

Mines per tank lost

Northwest
Europe

288

22%

3.1%

597,500

2,074

Italy

201

30%

4.3%

833,000

4,144

North Africa

338

19.5%

2.7%

223,000

660

Totals and
mines per tank

827

10.1%

1,653,500

2,000

From the table it will be seen that, on the assumption made previously, nearly two thousand enemy mines were needed to cause the loss of one British tank. It would also appear that the number of mines per tank lost varied between theatres, this being particularly noticeable on comparing the Italian and North African campaigns.

On comparing the three theatres, it would seem that the percentage of tank losses were a multiple of the percentage front by a factor of seven in each case. Thus for Northwest Europe we have 3.1 × 7 = 21.7, which is very nearly equal to the twenty-two per cent for the tank losses. However, it is thought that this numerical similarity is entirely fortuitous.

It is concluded that nearly two thousand enemy mines were required to cause the loss of one British tank, on the assumption that equal numbers of mines went to each mile of the German front line.

Appendix A


Appendix B

Table 1: Front Consumption of ‘T’ Mines, 1939-1944

Data taken from German sources

 

1939

1940

1941

1942

1943

1944

January

800

37,700

41,700

157,100

438,400

February

3,700

4,600

52,000

282,700

807,700

March

5,900

1,800

119,100

242,500

983,000

April

8,700

4,500

54,400

138,100

1,321,900

May

45,500

11,400

78,100

255,100

1,106,500

June

16,000

8,400

56,200

245,000

800,000

July

500

20,735

66,000

365,800

754,000

August

3,100

26,520

73,500

462,700

1,083,000

September

92,000

2,200

21,400

136,900

426,500

361,000

October

12,000

3,200

18,700

101,300

290,700

470,000

November

2,400

6,300

28,700

148,900

373,500

410,000

December

1,700

6,300

36,500

135,500

174,300

?

Totals

108,100

102,200

220,955

1,063,600

3,414,000

8,535,500

Grand total

13,444,355

Table 2: Number of Unassembled ‘T’ Mines Ready for Delivery
 to Ordnance Stores from the Ordnance Branch of the War Ministry, 1939-1944

 

1939

1940

1941

1942

1943

1944

January

44,000

90,000

43,900

1,055,000

606,000

February

23,000

80,000

213,000

1,502,000

909,000

March

nil

42,000

336,000

1,260,000

936,000

April

34,500

89,900

221,100

1,220,000

946,500

May

65,000

45,400

94,800

881,000

572,000

June

58,000

42,400

68,500

940,400

499,000

July

45,900

10,000

224,700

1,000,000

541,900

August

31,000

36,000

156,900

1,000,000

592,500

September

64,000

38,200

75,000

522,000

1,000,000

663,000

October

37,000

74,000

20,000

801,000

513,400

534,000

November

43,000

51,000

42,000

980,300

406,000

426,000

December

40,000

?

32,600

891,600

390,000

?

Totals

184,000

464,600

605,300

4,553,800

11,167,800

7,125,900

Grand total

24,017,400

Appendix C

Table 1: Mileage of German Front Lines

The data contained in this table were extracted from the Times for the periods shown. In columns (b), (c)  and (d), the figures in brackets give the estimated British fronts for the relevant periods, and these are shown as totals in column (e).

In column (f) are shown the percentages of the total German front contained by the British during each year. These figures are broken down by theatres in the second table, and are shown with the estimated number of mines consumed in each theatre.

Date

(a)
USSR

(b)
Italy

(c)
North­west Europe

(d)
North
Africa

(e)
British
component

(f)
Yearly percent (e) is of total enemy front

1941

January

40

40

 

April

40

40

7.7%

July

900

40

40

 

October

1,000

40

40

 

1942

January

1,100

40

40

 

April

1,200

40

40

3%

July

1,200

35

35

 

October

1,200

35

35

 

1943

January

1,000

50

50

 

April

1,000

120 (85)

85

7%

July

900

90 (80)

80

 

October

900

100 (80)

80

 

1944

January

900

100 (80)

80

 

April

900

100 (80)

80

 

July

1,100

170 (145)

90 (40)

185

16%[2]

October

1,000

130 (110)

600 (180)

290

 

 

1945

January

1,000

140 (11)

600 (190)

310

 

April

900

300 (250)

700 (200)

450

 

Totals

16,200

1,040

1,990

570

2,000

 

It will be seen that the total German front, given by the sum of the four theatres, was 19,835; thus the British element was on the average

     2,000

    ----------

     19,835 = 0.101 of the total German front.

