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| Greek gun crew at work in the campaign in Albania, 1940-41. |
The Greco-Italian War, also called the Italo-Greek War,
Italian campaign in Greece, Italian invasion of Greece, and War of '40 in
Greece, took place between Italy and Greece from 28 October 1940 to 23 April
1941. This conflict began the Balkans campaign of World War II between the Axis
powers and the Allies, and eventually turned into the Battle of Greece with
British and German involvement. On 10 June 1940, Italy declared war on France
and the United Kingdom. By September 1940, the Italians had invaded France,
British Somaliland and Egypt. This was followed by a hostile press campaign in
Italy against Greece, accused of being a British ally. A number of provocations
culminated in the sinking of the Greek light cruiser Elli by the Italians on 15
August. On 28 October, Mussolini issued an ultimatum to Greece demanding the
cession of Greek territory, which the Prime Minister of Greece, Ioannis
Metaxas, rejected.
Italy's invasion of Greece, launched with the divisions of
the Royal Army based in Italian-controlled Albania, badly armed and poorly
commanded, resulted in a setback: the Italian forces encountered unexpectedly
tenacious resistance by the Hellenic Army and penetrated only a few kilometers
into Greek territory and had to contend with the mountainous and muddy terrain
on the Albanian–Greek border. With British air and material support, the Greeks
stopped the Italian invasion just inside Greek territory by mid-November and
subsequently counter-attacked with the bulk of their mobilized army to push the
Italians back into Albania – an advance which culminated in the Capture of
Klisura Pass in January 1941, a few dozen kilometers inside the Albanian
border. The defeat of the Italian invasion and the Greek counter-offensive of
1940 have been called the "first Axis setback of the entire war" by
Mark Mazower, the Greeks "surprising everyone with the tenacity of their
resistance".
The front stabilized in February 1941, by which time the
Italians had reinforced the Albanian front to 28 divisions against the Greeks'
14 divisions (though Greek divisions were larger). In March, the Italians
conducted the unsuccessful spring offensive. At this point, losses were
mutually costly, but the Greeks had far less ability than the Italians to
replenish their losses in both men and material, and they were dangerously low
on ammunition and other supplies. They also lacked the ability to rotate out
their men and equipment, unlike the Italians. On the other side the Italian
equipment proved to be of poor quality and of little use, while Italian morale
remained low throughout the campaign.
Adolf Hitler decided that the increased British intervention
in the conflict represented a threat to Germany's rear,* while German build-up
in the Balkans accelerated after Bulgaria joined the Axis on 1 March 1941.
British ground forces began arriving in Greece the next day. This caused Hitler
to come to the aid of his Axis ally. On 6 April, the Germans invaded northern
Greece ("Operation Marita"). The Greeks had deployed the vast
majority of their men into a mutually costly stalemate with the Italians on the
Albanian front, leaving the fortified Metaxas Line with only a third of its
authorized strength. Greek and British forces in northern Greece were
overwhelmed and the Germans advanced rapidly west and south. In Albania, the
Greek army made a belated withdrawal to avoid being cut off by the Germans but
was followed up by the Italians. Greece surrendered to German troops on 20
April 1941 and to the Italians on 23 April. Greece was subsequently occupied by
Bulgarian, German and Italian troops. The Italian army suffered 102,064 combat
casualties (with 13,755 dead and 3,900 missing) and fifty thousand wounded; the
Greeks suffered over 83,500 combat casualties (including 13,325 killed and
1,200 missing) and forty two thousand wounded.
Background
Italian Imperialism
In the late 1920s, Italian Prime Minister Benito Mussolini
said that Fascist Italy needed Spazio vitale, an outlet for its surplus
population and that it would be in the best interests of other countries to aid
in the expansion of Imperial Italy. The regime wanted hegemony in the
Mediterranean–Danubian–Balkan region and Mussolini imagined the conquest
"of an empire stretching from the Strait of Gibraltar to the Strait of
Hormuz".
There were designs for a protectorate over the Albanian
Kingdom and for the annexation of Dalmatia and economic and military control of
the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the Kingdom of Greece. The fascist regime also
sought to establish protectorates over the First Austrian Republic, the Kingdom
of Hungary, the Kingdom of Romania and the Kingdom of Bulgaria, which lay on
the periphery of an Italian European sphere of influence.
In 1935, Italy began the Second Italo-Ethiopian War to
expand the empire; a more aggressive Italian foreign policy which "exposed
[the] vulnerabilities" of the British and French and created an
opportunity the Fascist regime needed to realize its imperial goals. In 1936,
the Spanish Civil War began and Italy made a military contribution so vast that
it played a decisive role in the victory of the rebel forces of Francisco
Franco. "A full-scale external war" was fought for Spanish
subservience to the Italian Empire to place Italy on a war footing and to
create "a warrior culture".
In September 1938, the Italian army had made plans to invade
Albania, which began on 7 April 1939, and in three days had occupied most of
the country. Albania was a territory that Italy could acquire for "living
space to ease its overpopulation" as well as a foothold for expansion in
the Balkans. Italy invaded France in June 1940, followed by their invasion of
Egypt in September. A plan to invade Yugoslavia was drawn up, but postponed due
to opposition from Nazi Germany and a lack of Italian army transport.
Greek–Italian Relations in the Interwar
Period
Italy had captured the predominantly Greek-inhabited Dodecanese
Islands in the Aegean Sea from the Ottoman Empire in the Italo-Turkish War of
1912. It had occupied them since, after reneging on the 1919 Venizelos–Tittoni
agreement to cede them to Greece. When the Italians found that Greece had been
promised land in Anatolia at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919, for aid in the
defeat of the Ottoman Empire during the First World War, the Italian delegation
withdrew from the conference for several months. Italy occupied parts of
Anatolia which threatened the Greek occupation zone and the city of Smyrna.
Greek troops were landed and the Greco-Turkish War (1919–22) began with Greek
troops advanced into Anatolia. Turkish forces eventually defeated the Greeks
and with Italian aid, recovered the lost territory, including Smyrna. In 1923,
Mussolini used the murder of an Italian general on the Greco-Albanian border as
a pretext to bombard and temporarily occupy Corfu, the most important of the
Ionian Islands.
The Greek defeat in Anatolia and the signing of the Treaty
of Lausanne (1923) ended the expansionist Megali Idea. Henceforth Greek foreign
policy was largely aimed at preserving the status quo. Territorial claims to
Northern Epirus (southern Albania), the Italian-ruled Dodecanese, and
British-ruled Cyprus remained open but inactive in view of the country's
weakness and isolation. The main threat Greece faced was from Bulgaria, which
claimed Greece's northern territories. The years after 1923 were marked by
almost complete diplomatic isolation and unresolved disputes with practically
every neighboring country. The dictatorship of Theodoros Pangalos in 1925–26
sought to revise the Treaty of Lausanne by a war with Turkey. To this end,
Pangalos sought Italian diplomatic support, as Italy still had ambitions in
Anatolia, but in the event, nothing came of his overtures to Mussolini. After
the fall of Pangalos and the restoration of relative political stability in
1926, efforts were undertaken to normalize relations with Turkey, Yugoslavia,
Albania and Romania, without much success at first. The same period saw Greece
draw closer to Britain and away from France, exacerbated by a dispute over the
two sides' financial claims from World War I.
The Greek government put renewed emphasis on improving
relations with Italy and in November 1926, a trade agreement was signed between
the two states. Initiated and energetically pursued by Andreas Michalakopoulos,
the Italian–Greek rapprochement had a positive impact on Greek relations with
Romania and Turkey and after 1928 was continued by the new government of
Eleftherios Venizelos. This policy culminated with the signing of a treaty of
friendship on 23 September 1928. Mussolini exploited this treaty, as it aided
in his efforts to diplomatically isolate Yugoslavia from potential Balkan
allies. An offer of alliance between the two countries was rebuffed by
Venizelos but during the talks Mussolini personally offered "to guarantee
Greek sovereignty" on Macedonia and assured Venizelos that in case of an
external attack on Thessaloniki by Yugoslavia, Italy would join Greece.
During the late 1920s and early 1930s, Mussolini sought
diplomatically to create "an Italian-dominated Balkan bloc that would link
Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, and Hungary". Venizelos countered the policy
with diplomatic agreements among Greek neighbors and established an
"annual Balkan conference ... to study questions of common interest,
particularly of an economic nature, with the ultimate aim of establishing some
kind of regional union". This increased diplomatic relations and by 1934
was resistant to "all forms of territorial revisionism". Venizelos
adroitly maintained a principle of "open diplomacy" and was careful
not to alienate traditional Greek patrons in Britain and France. The
Greco-Italian friendship agreement ended Greek diplomatic isolation and led to
a series of bilateral agreements, most notably the Greco-Turkish Friendship
Convention in 1930. This process culminated in the signature of the Balkan Pact
between Greece, Yugoslavia, Turkey and Romania, which was a counter to
Bulgarian revisionism.
The Second Italo-Ethiopian War marked a renewal of Italian
expansionism, and began a period where Greece increasingly sought a firm
British commitment for its security. Although Britain offered guarantees to
Greece (as well as Turkey and Yugoslavia) for the duration of the Ethiopian
crisis, it was unwilling to commit itself further so as to avoid limiting its
freedom of maneuver vis-à-vis Italy. Furthermore, with the (British-backed)
restoration of the Greek monarchy in 1935 in the person of the anglophile King
George II, Britain had secured its dominant influence in the country. This did
not change after the establishment of the dictatorial 4th of August Regime of
Ioannis Metaxas in 1936. Although imitating the Fascist regime in Italy in its
ideology and outward appearance, the regime lacked a mass popular base, and its
main pillar was the King, who commanded the allegiance of the army. Greek
foreign policy thus remained aligned with that of Britain, despite the parallel
ever-growing economic penetration of the country by Nazi Germany. Metaxas
himself, although an ardent Germanophile in World War I, followed this line,
and after the Munich Conference in October 1938 suggested a British–Greek
alliance to the British ambassador, arguing that Greece "should prepare
for the eventuality of a war between Great Britain and Italy, which sooner or
later Greece would find itself drawn into". Loath to be embroiled in a possible
Greek–Bulgarian war, dismissive of Greece's military ability, and disliking the
regime, the British rebuffed the offer.
Prelude to War, 1939–40
On 4 February 1939, Mussolini addressed the Fascist Grand
Council on foreign policy. The speech outlined Mussolini's belief that Italy
was being imprisoned by France and the United Kingdom and what territory would
be needed to break free. During this speech, Mussolini declared Greece to be a
"vital [enemy] of Italy and its expansion." On 18 March, as signs for
an imminent Italian invasion of Albania as well as a possible attack on Corfu
mounted, Metaxas wrote in his diary of his determination to resist any Italian
attack.
Following the Italian invasion of Albania in April,
relations between Italy and Greece deteriorated rapidly. The Greeks began
making defensive preparations for an Italian attack, while the Italians began
improving infrastructure in Albania to facilitate troop movements. The new
Italian ambassador, Emanuele Grazzi, arrived in Athens later in April. During
his tenure, Grazzi worked earnestly for the improvement of Italian–Greek
relations, something that Metaxas too desired—despite his anglophile stance,
Grazzi considered him "the only real friend Italy could claim in Greece"—but
he was in the awkward position of being ignorant of his country's actual policy
towards Greece: he had arrived with no instructions whatsoever, and was
constantly left out of the loop thereafter, frequently receiving no replies to
his dispatches. Tensions mounted as a result of a continued anti-Greek campaign
in the Italian press, combined with provocative Italian actions. Thus during
Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano's visit to Albania, posters supporting Albanian
irredentism in Chameria were publicly displayed; the governor of the Italian
Dodecanese, Cesare Maria De Vecchi, closed the remaining Greek communal schools
in the province, and Italian troops were heard singing "Andremo nell'Egeo,
prenderemo pure il Pireo. E, se tutto va bene, prenderemo anche Aténe."
("We go to the Aegean, and will take even Piraeus. And if all goes well,
we will take Athens too."). Four of the five Italian divisions in Albania
moved towards the Greek border, and on 16 August the Italian Chief of the
General Staff, Marshal Pietro Badoglio, received orders to begin planning for
an attack on Greece. On 4 August, Metaxas had ordered Greek forces to a state
of readiness and a partial mobilization.
The
entire road-building program has been directed towards the Greek border. And
this is by order of the Duce, who is thinking more and more of attacking Greece
at the first opportunity." —Entry in Ciano's diary for 12 May 1939
Although both Britain and France publicly guaranteed the
independence of Greece and Romania on 13 April 1939, the British still refused
to be drawn into concrete undertakings towards Greece, as they hoped to entice
Mussolini to remain neutral in the coming conflict with Germany, and saw in a
potential Greek alliance only a drain on their own resources. With British
encouragement, Metaxas made diplomatic overtures to Italy in August, and on 12
September, Mussolini wrote to Metaxas, assuring him that if he entered the war,
Italy would respect Greek neutrality, and that Italian troops based in Albania
would be pulled back about 30 kilometers (20 miles) from the Greek border. The
Italian dictator even instructed Grazzi, to express his trust towards Metaxas and
offer to sell Greece aircraft. On 20 September, the Italians offered to
formalize relations by renewing the 1928 treaty. Metaxas rejected this, as the
British Foreign Office was opposed to a formal commitment by Greece to Italy,
and made only a public declaration of friendship and good-will. Greek–Italian
relations entered a friendly phase that lasted until spring 1940.
