 |
This photo of British LCA-1377 allows us to detail its frontal armor. A U.S. Rangers badge is visible on at least one man's shoulder, indicating the photo is part of the reportage of the Rangers boarding at Weymouth. The three Rangers at the front of LCA-1377 are from left to right: Lt Stan Askin, Capt John Raaen and Maj Richard Sullivan. The medics' helmets are adorned with conventional neutrality marks, which establishes that they were worn by some on D-Day. The medic at the back of the boat is the chaplain of the 5th Ranger Battalion, Father Lacy, who carried a 60mm mortar shell case modified to accommodate small medical equipment. Chaplains were attached to medical units, hence the Red Cross insignia. LSI(H) HMS Prince Baudouin carried Companies C, D, F and half of HQ Company. HMS Prince Leopold was carrying Companies A, B, E and the other half of HQ Company. On June 6, 1944 the eight LCAs carried HQ, A, C, F Companies, 5th Rangers Battalion (TF A), and four Forward Observers of the 58th Antiaircraft Field Artillery Battalion scheduled for H+65 on Dog Green. They arrived at 08:00 on Dog White. |
Landing Craft Assault (LCA) was a landing craft used
extensively in World War II. Its primary purpose was to ferry troops from
transport ships to attack enemy-held shores. The craft derived from a prototype
designed by John I. Thornycroft Ltd. of Woolston, Hampshire, UK. During the war
it was manufactured throughout the United Kingdom in places as various as small
boatyards and furniture manufacturers.
Typically constructed of hardwood planking and selectively
clad with armor plate, this shallow-draft, barge-like boat with a crew of four
could ferry an infantry platoon of 31 and five additional specialist troops, to
shore at 7 knots (13 km/h). Men generally entered the boat by walking over a
gangplank from the boat deck of a troop transport as the LCA hung from its
davits. When loaded, the LCA was lowered into the water. Soldiers exited by the
boat's bow ramp.
The LCA was the most common British and Commonwealth landing
craft of World War II. Prior to July 1942, these craft were referred to as
"assault landing craft" (ALC), but "landing craft, assault"
(LCA) was used thereafter to conform with the joint US-UK nomenclature system.
The LCA design's sturdy hull, load capacity, low silhouette,
shallow draft, little bow wave, and silenced engines were all assets that
benefited the occupants. The extent of its light armor, proof against rifle
bullets and shell splinters with similar ballistic power recommended the LCA.
Also, soldiers were able to sit, unlike other landing craft which required them
to stand. Throughout the war in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the Indian
Ocean, the LCA was the most likely sea assault transport of British Commandos,
United States Army Rangers, and other special forces.
Origins
For centuries the Royal Navy had been landing soldiers on
hostile shores, prominent examples being Quebec 1759, Peking 1900, during the
Dardanelles campaign 1915-16 and the Zeebrugge Raid 1918. During the inter-war
period, however, a combination of recent experience and economic stringency
contributed to the delay in producing a modern infantry assault landing craft.
The costly failure of the Gallipoli campaign during World
War I coupled with the emerging potential of airpower satisfied many in naval
and military circles that the age of amphibious operations had come to a close.
Still, throughout the 1920s and 1930s, animated discussion in Staff Colleges in
Britain and the Indian Army Staff College, Quetta surrounded the strategic
potential of the Dardanelles campaign compared with the strategic stalemate of
the Western Front. The economic austerity of the worldwide economic depression
and the government's adoption of the Ten Year Rule assured that such
theoretical talk would not result in the procurement of any equipment.
The Munich Agreement of 1938 delayed the inevitable war
between Britain and Germany. Munich also led to many changes in Imperial
General Staff policies, among which was the acceptance of a proposal in
November from the Inter-Service Training and Development Centre (ISTDC) at Fort
Cumberland for amphibious assault procedures and for a new type of landing
craft. Up to this time the Landing Craft Committee had produced some Motor
Landing Craft but had not formed procedures for the assault role of these
boats. Now there were specifications for what the new boat must be able to do.
It must weigh less than ten long tons, enabling lifting by passenger liner
davits. The new craft also had to be built around the load - apart from crew it
should carry the thirty-one men of a British Army platoon and five assault
engineers or signalers – and be so shallow drafted as to be able to land them,
wet only up to their knees, in eighteen inches of water. The troops had to
unload quickly. All of these specifications made the LCA personnel carriers; a
separate set of requirements were laid down for a vehicle and supplies carrier,
although previously the two roles were combined in the Motor Landing Craft.
When the ISTDC approached the Director of Naval Construction
(DNC) at the Admiralty to design a craft to these specifications the DNC staff
were urgently engaged in designing new ships to serve more immediate
priorities. Germany's coastline was small and the army would be able to engage
the enemy through France. Any urgent need for landing craft was not apparent
and ISTDC were told it would take seven months to design what was required. The
Board of Trade was therefore approached and asked to suggest a maritime
architect. Mr. Fleming of Liverpool was proposed who soon came down to Fort
Cumberland and the design of the first LCA began.
Following many visits with new drawings and proposals, a
plan was ready by November 1938. Approval was sought from the DNC to build a
prototype Fleming LCA. A wooden mock-up of the craft had been built in the
model shed in Portsmouth dockyard. Fully equipped troops had practiced
embarking and disembarking from it, and the design was altered to meet the
practical difficulties discovered. The craft to be put into service was to be
built of Birmabright, an aluminum alloy.
A meeting with the DNC was convened to discuss the results.
The Fleming craft had few friends in the DNC, though their criticisms were not
specific. They introduced representatives of three shipbuilding firms. The
ISTDC were only interested in the Fleming design submitted already, and in
trying the craft at a landing on the east coast of England in a matter of
months. The DNC accepted this, but asked ISTDC to give their specifications to
the firms present so that they could also submit designs. Two of the firms were
unable to tender, the third, Messrs Thornycroft, had a proposal on the drawing
board in forty-eight hours and ISTDC and the DNC agreed that construction of a
prototype should be paid for. The craft might be constructed for experimental
purposes on the understanding that the DNC held no responsibility.
J. S. White of Cowes built a prototype to the Fleming
design. Eight weeks later the craft was doing trials on the Clyde. The craft
behaved admirably, though it tended to bury its nose in the sea at full
throttle. Noise from the two 120 hp Chrysler engines was excessive, being
amplified by the metal hull. Also, there remained the difficulty of applying armor
plate to the hull. The sides were not flat, but rounded – a complicated shape
for which to roll an armored skin. The Birmabright alloy used also presented
chemical and physical obstacles for the application of hardened steel plates.
The Thornycroft design was being built at the same time with
a hull of mahogany, the internal arrangements for the troops and exit being
generally similar to the mock-up that had been built in Portsmouth Dockyard.
The power plant of two 65 hp Ford V8 engines would be much quieter.
The Fleming won competitive trials at Langstone Harbour.
Compared to the Thornycroft, the Fleming was superior in many areas. Troops
disembarked in a quarter of the time. The silhouette and bow wave were smaller,
qualities typically beneficial for surprise landings. However, the Fleming
remained noisy. During trials on a misty morning the noisy approaching craft
frightened civilians along the shore; tactical surprise was impossible.
Afterwards, Thornycroft produced a prototype to a revised
design based on a double-diagonal mahogany hull. The silhouette and bow wave
were small, and the twin engines could be made silent beyond 25 yards. Armor
could replace the outer mahogany planking. Beaching qualities were
satisfactory, something retained by the LCA. There was a lowerable ramp, but
disembarkation speed remained unsatisfactory due to the narrowness. The revised
Thornycroft became the basis for the LCA. DNC and Thornycroft collaborated to
develop the design further, leading to a third prototype, ALC No 2.
Design
All landing craft designs (and landing ship designs for
ships intended to beach) must find a compromise between two divergent
priorities; the qualities that make a good sea boat are opposite those that
make a craft suitable for beaching. The LCA keel was produced from Canadian
rock elm which was treated with steam to make it pliable and then shaped using
a keel block and wedges. Twenty-four mahogany transverse frame pieces were
joined to the keel providing the overall structure. The craft had a hull built
of double-diagonal mahogany planking. The sides were plated with "10lb.
DIHT" armor, a heat treated steel based on D1 steel, in this case
Hadfield's Resista ¼". Steps were taken to ensure that the boat would not
sink when swamped. In the bow section between the armored doors and the ramp,
each bulkhead was packed with 30 cubic feet (850 L) of Onazote (a type of vulcanized
foam rubber) buoyant material. The same Onazote packing was placed along both
hull sides for the length of the well, and 42.5 cubic feet (1.20 m3) filled the
aft compartment.
The LCA had a long central well section fitted with three
benches, one centre, one each port and starboard, for seating troops. The side
benches were covered by the top deck. The well was divided from the bow by a
bulkhead fitted with two vertically hinged doors. This pair of forward-opening armor-plate
doors led to the ramp, which was lowered and raised by a simple arrangement of
pulleys and wire. Two rollers on the leading outboard edge providing some
freedom of movement for the ramp when it was grounded. Over this ramp troops
could come ashore in two to three minutes, or less if the soldiers and crews
were well trained. Immediately behind the bulkhead were the steering shelter on
the starboard, and the Lewis gun shelter on the port. The steering shelter was
fitted with a telegraph and voice pipe for communication with the stoker, a
featherspray control lever, and a fold-up seat. The shelter was protected on
all four sides by non-magnetic bulletproof plate surmounted by a hinged
double-door roof. Most LCAs were fitted with a compass.
