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| Aerial view of Iwo Jima, 1945. |
In anticipation of
the Battle of Iwo Jima, Lieutenant General Tadamichi Kuribayashi prepared a
defense that broke with Japanese military doctrine. Rather than defending the
beaches, Kuribayashi devised a defense that maximized enemy attrition. The
American plan of attack was made in anticipation of a standard defense.
Japanese Planning
Even before the fall
of Saipan in June 1944, Japanese planners knew that Iwo Jima would have to be
reinforced significantly if it were to be held for any length of time, and
preparations were made to send sizable numbers of men and quantities of materiel
to that island. In late May, Lieutenant General Tadamichi Kuribayashi was
summoned to the office of the Prime Minister, General Hideki Tōjō, and told
that he had been chosen to defend Iwo Jima to the last. Kuribayashi was further
apprised of the importance of this assignment when Tojo pointed out that the
eyes of the entire nation were focused on the defense of Iwo Jima. Fully aware
of the implications of the task, the general accepted, and by 8 June 1944,
Kuribayashi was on his way to convert Iwo Jima into an impregnable fortress.
When he arrived,
some 80 fighter aircraft were stationed on Iwo Jima, but by early July only
four remained. A United States Navy force then came within sight of the island
and bombarded it for two days, destroying every building and the four remaining
aircraft.
Much to the surprise
of the Japanese garrison on Iwo Jima, there was no American attempt to invade
the island during the summer of 1944. There was little doubt that in time the
Americans would attack, and General Kuribayashi was more determined than ever
to exact the heaviest possible price for Iwo Jima, although the lack of naval
and air support meant that Iwo Jima could not hold out indefinitely against an
invader with sea and air supremacy.
By late July,
Kuribayashi had evacuated all civilians from the island. Lieutenant General
Hideyoshi Obata, commanding general of the 31st Army, early in 1944 had been
responsible for the defense of Iwo Jima prior to his return to the Marianas.
Following the doctrine that an invasion had to be met practically at the
water’s edge, Obata had ordered the emplacement of artillery and the construction
of pillboxes near the beaches. General Kuribayashi had a different strategy.
Instead of attempting to hold the beaches, he planned to defend them with a
sprinkling of automatic weapons and infantry. Artillery, mortars, and rockets
would be emplaced on the foot and slopes of Mount Suribachi, as well as in the
high ground to the north of Chidori airfield.
The reason for
Kuribayashi’s departure from the water’s edge defense strategy, which had been
the normal practice for the Japanese Imperial Army, was that he predicted that
American air and naval bombardments would destroy any defenses on the beaches.
It had been used at Saipan to great losses for the Japanese. For water’s edge
defense to work, it needed support from the air and sea, none of which the
Japanese Imperial Navy was capable of mounting at this point anymore. However,
other military branches, especially the navy, were still insistent on the water’s
edge defense and demanded that Kuribayashi see to it. In the end Kuribayashi
had some pillboxes built at the beach as a token measure. The pillboxes were
destroyed by American bombardment.
Caves, Bunkers and Tunnels
A prolonged defense
of the island required the preparation of an extensive system of caves and
tunnels, for the naval bombardment had clearly shown that surface installations
could not withstand extensive shelling. To this end, mining engineers were
dispatched from Japan to draw blueprints for projected underground
fortifications that would consist of elaborate tunnels at varying levels to
assure good ventilation and minimize the effect of bombs or shells exploding
near the entrances or exits.
At the same time,
reinforcements were gradually beginning to reach the island. As commander of
the 109th Infantry Division, General Kuribayashi decided first of all to shift
the 2nd Independent Mixed Brigade, consisting of about 5,000 men under Major
General Kotau Osuga, from Chichi to Iwo Jima. With the fall of Saipan, 2,700
men of the 145th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Colonel Masuo Ikeda, were diverted
to Iwo Jima. These reinforcements, who reached the island during July and
August 1944, brought the strength of the garrison up to approximately 12,700
men. Next came 1,233 men of the 204th Naval Construction Battalion, who quickly
set to work constructing concrete pillboxes and other fortifications.