In May 1940, as Italian entry into the war became imminent,
the Italian press began an anti-Greek propaganda campaign, accusing the country
of being a foreign puppet and tolerating British warships in its waters.
Following the defeat of France, Greek–Italian relations deteriorated further.
From 18 June, De Vecchi sent a series of protests to Rome, reporting on the
presence of British warships in Crete and other Greek islands and claimed that
a British base had been established at Milos. The allegations were overblown
but not entirely unjustified: in January 1940, bowing to British pressure,
Greece concluded a trade agreement with Britain, limiting its exports to
Germany and allowing Britain to use the large Greek merchant fleet for its war
effort, marking Greece a tacit member of the anti-Axis camp, despite its
official neutrality. British warships did sail deep into the Aegean, leading
the British ambassador in Athens to recommend, on 17 August, that the
government put a stop to them. Mussolini saw his war as a guerra parallela
("parallel war") under which Italy would finally conquer its spazio
vitale allied to Germany, but without the help of Germany since until early
1941 he remained vehemently opposed to the Wehrmacht operating in the
Mediterranean. As such, he wanted Italy to occupy all the territory that he saw
as part of Italy's spazio vitale, including in the Balkans, before Germany won
the expected victory over Britain. The consistent German opposition to any
Italian move into the Balkans was a major irritant to Mussolini as he saw it as
a German attempt to block Italy from getting its fair share of the spoils
before the war was won. In July 1940, Mussolini was forced under German
pressure to cancel a planned invasion of Yugoslavia (an important source of raw
materials for the Reich), which was frustrating to him as he long had designs
on Yugoslav territory.
Italian military forces harassed Greek forces with air
attacks on Greek naval vessels at sea. On 12 July, while attacking a British
petrol carrier off Crete, Italian aircraft based in the Dodecanese went on to
bombard Greek warships in harbor at Kissamos. On 31 July Italian bombers
attacked two Greek destroyers in the Gulf of Corinth and two submarines in
Nafpaktos; two days later a coastguard vessel was attacked at Aegina, off
Athens. Ciano's diary confirms that over the summer of 1940, Mussolini turned
his attention to the Balkans: on 6 August, Mussolini was planning an attack on
Yugoslavia, while on 10–12 August he railed against the Greeks, promising to
rectify the "unfinished business" of 1923. Count Ciano was the Italian
official who had pushed most strongly for the conquest of Albania in 1939 and
afterwards Albania was ruled very much as his own "personal fiefdom"
as the viceroy Francesco Jacomoni was a lackey of Ciano's. As a way of
improving his prestige within the regime, Ciano was the Italian official who
pressed the hardest for the invasion of Greece as he saw conquering Greece (an
invasion that would have to be launched from Albania) as a way of showing off
just how well run Albania was under his rule. On 10 August 1940, Ciano met
Mussolini to tell him the story of the Albanian bandit Daut Hoxha, whom Ciano
presented to Mussolini as a pro-Italian Albanian patriot murdered by the
Greeks. In reality, Hoxha was a cattle-thief with a "long history of extreme
violence and criminality" who had been beheaded by a rival gang of
Albanian bandits. As intended, Ciano's story worked Mussolini into a state of
rage against the Greeks, with Ciano writing in his diary: "The Duce is
considering an 'act of force because since 1923 [the Corfu incident] he has
some accounts to settle and the Greeks deceive themselves if they think he has
forgotten'".
On 11 August, orchestrated by Ciano and the Italian viceroy
in Albania, Francesco Jacomoni, the Italian and Albanian press began a campaign
against Greece, on the pretext of the murder of the bandit Daut Hoxha in June.
Hoxha was presented as a patriot fighting for the liberty of Chameria and his
murder the work of Greek agents. Ciano wrote approvingly in his diary that
Mussolini wanted more information on Ciamuria (the Italian term for Epirus) and
had ordered both Jacomoni and General Count Sebastiano Visconti Prasca Guzzoni
to Rome. Visconti Prasca, the aristocratic commander of the Regio Esercito
forces in Albania was a bodybuilder excessively proud of his "manly
physique" who neglected his military duties in favor of physical
exercises, and promptly told Mussolini that his forces were more than capable
of conquering Greece. Although Greek "expansionism" was denounced and
claims for the surrender of Chameria made, Ciano and well-informed German
sources regarded the press campaign as a means to intimidate Greece, rather
than a prelude to war.
On 15 August 1940 (the Dormition of the Theotokos, a Greek
national religious holiday), the Greek light cruiser Elli was sunk by the
Italian submarine Delfino in Tinos harbor. The sinking was a result of orders
by Mussolini and Navy chief Domenico Cavagnari allowing submarine attacks on
neutral shipping. This was taken up by De Vecchi, who ordered the Delfino's
commander to "sink everything in sight in the vicinity of Tinos and
Syros", giving the impression that war was imminent. On the same day,
another Greek steamship was bombarded by Italian planes in Crete. Despite
evidence of Italian responsibility, the Greek government announced that the
attack had been carried out by a submarine of unknown nationality. No-one was
fooled and the sinking of Elli outraged the Greek people. Ambassador Grazzi
wrote in his memoirs that the attack united a people "deeply riven by
unbridgeable political differences and old and deep-running political
hatreds" and imbued them with a firm resolve to resist. Grazzi's position
was particularly problematic: a firm believer in Italian–Greek friendship, and
unaware of Ciano's shift towards war, he tried his best to smooth over problems
and avoid a conflict. As a result, Metaxas, who believed Grazzi to be a
"faithful executor of Rome's orders", was left unsure of Italy's true
intentions, wavering between optimism and "crises of prudent
rationalism", in the words of Tsirpanlis. Neither Metaxas nor Grazzi
realized that the latter was being kept in his post "deliberately in order
to allay the suspicions of the Greek government and so that the aggressive
plans against Greece might remain concealed".
German intervention, urging Italy to avoid Balkan
complications and concentrate on Britain, along with the start of the Italian
invasion of Egypt, led to the postponement of Italian ambitions in Greece and
Yugoslavia: on 22 August, Mussolini postponed the attack on Greece for the end
of September, and for 20 October on Yugoslavia. On 7 October, German troops
entered Romania, to guard the Ploiești oil fields and prepare for Operation
Barbarossa. Mussolini, who had not been informed in advance, regarded it as an
encroachment on Italy's sphere of influence in the Balkans, and advanced plans
for an invasion of Greece. The fact that Hitler never told Mussolini of any
foreign policy moves in advance had long been considered humiliating by the
latter and he was to determined to strike Greece without informing Hitler as a
way of asserting Italian equality with Germany. On 13 October, Mussolini told
Marshal Badoglio that Italy was going to war with Greece, with Badoglio making
no objections. The next day, Badoglio first learned that Mussolini planned to
occupy all of Greece instead of just Epirus as he had been led to understand,
which led Badoglio to say that the Regio Esercito would require 20 divisions in
Albania, which in turn would require 3 months, but he did not press this point.
The one man in Italy who could have stopped the war, King Victor Emmanuel III,
chose to bless it instead. The king told Mussolini at a meeting that he had his
support as he expected the Greeks to "crumble". Victor Emmanuel was
looking forward to having a fourth crown to wear (Mussolini had already given
Victor Emmanuel the titles Emperor of Ethiopia and King of the Albanians).
Opposing Plans
Italy
The Italian war aim was to establish a Greek puppet state,
which would permit the Italian annexation of the Ionian Islands and the
Sporades and the Cyclades islands in the Aegean Sea, to be administered as a
part of the Italian Islands of the Aegean. The islands were claimed on the
basis that they had once belonged to the Venetian Republic and the Venetian
client state of Naxos. The Epirus and Acarnania regions were to be separated
from the rest of the Greek territory and the Italian-controlled Kingdom of
Albania was to annex territory between the Greek north-western frontier and a
line from Florina to Pindus, Arta and Preveza. The Italians intended to partly
compensate Greece for its extensive territorial losses by allowing it to annex
the British Crown Colony of Cyprus after the war.
On 13 October, Mussolini finalized the decision for war when
he informed Marshal Badoglio to start preparing an attack for 26 October.
Badoglio then issued the order for the Italian military to begin preparations
for executing the existing war plan, "Contingency G[reece]", which
envisioned the capture of Epirus as far as Arta but left the further pursuit of
the campaign open. On the next day, Badoglio and acting Army Chief of Staff
Mario Roatta met with Mussolini, who announced that his objective was the
capture of the entire country and that he would contact Bulgaria for a joint
operation. Roatta advised that an extension of the invasion beyond Epirus would
require an additional ten divisions, which would take three months to arrive
and suggested limiting the extent of the Italian demobilization. Both generals
urged Mussolini to replace the local commander, Lieutenant-General Sebastiano
Visconti Prasca, with someone of greater seniority and experience. Mussolini
seemingly agreed but also insisted on the attack going ahead at the determined
date, provisionally under Prasca's command. Badoglio and Roatta seemed
unconvinced that the operation would take place, as with similar projects
against Greece and Yugoslavia.
The following day Mussolini called another conference, with
Badoglio, Roatta, Visconti Prasca, Ciano, and Jacomoni. Neither Admiral
Domenico Cavagnari of the Regia Marina nor Francesco Pricolo of the Regia Aeronautica
were asked to attend while Roatta arrived late as he was invited by Mussolini's
secretary to the meeting just before it started. Mussolini reiterated his
objectives; stated he believed that neither of Greece's allies in the Balkan
Pact, Yugoslavia or Turkey would act; expressed his determination that the
attack take place on 26 October and asked for the opinion of the assembled.
Jacomoni agreed that the Albanians were enthusiastic but that the Greeks would
fight, likely with British help, while Ciano suggested that the Greek people
were apathetic and would not support the "plutocratic" ruling class.
Prasca offered assurances that the operation was as perfectly planned as
"humanly possible", and promised to finish off the Greek forces in
Epirus (which he estimated at 30,000 men) and capture the port of Preveza in
ten to fifteen days. Prasca regarded the campaign as an opportunity to win fame
and achieve the coveted rank of Marshal of Italy by conquering Athens. He was
relatively junior in his rank and knew that if he demanded more troops for the
Albanian front, it was likely that a more senior officer would be sent to
command the operation, earning the accolades and promotions instead.
During the discussion only Badoglio voiced objections,
pointing out that stopping after seizing Epirus—which he conceded would present
little difficulty—would be an error, and that a force of at least twenty
divisions would be necessary to conquer the whole country, including Crete,
through he did not criticize Prasca's plans. Badoglio also stated he believed
it was very unlikely that Britain would send forces to Greece and wanted an
Italian offensive into Egypt to be timed with the invasion of Greece. Roatta
suggested that the schedule of moving troops to Albania would have to be
accelerated and called for two divisions to be sent against Thessaloniki as a
diversion. Prasca pointed out the inadequacy of Albanian harbors for the rapid
transfer of Italian divisions, the mountainous terrain, and the poor state of
the Greek transport network, but remained confident that Athens could be
captured after the fall of Epirus, with "five or six divisions". The
meeting ended with an outline plan, summed up by Mussolini as "offensive
in Epirus; observation and pressure on Salonika, and, in a second phase, march
on Athens". The British historian Ian Kershaw called the meeting at the
Palazzo Venezia on 15 October 1940 "one of the most superficial and
dilettantish discussions of high-risk military strategy ever recorded".
The Greek historian Aristotle Kallis writes that Mussolini in October 1940
"was overpowered by hubris", a supremely overconfident man whose
vainglorious pursuit of power led him to believe that under his leadership
Italy was about to win as he put it "the glory she has sought in vain for
three centuries".
The staging of incidents at the border to provide a suitable
pretext (analogous to the Gleiwitz incident) was agreed for 24 October.
Mussolini suggested that the expected advance of the 10th Army (Marshal Rodolfo
Graziani) on Mersa Matruh, in Egypt, be brought forward to prevent the British
from aiding Greece. Over the next couple of days Badoglio failed to elicit
objections to the attack from the other service chiefs or to achieve its
cancellation on technical grounds. Mussolini, enraged by the Marshal's
obstructionism, threatened to accept his resignation if offered. Badoglio
backed down, managing only to secure a postponement of the attack until 28
October.
The front was roughly 150 kilometers (90 mi) wide in
mountain terrain with very few roads. The Pindus mountains divided it into two
theatres of operations, Epirus and western Macedonia. The Italian forces in
Albania were organized accordingly: the XXV Ciamuria Corps (Lieutenant-General
Carlo Rossi) in the west was charged with the conquest of Epirus, while the
XXVI Corizza Corps (Lieutenant-General Gabriele Nasci) in the east, around
Korçë, would initially remain passive in the direction of western Macedonia.
On 18 October Mussolini sent a letter to Tsar Boris III of
Bulgaria inviting him to take part in the coming action against Greece, but
Boris refused, citing his country's unreadiness and its encirclement by hostile
neighbors. This was not regarded as a major setback, as the Italian leadership
considered that the threat of Bulgarian intervention alone would compel the
Greek High Command to commit most of its army in eastern Macedonia and Thrace.
It was not until 24 October that Badoglio realized that not only were the
Greeks already mobilizing, but that they were prepared to divert most of their
forces to Epirus, leaving only six divisions against Bulgaria. Prasca would
still have numerical superiority at the start of the campaign (some 150,000 men
against 120,000) but concerns grew over the vulnerability of the left flank.
The 29th Infantry Division "Piemonte" was diverted from the attack in
Epirus to bolster XXVI Corps in the Korçë area, while the 19th Infantry
Division "Venezia" was ordered south from its position along the
Yugoslav border.
