Communist Guerrilla Warfare Against the Japanese: Base Area Utilization and Expansion

China's Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh review Communist troops before they leave for action behind the Japanese lines.

by Dr. Stephen N. Twining, Ph.D

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) forces had a long history of using guerrilla warfare tactics against superior conventional forces. Strangely, during the initial stages of the Japanese invasion the CCP met the Japanese forces with conventional force tactics. The results were a disaster. The CCP, however, was later able to take advantage of the situation by returning to a strategy of guerrilla warfare that used base areas and stressed political mobilization of the peasants with the backing of the Eighth Route Army. In the sense that the CCP was able to maintain and increase its force levels while increasing its political control at the expense of the Kuo Min Tang (KMT), the tactic was a success.

The CCP discovered a situation that was perfectly suited to their strategy and experience following the Japanese invasion in 1937. The superiority of the Japanese military negated any chance of positional warfare. Yen Hsi-shan's crushing defeat in Shansi was a vivid reminder. The Japanese failure to occupy the rural areas combined with the brutal nature of its invasion provided the CCP with a fertile ground for their insurgency: the peasants. The CCP analyzed the Japanese Army as having certain weaknesses that favored the use of the party's long-time tactic of guerrilla warfare. Chu Teh, commander of the communist forces, felt that the Japanese infantry was inferior when forced to independent actions and was overly dependent on mechanical means of transport for communications and supply. This obliged them to take the easiest and most level routes of advance and preclude any advantage they might have in the hill country. He advocated fighting in the hills and avoiding battles in the open country.

Mao Tse-tung felt that the Japanese had underestimated the Chinese strength. The internal conflicts among the Japanese militarists combined with the Japanese underestimates of Chinese strength were seen by Mao as causing many mistakes on the part of the Japanese military command. Mao saw these mistakes as:

Piece-meal reinforcement.

Lack of strategic coordination.

Dispersion of main forces at certain times.

Failure to utilize certain opportunities for military action.

And failure to wipe out forces it had surrounded.

In addition to the tactical style of the Japanese Army, there were factors inherent in the Central Chinese Army that were conducive to the CCP guerrilla warfare. Whereas the Japanese Army had an excellent mobilization and conscription plan, the Central Chinese Army under Chiang Kai-shek had little or no plan. China had no reserves to mobilize to active duty status. (The Japanese had mobilized six infantry divisions from the reserves.) The machinery for mobilization utilized by the Chinese was inadequate and inefficient. Control was placed at the provincial level with local warlords controlling conscription at the local level. The Central Government did not send directives to guide the conscription except in areas under its direct control. Even then the system functioned poorly. Individuals drafted from one area were sent on foot hundreds of miles to join their units. One source states that of those drafted only 56% reached their assigned units due to attrition by death and desertion. This had the effect of leaving large supplies of manpower resources untapped for conscription. The manpower was therefore of potential availability as guerrillas.

In view of the above factors, several plans for successful resistance were formulated by the CCP leadership under a general concept of protracted war. Victory was possible only if decisive engagements were avoided in unfavorable circumstances. The concept of compulsory mobilization must be replaced by political mobilization. A united command must be formulated and through this the army must be controlled, disciplined, and its efforts combined with the partisan warfare of the people. Only by preserving friendly forces and liquidating enemy forces could victory be gained. To accomplish this, Mao recommended that the CCP use of mobile warfare of independent initiative be combined with the fullest possible use of guerrilla tactics.

The guerrilla principles were stated by Mao in Strategic Problems of Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Warfare to be:

Carry out offensives in a defensive war on their [the unit's] own initiative, with flexibility and according to plan with battles of quick decision in a protracted war, and exterior-line operations within interior-line operations.

Coordinate with regular warfare.

Establish base areas.

Undertake strategic offensive.

Develop into mobile warfare.

Establish correct relation of commands.

These principles would insure the continuance of the protracted war. It was imperative to maintain protracted war in order to gain time to strengthen Chinese resistance while simultaneously expediting and awaiting changes in the international situation as well as the defeat to the Japanese from within. Once this was accomplished a strategic counteroffensive could be launched driving out the Japanese. Space would also yield the time that was needed to accomplish revolutionary organization and political cohesion.