Drive was by two shafts from the pair of Ford V8 engines to
two 19 inch x 14 inch 2-bladed propellers. Fuel capacity was 64 imperial
gallons (290 L). The craft were steered by twin rudders with steering wires
that ran from the coxswain's shelter aft through the well and engine
compartment, and the last three foot (unarmored) buoyancy section in the stern.
The LCA propulsion system was designed to be quiet. At low speeds the engines
could not be heard at 25 yards. The LCA handled well enough in moderate seas
when waves were 3 to 5 ft (0.91 to 1.52 m) but could make no speed against
rough weather, demonstrated in the number of LCA-hulled support craft that
foundered in 6 ft (1.8 m) waves while on tow to Normandy (specifically
LCA(HR)). The power-plant, while quiet, has been criticized for being
underpowered. Nevertheless, the bow lines and small ramp made the LCA a
reasonably good sea boat.
Type: Landing craft
Displacement: 9 long tons (9,144 kg)
Length: 41 ft 6 in (12.65 m)
Beam: 10 ft (3.0 m)
Draught:
Light: 1 ft 1 in (0.33 m) forward,
1 ft 9 in (0.53 m) aft
Loaded: 1 ft 9 in (0.53 m) fwd, 2
ft 3 in (0.69 m) aft
Ramps: 1
Propulsion: 2 × 65 hp Ford V-8 petrol
Speed:
10 knots (19 km/h; 12 mph) (light)
6 knots (11 km/h; 6.9 mph) (loaded)
Range: 50–80 miles
Troops: 36 troops or 800 lb (363 kg) cargo
Crew: Four: coxswain, two seamen and a stoker plus one
officer per group of three boats
Armament:
1 × Bren light machine gun
possibly 2 × Lewis Gun
2 × 2-inch mortar fitted aft (later
models)
Armor:
10 lb. DIHT (.75 in (19 mm)) on
bulkheads and sides
7.8 lb. DIHT (.25 in (6.4 mm)) on
decks above the troop well and engine space.
Variants
From the start, the Inter-Service Training and Development Centre
intended to use armed versions of the LCA to provide close support to the
troop-carrying types. These variants were armed with heavy machine guns and
smoke-firing mortars. The two prototype LCA from 1938 were converted for this
purpose, and other, similar, conversions became the Mkl LCS(M). The Mk1 had a
centrally located armored steering shelter just fore of the engine compartment,
and was armed with two .50 inch machine guns, two .303 Lewis guns, and one
4-inch mortar or 20mm gun. The crew of 11 included one officer, three ratings
to sail, and seven gun crew. The Mk2 was similarly armed on a standard LCA
hull, except the two machine guns were in a twin turret rather than single
mounts. These craft were not expected to beach and later in production boats
were given a proper bow, making them more seaworthy. Thus the LCS(M)(3) was
produced and stayed in production for the rest of the war. The LCS(M)(3) used
Scripps marine conversions of the Ford V8 engine and had 98 gal. fuel tanks. The
power-operated turret was armed with twin .50 inch Vickers machine guns.
The LCA(HR) ('Hedgerow') was another support weapon variant.
The troop well was filled by a Hedgehog spigot mortar weapon. The additional
weight of this weapon and the force it placed on the craft when fired required
strengthening of the well floor. This was the same Hedgehog used in
anti-submarine warfare with the addition of impact fuse extensions in the
projectile nose to detonate the warheads above ground - it fired 24 bombs
arranged in four rows of six, each bomb containing about 30 lb (14 kg) of
explosive. When fired successfully the bomb pattern was a 100-yard circle about
250 yards forward. The bombs would clear paths through mines and wire on the
beach. Using this principle of 'counter-mining' - the explosions from mortar
rounds setting off the mines both above and below the water's edge, proved very
successful. They were used at Salerno and Normandy. Later in the war, the US
built a similar craft the "Woofus" based on the LCM.
One experiment was mounting a "flying hose" on an
LCA as a mine-clearing line charge device for clearing mines and obstacles on
beaches. The LCA was fitted with a coil of hose, attached to a rocket. The
rocket would carry the hose onto the beach, the crew would pump nitroglycerine
into the hose, and then attach an explosive charge to the near end and throw it
overboard. Fortunately, this system was never used operationally. The same
concept was employed by the 79th Armoured Division (called
"Congers"), using Universal Carriers. The nitroglycerin supply for
the unit using them accidentally ignited - causing great damage and loss of
life.
While not, perhaps, a variant, a field modification was
developed by US Rangers with assistance from LCA crews and Commandos, for the
famous Pointe du Hoc assault of 6 June 1944. Each of the 10 LCAs of Flotillas
510 and 522 which carried the 2nd Ranger Battalion to Pointe du Hoc was fitted
with 3 pairs of rocket tubes, firing six-tine grapnels. These pulled up (by
pairs) ¾" plain ropes, toggle ropes, and rope ladders. The ropes and
ladders were stowed in three large tackle boxes mounted down either side of the
LCA decks and the rocket tubes were positioned down either side behind the
corresponding boxes. In addition, each craft carried a pair of small
hand-projector-type rockets, which could be easily carried ashore and fired
small 100 ft ropes. These could carry to full extension provided the line was
dry and used in moderate weather conditions. Each craft also carried
tubular-steel extension ladders made up of light, four-foot sections suitable
for quick assembly. These modified craft had the central bench in the well
removed. At least some of the LCAs also had smoke floats on the stern and the
armament in the gunner's shelter was a Lewis gun, but a variety of Brens and
other light weapons were also carried.
Additional support craft variants included the LCA (OC),
which was fitted to clear foreshore obstructions. Neither the LCA (FT) fitted
with a flamethrower, nor the LCA (CDL) appears to have been used in action. The
latter was a conversion by the parent firm of Thornycroft to carry an armored
searchlight (Canal Defence Light) originally developed for use in tanks and
intended to blind the enemy or create 'Artificial Moonlight' in a night attack.
Though plans exist of a prototype conversion it is not clear whether it was
ever completed. There was an LCA (Bakery) variant to provide fresh bread.
Production and Development History
With few exceptions, the hull, ramp, and power plant of the
LCA remained the same throughout the war. Early on the coxswain's position was
moved from aft to forward on the starboard side. Other particulars could vary
greatly; some LCAs having Direction finding antenna loops, others Danforth
anchors on vertical racks forward. The hatch layout on the stern deck varied,
as did the placement and type of mooring bits, chocks, cleats, fairleads, and
fuel caps. Photographic evidence shows all these variations and also
differences in the placement of the lifelines that were looped along either
hullside for men in the water.
The Admiralty ordered 18 LCAs from Messrs. Thornycroft in
April 1939. These early boats weighed more than 9 tons and had flush-decked
hulls, an armored bulkhead forward that wrapped around the steering compartment
on the starboard side. The steering compartment's armor plates stood about two
feet proud of the deck line. In September, 8 more were ordered. Ford V8 marine
conversions by Thornycroft powered the early groups of LCAs, these water-cooled
petrol engines developing 65 hp each when driving the 19"x14"
2-bladed propellers through a 41:20 gear reduction. The twin propulsion units
gave a speed of 10½ knots at 2,800 revolutions per minute with a load of 8,300
lb (3,800 kg) in the boat. Later craft used propellers with three blades.
The Admiralty placed orders for 30 LCAs in March 1940. By
this time, Thornycroft were subcontracting with South Coast yacht-builders to
fill the Admiralty's many small boat orders as Thornycroft yards were overtaxed
building war-emergency convoy escorts and the like. Some LCAs - Numbers 24-29
and 51 - were fitted with Parsons conversions of the Ford V8, driving
propellers similar to the standard type but on a 2:1 gear reduction; these LCAs
did 12 knots (22 km/h) at 3,300 revolutions. The standard engine fitted in
almost all other craft was the Scripps conversion of the Ford V8. Official
trial results for craft built in 1940–1 with this engine show a consistent
performance with an unladen speed of 11 knots (20 km/h) at 2,800 revolutions.
June saw 64 more LCA orders, and then between late September and March 1941
another 104. These early craft did not yet have the later standard portside armored
Lewis gun position, but nevertheless, had framed canvas hold covers, scaling
ladders mounted on the decks amidships, and various other refinements dropped
when mass production got into full swing. The finish and performance of these
early LCAs were quite fine, which might be expected as these boats were built
in established Thornycroft selected yards, but in circumstances of nightly
blackouts, air raids, wartime restrictions, and shortages the LCA building program
was a remarkable achievement.
About April 1941 the Admiralty decided not to place orders
exclusively through Thornycroft and leaving them to sub-contract, rather, the
Admiralty placed orders directly with cabinet makers, carpenters, and yacht-builders
in all parts of Britain. After February 1942, LCAs began being manufactured
with deck armor in addition to their vertical armor. In the 42 months prior to
the end of 1944 Britain was able to produce an additional 1,694 LCAs. Certain
details were modified as production ran, but the basic LCA design remained
unchanged for the length of the war. By the time production was in full tilt in
preparation for Operation Overlord production rose to sixty LCAs a month.
Sources differ regarding the speed and endurance of the LCA.
By 1945 the all-up loaded weight of an LCA had risen to 13½ tons, due to the
addition of further armor and the weight of weaponry an infantry platoon
expected to carry into battle. As with all wooden vessels after prolonged
immersion, weight increased in the LCA and performance consequently fell. The
equipment had evolved and so had the personnel. The time of needing a few craft
for raiding was past and the time for invasion, for scores of flotillas dawned.
Another obstacle to getting the best performance out of the LCA was the early
war tendency to return ratings to their various barracks who had landing craft
and small marine engine training. Unfortunately, the Navy appointed these
ratings to duties without regard to the importance of their amphibious skills.