On 10 August 1944,
Rear Admiral Rinosuke Ichimaru reached Iwo Jima, shortly followed by 2,216
naval personnel, including naval aviators and ground crews. The admiral, a
renowned Japanese aviator, had been crippled in an airplane crash in the
mid-twenties and, ever since the outbreak of the war, had chafed under repeated
rear echelon assignments.
For the remainder of
1944, the construction of fortifications on Iwo also went into high gear. The
Japanese were quick to discover that the black volcanic ash that existed in
abundance all over the island could be converted into concrete of superior
quality when mixed with cement. Pillboxes near the beaches north of Mount
Suribachi were constructed of reinforced concrete, many of them with walls four
feet thick. At the same time, an elaborate system of caves, concrete
blockhouses, and pillboxes were established. One of the results of American air
attacks and naval bombardment in the early summer of 1944 had been to drive the
Japanese so deep underground that eventually their defenses became virtually
immune to air or naval bombardment.
While the Japanese
on Peleliu Island in the Western Carolines, also awaiting American invasion,
had turned the improvement of natural caves into an art, the defenders of Iwo
Jima developed it into a science. Because of the importance of the underground
positions, 25% of the garrison was detailed to tunneling. Positions constructed
underground ranged in size from small caves for a few men to several underground
chambers capable of holding 300 or 400 men. In order to prevent personnel from
becoming trapped in any one excavation, the subterranean installations were
provided with multiple entrances and exits, as well as stairways and interconnecting
passageways. Special attention had to be paid to providing adequate ventilation,
since sulphur fumes were present in many of the underground installations.
Fortunately for the Japanese, most of the volcanic stone on Iwo was so soft
that it could be cut with hand tools.
General Kuribayashi
established his command post in the northern part of the island, about 500 m
northeast of Kita village and south of Kitano Point. This installation, 20 m
underground, consisted of caves of varying sizes, connected by 150 m of
tunnels. Here the island commander had his own war room in one of three small
concrete enclosed chambers; the two similar rooms were used by the staff.
Farther south on Hill 382, the second highest elevation on the island, the
Japanese constructed a radio and weather station. Nearby, on an elevation just
southeast of the station, an enormously large blockhouse was constructed which
served as the headquarters of Colonel Chosaku Kaidō, who commanded all
artillery on Iwo Jima. Other hills in the northern portion of the island were
tunnelled out. All of these major excavations featured multiple entrances and
exits and were virtually invulnerable to damage from artillery or aerial
bombardment. Typical of the thoroughness employed in the construction of
subterranean defenses was the main communications center south of Kita village,
which was so spacious that it contained a chamber 50 m long and 20 m wide. This
giant structure was similar in construction and thickness of walls and ceilings
to General Kuribayashi’s command post. A 150 m tunnel 20 m below the ground led
into this vast subterranean chamber.
Perhaps the most
ambitious construction project to get under way was the creation of an
underground passageway designed to link all major defense installations on the
island. As projected, this passageway was to have attained a total length of almost
27 km (17 mi). Had it been completed, it would have linked the formidable underground
installations in the northern portion of Iwo Jima with the southern part of the
island, where the northern slope of Mount Suribachi alone harbored several
thousand yards of tunnels. By the time the Marines landed on Iwo Jima, more
than 18 km (11 mi) of tunnels had been completed.
A supreme effort was
required of the Japanese personnel engaged in the underground construction
work. Aside from the heavy physical labor, the men were exposed to heat from
30–50 °C (86–122 °F), as well as sulphur fumes that forced them to wear gas
masks. In numerous instances a work detail had to be relieved after only five
minutes. Renewed American air attacks struck the island on 8 December 1944 and
became a daily occurrence until the actual invasion of the island.
Subsequently, a large number of men had to be diverted to repairing the damaged
airfields.
Artillery
Next to arrive on
Iwo Jima were artillery units and five anti-tank battalions. Even though
numerous supply ships en route to Iwo Jima were sunk by American submarines and
aircraft, substantial quantities of materiel did reach Iwo Jima during the
summer and autumn of 1944. By the end of the year, General Kuribayashi had available
to him 361 artillery pieces of 75 mm or larger caliber, a dozen 320 mm mortars,
65 medium (150 mm) and light (81 mm) mortars, 33 naval guns 80 mm or larger,
and 94 anti-aircraft guns 75 mm or larger. In addition to this formidable array
of large caliber guns, the Iwo Jima defenses could boast more than 200 20 mm
and 25 mm anti-aircraft guns and 69 37 mm and 47 mm antitank guns.
