 |
| U.S. Army M4 "Sherman" tanks of Company A, 741st Tank Battalion and other equipment loaded in an LCT, ready for the invasion of France, circa late May or early June 1944. One tank has a welded hull. The other (marked "USA 3036947") has a cast armor hull. Both have extended air intakes for operations in water. Note the markings "1A-741Δ" ("First Army - 741st Tank Bn") on the trailer are consistent with what should be found on a 741st vehicle. USS LCT-213 is tied up alongside and several LSTs are anchored out in the harbor of this southern English port. (U.S. Army Signal Corps) |
Committee 34, The Armored School
Editor’s Foreword
This article is a reprint of “The Armored Division as an Assault Landing Force,” a research report prepared at The Armored School, Fort Knox, Kentucky, 1951-1952 by Committee 34, Officers’ Advanced Course, The Armored School, 1951-1952 (composed of Lieutenant Colonel Alva T. McDaniel, Major Francis A. Cooch III, Major George V. Labadie, Captain Edwin W. Piburn Jr., and Captain James R. Porta), and published by The Armored School, Fort Knox, Kentucky, in May 1952.
The report included several photographs which have not been reproduced in this reprint. The photographs were all copied directly from other published works (including the captions) and have now been seen numerous times in other works. Since I was provided only with a photocopy of the original report, and the original was typewritten and not very well printed, the photographs have not been reproduced in this article. Also see footnote 69 for more comments on the charts and maps.
The report was unclassified under Department of Defense Directive 5200.10, which stipulated that the material was to be downgraded at three-year intervals and declassified after twelve years, although such is usually not accomplished until someone actually requests such to be able to utilize or copy the document.
I am indebted to Abe Flatau for providing a copy of this report so that it could be reprinted, making it more readily available to everyone.
Introduction
The history of American diplomacy and foreign policy since the founding of our country, has, with few exceptions, been one of peace. America has rarely been the aggressor. Rather, the aggressors of the world have come to us. This policy has put us initially on the defensive in almost every war in which we have been engaged. We have had to suffer initial reverses while our industry became geared to war and our civilian armies were mobilized and trained. While we are suffering reverses in the initial stages of a war, we and our allies are losing ground—ground which later we must retake. Herein lies the basis of our study—our necessity for retaking the ground we have lost in the initial stages of our wars—ground that must be lost because of our belief in the proper conduct of nations.
The retaking of lost ground involves many factors. One of the most important of these factors is amphibious warfare. No greater example of this can be found than our recent experiences in World War II. Our Pacific war was a continual succession of amphibious operations. All of our great land operations in Europe were preceded by amphibious invasions. During the war, as our experience gained on the practical field of battle, so did our amphibious doctrine grow, was studied, applied, corrected, tried again, revised, and tried again. As a result, we have today what we believe to be sound amphibious doctrine. However, in our World War II landings, little use was made of our armored divisions as an assault force. This same omission is apparent in the doctrine published and available today. Doctrine concerning the use of armor in an amphibious operation is limited to a few short sentences. Doctrine pertaining to the use of an armored division in such a role is, for all practical purposes, non-existent.
The armored division, a relatively new organization, has a definite place in our army. In the early days of World War II its capabilities and limitations were understood by only a few of our leaders. As the war progressed and experience was gained, knowledge and understanding of the armored division grew. However, there remains a general lack of understanding throughout the army. This misunderstanding applies not only to the armored divisions but also to armor in general.
This study is not concerned with the overall doctrine of armor, the above only being mentioned to show the need that exists for studies on the capabilities, limitations, and uses of the armored division in various roles. Our mission is to determine the practicability of the armored division as an assault landing force.
Armor has a place in the American Army. The armored division has a definite role to play in any operations we may undertake in the foreseeable future. With this fact we preface our study. From here then, let us move to the specialized field of assault landings. What is the role of the armored division in such an operation? Given such a mission, how should the present day armored division go about accomplishing this task? These are the questions we shall attempt to answer.
Scope
This study is designed to look into one role in which an armored division might be employed—that of an assault landing force. We shall here attempt to formulate broad doctrine which would apply to an armored division given such a role. First we shall go into the history of World War II and look at the few examples where an armored division was employed in an assault landing. With these few historical examples as a springboard, we shall project ourselves into the future. Using the current organization of the armored division as a basis, we will determine the practicability of such a mission for the division and the methods for conducting such a landing, showing:
The factors that would determine the employment of the armored division in such a role;
special training required;
amphibious vehicles and vehicular equipment;
shipping requirements;
organization for the landing; and our recommendations concerning the concept of employment.
This is our scope. It will be as was stated above, broad doctrine—an overall look at the requirements for and practicability of the employment of an armored division as an assault landing force.
Problems and Limitations of the Study
In undertaking this study, we enter upon a virgin field. The only document directly concerned with the subject, other than historical examples, that came to light during our research was sixteen volumes of loading tables for an armored division. These tables were prepared for the army at Camp Calvin B. Matthews, California, by the Marine Corps in February 1945.[1] The tables are based both on World War II armored division organization, and the capabilities and capacities of World War II landing craft. They have, therefore, limited application as far as this study is concerned.
Further research brought out that, during World War II, an armored division as such, never made an assault landing. To be sure, major elements of armored divisions took part in two amphibious operations, and separate tank battalions took part in many landings, but the complete armored division was never used.
One other difficulty must be mentioned. Both vehicles and landing craft for use in future wars are still in the research and development stage. Many new developments are highly classified. These two factors make it impossible to determine exactly what equipment will be available in future amphibious operations. Without this definite information, many of the details involved in a landing cannot be exactly determined. Generalities may be stated. Assumptions may be made, but much of the information so necessary to a division in an assault landing cannot be exactly determined.
Many of the statements that follow in subsequent chapters, because of the lack of historic example, past research and knowledge of future equipment, are entirely the opinions of the committee. We have attempted, wherever possible, to support conclusions with documentation. Where it has not been possible, we have attempted to draw conclusions which could be supported by available facts, doctrines or logical thought.
Definition of Terms
The terms listed below are used quite frequently in this study. Most of them are military. Even among the military, however, there is often a difference of opinion as to their exact meaning. In addition, many have special meanings when used in connection with an amphibious operation. Therefore, in order to clarify their meaning as used in this study, we are defining them below:
Amphibious Operation—“A landing made from ships or craft to achieve an objective on land… The forces involved depend primarily upon waterborne means for transport to the objective area, for initial tactical and logistical support, and for special techniques and equipment used in debarking.”[2]
Assault Landing Force—A unit making the initial landings on a hostile shore.
Waves—The order in which troops making an assault landing move from either one shore to the next or from the ship to the shore.
H-hour—The time at which the first wave reaches the hostile shore.
D-day—The day the assault troops are to land on the hostile shore.
Landing Craft—“A craft which is especially designed for beaching, unloading or loading, and retracting from the beach. The term generally is applied to non-ocean-going vessels of less than 200-foot length designed for landing operations.”[3]
RCT (Regimental Combat Team)—Usually consists of an infantry regiment plus supporting artillery and engineers. Miscellaneous service troops may be attached.
Combat Loading—“The loading of assault troop units with their essential combat equipment, vehicles, and supplies in the same vessel, and in a manner permitting immediate and rapid debarkation in a desired priority for the landing attack.”[4]
Organizational Loading—“Troops with their equipment and supplies embarked on the same ship but without regard to the prerequisites of a tactical debarkation.”[5]
Convoy Loading—“The loading of troops, equipment, and supplies on vessels in the same convoys but not necessarily on the same ship.”[6]
Shore to Shore—“The bulk of the landing force with certain supplies and equipment is transported in landing ships… from a shore base directly to a landing beach without transshipment.”[7]
Ship to Shore—“A transshipment of troops, equipment, and supplies from seagoing vessels to smaller landing craft and the subsequent movement to the landing beach.”[8]
Demonstration—“Amphibious demonstrations are made for the purpose of confusing the enemy as to the location of the main landing.”[9]
Raid—“… an operation… involving the temporary seizure of a limited objective or a swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy or destroy his installations. It ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission.”[10]
Occupation—“… a limited operation to seize and secure a land area for use as an air, naval, or logistical base to support further operations, or to deny use of the area to the enemy.”[11]
Invasion—“… a large scale operation to seize and secure a beachhead from which to launch and support a major land offensive.”[12]
LVT (Landing Vehicle Tracked)—An amphibious personnel or cargo carrier.
LVT(A) (Landing Vehicle Tracked (Armored)—An amphibious tank.
Methods of Research
In undertaking this study, our first effort was to determine our scope. Shortly after beginning the study we attempted to set it down. As research progressed, the scope, of necessity, was revised. Many factors, originally thought necessary to be included, have been dropped. Conversely, factors not originally considered have been included.
Another factor that came under consideration was how deep we should go into each phase of the subject. After a few weeks, we realized that many factors under consideration could conceivably, in themselves, be the subject of long research studies. We decided, therefore, not to cover each phase of the landing operation in great detail.
During the first four months of the project, all members of the committee worked as individuals securing as much background material as possible. Toward the end of the fourth month, a committee meeting was hold in which the chapters to comprise the study were outlined. At this point, each member of the committee became a specialist. Each was assigned a particular chapter or chapters which became his specific project. This step was necessitated because of the broad field of the subject. It was felt that a combined effort on each chapter would produce too much diversion of effort. Furthermore, it would allow no one individual sufficient time to dig as deeply as time would permit into any particular phase.
This then was our method of research—first, we determined a scope; second, we outlined the study; third, each member of the committee assumed responsibility for the preparations of one or two chapters.
Outline of Study
Following this brief explanation of our study and the problems involved, the next chapter will be devoted to a discussion of armored participation in several World War II landings. Subsequent chapters will consider the following as they affect this study; a brief review of amphibious operation doctrine; current armored division organization; vehicular developments since World War II that affect the armored division shipping requirements; training; and conclusions and recommendations.
Assault Landings, World War II
We shall now briefly turn back the pages of history to look at several World War II landings. The past war involved many amphibious operations. However, in none was an intact armored division employed as the assault landing force. Armor was employed in almost all landings. In two major operations—Torch (invasion of North Africa) and Husky (invasion of Sicily) major elements of armored divisions were employed. Separate tank battalions were employed in many landings. Today, these separate tank battalions are organic to the Infantry Division. Our study, however, is concerned with the armored division. So, the lessons for us are few. Nevertheless, our study would not be complete if we did not at least briefly look into some World War II landings.
Although specific lessons concerning the armored division are few, many are the lessons concerning armor. It would appear then, that if we took these lessons concerning armor, put them together, and looked at the result, we would have a clear pattern for an armored division. This, at the best, is a half-truth. The armored division is more than just a collection of tanks. True, the division is built around the tank—everything in the division is there with one mission—to get the tanks on the objective. The entire division is geared to this. In the infantry division everything is designed to assist the doughboy in seizing the objective. For this reason, the sum total of the experiences of separate tank battalions operating with infantry divisions in assault landings will not add up to complete armored division doctrine for the same type of operation. The basic doctrine for and the techniques of employing the armor in the two divisions is greatly different.
Our review will be short. Each of the four landings we will discuss—North Africa, Sicily, Normandy, Okinawa—are subjects for complete studies. Accounts of the last two have already been published by the Historical Section, Department of the Army, in lengthy volumes. Three years was spent in the preparation of Cross Channel Attack by Dr. G. A. Harrison.[13] Many other accounts of all four landings have also been published. Here, we shall touch each briefly to show the part played by armor, and in particular, where applicable, the armored division.
Since we are covering these four landings briefly, we shall make no comment on the manner in which the armor was employed. Both praise and criticism will be left to more lengthy studies. Here, we will state facts—the plans and what actually happened. The critical analysis we leave to others.
The reader has probably wondered why we chose to discuss only four landings, and why, after choosing but four landings, we selected the four covered here. To answer the first question, four landings were chosen because time, space, and the purpose of the study did not permit more. In answer to the second question, the four landings selected were chosen because
both the North African and Sicilian landings represent the only occasion when major elements of an armored division have been employed in an assault landing; and
the Normandy and Okinawa landings represent two of the largest assault operations in two major theaters during World War II.
We could have picked many others, in addition to or instead of the four we have chosen. But, within the time available and the scope of our study, these four appeared to offer the most.
Invasion of North Africa
General
On 8 November 1942, the Allies took their first major step forward, since the fall of Dunkirk in 1940, toward the defeat of Germany. On that day, landings in North Africa (Operation Torch) were initiated. Months of planning had gone into the operation.
During the spring and early summer of 1942, there was much discussion of possible courses of action at the highest Allied levels.[14] The main issue concerned whether we should put all effort into plans for an invasion of the continent of Europe in 1943 or, to keep Soviet Russia in the war, we should undertake a major operation in 1942.[15] On the evening of 30 July 1942, the President informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff “that he wanted to do Torch…”[16] The next day the information was cabled to General Eisenhower, then in London.[17] He was to take temporary command until a final decision was made on a permanent commander.[18]
The final Torch plan involved three major Task Forces. The Western Task Force, under the command of Major General George S. Patton was to sail directly from the United States to capture Casablanca. This force included five Regimental Combat Teams, one armored combat command and one armored combat team. The shipping required for transport consisted of twelve combat loaders, ten auxiliary combat loaders, six cargo ships, and one sea train.[19]
The Center Task Force, under the command of Major General L. R. Fredendall, sailed from the United Kingdom and had the mission of seizing Oran. This force consisted of three Regimental Combat Teams (all from the 1st Infantry Division), one combat command from the 1st Armored Division, and the 1st Ranger Battalion. The shipping required to transport the force consisted of thirteen infantry landing ships, seven personnel ships, three tank landing ships, one gun landing ship, and twenty-three motor transport landing ships.