These theories made good sense in view of the conditions facing the communist forces in North China. They failed, however, to specify the manner in which the theory was to be applied. Mao's writings are also "after the fact" and were describing what had already come to pass. The individual, who apparently adapted the long-time communist strategy of guerrilla warfare to the North China situation, was Liu Shao-ch'i. His vehicle was to utilize Mao's concept of the base area and adapt it to the conditions in North China being produced by the Japanese invasion.

After initial attempts at mobile warfare, the three divisions of the Eighth Route Army sought to establish base areas in mountainous terrain that were less vulnerable to the Japanese offensive tactics. The main architect of this was Liu Shao-ch'i. Liu saw these base areas as necessary to sustain long-term guerrilla warfare. Five categories of conditions were necessary for the establishment of these anti-Japanese base areas: political, military, social, topographical, and the war's continuance. A government had to be able to organize, arm and guide the masses in the resistance. The military had to be of sufficient armed strength for self-defense to insure the base would not be destroyed by the Japanese.

Social conditions must be such that the masses would cooperate with the military and the government. The terrain had to lend itself to guerrilla development while simultaneously placing the Japanese at a disadvantage. Liu considered the best terrain that which was the poorest for transportation. The war had to be continued throughout the nation to prevent the Japanese from concentrating their superior power solely against the guerrillas. This would also cause the rear areas to become more empty of enemy troop concentrations and thus indirectly aid CCP development.

The CCP priorities in the Sino-Japanese War were: maintain base areas; expand to new areas (not necessarily due to strategic considerations but definitely to increase CCP strength among the peasantry); absorb or eliminate rival nationalistic groups; and conduct anti-Japanese operations only in self-defense or to keep the nation in the war. Utilization of the base area concept, combined with the effective use of the Eighth Route Army for expansion, was the key to a successful guerrilla strategy.

Mao maintained that a centralized command was essential to coordinate operations. The actual implementation of strategic directives, however, was left to the subordinate commands in their campaigns and battles. This allowed the necessary elasticity for the conduct of guerrilla warfare. Chu Teh stressed the importance of coordinated action and the ability of various units to cooperate with each other.

The military tactics of the CCP were to attack supply columns, sever communication lines, and raid isolated Japanese outposts or small groups only when assured of superior strength. Military tactics were mainly a function of the political and economic policy and were suited to CCP arms and equipment. Attacks on supply and communication lines were to force the Japanese to maintain their garrison force strength, spend money on maintenance and repair, and lower Japanese morale. In addition to the military campaigns, the base areas were to extend their political and economic control in areas adjacent to the Japanese occupied areas.

The Eighth Route Army would avoid a pitched battle with a strong enemy. When a Japanese column would penetrate base areas, the tactic was to offer passive resistance to the force of the Japanese attack while attacking the enemy flanks and rear attempting to cut off his communication line. When the Japanese would encamp during an operation, night attacks would be launched to disturb the enemies' rest.

The base areas were originally established by units of the eighth Route Army. The 115th Division settled in the Northeast Shansi mountainous area establishing the Chin-Ch'a-Chi base. The topography of the area was suited to the establishment of a base area. This base also controlled the access to the plains of Hopei and its peasant population. The 115th found the Fou-p'ing area in a virtual political vacuum. Local officials and KMT troops were gone. A border government was established in January 1938 utilizing non-CCP politicians who had retreated from Taiyuan and were members of the Shansi Sacrifice League (Hsi Meng Hui).

The 120th Division under Ho Lung established itself in the Northwest Shansi region in April 1938. This area was barren, poverty stricken, and sparsely populated. It was, however, a strategically important area controlling the communications and defense between Shen-Kan-Ning base (Yenan) and Chin-Ch'a-Chi base.

The 129th Division under Liu Po-ch'eng established a third area in southeastern Shansi. This base area became known as the Chin-Chi-Lu Yu base (Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan). This base did not achieve status as a border region government until early 1941 but had a governmental office in August 1938 under Yan Hsiu-feng and Sung Jench'iung.

The Shen-Kan-Ning base had been established prior to the Sino-Japanese War. This was the Yenan base. Several authors have stated that this base was in command of the other base areas. The political structure does indicate this. An equally convincing argument is held by other authors that the political control of base areas was extremely difficult and that the Chin-Ch'a-Chi area served as a model for other base areas. The military chain of command appears to have run from each base area headquarters to the General Headquarters in the T'ai-hang Mountains. Military decisions seemed to have been made independent from Yenan until after the 100 Regiments campaign.