In June 1941 this pattern was changed with the establishment of the Combined
Operations naval base HMS Quebec at Inveraray. Combined Operations was then
able to keep trained landing craft crew until boats became available.
Crew and Flotilla Structure
Early in the war the arrangements for manning LCAs and
structure of LCA units was governed by the expediency of the moment;
nevertheless, by mid-war permanent crews and larger formation plans could be kept.
Manning the LCA
In Royal Navy service LCAs were normally crewed by
hostilities-only ratings, personnel of the Royal Naval Patrol Service, and
officers and ratings of the Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve (RNVR). Approximately
43,500 hostilities-only and 5,500 RNVR officers and ratings crewed the various
landing craft types in 1944. Of these, the Royal Canadian Navy provided 60
officers and 300 ratings, on the condition that they be formed into
specifically Canadian companies.
In July 1943 Royal Marines from the Mobile Naval Bases
Defence Organization and other shore units were drafted into the pool to crew
the expanding numbers of landing craft being gathered in England for the
Normandy invasion. By 1944, 500 Royal Marine officers and 12,500 Marines had
become landing craft crew. By 1945, personnel priorities had changed once more.
Marines of landing craft flotillas were formed into two infantry brigades to
address the manpower shortage in ending the war in Germany.
In Royal Indian Navy (RIN) service, crewing LCAs followed
somewhat similar lines. By mid-1941 members of the RIN Reserve and RIN
Volunteer Reserve were being trained to operate LCA. In 1942, the RIN began
receiving four battalions of Indian army troops to provide crews for landing
craft. Seven hundred soldiers of the 9/1st Punjab Regiment volunteered for such
a transfer in February 1943. The 15/13th Frontier Force Rifles Regiment voted
similarly. These battalions were transferred despite the fact that few of the
men had ever seen the sea. Their training suffered severely from lack of
landing craft, spares, and trained instructors. From around mid-1943 there was
also a Burma Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve in existence working closely among
LCA and LCS crews. By 1945, the BRNVR seems to have been formed into the 59th
Motor Launch Flotilla. In all likelihood, it had been put together at least
partly from those with maritime experience escaping from the 1942 Japanese
onslaught in Burma.
A junior naval or Royal Marine officer commanded three LCAs
and was carried aboard one of the craft. The officer relayed signals and orders
to the other two craft in the group by signal flags in the earlier part of the
war, but by 1944 many of the boats had been fitted with two-way radios. On the
wave leader's boat the Sternsheetsman was normally employed as the Signalman
but flags, Aldis lamps, and loudhailers were sometimes more reliable than 1940s
radio equipment. The communications equipment of the troops being ferried could
sometimes prove helpful.
LCA Crew
The LCA's crew of four ratings included a Sternsheetsman,
whose action station was at the stern to assist in lowering and raising the
boat at the davits of the Landing Ship Infantry (LSI), a Bowman-gunner, whose
action station was at the front of the boat to open and close the armored
doors, raise and lower the ramp, and operate the one or two Lewis guns in the armored
gun shelter opposite the steering position, a stoker-mechanic responsible for
the engine compartment, and a Coxswain who sat in the armored steering shelter
forward on the starboard side. Though in control of the rudders, the coxswain
did not have direct control of the engines and gave instructions to the stoker
through voicepipe and telegraph. The craft relayed signals and orders to the
other two craft in the group by signal flags in the earlier part of the war,
but by 1944 many of the boats had been fitted with two-way radios. The
sternsheetsman and bowman were to be available to take over from the coxswain
or stoker should they be killed or injured. On longer journeys they might
relieve them to rest. They also manned any additional machine guns and operated
the kedge anchor, if it was required. In mine fields and among anti-invasion
obstacles and rocks seaman would sit on the bow or stern or move about the
sides of his boat piloting or preventing it from hitting the obstacles.
Flotilla Size
Normally, a flotilla comprised 12 boats at full complement,
though this number was not rigid. The flotilla's size could alter to fit
operational requirements or the hoisting capacity of a particular LSI. An
infantry company would be carried in six LCAs. A flotilla was normally assigned
to an LSI. These varied in capacity with smaller ones, such as the 3,975+ ton
HMCS Prince David able to hoist 6 LCAs, and larger ones, such as the nearly
16,000 ton HMS Glengyle with room for 13 LCAs.
From Ship to Shore
Throughout World War II, LCAs travelled under their own power,
towed by larger craft, or on the davits of LSIs or Landing Ship, Tank (LSTs).
In larger operations such as Jubilee, Torch, Husky, and
Overlord, LCAs were carried to invasion areas by Landing Ship Infantry (LSI).
The location chosen for the LSI to stop and lower the LCA was a designated
point inside the 'Transport Area' when the LSI was operating with a US Navy
Task Force, or the 'Lowering Position' when with a Royal Navy Task Force. The
transport area or lowering position was approximately 6–11 miles off shore (11
miles was amphibious doctrine for the USN by mid-war, while the RN tended to
accept the risks associated with drawing nearer shore). Normally landing ships
were fitted with heavy-duty power-operated davits. Early landing ships were
fitted with Welin-McLachlin davits – these being generally in use in the
Merchant Navy for standard 99 man lifeboats. As the weight of LCAs increased
through the war (eventually approaching 14 tons) heavier davits were required.
Later LSIs and those being refitted were provisioned with luffing davits of a
crossbeam type. The davits themselves provided a demarcation between the
responsibilities of the LSI crew (either Royal Navy or Merchant Navy) and the
members of the LCA Flotilla.
The LCAs were swung down to the level of the loading decks
and the crews climbed aboard. At this time the troops were assembled by
platoons ready to cross gangways. When the coxswain gave the platoon commander
the word, he took his men over and into the stern of the LCA and they filed
forward. The platoon divided into three lines, one for each section of the
platoon, the outboard two sections sitting under the protection of the troop
well's armored decks, the centre section crouched on the low seating bench down
the middle. Despite the wires holding the craft to a fender, the LCA rolled
with the motion of the ship. The coxswain would then call, 'Boat manned,' to
the telephone operator at the loading station, who, in turn, reported to the
'LC' Control Room. The coxswain would then warn the troops to mind the pulleys
at the ends of falls fore and aft, which could wave freely about when the craft
had been set in the water. The task of hooking on and casting off from the ship
required skill and seamanship from the coxswain, bowman, and sternsheetsman.
The snatch blocks used were heavy steel and difficult to handle. The bowman and
sternsheetsman stood by his respective block, as the craft was lowered into the
water. At a time when there was sufficient slack in the falls both had to cast
off at the same instant, and the blocks had to be released while there was
slack in the falls. If the boat was not freed at both ends at once the rise and
fall of the sea could cause the boat to tip, swamp, and perhaps capsize with
loss of life. Casting-off was done in all sorts of sea conditions, and the sea
might be rising and falling a meter or more (6' swells were not uncommon on
D-Day). A combination of skill and luck could redeem a failure to cast-off,
nevertheless. On D-Day, an LCA of Royal Marine 535 Flotilla, LSI Glenearn,
released all but its after falls, which were jammed, and the craft tilted
alarmingly to 45 degrees. The coxswain kept his head, calming the passengers,
while seamen worked to free the falls. Once free, the coxswain needed to get
the LCA away to prevent colliding with the towering side of the LSI as it rose
and fell with the swells.
Commonly, the LCAs of a flotilla would form line-ahead
behind a motor launch or Motor Torpedo Boat (MTB) that would guide them to their
designated beach (it was not normal for LCAs to circle the landing ship as was
USN and US Coast Guard practice). As the LCA approached the beach they would
form line abreast for the final run-in to the beach. When the front of the LCA
came to ground on the beach it was called the 'touch down.'
Service History
Throughout the Second World War, LCAs were used for landing
Allied forces in almost every Commando operation, major and minor, in the
European theatre. They also saw service in North Africa and the Indian Ocean.
They saw a little service in the Pacific close to the end of the war. Below are
operations involving LCA and LCA variants, and descriptions of how the
attributes of the craft, good or ill, suited operational circumstances.
1940
The Norwegian Campaign
The first four LCAs used in an opposed landing disembarked
120 French Foreign Legionnaires of the 13th Demi-Brigade (13e DBLE) on the
beach at Bjerkvik, 8 miles (13 km) north of Narvik, on 13 May during the
Norwegian Campaign. The army commander, General Antoine Béthouart, responsible
for capturing the area north of Rombaks, realized that a landing behind German
lines in the Herjangsfjord was required to force the enemy to retire. To assure
that plans he made with the Royal Navy were understood by the Legionnaires, a
meeting took place aboard HMS Effingham. The plan agreed involved the LCAs
making the twenty-mile (32 km) approach journey under their own power, a
pre-landing bombardment by ships, followed by the landing of three tanks - one
from a new LCM (Mk. I), and two from the older Motor Landing Craft (MLC), then
the landing of an initial wave of infantry from LCAs, and then a follow on
force carried in barges towed by motor torpedo boats. On 12 May, at about
23:40, Royal Navy destroyers commenced a bombardment of the town intended to
destroy all buildings on the foreshore. The LCAs landed soon after 01:00, when
the LCM (Mk. I) had delivered a tank to the beach (the other tanks in MLCs were
delayed). The LCA crews maneuvered their craft to the left of the village of
Bjerkvik, the intended landing place, and under a slight rise in the ground in
order to spare the soldiers casualties from opposing machine gun fire. Though
touchdown was in the early hours of the new day the midnight sun illuminated
the battle. Once ashore, the 13e DBLE's companies deployed and moved to seize
the high ground to the north and south of the town. This debut of the new LCA
was seen, from a distance, by Admiral L. E. H. Maund, who had done much work in
its development:
We
could see the dark forms, like so many ants, after their five hours in the
L.C.A., run out of their craft, open out and, without a moment's pause, advance
across and over the knoll that covered the village from the west. They disappeared
and later could be seen crossing behind the village on to the Gratangen road to
follow the first tank on its way to the north and so take from the rear that
was holding up the advance of the Chasseurs from Gratangen.