Table 2: Estimate of Mines Consumed on Each British Sector

Period

Italy

Northwest Europe

North Africa

 

Per cent
of front

Number of mines
consumed

Per cent
of front

Number of mines
consumed

Per cent
of front

Number of mines
consumed

1941

7.7%

17,013

1942

3%

31,908

1943

1.9%

64,866

5.1%

174,134

1944-45

9%

768,205

7%

597,500

Average fronts,
total mines

4.3%

833,000

3.1%

597,500

2.7%

223,000

Note

The average fronts given at the foot of the table are for the whole period 1941 to 1945 inclusive, whereas in the body of the table yearly values are shown.

The numbers of mines consumed have been rounded off to the nearest 500.


 



[1]    Definition

        Y Casualty: Requires assistance from repair personnel and likely to be repairable by unit fitters and light aid detachments or second line workshops.

        Z Casualty: Requires extensive repair or replacement involving evacuation.

[2]      Includes January to April 1945.



German Riegel mine 43 anti-tank landmine.

The Riegel mine 43 or (Sprengriegel/R.Mi. 43) is a German steel cased anti-tank bar mine used during the Second World War. The mine is a long thin rectangle. It consists of a lower and upper metal tray, and an internal metal cased explosive block. It uses two ZZ42 fuses inserted into either end of the internal block, although it can be used with an additional pressure fuse on the top. The mine is similar to the Italian B-2 mine. A variant, the Riegel mine 44 was also produced with a different fuse. Approximately 3,051,400 were produced between 1943 and 1945. Riegel mines are almost impossible to disarm because wires in the fuse mechanisms become corroded, which makes them highly unstable. As a result, the mine becomes extremely sensitive to the smallest disturbance, and therefore can easily detonate simply by touching it. The situation is further complicated by the fact that Riegel mines can be fitted with up to three anti-handling devices. The recommended render-safe procedure for any Riegel mine is to destroy it in situ by detonating a small explosive charge next to it. Countries where Riegel mines were laid include the Netherlands, Egypt and Libya.

Riegel mine 43. 

 

Churchill Mk V tank destroyed by a Riegelmine in the Overloon War Museum, in addition to the visible mobility damage the mine penetrated the belly armor gutting the hull with blast and fire damage. 

Topfmine B.

The Topfmines ("pot mines") were a series of German circular minimum metal anti-tank blast mines that entered service with the German army in 1944, during the Second World War.

The mines used a case made of compressed wood-pulp, cardboard and tar along with glass plugs and components designed to be undetectable by Allied mine detectors. Often the only metallic part of the mines was the detonator.

To enable the mines to be found by friendly forces, the mines were painted with a black sandy substance called Tarnsand (camouflage sand). Allied forces found that although the mines were undetectable by Allied mine detectors, German mine detectors could find the mines when they had been marked with Tarnsand. The secret of Tarnsand was maintained until after the end of the war, when it was discovered that it was a mildly radioactive substance and the German mine detectors incorporated a simple Geiger counter.

The Topfmine A had a flattened dome-shaped case with a raised flat circular pressure plate on the top surface surrounded by a circular shear groove. The case was normally made from pulped wood and cardboard mixed with tar for waterproofing. However, sometimes the case was made from bituminous coal waste. The SF 1 fuse was inserted into the underside of the mine and was placed inside a large glass plug which sealed the bottom of the mine. A secondary fuse well was provided on the bottom of this plug for installing anti-handling devices. The SF 1 fuse was constructed of glass and wood and contained a detonator and booster charge.

Pressure of approximately 330 pounds (150 kg) on the pressure plate caused the plate to shear off from the mine casing, collapsing down on the glass head of the pressure fuse. The glass head was driven downwards, crushing two glass vials of chemicals, which reacted together causing a flash, initiating the detonator, booster and finally the main charge of TNT.

Two versions of the mine were produced—a fully waterproofed version designated "To.Mi.A4531" and the normal "To.Mi.4531."

The Topfmine B (To.Mi.B4531) was broadly similar to the "A" version, the principal difference being a smooth case without a raised pressure plate. This version instead had an internal shear groove to prevent water from working its way into the mine and possibly deactivating it.

The Topfmine C (To.Mi.C4531 or Pappmine) changed the design to an eight-sided flattened cylinder shape, with a central glass fuze plug on the top. This design was very thin-walled and sympathetic detonation could occur if the mines were planted closer together than seven feet (2.1 m).

Topfmine C.