In 1936 General Alberto Pariani had been appointed Chief of
Staff of the army, and had begun a reorganization of divisions to fight wars of
rapid decision, according to thinking that speed, mobility and new technology
could revolutionize military operations. In 1937, three-regiment (triangular)
divisions began to change to two-regiment (binary divisions), as part of a ten
years plan to reorganize the standing army into 24 binary, 24 triangular,
twelve mountain, three motorized and three armored divisions. The effect of the
change was to increase the administrative overhead of the army, with no
corresponding increase in effectiveness, as the new technology of tanks, motor
vehicles, and wireless communications was slow to arrive and was inferior to
that of potential enemies. The dilution of the officer class by the need for
extra unit staffs was made worse by the politicization of the army and the
addition of Blackshirt Militia. The reforms also promoted frontal assaults to
the exclusion of other theories, dropping the previous emphasis on fast mobile
warfare backed by artillery.
Prior to the invasion Mussolini let 300,000 troops and
600,000 reservists go home for the harvest. There were supposed to be 1,750
lorries used in the invasion but only 107 arrived. The possibility that Greek
officials situated in the front area could be corrupted or would not react to
an invasion proved to be mostly wishful thinking, used by Italian generals and
personalities in favor of a military intervention; the same was true for an
alleged revolt of the Albanian minority living in Chameria, located in the
Greek territory immediately behind the boundary, which would break out after
the beginning of the attack.
On the eve of 28 October 1940, Italy's ambassador in Athens,
Emanuele Grazzi, handed an ultimatum from Mussolini to Metaxas. It demanded
free passage for his troops to occupy unspecified strategic points inside Greek
territory. Greece had been friendly towards Nazi Germany, profiting from mutual
trade relations, but now Germany's ally, Italy, intended to invade Greece.
Metaxas rejected the ultimatum with the words "Alors, c'est la
guerre" (French for "then it is war"). In this, he echoed the
will of the Greek people to resist, a will that was popularly expressed in one
word: "ochi" (Όχι) (Greek for "no"). Within hours, Italy
attacked Greece from Albania. The outbreak of hostilities was first announced
by Athens Radio early in the morning of 28 October, with the two-sentence
dispatch of the general staff.
Since
05:30 this morning, the enemy is attacking our vanguard on the Greek-Albanian
border. Our forces are defending the fatherland. — Greek General Staff, 28
October 1940
Greece
In 1936, the 4th of August Regime came to power in Greece,
under the leadership of Ioannis Metaxas. Plans were laid down for the
reorganization of the Greek armed forces, including building the "Metaxas
Line'", a defensive fortification along the Greco-Bulgarian frontier.
Large sums of money were spent to re-equip the army but due to the increasing
threat of and the eventual outbreak of war, the most significant foreign
purchases from 1938 to 1939, were only partly delivered or not at all. A
massive contingency plan was developed and great amounts of food and equipment
were stockpiled in many parts of the country as a precaution in the event of
war. After the Italian occupation of Albania in spring 1939, the Greek General
Staff prepared the "IB" (Italy-Bulgaria) plan, anticipating a
combined offensive by Italy and Bulgaria. Given the overwhelming superiority of
such an alliance in manpower and matériel, the plan prescribed a purely
defensive strategy, including the gradual retreat of the Greek forces in Epirus
to the Arachthos River–Metsovo–Aliakmon River–Mt. Vermion line, to gain time
for the completion of mobilization.
With the completion of partial mobilization of the frontier
formations, the plan was revised with variants "IBa" (1 September
1939) and "IBb" (20 April 1940). These modified the role of the main
Greek force in the region, the 8th Infantry Division (Major-General Charalambos
Katsimitros). Plan "IB" foresaw it covering the left flank of the bulk
of the Greek forces in western Macedonia, securing the Metsovon pass and
blocking entry into Aetolia-Acarnania, "IBa" ordered the covering of
Ioannina and the defense of the Kalamas river line. Katsimitros had discretion
to choose the defensive line and chose the Kalpaki line, which lay astride the
main invasion axis from Albania and allowed him to use the Kalamas swamps to
neutralize the Italian tank threat. The Greek General Staff remained focused on
Bulgaria as its main potential enemy: of the 851 million drachmas spent on
fortification between April 1939 and October 1940, only 82 million went to the
Albanian frontier and the rest on the Metaxas Line and other works in the
north-east.
Nevertheless, given the enormous numerical and material superiority
of the Italian military, the Greek leadership, from Metaxas down, was reserved
and cautious, with few hopes of outright victory in a conflict with Italy. The
General Staff's plan for the defense of Epirus envisaged withdrawal to a more
defensible line, and it was only through Katsimitros' insistence that the
Italian attack was confronted close to the border. Metaxas himself, during a
briefing of the press on 30 October 1940, reiterated his unshakeable confidence
on the ultimate victory of Britain, and hence of Greece, but was less confident
on the short-term prospects, noting that "Greece is not fighting for
victory. It is fighting for glory. And for its honor. ... A nation must be able
to fight, if it wants to remain great, even with no hope of victory. Just
because it has to." On the other hand, this pessimism was not shared by
the population at large, whose enthusiasm, optimism, and the almost religious
indignation at the torpedoing of Elli, created an élan that helped transform
the conflict in Greece's favor. As late as March 1941, when the German
intervention was looming, an Italian officer summed up the Greeks' attitude for
Mussolini with the words of a captured Greek officer: "we are sure that we
will lose the war, but we will give you the spanking you need".
Forces
Italy
In the Epirus sector, the Army Corps of the Ciamuria, which
operated in the Chameria region (Italian: Ciamuria), and consisted of the 23rd
Infantry Division "Ferrara" (12,785 men, 60 guns and 3,500 Albanian
auxiliary troops), the 51st Infantry Division "Siena" (9,200 men and
50 guns), the 131st Armored Division "Centauro" (4,037 men, 24 guns
and 163 light tanks, of which only 90 operational)., and the Regiment
"Cavalleggeri Guide". In addition, the army corps was reinforced by
the brigade-level Littoral Grouping, which consisted of the 3rd Regiment
"Granatieri di Sardegna e d'Albania", Regiment "Lancieri di
Aosta" and Regiment "Lancieri di Milano", and operated on the
Italian right along the coast (4,823 men and 32 guns). The Army Corps of the
Ciamuria, which was renamed XXV Army Corps on 17 November 1940, comprised 22
infantry battalions, three cavalry regiments, 61 artillery batteries (18 heavy)
and 90 tanks. Along with Blackshirt battalions and auxiliary troops, it
numbered c. 42,000 men. XXVI Army Corps in the Korçë area comprised the 29th
Infantry Division "Piemonte" (9,300 men and 32 guns), and the 49th
Infantry Division "Parma" (12,000 men and 60 guns). In addition, the
Corps comprised the 19th Infantry Division "Venezia" (10,000 men and
40 guns), moving south from its deployment along the Yugoslav frontier between
Lake Prespa and Elbasan, and was later reinforced with the 53rd Infantry
Division "Arezzo" (12,000 men and 32 guns) around Shkodër. The XXVI
Army Corps totaled 32 infantry battalions, about ten tanks and two cavalry
companies, 68 batteries (7 heavy) for a total of c. 44,000 men. The 3rd Alpine
Division "Julia" with (10,800 men and 29 guns), was placed between
the corps to cover the advance of XXV Army Corps along the Pindus mountains.
The Regia Aeronautica had 380 aircraft available for operations against Greece.
About half of the fighter force consisted of 64 Fiat CR.42 Falco (Hawk) and 23
Fiat CR.32 Freccia (Arrow) biplanes (the latter already outdated). More modern
and effective were the fifty Fiat G.50bis, Italian first all-metal fighters,
available at the opening of the hostilities. Sixty CANT Z.1007s Alcione
(Halcyon) represented the bulk of the Italian bomber force. Of wooden
construction, these three-engined aircraft could endure a lot of punishment and
were highly maneuverable. Other trimotors were also based on Albanian
airfields: 72 Savoia-Marchetti SM.81 Pipistrello (Bat), a veteran of Spanish
War, with fixed undercarriage, and 31 Savoia-Marchetti SM.79 Sparviero
(Sparrowhawk) built with steel tubes, timber, aluminum, and fabric and carrying
scarce defensive firepower.
Greece
On 28 October, the Greek army had 14 infantry divisions, one
cavalry division and three infantry brigades, all at least partly mobilized
since August; four infantry divisions and two brigades were on the border with
Albania; five infantry divisions faced Bulgaria and five more with the cavalry
division were in general reserve. Greek army divisions were triangular and held
up to 50 per cent more infantry than the Italian binary divisions, with
slightly more medium artillery and machine-guns but no tanks. Most Greek
equipment was still of First World War issue, from countries like Belgium,
Austria, Poland and France, all of which were under Axis occupation, cutting
off the supply of spare parts and ammunition. Many senior Greek officers were
veterans of a decade of almost continuous warfare, including the Balkan Wars of
1912–13, the First World War, and the Greco-Turkish War of 1919–22. Greece had
conscription with all able-bodied males upon turning 18 years old were required
to serve for 24 months in the military.
In Epirus, the 8th Infantry Division was already mobilized
and reinforced with a regiment and the staff of the 3rd Infantry Brigade,
fielding 15 infantry battalions and 16 artillery batteries. At the time of the
Italian attack, the 2/39 Evzone Regiment was moving north from Missolonghi to
reinforce the division. The western Macedonia sector was held by the Western
Macedonia Army Section (TSDM), based at Kozani (Lieutenant-General Ioannis
Pitsikas), with the II Army Corps (Lieutenant-General Dimitrios Papadopoulos)
and III Army Corps (Lieutenant-General Georgios Tsolakoglou), each of two
infantry divisions and an infantry brigade. The total forces available to TSDM
on the outbreak of war consisted of 22 infantry battalions and 22 artillery
batteries (seven heavy). The Pindus sector was covered by the "Pindus
Detachment" (Απόσπασμα Πίνδου) (Colonel Konstantinos Davakis) with two
battalions, a cavalry company and 1.5 artillery batteries.
The Royal Hellenic Air Force (Ellinikí Vasilikí Aeroporía,
RHAF) had to face the numerically and technologically superior Regia
Aeronautica. It comprised 45 fighters, 24 light bombers, nine reconnaissance
aircraft, about 65 auxiliary aeroplanes and 28 naval cooperation aircraft. It
consisted of the 21st, 22nd, 23rd and 24th pursuit squadrons, the 31st, 32nd,
33rd bomber squadrons, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th military cooperation squadrons,
the 2828 Independent Military Cooperation Flight and the 11th, 12th and 13th
naval cooperation squadrons. At the outbreak of the war the operational combat
fleet of the Royal Greek Air Force counted 24 PZL P.24 and nine Bloch MB.151
fighters, as well as eleven Bristol Blenheim Mk IV, ten Fairey Battle B.1 and
eight Potez 633 B2 bombers. Serviceable ground attack and naval support
aircraft included about nine Breguet 19 two-seater biplane bombers, 15 Henschel
Hs 126 reconnaissance and observation aircraft, 17 Potez 25A observation
aircraft, nine Fairey III amphibious reconnaissance aircraft, 12 Dornier Do 22G
torpedo bombers, and 9 Avro Anson maritime reconnaissance aircraft. The main
air bases were located in Sedes, Larissa, Dekeleia, Faleron, Eleusis, Nea
Anchialos and Maleme.
The Royal Hellenic Navy had the elderly cruiser Georgios
Averof, two modern destroyers, four slightly older Italian destroyers and four
obsolete Aetos-class destroyers. There were six old submarines, fifteen
obsolete torpedo boats and about thirty other auxiliary vessels.
Britain
On 22 October 1940, six days before the Italian invasion of
Greece, despite the Italian invasion of Egypt, the RAF Air Officer
Commanding-in-Chief Middle East in Cairo was ordered to prepare squadrons for
Greece, based on Ultra decodes and other sources that an Italian invasion of
Greece was imminent. The RAF first sent 30 Squadron, consisting of one flight
of Blenheim IF night fighters and one flight of Blenheim I light bombers, that
were based at Athens-Eleusis airfield. Soon afterwards, six Vickers Wellington
medium bombers were detached from 70 Squadron and a flight of Blenheim Is from
84 Squadron arrived. All RAF assets were placed under the command of Air
vice-marshal John D'Albiac. The RAF aircraft participated in the Greek
counter-offensive that began on 14 November, with No. 84 Squadron operating
forward from Menidi. A few days later, the Gloster Gladiator fighters of 80
Squadron moved forward to Trikala, causing significant losses to the Regia
Aeronautica. 211 Squadron with Blenheim Is, followed before the end of
November, joining 84 Squadron at Menidi and 80 Squadron moved to Yannina, about
65 kilometers (40 mi) from the Albanian border. In the first week of December,
14 Gladiators were transferred from the RAF to the RHAF.
Campaign
The Greek official history of the Greco-Italian War divides
it into three periods:
The
Italian offensive and its failure from 28 October to 13 November 1940
The
Greek counter-offensive, from 14 November to 6 January 1941, the initial Greek
counter-offensive in 14–23 November, with the restoration of the pre-war border
in Epirus and the capture of Korçë, followed by the Greek advance into Albania
until 6 January 1941
The
gradual stabilization of the front from 6 January 1941 until the onset of the
German attack on 6 April; the final Greek advances, until 8 March, followed by
the Italian spring offensive and the stalemate until April.