The LCAs, along with towed ship's boats and other landing
craft types, then turned to landing the rest of 13e DBLE and its supporting
elements.
Maund was most pleased with the efficiency with which the
Legionnaires disembarked from the LCA. The small flotilla of LCAs, MLCs, and an
LCM (Mk. I) had added greatly to the Allies' tactical latitude. No LCAs were
lost to enemy action during these operations in Norway. One craft was lost,
sometime before 27 May, being burned out by accident while lying up on the east
shore of the Herjangsfjord. The three LCAs surviving could not be hoisted on
available ships when the decision was made to evacuate. An attempt was made to
tow them home behind trawlers, but the sea became too rough and the LCAs had to
be cut adrift and sunk.
Dunkirk
More than a dozen LCAs were used in evacuating the BEF from
Dunkirk (Operation Dynamo). Eight LCAs were sent to Dunkirk on a merchant ship,
SS Clan MacAlister. Designed to be hoisted on the standard passenger liner
davits used for the 99 man lifeboats, the LCA could be carried and launched
from a large number of Merchant Navy vessels. Clan MacAlister began hoisting out
LCAs upon arriving off Dunkirk, 29 May, but was attacked and sunk before
releasing half the craft. Five LCAs were lost with Clan MacAlister. The
remaining eight began taking soldiers off the beaches at La Panne and Dunkirk.
One became stranded on the beach and was set afire by its crew. The balance
returned to England "in a bad way" after taking some 2,000 soldiers
directly off the beaches.
1941
Though the LCA had been designed around the most common
likely load, a British infantry platoon, the original war establishment of a
commando (a headquarters and 10 troops) was formed without reference to this
fact. Early in 1941, each Commando unit's establishment was changed to consist
of a Headquarters and six troops. Each troop would comprise three officers and
62 other ranks; this number was set so each troop would fit into two LCA.
Norway
In March, LCAs carried the first British Commando raid of
the war, directed at Norway. Operation Claymore was conducted by men of No. 3
and No. 4 Commandos. The landing force were to destroy the fish oil producing
facilities in the ports of Stamsund, Hennmgsvaer, Svolvaer, and Brettesnes. The
six LCAs and 2 LCM(1)s of the newly converted Landing Ship Infantry HMS Queen
Emma carried men of 4 Commando, as well as Royal Engineer demolition experts
and a contingent of men from the Royal Norwegian Navy in a raid on the Lofoten
Islands. HMS Princess Beatrix, also new and with a similar flotilla of landing
craft, landed No. 3 Commando. The two LSIs, in company with five destroyers,
entered the Vestfjorden before 04:00 on 4 March, and launched their attack. The
morning weather was clear, cold, and calm, and the landing craft approached all
four landing points more or less simultaneously in broad daylight (sunrise was
approximately 06:20). The LCAs were crowded with raiders; one craft ferrying 41
officers and men in addition to the four man crew. The occasional ice-cold wave
would lop over the side to brace the passengers. Surprise was complete and
there was little resistance. Though the LCA crews had been told to expect
"gently shelving beach", the quay at the landing was quite high, and
local civilians had gathered to tie up the landing craft and assist the troops
in climbing the quay. All targets selected were located and destroyed. The
troops were embarked by 13:00 and within half an hour the British had left.
After returning, the LCA flotilla from Queen Emma was used for a time in
Combined Operations training in Scotland.
In December there were two raids. The first was Operation
Anklet, a raid on the Lofoten Islands by No. 12 Commando on 26 December. The
German garrison was in the midst of their Christmas celebrations and was easily
overcome; the Commandos re-embarked after two days. Operation Archery was a
larger raid at Vågsøy Island. This raid involved men from Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 6
Commandos, a Royal Navy flotilla, and limited air support. The raid caused
significant damage to factories, warehouses, and the German garrison, and sank
eight ships. After this the Germans increased the garrison in Norway by an
extra 30,000 troops, upgraded coastal and inland defenses, and sent a number of
capital ships to the area.
Mediterranean
In the Mediterranean, LCAs from HMS Glengyle carried No. 7
Commando (designated A battalion Layforce, 6th Infantry Division at the time)
in their raid on Bardia in April. The objective was to silence a coastal defense
battery atop 300 ft high cliffs on a rocky coast. Here the sturdy hull of the
LCA, coupled with the skill of the crews allowed many of the Commandos to land
almost dry-shod.
Later that month, following the successful German
intervention, LCAs were involved in the evacuation of Greece, where in hastily
organized operations some 50,000 troops were embarked from ports including
Porto Rafti, Argos, and Kalamata.
In May LCAs ferried many of these troops to Crete, and days
later, LCAs from Glengyle and HMT Cameronia evacuated 6,000 Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders during the evacuation of Crete.
1942
Operation Biting, between 27–28 February (also known as the
Bruneval Raid), targeted a German coastal radar installation atop 300-foot (91
m) cliffs. The raiding party itself was dropped by parachute at night and
following the raid was taken back to England by sea. The naval force under
Commander F. N. Cook, Royal Australian Navy, departed earlier, during the
afternoon of the 27th, for the journey across the Channel. Motor Gun Boats
(MGBs) towed LCAs across the Channel (LCA crews manned their craft during such tows)
and carried detachments from No. 12 Commando who would provide fire support for
the raiding party when they reached the evacuation beach. To accomplish this
task each LCA had sandbags laid down its decks as parapets for Boys anti-tank
rifles and Bren guns fitted with high volume drum magazines. When close to the
coast the commandos climbed into the LCAs, the crews cast off, and the craft
made for the beach under their own power. Meanwhile, on land, having
accomplished their objectives the airborne raiders withdrew through a gully in
the cliffs to the evacuation beach. By this time, it was 02:15, a sea mist
prevented the naval force from seeing paratrooper's signals to evacuate them.
The raiders fired off an emergency Very light seen by three LCA crews who soon
approached accompanied by three MGBs. The original plan for the operation had
called for two LCAs to land on the beach at a time, but this had never been
satisfactorily achieved during the training maneuvers. Instead, as the other
three LCAs caught up, all six landed at the same time. One, LCA 125, dropped
its kedge anchor just prior to beaching, but the anchor line played out and ran
off the drum. Troops in the landing craft opened fire on German troops
gathering by the top of the cliff. With all the craft beached at once, and
enemy fire causing considerable confusion on the beach, some LCAs left
over-crowded, whilst others left half-empty. The coxswain of LCA 125 was able
to reverse his engines quickly and prevent the craft from being stranded. The
entire raiding force was taken off the beach and soon transferred to MGBs for
more comfortable transport back to England. Communications had failed; the
naval force had received no signals apart from the Very light, and had spent
much of the time hiding from a German naval patrol that had nearly discovered
them. The journey back to Britain was uneventful, with the MGBs, LCAs in tow,
being escorted by four destroyers and a flight of Spitfires. This raid with its
dramatic embarkation from the base of a cliff occupied by enemy soldiers
demonstrated the need for deck armor on LCA. Production of new craft soon
incorporated 1/4 inch armor for the decks over the hold and the stoker's
position.
In April two troops of No. 4 Commando and eight officers and
43 other ranks of the Carleton and York Regiment (1st Canadian Infantry
Division) took part in Abercrombie, a raid on Hardelot, France, near Boulogne.
The LCAs of HMS Prince Albert transported the party. This raid also marked the
first operational use of the new LCS. The raid set out on the night of 19 April
with the LCAs towed by MGBs. The plan was for the party to travel to within two
miles (3.2 km) of the French coast on the MGBs and then transfer to the LCA for
the landing. Due to high seas and strong winds, which swamped and sank LCA 211,
the raid was stopped with the loss of two naval ratings. The raid was remounted
two nights later in calmer seas, but the period of optimum tide, moon, and
darkness had past. The raid became uncoordinated, and whilst the commandos got
ashore and began their mission, the boats with the regular infantry became
lost. Soon a German E-Boat was engaged by the MGBs. The army officers in the
LCA conferred and decided not to disembark. Aboard the LCS, the senior naval
officer's compass failed, and the flotilla only returned to England steered by
Lt. Groom's army compass.
Madagascar
In response to the dramatic Japanese advances in early 1942,
Combined Operations landing craft were shipped to the Indian Ocean for
Operation Ironclad, the invasion of the Vichy French colony of Madagascar on 5
May. Following the assault, it was intended that the craft would be sent on to
India and Burma.
The initial target was the naval base at Diégo Suarez. The
harbor entrance faced east and was well defended with gun batteries, but a neck
of land 3 to 6 miles (4.8 to 9.7 km) wide separated Diégo Suarez from good
landing beaches, in Courrier Bay and Ambararata Bay, on the northwest coast.
The Joint Planners decided in favor of these western beaches as opposed to a
direct approach. This decision had a definite effect on the employment of the
LCAs. Despite the advantages of the western approach the LCAs and other vessels
would have to contend with rocks, reefs, and mines.