The Eastern Task Force, under the command of Major General Charles W. Ryder, Commanding General 34th U.S. Infantry Division, sailed from the United Kingdom, and had the mission of seizing Algiers. Once a firm foothold was established, command of this force was to pass to Lieutenant General Kenneth A. N. Anderson, Commanding General 1st British Army.[20]
In this study, we will concern ourselves primarily with the armor of the Western and Center Task Forces. Before going into the details concerning these two landings, one significant detail must be brought out. This point involves around the political background of the landing. It must be remembered that in all cases, the enemy who would oppose our landings would be French. The French, allies of the British until their collapse in the summer of 1940, controlled all of that portion of North Africa in which our landings were to take place. Most French officers were torn between their traditional hatred of the German and their loyalty to their government, regardless of what form that government took. The pre-invasion political intrigue is a subject in itself. However, no study on this invasion would be complete without pointing out that the Allied leaders felt, that, in all likelihood little or no resistance to the landings would be met. This very fact made it possible “to accept certain calculated risks which in other circumstances would have been unwarranted. The success of the assault phase makes it apparent that the risks taken were justified.”[21]
Center Task Force
The Center Task Force, consisting of elements of the 12th Air Force, 1st Infantry Division (-), CCB, 1st Armored Division, plus attached and supporting service troops, was ordered to attack at 080100 November 1942 to seize Oran and adjacent airfields. The plan of attack was to land on three beaches from east to west (Arzew Bay, Les Andalouses, and Mersa Bou Zedjar) to capture the objective by converging attacks from the northeast, west, and south. (Chart No. I) Two RCTs of the 1st Division made the initial assault at Arzew Bay. Their mission—to secure a beachhead for CCB, protect the left (west) flank of the Center Task Force, and to capture Oran. The assault at Les Andalouses was made by the 26th RCT, 1st Infantry Division. The assault at Mersa Bou Zedjar was made by elements of CCB.[22] This landing shall be studied more in detail later.
In addition to these main landings, elements of the Task Force were ordered to sail on Coast Guard cutters directly into Oran harbor in hopes for a rapid seizure of the city. This force was doomed to failure and suffered by large the greater casualties of any force during the landing.
CCB, 1st Armored Division
For this landing, CCB was divided into two columns. The East column was under the command of Major General (then Brigadier General) Oliver, Commanding General CCB, and was to land at Arzew Bay after the beach had been secured by the 1st Infantry Division. The West Column, Green Force, under the command of Brigadier General (then Colonel) Robinett, Commanding Officer, 13th Armored Regiment, was to make the assault landings at Mersa Bou Zedjar (X-Ray beach).[23]
Let us now turn our attention to each of these columns:
Task Force Red (East Column) (see Appendix I for troop list)
Task Force Red was ordered to land at Arzew Bay (Zebra Red Beach) after the beachhead had been secured by elements of the 1st Infantry Division. In addition, the column had several missions which are of interest. They were:
dispatch a Provisional Battalion (“Red Flying Column”) to seize and secure Tafaraoui airfield
seize and secure La Senia airfield
seize and secure Oggaz airfield; and
assist the 1st Infantry Division in the capture of Oran by attacks from the south.
All in all, CCB, in Field Order #1 dated 11 October 1942, gave the Red Column eleven specific missions they were to accomplish.
The “Flying Column” was under the command of Colonel (then Lieutenant Colonel) Waters and consisted of the following troops: 1st Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment (-); Company E, 6th Armored Infantry Regiment; one platoon, Company B, 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion; one platoon, Company B, 16th Armored Engineers; and an attached reconnaissance section. The general plan called for the column to land as soon as the beach was secured, assemble in the vicinity of St. Leu, and then, as soon as assembled, move out to seize Tafaraoui. In addition to seizing Tafaraoui, the column also had the mission of covering the assembly area of the remainder of Task Force Red. Once Tafaraoui was secured, the “Flying Column” was to be prepared to move on La Senia airport and Oran.[24]
Prior to the invasion, CCB had been located in the United Kingdom. On or about 1 October 1942, in preparation for embarkation, elements of the combat command began assembling at various ports throughout England. The “Flying Column” was combat loaded on two “Maricabo” boats. Prior to loading, all vehicles of the “Flying Column” were waterproofed for a landing in at least thirty-two feet of water.[25]
At 0051 on 8 November 1942, land operations commenced on Zebra Beach. The landing was unopposed, and at 0221 hours the beach was reported clear.[26] Shortly thereafter, the “Flying Column” began unloading opposite St. Leu (near Arzew).13
The first unit to strike out inland was the Reconnaissance Company (minus one platoon), 13th Armored Regiment. This unit departed the beach area at 0820,14 and by 0840 had cleared CR 106, three miles southeast of St. Cloud.[27] Here they remained throughout the day protecting the left flank of the troops at Tafaraoui.[28]
The “Flying Column” was not much longer in getting started. The column departed from Tafaraoui at 0835, and, around 1100, after encountering only light scattered resistance, was in position to assault the airport. Company B, 1st Armored Regiment (1st Platoon, Company E, 6th Armored Infantry Regiment Attached) assaulted from the east. Company A, 1st Armored Regiment, assaulted from the south. Company E, 6th Armored Infantry Regiment (minus one platoon) was ordered to establish roadblocks to the north and northeast for the dual purpose of preventing reinforcements from Oran reaching the airport and also preventing the escape of the airport garrison.[29] At 1112 the attack was launched and by 1215, the airport and three hundred prisoners were in the hands of the “Flying Column.” Meanwhile, Company E, 6th Armored Infantry Regiment (minus one platoon), on road block duty, had captured, intact, an ammunition train and guards en route to Tafaraoui from Oran.[30] The road blocks established by the company received ineffective artillery fire and aerial bombardment during the day.[31] Tafaraoui was also bombed by French planes from La Senia.
Immediately after securing the airport, the “Flying Column” began to reorganize for a continuation of the attack toward La Senia. However, the bombing and strafing attacks, the necessity for the guarding of prisoners of war and captured material, the necessity for the destroying of several artillery batteries, and reports of troops coming up from the south prevented an assault on La Senia from being launched that day. Shortly after daylight on 9 November 1942, the column moved out for La Senia—but that is another story.
Meanwhile, the remainder of Red Task Force, CCB, spent the day
getting ashore and reorganizing. About mid-morning the Command Post of CCB was established in the post office of St. Leu. The 2nd Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry Regiment (minus Company E with the “Flying Column”) completed their unloading at 1130 and were immediately ordered to move to and occupy the high ground three-quarters of a mile east of St. Leu. Here they remained for the rest of the day, protecting the beachhead, without enemy contact.[32]
Task Force Green (West Column) (for Troop List, see Appendix II)
Task Force Green, under Brigadier General (then Colonel) Robinett’s command, was ordered to attack the beaches at Mersa Bou Zedjar (X-ray beach) at 0100 on 8 November 1942 to seize and secure the airport at Lourmel. Thereafter, to assist the Red Force to capture the airfields at Tafaraoui and La Senia, and to assist in the capture of Aran as directed by the commanding general, CCB.[33]
Colonel Robinett gave the assault mission to the 1st Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry Regiment (minus Company B and detachments). A “Green Flying Column” was also organized. This force, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Todd (killed in Tunisia on 28 December 1942) consisted of the 1st Battalion, 13 Armored Regiment (minus Companies A, B, and a detachment of Headquarters Company), Company B, 6th Armored Infantry Regiment (minus two platoons), 2nd Platoon, Company C, 701st TD Battalion, and the 1st Platoon (Reinforced), Company A, 16th Armored Engineer Battalion.
The assault force was ordered to assault the beaches at 0100 on 8 November 1942 with one-company on X-ray Green beach and one company on X-ray White beach. As soon as the beach was secured, plans called for the “Flying Column” to land, and, as soon as assembled to move out toward Lourmel to secure the airport and facilities there. Upon seizure of the Lourmel airport, the column was to reorganize and be prepared to advance on Tafaraoui or La Senia airfields.
Landing operations against Mersa Bou Zedjar started on 7 November 1942 at 2347 hours. There was no opposition anywhere on X-ray beach and at 0346, the beachhead was reported clear.[34] At 0400 Lieutenant Colonel Kern, Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry Regiment, radioed the Task Force Command Post his entire unit was ashore and was proceeding to their final objectives.[35] These objectives were soon secured, and the battalion (minus Company B) spent an uneventful day securing the beachhead.[36]
Meanwhile, the remainder of the Task Force began to unload. The first unit to land, was a platoon from the Reconnaissance Company, 13th Armored Regiment. On the beach, soft sand was encountered which slowed down the unloading considerably. Nevertheless, the “Flying Column” managed to get ashore and at 0900 hours moved out for Lourmel.
Meanwhile, the Reconnaissance Platoon of the Reconnaissance Company, 13th Armored Regiment, had preceded the “Flying Column” toward Lourmel. This unit met the first resistance to the landing near Lourmel. However, it was very light, and by 0903 had been overcome. The “Flying Column” occupied Lourmel without incident at 1125.22
Orders went out almost immediately for the “Flying Column” to continue the attack to seize La Senia. So, shortly after noon on 8 November 1942, the column moved out.
The first resistance, an enemy roadblock, was encountered one mile west of Bou Telis at 1408. This roadblock was destroyed by 1443, but two friendly tanks were lost in the engagement.
An enemy roadblock, one machine gun, and one emplaced 75mm gun were destroyed at 1517 near Brediah. However, another vehicle was lost to the column during this attack—a half-track—and the column by-passed Brediah to the south and continued on their mission to La Senia. La Senia was not to be reached that day, however, and the column bivouacked for the night in Sabkra.
Summary
In this short review of the action of CCB, 1st Armored Division, during the Torch Operation, we have seen how one major element of an armored division was given several missions to accomplish during the assault landing phase. One element of the combat command landed after the beach had been secured and, after landing, advanced rapidly to seize an objective deep inland. At that same time, another element of the combat command was making its own assault landing, and, after securing a beachhead, dispatched a mobile Task Force deep inland to seize an important objective. True, the landings were unopposed, and only on rare occasions will it be possible to land so easily. Regardless of this fact, the operation does point out several possible missions for an armored division in an assault landing.
Western Task Force
The Western Task Force, under the command of Major General G. S. Patton, Jr., sailed from the United States in October 1942. Their mission—to invade French Morocco and seize the principal port and city of Casablanca. This invasion involved the longest pre-landing sea voyage in the history of warfare to that time. In addition, it was necessary for the convoy to travel through submarine-infested waters. Even so, not one ship of the convoy was lost during the voyage.
The plans called for landings to be made in three places:
at Fedala, thirteen miles northeast of Casablanca; the objective here was to initiate operations for the capture of Casablanca from the East;
at Safi, 130 miles to the southeast of Casablanca; the immediate objective of this landing was to land armor and to prevent the French troops at Marrakech from reinforcing Casablanca; and
approximately eighty miles northeast of Casablanca; here the objective was to seize the Port Lyautey airfields and to protect the northern flank of the Task Force.[37]
This study will primarily concern itself with the landings at Safi, for it was here that the greatest amount of armor was involved.
Safi Safi, 150 miles south of Casablanca, was assaulted by Task Force X-ray (Blackstone) under the command of Major General E. N. Harmon, Commanding General, 2nd Armored Division. General Harmon was given the following missions:
to secure Safi and the airport east of the town;
to insure the unloading of the armored units aboard the Sea Train Lakehurst;
to secure crossings over the Oued Oum Er Rebia River in order to insure participation of his force in the capture of Casablanca; and
to prevent the garrison at Marrakech from reinforcing Casablanca.[38]
To accomplish the mission, the following troops were put under General Harmon’s command:
an infantry landing team consisting of the 47th Infantry Regiment, 9th Infantry Division and the 2nd Battalion, 540th Engineers;
an armored battalion landing team consisting of a tank battalion, an armored infantry battalion (both from the 2nd Armored Division), and two platoons of anti-aircraft artillery; and
the Sea Train Lakehurst carrying a tank battalion from the 67th Armored Regiment, a detachment from the 56th Medical Battalion and a platoon from Company “B,” 443rd Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion.
This force comprised the bulk of the armor in the Western Task Force. It was given to General Harmon since the overall plan envisioned his force moving the 150 miles up the coast to Casablanca and attacking that city from the rear. Although a brilliant attempt was made to accomplish this mission, rapid conclusion of an armistice with the French made this plan, in the end, unnecessary.
The Safi garrison, 450 effectives, received an invasion alert at 0320 on the morning of 8 November 1942, Then, about 0400, under the cover of darkness the destroyer Bernadou, carrying Company K, 47th Infantry, entered Safi Bay. At 0428, it was fired on from the shore by a French 75 battery followed by machine gun and rifle fire. The destroyer Mervine, covering the Bernadou, countered this fire and within six minutes, all enemy fire was silenced. No further opposition from the 75 battery or the machine guns at the harbor mouth was encountered. However, at 0430 the Bernadou ran aground necessitating debarking K Company over the side. This was done, and that part of the port (Phosphate Dock) was seized without opposition. At 0500, the destroyer Cole tied up at the Phosphate Dock. L Company, 47th Regiment, on board, disembarked, relieved K Company of guarding the dock after which K Company moved to the south of Safi where they established a roadblock.[39]
The main assault landings began at 0530 when the light tanks attached to the 1st Battalion, 47th Regiment, landed in the main harbor area on Green Beach and the 1st Battalion landed on Blue Beach, about 2,000 yards to the north. Immediately after landing the 1st Battalion began to move south toward Safi. At dawn, just north of the town, the column received machine gun and rifle fire from French in position on the high ground just east of the road. This was the initial baptism of fire for these troops, and after deploying, they bogged down. However, Colonel Randle, the regimental commander, took personal charge of the battalion, led an attack against the position, and the resistance was quickly overcome.
The only other resistance of note during the day centered around the French barracks in Safi. A combination of tanks and infantry soon eradicated this resistance and the beachhead was seized by 1000 hours. The final D-day objective—a 10,000 yard beachhead—was secured by 1600 hours.
The Sea Train Lakehurst tied up at the Phosphate Dock at 1400 hours, and within twenty-four hours, all the tanks on board had been unloaded.
Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion, 47th Regiment, with one platoon of light tanks attached had made an unopposed landing on Yellow Beach, eight miles south of Safi. Here, the surf conditions were bad and not until 1400 hours was the entire team on shore. By night fall, they had moved north without opposition and were occupying the south portion of the 10,000-yard beachhead. An armored team was sent twelve miles east along the road to Marrakech to cover any threat that might develop during the night from French troops stationed there. This force occupied its positions without incident.