The firepower of the
artillery was further augmented with a variety of rockets varying from an
eight-inch type that weighed 90 kg and could travel 2–3 km, to a giant 250 kg
projectile that had a range of more than 7 km. Altogether, 70 rocket guns and
their crews reached Iwo Jima.
Tanks
In order to further
strengthen the Iwo defenses, the 26th Tank Regiment, which had been stationed
at Pusan, Korea after extended service in Manchuria, received orders to head
for Iwo Jima. The officer commanding this regiment was Lieutenant Colonel Baron
Takeichi Nishi, a 1932 Olympic gold medalist. The regiment, consisting of 600
men and 28 tanks, sailed from Japan in mid-July on board the Nisshu Maru. On 18
July 1944, as the ship, sailing in a convoy, approached Chichi Jima, it was
torpedoed by an American submarine, USS Cobia. Even though only two members of
the 26th Tank Regiment were killed, all of the regiment’s 28 tanks went to the
bottom of the sea. It would be December before these tanks could be replaced.
The 22 tanks which finally reached Iwo Jima included medium Type 97 Chi-Ha and
light Type 95 Ha-Go tanks. Neither of these types were near comparable to the
better armed and better armored M4 Sherman medium tanks fielded by the
Americans.
Initially, Colonel
Nishi had planned to employ his armor as a type of “roving fire brigade”, to be
committed at focal points of combat. The rugged terrain precluded such
employment and, in the end, the tanks were deployed in static positions under
the colonel’s watchful eyes. They were either buried or their turrets were
dismounted and so skillfully emplaced in the rocky ground that they were
practically invisible from the air or the ground. The headquarters of the 26th
Tank Regiment, which was located near the village of Maruman, was moved to the
eastern part of the island when the battle began.
Defense Planning
While Iwo Jima was
being converted into a major fortress with all possible speed, General
Kuribayashi formulated his final plans for the defense of the island. This
plan, which constituted a radical departure from the defensive tactics used by
the Japanese earlier in the war, provided for the following major points:
In order to prevent disclosing their
positions to the Americans, Japanese artillery was to remain silent during the
expected prelanding bombardment. No fire would be directed against the American
naval vessels.
Upon landing on Iwo Jima, the Americans were
not to encounter any opposition on the beaches.
Once the Americans had advanced about 500 m
inland, they were to be taken under the concentrated fire of automatic weapons
stationed in the vicinity of Motoyama airfield to the north, as well as
automatic weapons and artillery emplaced both on the high ground to the north
of the landing beaches and Mount Suribachi to the south.
After inflicting maximum possible casualties
and damage on the landing force, the artillery was to displace northward from
the high ground near the Chidori airfield.
In this connection,
Kuribayashi stressed once again that he planned to conduct an elastic defense
designed to wear down the invasion force. Such prolonged resistance naturally
required the defending force to stockpile rations and ammunition. To this end
the island commander accumulated a food reserve to last for two and a half
months, ever mindful of the fact that the trickle of supplies that was reaching
Iwo Jima during the latter part of 1944 would cease altogether once the island
was surrounded by a hostile naval force.
During the final
months of preparing Iwo Jima for the defense, General Kuribayashi saw to it
that the strenuous work of building fortifications did not interfere with the
training of units. As an initial step towards obtaining more time for training,
he ordered work on the northernmost airfield on the island halted. In an
operations order issued in early December, the island commander set 11 February
1945 as the target date for completion of defensive preparations and specified
that personnel were to spend 70% of their time in training and 30% in
construction work.
Despite intermittent
harassment by American submarines and aircraft, additional personnel continued
to arrive on Iwo until February 1945. By that time General Kuribayashi had
under his command a force totaling between 21,000 and 23,000 men, including
both Army and Navy units.