Regardless of the source, the policy was to expand to new areas after establishing a base area. Upon occupying an area the support of the local population was secured. The militia was then recruited as the Self-Defense Corps. Normally, a village would be able to sustain a 30-man platoon. Equipment and training would be provided these militia when it was available. Recruitment proceeded rapidly during the period 1937-1940, but never at a rate that exceeded the size of the area's population or resources. The key to recruitment for military purposes was the growth of the political consciousness of the population. The development of guerrilla forces and the desired degree of political and economic cooperation was seen by many as in direct proportion to the political commitment of the population. The peasant had to be persuaded to feed, house and inform guerrilla units; and the effectiveness of the units would depend upon the goodwill of the villagers. This was accomplished through propaganda, mass organizations, the press, education, the theater (Ting Ling's dramatic troupe) was well as by eliminating marauding bandits and by instilling discipline into the recruited armies. In situations where these techniques did not produce a committed peasantry, the CCP would burn resident certificates of a village to force it to resist the Japanese. Gentry who sympathized with the Japanese were branded as traitors and their properties were confiscated by the CCP. The gentry's only alternative was to take part in the leadership of the resistance forces and made contributions to its support.

In the Hopei-Shansi-Chahar base areas in Central Hopei 15% of the agricultural land was redistributed through the confiscation of gentry property.

New base areas were established by a variety of methods. Common methods were:

To use a propaganda unit from a regiment as a stay-behind force while the remainder of the regiment retreated before advancing Japanese units.

To send a regular army column deep into occupied territory.

To infiltrate army political cadres into their native regions alone without military backing.

A thorough area study would be conducted prior to infiltration into an area. This study would include knowledge of local politics, economy, grievances, Japanese strength, pro-Japanese sentiment, culture and superstitions. After infiltration, supporters of the resistance would be identified and become the base of the organization. Expansion was desirable in the anti-Japanese strategy as well as in the expansion of CCP strategy. It was similar to an old Chinese chess game where one can deny an area to an enemy by surrounding an area with one's pieces. Even if the blocked area contains no strategic piece, it is still area denied the enemy. Area denied the enemy meant less area available for his future occupancy and reduced the potential for profitable occupation.

The motivation to expand received a push in February 1938. The Eighth Route Army attempted to recapture Taiyuan in Shansi and incurred losses severe enough to force the 120th Division to seek replacements by expanding into the Hopei Plains. The failure of the offensive in Shansi combined with the lack of ammunition and food drove guerrilla bands to surrender. Vanguard units of the 129th encountered guerrilla units, militia, Japanese puppet troops and other anti-Japanese military organizations. The success of these vanguard units encouraged Liu Po-ch'eng to dispatch the main body of the division to southern Hopei establishing the Chi-Nan Military District. Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien led the first column to the area and assisted by young Yenan political activists, village level militia and local troops, seized partial political control over thirty hsien in southern Hopei. Guerrilla units were gradually organized from selected bands already engaged in guerrilla operations when the CCP reached their operational area. This was part of a general pattern in which fighting units were formed from pre-existing anti-Japanese units and the previously unmotivated population was recruited with these units as a nucleus. Peasants, previously unmotivated but later converted, were not used as main force military units until after 1941. During the period in question, they were built up as a base for future use.

The development of the Central Hopei zone by the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region was also an example of CCP expansion primarily through conversion of local Nationalists and guerrilla leaders assisted by the arrival of Red Army units. The leader of the anti-Japanese forces in the area was Lu Chen-ts'ao, a Nationalist military commander. After the fall of Paoting, he had refused to retreat south with the rest of the Nationalist troops and united with the local militia in Ankuo hsien. He and his men were "voluntarily" incorporated into the Eighth Route Army.

The CCP had sent political agents to contact Lu shortly after the Fou-p'ing area was established. Lu had already organized a local government in his area and had a force of 3,000 men. The agents invited Lu and his men to undergo six weeks of political training. After this was completed, the agents returned accompanied by the 129th Division to mobilize the peasants. General Lu then set up a training camp.