The next day, General Harmon proceeded north toward Casablanca with a large armored force. By skillful maneuver, he had deceived the French as to his intentions and was well on his way to Casablanca when the armistice was signed.
The landing at Safi, although against only light opposition, illustrates another mission for which an armored division might be used as an assault landing force to land on a lightly held beach several miles from the main landing, and after landing, to move parallel to the coast and attack the enemy defending the main beachhead from the rear.
Port Lyautey and Fedalah
At the same time the Safi operations were taking place, landings were being made at both Port Lyautey and Fedalah. Both were primarily infantry landings. Within both task forces there were armored battalion landing teams. Both of these landings ran into some difficulties, but in the end were successful. For our purpose, they have little application and will not be studied.
Conclusion
In concluding the Torch operation, it seems pertinent to quote from the after action recommendations submitted by the G3, Center Task Force:
…Armored Units. In all future planning it is believed that the use of armored units should be stressed. The coordinated use of infantry and tanks permits maximum exploitation of surprise or early success. Also, the psychological effect on the enemy caused by the early appearance of tanks cannot be overemphasized. It is further believed that the inclusion of tanks where practicable will minimize casualties and reduce the time required to reach the objective. Special types assault craft to transport large numbers of tanks, anti-aircraft guns, artillery, and other vehicles must be made available.[40]
Sicilian Invasion
Introduction
On 10 July 1943, Allied Forces invaded the island of Sicily—Operation Husky. The 2nd U.S. Armored Division was one of the major United States units employed. Prior to the landing, the division received special amphibious training at the Fifth Army Invasion Training Center (FATIC) in North Africa. During this training period, practice landings were conducted, loading techniques of LCIs, LSTs and LCTs were studied, and vehicles and equipment were waterproofed and prepared for shipment. In order to acquaint the tank gunners with the peculiarities of firing from an LST, actual gunnery practice was conducted from the LSTs during the practice landings.[41]
The greatest difficulty encountered throughout this training period was in unloading the LSTs. This was brought about by the flat beach gradient of the Mediterranean shore and the deeper draft of the LST. Both FATIC and naval personnel attempted to solve this problem, and, although much training time was lost while this difficulty was under study, a completely satisfactory solution was never found.[42]
Final plans for the landing called for the division to be split into two separate forces. Combat Command A (CCA) was attached to the 3rd Infantry Division—JOSS Force—and placed under the command of Lieutenant General (then Major General) L. K. Truscott. The division, less CCA but with the 18th Regimental Combat Team attached was to be the army floating reserve.[43]
CCA, 2nd Armored Division (see Appendix III for Task Organization)
In addition to CCA—commanded by Major General (then Brigadier General) Maurice Rose, the JOSS Force consisted of the 3rd Infantry Division, one ranger battalion, and supporting troops.[44] The missions of this force were to land in the Licata area, capture and secure the port and airfield by dark of D-day, extend the beachhead, and protect the left flank of the operation against interference from the northwest. On its right flank, it was to maintain contact with II Corps.[45]
Prior to the embarkation, special floating ramps were procured to expedite the unloading of the LSTs. Beside this difficulty with the beach gradient, insufficient troop space further complicated the loading. This necessitated the separation of the armored infantry units from their personnel carriers.[46]
One other technique employed during the embarkation phase was that of split loading battalion and separate company headquarters. Although this increased the loading problem, it was felt necessary in order that an entire headquarters would not be lost with the sinking of one ship.[47] This split loading paid off, for on the morning of 11 July 1943 (D + 1), two Focke-Wulf 190s bombed the harbor at Licata. Two LSTs were sunk, one of which was carrying one half of Headquarters Company, CCA. Although personnel casualties were light, vehicular casualties were high—forty percent loss in Headquarters Company, CCA.[48]
During the forty-eight hours prior to D-day, the Western Mediterranean experienced one of the worst storms in recent years. The entire invasion was nearly disrupted and serious damage was done to the special floating ramps so necessary to the successful unloading of the vessels.
At 0245 hours on 10 July 1943, the infantry of the 3rd Division and the 3rd Ranger Battalion assault landed on the coast of Sicily. For the landing, the 3rd Battalion, 66th Armored Regiment, was detached from CCA, and attached to the assaulting infantry. Shortly after daybreak three companies from the battalion were debarked and deployed on the beach assisting the infantry in mopping up beach resistance.[49]
Elements of the 2nd Battalion, 41st Armored Infantry Regiment, led the debarkation of the main body of CCA. Shortly after getting ashore, twelve enemy soldiers were captured near Licata by Company G of the battalion.
The combat command continued to debark throughout the rest of the day and night. At midnight, General Rose received orders to attack at 0630 on the morning of 11 June 1943 to secure Nardo and Canacatti. By daybreak, two-thirds of the combat command had debarked and at 0630, the advanced guard passed through the leading elements of the 3rd Infantry Division. The remaining one-third of the combat command was ordered to close up on the main body in company sized groups immediately after debarking.
2nd Armored Division (minus CCA, plus 18th RCT)
The 2nd Armored Division—KOOL Force—was under the command of Major General Hugh Gaffey. This force was the floating reserve of Seventh Army and was ordered “to be prepared to land in support of any of the assaults.”
At 1520, on D-day, KOOL Force received orders to land on Dime Beach just west of Gela.[50] H-hour here had been at 0245 hours. The command echelon went ashore at 1700 and made arrangements for assembly areas.[51] And at 1900, the 18th RCT and the 1st Battalion, 41st Armored Infantry Regiment, began to debark. These units were completely unloaded prior to daylight.[52]
The first tanks to debark were two platoons of Company I, 67th Armored Regiment, which were unloaded at 0200 on the morning of 11 July 1943. However, because of high surf and congestion on the beach, it was decided not to unload any more armored vehicles during the hours of darkness.[53]
Until about noon, 11 July 1943, only four American tanks were available for combat and in position to fire on the entire beachhead. During the early morning, Major General White (then Colonel), CCB commander, had located these tanks. He ordered them to take up positions from which they could cover the CCB command post and the troops in the assembly area.
The unloading continued all day on 11 June 1943 and was completed by early morning of 12 June 1943.[54]
Concerning this landing phase, General White has said the following:
…A number of tanks were out of action for a considerable period of time after getting ashore because of two factors:
Somervelt mats (chickens were laid to assist wheel vehicles through deep sand) and
Deep sand.
The Somervelt mats became entangled in the tracks and could only be removed by cutting with large nippers. In avoiding the Somervelt mats successive vehicles moving up the steep sandy hill near the beach bogged down in the sand and generally threw one or both tracks.[55]
While the main body of the division was busily engaged in debarkation, the 1st Infantry Division, one of the assault divisions, was receiving a serious counterattack. About 1000 hours, on the morning of 11 June 1943, the division was attacked by approximately thirty to forty German tanks. The enemy tanks succeeded in breaking through 1st Division positions and debouching on the plain northeast of Gela. Here they were engaged and successfully repulsed by a platoon of four tanks from Company I, 67th Armored Regiment, assisted by some 1st Division Field Artillery and Infantry cannon. This action lasted about two hours when the enemy withdrew leaving behind fourteen knocked out tanks. Most of these fourteen tanks were destroyed by the four American tanks while the losses to our own tankers consisted of four men wounded. The defeat of this enemy counterattack was one of the turning points of the Sicilian campaign.[56] The bulk of the 1st Division anti-tank guns had been lost when the LST on which they were being transported was hit by a bomb and burned on D-day. If the four tanks had not been present serious consequences would have come of this attack.[57]
Conclusion
The landings in Sicily point out several lessons of particular importance to the armored division. These are:
It is essential that tanks be debarked early in order to support an amphibious operation.
Vehicles should be compactly and completely loaded so that crews can sustain themselves until supply echelons can become operational.[58]
Unloading ramps are necessary on each tank carrying ship in order to permit quick unloading of units such as platoons.[59]
Split loading of units, especially headquarters units should be practiced to the maximum extent consistent with shipping.[60]
Normandy, 6 June 1944
Introduction
The long-awaited assault against Fortress Europe began in the early morning of 6 June 1944. Allied forces, under the supreme command of General Eisenhower, launched their initial assault to secure a beachhead on the continent of Europe.
Many volumes have and will be written on this operation, the greatest invasion in all history. For our purpose, we shall take but a few short paragraphs to see what armor was used and how it was employed during the initial assault.
No armored divisions were initially employed in the operation. The first armored division to arrive in France was the 2nd Armored Division, which began landing on 9 June, three days after D-day.[61]
The use of tanks in the assault was a subject of prolonged discussion and experimentation. The final decision was to employ tanks as close support artillery—not as an armored force. Two of the major characteristics of armor—mobility and shock action—were disregarded. In addition, final plans did not call for the tanks to make any exploitation off beaches. This decision was brought about by the feeling that only an armored gun would have any chance for survival on the beach. In addition, it was felt, that tank cannon would be quite effective for firing into pillbox embrasures. The planners visualized the tanks not leaving the beach during the assault phase, but rather remaining in and firing from positions hull deep in the water.[62]
With this concept in mind then, a tank battalion was attached to each of the assault regiments. These tanks were to lead the attack. They were to get ashore in one of two ways. Some would be carried to the beach on LCTs and land with the first infantry waves. Others were to be launched at sea and “swim” into shore. The “swimming” tanks were expected to reach the beach prior to the arrival of the infantry.
These amphibious tanks were commonly called “DD” tanks. Later chapters will explain them in more detail.
For the landings, the separate tank battalions were placed in two armored groups—the 3rd and 6th. These groups were in turn attached to the 1st Infantry Division (3rd Armored Group) for the landing on Omaha Beach and the 4th Infantry Division (6th Armored Group) for the Utah Beach landings. The 3rd Armored group consisted of the 741st, 743rd, and 745th Tank Battalions while the 70th and 746th Tank Battalions made up the 6th Armored Group.[63]
In turn, the battalions were organized for the assault into two echelons—assault and support. The assault echelon consisted of three medium tank companies. Two were equipped with the DD flotation device. The third was not so equipped, but did have a Tank Dozer Platoon attached. The support echelon consisted of a minimum of battalion command personnel plus a maintenance section and supply vehicles. It was not planned for the residue of the battalions to land until about 15 June.
During the period 1 March 1944 to 16 May 1944 the 3rd Armored Group conducted intensive training in the employment of DD tanks. Then, on 16 May, loading began. On this date, two companies each from the 70th, 741st, and 743rd Tank Battalions loaded on LSTs—four DD tanks to a ship. On 30 May, the 3rd Armored Group Headquarters and the remaining battalions began loading. This loading was completed by 2 June. Everyone was ready for the big show.
6 June 1944
Originally the landings were scheduled for 5 June, but Channel storms necessitated calling off the operation for that day. By now, the entire world is familiar with General Eisenhower’s famous decision to go ahead on 6 June even though the weather was not promising. But this bad weather, and, as a consequence, rough sea was to play havoc with our DD tanks.
In the 4th Division sector, on Utah Beach, where initial resistance was unexpectedly light, thirty-two DD tanks were supposed to land in the first wave. However, they landed fifteen minutes late because of the loss of a control vessel which struck a mine. But the opposition was so light that there was no immediate need for them. All but four of these thirty-two tanks got ashore safely—the four being lost when the LST carrying them hit a mine.[64]
On Omaha Beach, the picture was quite different. Here the 1st Division had an extremely difficult time. Throughout most of D-day, the German LXXIV Corps believed they had stopped this assault on the beach.[65]
At H-50, two DD companies of the 741st Tank Battalion were launched 6,000 yards off shore. Almost immediately they began to have difficulty with the sea. Only five of the thirty-two launched succeeded in reaching shore.[66]
On the extreme right flank of the beach, sixteen tanks were scheduled to land ahead of the infantry (Company A, 116th Infantry). Only eight survived enemy artillery and reached shore. These eight were brought in on LSTs, it having been decided that the sea was to rough to launch them.[67]
On the left flank of the 116th Regiment’s sector, the situation was not so bad. Here, two companies of tanks were landed by LSTs ahead of the infantry. These companies did not suffer any losses.
Meanwhile, in the 16th Regiment’s sector (on the left flank of 116th Regiment), the troops were experiencing what was probably the most difficult of the landings. Almost all the DD tanks were swamped and lost. One tank company was beached from LSTs and almost immediately lost five tanks. As a result, only one-third of the planned armor support was initially available to the 16th Infantry.
Thus, we have seen how on the Utah Beach, where initially tanks were not needed because of light resistance, they were available. On the other hand, on Omaha Beach where resistance was stiff, most of the tanks were lost to the surf. In concluding its report on the D-day landings, the 1st Army Armored Section made the following pertinent statement:
The use of DD Tanks in their present state of development is restricted to quiet water.[68]
Okinawa, 1 April 1945
General
The operation against Okinawa—the first Japanese “home” island to be invaded[69]—was one of the last large battles of World War II. It is the only amphibious landing from the Pacific Theater of Operations that we shall study.
A brief statement as to why this battle is being included is in order. As will be shown later, initial enemy resistance was almost non-existent. However, the operation was one of the largest undertaken in the Pacific Theater during World War II.
For the assault echelon alone, about 183,000 troops and 747,000 measurement tons of cargo were loaded into over 430 assault transports and landing ships at eleven different ports from Seattle to Leyte, a distance of 6,000 miles.[70]
Not just from the viewpoint of size alone is this battle important. This plan was “in many respects the culmination of experience of all previous operations in the Pacific war.”[71] There were no armored divisions in the Pacific Theater during World War II. There were, however, many tank and amphibious tank battalions. Many experiences of these units are applicable to this study. Here we have time for but one landing. Thus, since our time limit was restricted, we attempted to choose that landing that would offer the most. Okinawa, because of the factors outlined above appeared to offer what we needed.
Background
Operation Iceberg, the plan for the invasion of Okinawa, marked the beginning of the end for Japan. United States troops were at last to fight on land considered by the Japanese to be part of their “home” islands.