Lines of Defense
General Kuribayashi
made several changes in his basic defense plan in the months preceding the
American invasion of Iwo Jima. The final strategy, which became effective in
January 1945, called for the creation of strong, mutually supporting positions
which were to be defended to the death. Neither large scale counterattacks,
withdrawals, nor banzai charges were contemplated. The southern portion of Iwo
in the proximity of Mount Suribachi was organized into a semi-independent
defense sector. Fortifications included casemated coast artillery and automatic
weapons in mutually supporting pillboxes. The narrow isthmus to the north of
Suribachi was to be defended by a small infantry force. On the other hand, this
entire area was exposed to the fire of artillery, rocket launchers, and mortars
emplaced on Suribachi to the south and the high ground to the north.
A main line of
defense, consisting of mutually supporting positions in depth, extended from
the northwestern part of the island to the southeast, along a general line from
the cliffs to the northwest, across Motoyama Airfield No. 2 to Minami village.
From there it continued eastward to the shoreline just south of Tachiiwa Point.
The entire line of defense was dotted with pillboxes, bunkers, and blockhouses.
Colonel Nishi’s immobilized tanks, carefully dug in and camouflaged, further
reinforced this fortified area, whose strength was supplemented by the broken
terrain. A second line of defense extended from a few hundred yards south of
Kitano Point at the very northern tip of Iwo across the still uncompleted
Airfield No. 3, to Motoyama village, and then to the area between Tachiiwa
Point and the East Boat Basin. This second line contained fewer man-made
fortifications, but the Japanese took maximum advantage of natural caves and
other terrain features.
As an additional
means of protecting the two completed airfields on Iwo from direct assault, the
Japanese constructed a number of antitank ditches near the fields and mined all
natural routes of approach. When, on 2 January, more than a dozen B-24
Liberator bombers raided Airfield No. 1 and inflicted heavy damage, Kuribayashi
diverted more than 600 men, 11 trucks, and 2 bulldozers for immediate repairs,
rendering the airfield operational within only 12 hours. Eventually, 2,000 men
were assigned the job of filling the bomb craters, with as many as 50 men
detailed to one crater. By the end of 1944 American B-24 bombers were over Iwo
Jima almost every night, and U.S. Navy carriers and cruisers frequently sortied
into the Ogasawaras. On 8 December 1944, American aircraft dropped more than
800 tons of bombs on Iwo Jima, which did very little real damage to the island
defenses. Even though frequent air raids interfered with the Japanese defensive
preparations and robbed the garrison of badly needed sleep, work was not
materially slowed.
As early as 5
January 1945, Admiral Ichimaru conducted a briefing of naval personnel at his
command post in which he informed them of the destruction of the Japanese Fleet
at the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the loss of the Philippines, and the expectation
that Iwo would shortly be invaded. Exactly one month later, Japanese radio operators
on Iwo reported to the island commander that code signals of American aircraft
had undergone an ominous change. On 13 February, a Japanese naval patrol plane
spotted 170 American ships moving northwestward from Saipan. All Japanese
troops in the Ogasawaras were alerted and occupied their battle positions. On
Iwo Jima, preparations for the pending battle had been completed, and the
defenders were ready.
American Planning
The origins of the
battle lie in the complex politics of the Pacific theater, in which operational
control was divided between the South West Pacific Area (command) of General
Douglas MacArthur and the Pacific Ocean Areas (command) led by Admiral Chester
Nimitz. The potential for interservice rivalry between the Army and Navy
created by this partition of responsibility was exacerbated by similar
divisions within the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in Washington. By September
1944, the two services could not come to an agreement about the main direction
of advance towards the Japanese home islands in the coming year. The Army was
pressing for the chief effort to be an invasion of Formosa (Taiwan), in which
MacArthur would be in overall command and in which it would predominate.