Diégo Suarez
Ironclad was Britain's longest range amphibious operation of
the war. The landing ships were the LSIs HMS Winchester Castle with 14 LCAs,
HMS Royal Ulsterman, Keren, and Karanja each carrying 6 LCAs, Sobieski with
LCP(L)s, RFA Derwentdale carrying 15 LCM(Mk. 1)s to land tanks and other
vehicles, and HMS Bachaquero, the world's first operational LST. Few could
sleep between supper and midnight 4 May because of the turgid tropical heat and
the noise from preparing the LCAs. Across the boat decks of the LSIs, all sorts
of stores were being manhandled into the LCAs. Because of the long journeys
which the landing craft had to make from the parent ships to the landing
beaches in Courrier Bay and Ambararata Bay, the landing craft crews ate
breakfast at midnight on 4/5 May. At 02:00 the convoy had reached the outer
anchorage, and the minesweepers were clearing the 8 miles (13 km) lanes to the
main anchorage. The five blacked-out LSIs sailed towards the coast proceeding
slowly in line ahead. The assault troops gathered by platoon at their assigned
gangways and clambered into the LCAs. Orders were given to lower all assault
craft to within 6 feet (1.8 m) of the waterline. The electric motors of ships'
davits accomplished this with soldiers (and vehicles, in the case of LCMs)
aboard.
Each LSI could just see the faint outline of the nearest
ship ahead, as the convoy furtively sailed forwards. Navigation marker-lights
appeared marking the swept channel. The night was silent save the low throb of
ships' engines, the churning of water, and the explosion of two swept mines
(one at 03:00 and the other at 03:15). In good time, the ships hove to and
anchored. Electric motor noise filled the air once more as the LCAs were
lowered the remaining distance and met the sea with a loud splash. Then the
LCAs chugged away, fully loaded with soldiers and equipment, headed into the
darkness.
The searchlight of HMS Lightning guided the LSI Royal
Ulsterman into Courrier Bay carrying No. 5 Commando to an assault preliminary
to the main landing. At 04:30, the Royal Ulsterman's LCA touched down at the
base of a 50 feet (15 m) cliff, which the commandos then proceeded to scale
achieving complete surprise over the two Vichy gun crews. The landings in
Courrier Bay were designated Red North, Red Centre, Red South, and in addition
to No. 5 Commando, LCAs also landed a company of the East Lancashire Regiment.
A small force of corvettes proceeded the LCAs to their
landing beaches in Ambararata Bay, sweeping mines clear and placing
navigational lights to mark safe passage through the rocks, enabling the
flotillas to land 29th Brigade without casualties. The beaches here were
designated Blue for the South Lancashire Regiment and the balance of the East
Lancashires north of the bay, White for the Royal Welch Fusiliers in the
centre, and Green for the Royal Scots Fusiliers at the south end of the bay. Touchdown
was 04:45, 1¼ hours before sunrise (06:06 on 5.5.42). The landings were made in
darkness, though with almost a half-moon in the sky. Also, the sea was very
calm. Complete surprise was achieved, against light or no opposition, as the
Vichy French believed navigating through the reefs and rocks efficiently in the
dark was not likely. After retracting, the LCAs began making return trips back and
forth with reinforcements and equipment. When the sun rose, the landing craft
crews in Courrier Bay discovered that they were surrounded by jagged rocks that
continued as far out to seaward as they could see.
Because the approaches were more heavily mined than
anticipated, the ships of the invasion fleet were unable to use the main
anchorage safely until it was properly swept. As the day proceeded, ship to
shore travel became more difficult as a south-easterly gale blew up and made
heavy seas. But by this time, no one thought to delay operations for better
weather. Thus, LCAs were required to make long and frequent journeys from ship
to shore with supplies and reinforcements in worsening sea conditions.
Originally, the Joint Planners had limited Ironclad to the
capture of Diego Suarez, after which the LCAs and other amphibious assets would
travel on to India. With the naval base now in British control the Admiralty
gave orders 16 May that further operations in Madagascar were to be abandoned.
The ships and craft assembled for Ironclad were assigned to other pressing
duties. However, South African prime minister Smuts insisted on further
Madagascan ports being captured. This, along with a Vichy decision to fight on,
kept LCAs employed in Madagascar through the end of September.
Majunga, Morondava, and Nossi-BĂ©
On 10 September, LCAs landed the lead elements of the 29th
Brigade at Majunga, in north-western Madagascar, to re-launch offensive
operations ahead of the rainy season. Though zero hour was supposed to be
before dawn some of the landing craft broke down. The landings took place later
in the day without the cover of darkness. As machine guns began firing on the
landing craft, the support vessels fired on the shore providing cover to the
assaulting troops, who suffered casualties as they stormed the quayside. Along
the beaches the high tide at the time of the assault carried the landing craft
very close to the main seafront road, and at least one LCA was beached and stranded
until the next tide The follow on units of the 22nd (East African) Brigade also
landed in LCAs and LCMs. At the same time, in a violent thunderstorm, a troop
of No. 5 Commando made a diversionary assault on a radio station and airfield
at Morondava, more than 400 miles (640 km) south of Majunga. The commandos were
not transported in LCAs, but entered the port aboard the destroyer HMAS Napier.
During the Madagascar operations it became obvious that the
LCA design was not ideal for utility and supply purposes and future expeditions
were allotted more LCMs and LCVs. LCAs were used in additional landings during
the campaign before Madagascar surrendered in September.
Dieppe
Sixty LCAs were involved in Operation Jubilee at Dieppe in
August and carried the assault infantry of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division,
A Commando Royal Marines, and No. 4 Commando. Eight LCS(M)(Mk I)s were among
the fire support craft. The plan for this large-scale raid was for the force to
stay ashore for two tides and re-embark on the rising tide before dark. The
operation included landings on beaches designated (west to east) Orange, Green,
White, Red, Blue, and Yellow.
Until Dieppe, LCAs had only been used in small numbers. The
part of the naval plan, 'Outline for Operation' (JNO 1), for the Dieppe Raid
that involved LCAs, and other minor landing craft, was much more complicated
than any previous combined operations plan. In all other sizable raids
beforehand coxswains had groped in the darkness and spent extra time while
finding the correct landing beaches. Now a large number of flotillas of various
landing craft types needed to coordinate their activities. The endless
working-up practices and landing exercises carried out prior to the Dieppe
assault were not confined to training infantry; they were also designed to
shake down the crews of the landing craft flotillas. This was necessary because
officers and ratings with LCA experience were not left idle after operations,
but were reassigned to other pressing duties throughout the Navy. This massive
raid required more trained crews and more flotilla coordination. The few
experienced LCA hands available had to be supplemented by dozens of new crewmen
collected by the RNVR. These had to learn how to approach a beach, ground on
it, disembark troops, ease off the beach, and remain off shore within instant
call, ready to come when necessary.
In the Jubilee plan, the LCAs for 2nd Division were to touch
down just before dawn. The lowering point for the landing ships was 10 miles
(16 km) from the shore. Here too was an added complication, because naval
planners wished to avoid the danger of flotillas colliding, becoming mixed
together and confused. Therefore, zero hour was to be half an hour later for the
inner than the outer beaches. At about 03:00 the LCAs were to be lowered from
their landing ships. Once the LCAs were away, the ships would then sail back to
England. The LCAs would make the two-hour journey to the shore. On 19 August,
Nautical Twilight was 04:31 and sunrise 05:50. The four outer landings would
touch down at 04:50 and the two inner flotillas of LCAs would touch down half
an hour later. After disembarking their troops the LCAs, along with other
landing craft types, were to withdraw away from the coast a few miles to an
area protected by a smoke screen designated as the "boat pool." Here
the landing craft would wait until ordered to re-embark the assault force at
the end of the operation. The LCAs were to make their own way back. Despite the
plan, the raid soon began to go wrong.
At 03:47, while approximately seven miles from the French
coast, the 1st and 24th Flotillas (LCP(L)), some craft crewed by RCNVR,
carrying No. 3 Commando, were illuminated by star shells fired from a group of
German armed trawlers. The element of surprise was lost.
Orange Beach
At the lowering position, ten miles (16 km) off the coast,
at 03:00, aboard the LSI Prins Albert the boatswain's whistle summoned the
troops of No. 4 Commando to the loading deck. Seven LCAs waited on their davits
for the commandos, most of whom were overloaded with 3" mortar bombs and
equipment, to walk across the gangways onto the sterns of the landing craft.
Zero hour for landing was to be 04:50 and re-embarkation was timed for 07:30 —
two hours and forty minutes for the commando operation. In darkness, the LCAs
were then lowered into the Channel. Prins Albert's eighth LCA would be employed
in transporting Goatley boats to the withdrawal at the close of the operation.
Once the landing craft were away, Prins Albert sailed back to England.
The landing craft enjoyed a number of navigating advantages,
mostly planned, but one great windfall was provided by the Germans. The
flotilla formed two columns behind their navigational guide, MGB 312, and set
off for the coast. Also escorting the flotilla was Steam Gun Boat (SGB) 9,
ready to provide close support. Both these gun boats possessed far more
sophisticated navigational instruments than the LCA.
The Pointe d'Ailly Lighthouse was working. Its silhouette
stood out plainly against the horizon from sea level; even when not lit it
could be seen for five miles (8.0 km) on a clear night through binoculars. For
the LCA flotilla, tactical surprise seemed possible, as it was highly
improbable that the enemy would be obliging enough to assist the Royal Navy
with such a brilliant navigational aid.
Looking over to the east, at 03:50, those aboard these LCAs
could see the gunfire and flares that marked the collision of the Yellow Beach
flotillas with the German convoy. Once the fire of the engagement far off to
port died away, navigation was aided again by the spectacle of red and green
navigation lights shining steadily on Dieppe's harbor entrance.