On 3 October 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that a portion of the Ryukyus Islands be seized.[72] Okinawa is the most important island in this group. Not only that, it is within the outer ring of Japanese defenses. Once Okinawa was under our control, Japan had but two choices: (1) surrender or (2) prepare for an all out defense of their home islands.
The landings were to be conducted by the Tenth U.S. Army under the command of Lieutenant General S. B. Buckner, Jr. For this operation, Tenth Army consisted of two major commands, in addition to air and naval forces—XXIV Corps under command of Major General J. R. Hodge and III Amphibious Corps (Marine) under command of Major General R. S. Geiger. Attached to the XXIV Corps were two Army divisions—the 7th and 96th. Attached to the III Amphibious Corps (Marine) were two Marine divisions—the 1st and 6th. In addition, under Army control were the 2nd Marine Division, 27th Army Division and the 77th Army Division.[73]
Within the XXIV Corps, coordination of the tank battalions, amphibious tractor battalions, and amphibious tank battalions was accomplished through the 20th Armored Group.[74] It is with this group that we are primarily concerned.
In January 1945, XXIV Corps was engaged in the final phase of the Leyte operation when orders were received attaching them to 10th Army for the Okinawa campaign. At this time, 20th Armored Group was a part of XXIV Corps.[75] Immediately after receiving the corps order for Okinawa, the Commanding Officer, 20th Armored Group, directed the amphibious units within the group to hold show down inspections; to prepare and submit loading plans; to requisition all shortages; and to maintain command liaison with the divisions to which they would be attached in the assault. These units would come under operational control of the divisions when they (the amphibious units) crossed the beach to load. The tank battalions of the group remained with the divisions with whom they had operated during the Leyte Campaign.[76]
During this preparation, group headquarters acted primarily in an advisory capacity. Issue of major items of supply to the tank battalions was controlled by the group through coordination with XXIV Corps special staff. Major items for the amphibious units were issued by the Group S4. In addition the Group Commander acted as Armored Advisor to the Commanding General XXIV Corps.
Time for training and rehearsal was limited by the time required for maintenance. The Group had learned from their experience in the Leyte, Saipan, and Tinian operations that amphibious vehicles, because of their specialized nature, required more maintenance time to ready them for the assault after the final rehearsal than any other ground units taking part in the operation.[77]
Upon completion of the training period all units of the group loaded under division control as the shipping became available. For the operation, the units were attached as follows:[78]
7th Infantry Division
536th Amphibious Tractor Battalion
718th Amphibious Tractor Battalion
776th Amphibious Tank Battalion
711th Tank Battalion
96th Infantry Division
788th Amphibious Tractor Battalion
728th Amphibious Tractor Battalion
80th Amphibious Tank Battalion
63rd Tank Battalion
77th Division
73rd Amphibious Tractor Battalion
15th Amphibious Tractor Battalion
708th Amphibious Tank Battalion
706th Tank Battalion
Landings, 1 April 1945
The final plan to attack called for XXIV Corps and III Amphibious Corps to land with two divisions abreast—a total of four divisions in the assault. In addition, a demonstration was to be made by the 2nd Marine Division on the southeastern side of the island.[79] Units were loaded and the assaults made as shown in Chart 8.[80] [Chart not available; see note for details. —Editor]
H-hour was set for 0830. The fire support force of ten battleships, nine cruisers, twenty-three destroyers, and 177 gunboats began their pre-H-hour bombardment at 0530. Altogether this was the largest pre-invasion concentration of naval gunfire in history—a total of 44,825 rounds of five inch or larger, 33,000 rockets, and 22,500 mortar shells were fired in this preparation. Then at 0745, carrier planes covered the beach with napalm.[81]
Meanwhile, the troops and tanks to lead the assault were readying themselves. Amphibian tanks comprised the first wave and at 0800 they were flagged across the line of departure, 4,000 yards from the beach. Behind them, five to seven waves of assault troops in amphibian tractors followed.
The way in was led by gunboats firing rocket, mortars and 40mm guns. This concentration was so great that it averaged twenty-five rounds in each one hundred yards square. Upon approaching the reef, these gunboats turned aside and the amphibious tanks and tractors continued to the beach.[82]
During the entire move to the beach, the only sign of the enemy was an occasional mortar or artillery shell; “…the long line of invasion craft advanced as though on a large scale maneuver.”
At 0830, the first waves began to touch down—almost all on time. The entire landing was unbelievably easy. There had been but little artillery fire, no enemy on the beach, and only a few land mines. By nightfall, the beachhead was 1,500 yards long and, in places, 5,000 yards deep.[83] It wasn’t until 5 April 1945 that stiff enemy resistance was finally met. The winning of the island was still a long way off. But a very definite foothold had been secured.
Conclusion
Thus we have seen, in four landings, different methods for the use of armor in an amphibious operation. First, to secure an objective deep inland; second, to advance parallel to the coast and attack enemy opposing another landing from the rear; third, as the army reserve; fourth, as armored artillery; and fifth, leading an attack as amphibious tanks.
Armor has a place in an amphibious operation. We will now determine the role of the armored division in an assault landing.
Doctrine and Organization
The tactics and techniques employed in amphibious operations in World War II varied considerably as experience was gained and lessons learned. The strength and composition of landing forces changed with each operation but one thing became apparent, the tank was a necessary part of any landing force.
The position of tanks within the assault force depends upon… the nature of the enemy defenses, and beach obstacles. In any case, tanks must either closely follow or be followed closely by infantry…[84]
When the terrain is suitable for tank operations and the beaches are not heavily defended by anti-tank weapons and anti-tank obstacles, tanks may be in the leading waves…[85]
When the terrain for tank operations is poor or restricted or when the beach is heavily defended by anti-tank weapons and obstacles, tanks are used in later waves…[86]
This section is concerned with two questions—since the tank is a necessary part of the landing force in amphibious operations, why was the armored division not used as an assault landing force during World War II, and second—is the armored division now suitable for such a role? Before considering the armored division organization, however, the general nature and characteristics of amphibious operations must be fully appreciated.
The execution of amphibious operations is divided into the following general phases:
Planning
Detailed planning is required for the successful execution of a landing. Planning begins months in advance of the expected D-day in order to coordinate the forces required for the operation. The time required for this phase depends upon the size of the operation. For example, the planning staff for Overlord (invasion of France) was established under Lieutenant General Frederick E. Morgan in April 1943—fourteen months before the actual invasion. Even before the end of 1941 British joint planners had drawn up an invasion plan for the European continent called Roundup. This plan bore little resemblance to the final Overlord plan but is mentioned here to show the degree of planning required for an operation of this nature.
Concentration and Special Planning
Forces selected for the operation are concentrated and specialized training is accomplished to insure the organization of an integrated task force. Specialized training includes rehearsals under conditions as near as possible like those to be encountered in the actual operation.
Embarkation
Troops, equipment, supplies, and vessels are concentrated at the places of embarkation. The landing force is combat loaded in assault craft.
Voyage
The landing force is moved from points of embarkation to the landing area in preparation for the assault.
Landing
Naval and air units are positioned to support the landing force and begin preparation of the beach area by naval gunfire and air bombardment. The landing force assaults the beach and secures beachhead lines.
Consolidation
Reorganization of the assault forces is accomplished and beachhead lines are consolidated. Major supply points are established ashore and adequate supplies are unloaded.
The detailed planning for landing operations is required because of the special problems created by unfavorable conditions inherent in such operations. Some of these conditions are as follows:
Tactics and techniques of landing operations are largely dictated by the availability of suitable ships and landing craft. The strength, composition, equipment, and supplies employed in an operation must be fitted to the available shipping space.
Organic supporting weapons of the landing force function only to a limited degree in the early stages of an operation and fire support must usually be furnished by the navy and aviation. The use of naval gunfire and close air support increased the problems of coordination, communications, command, and pre-invasion training since most army units are unfamiliar with naval fire procedures.
Special organization of army units is required to provide appropriate forces for the landing and to facilitate the debarkation of intact combat units. Combat units must be so organized that they are self-sufficient in fire power until supporting weapons are landed. Automatic weapons and other fires must be used in lieu of normal artillery support.
Suitable beaches and terrain in the objective area are of vital concern. Favorable beaches are those that permit the beaching of landing craft and landing ships close to the shoreline to permit rapid debarkation, and advance inland of troops and equipment without excessive interference from navigational hazards. Suitable exit routes from the beach inland are required to facilitate rapid dispersion of vehicles and supplies.
Enemy strength and dispositions in the objective area affect the composition of the assaulting forces. Special equipment may be required to remove obstacles and clear areas for landing craft. Heavily defended shores may have pillboxes constructed on the beach with flat trajectory weapons emplaced to fire on assaulting troops while still afloat. The presence of enemy mechanized forces in the objective area requires that tanks be landed in the early waves to counter the threat and protect the beachhead.
Many other problems can and do arise in amphibious operations. Assault troops may be landed on the wrong beaches. Ships may be forced by enemy action to leave the transport area after landing the assault troops but before supplies and equipment can be landed. Underwater conditions and strong defenses may deny certain beaches. Unfavorable tides and weather may prevent landings. All these factors affect the planning and successful execution of landing operations, however, certain characteristics of amphibious operations tend to favor the attacker and should be considered here.
Amphibious operations are aggressive by nature. The choice of time and places lies with the attacking force and require the defender to dissipate his forces in order to defend the entire coastline or leave certain areas lightly defended and relatively unprotected.
Tactical surprise may be obtained by the attacker. The enemy can often be deceived as to the true location of the main landing by the use of demonstrations and feints. Strategic surprise normally is not possible because of the necessity for a buildup of supplies and troop concentrations.
The mobility of floating reserves makes it possible for the attacker to take advantage of success in an unexpected quarter or to exploit any weakness discovered in the hostile defense.
The most outstanding characteristic of amphibious operations is shock at the point of contact. This shock is obtained by the concentration of superior forces and striking in overwhelming strength at one or more selected points in the hostile defensive system. The initiative is with the attacker and allows this concentration of force.
These are the general characteristics and conditions, favorable and unfavorable, that must be considered in the planning and execution of a landing operation. There are many details in addition to the above that must be planned for but will not be discussed here.
It has been pointed out in the preceding chapter that the armored division was not used in World War II as an assault landing force. The discussion to follow will attempt to show some reasons why.
Organization
The armored division of World War II was the result of six separate re-organizations occurring during the period July 1940-September 1943.[87] Actually, two different organizations were employed during World War II but only one will be discussed, the organization prescribed on 15 September 1943, since all but two were organized under this Table of Organization.
As stated in the initial training directive, 6 August 1940, the role of the armored division was to conduct highly mobile offensive warfare through a self-contained unit composed of the requisite arms and services.[88] This statement was amplified in the Armored Force Field Manual 17-10, which stated: “The role of the armored force and its components in the conduct of highly mobile ground warfare is primarily offensive in character, by self-sustained units of great power and mobility composed of specially equipped troops of the required arms and services.” By 15 January 1944, FM 17-100, The Armored Division, stated the role of the armored division as follows: “The armored division is organized primarily to perform missions that require great mobility and firepower.”
The various re-organizations of the division followed four continuous trends: a decrease in light tank strength, an increase in the relative strength of the infantry elements of the division, the elimination of needless command echelons, and the lightening of the service elements.
Armored Division TO&E 17 (Abstract), 15 September 1943[89]
Entire division: 10,937
Division headquarters: 164
Tank battalions (three): 729
Infantry battalions (three): 1,001
Combat command headquarters and headquarters company (two): 184
Division trains, headquarters and headquarters company: 103
Reserve command headquarters: 8
Field artillery (three battalions): 1,623
Cavalry reconnaissance squadron: 935
Engineer battalion: 693
Medical battalion: 417
Ordnance battalion: 762
Signal company: 302
Military police platoon: 91
Division headquarters company: 138
Band: 58
Attached medics: 261
Attached chaplains: 8
A study of the above table shows that even though the relative strength of infantry in the division was improved over the former organizations, the strength was entirely inadequate for most operations. A total of three battalions of three rifle companies could hardly be considered sufficient for a landing operation.
Another weakness of the division was inadequate service support. No quartermaster battalion was organic and special measures were required for service support in normal operations. A quartermaster truck company was attached to provide this support in some divisions.
Division artillery consisted of three armored field artillery battalions, light. No medium artillery was organic to the division.
In addition to the weaknesses of the armored division, a serious shortage of ships and landing craft existed throughout the planning phase.
…The Allies did not have enough landing craft and other facilities to mount simultaneously both the cross-channel and the Mediterranean attacks in the strength we wanted…[90]
Whether such a shortage will exist in future operations is a matter of speculation. The requirements for landing craft were not known at the start of World War II and craft were designed and produced as the need became apparent. Much experience was gained at this time and some craft are now available. Research and development has continued to the present time as will be seen in later chapters. There is little reason to believe that such a serious shortage should exist in future operations.
These factors no doubt influenced the composition of landing forces in World War II. Certainly the shortage of landing craft suitable for transporting armored vehicles was a deciding factor in all these operations.
What has been done since then to correct the weaknesses of the armored division and is the division suitable for assault landings? By June 1945 organizational changes were being solidified by the War Department for a new type armored division based on the concepts of our armored commanders. It was realized that there was a definite place in our armored organization for the heavy type division to perform missions beyond the capabilities of the light armored division.
In the new armored division, prescribed in October 1948, combat effectiveness and service support were increased materially. (See Appendix IV.) The armored infantry units were re-organized to provide four rifle companies in each armored infantry battalion and an additional battalion was added to give a total of sixteen rifle companies compared to nine in the former organization. A quartermaster battalion was added to provide the much-needed service support to make the division logistically self-sufficient for limited operations. A medium artillery battalion was added to provide the balance of artillery required for fire support. Other units added are the heavy tank battalion and an anti-aircraft artillery battalion to bring the total strength of the division to 15,973.
The division now possesses a balance of arms and services required for the accomplishment of assigned missions and some characteristics particularly desirable in a unit employed in amphibious operations.