After the success of this base, the Eighth Route Army penetrated east Hopei in the spring and summer of 1938 settling in the rural areas of Hsing-lung, Ch'ie-nan, Pao-ti, Feng-jun, Chi, Yu-tien and Tsun-hua hsiens. In order to divert Japanese troops from the Central China front and delay the fall of Hankow, General Lu organized an uprising. Seven thousand T'ang-shan miners and peasants rose up against the Japanese in July 1938. The miners and peasants joined the guerrillas under the leadership of Li Yun-ch'ang. The main unit involved was the Sung-Teng Detachment. It had been formed from an assortment of Peiping University students, bandits, and soldiers from Manchuria. In 1937-38 this force had held the P'ing-Hai area west of Peking. The uprising was planned to extend the Sino-Japanese War, deepen the political consciousness of the people, increase the spirit of resistance in the area, and capture the strategic area from the Japanese. It was an action completely out of character with CCP strategy and must have stemmed from General Lu rather than the CCP. The plan failed. The action brought a Japanese guerrilla hunt. By autumn the Sung-Teng column of the Eighth Route Army was obliterated and the remnants retired to the west of Peking.

The Japanese Army slackened the pressure on the area for a nine-month period. This allowed the second Column of the Eighth Route Army to enter the area. Attention was concentrated on political activity because the CCP supposed the peasants may have feared the guerrillas due to Japanese mopping-up operations. A guerrilla base was finally established in the summer of 1941 under the overall guidance from the Chin-Ch'a-Chi area. The guerrillas maintained a low profile, merely maintaining themselves and not provoking the Japanese to undertake more mopping-up operations. General Lu's abortive uprising convinced the CCP (and General Lu) of the need to develop mass political organizations in the new base areas prior to undertaking extensive military operations and of the need to insure central military direction among absorbed guerrilla units by attachment of Eighth Route Army units to these absorbed units.

Ho Lung, commander of the 120th Division, sent detachments north in the summer of 1938 to expand his base area. In June, Li Ching-ch'uan proceeded into Suiyuan in the Ta-ching-shan range with a small detachment of young political activists. Their efforts were successful and laid the foundations for the future Shansi-Suiyuan base area. In the autumn of 1938 Ho Lung was forced to move the main body of the 120th Division to central Hopei to support Hieh Jung-chen's and General Lu's defense against the Japanese offensive stated above. The pressure eased due to Japanese withdrawals to support the battle for Wuhan. Ho Lung took over the command of General Lu's guerrillas. During this period peasants were recruited and trained for the regular division and complete militia units were inducted into his force. This was unusual for the period in question. The 120th then conducted conventional warfare instead of the usual guerrilla themes being espoused from Yenan. By the end of 1939, Ho Lung returned to northwest Shansi to protect the strategic area in the face of the KMT blockade and pressure on Shen-Kan-Ning.

The standard tactic of alliances was aided during this period due to the vacuums created by withdrawal of Japanese units being sent to support units engaged in conventional battles against Chiang Kai-shek's forces. The Eighth Route Army attempted to either convert or eliminate the irregular bandits that arose in the early months of the war. Those leaders that agreed to ally with the Eighth Route Army had to agree to do the following:

Fight the Japanese.

Accept orders.

accept political training and political leaders.

Do not harm the people.

Operate within their budgets.

Eat the same food regardless of military rank.

Accept the pay schedule of the Central Army.

Prove sincerity by attacking the Japanese.

The alliance placed units in subordinate status to the CCP. Those units that resisted the alliance were labeled bandits. If a unit desired to remain independent, the CCP would simply not aid them during Japanese mopping-up campaigns. The CCP methods left no room for any victor over Japan besides itself. The CCP operations were aimed to thwart the Japanese invasion and also to displace the KMT. The fear of irregular troops becoming marauding bands was not without basis. The outlying villages outside Peking were reported to be in bad condition. The population was suffering from actions of bandits and remnants of the 29th Army.

The Shantung area had a long history of peasant rebellion and local military organizations in the rural areas. The refusal of Han Fu-ch'u to offer resistance to the Japanese in the Sino-Japanese War had several long-lasting effects. His capitulation was followed by a general retreat of government leadership from the area. This left the populace to their own devices and produced a strong feeling against collaborators. The conventional war came to the area in the early spring when the Japanese suffered the temporary but unexpected setback at T'ai-ehr-chuang in April 1938. The weapons on this battlefield combined with those of the retreating troops of Han provided arms for the peasants. In addition, many students had moved to Shantung after Japan occupied Peiping and Tientsin. The province topography consisted of mountainous areas and areas containing moors and swamps. It was an ideal situation for guerrilla warfare. The Japanese had been present in the area for a long time as economic imperialists and a strong anti-Japanese sentiment had resulted. There were literally hundreds of guerrilla and bandit forces operating in the area. A three-sided struggle resulted between the KMT, the CCP, and the Japanese.