The Navy however
preferred the idea of an operation against Okinawa, which would be a mainly
seaborne effort. Seeking to gain leverage and so break the impasse, on 29
September Nimitz suggested to Admiral Ernest King that as a preliminary to the
Okinawa offensive the island of Iwo Jima could be taken. The tiny island lacked
harbors and so was of no direct interest to the Navy, but for some time General
Henry Harley Arnold of the U.S. Army Air Forces had been lobbying to take Iwo
Jima. He argued that an airbase there would provide useful fighter escort cover
for the B-29 Superfortresses of his XX Bomber Command, then beginning its strategic
bombing campaign against the Japanese home islands (the later role of Iwo Jima
as a refueling station for B-29s played no part in the original decision-making
process). Arnold’s support in the JCS enabled the Navy to get Okinawa rather
than Formosa approved as the main target on 2 October. At this time the Iwo
Jima invasion was expected to be a brief prologue to the main campaign, with
relatively light casualties; King assumed that Nimitz would be able to reuse three
of the Marine Corps divisions assigned to Iwo Jima for the attack on Okinawa,
which was originally scheduled to take place just forty days later.
On 7 October 1944,
Admiral Chester Nimitz and his staff issued a staff study for preliminary
planning, which clearly listed the objectives of Operation Detachment. The
overriding purpose of the operation was to maintain unremitting military
pressure against Japan and to extend American control over the Western Pacific.
Three tasks specifically envisioned in the study were the reduction of enemy
naval and air strength and industrial facilities in the home islands; the
destruction of Japanese naval and air strength in the Bonin Islands, and the
capture, occupation, and subsequent defense of Iwo Jima, which was to be
developed into an air base. Nimitz’s directive declared that “long range
bombers should be provided with fighter support at the earliest practicable
time”, and as such Iwo Jima was “admirably situated as a fighter base for
supporting long range bombers.”
On 9 October,
General Holland Smith received the staff study, accompanied by a directive from
Admiral Nimitz ordering the seizure of Iwo Jima. This directive designated
specific commanders for the operation. Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, Commander,
Fifth Fleet, was placed in charge as Operation Commander, Task Force 50. Under
Spruance, Vice Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, Commander, Amphibious Forces,
Pacific, was to command the Joint Expeditionary Force, Task Force 51. Second in
command of the Joint Expeditionary Force was Rear Admiral Harry W. Hill.
General Holland Smith was designated Commanding General, Expeditionary Troops,
Task Force 56.
It was not
accidental that these men were selected to command an operation of such vital
importance that it has since become known as “the most classical amphibious
assault of recorded history.” All of them had shown their mettle in previous engagements.
One chronicler of the Iwo Jima operation put it in the following words:
The team assigned to Iwo Jima was superb: the
very men who had perfected the amphibious techniques from the Battle of Guadalcanal
to the Battle of Guam. Nearly every problem, it was believed, had been met and
mastered along the way, from the jungles of Guadalcanal up through the
Solomons, and across the Central Pacific from the bloody reefs of Battle of
Tarawa to the mountains of the Marianas.
Primary Plan
The U.S. V
Amphibious Corps (VAC) scheme of maneuver for the landings was relatively
simple. The 4th and 5th Marine Divisions were to land abreast on the eastern
beaches, the 4th on the right and the 5th on the left. When released to VAC,
the 3rd Marine Division, as Expeditionary Troops Reserve, was to land over the
same beaches to take part in the attack or play a defensive role, whichever was
called for. The plan called for a rapid exploitation of the beachhead with an
advance in a northeasterly direction to capture the entire island. A regiment
of the 5th Marine Division was designated to capture Mount Suribachi in the
south.
The detailed scheme
of maneuver for the landings provided for the 28th Marine Regiment of the 5th
Marine Division, commanded by Colonel Harry B. Liversedge, to land on the
extreme left of the corps on Green 1. On the right of the 28th Marines, the
27th Marine Regiment, under Colonel Thomas A. Wornham, was to attack towards
the west coast of the island, then wheel northeastward and seize the O-1 Line.