The Greek commander-in-chief, Alexandros Papagos, in his
memoirs regarded the second phase as ending on 28 December 1940; as the
historian Ioannis Koliopoulos comments, this seems more appropriate, as December
marked a watershed in the course of the war, with the Greek counter-offensive
gradually grinding to a halt, the German threat becoming clear, and the
beginning of British attempts to guide and shape Greek strategy. According to
Koliopoulos, the final three months of the war were militarily of little
significance as they did not alter the situation of the two combatants, but
were mostly dominated by the diplomatic and political developments leading up
to the German invasion.
Italian Offensive (28 October –
13 November 1940)
Italian forces invaded Greece in several columns. On the
extreme Italian right, the coastal group moved south in the direction of
Konispol with the final aim of capturing Igoumenitsa and thence driving onto Preveza.
In the central sector, the Siena Division moved in two columns onto the area of
Filiates, while the Ferrara Division moved in four columns against the main
Greek resistance line at Kalpaki with the aim of capturing Ioannina. On the
Pindus sector, the Julia Division launched five columns aiming to capture
Metsovo and cut off the Greek forces in the Epirus sector from the east. With
the onset of the Italian offensive, Papagos, until then the Chief of the
Hellenic Army General Staff, was appointed commander-in-chief of the newly
established General Headquarters. The Army General Staff, which functioned as
the main field staff throughout the war, was handed over to Lieutenant-General
Konstantinos Pallis, recalled from retirement. With Bulgarian neutrality
assured—following the terms of the Balkan Pact of 1935, the Turks threatened to
intervene on Greece's side if the Bulgarians attacked Greece—the Greek high
command was free to throw the bulk of its army against Italian forces in
Albania. Almost half the forces assigned to the Bulgarian front (13th and 17th
Divisions, 16th Infantry Brigade) and the entirety of the general reserve (I
Army Corps with 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Infantry Divisions, as well as the Cretan 5th
Infantry Division and the Cavalry Division) were directed to the Albanian
front.
Epirus and Coastal Sectors
On the Epirus sector, Katsimitros had left five battalions
along the border to delay the Italian advance, and installed his main resistance
line in a convex front with the Kalpaki pass in the centre, manned by nine
battalions. Further two battalions under Major-General Nikolaos Lioumbas took
over the coastal sector in Thesprotia. The swamps of the Kalamas river,
especially before Kalpaki, formed a major obstacle not only to armored
formations, but even to the movement of infantry. A further battalion and some
artillery were detached to the Preveza area in the event of an Italian landing,
but as this did not materialize, they were swiftly moved to reinforce the
coastal sector. By the night of 29/30 October, the Greek covering units had
withdrawn to the Kalpaki line, and by 1 November, Italian units made contact
with the Greek line. During these three days, the Italians prepared their assault,
bombarding the Greek positions with aircraft and artillery. In the meantime,
the developing Italian threat in the Pindus sector forced Papagos to cable
Katsimitros that his main mission was to cover the Pindus passes and the flanks
of the Greek forces in western Macedonia, and to avoid offering resistance if
it left his forces depleted. Katsimitros had already decided to defend his
line, however, and disregarded these instructions, but detached some forces to
cover its right along the Aoös River. On 1 November, the Italians managed to
capture Konitsa and the Comando Supremo gave the Albanian front priority over
Africa.
The scheduled Italian amphibious assault on Corfu did not
materialize due to bad weather. The Italian navy commander, Admiral Domenico
Cavagnari, postponed the landing to 2 November, but by that time Visconti
Prasca was urgently demanding reinforcements, and Mussolini ordered that the
47th Infantry Division "Bari", earmarked for the operation, be sent
to Albania instead. Mussolini proposed a landing at Preveza on 3 November to
break the emerging impasse, but the proposal met with immediate and categorical
refusal by the service chiefs.
The main Italian attack on the Kalpaki front began on 2
November. An Albanian battalion, under the cover of a snowstorm, managed to
capture the Grabala heights, but were thrown back by a counterattack on the
next day. On the same day, an attack spearheaded by 50–60 tanks against the
main Kalpaki sector was also repulsed. The Greek units east of the Kalamas were
withdrawn during the night. On 5–7 November, repeated assaults were launched
against the Grabala and other heights; on the night of the 7th, Grabala briefly
fell once more, but was swiftly recaptured. On 8 November, the Italians began
withdrawing and assuming defensive positions until the arrival of
reinforcements. On the coastal sector, the Italians made better progress. The
Greek covering units were forced south of the Kalamas already on the first day,
but the bad state of the roads delayed the Italian advance. On the night of 4/5
November, the Italians crossed the river and broke through the defenses of the
local Greek battalion, forcing Lioumbas to order his forces to withdraw south
of the Acheron River. Igoumenitsa was captured on 6 November, and on the next
day, the Italians reached Margariti. This marked their deepest advance, as the
Thesprotia Sector began receiving reinforcements from Katsimitros, and as on
the other sectors the situation had already turned to the Greeks' favor.
As evidence of the Italian offensive's failure mounted, on 8
November, Visconti Prasca was relieved of overall command in Albania and
relegated to command the Italian forces in the Epirus front, while General
Ubaldo Soddu, State Undersecretary of War, assumed his place. Soddu's report
from Albania underlined Greek resistance in Epirus and the mounting threat of
the Greek concentration in western Macedonia, and recommended taking up
defensive positions "while awaiting the reinforcements that would permit
us to resume action as soon as possible". Mussolini consented. With the
Italians on the defensive, 8th Division began launching local counterattacks to
regain the lost ground. By 13 November, the Greek forces once again stood at
the Kalamas river along its entire length. On 12 November, I Army Corps under
Lieutenant-General Panagiotis Demestichas took over the Epirus sector. 8th
Division was subordinated to it, while the coastal sector was placed under the
independent Lioumbas Detachment.
Pindus Sector
A greater threat to the Greek positions was posed by the
advance of the 3rd Alpine Division "Julia", under Mario Girotti, over
the Pindus Mountains towards Metsovo, which threatened to separate the Greek
forces in Epirus from those in Macedonia. The opposing Greek force, the Pindus
Detachment, numbered 2,000 men, was formed of reservists of the 51st Regiment,
mobilized on 29 August, while one of its three battalions (III/51) was formed
as late as 15 October and was still on its way to the front. Colonel Davakis
and his men had to cover a front some 37 km in width, and moreover over
extremely broken terrain. The Italian attack began under torrential rainfall
and made rapid progress, forcing the Greeks to abandon their forward posts,
especially in the Detachment's central sector. Davakis was forced to deploy the
companies of the III/51 Battalion piecemeal as soon as they arrived, leaving
himself with no reserves.
The situation worried the TSDM, which began sending whatever
reinforcements it could muster, and assigned the Pindus sector to the 1st
Infantry Division. Despite the onset of snowfall on the 29th, the Julia
Division continued pressing its attack on the Greek centre and left during
29–30 October, forcing the Greeks to withdraw towards Samarina. From 30
October, however, the Greeks managed to stabilize the situation. Command in the
Pindus sector passed to 1st Division and Major-General Vasileios Vrachnos,
while additional forces—the Cavalry Division, 5th Brigade, and he newly formed
Cavalry Brigade—were deployed on the flanks of the Italian salient and in the
rear to secure the vital passes.
After covering 40 kilometers (25 mi) of mountain terrain in
icy rain, the Julia Division captured the village of Vovousa, on 2 November,
but failed to reach its primary objective; Metsovo, 30 kilometers (20 mi)
south. That same day, Davakis was gravely wounded during a reconnaissance
mission near Fourka. However, it had become clear to the Italians that they
lacked the manpower and the supplies to continue in the face of the arriving
Greek reserves. On 3 November, the Italian spearhead was surrounded from all
sides. The commander of the Julia Division requested from the Italian
headquarters relief attacks and Italian reserves were thrown into the battle.
Thus, Visconti Prasca sent forward the Bari Division to its aid, but it was
unable to reach the cut-off Italian forces. In the meantime, the assistance of
the local civilians, including men, women, and children, to the Greek forces
proved invaluable. As a result of the Greek pressure the Julia Division was
virtually wiped out, while the villages previously taken by the Italians were
recaptured on 3 and 4 November. Within less than a week, the remaining Italian
troops in this sector were in roughly the same positions they occupied before
the declaration of the war. By 13 November the Greek forces had completed the
re-occupation of the Grammos and Smolikas mountain ranges. On the same day,
Visconti Prasca was relieved and recalled to Italy.
Greek Counter-offensive (14
November 1940 – 6 January 1941)
By 14 November, the Italian forces in Albania had been
reorganized in two field armies: the Ninth Army, formed out of the XXVI Corps
in the Korçë sector, comprising five infantry and two alpine divisions with
elite Alpini troops as well as a number of independent regiments, including
Blackshirt and Albanian battalions; and the Eleventh Army (former XXV Corps) on
the Epirus sector, with three infantry, an armored, and a cavalry division, as
well as a number of independent units. The Italian situation was very
difficult, as the troops on the front had been fighting non-stop for three
weeks and were exhausted. The supply situation was abysmal, with the army
lacking lorries, horses, and mules; the limited capacity of Albania's two main
ports, Valona and Durrës, created a bottleneck for supplies and reinforcements,
while the airlift initiated between Italy and Tirana—which consumed all of the
Italian Air Force's transport capacity to the detriment of Africa—could
transport troops, but not heavy equipment. The Greek order of battle on 14
November consisted of Lieutenant-General Demestichas' I Corps on the coastal
sector (2nd, 8th, and the Cavalry Divisions, and the Lioumbas Detachment),
Lieutenant-General Papadopoulos' II Corps in the Pindus sector (1st Infantry
Division, 5th Brigade and the Cavalry Brigade), and Lieutenant-General
Tsolakoglou's III Corps in western Macedonia (9th, 10th, 15th Infantry
Divisions, with 11th Division assembling in its rear). The latter two corps
were under the command of TSDM, led by Lieutenant-General Pitsikas. The 3rd,
4th, and 5th Infantry Divisions, as well as the 16th Brigade, were kept in
reserve. By 12 November, Papagos had over 100 infantry battalions on familiar
terrain against fewer than fifty Italian battalions.
Fall of Korçë (14–23 November)
From the first days of November, III Corps had undertaken
limited advances into Albanian territory, and already on 6 November, it
submitted plans for a general offensive. Judging it too ambitious for the
moment, Papagos postponed the offensive for 14 November. III Corps' main
objective was the capture of the Korçë plateau, which controlled access to the
interior of Albania along the valley of the Devoll river. The plateau lay
behind the Morava and Ivan mountains on the Greco-Albanian frontier, which were
held by the 29th Piemonte, the 19th Venezia, and the 49th Parma divisions. The
Italians were later reinforced by the 2nd Alpine Division
"Tridentina", the 53rd Infantry Division "Arezzo", and
30–50 tanks of the Centauro Division. Leaving five battalions to secure its
rear, III Corps attacked with twenty battalions and 37 artillery batteries. Due
to the lack of tanks or anti-tank weapons to counter Italian armor, the Greeks
decided to limit their movement along the mountain ridges, never descending to
the valleys. The offensive was launched on the morning of 14 November, with the
corps' three divisions moving on converging lines of attack towards Korçë. To
achieve surprise, the attack was not preceded by an artillery barrage.
The Italian forces were indeed taken by surprise, allowing
the Greeks to force several breaches in the Italian positions on 14–16
November. On 17 November, III Corps was reinforced with 13th Division, and on
the next day, with 11th Division, which along with the 10th Division formed a
new command, the "K" Group of Divisions or OMK (Lieutenant-General
Georgios Kosmas). The most critical moment for the Greeks came on 18 November,
when elements of the 13th Division panicked during an ill-coordinated attack
and the division almost retreated; its commander was sacked on the spot and the
new commander, Major-General Sotirios Moutousis, forbade any further retreat,
restoring the front. On 19–21 November, the Greeks captured the summit of
Morava. Fearing that they would be surrounded and cut off, the Italians
retreated towards the Devoll valley during the night, and on 22 November the
city of Korçë was captured by 9th Division. By 27 November, TSDM had captured
the entire Korçë plateau, suffering 624 dead and 2,348 wounded. Further south
and west, I and II Corps had moved to evict the Italians from Greek territory,
which they achieved by 23 November. II Corps further moved across the border
line, capturing Ersekë on 21 November and Leskovik on the next day. On 23
November, bowing to pressure from Badoglio and Roatta, Mussolini finally
reversed his early October order for demobilization.
Greek Offensive Towards Valona (23 November – December 1940)
Following the capture of Korçë and the eviction of the
Italian forces from Greek soil, the Greek GHQ faced two options: continue the
offensive in the Korçë sector in the direction of Elbasan or shift focus on the
left flank and drive towards the port of Valona. The latter was chosen, as the
capture of Valona would be of great strategic significance, leaving the
Italians with only Durrës as an entry port. TSDM, comprising III Corps and OMK,
would defend their positions on the Greek right and apply pressure, while I
Corps would move north along the Gjirokastër–Tepelenë–Valona axis. II Corps
would form the pivot of the movement, securing the connection between I Corps
and TSDM, advancing in step with its western neighbor in the direction of
Berat. I Corps was reinforced with 3rd Division (21 November) and II Corps with
11th Division (27 November) and the Cavalry Division (28 November).