The middle class peasants formed more self-defense organizations after the spring 1938 Japanese offensive. These organizations were formed around already existing semi-religious societies: the Red Spear, the Black Flag, the Yellow Oust, Wu Chi Tao, Kang Feng Tao and others.

After the Japanese captured the provincial capital of Tsinan, a guerrilla force known as the 15th Mobile Column arose in northeast Shantung, headed by Wan Shang-chin and boasting of a scattered force of 20,000 men. Another unit was formed south of Changyi by Yang Hsiufeng. One observer reports that these independent guerrilla units experienced encroachments on their areas by communist units. (Yang later became chairman of the Chin-Chi-Lu-Yu Border Government.) The problem apparently was that the communists had established a headquarters in northeast Shantung and the independent guerrilla territory lay between this headquarters and another communist headquarters in northwest Shantung.

Another unit was formed in the Liao-ch'eng area under Fan Chu-hsien. This man, a former subordinate of Han Fu-chu, maintained a 30,000-man force in the area until the force was defeated in November 1938 by the Japanese and Fan was killed in action. This removed the force's influence in the area and a puppet government was set up in the area by the Japanese. Eighth Route units did little to assist Fan when he was surrounded by the Japanese.

The area came under communist influence due to pressure from both the Eighth Route Army's 115th Division and the New Fourth Army. The first column of the 115th Division entered the area in October 1938 under the command of Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien. Initially entering the south Shantung area, Hsu concentrated on incorporating many local guerrilla units. This encroached upon a 20,000-man guerrilla unit in the southern Shantung area under General Tan whose headquarters was in Chowsien.

The area had been the responsibility of a Central Army unit known as the 69th Corps under the command of KMT General Shih Yu-san. The unit with attached marines was tasked with conducting guerrilla operations in southern and central Shantung beginning 15 May 1938 following the Japanese counterattack at T'ai-ehr-chuang. They were later joined by the 57th Corps of the 24th Army Group from northern Kiangsu. The arrival of the Eighth Route units was in direct competition with these two corps and infringed on their operational areas.

Hsu assimilated diverse guerrilla groups in the area including many members of units commanded by a General Sun. One source is extremely critical of Sun claiming that he was jealous of the successes of the rival guerrilla units. He was also accused by the source as indiscriminately recruiting bandits, alienating the landlords and gentry, misusing his authority by interfering in hsien politics by appointing magistrates, attempting to wreck the United Front, and disliking the Fourth Brigade and the Eighth Route Army. Regardless of the truth of this, Sun was temporarily promoted out of the situation winding up as Chairman of the Provincial Government of Chalar. The beneficiary of his unit's manpower was the Eighth Route Army. Parts of the 69th Corps were later recalled from the area and put into the battle of Hankow in October 1938 leaving the area open for CCP expansion.

In April 1939, the 115th Division Headquarters and the 343rd Brigade of the 115th Division arrived in northwestern Shantung to assist the CCP expansion in the area. These units were controlled by Ch'en Kuang and Lo Jung-huan. Prior to its arrival, it had linked up with the remnants of Fan Chu-hsien's guerrillas.

The 343rd eventually established bases on the Shantung promontory south of Chefoo and Lung-k'ow and in the area around Tsinan. Fighting was continuous in the area during the period in question between rival guerrilla units. Forces under KMT Admiral Shen Hun-lieh and KMT General Yu Hsueh-chung contested the communist incursions into their territories. The line separating the operations of the Eighth Route units and the New Fourth Army units became the Lunghai Railway.

The major base areas in Central China were created by the New Fourth Army. In September 1937, the Central Government placed the New Fourth Army within the KMT Corps under the command of K'u Ch'u-tung and directed it to operate north of the Yangtze River. The initial period of the war was a period of expansion rather than one of military operations for the unit. This expansion was difficult to the south of the Yangtze due to the competition with the KMT remnant units and the presence of the Japanese. There were small scale guerrilla operations run against small Japanese patrols and raids undertaken against isolated Japanese bases, supply columns, railroads and puppet troops.