Action by the 27th and 28th Marines was designed to drive the enemy from the
commanding heights along the southern portion of Iwo, simultaneously securing
the flanks and rear of VAC. As far as the 4th Marine Division was concerned,
the 23rd Marine Regiment, commanded by Colonel Walter W. Wensinger, was to go
ashore on Yellow 1 and 2 beaches, seize Motoyama Airfield No. 1, then turn to
the northeast and seize that part of Motoyama Airfield No. 2 and the O-1 Line
within its zone of action. After landing on Blue Beach 1, the 25th Marine
Regiment, under Colonel John R. Lanigan, was to assist in the capture of
Airfield No. 1, the capture of Blue Beach 2, and the O-1 Line within its zone
of action. The 24th Marine Regiment, under Colonel Walter I. Jordan, was to be
held in 4th Marine Division reserve during the initial landings. The U.S. 26th
Marine Regiment, led by Colonel Chester B. Graham, was to be released from
corps reserve on D-Day and prepared to support the 5th Marine Division.
Division artillery
was to go ashore on order from the respective division commanders. The 4th
Marine Division was to be supported by the 14th Marine Regiment, commanded by
Colonel Louis G. DeHaven; Colonel James D. Waller’s 13th Marine Regiment was to
furnish similar support for the 5th Marine Division.
The operation was to
be timed so that at H-Hour 68 Landing Vehicle Tracked (LVT), comprising the
first wave, were to hit the beach. These vehicles were to advance inland until
they reached the first terrace beyond the high-water mark. The armored
amphibians would use their 75 mm howitzers and machine guns to the utmost in an
attempt to keep the enemy down, thus giving some measure of protection to succeeding
waves of Marines who were most vulnerable to enemy fire at the time they
disembarked from their LVTs. Though early versions of the VAC operations plan
had called for the Sherman tanks of the 4th and 5th Tank Battalions to be
landed at H plus 30, subsequent studies of the beaches made it necessary to
adopt a more flexible schedule. The possibility of congestion at the water’s
edge also contributed to this change in plans. In the end, the time for
bringing the tanks ashore was left to the discretion of the regimental
commanders.
Alternate Plan
Since there was a
possibility of unfavorable surf conditions along the eastern beaches, VAC
issued an alternative plan on 8 January 1945, which provided for a landing on
the western beaches. However, since predominant northerly or northwesterly
winds caused hazardous swells almost continuously along the southwest side of
the island, it appeared unlikely that this alternative plan would be put into
effect.
References
Buell, Thomas B. (1980). Master of Sea Power:
A Biography of Ernest J. King. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. p.
473.
JCS 713/18, “Future Operations in the
Pacific”, 2 October 1944.
Ross, Steven T. (2000). “United States
Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, “Operation Detachment (Iwo Jima)”, 7
October 1944”. U.S. War Plans, 1939–1945. Malabar, Florida: Krieger Pub. Co.
pp. 199-201.
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| Location of Iwo Jima. |
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| Strategic Situation February 1945. |
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| Hill 362A on Iwo Jima looking at top and north face. Dotted lines indicate the underground Japanese tunnel system. One of five sketches prepared by the 31st U.S. Naval Construction Battalion. |
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| Lieutenant General Tadamichi Kuribayashi, Iwo Jima. Circa 1944. |
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| Lieutenant General Tadamichi Kuribayashi, Iwo Jima. Circa 1944. |
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| General Tadamichi Kuribayashi with his staff of the 109th Division on Iwo Jima. Late 1944. |
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| General Tadamichi Kuribayashi with his staff of the 109th Division on Iwo Jima. Late 1944. |
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| Cave on Iwo Jima for the staff of the Japanese Army 109th Division, late 1944. |
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| General Kuribayashi, commander of the Japanese forces at Iwo Jima; circa 1937-1944. |
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| Lieutenant General Tadamichi Kuribayashi, commander of Iwo Jima. |
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| Japanese Soldiers of the 145th Infantry Regiment on Iwo Jima. 1 February 1945. |
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| General Tadamichi Kuribayashi (middle of second row) with his staff of the 109th Division on Iwo Jima. Late 1944. |
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| The entrance to Gen. Kuribayashi’s cave on Iwo Jima in September 1945. |
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| Photograph of the sign for Gen. Kuribayashi’s Cave on the island of Iwo Jima, Japan, in September 1945 during World War II. |
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| Japanese troops in cave, Iwo Jima. |
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| Admiral Raymond A. Spruance. |
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| Vice Adm. Richmond Kelly Turner. |
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| Rear Admiral William H. P. Blandy. |