A high degree of flexibility is provided in the division by the combat command-separate battalion organization. The separate battalion is self-sufficient administratively with organic supply, maintenance, and administrative personnel. Battalions and companies from the battalions may be assigned to the combat commands for a particular mission without interference with its service support or ability to operate independently. This flexibility in the formation of combat teams is of particular importance in landing operations because of the required special organization for landing. Combat command staffs are accustomed to having a variety of types of units under their control. The integration of these units into a fighting team for maximum efficiency is a daily problem.
One other point that cannot be overlooked. The infantry and tank soldiers of the division are trained from the beginning to take their place as a part of the tank-infantry team. Rarely does the armored infantry battalion fight without attached tanks. Conversely, the tank battalion rarely fights without attached infantry. This practice of fighting as a part of a task force rather than as battalions develops in the individual a ready ability to fight in any type of organization.
The automatic weapons essential to the early stages of an amphibious operation are present in the division. The firepower of the division is tremendous. The following table shows the number and types of weapons in the armored infantry battalion compared to those of the standard infantry battalion.
Comparison of Automatic Weapons[91]
|
|
.30 cal. MG light |
.30 cal. MG Heavy |
.50 cal. MG |
BAR |
SMG |
|
Armored infantry |
45 |
38 |
9 |
37 |
123 |
|
Infantry battalion, |
13 |
4 |
8 |
45 |
0 |
The automatic weapons of attached tanks are added to the figures above when combined into tank-infantry teams.
The armored division operates with radio as the normal means of communication. This flexible means is required for effective control of a mobile unit. Adequate communications equipment is present in the division. For example, the armored infantry battalion is equipped with 202 radio sets of all types, of which 169 are suitable for hand carry. Special communications to control assault units, naval gunfire and air support is essential in landing operations. The communications equipment of the armored division meets this requirement.
The armored division is a completely mobile unit. Once ashore, this mobility combined with the characteristic shock of the landing would enable the division to quickly expand the beachhead and capture the assigned objective.
The characteristics favoring the employment of the armored division in landing operations have been pointed out. One problem exists, however, that should be considered at this time. The heavy equipment providing the mobility and armor protection presents a problem when considered in connection with conditions existing in World War II. A comparison of the total vehicles in the armored division and the infantry division is given in the following table.
Comparison of Vehicles by Type[92]
|
Division |
Unarmored (all types) |
Armored (all types) |
Trailers |
|
Infantry |
2,334 |
259 |
1,514 |
|
Armored |
2,165 |
1,241 |
1,358 |
This comparison points up the fact that although the armored division has fewer general purpose vehicles and trailers, it has approximately 1,000 more armored vehicles than the infantry division. This requirement for shipping space could be lowered somewhat by the elimination of some non-essential administrative vehicles when combat loading and in addition, armored infantry could land and operate initially without armored personnel carriers. This, however, would seriously restrict the mobility of the unit ashore if carriers did not follow closely and the effectiveness of the division would be neutralized to some degree.
Conclusion
In this chapter an attempt has been made to point out some of the factors that must be considered before a decision can be reached to employ an armored division as an assault landing force. Many other factors must be considered—effect of adverse sea and weather, organization of the force for landing, organization of shore logistical elements, to name a few. These considerations are inherent in any amphibious operation and not special considerations affecting the armored division alone. The characteristics and capabilities of the armored division of today must be considered when planning amphibious operations of the future.
Special Vehicle Requirements
The use of an armored division as an assault landing force is governed largely by the type and availability of the necessary equipment to get the armored vehicles from transport area over the last three to six thousand yards of water from naval transports to the beach. In this chapter we will discuss the various methods and materiel used in the past, that presently available, and some possible future developments that will get us through this particularly vulnerable stage of an assault landing.
Equipment for the Assault
Beach landing of armored vehicles has been accomplished in two ways:
Transporting tanks to the beach on naval landing craft, or ships and
by making the tanks capable of floating and propelling themselves over this distance.
Craft and considerations involving their use will be discussed in detail in the following chapter. However, to understand the necessity for the development of amphibious vehicles and related equipment we should remember some of the advantages and disadvantages in the use of landing ships as a method of getting armor on the beach. This method requires less shipping space than when tanks are equipped to float and allows speedier movement to the beach. The movement to the beach is easier to control and almost unlimited time can be spent in the transport area prior to the assault. On the other hand use of our present landing ships limits almost entirely the employment of the tank guns during the assault, presents a large target, and entails the loss of all tanks as well as the landing ship itself if sunk. In some instances it requires a ship of the LSD type to carry the loaded landing ship to the assault area.
These and other considerations brought about the development of two general types of amphibious equipment to get armor ashore. Devices were built to make standard tanks float, and for the primary purpose of amphibious operations, tanks capable of “swimming” without special attachments were manufactured.
In discussing these vehicles and vehicular equipment we should first realize what characteristics are desired and then we will be better able to decide whether these requirements have been met satisfactorily. Also we must keep in mind that our purpose in this discussion is to arrive at the best method of landing an armored division in an amphibious assault.
Starting from the beginning we first want to take up as little shipping space as possible. We want ease of launching from the transport, and a certain degree of safety in the water. Sufficient speed to allow us to accompany assaulting infantry is required. We must have enough endurance to allow for necessary assembly in the transport area, movement to the beach, and normal operation after landing. Also the vehicle should be maneuverable in the water. We must be able to fire the tank gun during the assault. Upon reaching shore the vehicle must be capable of immediate combat and should be able to discard in a minimum of time any flotation equipment which hinders its land operation. These requirements must in no way reduce the amount of ammunition carried by the vehicle.
With these requirements in mind we will discuss in more detail what equipment is available or could conceivably be made available to meet them.
Duplex Drive Tank
One of the earliest developments for floating standard type tanks was the Duplex Drive or DD tank. Designed by the British and used in World War II, it consisted of a medium tank with a collapsible canvas wall built around it just above the tracks. Propellers were geared to the engine and it was steered by two rudders. With the addition of waterproofing the tank was able to float and propel itself through deep water until the tracks contacted the ground. Upon reaching shore the propellers were disengaged and the canvas wall was collapsed, allowing the tank to operate normally.[94]
About three times as many DD tanks can be carried in one landing craft as those fitted with pontoons. The system does not greatly restrict the mobility of the vehicle and it enables a tank when so equipped to cross more than one water obstacle. Preparation for swimming requires very little time.[95]
The vehicles can be used only in comparatively quiet water as there is danger of being swamped in heavy seas or by the surf as the tracks make contact with the beach. Due to the height of the canvas float the main armament cannot be fired while the tank is in the water. The canvas is also highly vulnerable to underwater obstacles.
Rigid Flotation Device
A more rugged type of flotation device for the M4 medium tank, known as the T-6, was employed experimentally by Marine and Army tank units during the Okinawa landing.
The T-6 consists essentially of six steel pontoons; one pontoon on each side of the tank, one on the bow, one on the rear, with box extension and rear extension pontoons which hinge upward for more compact stowage prior to launching. The six pontoons are compartmented by sheet steel partitions into many sub-compartments. Sub-compartments are filled with plastic foam to further ensure buoyancy should the pontoons become punctured.
T-6 floated tanks are seaworthy, having been successfully tested in twelve-foot waves. The floated tank is forty-three feet long and therefore provides a fairly stable gun platform, enabling a tank gunner employing the gyrostabilizer to deliver accurate fire during the beach approach. Compared with LVT(A)s (amphibious tanks), the floated tank constitutes a more stable gun platform; the higher velocity and greater accuracy of the stabilized tank gun in comparison with the LVT(A) howitzer and the tank’s heavier armor, are important advantages. Pontoons are jettisonable from inside the tank on reaching the beach. Pontoons are remountable and can be reused.
T-6 devices, as used on Okinawa, generally provided adequate floatation but needed further development to improve steering, to increase speed above the four-and-a-half knots obtained by the tank tracks revolving in the water, and to provide a reverse.[96]
Little modification has been made on this device. It is now called the M-19 Flotation Device by the Army. Some of the disadvantages are readily apparent in the specifications: Its length is 47 feet 8 inches, width 11 feet, and height 11 feet 8 inches (including exhaust and intake stack of waterproofing kit) when prepared for launching. The front and rear outboards can be folded upward for loading, reducing the length to 33 feet 7 inches and increasing the height only two inches. The weight of the flotation device is approximately 15 tons. No improvement has been made in manner of propulsion and the speed remains about five miles per hour in the water.[97]
The same principle was employed in the development of the T8 swimming device for the M-26 tank. This model could probably be adapted very easily for use on the M-46 or M-47 tank.
To compensate for the weight of the M-26 tank it was necessary to increase the length of the device to 65 feet and the width to 14 feet. The weight of the device itself is 34,000 pounds.[98] Since this is the latest equipment built along this line the following extracts from the development report gives a good picture of its capabilities and limitations.
Description
The Device, T8, provides the means for floating the Medium Tank, M26, as a self-propelled unit. It consists of metal floats in four jettisonable assemblies with propulsion furnished by the vehicle tracks; steering is accomplished with two rudders… The rudders are manually operated by a crank handle in the driver’s compartment which connect to the rudders by chain and cable. The vehicle is equipped with a standard fording kit.
Purpose
To provide flotation equipment which will permit the Medium Tank, M26, to navigate, under its own power, deep rivers and expanses of ocean.
History
The first test of the equipment was made at Aberdeen Proving Ground 25 April 1946… The size and weight of the device poses a problem in logistics. Assembly under field conditions would be a major problem. It was recommended… No further development work should be carried on with floating devices of this type for the Medium Tank M26, or other vehicles of equal or greater weight except as an expedient.
The rear extension and the width of the device make launching from the landing ships impossible. They can only be launched from a ship of the LSD type which actually floats the tank inside the ship allowing it to move out under its own power.
The poor speed and maneuverability in water of tanks equipped with this device might possibly be improved with the installation of removable propellers geared to each rear track idler. This would enable the driver to speed up or slow down either propeller by use of the normal tank steering as is done with all water craft having two propellers.
LVTs and LVT(A)s
Amphibious tanks or Landing Vehicle Tracked (Armored) while not organic to the armored division, might be issued for the initial assault and used until the standard tanks can come ashore, or amphibious tank and tractor battalions could be attached for the assault phase. The initial assault is the normal mission for units equipped with these vehicles.
LVTs have been used successfully in many amphibious landings in the Pacific in World War II and as recently as the Inchon landing in Korea. These vehicles are all basically the same with the exception that the LVT(A)1 mounted a 37mm gun while the LVT(A)4s and 5s mount a 75mm howitzer. The 4s and 5s are the only type in use by the Army at present. The primary effectiveness in the LVT(A)4 and the LVT(A)5 are the addition of a gyrostabilizer and power-operated turret on the latter.
LVT(A)s need no special preparation for swimming. Their tracks are equipped with a double cup welded to each section which gives better traction in the water, but speed is still only about 5.7 miles per hour. Being specifically designed for amphibious operations it has poor cross-country endurance, particularly in regard to tracks. A high silhouette and thin armor make it vulnerable to anti-tank fire, so after accompanying the infantry to their first objective it is usually used for artillery support. It is capable of carrying over two and one-half tons of ammunition which is often in short supply in the first stages of a landing.
Amphibious tractors of the LVT4 type are cargo and personnel carriers and have the same suspension system and engine as the amphibious tank. Their cargo compartment is open and the rear door is a hinged ramp which allows the loading of such equipment as the ¼-ton truck or 105mm howitzer. They are rated at 8,000 pounds capacity but have been known to carry as much as eight tons in still water. Such a load is, of course, hard on the suspension system when operating on land.
Marine units are presently equipped with the LVT3 which differs only in that it has two Cadillac engines mounted in the side pontoons instead of the air-cooled engine behind the driver’s compartment as in the LVT4. This results in some reduction of the cargo compartment. Neither the radial engine nor the two Cadillac engines give enough power for the weight of the tanks and tractors and the loads they carry. The vehicles cannot be steered at low speeds in the water due to the track propulsion. Also continual turning causes the brake bands to heat up and become inoperative.
None of these vehicles have been manufactured since World War II. However, the Army has one regular battalion and other Reserve and National Guard battalions consisting of two companies of tanks and two companies of tractors each. They are equipped with the LVT(A)4 and LVT(A)5 in the tank companies and the LVT in the tractor companies.
A modification has been made on the LVT3 by way of a removable armored cover for the cargo compartment making it a good armored personnel carrier. It was used as such by the Marines in the Inchon landing and for two crossings of the Han River. This could well be an answer to the problem of armored personnel carriers not being able to accompany the armored infantry in the initial waves of the armored division.
Deep Fording Kits
As mentioned above all tanks using either the DD or rigid type of swimming device as well as those brought ashore by landing craft require the use of deep fording kits. Such kits are available for all armored vehicles presently in use and are composed generally of exhaust and intake stacks, waterproofing compound and tape. Installation required around four hours by a crew with proper supervision. On some vehicles it is necessary to weld adapter plates to the tank for installation of stacks.
Deep fording kits allow a tank to be submerged to the top of the turret if so desired. Those portions of the kit which inhibit normal operation of the vehicle can be quickly and easily removed.
Wheeled Vehicles
Wheeled vehicles needed on an amphibious assault present no particular problem as they will necessarily be brought ashore in landing craft. Most recently developed wheeled vehicles are waterproofed when built and some are capable of operation while completely submerged. If older type vehicles are used, waterproofing kits are available to make them capable of moving under their own power through the water between the landing craft ramp and the beach.
Underwater Tanks
An article in Mechanics Illustrated envisions an underwater tank mounting a recoilless rifle[99] and may not be as visionary as it sounds according to an unconfirmed report of an ex-German officer published in Armor Magazine. This officer states he was trained in undersea tanks for the planned invasion of England in World War II.[100]
An operation using such undersea tanks would require extensive reconnaissance of the ocean floor and the beaches. Also, many beaches which might otherwise make good landing areas would have to be ruled out because of very deep water or because of the existence of a shelf, or other underwater obstacle. This would limit even further the normally limited use of amphibious tanks. If, however, standard tanks could be equipped economically and with sufficient margin of safety for this type operation, it would solve some of our problems. There would be no need to fire the main armament between ship and shore, shore batteries would have little or no effect during the most hazardous part of the operation, and certainly there would be a degree of surprise inherent.