At about 04:30, just before Nautical Twilight, the flotilla
broke into two; one group of three LCAs continued on the same bearing toward
Vasterival (Orange One Beach) and four LCAs followed MGB 312 to a new bearing
starboard along the coast to Quiberville (Orange Two Beach). Approximately 2
miles (3.2 km) separated the Orange beaches. Two Spitfires flew overhead and
fired on the lighthouse which straight away doused its light. Anti-aircraft
fire went aloft along the coast as additional planes strafed the Hess Battery,
creating a distraction which covered the approach of the landing-craft.
The first LCA group, arriving at 04:50 at Orange One Beach,
touched down with textbook precision — at the right beach at the right time.
The shingle beach was simply a narrow cove, perhaps seventy yards long with the
beach sixty yards deep. The Commandos raced up the beach unopposed.
The four LCAs approaching Quiberville were observed from
shore and illuminated by star shell at 04:53, just as they were making their
final run in to touch down. Orange Two Beach was larger - some 300 yards (270
m) long and 400 yards (370 m) deep with an incline to the right leading to the
wide valley of the River Saane. Incoming machine gun fire from pillboxes did
not cause casualties while the commandos were aboard the armored landing craft.
This unit was able to accomplish its mission: the
destruction of the Hess Battery.
Once the LCAs had landed the Commando at Quiberville, they
withdrew and made their way to Vasterival. The Commandos' withdrawal was made
through Orange One Beach, the calculation being that the German reaction would
concentrate on Quiberville. In this the plan was most successful. The enemy
made no attempt to counter-attack, only desultory sniping. The re-embarkation
began at approximately 07:30 under cover of 18-type smoke generators on the
beach and naval smoke floats on the water. The wide, flat beach and rapidly
ebbing tide made re-embarkation difficult, and the troops had to wade out up to
their necks to reach the landing-craft which had waited unmolested fifty yards
off-shore throughout the operation. The Commandos had to wade out to the LCAs
because the fast-ebbing tide threatened to strand any craft that touched down. Goatley
collapsible boats were brought in by an LCA crew to help cover the water gap,
widening by the fast ebbing tide. German prisoners were used to carry the
wounded down to the water where they were placed in the Goatley boats for the
trip out to the LCA. By 08:15, the LCAs had re-embarked the raiders. Two miles
offshore the wounded were transferred to a destroyer on the way back to the
boat pool around HMS Calpe and then the LCAs returned the approximately 65
miles (105 km) to England under their own power.
Blue Beach
The main landings, those by 2nd Canadian Division, were
mostly crushed on the beaches. At Puys (Blue Beach), some of the LCAs
transporting The Royal Regiment of Canada mistook for their guide boat another
similar craft. Corrections in course were made, but this was at the cost of
arriving a quarter of an hour late. Touch down at Puys was about 05:10 in the
light of dawn and amid German flares, instead of 04:50 darkness. Some LCAs were
able to provide the men first off a dry landing, but those last off the landing
craft had to jump into the water and wade ashore. (In certain beaching
conditions, each man's last step as he ran off the ramp pushed the LCA back out
to sea.) Alasdair Ferguson, second-in-command of the seven LCAs of the 10th LCA
Flotilla, carried on HMS Princess Astrid, felt his LCA scrape bottom as enemy
fire poured down from a cliff, entering the craft. Having touched down, he
ordered "Down ramp!" and urged the troops of the Royal Regiment of
Canada and the Royal Canadian Artillery onto the beach. Soldiers were shot down
before they cleared the ramp, where their bodies blocked others. Others fell as
they crossed the beach to the seawall 40 feet (12 m) away. The operation was
not successful. All three waves (1st and 2nd LCA, and 3rd LCM1) on Blue Beach
were subject to withering fire. The Royal Regiment were trapped against the
impenetrable seawall.
Since the third wave had landed on Blue Beach at 05:45 few
other craft had been able even to approach the shore. At 07:00 two craft picked
up a request from the beach party. LCA 209 went in but was immediately half
swamped by a rush of soldiers. She tried to back off but was hit by an enemy
shell and sank 50 yards out, killing all save two crew and a soldier. At 09:40
the signal to withdraw was sent to all the assault forces - "Vanquish 1100
hours". This presented great difficulties for the LCAs as they were
designed best to beach on rising tides and the tide would not rise again for
some hours. A few soldiers managed to swim out and be picked up by friendly
craft but many more were killed in the attempt. Unarmored craft could not come
near the beach because the fire was too heavy. Several LCAs went in to evacuate
troops, including the four surviving craft of the 10th LCA Flotilla, but
suffered due to the intense fire from mortars and machine-guns; two 10th
Flotilla craft were sunk. When Ferguson saw that there was no sign of life on
the beach, he reluctantly obeyed an order to withdraw. Only one craft, LCA 209,
managed to touch down on Blue Beach for the evacuation and while taking wounded
aboard it was unable to raise its ramp before it pushed off the beach. Grenades
and mortar bombs added more casualties, and with men hanging on to LCA 209's
sides, mortar bombs finally sank it. By 08:30 the Royal Regiment had
surrendered.
White Beach and Red Beach
The main beaches on the Dieppe waterfront are almost a mile
long. Following strafing of the defenses by aircraft, and a short bombardment
by destroyers, aircraft laid a blanket of smoke on Dieppe Harbour. LCSs with
heavy machine-guns and smoke mortars engaged targets ashore and provided a
smoke-screen over the eastern headlands. The LCSs continued to engage targets
all morning, but also suffered extensively from the defenders' fire. The first
wave of LCAs touched down between 05:20 and 05:23. They carried The Royal
Hamilton Light Infantry to Red Beach and The Essex Scottish Regiment to White
Beach. Once the infantry left the armor-plated protection of the LCAs they were
in a killing field. None of the preparatory fire had diminished the defense,
and the new tank landing craft, designed to deliver tanks to accompany the
assault infantry, were ten minutes late. As the smoke drifted off, the
Canadians found themselves savagely pinned down. Their landing craft, LCAs and
LCM(Mk. I)s, had orders to collect off the coast in the boat pool - an area
covered in smoke. Adding to the tragedy, the floating reserve, Les Fusiliers
Mont-Royal, were sent to reinforce the Essex Scottish, who had been incorrectly
reported as making good progress. The Fusiliers were transported in LCP(L)
Eureka boats made of seven-plywood; they provided no protection from bullets or
shrapnel. The Fusiliers received fire all the way in to the beach, and only 125
of them made it back to England. On White Beach, LCAs landed 369 men of A
Commando Royal Marines in withering fire - none got more than a few yards
ashore.
On these central invasion beaches, it was vital that the
Canadians hold the Casino as its capture would make the whole of the shoreline
untenable. When the signal to withdraw was sent and the time arrived, The Royal
Navy started to move in to extricate the Canadians and the RAF began to lay
smoke. Flights of LCAs and LCM(Mk 1)s came in and suffered heavy casualties but
the Royal Navy managed to extricate several hundred Canadian troops before the
Canadians withdrew from the Casino and the beach became impossible to defend.
At 12:20, the Naval Force Commander gave the order to stop the evacuation as
the beach was virtually all in enemy hands. The German garrison ceased firing
at 13:58 after LCA 186, the last craft to return from Dieppe, quit the beach.
Green Beach
At Pourville (Green Beach), LCAs carrying the South
Saskatchewan Regiment touched down on the shingle beach at approximately 04:52
without having been detected. All the troops got ashore before the Germans
opened fire. This was less than half an hour after zero hour. The LCA flotillas
had left their landing ships punctually, but lost time on the run in. As the
landing craft moved shoreward they received "a warm wind laden with the
smell of hayfields blowing upon them from the south." Unfortunately, some
of the landing craft had drifted off course on the way in, and most of the
battalion was disembarked west of the Scie River, not east of it as planned.
The opposition was much lighter on Green Beach for the landing craft and did
not begin to stiffen for the South Saskatchewans until they were getting
established on shore. German resistance to the Saskatchewans had been
stiffening inland, but Green Beach was still not receiving heavy fire at
approximately 05:35 when a LCA landed the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of
Canada. By 08:45 the expected link-up with Churchill tanks of the Calgary
Regiment landing at White Beach had not taken place. When, at 09:40, the signal
to withdraw was sent, German resistance was growing and the Saskatchewans and
Camerons were being fought to a standstill.
Confusion between ship and shore led to the South
Saskatchewans reducing their defensive perimeter too quickly, yielding the
western heights to German infantry. The original order for evacuation was for
10:00 but was changed to 11:00. The change proved disastrous for the assault
troops, as the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada had already started to
withdraw to the beach at 09:30, closely followed by the Saskatchewans. They
would have to contend with the increasing enemy action for another hour,
despite the perimeter now being too close to the beach. At about 10:30, all
available craft were sent to Green Beach at Dieppe, which was still under
intense fire from mortars and machine-guns. At 10:45, six LCAs came inshore to
Green Beach under heavy fire. It was a mistake; the evacuation should have
begun on Red Beach. As Alasdair Ferguson grounded his LCA, he could see no
movement on the beach. Moments later, so many troops were rushing Ferguson's
craft that it was swamped and, as he made out to sea, the craft was hit by a
shell and capsized. He helped the survivors board another craft, and the
traumatized sailors and soldiers returned to Newhaven. The other five LCAs
participated in a chaotic evacuation, taking men aboard and clearing the beach
successfully, but casualties mounted. A second flight of LCAs appeared soon
after, but the state of the tide was changing markedly and the risk of becoming
stranded kept the LCAs well off shore. The loss of the western heights and the
receding tide made further attempts to evacuate most costly. Heavy losses
occurred on the sand and in the water. By 11:30, the few men left on the beach
were overwhelmed by an enemy attack and captured while attempting to disengage.