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| Rear Adm. Harry W. Hill. |
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| Lt. Gen. Holland M. Smith. |
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| Maj. Gen. Harry Schmidt. |
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| Maj. Gen. Keller Rockey. |
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| Maj. Gen. Clifton Cates. |
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| Maj. Gen. Graves Erskine. |
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| Third Marine Division Staff on Guam, 1945, prior to Iwo Jima. |
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| Iwo Jima Planning Meeting, 1945. Harry Schmidt speaking. Front row left to right, unidentified, James Forrestal, Holland Smith, unidentified. |
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| Iwo Jima Planning Briefing, 1945. Front row left to right, unidentified, James Forrestal, Holland Smith, unidentified, Harry Schmidt. |
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| Fires and explosions on Iwo Jima's Airfield #1, resulting from a bombardment delivered by heavy cruisers of Cruiser Division Ten, 2 July 1944. |
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| Lt Fred Eberle of the USAAF 333rd Fighter Squadron nursing his damaged P-38 Lighting back to Saipan after receiving battle damage over Iwo Jima, 15 January 1945. Photo taken from an accompanying B-24 Liberator. |
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| Coordinated Attack rips Iwo Jima Surface units of the Pacific Fleet, aircraft of the Strategic Air Force, Pacific Ocean Areas, and B-29's of the XXI Bomber Command attacked Iwo Jima in a coordinated action on January 23 (west longitude date). Our surface units inflicted severe damage on island installations. The above photos show ships of the attacking unit pouring their shells into the Japanese stronghold where fires were visible 15 to 20 miles away. Guns blazing, the task force steams along the Iwo Jima shore. Quoted from the original photo caption, released by Commander-in-Chief, Pacific on 27 January 1945. Photographed from a Navy PB4Y aircraft. USS Indiana (BB-58) is leading the line, followed by ships of Cruiser Division 5. (US Naval History and Heritage Command photo NH 104218) |
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| Battleship Indiana and Cruiser Division 5 bombarded Iwo Jima, 23 January 1945. |
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| Aerial photograph of Iwo Jima during a raid on its southern Airfield Number One, early 1945. |
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| Aerial photograph of Iwo Jima during a raid on its southern Airfield Number One, early 1945. |
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| Eastern side of Mount Suribachi prior to US invasion, Iwo Jima, early 1945. |
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| B-24J Liberator “Vera L” and other aircraft from the 27th Bomb Squadron drop 55-gallon drums filled with gasoline on Iwo Jima to burn off the plant growth in advance of the landings to come two weeks later. 1 February 1945. |
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| USAAF bombardment of Iwo Jima in 1945. |
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| Airfield Number Two burning after American air raid, Iwo Jima, early 1945. |
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| Rear Adm. William H.P. Blandy, left. Four high-ranking U.S. officers, including Vice Admiral Richmond K. Turner (right), Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Operations on Iwo Jima, and Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith (second from right), Commander of U.S. Marines on the island, examine a scale model of Iwo Jima as they discuss plans for attacking the heavily defended island fortress. Such a high detailed model was made possible by excellent pre-invasion reconnaissance photographs from which every contour and characteristic of the terrain could be copied. Rear Admiral Harry W. Hill, USN, second to left, and Rear Adm. William H.P. Blandy, USN, left. |
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| The product of dozens of photographic reconnaissance missions over Iwo Jima by Navy and Army Air Corps pilots produced numerous photographs like this one… |
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| …that provided the detail necessary to produce dozens of relief maps made of rubber and plaster of Paris like this one for pilots bombing the island's two airfields (with a third airfield under construction) in the months before the invasion. Planners of the invasion as well as those providing naval gunfire support to the thousands of Marines who stormed ashore on D-Day, February 19, 1945, also made use of the finely-detailed topographical maps. However, there were not similarly-detailed charts of the underwater environment immediately off the invasion beach. That is, until Underwater Demolition Team (UDT) swimmers and reconnaissance Marines charted it two days before D-Day, or "D minus two." (Naval History & Heritage Command NH 104135) |
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| Beach Green 1, north slopes of Mt Suribachi. |
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| Beaches Green 1 and Red 1. |