Some problems which would probably arise in such a vehicle would be those of exhaust and air intake or a special engine-burning fuel which supplies its own oxygen. Other problems which would arise are air for the crew, underwater navigation, traction on soft ocean floor, escape mechanism for crew, and lowering the vehicle from the ship to the ocean floor. However, more thought could well be given this subject.
Planned Developments
There is no indication of any development or research at present in the U.S. Army toward solving the problem of ship to shore movement of armored vehicles under their own power. Report of the Combined Conference on Armor for 1949 states in effect that for the present the British will proceed with their development of DD-type swimming devices and the United States will continue to develop the rigid-type like the T8 for all tanks of the light and medium classes. The Report of the Combined Conference for Armor for 1951 states essentially the same thing with no indication of any progress being made in the intervening two years. The present plans of the United States, as far as is known, call for no research toward the design of an improved amphibious tank.
Conclusions
Due to the great weight of our present medium tank it is obvious that any rigid device to float them will necessarily be very large. It is not desirable to modify the tank at the factory for propellers because of increased weight and cost. Non-rigid devices have not proved reliable under fire or in rough water. The problems of speed, endurance, maneuverability, as well as that of increased shipping space requirements still remain in the use of the rigid type. They would probably be very useful on a shore-to-shore operation, river crossing, or in crossing reefs, but the facts indicate that an entirely different method should be developed to take tanks to the beach on a ship to shore assault.
The LVT(A)s while giving the best solution available at present still lack speed and maneuverability. They need a more powerful gun, more armor, and a bigger engine, but this would cause a corresponding increase in size and weight.
The best solution for the problem of transporting armor in an assault landing, we believe, is the further development of a new tank landing craft which will eliminate many of the disadvantages inherent in those presently available.
Naval Requirements
Through the ages armies have relied upon navies to move them from continent to continent and to maintain their supply lines. However, World War II was the greatest period of development of the amphibious operation per se. The combined arms concept of warfare was extended to include joint Army-Navy command relationships, staff planning, and fire support. To execute these amphibious operations specialized ships were required. The necessity for invasion from the sea, beginning in North Africa and Sicily and continuing through Normandy against the Germans, from Guadalcanal almost to the main islands of Japan in the Pacific, brought about these developments. These craft, all shallow draft, flat bottomed, and capable of unloading men and vehicles directly onto a beach, ranging in size from seven-foot rubber boats to ships of over 300 feet in length.
Since World War II, there have been many changes in Army equipment. This is especially true of the armored division where the weight of the medium tanks of its main striking force have increased by approximately fifteen tons. This exceeds or alters the rated capacities of most of the World War II landing craft.
The latest naval concept of the ship-to-shore movement is based upon dispersion and speed. This is dictated by the obvious atomic bomb target that the invasion fleet presents. To gain dispersion, consideration is being given to moving directly to the beach with the possible elimination of the rendezvous area (as referred to in FM 60-10). The assault waves form in the transport area, possibly out of sight of land and move directly to the beach past control vessels acting as checkpoints and lines of departure. Further dispersion is obtained by increasing the size of the transport group circles and distance between them.[101]
To obtain speed, control, and maneuverability, it is envisioned that the tank-infantry team will be landed in the assault by Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel, Landing Craft, Mechanized, and under the most ideal conditions, by Landing Ship, Utility, and Landing Ships, Medium. The maximum speed for each of these vessels is approximately ten knots.
In discussing the shipping requirements for landing an armored division in assault, we will deal with both present standard and proposed landing craft. A discussion of each of the landing craft considered usable in the assault phase of the armored division landing follows.
Landing Craft, Mechanized (LCM-6)[102]
This vessel was designed during World War II to land one M4 medium tank or 68,000 pounds of supplies. It is not suitable for landing a modern medium tank of the M46 or M47 type; it is capable, however, of landing any of the following armored division loads:
1 Light Tank M24
1 loaded Half-track
4 loaded ¼-ton Trucks
2 loaded ¼-ton Trucks with Trailers
Landing Craft, Mechanized (LCM-8)[103]
The latest developments in tank landing craft are a series of LCM-8s known as “H,” “V,” and “W.” The most radical and the one showing the most promise is the LCM (8H). It is a scow-bowed craft with a ramp; very similar in appearance to the LCM-6 but much larger. Its length over all is ninety feet with a beam of twenty-one feet. The LCM 98H) is capable of carrying and beaching a seventy-ton load at a speed of 10.7 knots. It can carry two TD-24 angle dozers or two M4A3E8 medium tanks, or one M26 medium tank. These loads have actually been carried in tests. Two M4A3E8 medium tanks are considered a “full load.” The main feature of this vessel is that it is provided with retractable caterpillar treads which enable it to crawl over bars and land high up on the beach. Its speed using these traction units is sixty-five feet per minute. The ramps of all the “8” series of LCMs are fixed so that embarked tanks can fire their main armament to the front and flanks. Although not proven by tests, it is expected that a Landing Ship Dock will carry seven LCM (8H)s.
The LCM (8W) and LCM (8V) are similar in that they are capable of carrying a seventy-ton load (one tank, embarked well astern in the well deck to preserve trim) at a speed of ten knots. They differ in hull shape, one being V-shaped, the other W-shaped, and do not have the traction mechanism. Their over all length is seventy feet compared with the H’s ninety feet, giving a template loading figure of nine aboard an LSD. The Landing Ship, Dock, at present seems to be the only practical way of transporting these craft because of their size and lifting weights (fifty-six tons for the “V” and “W” and 110.5 tons for the “H”).
Landing Craft, Mechanized, are considered appropriate for landing tanks on hostile shores under fire. Current Navy doctrine prefers the use of these craft rather than dealing with the greater ocean-going shipping problem incurred when handling tanks fitted with “one-way” flotation devices.[104] It is expected that LCM-6 and LCM-8 will land the tanks and reconnaissance units, from H-Hour to H plus 60, and, of course, a certain percentage of them can be used more than once, depending upon losses.
Landing Ship, Utility (LSU)[105]
(Formerly known as LCT-5). A somewhat larger vessel than the LCM, this vessel is capable of beaching a load of 150 tons, or three medium tanks. Because of its greater vulnerability, it is expected that this vessel will be used for landing the armor of the floating reserve and supply vehicles. Under the most ideal beach and surf conditions and light to moderate resistance, it could be used for assault waves. Typical loads for the LSU are:
3 Medium Tanks M46 or M47
9 loaded 2½-ton Trucks
9 loaded Half-tracks
This ship can also be loaded at sea from the Landing Ship, Tank, by lashing the LSU to the open ramp of the LST and opening its stern gate. Thus, any vehicle aboard the LST can be driven aboard the LSU and taken to the beach. This technique would be useful in landing reserve tanks “on call.” Its ability to be used in this fashion and as a lighter to unload transports and cargo ships makes it most valuable in the supply build-up phase. It is normally carried long distances aboard LSDs or in special launching racks on LSTs.
Landing Ship, Medium (LSM)[106]
Although similar in capacity and use to the LSU, the LSM is a larger vessel with accommodations for troops. It is definitely a sea-going vessel. Its speed is thirteen knots; range five hundred miles. It is capable of carrying 165 tons of cargo or three medium tanks; other typical loads would be:
6 Motor Gun Carriage M37
9 loaded 2½-ton Trucks
Many of these have been converted to support ships by the addition of multiple rocket launching racks.
Landing Ship, Tank (LST)[107]
The largest ocean-going ship that is designed to beach and land tanks over a bow ramp. Its enclosed tank deck will hold ten medium tanks or five hundred tons for beaching purposes. Total payload is 1,900 tons, but the draft with this load precludes beaching. Its speed loaded is nine knots. It can carry 350 tons of vehicles (no tanks) or cargo as a deck load or one LSU in a launching cradle or two LCM (6)s. Pontoon causeway sections and barges may be carried also but must be launched prior to beaching. It is envisioned that the bulk of the armored division support, logistical, and reserve elements would be carried aboard LSTs.
Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel (LCVP)[108]
This vessel is designed to land thirty-six dismounted troops or 8,100 pounds of cargo. The initial waves of armored infantry (without carriers) will be landed in this type craft. Other typical loads are:
1¼-ton Truck and Trailer
1¾-ton Truck
The normal operating procedure for the ocean-going shipping is to pre-load the LCMs and LSUs and carry them aboard Landing Ships, Dock (LSDs). An LSD can carry fourteen loaded LCM (6)s, three loaded LSUs, and seven to nine loaded LCM (8)s. The LCVPs are carried in davits or stacked on the deck on the same transports (APAs and AKAs) that carry the infantry and are loaded in the transport area offshore from the hostile beach. An APA (Haskell Class) carries 1,561 troops and twenty-two LCVPs; an AKA (Arcturus Class) carries 1,500 tons of cargo, 172 troops and fifteen LCVPs.
Standard amphibious practice for landing direct support artillery is to use amphibious 2½-ton trucks, DUKWs. The DUKWs are pre-loaded with towed artillery pieces and are launched from an LST as an “on call” wave and unloaded by an A-frame and winch on the DUKW.[109] The armored field artillery of the armored division will be landed later directly on the beach from LSTs. It is envisioned that air support, naval gunfire and 4.2 mortars will provide sufficient fire support until the above can be accomplished safely.
The problem of reefs and/or obstacles remains. We envision it being solved by landing UDTs and/or engineer breaching teams depending upon the obstacle to be cleared prior to the arrival of the tank-infantry teams of the first wave. These breaching teams could be landed under cover of darkness or by stealth from Perch Class submarine transports which will carry 115 troops, an LVT, and eight ten-man rubber boats, complete with outboard motors if needed.
Typical Landing Plan for Armored Infantry Battalion
The first wave contains four armored infantry rifle platoons and two medium tank platoons. This represents the assault rifle platoons and attached tank platoons of two armored infantry rifle companies (dismounted). They are transported in eight LCVPs and ten LCM (8H)s.
The second wave contains the remainder of both assault armored infantry companies in six LVCPs.
The third wave contains the other two rifle companies, 81mm mortar platoon and command group of the armored infantry battalion. The only vehicles of the armored infantry battalion brought ashore up to now are the command half-track and two ¼-ton trucks. This wave is composed of eighteen LCVPs and one LCM-6.
The fourth wave contains the balance of the assault tank company and two reconnaissance platoons (mounted)—one organic to the armored infantry battalion, the other organic to the same tank battalion that provided the tank company. The ¼-ton trucks of the reconnaissance platoons are in ten LCVPs while their light tanks and half-tracks are in six LCM-6s. There are also seven LSM (8H)s in this wave.
The fifth wave contains a 4.2 mortar platoon with transportation and extra ammunition in eight LCVPs.
The next three waves are “on call” waves, consisting of:
a battalion of towed 105mm artillery in DUKWs and one company of anti-aircraft artillery (self-propelled)
a company of medium tanks
the half-tracks of the armored infantry battalion loaded with ammunition and ration re-supply for their respective squads. These waves would be called in by radio in the order and at a time specified by the armored infantry battalion commanding officer. These last three waves are all aboard LSTs carrying LSUs. It is hoped that the LSTs can be beached on call; if not, use of the nine LSUs as lighters is contemplated.
It is realized that a large portion of these vessels are not filled to absolute capacity. This is done to preserve tactical integrity of units and it is believed that remaining space aboard craft will be taken up by extra ammunition. Shore party elements would accompany waves four and five.
The total ocean-going transportation required to move the armored battalion landing team represented here is estimated to be:
9 Landing Ships, Tank
3 Landing Ships, Dock
1 APA Attack Transport
Amphibious Training
The ultimate goal of the armored division in the amphibious assault landing is to develop tank-infantry teams in which the individual members know not only their own jobs but also how to function with other members of the team. These teams may be as small as an infantry squad with one tank or as large as an infantry battalion supported by a tank company. The infantry must be trained to protect tanks from enemy anti-tank measures during the re-organization after the landing. The commanders of the combined arms teams must be selected carefully, because they will initially have complete control of their teams if committed prior to re-organization of the assault units ashore.
The discussion of amphibious training herein is based on the following premises:
All individuals must have completed tactical training in land warfare and technical training in the operation and care of organic weapons and equipment.
That the Navy will use its present amphibious training center for the armored divisions and provide special courses, conduct shore training, supervise and assist in shipboard training.
To prepare individuals, units and staffs to perform their assigned functions in a coordinated amphibious assault landing. The training must develop individual and unit proficiency for the unified aggressive assault against an enemy-held beach by the tank-infantry team.
In order to clearly specify what type of training, special or otherwise, troops of the armored division must have in order to make an assault landing on hostile shores, we must first attempt to determine what type of craft or vehicles they would make the assault landing in. If the requirements are to swim tanks across the water in a ship-to-shore movement it would also be required that the vehicle must be able to fire its main armament while afloat.[110] To date no major power accepts the present DD (Duplex Drive) device on armor inasmuch as the equipment prohibits the use of the main armament of the tank while afloat. If landing craft, capable of transporting one or more tanks, were utilized then it is deemed necessary that the craft be so constructed that the tanks could fire their main armament over the bow ramps.
Doctrine and techniques as set forth in Field Manuals 17-34, 60-5 and 60-10 clearly outline the necessary training if landing craft are used in the landing. The training time would and could be cut down because of this especially if present equipment was used. In the event more modern and larger landing craft (as outlined in preceding chapters) are so constructed and are available then training problems would still be much simpler. However, if the training phase leans towards the use of amphibious type tanks, then the training problems become much more acute and individual and unit training time would have to be increased two-fold.
Even though landing craft or tanks were used, the individual training would certainly cover the same subjects. All units of the armored division, especially the main assault forces, tank and armored infantry battalions, would be given the same individual training and schooling. It is recognized that specialists from all units would attend specialist courses at amphibious training centers. The individual training for units of the division would include:[111]
Technique of embarkation.
Requirements of troop life aboard ship and naval customs.
Survival at sea.
Technique of debarkation.
Conduct during the ship-to-shore movement.
Method of assaulting the hostile beach. Prior to conducting water exercises all personnel must undergo training in survival methods, procedure of using life belts and all should have a basic knowledge of how to swim.