I
said that we would break the Negus' back. Now, with the same, absolute
certainty, I repeat, absolute, I tell you that we will break Greece's back. —Mussolini's
speech in Palazzo Venezia, 18 November 1940
Between 24 and 30 November, I Corps moved north into Albania
along the Drinos river, while II Corps moved in the direction of Frashër, which
it captured in early December. TSDM continued to apply pressure against the
Italians and the 10th Division captured Moscopole on 24 November. Pogradec was
captured unopposed by the 13th Division on 30 November. The continued Greek
advance caused another crisis in the Italian hierarchy. The news of the fall of
Pogradec and the pessimistic reports of the Italian commanders in Albania
reportedly caused Mussolini to consider asking for a truce through the Germans
but in the end he recovered his nerve and ordered Soddu to hold fast. The
Greeks would be worn out, since they had "... no war industry and can only
count on supplies from Great Britain". Mussolini, encouraged by the
hardline Fascist Party secretary Roberto Farinacci, sacked Badoglio on 4
December and replaced him with Ugo Cavallero as Chief of the General Staff. The
resignation of the governor of the Italian Dodecanese, Cesare Maria De Vecchi
and Admiral Cavagnari, followed within a few days.
I Corps captured Delvinë on 5 December and Gjirokastër on 8
December; the Lioumbas Detachment captured Sarandë— renamed Porto Edda after
Edda Mussolini—on 6 December. Further east, the 2nd Division captured the Suhë
Pass after a fierce struggle from 1–4 December, while 8th Division launched
repeated attacks on the heights around the Kakavia Pass, forcing the Italians
to withdraw on the night of 4/5 December. The division had suffered considerable
losses but took over 1,500 prisoners, several artillery pieces and thirty
tanks. In the TSDM sector, Lieutenant-General Kosmas (in command of the K
Group, essentially the 10th Division) captured the Ostravicë Mountain on 12
December, while III Corps—since 1 December reinforced with 17th Division, which
replaced 13th Division—completed its occupation of the Kamia massif and secured
Pogradec.
On 2 December, Papagos, and Crown Prince Paul, visited the
front. Pitsikas and Tsolakoglou urged him to order an immediate attack on the
strategic Klisura Pass, without waiting for I and II Corps to level with TSDM.
Papagos refused and ordered the plan to continue, with III Corps relegated to a
passive role (this decision was later criticized, coupled with the onset of
winter, it immobilized the Greek right wing). Despite the atrocious weather and
the heavy snowfall, the Greek offensive continued on the left throughout
December. I Corps, now comprising 2nd, 3rd and 4th Divisions (8th Division and
the Lioumbas Detachment were moved back into reserve) captured Himarë on 22
December. II Corps, moving between the Aöos and the Apsos rivers, reached the
vicinity of Klisura, but failed to capture the pass. To its right, the V Army
Corps (the former K Group but still comprising only the 10th Division) managed
to advance up to Mount Tomorr and secure the connection between II and III
Corps, which remained in their positions.
End of the Greek Offensive and Stalemate
(6 January – 6 April 1941)
On 28 December 1940, the Greek GHQ took the decision to halt
large-scale offensive operations in view of the stiffening Italian resistance,
the worsening supply situation and the bad weather, which inter alia led to a
large number of frostbite casualties. This decision took effect on 6 January,
whereby only local offensive operations would take place to improve Greek lines
until the weather improved. The Italians had eleven infantry divisions, (11th
Infantry Division "Brennero", 19th Infantry Division
"Venezia", 23rd Infantry Division "Ferrara", 29th Infantry
Division "Piemonte", 33rd Infantry Division "Acqui", 37th
Infantry Division "Modena", 48th Infantry Division "Taro",
49th Infantry Division "Parma", 51st Infantry Division
"Siena", 53rd Infantry Division "Arezzo", and 56th Infantry
Division "Casale") and four Alpine divisions (2nd Alpine Division
"Tridentina", 3rd Alpine Division "Julia", 4th Alpine
Division "Cuneense", and 5th Alpine Division "Pusteria")
and the 131st Armored Division "Centauro", with the 6th Infantry
Division "Cuneo" and the 7th Infantry Division "Lupi di
Toscana" moving to the front. There were also two independent Bersaglieri
regiments, a grenadier regiment, two cavalry regiments, Blackshirt and Albanian
battalions and other units. According to official Italian documents, on 1
January 1941, Italy had 10,616 officers, 261,850 men, 7,563 vehicles, and
32,871 animals in Albania. This strengthening of the Italian position prompted
Cavallero, who after Soddu's recall on 29 December combined his post as Chief
of the General Staff with the overall command in Albania, to pronounce that the
"period of crisis [was] almost overcome" and to begin planning for an
attack aiming to recapture Korçë in early February.
Struggle for Klisura Pass and Tepelenë
The main operation envisaged by the Greek GHQ was the
capture of the Klisura Pass by II Corps, coupled with minor offensives by I
Corps and TSDM to improve their positions. II Corps attacked on 8 January, with
1st Division on the left and 15th Division, followed by the 11th Division, on
the right flank. The 15th Division faced the Julia Division, and after a hard struggle
managed to capture its positions in a costly success. The 11th Division
followed up on 9 January next day captured the pass. The offensive forced
Cavallero to deploy the reserves he had husbanded for the Korçë offensive,
which never took place. The newly arrived Lupi di Toscana division was routed.
The division went into action on 9 January to support the Julia Division, after
a 24-hour forced march in horrendous weather, without having time to reconnoiter
the front, without maps and without coordinating fire support with the Julia
Division. The commander and the chief of staff failed to coordinate its two
regiments, which became entangled on the same mule track. Despite attacking
downhill and facing a numerically inferior enemy, the division lost a battalion
to encirclement and were driven back to their starting positions after two
days. By 16 January, the division had disintegrated and "ceased to exist
as an organized force", with only 160 officers and men immediately
available and over 4,000 casualties. On 26 January, the Italians
counter-attacked to recover the pass but II Corps, reinforced with 5th
Division, managed to repel them and then counter-attacked. In the Battle of
Trebeshina, a series of engagements from 2–12 February, the Trebeshinë massif
was captured. The capture of the strategic Klisura pass by the Greek army was
considered a major success by the Allied forces, with the Commander of the
British forces in the Middle East, Archibald Wavell, sending a congratulatory
message to Alexander Papagos.
As the threat of a German invasion from Bulgaria increased,
the need to transfer Greek divisions to the Bulgarian frontier forced Papagos
to launch a final effort to capture Valona as quickly as possible. The RAF
agreed to challenge the air superiority of the Regia Aeronautica, which had
recovered with the loss of much of the RHAF in ground-attack operations, rather
than continue ineffective attempts at interdiction. With reinforcements from
Egypt and the drying of a landing-ground at Paramythia, the RAF managed 200
close support sorties by the end of February. Launched in mid-February, the
attack saw I Corps gain ground towards Tepelenë; Italian resistance and a
deterioration in the weather forced a suspension of operations before Tepelenë,
let alone Valona or Berat, were reached. The Italian defensive success was
costly, and signs of an imminent Italian offensive in the central sector of the
front forced a return to the defensive.
By early February 1941, the Greek Army was down to less than
two months of artillery ammunition overall and had shortages in every area of
material, while the Italians possessed ample reserves, endangering their
position. The Greeks appealed to the United States for material aid, but the
British ensured that they themselves got first priority for US production.
Furthermore, there were shortages of materials and even food across the
country. Continuing degradation of their logistical capability would soon mean
the end of effective Greek resistance. British material and air support had
been provided, but at this point it was "relatively small." Further
British aid in March and April would only partially alleviate this problem.
On 14 February, in view of GHQ's increasing concern with developments
on the Bulgarian frontier, a new higher command, the Epirus Army Section (TSI),
under Lieutenant-General Markos Drakos, was formed, comprising I and II Corps.
Despite Greek success in Albania, dissension within the Greek leadership
emerged over strategy towards the expected German attack and the need for a
withdrawal in Albania. The front commanders in Albania represented their views
to GHQ in Athens and in early March, Papagos moved to replace virtually the
entire leadership in the Albanian front: Drakos, Kosmas and Papadopoulos, the
commanders of TSI, I and II Corps respectively, were replaced by the TSDM
commander Lieutenant-General Pitsikas, Lieutenant-General Demestichas and
Major-General Georgios Bakos, TSDM being taken over by Tsolakoglou.
Italian Spring Offensive
On 4 March, the British sent the first convoy of Operation
Lustre with W Force (Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson) and supplies
for Greece. The Italian leadership desired to achieve a success against the
Greek army before the impending German intervention and reinforced the Albanian
front to 28 divisions with an average of 26 serviceable bombers, 150 fighters,
along with 134 bombers and 54 fighters of the 4° Squadra in Italy. Cavallero
planned an attack on 32 km (20 mi) of the centre of the front, to recapture
Klisura and advance towards Leskovik and Ioannina. The attack would be carried
out by the VIII Army Corps (24th Infantry Division "Pinerolo", 38th
Infantry Division "Puglie", and 59th Infantry Division
"Cagliari"), with XXV Corps (2nd Infantry Division
"Sforzesca", 47th Infantry Division "Bari", 51st Infantry
Division "Siena", and 7th Infantry Division "Lupi di
Toscana") as a second echelon, and the Centauro and Piemonte divisions as
general reserves. The Greek units opposite them were II Corps (17th, 5th, 1st,
15th, and 11th Divisions), with three regiments as TSI's general reserve, and
4th Division providing reinforcement. II Corps continued limited offensive
action as late as 8 March to improve its positions.
The Italian attack, watched by Mussolini, began on 9 March,
with a heavy artillery barrage and air bombardment; on the main sector, held by
the Greek 1st Division, over 100,000 shells were dropped on a 6 km (4 mi)
front. Despite repeated assaults and heavy shelling, the positions of 1st
Division held during 9–10 March. A flanking maneuver on 11 March ended in
Italian defeat. The exhausted Puglie Division was withdrawn and replaced with
the Bari Division during the subsequent night, but all attacks until 15 March
failed. The Italian offensive halted on 16–18 March, allowing the Greeks to
bring reserves forward and begin a gradual reshuffle their line, relieving the
1st Division with the 17th. The Italian offensive resumed on 19 March with
another attack on Height 731 (the 18th thus far). Attacks, preceded by heavy
artillery bombardments, followed daily until 24 March, the last day of the
Italian offensive, without achieving any result. Mussolini admitted that the
result of the Italian offensive was zero. Italian casualties amounted to over
11,800 dead and wounded, while the Greeks suffered 1,243 dead, 4,016 wounded
and 42 missing in action.
Greek and Italian Logistical Situation
in Early 1941
Although it failed, the Italian spring offensive revealed a
"chronic shortage of arms and equipment" in the Greek Army. Even with
British support, the Greeks were fast approaching the end of their logistical
tether. British intelligence estimated that Greece's reserves, although
numbering 200,000–300,000 partly-trained men on paper, could not be mobilized
for lack of arms and equipment, which were being consumed by the Albanian
front. By the end of March 1941, the Greek Army possessed one month's supply in
various types of artillery ammunition. The British had already supplied, among
other goods, 40 million 7.92 rounds and 150 mortars (50 51mm and 100 76mm) the
previous month, but had not yet fulfilled the Greeks' mid-January request of
300,000 uniforms and sets of shoes.
The Italians still had reserves of men and materiel, the
Greek defenses of Macedonia and Thrace, which would face the German attack,
were left undermanned and underequipped due to the demands of the Albanian
front. The Eastern Macedonia Army Section (TSAM), which manned the Metaxas
Line, was left with only 70,000 men to defend against any potential German
advance, though plans called for the fortifications to be held by 200,000 men.
British planners disagreed with the Greek plan to hold on to the Metaxas Line,
as well as the insistence of not ceding a single bit of ground to the Italians,
noting that the Greek forces were insufficient to prevent or resist a German
breakthrough. The Central Macedonia Army Section (TSKM), which manned the
Yugoslav border, was even weaker: its three divisions were recently raised from
reserves and possessed no anti-air weaponry, anti-tank weaponry, armored
vehicles, or almost any motor vehicles. They had few automatic weapons and
faced even shortages of basic supplies such as tents and helmets. 14 out of the
20 available divisions of the Greek army were facing the Italians on the
Albanian front as part of the Epirus Army Section, totaling 33 regiments. In an
effort to keep Greece in the fight, British aid drastically stepped up in March
and April, which included uniforms, weapons, and ammunition of various types.
However, the Greeks still did not consider this sufficient for successfully
prosecuting the rest of the war.
Though the Greek forces faced logistical difficulties their
supply lines worked much better. On the other side, Italian supplies and
ammunition faced critical levels even after one month of military operations.
In general Italian logistics failed to keep up with the confusing movements of
the Italian units, as a result they were perennially lacking essential
supplies. Italian General Gabriele Nasci realized that the Greek units were far
more familiar in mountain warfare and could always employ local guides and
provisions, thus freeing them from concern with supply line and enable them to
attack in more flexible way. Indeed, the area that the conflicts took place was
far more familiar to the Greek soldiers than to the Italians. The Greek side
was far more familiar in mountain warfare considering also the fact that many
Greeks especially those natives of Epirus were fighting for their homes.
Additionally some Greek weapons were superior to their Italian counterparts:
the Hotchkiss machine gun outperformed the Italian Breda and Fiat equivalent
and was less liable to overheating as well as jammed less often. The Skoda 75
mm and 105 mm mountain artillery of the Greek army was also superior compared
to Italian mortars.