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| Beaches Green 1, Red 1 and Red 2. |
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| Beaches Red 1 and Red 2. |
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| Beaches Red 2 and Yellow 1. |
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| Beaches Yellow 1 and Yellow 2. |
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| Beaches Yellow 2 and Blue 1. |
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| Blue Beaches. |
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| Northwest beaches. |
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| Green Beach, February 1945. |
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| American invasion force headed for Iwo Jima, February 1945. |
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| Marines of the Fifth Marine Division, en route to the enemy’s “Gibraltar” of the Volcano Islands, Iwo Jima, make themselves as comfortable as possible in their cramped quarters aboard the transport. |
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| Men of the Twenty-eighth Marine Regiment, Fifth Marine Division, play cards below the decks of their transport bound for the Volcano Island stronghold, Iwo Jima. Members of this Regiment hoisted the American flag over Mt. Suribachi after a violent fight up the steep sides of the volcano. |
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| Physical fitness training on board, on ship near Iwo Jima, 1945. James Forrestal (throwing the ball). |
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| Physical fitness training on board, on ship near Iwo Jima, 1945. James Forrestal in center. |
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| Lieutenant Wade speaks to his men at a pre-invasion briefing, early February 1945. |
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| The Marines knew where they were going and from briefing classes such as this one being held by Marine Captain K. Chandler, on board ship before the landing, were well acquainted with the nature of their objective, Iwo Jima. |
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| Major General C. B. Cates, commanding general of the Fourth Marine Division talks to War Correspondents just prior to the assault on Iwo Jima. Left to right are: Brigadier General Franklin A. Hart; Robert Sherrod, of Time Magazine; Keith Wheeler of the Chicago Times; Major General Cates; William Marien, of the Sidney, Australia, Morning Herald’ James Lindsley, of the Associated Press; Axel Olsen, of the Melbourne, Australia, Argus; William Forster, of the National Broadcasting Company; Lieutenant Colonel William F. Thyson; and Colonel John L. Lanigan. They are studying a three-dimensional map of Iwo Jima. |
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| Chance Vought F4U Corsairs on the flight deck of an aircraft carrier heading to Iwo Jima. |
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| Pre-invasion bombardment of Iwo Jima, 17 February 1945. Looking north with Mount Suribachi in the foreground. Photographed by an airplane from USS Makin Island. |
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| Minesweepers worked the waters off Iwo Jima before the invasion, 17-18 February 1945. Note the anti-aircraft bursts above the island and a burning aircraft close to the ground on the right. |
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| Naval gun shells explode on Mount Suribachi, Iwo Jima, 17-19 February 1945. |
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| On D-2, 17 February 1945, U.S. destroyers pound Iwo Jima in preparation for a beach reconnaissance by Underwater Demolition Team (UDT) "Frogmen." |
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| Pre-invasion bombardment of Iwo Jima's west beach as seen from an American vessel, 17 February 1945. |
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| Shells explode ashore during the pre-invasion bombardment of Iwo Jima, 17 February 1945. |
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| A column of LCS(L) passes Mount Suribachi, on the southern end of Iwo Jima, during the pre-invasion bombardment, circa 17-19 February 1945. (US Naval History and Heritage Command photo NH 104146) |
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| Aerial of Suribachi Volcano on the southwestern tip of Iwo Jima, Volcano Island. Part of invasion fleet in the background. |
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| Aerial view of Mt Suribachi, February 1945. |
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| USS Barrow (APA-61) emitting smoke, probably during invasion rehearsals in late 1944 or in 1945. This may be a test of defensive smoke generating equipment. Original 35mm Kodachrome transparency, photographed by Lieutenant Howard W. Whalen, USNR, Boat Group Commander, USS Sanborn (APA-193). (U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command photograph NH 104332-KN) |
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| USS Barrow (APA-61) off an unidentified coast, probably during invasion rehearsals in late 1944 or in 1945. Original 35mm Kodachrome transparency, photographed by Lieutenant Howard W. Whalen, USNR, Boat Group Commander, USS Sanborn (APA-193). (U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command photograph NH 104406-KN) |