Individual crew members, drivers, and maintenance sections of all units within the armored division will receive training in the proper method of waterproofing of wheeled and track vehicles. It is possible that the teams from TTU (Troop Training Units) from amphibious training centers will conduct such training at the division’s home station. At the same time the Amphibious Training Command, U.S. Atlantic and Pacific Fleets are conducting waterproofing courses that are open to Army personnel as individuals or for an entire unit. Like courses are conducted by the Amphibious Commands for communication personnel and intelligence personnel.
The training schedules at present in effect in the armored division should be augmented by many subjects embracing the amphibious movement. The training schedule as outlined in appropriate Field Manuals seems adequate for the basic training of the individual; however, for this more specialized use of the personnel and vehicles of the armored division, the training schedule would have to include many subjects of amphibious warfare. Returning to our previous statement of the fact that it is possible for a landing to be made in landing craft or by the swimming tank, we still must be ready to change the training schedule to fit either case. Subjects necessary for either type of training that must be included within the training schedule are:
Landing Craft and Landing Ships
Physical training, swimming.
Introduction to naval landing craft and landing ships.
Boat team organization.
Debarkation techniques.
Troop life aboard ship.
Medical treatment and evacuation.
Ship-to-Shore Movement of Tanks
Physical training, swimming.
Amphibious ship types.
Driving water, individual, day and night.
Driving water, formation, day and night.
Combat firing, water.
Abandon tank exercises.
Navigation on water.
Much detailed training would have to be spent on that portion of the training schedule if tanks were used rather than landing craft to land the armored division. The problems are ably put forth in this extract from the Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the Operations in Europe of the A.E.F. to 6 June 1944 to 8 May 1945, page 22:
It was, moreover, not possible in every beach to swim in the amphibious DD tanks upon which we relied to provide fire support for the infantry clearing the beach exits. These were launched at Sword, Utah and Omaha beaches and, although late, reached land at the two former; at Omaha, however, all but two or three foundered in the heavy seas…
Unit training for the tank and armored infantry battalions may begin at the home station and continue at an amphibious training center unless additional facilities such as adequate landing craft and a beach area are available near the home station. Unit training includes instruction in ship-to-shore movements, boat discipline and assault landing tactics and techniques. Most important the instruction includes the organization, composition and formation of tank-infantry teams to further include:
The formation and tactics of assault waves.
Boat drills.
Reduction of beach defense.
Air support.
Naval gunfire support.
Formations used by the amphibious teams are similar to those employed on land in unit training: line formations of platoon or company strength for the initial assault wave or succeeding waves; column formation of platoons and companies abreast for the initial wave or succeeding waves; and an echelon or wedge formation.[112] Platoon and company training should be conducted until all members of the teams are thoroughly familiar with the various assault landing formations. Each unit training phase concerning formations must be so conducted that the situation on the hostile shore and the surf would make it necessary to attack in various types of formations. Control craft with suitable radios could conduct the phase and through the radio so change the situation on shore so that the wave commander could change his formation. Familiarization of the different types of formations should be conducted by sand table and mock-up drills prior to the actual training in the water. Control through radios and arm signals is an important fact and will have to be continually stressed throughout the training.
The main landing and the advance inland is the final part of unit training and emphasis must be placed on the integration of the tank-infantry teams and coordination of all participating and support elements. The tank-infantry teams are organized and trained to reduce enemy installations in the immediate beachhead area. The characteristics of the available landing craft and naval ships may affect the composition of these teams. The landing exercises permit a check on the status of training of the teams.
For the initial phase of waterborne training the team commanders will have to condition the members of the combined arms team to the continual hazards until each can overcome the natural fear of becoming trapped in a swamped landing craft or sinking tank. Exercises should be conducted near the shore and escort craft should accompany each of the teams for salvage and emergency rescue.
Commanders and key staff officers would be schooled in amphibious doctrine so that they can prepare their plans properly and assist in the preparation of joint armor and infantry plans. Staff training for amphibious operations is completed before unit training is started. When the division is ready to start unit training the staffs prepare and supervise the training exercises. Command post exercises are an important part of staff training. Further staff instructions should include:
Operation orders.
Administrative orders.
Embarkation orders.
Debarkation orders.
Approach schedules.
Loading diagrams.
Naval gunfire plans.
Shore party plans.
Selected staff officers should receive special instructions in the principles of loading and the necessary coordination, and the details of planning the combat loading and priority for unloading of the type of ships on which their units are to be transported. The special instruction includes:
Loading diagrams.
Consolidated unit personnel and tonnage tables.
Vehicle debarkation priority tables.
Loading plans should conform to the actual assault landing in order to lend realism to the landing exercises.
Upon completion of the unit training, landing exercises should be conducted for assault teams of battalion size and larger. The purposes of these exercises are to test the plans and to effect the necessary coordination to ensure the success of the landings. The area selected for these exercises should be a logical site for landing on a hostile shore. The shore line selected should offer no hazardous underwater formations nor strong offshore currents. Areas where live ammunition can be fired are highly desirable. The exercises should include:
Combat loading of troops and vehicles.
Voyage to exercise area with concurrent briefing of the tank-infantry teams.
Assembly and organization of landing waves in the rendezvous area and movement to the line of departure.
Assault landing.
Movement inland by the tank-infantry teams.
Landing under naval gunfire and air support.
Final critique.
Other factors of importance to the teams and the division as a whole during the landing exercises are:
Methods of control and communications.
Methods of recovery of vehicles in the water.
Continuous maintenance of vehicles and equipment.
Medical treatment and evacuation during the ship-to-shore movement.
The Amphibious Training Command, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, located at Little Creek, Norfolk, Virginia, and U.S. Pacific Fleet, Coronado, California, conducts various amphibious training courses for Navy, Air Force and Army personnel. To attend courses Army personnel request quotas through OCAFF. It is deemed advisable that officer personnel assigned to specialist duties within the armored division be sent to these courses.
The general amphibious communications course is designed for all phases of joint communications applicable in amphibious warfare, and to familiarize communication officers with the operation and use of communications equipment used in amphibious operations, including waterproofing. Instruction will also include ship-to-shore phases, familiarization with tactical air control parties and shore fire control parties, as well as communications methods, techniques, doctrines, organization, and practices in amphibious warfare. Similar courses are conducted for enlisted communication personnel.
The naval gunfire spotters and assistant spotters course prepares troop officers and senior non-commissioned officers as naval gunfire spotters for duty in troop units. This course includes map and aerial photograph reading; naval gunfire communications procedures, equipment and nets; elementary fire control for gunfire support; extensive conduct of fire; a brief review of the tactical employment of field artillery and close air support; and the technique of executing naval gunfire support. A like course is designed for staff officers to prepare them for duty with gunfire support groups, troop divisions and higher echelons in the fields of naval gunfire support and the coordination of the supporting arms.
Courses available at the Amphibious Training Command for composite groups of United States armed forces that personnel of the armored division could attend are:
Troop amphibious staff planning course.
Signal waterproofing course.
Wheeled vehicle waterproofing course.
In the event an armored division was selected to engage in amphibious training and exercises it seems logical from time, space, material and equipment involved from both the Army and Navy that only elements of the division would be actually trained at one time… one battalion reinforced or elements of a combat command. This would involve moving the unit or units selected to a previously designated coastal area with suitable terrain for onshore and offshore armored operations. Because of the large amount of equipment and number of vehicles that would have to be moved to the coast, it is anticipated that the amphibious training center would have the necessary vehicles, equipment and landing craft on hand for the training period. Much of the training could be completed at the armored division’s home station. However, because of the magnitude and importance of the ship-to-shore movement training phase, training for assault teams and staff personnel, would have to be conducted on the water typical of that the division would be facing in the event they were to make an amphibious landing. Control, communications and importance of realism in the ship-to-shore movement are important enough that this training should not be simulated if at all possible.
Conclusion
To properly determine the type of special training the armored division must have in order to make an amphibious landing, the conclusions reached in preceding chapters regarding new equipment must be studied. With present equipment in the hands of the troops, there is no doubt at all that training doctrines and training equipment used in World War II would again have to be used. It is always important to remember that the reproduction of actual conditions is basic in the education of troops.
Concept of Employment
Conclusions made as a result of this study are of necessity based on some indefinite factors. Assumptions must be made on the basis of what is presently known. Past performances cannot be relied upon since, as has been pointed out, an entire armored division was not employed as a landing force in World War II and the present organization is not combat tested. New armored equipment is being developed and performance tests have not been completed. Amphibious equipment is being produced to handle the heavier loads. This equipment is still being tested. Atomic weapons are being produced that will greatly affect all future operations. The principles of war have not changed, however, and can provide the basis for some conclusions.
The authors believe the armored division of today could profitably be employed as an assault landing force and will have a place in large-scale amphibious operations of the future. The armored division is not expected to replace the infantry division as the normal landing force, but rather, will be employed as a part of the corps as a complementary organization to the infantry division as in all other operations. Normal terrain limitations will apply possibly to a greater degree than in other operations but the opportunity for surprise cannot be overlooked.
Surprise must be sought throughout the action by every means and by every echelon of command. Surprise may be produced by… variations in the means and methods employed in combat, by rapidity and power of execution; and by the utilization of terrain which appears to impose great difficulties.[113]
The armored division is not suitable for prolonged operations in a small beachhead area and missions assigned to the division must be those that utilize to the utmost the characteristics of mobility, heavy firepower and shock action.
The division might be employed in conjunction with airborne forces dropped on critical objectives inland from the beach area. The employment of the division to effect the linkup would permit the use of airborne forces at a greater distance from the beach than has been possible in past operations and result in a more rapid expansion of the beachhead.
The armored division employed in a secondary landing as an enveloping force could force the rapid expansion of the main beachhead by conducting a surprise attack on the flank or rear of the enemy opposing the main landing.
The early seizure of major ports and airfields is essential to the rapid buildup of supplies and reinforcements for large invading forces. Such a mission would be suitable for the armored division.
The development of atomic weapons by potential enemies can be expected to force changes in the techniques employed in future operations. The concentration of great numbers of ships and landing craft in a relatively small transport area such as was used in World War II will be impossible in the face of an atomic threat. A much greater dispersion of forces will be required and the transport area moved further offshore. The result will be increased problems of control for the landing force both afloat and ashore. The possibility of assault forces being landed on the wrong beaches and being widely separated will be greatly increased. In some cases it may be desirable to employ a highly mobile armored unit as the landing force to provide armor protection for the assault troops in the movement to the beach to insure prompt re-organization ashore, and to insure the rapid expansion of the beachhead. If the enemy has the capability of employing atomic weapons against an invading force the concentration of large numbers of dismounted troops in a small beachhead could be disastrous.
Organization for Landing
The successful accomplishment of any of the missions outlined above would depend upon the degree of surprise obtained in the operation and the speed of execution. These requirements are not peculiar to this type operation alone nor to the armored division but are required to a greater degree than in many other operations. In order to obtain the speed required, special attention must be given to the organization and training of the division shore party as well as the combat engineers required for the improvement of the beaches. Suitable attachments would be required to perform the following functions:
Embarkation of troops, equipment, and supplies.
Debarkation and landing of troops and equipment.
Conduct of initial assault operations ashore.
Control of naval gunfire support.
Discharge of cargo from assault shipping.
Operation and tactical use of amphibious vehicles.
The attachments required to perform these functions would depend upon the mission, enemy forces and disposition, nature of the beaches and types of assault craft available. Suitable attachments for the division might include the following:
Division shore party.
One or more combat engineer battalions.
Naval gunfire control personnel.
Tactical air control parties.
Two or more amphibious truck companies (DUKW).
One or more amphibious tank battalions.
One or more amphibious tractor battalions.
One or more chemical mortar battalions.
One or more artillery battalions.
Units must be assigned to combat commands as required to perform the assigned missions, to provide dispersion of personnel and equipment, and to allow independent operation of the combat commands for a limited time. A typical combat command organization might be as follows:
Two armored infantry battalions
One medium tank battalion
One armored field artillery battalion
One armored engineer company
One reconnaissance company
One anti-aircraft artillery battery
One armored signal company or detachment
One armored ordnance company or detachment
One military police platoon
One armored medical company
Combat command shore party
Tactical air control parties
Quartermaster detachment
Formations
The formation adopted by the division for the assault landing will be governed by the mission and the distance to the objective. Missions requiring the division to make the assault landing and to seize an objective at some distance from the beach will require the landing to be made in a column of combat commands. The division could land on a comparatively narrow front with the leading combat command organized infantry heavy to establish the beachhead and protect the landing of other elements. The following combat commands would be permitted freedom of action to assemble rapidly and pass through the leading combat command to seize the distant objective. Disadvantages of this formation are that a greater period of time would be required to land the division at a time when speed is essential and during this time the force would be concentrated in a small beachhead.
Missions requiring a limited objective attack or seizure of close-in terrain features would permit the division to attack with two combat commands abreast in the initial assault. Such a formation would speed the landing of the division elements and allow greater dispersion of vehicles and personnel in the beachhead. In this formation forces would become widely dispersed on the beach perimeter and only a small portion of the units would be uncommitted. This formation limits the flexibility of the division and would be effective against light resistance.
Conclusion
This concept of employment does not differ from the published doctrine for amphibious operations and the general principles for employment of the armored division. Basically, the question of successfully employing the armored division as an assault landing force depends upon the availability of suitable shipping and the selection of proper missions that utilize the outstanding characteristics of the division. The power of this unit must be exploited to the fullest in future operations.