Thus, the CCP military forces took advantage of the lack of Central Government (KMT) influence in areas and established base areas that were used to mobilize the peasantry and to act as springboards for further expansions. Rival KMT and independent guerrilla units were absorbed or eliminated by the CCP directly or were unaided by the CCP when under attack by the Japanese. Thus, the CCP used guerrilla warfare to establish itself as the major Chinese political and military force in North China and then awaited international events to defeat the Japanese enemy.

China's Mao Tse-tung (center) with Col. Barratt, U.S. Army Observer section.

Chu Te (Zhu De), Colonel David D. Barrett, and Mao Zedong. Yan’an, Shaanxi Province. 1944.

Chinese guerrilla fighter.

Lo Shan, China, 12 June 1945. Left to right: Liu Young, Communist (Kungchantang) New Fourth Army (NFA); 2nd Lieutenant John F. Kinney, USMC; 2nd Lieutenant John A. McAlister, USMC; James D. McBrayer, Jr., USMC; Lewis Bishop, AVG pilot; 2nd Lieutenant Richard M. Huizenga, USMC; Commissar Soong, NFA; a soldier, NFA; a major, Chinese Nationalist Army (Kuomintang or KMT); Hu Ping, interpreter, NFA; a soldier NFA.

Ko Yang, China, 14 June 1945. Standing, left to right: First three men are Kuomintang (KMT) soldiers; Colonel H. M. Liu, 1st Brigade, KMT; Major General Li Hwa, 1st Brigade, KMT; next three are staff officers, 1st Brigade. Sitting, left to tight: John Wu, KMT interpreter; Magistrate of Ko Yang; 2nd Lieutenant John A. McAlister, USMC; 2nd Lieutenant John F. Kinney, USMC; 2nd Lieutenant James D. McBrayer, Jr., USMC; 2nd Lieutenant Richard M. Huizenga, USMC; Lewis Bishop, AVG pilot; KMT staff officer.

Tai Ho, China, 16 June 1945. Standing, left to right: W. C. Wang, Blockade station master; Protestant missionary; next five are KMT staff officers. Sitting: Major General Tang, Vice C-in C, Kuomintang (KMT) armies north of the Hwai River; General Lu, C-in-C, KMT armies north of the Kwai River; 2nd Lieutenant John A. McAlister, USMC; 2nd Lieutenant John F. Kinney, USMC; 2nd Lieutenant James D. McBrayer, Jr., USMC; 2nd Lieutenant Richard M. Huizenga, USMC; Lewis Bishop, AVG pilot; the Reverend F. Paul Greck, Catholic missionary from Malta; Shu Han Sung, magistrate of Tai Ho.

Mao Zedong (Tse-tung) on the left and Zhu De (Chu Teh) on the right pose for a very rare portrait before their eventual overthrow of the Nationalist Chinese government. Zhu is considered the founder of the Chinese Red Army. Yan'an, China; c. 1938.

Chinese Communist leader Mao Zedong, better known as Mao Tse-tung, addresses a meeting calling for even greater efforts against the Japanese, at the Kangdah (Anti-Japanese) Cave University.

Chinese Communist guerrilla leader Mao Tse-tung, the future President of communist China and chairman of the Communist Party, addressing a meeting. 12 November 1944.

Mao Zedong during what is thought to be the Long March: here with the Army in the course of the northern Shaanxi, China, 1934 - 1935.

A group of survivors from the Long March after their arrival in Shenxi in 1934. This Long March was undertaken by members of the Chinese Communist party and army after having been forced to flee from the south (where they had been based) by the anti-Communist action led by Chiang Kai-Shek. They headed north with Mao at their head.

Soldiers of the Red Army's Fourth Front Army led by Chairman Mao Zedong are pictured in 1935 in northern Shensi at their arrival after the long journey, called "the Long March", through China from October 1934 to October 1935.

The future dictator and leader of the Chinese Communist Party Mao Zedong leading the Communists on the Long March with political commissioner Zhou Enlai and commander in chief of the People's Liberation Army Zhu De at his side. Jiangxi, 1935.

Chinese guerrilla fighter Cheng Benhua smiling moments before execution by the Japanese; she was 24; circa late 1938.

Soldiers of the Northeast anti-Japanese coalition forces; circa 1940s.

Eighth Route Army fighting on Futuyu Great Wall, 1938.

Chinese Communist 8th Route Army bayonet training.