As such at 29 March, Italian General Mario Roatta, Chief of
the Italian General Staff, asked for German intervention to relieve the
pressure on his own formations. On the other hand, just before the German
intervention at April 1941, Greek, British and Yugoslav officers agreed that a joined
Greek-Yugoslavian operation would force the Italians back to the Adriatic.
Orders given by General Papagos dictated the advance of the Epirus Army towards
Vlore and Berat, while the West Macedonia Army would cut the remaining Italian
units located in Elbasan and Durrës. Additionally, Papagos advised the Yugoslav
side to advance in the direction of Durrës, Kukes and Elbasan. A swift Italian
defeat would free up forces that could be used for the defense of Macedonia
against a German threat.
German Intervention and Italian Second
Spring Offensive
With most of the Greek army on the Albanian front, Operation
Marita began through Bulgaria on 6 April, which created a second front. Greece
had received a small reinforcement from British forces based in Egypt in
anticipation of the German attack, but no more help was sent after the
invasion. The Greek army was outnumbered; the Bulgarian defensive line did not
receive adequate troop reinforcements and was quickly overrun. The Germans
outflanked the immobile Greek forces on the Albanian border, forcing the
surrender of the Eastern Macedonia Field Army section in only four days. The
British Empire forces began a retreat. For several days Allied troops contained
the German advance on the Thermopylae position, allowing ships to be prepared
to evacuate the British force. The Germans reached Athens on 27 April and the
southern shore on 30 April, capturing 7,000 British troops. The conquest of
Greece was completed with the capture of Crete a month later and Greece was
occupied by the military forces of Germany, Italy, and Bulgaria until late
1944.
On 6 April, Papagos ordered TSDM to launch an attack towards
Elbasan, in conjunction with Yugoslav forces. The attack began on 7 April and
the 13th Division made some progress, but the Yugoslav army, attacked by the
Germans, rapidly collapsed and the operation was cancelled. On 12 April, GHQ in
Athens ordered the Greek forces on the Albanian front to retreat but the
decision was too late. The Greek commanders knew that Italian pressure, the
lack of motor transport and pack animals, the physical exhaustion of the Greek
army, and the poor transport network of Epirus meant that any retreat was
likely to end in disintegration. Advice to retreat before the start of the
German attack had been rejected and they petitioned Pitsikas to surrender.
Pitsikas forbade such talk, but notified Papagos and urged a solution that
would secure "the salvation and honor of our victorious Army". The
order to retreat, the disheartening news of the Yugoslav collapse, and the
rapid German advance in Macedonia led to a breakdown of morale in the Greek
troops, many of whom had been fighting without rest for five months and were
forced to abandon hard-won ground. By 15 April, the divisions of II Army Corps,
beginning with the 5th Division, began to disintegrate, with men and even
entire units abandoning their positions.
With the advantage of German advance on Greece. On 13 April,
General Ugo Cavallero ordered the Italian 9th Army (General Alessandro Pirzio
Biroli) and the 11th Army (General Carlo Geloso) to pursuit the retreating
Greek units in Albania. The Italian advance was slowed due to the Greek
rearguard actions left by the retreating Greek forces. Koritsa was reached on
14 April, Bilishti on 15 April, but Erseke fell on 17 April due to the stiff
Greek resistance, Klisura also fell on the same day. The Italian offensive
pushed towards Leskovik to Ponte Perati. Where the vanguards of the 47th
Infantry Division 'Bari' encountered stiff Greek resistance, which was taken
before the armistice. Cavallero desired of a combined action which would
encircle the Greek forces in Epirus. But it was beyond capacity to the Italian
forces to make this action. The XXV Army Corps entered Greek territory on 21
April.
Armistice
On 16 April, Pitsikas reported to Papagos that signs of
disintegration had also begun to appear among the divisions of I Corps and
begged him to "save the army from the Italians" by allowing it to
capitulate to the Germans, before the military situation collapsed completely.
On the following day TSDM was renamed III Army Corps and placed under Pitsikas'
command. The three corps commanders, along with the metropolitan bishop of
Ioannina, Spyridon, pressured Pitsikas to unilaterally negotiate with the Germans.
When he refused, the others decided to bypass him and selected Tsolakoglou, as
the senior of the three generals, to carry out the task. Tsolakoglou delayed
for a few days, sending his chief of staff to Athens to secure permission from
Papagos. The chief of staff reported the chaos in Athens and urged his
commander to take the initiative in a message that implied permission by
Papagos, although this was not in fact the case. On 20 April, Tsolakoglou
contacted Obergruppenführer Sepp Dietrich, the commander of the nearest German
unit, the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler (LSSAH) brigade, to offer surrender.
The protocol of surrender was signed by Tsolakoglou and Dietrich at 18:00 on
the same day. Presented with the fait accompli an hour later, Pitsikas resigned
his command.
The surrender agreement between Greece and Germany was
sparked protest by Mussolini, which Greece is required to surrender to Italy
also. General Wilhelm List spoke to Mussolini that another surrender agreement
will be drawn with the Italians. The surrender agreement was formally signed on
23 April by General Tsolakoglou for Greece, General Alfred Jodl for Germany and
General Alberto Ferrero for Italy.
Sea and air campaign
Naval Operations
Thoroughly outclassed by the far larger and more modern
Italian Regia Marina, the Royal Hellenic Navy (RHN) was unable to attempt a
direct naval confrontation. Its role was rather limited to patrol and convoy
escort duties, a particularly important task given the general inadequacy of
the Greek transport network on land; apart from large quantities of matériel,
c. 80,000 mobilized men and over 100,000 animals were moved by sea during the
war. The RHN carried out limited operations against Italian shipping in the
Strait of Otranto with submarines (losing one vessel), sinking at least 23,000
tonnes (23,000 long tons) of transport and merchant shipping, but lack of
maintenance facilities made it impossible to continue the effort. However, the
Greek submarine force was too small to be able to seriously hinder the supply
lines between Italy and Albania; between 28 October 1940 and 30 April 1941
Italian ships made 3,305 voyages across the Otranto straits, carrying 487,089
military personnel (including 22 field divisions) and 584,392 tons of supplies
while losing overall only seven merchant ships and one escort ship. Destroyers
carried out bold but fruitless night raids on 14 November 1940, 15 December and
4 January 1941.
The British fought the Battle of the Strait of Otranto on 12
November acting as a decoy force and the Regia Marina had half of its capital
ships put out of action by the British Royal Navy (RN) during the Battle of
Taranto (11–12 November) but Italian cruisers and destroyers continued to
escort convoys between Italy and Albania. On 28 November, an Italian squadron
bombarded Corfu and on 18 December and 4 March, Italian task forces shelled
Greek coastal positions in Albania. From January 1941, the main task of the RHN
was to escort the convoys of Operation Excess to and from Alexandria, in
co-operation with the RN. As the convoys transporting Lustre Force began in
early March, the Italian Fleet sortied against them and the British were
forewarned by Ultra decrypts. The Mediterranean Fleet intercepted the Italians
at the Battle of Cape Matapan on 28 March and sank three cruisers and two
destroyers, the greatest Italian naval defeat at sea of the war.
Air Operations
Regia Aeronautica
The poor infrastructure in Albania air bases hindered
communications and movements between the Italian flying units. Only two
airfields – Tirana and Valona – had Macadam runways so Autumn and Winter
weather made operations more difficult. There was also the usual lack of
co-operation with Italian Navy and Army. Two days after the start of the war,
on 30 October, there was the first air battle. Some Henschel Hs 126s of 3/2
Flight of 3 Observation Mira took off to locate Italian Army columns. But they
were intercepted and attacked by Fiat CR.42s of 393a Squadriglia. A first
Henschel was hit and crashed, killing its observer, Pilot Officer Evanghelos
Giannaris, the first Greek aviator to die in the war. A second Hs 126 was
downed over Mount Smolikas, killing Pilot Officer Lazaros Papamichail and
Sergeant Constantine Yemenetzis.
Royal Hellenic Air Force
On 2 November, a squadron of 15 Italian CANT Z.1007 bombers,
with Fiat CR.42 fighter escorts headed towards Thessaloniki and was intercepted
by Greek PZL P.24 fighters of the 22nd Squadron. The Greek flying ace second
lieutenant Marinos Mitralexis shot down one bomber and being out of ammunition,
aimed the nose of his PZL P.24 at the tail of a bomber, smashed the rudder and
sent the bomber out of control. The news of Mitralexis' feat quickly spread
throughout Greece and boosted morale. On 2 December, the 21st Pursuit Squadron
re-equipped with 14 ex-RAF Gladiators.
RAF
Ultra decrypts of orders to the Regia Aeronautica and
nightly reports from 4° Zona Aerea Territoriale in Italy to Comando Aeronautico
Albania della Regia Aeronautica in Tirana, disclosed bombing targets for the
next day and were sent to RAF HQ in Greece, to assist in fighter interception.
From mid-November to the end of December, the Blenheim and Wellington bombers
from Egypt flew 235 sorties but almost 1⁄3 failed, due to a lack of all-weather
airfields and the season, when flying was possible for about 15 days per month.
The bombing effort was concentrated on Durazzo and Valona but some close
support operations were carried out and the fighters near Athens helped to
reduce the number of Italian raids. By the end of 1940, the Gladiator pilots
had claimed 42 aircraft shot down for the loss of six, which established a
measure of air superiority over the Pindus mountains. In January 1941, 11
Squadron and 112 Squadron were sent to Greece despite being at half strength.
33 Squadron, 113 Squadron (Blenheims) and 208 Squadron (Lysanders and
Hurricanes) moved in March.
The British fighters were able to prevent most Italian air
operations after mid-February, when the Greek army made a maximum effort to
capture Valona. The RAF managed fifty sorties on 13 and 14 February; Gladiators
and Hurricanes intercepted a raid by fifty Italian aircraft on 28 February, the
RAF claiming 27 aircraft for the loss of one. When the Greek advance was slowed
by more bad weather and Italian reinforcements, the RAF returned to attacks on
airfields and ports. On the eve of the German invasion in April, the RAF had
claimed 93 Italian aircraft confirmed and 26 probables, for a loss of four
pilots and ten aircraft. RAF Greece had been increased to nine squadrons and
two Wellington detachments of about 200 aircraft, of which only 80 were
serviceable, in support of about 100 Greek and Yugoslav aircraft. RAF losses in
the Greek campaign were 163 men killed, missing or prisoner (150 aircrew) and
209 aircraft, 72 in the air, 55 on the ground and 82 destroyed or abandoned
during the evacuation.
Home Front
Greece
The war was greeted with great enthusiasm by the Greek
population, in Athens crowds filled the streets with patriotic fervor, as
newspapers hurried to publish their newest editions to stir up the people
further. The popular story that Metaxas had defiantly told Grazzi
"ochi!" ("no!") on the night of 28 October 1940 made the
previously unpopular prime minister into a national hero. Georgios Vlachos in
an editorial in his newspaper Kathimerini wrote: "Today there is no Greek
who does not add his voice to the thunderous OCHI. OCHI, we will not hand over
Greece to Italy. OCHI, Italian ruffiani will not set foot on our land. OCHI,
the barbarians will not desecrate our Parthenon". He also wrote his famous
article "The dagger" (To stileto).
Men in Greece rushed to volunteer for the war effort,
cramming into the back of trams to get to the recruiting offices. Morale
amongst the troops was as high as it could get with a universal feeling that
Greece must fight, with few entertaining the idea of failure. This enthusiasm
was not shared by some of the political leadership, there was a sense that
Greece would lose the war but needed to fight nonetheless, Metaxas stated in a
letter to Winston Churchill that "The war we confront today is thus solely
a war of honor" and that "The outcome of the world war will not be
decided in the Balkans."
The popularity of Metaxas' regime would also receive a
boost, with Metaxas becoming a national hero overnight, with even many
left-wing and liberal Greeks who opposed Metaxas showing admiration and support
for him, flocking to the cause.
Soon, with the first victories at the front, Greek artists
started to write and sing patriotic and festive songs. The reputation of Sofia
Vembo skyrocketed when her performance of patriotic and satirical songs became
a major inspiration for the fighting soldiers as well as the people at large
for whom she quickly became a folk heroine. Another satirical popular song
named Koroido Mussolini (Mussolini fool) was written by Nikos Gounaris in the
rhythm of "Reginella campagnola", a popular Italian song of the era.
Italy
The announcement of the Italian attack was greeted with
favour but not much enthusiasm, by the Italian public. The situation changed as
the Italian attack devolved into a stalemate in early November, especially
after the British Taranto raid and the start of the Greek counter-offensive. In
private conversations, Italians soon took to calling the war in Albania "a
second and worse Caporetto". The regime's popularity slumped further with
the introduction of strict rationing in food, oil and fats in early December.
Despite imposing a price freeze in July, prices rose and the state distribution
network of staple foods and heating oil broke down. Coupled with the dismissal
of Badoglio and the British advance in North Africa in Operation Compass, it
produced "the regime's most serious crisis since the murder of Giacomo
Matteotti in 1924" (MacGregor Knox). In a move designed to bolster the
Fascist Party's flagging standing, in mid-January 1941 Mussolini ordered the
all senior gerarchi and officials under 45 years, to go to the Albanian front
(much to their displeasure). According to Dino Grandi at least, this move
caused much resentment against Mussolini among the Party leadership that
simmered underground and resulted in his dismissal in July 1943.
On the other hand, the Greek historian Zacharias Tsirpanlis
observes that while post-war Italian accounts confirm the view that "due
to the Greek success Italian public opinion slowly turned against the Fascist
regime, marking the beginning of the end for Mussolini", this did not yet
materialize in any form of active resistance, including in the front itself.