Yellow Beach
No. 3 Commando were carried to Yellow Beach in LCP(L)s. No
LCAs were present on Yellow Beach.
Losses and Results
Of the 33 landing craft of all types lost, approximately
half, 17, were LCAs, along with 1 LCS(M)(Mk I), No. 9. Two more LCS(M)(Mk I)s,
No. 8 and No. 25, were damaged sufficiently in fire-fights off Blue Beach
during the evacuation that most of their crews were casualties and their guns
silenced. The crews bringing in the landing craft to the beaches, as well as
assault troops trying to get to them, again suffered significant casualties
from intense German fire.
As a result of the Dieppe raid, the Royal Navy determined to
keep permanent assault groups. The LCA flotillas of Dieppe in 1942 remained
together with other Dieppe naval assets and became the Force J (for 'Jubilee')
that again carried Canadians, this time to assault Juno Beach on D-Day.
The Torch Landings
The invasion of French North Africa, Operation Torch, took
place 8 November. The operation involved three Task Forces - Western, Centre,
and Eastern - landing US and British divisions over 500 miles of coast.
The Western Task Force sailed directly from the United
States and landed near Mehdia, Casablanca, and at Safi. This task force
contained no LCAs.
Making landings inside the Mediterranean at Algiers and Oran
were two task forces composed primarily of British ships. In these landings
LCAs were the most numerous landing craft type. Torch was the largest
amphibious operation mounted to date and was done on a "shoestring"
budget with regard to landing craft and personnel. Combined Operations
establishments were combed through zealously for personnel in anticipation of
the operation. The requirements were so great that partially trained crews were
embarked in Landing Ships (some had not operated an LCA until they were on
board). The Combined Operations HQ was under considerable strain as the demands
increased. The operational plan had originally asked for 15 LSIs. 25 eventually
participated. Originally, as the Torch plan was developed, 91 LCA and crews
were required, but eventually 140 LCAs were employed. For want of training,
several LCA flotillas got into difficulties. Even the trained crews were
subjected to operations in a foreign environment; the coasts of French North
Africa were vastly different from the Scottish establishments used for
training.
Algiers
The approximately 50 miles of coast assaulted by the Eastern
Task force was divided into 3 sectors – A, B, and C (Apple, Beer, and Charlie).
In the last hour of 7 November, the landing craft were launched from their
parent ships, in a moderate swell, a new moon and a westward current of about 4
knots. Running west to east beginning just east of Castiglione were Apple Green
and Apple White, assaulted by 11 Brigade, British 78th Infantry Division. Just
east of Cape Sidi Ferruch was Beer Green, assaulted by No. 1 Commando, and Beer
White assaulted by 168 Regt., US 34th Infantry Division. US Navy transports
were in the majority at Charlie Beach to the east of Algiers, and it is likely
that no LCAs were employed there during the initial landings.
A Sector
At 23:49, flotillas of LCAs moved off from LSIs Karanja,
Viceroy of India, and Marnix van Suit Aldegonde to land 11 Brigade well on the Apple
beaches. There was some delay off these westernmost beaches, late in the night
of 7 November, as a small French convoy appeared, distracting the minesweepers
guiding the LCAs to the beaches. Still, the flotillas continued toward the
objective and A Green flight beached at H-Hour (01:00). A White flight touched
down at H-hour + 8 minutes. Some delay and confusion, and damage to landing
craft, was caused by the unexpected shallowness of water and sandbars. Although
periscope observations had been carried out, no reconnaissance parties had
landed on the beaches to determine local conditions.
1943
Far East
By February it was obvious that there would be no major
amphibious operation in Burma before the onset of the monsoon season, due in
the Bay of Bengal in May. Nevertheless, Lieutenant Commander Robert D. Franks,
RN, managed to introduce two craft, LCS(M) 17 and LCS(M) 23, into the Mayu
River, which empties into the Bay of Bengal just north of Akyab, and of which
the Japanese held the mouth. The little flotilla was meant to frustrate
Japanese use of the river to reinforce their army which was pushing the British
north. Two Motor Launches of the Burma Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve (BRNVR) had
forced their way into the river already. For two and a half months these two
LCSs, designed for the English Channel, and the two BRNVR MLs took turns
dodging Japanese patrols by day, and wrecking Japanese outposts and ambushing
Japanese supply craft at night among the creeks and chaungs. On 25 April, LCS(M)
17 was sunk by enemy action. Gradually, the Japanese advance over land forced
Franks higher up the river: he might have continued operations against the
enemy, but in mid-May he was shot up by the RAF and decided it was unsafe to
stay in the no-man's-land between the two armies. The British troops had had to
withdraw so far up the river that there was no longer enough depth of water for
the other three vessels to maneuver. The MLs were destroyed by their crews, and
the remaining LCS(M) 23 was laid up at Taung Bazaar on a muddy bank where it
was claimed by the jungle. The 21 British Empire survivors of this vicious
little campaign had to struggle back to friendly lines on foot through swamps.
The Sicily Landings
Operation Husky, the invasion of Sicily in July 1943, was
the first direct assault on the defended territory of an Axis homeland, and the
most complex combined operations expedition yet. All together, 94 LCAs were
employed in six of the seven landing areas. In addition, new craft and vehicles
were used on some beaches in preference to LCAs. The results of such
innovations were mixed.
Most of the LCAs were in the Eastern Task Force sector,
landing initial assault units of the Eighth Army in the Gulf of Noto and around
Cape Passero. The Western Task Force employed LCAs in landing Seventh Army
infantry and Rangers near Licata and Gela.
The date for the invasion, Saturday, 10 July, occurred in
the second quarter of the moon. This was not an ideal phase of the moon where
the Navy was concerned; complete darkness would have been preferred. Although
the landing ships of the assault forces approached Sicily in a brilliant waxing
moon, which would not set until the vessels had stopped in their lowering
positions, the LCAs made their approach to the coast in darkness. H-Hour was
fixed at 02:45, almost two hours before first light.
On the afternoon of D-1 an unexpected north-westerly gale
(force 7) blew up and the invasion fleet's small craft were tossed about. On
D-Day itself the sea had calmed considerably as the hours passed, but continued
churning from the gale. Joss, Dime, Cent, Bark West, and Bark South Areas
experienced heavier seas in the wake of the storm. Bark East, Acid South, and
Acid North benefited from somewhat calmer water afforded by being on the
leeward of Sicily.
Joss
In the Joss landings, the LSIs HMS Princess Astrid and HMS
Princess Charlotte anchored approximately 3 miles (4.8 km) from Licata, about
the time that the moon was setting; at 01:00, 10 July. The 3rd US Rangers
aboard filed into the LCAs and were lowered into the sea. Their objective was
to hold the western flank of the 3rd US Division's landing area. By 01:50, the
Rangers left ship on their way to Licata. At 04:00, about half an hour before
first light, 6 of the 8 LCAs Astrid launched returned. Italian resistance at
Licata had been lighter than at Gela. Even so, the surf had been severe and the
other two LCAs had been left stranded on beach.
Dime
In the Dime landings, LCAs from the LSIs HMS Prince Charles
and HMS Prince Leopold landed the 1st and 4th Ranger Battalions. Though the
crossing in the LSIs had been storm-tossed, by the time the ship came to its
Transport Area the gale had settled. One Ranger recalls the sea "was
almost mirror like; it was kind of eerie." As LCAs closed the beach,
flares and rockets filled the sky. One LCA was damaged by a shell that snapped
a cable securing the ramp; the craft immediately flooded and all aboard were
lost except the coxswain. Although Italian resistance was more determined at
Gela, and the beach was mined, the rest of the LCAs delivered their Rangers to
their pier objective.
Bark West
Still, the sea was not ideal for landing craft. The diary of
one RCN LCA bowman states:
At
12:15 a.m., we were lowered away. It was pretty grim, since there was a great
wind and the davits themselves were shaking. When we hit the water our LCAs
really took a beating... The soldiers were very seasick and for the first time,
I thought I would be a victim. Up in the bow, I swallowed more salt water than
I thought existed.
However these unfavorable conditions had a beneficial side
effect - the enemy relaxed their guard in the belief that a landing in such
conditions was not likely and initial resistance proved less than expected.
Newer craft were used in the Sicily invasion such as the DUKW amphibious truck;
the Landing Craft Infantry (Large) (LCI(L)), and, for the first time in
numbers, the much larger Landing Ship Tank (LST Mk 2). None of these supplanted
the LCA in its designed role; none of these new types was intended for the
initial assault and the LCA was still vital for first wave transportation on
contested shores.
Bark South
The ships and craft landing the 51st (Highland) Division
arrived at their lowering positions 7 miles (11 km) south of Capo Passero by
23:00. During the night, even before the run in to Bark South, the 51st
Division suffered losses from crushing and drowning when troops transferred
from the LSI Queen Emma to LCI(L)s in the midst of the storm, but on the
morning that followed the Division was put ashore with fewer than a dozen
casualties. Many suffered from seasickness, even in the large troop transports.
Here LCAs were filled with soldiers and lowered, after which the craft formed
flotillas and moved to their respective waiting positions, Red and Green, a
mile off Bark South.