Troop List Task Force Red CCB, 1st Armored Division, 8 November 1942[114]
Brigadier General Oliver, Commanding
Headquarters, CCB
Detachment, 141st Armored Signal Company
Detachment, Headquarters 13th Armored Regiment
Reconnaissance, 13th Armored Regiment (less one platoon)
1st Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment (Reinforced)
2nd Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry Regiment (Reinforced)
2nd Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment (Reinforced)
27th Armored Field Artillery Battalion (Reinforced)
Company B, 16th Armored Engineer Battalion (less one platoon less one squad)
Detachment, Company E, 16th Armored Engineer Battalion
Maintenance Company, 13th Armored Regiment (less Detachment)
Service Company, 13th Armored Regiment (less Detachment)
Company B, 47th Armored Medical Battalion (less Detachment)
Company B, 1st Armored Supply Battalion (less platoon)
2nd Battalion, 591st Engineer Boat Regiment (less Company F)
106th Separate Coast Artillery Battalion (Anti-Aircraft) (less Battery D)
Troop List Task Force Green CCB, 1st Armored Division, 8 November 1942[115]
Colonel Robinette, Commanding
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 13th Armored Regiment (less Detachment)
1st Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment
1st Platoon, Reconnaissance Company, 13th Armored Regiment
1st Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry Regiment (Reinforced)
Battery C, 27th Armored Field Artillery Battalion (Reinforced)
Company C, 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion
Battery D, 106th Coast Artillery Battalion (Anti-Aircraft)
Company F, 591st Engineer Boat Regiment
Detachment, 141st Armored Signal Company
Detachment, Company B, 47th Armored Medical Battalion
Detachment, Company E, 16th Armored Engineer Battalion
One Platoon, Company A, 15th Armored Engineer Battalion (Reinforced)
One Platoon, Company B, 16th Armored Engineer Battalion (less one squad)
Troop List CCA, 2nd Armored Division, Operation Husky, 10 June 1943[116]
Brigadier General Maurice Rose, Commanding
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, CCA
66th Armored Regiment
41st Armored Infantry Regiment (less 1st Battalion)
14th Armored Field Artillery Battalion
Company B, 82nd Reconnaissance Battalion
Company A, 17th Armored Engineer Battalion
Company B, 48th Armored Medical Battalion
Company C, Division Maintenance Battalion
Detachment, 142nd Armored Signal Company
Armored Division T/O&E 17 Abstract, 8 October 1948
Entire Division: 15,973
Division Headquarters: 189
Medical Detachment: 7
Infantry Battalions (four): 1,069
Tank Battalions (four): 677
Heavy (one): 757
Medium (three)
Combat Command, Headquarters and Headquarters Company (two): 13
Reserve Command, Headquarters and Headquarters Company (one): 11
Division Trains, Headquarters and Headquarters Company: 100
Field Artillery: 3,735
Reconnaissance Battalion: 829
Engineer Battalion: 1,095
Medium Battalion: 424
Ordnance Battalion: 737
Signal Company: 374
Military Police Company: 188
Division Headquarters Company: 166
Band: 70
Replacement Company: 41
Principal Armament
Rifle, caliber .30: 3,200
Carbine, caliber .30: 6,938
Automatic Rifle, caliber .30: 167
Machine Gun, caliber .30: 473
Machine Gun, caliber .50: 354
Mortars, 60mm: 51
Mortars, 81mm: 20
Anti-tank Rocket Launchers: 691
Rifle, 75mm: 3
Carriage, Motor Multiple Gun: 32
Carriage, Motor, Twin 40mm: 32
Tank, Medium: 315
Tank, Light: 58
Carriage, Motor:
105mm Howitzer: 54
155mm Howitzer: 18
Carrier, Half-track, 81mm Mortar: 12
Vehicle, Armored Utility: 636
Vehicles, all types (except boats and planes): 4,764
(Less combat types): 3,607
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[1] Combat Loading of Armored Division (Loading Tables), 16 volumes, prepared by U.S. Marine Corps, Camp Calvin B. Matthews, 21 February 1945.
[2] FM 60-5, Department of the Army, Washington, 1951), page 1.
[3] Ibid., page 329.
[4] Ibid., page 322.
[5] Ibid., page 332
[6] Ibid., page 324.
[7] FM 100-5, Department of the Army, Washington, 1949, page 233.
[8] FM 100-5, Department of the Army, Washington, 1941, page 233.
[9] FM 17-34, Department of the Army, Washington, 1950, page 71.
[10] FM 60-5, Department of the Army, Washington, 1951, page 4.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid., page 3.
[13] Army - Navy - Air Force Journal, Washington, 16 February 1952, page 749.
[14] Gordon A. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, Historical Section, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1951, page 11.
[15] Ibid., page 11.
[16] Ibid., page 31.
[17] Ibid., page 31.
[18] Ibid., page 32.
[19] General of the Army D. D. Eisenhower, Commander in Chief’s Dispatch, North Africa Campaign, 1942-1943, page 6.
[20] General of the Army D. D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, New York, 1948, page 83.
[21] Major General J. C. Hayden, DSO, OBE, Impressions Gained from the Assault Phase of the Operations in North Africa between 6 November and 23 November 1942, page 1.
[22] FO #l, Headquarters CCB, 1st Armored Division, 11 October 1942.
[23] A Short History of the 3rd Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry Regiment (author and date of publication unknown), page 2.
[24] FO #1, Headquarters Red Force, CCB, and 251, 111800 October 1942.
[25] 1st Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment, After Action Report (submitted 31 December 1942).
[26] Operations Report, Task Force Red, CCB, 1st Armored Division, page 1.
[27] S-3 Journal, 13th Armored Regiment, 8 November 1942, page 1.
[28] Operations Report, CCB, 1st Armored Division, as of 082400 November 1942.
[29] A Brief History of the 2nd Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry Regiment from October 11, 1942 to May 12, 1943, author unknown, page 2.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid.
[33] FO #1, Green Force, CCB, 1st Armored Division.
[34] Operations Report, Task Force Green, 2347 hours, 7 November 1942 to 1625 hours, 10 November 1942.
[35] Operations Journal, 13th Armored Regiment, 0400 hours, 8 November 1942, page 1.
[36] Operations Report, 1st Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry Regiment, 8 November 1942.
[37] General of the Army D. D. Eisenhower, Commander in Chief’s Dispatch, North Africa Campaign, 1942-1943, page 12.
[38] U.S. Landings in Morocco, Tactics Department, The Armored School, Fort Knox, 1943, page 8.
[39] Ibid., pages 12-14.
[40] Compilation of Reports on Lessons of Operation Torch (APO 512, Allied Force Headquarters, 16 January 1943), page 10.
[41] The 2nd Armored Division in the Sicilian Campaign, Committee #4, Advanced Class, The Armored School, 1949-50, Fort Knox, May 1950, page 10 (hereinafter referred to as Committee #4, Advanced Class, TAS, 49-50).
[42] Ibid., page 11.
[43] Report of Operations, 7th U.S. Army in the Sicilian Campaign, by the Staff, 7th U.S. Army, APO 758, September 1943, page 6 (hereinafter referred to as Operations Report, 7th Army).
[44] Committee #4, Advanced Class, TAS, 49-50, page 33.
[45] Committee #4, Advanced Class, TAS, 49-50, page 3.
[46] Committee #4, Advanced Class, TAS, 49-50, page 34.
[47] Committee #4, Advanced Class, TAS, 49-50, page 35.
[48] Committee #4, Advanced Class, TAS, 49-50, page 37
[49] Committee #4, Advanced Class, TAS, 49-50, page 36.
[50] Operations Report, 7th Army, page 64.
[51] Committee #4, Advanced Class, TAS, 49-50, page 20.
[52] Committee #4, Advanced Class, TAS, 49-50, page 21.
[53] Committee #4, Advanced Class, TAS, 49-50, page 22.
[54] Committee #4, Advanced Class, TAS, 49-50, page 23.
[55] Committee #4, Advanced Class, TAS, 49-50, page 24.
[56] Committee #4, Advanced Class, TAS, 49-50, page 25.
[57] Committee #4, Advanced Class, TAS, 49-50, page 26.
[58] Committee #4, Advanced Class, TAS, 49-50, page 71.
[59] Committee #4, Advanced Class, TAS, 49-50, page 72.
[60] Committee #4, Advanced Class, TAS, 49-50, page 73.
[61] Harrison, op.cit., page 361.
[62] Ibid., page 192.
[63] 1st U.S. Army, Report of Operations, 20 October 1943 to 1 August 1944, by Staff, 1st U.S. Army, page 195 (Annex 9 to Report).
[64] Harrison, op.cit., page 304.
[65] Ibid., page 305.
[66] Ibid., page 309.
[67] Ibid., page 315.
[68] 1st U.S. Army, Report of Operations, 20 October 1943 to 1 August 1944, by Staff, 1st U.S. Army, page 201 (Annex 9 to Report).
[69] Appleman, Burns, Gugeler and Stevens, The War in the Pacific—Okinawa: The Last Battle, Historical Division, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1948, page 69.
[70] Appleman, Burns, Gugeler and Stevens, op.cit., page 36.
[71] Appleman, Burns, Gugeler and Stevens, op.cit., page 17.
[72] Appleman, Burns, Gugeler and Stevens, op.cit., page 4.
[73] Appleman, Burns, Gugeler and Stevens, op.cit., page 1.
[74] Appleman, Burns, Gugeler and Stevens, op.cit., page 25.
[75] Major Daniel E. Westervelt, Armored Group in an Amphibious Operation, Fort Knox, May 1948, page 1.
[76] Ibid., page 2.
[77] Ibid., page 4.
[78] Ibid., page 6.
[79] Appleman, Burns, Gugeler and Stevens, op.cit., page 30.
[80] Appleman, Burns, Gugeler and Stevens, op.cit., Chart IV—XXIV Corps Assignment of Shipping for the Assault on Okinawa, opposite page 43. [The original report reproduced Chart IV from this work as Chart 8; however, the original chart was a large fold-out and it was reduced and reproduced (very poorly—most of the lettering was unreadable) as a single page in this report. Because of the poor quality of the chart’s reproduction in this report, it has not been reproduced in this reprint at this time (we did not have immediate access to a copy of the original book from which the chart was copied). The original chart appears to be quite detailed and if interested in this information, it is recommended you obtain a copy of the Appleman, et al, work. Also, the numbering of charts, maps and photographs in the original report was consecutive, regardless of whether it was actually a chart, map or photograph. In other words, while the text that this note number 69 refers to lists a “Chart 8,” there were not seven other charts in the report that preceded this one. In fact, “Chart 7” in the report was actually a map (showing the Okinawa invasion plan of attack). —Editor]
[81] Appleman, Burns, Gugeler and Stevens, op.cit., page 69.
[82] Appleman, Burns, Gugeler and Stevens, op.cit., page 70.
[83] Appleman, Burns, Gugeler and Stevens, op.cit., page 72.
[84] FM 31-5, War Department, November 1944, page 150.
[85] Ibid., page 151.
[86] FM 60-5, Department of the Army, February 1951, page 227.
[87] The Army Almanac, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950, page 275.
[88] Ibid.
[89] The Army Almanac, Washington, D.C., 1950.
[90] General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, Doubleday & Company, 1948, page 231.
[91] From Instructional Pamphlet CS 2, The Armored School, September 1949, and Reference Data Infantry Regiment, The Infantry School, May 1951.
[92] Instructional Pamphlet CS 2, The Armored School, September 1949, and Reference Data Infantry Regiment, The Infantry School, May 1951.
[93] Including 636 armored personnel carriers and all self-propelled artillery.
[94] Report of Operations, 1st U.S. Army, 20 October 1943 to 1 August 1944, a report prepared by the Armored Section, 1st U.S. Army, page 194.
[95] Report of the Combined Conference on Armor, 17-24 March 1949.
[96] Amphibious Operations Employment of Tanks, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia, PHIB-18, pages 27, 28, 29.
[97] Report of Subcommittee on Automotive Equipment to Ordnance Technical Committee, 25 May 1945.
[98] Research Development Manual, Combat Vehicles and Wheeled Transport Vehicle Components, ORDMX-D, Detroit Arsenal, Centerline, Michigan.
[99] “Undersea Tank,” Armor, photographs and editorial comment, January-February 1951, LX, page 39.
[100] Major Charles R. Cawthon, “Amphibious Tank Experiment,” Armor, September-October 1951, LX, page 26.
[101] Commander George Reith, USN, Member, Joint Amphibious Board. Interviewed at Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, Virginia, February 1952.
[102] U.S. Army, FM 60-5 Amphibious Operations, Battalion in Assault Landing, Washington, D.C., 1951, page 280.
[103] Naval Amphibious Test and Evaluation Unit, “Report of Beaching and Retracting Tests of Experimental LCMs and LCVPs,” Amphibious Training Command, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, Virginia, 1952.
[104] Lieutenant Colonel Oscar F. Peatross, USMC, Amphibious Instructor, The Armored School. Interviewed at Ft. Knox, Ky., Dec. 1951.
[105] Lieutenant Commander P. W. Bridwell, USN, Member, Joint Amphibious Board. Interviewed at Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, Virginia, February 1952; U.S. Army, FM 60-5 Amphibious Operations, Battalion in Assault Landing, op.cit., Appendix II.
[106] Ibid.
[107] Ibid.
[108] Ibid.
[109] Ibid.
[110] Report of Combined Conference on Armor, United States–United Kingdom–Canada, Fort Monroe, Virginia, 17-24 March 1949, Brigadier General Bruce C. Clarke, page 11.
[111] Catalog of Amphibious Training 1951, Amphibious Training Command, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, pages 21-32.
[112] Amphibious Operations, Regiment in Assault Landings, FM 60-10, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., January 1952, Chapters 3 and 4.
[113] FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations—Operations, USGPO, Washington, D.C., August 1949.
[114] Field Order #1, Headquarters CCB, 1st Armored Division, 11 October 1942.
[115] Field Order #1, Headquarters CCB, 1st Armored Division, 11 October 1942.
[116] the 2nd Armored Division in the Sicilian Campaign, Committee 34, Advance Class 1949-1950, Fort Knox, 1950.
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| Top: Landing Craft, Mechanized (LCM 6) Bottom: Landing Ship, Utility (LSU) |
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| Top: Landing Ship, Medium (LSM) Bottom: Landing Ship, Tank (LST) |
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| Center Task Force Landings in North Africa, 8 November 1942. |
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| Operations Overlay — Port Lyautey Operations. |
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| Fedalah Beachhead (Detailed Plan of Attack). |
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| Final Allied Plan — “Husky”. |
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| The Final Overlord Plan. |
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| Okinawa — The Plan of Attack. |
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