While a cynicism towards the Fascist regime and its symbols and leaders had set
in, incidents of insubordination remained isolated. Indeed, according to the
eyewitness account of Air Force chief Francesco Pricolo, when Mussolini made an
unannounced visit to the front on 2 March 1941, the Duce was himself surprised
by the enthusiasm with which he was greeted, having expected open hostility
from the soldiers.
Albania
In an effort to win Albanian support for Italian rule, Ciano
and the Fascist regime encouraged Albanian irredentism in the directions of
Kosovo and Chameria. Despite Jacomoni's assurances of Albanian support in view of
the promised "liberation" of Chameria, Albanian enthusiasm for the
war was distinctly lacking. The few Albanian units raised to fight alongside
the Italian Army mostly "either deserted or fled in droves". Albanian
agents recruited before the war, are reported to have operated behind Greek
lines and engaged in acts of sabotage but these were few in number. Support for
the Greeks, although of limited nature, came primarily from the local Greek
populations who warmly welcomed the arrival of the Greek forces. Despite
official Greek proclamations that they were fighting for the liberation of
Albania, Greek claims on Northern Epirus were well known. Albanian suspicions
were reinforced, when a new municipal council of eleven Greeks and four Albanians
was appointed at Korçë, and when the military governor of Gjirokastër
prohibited the celebration of the Albanian independence day on 28 November (his
counterpart in Korçë allowed it to go ahead and was reprimanded). The Greek
authorities even ignored offers of Albanian expatriates to enlist as volunteers
against Italy. The Greek occupation regime followed the regulations of
international law and the Albanian civil administration was left intact and
continued to operate, including law courts. No atrocities were committed and
the safes of the state bank were discovered unopened after the Greeks withdrew.
Aftermath
Analysis
Impact on Barbarossa
Hitler blamed Mussolini's "Greek fiasco" for his
failed campaign in Russia. "But for the difficulties created for us by the
Italians and their idiotic campaign in Greece", he commented in
mid-February 1945, "I should have attacked Russia a few weeks
earlier." Hitler noted when discussing the "pointless campaign in
Greece" that Germany was not notified in advance of the impending attack,
which "compelled us, contrary to all our plans, to intervene in the
Balkans, and that in its turn led to a catastrophic delay in the launching of
our attack on Russia. We were compelled to expend some of our best divisions there.
And as a net result we were then forced to occupy vast territories in which,
but for this stupid show, the presence of our troops would have been quite
unnecessary." "We have no luck with the Latin races", he
complained afterwards. Mussolini took advantage of Hitler's preoccupation with
Spain and France "to set in motion his disastrous campaign against
Greece". Andreas Hillgruber has accused Hitler of trying to deflect blame
for his country's defeat from himself to his ally, Italy.
Ian Kershaw wrote that the five-week delay in launching
Operation Barbarossa, caused by the unusually wet weather in May 1941, was not
decisive. For Kershaw, the reasons for the ultimate failure of Barbarossa lay
in the arrogance of the German war goals, in particular the planning flaws and
resource limitations that caused problems for the operation from the start. He
adds that the German invasion into Greece in spring 1941 did not cause
significant damage to tanks and other vehicles needed for Barbarossa, the
equipment diverted to Greece being used on the southern flank of the attack on
the Soviet Union. Von Rintelen emphasizes that although the diversion of German
resources into Greece just prior to the attack on the Soviet Union did little
for the latter operation, Italy's invasion of Greece did not undermine
Barbarossa before the operation started. Instead, Italy's invasion of Greece
was to have serious consequences for its ongoing campaign in North Africa.
Moreover, Italy would have been in a better position to execute its North
African campaign had it initially occupied Tunis and Malta.
Effect on Italy
In the preface to the collection of documents published in
1965 by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the historian and diplomat
Mario Toscano summed up the war as follows: "As we all know, the campaign
against Greece ended in total failure. This was due, as the published material
confirms, to Mussolini's conviction, based on indications he received from his
colleagues, that the campaign would be decided in the political rather than the
military sector. The consequences of this error were so serious as to bring
about Italy's complete subjection to Germany as far as the political and
military direction of the war was concerned." This has been echoed by
other writers since: Gann and Duignan regarded that the fighting in France,
Yugoslavia and Greece reduced Italy to the status of a [German] satellite,
while Ian Kershaw considers that the Greek failure, the Battle of Taranto
(11–12 November 1940) and the loss of Cyrenaica (9 December 1940 – 9 February
1941) served to end Italian aspirations to great power status.
Other authors have been critical of the Italian leadership's
handling of the operation. Jowett wrote in 2000 that Mussolini's "quick and
relatively easy victory" turned to defeat and stalemate, which exposed the
incompetence of the Fascist government and its war machine. Italian soldiers
suffered great hardship in the Albanian mountains, "due to the
incompetence and unforgivably bad planning of their leaders". In 2008,
Paoletti wrote that the Italian army fought in difficult terrain, was short of
clothing and equipment and units were split up as they arrived and used
piecemeal. Mussolini was guilty of "criminal improvidence", in causing
the great number casualties of the Italian army. The German invasion "went
smoothly, because the Greek army was concentrated against the Italians".
In 2009, Mazower wrote that the Italian invasion of Greece was a disaster and
the "first Axis setback" of the war. Mussolini had sent 140,000
poorly-equipped troops to attack Greece, over some of the worst mountain
country in Europe, at the beginning of winter. The Greeks repulsed the
invasion, to the surprise of enemies and Allies alike, an event made worse for
the Fascist regime because of the attack on Taranto and the disasters in Libya,
Eritrea and Ethiopia.
Several military historians have blamed the poor performance
of the Italian Army in Greece, as well as in France and North Africa, on
"innate defects" that had been evident already during World War I but
were consistently ignored due to institutional indifference. The Italian
military historian Lucio Ceva remarks that the Italian military was largely
unable to learn from its failures or from the enemies it faced; as military
historian Brian R. Sullivan points out, it took several decades before the
historical office of the Italian General Staff published studies on Italian
reverses like Caporetto or Guadalajara. Sullivan also demonstrates that the
deficiencies in doctrine, training, leadership, organization and logistics that
were apparent during the Spanish Civil War were simply ignored. A typical
example is the testing in Spain of the new binary divisions; although they
proved "too weak against opponents better armed than the Ethiopians and
[...] too inflexible in maneuver", so that the Italian divisions in Spain
reverted to the traditional triangular pattern in November 1937, in the very
same month, Army chief of staff Pariani insisted on pressing on with the
reorganization as the greater number of divisions resulting from it "would
give Fascist Italy the appearance of greater military power". The
diversion of large quantities of material and funds to the Spanish intervention
also impacted the Italian Army negatively: according to the official Italian
history of the conflict, the material left in or donated to Spain would have
sufficed to provide for 55 fully equipped divisions in June 1940, rather than
the 19 fully and 34 partially equipped ones in reality.
According to James Sadkovich, the effect of the Italo-Greek
war has been exaggerated by other authors, because Axis victories in the spring
of 1941 cancelled the Italian defeats of the previous winter. However, even he
admits the adverse effect that the start of the Greek campaign had on Italy's
war already under way in North Africa. Between October 1940 and May 1941, five
times as many men, one and a third times as much matériel, three and a half
times more merchant ships and at least twice the amount of escort vessels were
deployed on the Greek operation as in North Africa. As a result, the initial
numerical superiority that the Italians enjoyed over the British in the region,
was not to last. Graziani deferred his advance, aware that Italian strength was
insufficient to mount the major offensive through Egypt that Mussolini was
urging and expecting. The Germans saw the importance of the sector and offered
troops and equipment. The Comando Supremo wanted to take advantage of the
offer. It could have made the difference but Mussolini refused.
Impact on Greece
Anti-Italian feeling among the Greek public, already strong,
reached its peak after the sinking of "Elli" on 15 August 1940, the
day of the Dormition of the Mother of God, a major Orthodox religious holiday.
Greek optimism that the Italian attack would fail was evident from the first
moments of the war. Besides, official propaganda, as well as the spontaneous
reaction of the people created the optimism which was necessary for the first
difficult moments. From the first hours of the war a strong national feeling
was quite evident "to teach a lesson to the macaroni-boys" (Greek:
Μακαρονάδες, "Makaronades"), as the Italians were pejoratively
called. Various factors have contributed to the high morale of the Greek side
and the subsequent repulsion of the Italian attacks: the strong belief in a
just cause, the specialized and well trained military personnel of the Greek
army and its leadership, as well as the devotion of the civilian population who
lived next to the battlefields, including women, children and the elderly, to
the Greek cause. Public opinion in Greece still accepts that the failure of the
numerically superior Italian army came as a result of its unjustified action
against Greece.
After the Italian troops were driven from Greek soil, Greek
morale was further strengthened. The unpublished and unknown up to now
documents (memoranda, letters, plans) of Ubaldo Soddu (who did not write
memoirs), Commander of the Italian forces in Albania from 10 November to 30
December 1940, reveal the desperate efforts for control, the strict measures
for unjustified retreats and abandonment of positions, the tragic appeal even
for German help (on 24 November and 17 December). In his reports, Soddu analyzed
Greek offensive tactics and the bravery and the moral strength of the enemy,
during this period from November–December, the Greeks used no new method of
military tactics or quickly took advantage of the land left back by the Italian
retreat. Mussolini, after the capture of Himara by the Greeks, wrote of the
high morale that contributed to the victory of the enemy (24 December). The
Greek successes against Italy helped raise morale in Allied Europe and showed
that the Axis were not invincible. Inspired by these military developments,
British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, declared that "today we say
that Greeks fight like heroes, from now on we will say that heroes fight like
Greeks".
In 2007, Fisher wrote that although the advance of the Greek
army stalled at January 1941, due to harsh winter conditions and Italian
reinforcements, Greece had managed to secure a strong bridgehead in southern
Albania (Northern Epirus to the Greeks). Thus, it not only delivered a
humiliation to Mussolini, but also occupied an area inhabited by a substantial
ethnic Greek population,
As
the only active ally of Britain fighting in Europe, Greece, overcoming its
comparative disadvantage, provided the first victory against the Axis forces
... Greek advances stalled in early January 1941, falling victim to the harsh
winter and to Italian reinforcements. Nonetheless, the strong positioning of
Greek forces in southern Albania provided not only humiliation for Mussolini
but also an unexpected gain for Greece, which now occupied an area inhabited by
many Greeks that had been relegated to Albanian rule after the First World War.
— Fisher
The Greco-Italian War is viewed as a triumph in Greece and
often referred to as "the Epic of 40" ("Το Έπος του '40")
and 28 October, the day Metaxas rejected the Italian ultimatum, is a national
holiday known as Ohi Day (Greek: Επέτειος του Όχι, "Anniversary of the
'No'").
German Opinion
The difficulty Italy encountered in subduing a minor power
such as Greece further lowered the opinion among the Germans of their Italian
allies. German SS-Oberst-Gruppenführer Sepp Dietrich labeled the Albania
campaign as one of the three "great disasters [that have] deprived the
Italian Army of its former confidence", along with the Italian invasion of
France and Operation Compass. He bitterly noted: "For this attack they
used troops from Southern Italy - the opposite of what was needed for a winter
campaign in mountainous country, without proper equipment, over an
impracticable terrain, and without any organization in depth!". Wilhelm
Keitel, commenting about the end of the campaign, said that "this
miserable spectacle, laid on by our gallant ally, must have produced some
hollow laughter from the Greeks."
Others among the German leadership were less critical, most
notably Adolf Hitler. In his address to the Reichstag following the conclusion
of the Balkan Campaign, Hitler was complimentary to the Greeks for their
"extremely brave resistance", but stated that given the Greek
logistical situation, German involvement was not decisive in the Greco-Italian
conflict: "The Duce... was convinced that a quick decision would be
arrived at one way or another in the forthcoming season. I was of the same
opinion." He stated that he had no quarrel with Greece (which he had
acknowledged as part of the Italian sphere anyway) and that his intervention
was aimed solely at the British as he suspected that they planned to set up a
threat to his rear in the vein of the Salonika front of the First World War:
"the German forces, therefore, represented no assistance to Italy against
Greece, but a preventive measure against the British." He further noted
that by the beginning of April the Albanian campaign against the Italians
"had so weakened [Greece] that its collapse had already become
inevitable", and credited the Italians with having "engaged the
greater part of the Greek Army." In his private correspondence in April
1942, Hitler said: "It is equally impossible to imagine what might have
happened if the Italian front had not been stabilized in Albania, thanks to
Mussolini; the whole of the Balkans would have been set alight at a moment when
our advance towards the southeast was still in its early stages."
Casualties
The Italian invasion began with a force of about 87,000 men
and was increased to about 565,000 troops, supported by 463 aircraft and 163
light tanks. Italian forces suffered casualties of 13,755 killed, 50,874
wounded and 25,067 missing (of whom 21,153 were taken prisoner), for a total of
89,696 losses in action and 52,108 sick, 12,368 frostbite cases for a grand
total of 154,172 casualties. Eighteen ships of the Regia Marina were sunk. The
Regia Aeronautica had 79 aircraft destroyed (65 shot down) and more than 400
damaged, with 229 aircrew killed, while claiming 218 kills against Greek and
British and 55 probables. Greek military forces amounted to fewer than 260,000
men with casualties of 13,325 killed, 42,485 wounded, 1,237 missing and 1,531
prisoners, for a total of 58,578 losses and c. 25,000 frostbite cases, a grand
total of about 83,578 casualties. The RHAF lost between 52 and 77 aircraft. (In
Operation Marita, the Germans took 244,000 Yugoslav, 218,000 Greek and 9,000
British prisoners.)