 

The Holz-Sprung Mine 4672 or Hohlladungs-Spring-Mine 4672 (HL.Sp.Mi. 4672) (“hollow-charge jump mine”) was a German anti-tank mine, together with the Panzer stab 43. Developed during the Second World War it was the first landmine to combine a shaped charge anti-tank warhead with a tilt rod fuze. The Panzerfaust warhead was be mounted in a metal holder on a wooden panel buried in the ground with a Ki.Z.43 fuze protruding above the ground. When a vehicle passes over the mine, the rod is forced sideways triggering a black powder charge at the base of the projectile, launching the projectile out of the ground and into the belly of the vehicle. The large shaped charge was capable of penetrating over 100mm of belly armor, significantly more than tanks of the era had. Tests conducted by the Germans suggested the mine was capable of completely destroying (rather than merely disabling) 85% of the tanks it attacked, making it impossible to redeploy repaired vehicles and crew. Deliveries to the Wehrmacht began in October 1944 but the mine was not issued to combat troops until January 1945 due to manufacturing faults. Only 59,000 were built because it was felt that the warheads were better employed with the proven Panzerfaust technology.

Bounding Hollow-Charge Mine 4672 (Hohl-Sprung Mine 4672).

The bounding hollow-charge mine is cylindrical in shape with a cone-shaped top. It consists of an outer case, an inner case, a cone-shaped spacer head, an exposed flash tube, a concrete fragmentation collar, a propelling charge, two primer charges, and a hollow charge, which is the main charge. The outer case is screwed to a wooden base. The inner case contains the concrete fragmentation collar and the main charge. The cone-shaped spacer head is fixed to the top of the main charge with a rubber gasket to waterproof the joint. In the bottom of the main charge is a fuse well that contains an impact fuse. The impact fuse consists of s striker, a lightly compressed creep spring that holds the striker in place, a percussion cap, and a detonator. The fuse well is closed by a metal cap. In the bottom of the mine, between the inner and outer cases, is the propelling charge, which rests on a celluloid collar. In the bottom of the concrete fragmentation collar are two wells, each with a booster charge, a detonator, a percussion cap, and a delay pellet. The delay pellet rests on the propelling charge. The flash tube contains the main fuse well and is held to the mine by a bracket. The bottom of the flash tube contains a powder train that is fired by a special percussion cap assembly at the top of the flash tube. This special percussion cap assembly is fired by the main fuse, which can be a snap fuse 43/I or 43/II or a tilt fuse 43A or 43B. The mine is 6¼ inches in diameter and 11¼ inches long. It weighs a total 22 pounds, including 3.5 pounds of explosive.

Employment

This mine is effective against both vehicles and personnel. It was designed to penetrate 4 inches of armor, and for use in all types of terrain, including deep snow.

Functioning

(1) Actuating the main fuse releases a spring-loaded striker against the special percussion cap assembly.

(2) The flash produced by the special percussion cap assembly ignites the powder train.

(3) The powder train fires the propelling charge.

(4) The propelling charge propels the inner case into the air and, at the same time, fires the delay pellets.

(5) When the spacer head, which provides the correct "stand-off", strikes a solid object, such as a tank, the inertia of motion of the striker overcomes the light resistance of the creep spring, and the striker fires the percussion cap, the detonator, and the main charge.

(6) If the delay pellets burn through before the mine strikes a solid object, they fire the percussion caps, the detonators, the booster charges, and the main charge.

Note: In both (5) and (6) above there is fragmentation of the concrete fragmentation collar. This fragmentation is of primary importance in (6) which makes the mine an anti-personnel mine, and only of secondary importance in (5) where penetration is the primary effect and makes the mine an antitank mine.

Installing and Arming

(1) Unscrew the metal cap from the fuse well in the bottom of the main charge; insert an impact fuse, closed end first, into the fuse well; and replace the cap.

(2) Place the mine in a hole so the tip of the spacer head is flush with the surface of the ground.

(3) Attach the special percussion cap assembly to the flash tube.

(4) Screw a snap fuse 43/I or 43/II or a tilt fuse 43A or 43B in the main fuse well.

(5) Arm the main fuse according to the procedure outlined in chapter 5 for the fuse used.

Neutralizing

(1) Neutralize the main fuse according to the procedure outlined in chapter 5 for the fuse used.

(2) Unscrew the main fuse from the flash tube.

(3) Remove the special percussion cap assembly from the flash tube.

(4) Search for and neutralize any activating fuses.

(5) Lifting the mine.

(6) Unscrew the metal cap from the fuse well in the bottom of the main charge, remove the impact fuse, and replace the cap.

Packing


Two mines are packed in an open wooden crate, the wooden bases of the mines forming the ends of the crate. The impact fuses are packed separately in cartons of 10.

American mine field marking sign along Route 1 between Erklenz and Mönchengladbach, Germany, 3 March 1945.

US soldier in German mine field in Normandy, France, 1944.

French soldiers uncovering a German mine in France or Germany, circa 1944-45.

French officer inspecting a German glass mine, Germany, circa 1944-45.