In January 2018, following an agreement between the Greek
and Albanian foreign ministers, a systematic effort to recover the bodies of
fallen Greek soldiers from the war was undertaken between Greece and Albania.
It is estimated that between 6,800 and 8,000 fallen Greek soldiers were hastily
buried on location following their death, and their remains not properly
identified. Work by joint Greek-Albanian teams began on 22 January in the
Kelcyre Gorge, site of the Battle of Kleisoura Pass. A small number of Cham
Albanian activists tried to disrupt the work but were removed by Albanian
police. The remains of the Greek soldiers will be buried in the Greek military
cemeteries in the Kelcyre Gorge and in the Greek minority village of Bularat
(Vouliarates) near the Greek–Albanian border.
Occupation of Greece
On 13 April, Hitler issued Directive 27, including his
occupation policy for Greece and jurisdiction in the Balkans with Directive No.
31 (9 June). Italy occupied the bulk of the mainland, German forces occupied
Athens, Thessaloniki, Central Macedonia and several Aegean islands, including
most of Crete and Florina, subject of disputed claims by Italy and Bulgaria.
Bulgaria, which had not participated in the invasion, occupied most of Thrace
on the same day that Tsolakoglou surrendered taking the territory between the
Strymon river and a line through Alexandroupoli and Svilengrad west of the
Evros River. Italian troops took over their zone of occupation from 28 April to
12 June.
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Further Reading
Books
Anamali, Skënder; Prifti, Kristaq (2002). Shqiptarët gjatë
luftës së dytë botërore dhe pas saj: 1939–1990 [Albanians During World War II
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(in Albanian). Vol. IV. Tirana: Toena.
Badoglio, Pietro (1948). Italy in the Second World War;
Memories and Documents. London/New York/Toronto: Oxford University Press.
Beevor, Antony (1992). Crete: The Battle and the Resistance.
London: Penguin Books.
Carr, John (2012). On Spartan Wings. Barnsley, SY: Pens
& Sword Military.
Ceva, Lucio (1975). La condotta italiana della guerra:
Cavallero e il Comando supremo 1941–1942 [The Conduct of War: Cavallero and the
Supreme Command 1941–1942]. I Fatti e le idee. Milano: Feltrinelli.
Churchill, Winston S. (1948). The Second World War: The
Gathering Storm. Vol. I. London: Cassell.
Churchill, Winston S. (1949). The Second World War: Their
Finest Hour. Vol. II. London: Cassell.
Hall, Richard C. (9 October 2014). War in the Balkans: An
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ABC-CLIO.
Creveld, Martin van (1973). Hitler's Strategy 1940–1941: The
Balkan Clue. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Felice, Renzo de (1990). Italia in guerra 1940–1943 [Italy
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Einaudi.
Fowler, Will (2003). The Balkans and North Africa 1941.
Blitzkrieg. London: Ian Allan.
Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs 1939–1945. London:
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An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German
War, 1940–1941 (Land Operations). Athens: Army History Directorate Editions.
1997.
Higham, Robin (2015) [1986]. Diary of a Disaster: British
Aid to Greece 1940–41. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.
Hillgruber, Andreas (1993). Hitlers Strategie. Politik und
Kriegführung 1940–1941 [Hitler's Strategy: Politics and Warfare 1940–1941] (in
German) (3rd ed.). Bonn: Bernard & Graefe D. L.
Hitler, Adolf; Bormann, Martin (1961). Genoud, François
(ed.). The Testament of Adolf Hitler: The Hitler–Bormann Documents,
February–April 1945. London: Cassell.
Keegan, John (2005). The Second World War. Penguin.
Kershaw, Ian (2000). Hitler, 1936–1945: Nemesis. London:
Allen Lane.
Kirchubel, Robert; Gerrard, Robert (2005). Opposing Plans,
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Knox, MacGregor (1984). "Fascist Italy Assesses its
Enemies, 1935–1940". In May, Ernest R. (ed.). Knowing One's Enemies.
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University Press.
Lamb, Richard (1998). Mussolini as Diplomat. London: John
Murray.
Mack Smith, Denis (1974). Mussolini as a Military Leader.
Stenton Lecture. Reading: University of Reading.
Mack Smith, Denis (1976). Mussolini's Roman Empire.
London/New York, 1976: Longman.
Mack Smith, Denis (1983). Mussolini. London: Grenada.
Muggeridge, Malcolm, ed. (1948). Ciano's Diplomatic Papers.
London: Odhams.
Muggeridge, Malcolm, ed. (1947). Ciano's Diary 1939–1943.
London: Heinemann.
Papagos, Alexandros (1949). The Battle of Greece 1940–1941
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Payne, Stanley G. (1995). A History of Fascism 1914–45.
London: UCL Press.
Prasca, Sebastiano Visconti (1946). Io Ho Aggredito La
Grecia [I Attacked Greece]. Seconda guerra mondiale; colezione di memorie,
diari e studi (in Italian). Vol. V. Milano: Rizzoli.
Francesco, Pricolo (1946). Ignavia contro eroismo;
l'avventura italo-greca, ottobre 1940 – aprile 1941 [Apathy Against Heroism:
The Italo-Greek Adventure: October 1940 – April 1941]. Roma: Ruffolo.
Rintelen, Enno von (1951). Mussolini als Bundesgenosse.
Erinnerungen des deutschen Militärattachés in Rom 1936–1943 [Mussolini as Ally:
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Tübingen/Stuttgart: Rainer Wuderlich Verlag Hermann Leins.
Sullivan, Brian R. (2002). "Where One Man, and Only One
Man, Led. Italy's Path from Non-Alignment to Non-Belligerency to War,
1937–1940". In Wylie, Neville (ed.). European Neutrals and
Non-Belligerents during the Second World War. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
The Balkan Campaign 1940–1941. West Point, NY: Department of
Military Art and Engineering. 1948.
Walker, Ian W. (2003). Iron Hulls, Iron Hearts; Mussolini's
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for Greece and Crete: 1940–1941. Staplehurst UK: Spellmount.
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(ed.). The Penguin History of the Second World War. Penguin Books.
Wylie, Neville, ed. (2002). European Neutrals and
Non-Belligerents during the Second World War. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Journals
Carrier, Richard C. (October 2003). "Hitler's Table
Talk: Troubling Finds". German Studies Review. 26 (3): 561–576.
Ceva, Lucio (1979). "La campagna di Russia nel quadro
strategico della guerra fascista" [The Campaign of Russia in the Strategic
Framework of the Fascist War]. Politico. Saggi di Enzo Collotti et al.
Creveld, Martin van (1971). "25 October 1940: A
Historical Puzzle". Journal of Contemporary History. 6 (3). Sage: 87–96.
Creveld, Martin van (1974). "Prelude to Disaster: The
British Decision to Aid Greece, 1940–41". Journal of Contemporary History.
9 (3). Sage: 65–92.
Ledet, Michel (November 1996). "1940–1941: L'aviation
grecque au combat (1ère partie)" [Greek Aircraft in Combat]. Avions: Toute
l'aéronautique et son histoire (in French) (44): 22–27.
Ledet, Michel (December 1996). "1940–1941: L'aviation
grecque au combat (2ème partie)". Avions: Toute l'aéronautique et son
histoire (in French) (45): 34–38.
Ledet, Michel (January 1997). "1940–1941: L'aviation
grecque au combat (3ème et dernière partie)". Avions: Toute l'aéronautique
et son histoire (in French) (46): 36–41.
Sadkovich, James J. (1989). "Understanding Defeat.
Reappraising Italy's Role in World War II". Journal of Contemporary
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Sadkovich, James J. (1 May 1994). "Italian Morale
During the Italo-Greek War of 1940–1941". War and Society. 12 (1).
Langhorne, PA: Gordon and Breach: 97–123.
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| Eleftherios Venizelos, Prime Minister of Greece (various terms 1910–1933). |
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| Benito Mussolini, Prime Minister of Italy. |
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| Greek cruiser Elli that was sunk on 15 August 1940 while she sat at anchor. |
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| Ioannis Metaxas Prime Minister of Greece. |
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| Alexandros Papagos, commander of the Greek Army. |
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| A Greek woman sees her son depart for the Albanian front. |
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Bristol Blenheim Mark I, L6670 ‘UQ-R’, of No. 211 Squadron RAF preparing to taxy at Menidi/Tatoi, Greece. (Imperial War Museum CM288)
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| Italian invasion of Greece. |
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| Contstruction of fortifications in Eleas-Kalama sector (Epirus-Greece), March 1939, before the outbreak of the Greco-Italian War (1940-1941). |
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| The Greek counter-offensive during the Greco-Italian War (Nov. 13 1940-7 April 1941). |
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| Italian machine gunner in winter. |
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| Meeting of the Anglo-Greek War Council ca. January 1941. Left to right: Major General Michael Gambier-Parry, Dictator Ioannis Metaxas, King George II of Greece, Air Vice Marshal John D'Albiac (RAF) and General Alexandros Papagos. (Australian War Memorial 128421) |
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| Mussolini (on left) with Italian General Ugo Cavallero (on his right) during the Italian Spring Offensive. |
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| Italian soldiers at the front, April 1941. |
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| Greek PZL P.24F/G 1940, with the Δ120 marking of Marinos Mitralexis. |
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| Map of the 1941-1944 Axis Occupation of Greece. Depicted are the three occupation zones, plus the geographic regions and major urban centers. |
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| A Greek trumpeter gives the command to launch the military operation before the Capture of Kleisoura Pass, 6 January 1941. |
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Capture of Telepene by Italian troops in the winter of 1941. Photo taken on 12 February 1941.
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| Christmas presents are distributed to the Alpine troops in the front Italian lines on the Greco-Albanian front, 1940. |
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| Flying Officer R N Cullen of No. 80 Squadron RAF, preparing to take off from Paramythia, Greece, in Hawker Hurricane V7288 on the morning of 4 March 1941, as part of a fighter escort for bombers attacking Italian warships off the Albanian coast. During a resulting dogfight with Italian fighters, Cullen, flying as No. 2 to Flight Lieutenant M St J 'Pat' Pattle, was shot down and killed near Himare. At the time of his death, Richard Nigel Cullen, known as 'The Ape' because of his large physique, was credited with 16½ victories. (Imperial War Museum ME(RAF) 1270A) |
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| Difficulties for the Italian advance in Greece. The roads are partially unpracticable. But the well known art of constructing roads of the Italians is changing all in the shortest time possible and soon the roads are repaired in order to allow further advance, 1941. |
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| Greek lithograph with a fanciful depiction of the Battle of Korytsa in 1940 by Frixos Aristeus (1879–1951). |
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| Italian general, Messe, 2 June 1941. |
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| Unit of the Greek Army during the Spring Offensive (Spring 1941) in the Greco-Italian War. |
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| Greek artillery shelling in the Morava height, Greco-Italian War, November 1940. |
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| Greek forces marching in the streets of Korce during the Greco-Italian War, Nov 1940. |
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| A Greek Jewish combat soldier, Daniel Alhanati (right), during the Greco-Italian War. Taken at Korçë, Albania. December 1940. |
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| Greek soldier sitting on a captured Italian tankette CV-33, during the Battle of Elaia-Kalamas, Greco-Italian War, 1940. |
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| Greek soldiers of the 8th Infantry Division in the Albanian front, 1940. They operate the EYP Hotchkiss medium machine gun (a Greek Modified version of the Hotchkiss M1926 LMG). |
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| 1. Greek infantryman field dress 1938-1941. 2. Royal Hellenic air force pilot winter flying suit 1938-1941. 3. Royal Hellenic Air Force pilot summer flying suit 1938-1941. (Tilemahos Efthimiadis, Athens, Greece) |
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| Hellenic War Museum diorama of Greek pilot cutting tail off Italian bomber. (Gary Todd, Xinzheng, China) |
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| Greek Artilerry Major Ioannis Paparrodou (1904-1941), in Moscopole, 25 March 1941 during the national celebractions. |
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| Italian Siai-Marchetti SM-79 bombers flying over Greek territory, 11 Nov 1940. |
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| Italian soldiers in Albania, December 1940. |
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| Italian prisoners forming a line to get some food, 1941. |
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| Italian prisoners forming a line to get some food, 1941. |
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| After the capture of Kleisoura Pass, Greco-Italian War, Battle of Greece, 10 Jan 1941. |
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A Greek soldier holding his little daughter in his arms, 1940-41.
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| Officers of No. 211 Squadron RAF enjoy a meal in their open-air Officers' Mess at Paramythia. Seated at top right is the Squadron's Commanding Officer, Squadron Leader J R "The Bishop" Gordon-Finlayson. (Imperial War Museum ME(RAF)1024) |
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| Aircrew of No. 211 Squadron RAF being debriefed by a Greek Army liaison officer at Paramythia, Greece, following a sortie over Albania. (Imperial War Museum ME(RAF)1036) |
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| Presentation of the combat pennant to the 1st Bafile Battalion of the "San Marco" Regiment about to leave for Greece, May 1941. |
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| A group of Greek soldiers on there way to Kleisoura Pass. |
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| Volos, Greece, under attack by the Italian Air Force (Regia Aeronautica). Bomb explosions are marked by circles. Photo taken by Regia Aeronautica. 4 Nov 1940. |
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