The LCAs for the initial assault wave were scheduled to
touch down at 02:45, which they managed, and in most cases at the correct
beaches. At approximately 03:15, LCIs and LCTs moving the reserve companies and
assaulting battalion's headquarters were to touch down. Unfortunately, this
wave was not so successful; a number of craft initially failed to locate their
designated beaches, and, arriving 30 to 60 minutes late, delayed the division's
movement inland. Soon after, at 03:45, the LCIs and LCTs of the brigade reserve
follow-up flight were to be in the vicinity of the beaches ready to beach when
opportunity afforded. All craft were to be beached by first light (04:39) or be
in an unsinkable position by that time. To enable loading to be carried out
after sunrise, 05:47, arrangements were made for ample smoke canisters to be
carried in all craft, so that the area of the landing beaches could be
adequately smoked should the need arise.
Among the naval support for the LCAs approaching Bark South
were LCS(M)s to provide supporting fire during their approach to the beaches.
The naval plan worked adequately, with few exceptions, and there was no enemy
air or sea interdiction. The Mediterranean was rough, however, and most of
troops travelling in LCAs suffered sea-sickness, one man so much so that he
died. Some worry plagued planners regarding LCAs swamping in the heavy surf at
the shoreline, but the crews touched down and retracted their craft without
serious difficulty. Anxious minutes passed at the Red and Green waiting
positions, as by zero hour, when the assault wave of LCAs had beached, many of
the LCIs and most of the LCTs had not arrived. This was largely due to the
rough sea which, though inconvenient for landing ships carrying LCAs, had
considerably reduced the distances landing craft could cover.
Baytown
At 04:30 on 3 September, approximately an hour before first
light, LCAs carrying British 5th Division and Canadian 1st Division troops of
the 13th Corps, Eighth Army, touched down after crossing the Strait of Messina
into Calabria. This was a shore to shore landing craft operation with the
assault forces embarking at Mili Marina, south of Messina, and travelling an
average of 12,000 yards to their assault beaches. The LCAs and LCMs that
comprised the initial assault wave were joined by DUKWs and LCI(L)s in later
waves. The flotillas were led in by Motor Launches, and guided by directional
tracer from Bofors guns along with four vertical searchlight beams to allow
coxswains to keep their bearings. Still, navigation proved difficult. The rapid
and irregular currents, whirlpools, and winds of the Messina Strait hampered
navigation. Though the night was starlit, with no moon, the prodigious
artillery barrage accompanying the assault contained a high number of smoke
rounds (500). The navigation lights of the guiding Motor Launches, which LCA
coxswains were to follow, became lost among the lights on the opposing shore.
The task of 13th Corps was to cross the Straits and land in
two small bays north of Reggio. The 1st Canadian Division, landing at Fox
Beach, a short distance north of Reggio, were to capture the town and the
airfield south of town, while 5th Division took San Giovanni, to the north, and
the coastline to Canitello. The artillery barrage on the beach was planned to
take advantage of the LCA's splinter-proof armored protection. The barrage
would lift from the beach only moments before touchdown for the LCAs. Apart
from some craft landing in the wrong places, and some mixing of the divisions,
the assault troops landed without difficulty and with little hindrance from the
enemy. Following the assault phase, the LCAs were used to ferry supplies. By
the evening of D+1 the landing of supplies had gone so well that the build-up
was 1½ days ahead of schedule.
Far East
Toward the end of 1943, ships from one assault force (HMS
Bulolo and six LSIs with their attendant LCAs) that had taken part in Husky
were transferred to India only to be recalled to the Mediterranean for Anzio.
1944
Normandy Landings
On D-Day LCAs put troops ashore at Juno, Gold, and Sword
Beaches. LCAs landed the US infantry formations on either flank of Omaha Beach
and the Rangers who assaulted Pointe du Hoc. The westernmost landings on Utah
Beach and the pre-dawn landing on ĂŽles Saint-Marcouf were also carried in LCAs.
The LCA type was confronted with many challenges on D-Day;
some presented by the Neptune plan, some by the enemy defenses, and others by
the weather. The initial seaborne assault on the Normandy coast broke with
previous Allied practice, in that it was made in daylight. The invasion could
occur 6 June because the date satisfied certain preliminary requirements. Of
particular concern to landing craft, H-Hour was fixed forty minutes after
nautical twilight. H-Hour was also fixed for three hours before high-water
mark. The tide in the English Channel rises from west to east (high water in
Utah area occurs approximately 40 minutes before it occurs in the Sword area),
and so some difference in H-Hour were planned among the assault areas in order
to provide the initial assault landing craft the full advantage of a rising
tide. Among the many variable concerns to be considered by the planners was
whether to land below, among, or above the line of Element 'C' obstacles. The
sea conditions at many places along the coast (6' waves and 2.7-knot (5.0 km/h)
currents) were just at the outside operational limit of the LCA. The setting of
the Transportation Area 11 miles (18 km) from shore presented an additional
complication for LCAs operating in the Western Task Force Area in these
condition.
A total of 474 LCAs were used on the first day of D-Day (of
which 132 were lost or seriously damaged). With a high demand for crews for all
types of landing craft at the time of the Normandy landings, the Royal Navy
crews were supplemented by training Royal Marines to operate LCAs. RN crews
were preferentially assigned to the larger types of landing craft.
Consequently, many assault flotillas were entirely manned by Royal Marine
crews.
Gold Beach
Just before 05:58, moments before daybreak, at a lowering
position 7 miles (11 km) off shore, a bugler sounded reveille on the LSI Empire
Lance. The 6th Green Howards, of 69th Brigade, formed their boat sections on
deck and then boarded their LCAs down scramble nets. The storm of the previous
day was abating, but the weather was still grey, cold, and rainy. The water was
rough, with swells as great as 6 ft (1.8 m). (2 m) and each LCA rose and fell
in an alarming fashion. Once their craft were loaded, the crews pulled away
from the landing ship and sailed their LCAs forward to form the flotilla line
for the run in to the beach.
The approach to Gold area was to be no easy matter for the
LCAs scheduled to make H-Hour at 07:25. The assembly of the flotillas proved
difficult, with the seas running higher than in other landing areas. The timing
schedule was upset by the tide, which was driven in-shore by a strong
north-westerly wind, with water levels running 30 minutes earlier than normal.
After the assault, 2,500 obstacles were counted that the Germans had emplaced
on this coastal front of 3+1⁄4 miles (5.2 km). It proved almost impossible for
engineers and beach obstacle clearance parties to make lanes through these
barriers until the tide fell. For much of the morning, Germans in fortified
resistance nests directed a withering fire on to flights of LCAs touching down
on the beach, which added to the troubles of the assault units. At
approximately 09:50, approaching the shore side town of Asnelles, five of the
LCAs transporting No.47 Royal Marine Commando ashore blew up mines or were
wrecked on beach obstacles with the loss of more than a fifth of the Commando
before they reached the beach.
Juno Beach
On Juno Beach, RCN, RN, and RM flotillas employed 142 LCAs
and experienced some difficulty getting the units of the 3rd Canadian Infantry
Division to shore. Earlier, ten minutes had been lost to delays during the
passage of Task Force J from Southampton. The I Corps planners had scheduled
the landing on Nan, the eastern sector of Juno, at 07:45, 20 minutes later than
on Mike, the western sector. The planners considered that Nan landing craft
would require higher water to navigate among what aerial photographs suggested
were underwater rocks, but later discovered that this threat had been much
overestimated and that much of the shoal was actually floating seaweed. At any
rate, the shallow draft of the LCAs managed the transit without trouble from
the shoals, but other deeper draft landing craft types were at risk. The water
had risen fast in the strong north-westerly wind. When LCA carrying assault
infantry approached the beach, the crews discovered that the tide was running
too high for demolition personnel to clear lanes through the beach obstacles
(Demolition personnel on Juno used four LCA(OC)s, Obstacle Clearance).
Consequently, landing craft had to disembark their troops among the obstacles
or smash through them.
Utah Beach
Two little islands off Utah Beach presented a potential
threat to the invasion forces and became the first French territory liberated
by seaborne Allied soldiers on D-Day. At 04:30, four LCAs of 552 Flotilla
landed detachments of the US 4th and 24th Cavalry Squadrons on the ĂŽles
Saint-Marcouf. From a navigation perspective this operation presented acute
challenges; locating two tiny islets in darkness while weaving through unmarked
minefields to touch down on rocky shores. These LCAs came from SS Empire
Gauntlet, the landing ship whose LCAs also delivered the initial wave of the
1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, US 4th Division, the westernmost seaborne landing
of D-Day.
Dragoon Landings
The sturdiness and quietness of the LCA proved invaluable
during Operation Dragoon, the invasion of southern France in July 1944.
Operation Romeo had LCAs of the RCN disembark the 1er Commando Français de
l'Afrique du Nord to disable German artillery atop the cliffs of Cap Nègre.
Canadian LCAs also landed the U.S.-Canadian 1st Special Service Force on the
difficult, sharp-rocked shores of ĂŽle du Levant in a pre-dawn operation to
silence batteries there that threatened the main force. The LCA was a strong
little craft, in this instance standing up better to the pounding in rough landings
than other LC types, especially on these rocky offshore islands, when many
LCVPs were lost. Following the landings in southern France, the RN's LSI units
remained in the Mediterranean or began moving to the Indian Ocean in
anticipation of joining the war against Japan.
Walcheren and the Scheldt Estuary
There was one more notable use of LCAs in the war in
northwestern Europe: the fierce fighting around Walcheren Island and the
Western Scheldt (Battle of the Scheldt). Though by mid-September 1944, most
amphibious assets had been sent to the Mediterranean for Dragoon, the Royal
Navy still had 70 LCAs in Portsmouth. Because the approaches precluded the use
of destroyers to support the assault, the presence of LCSs and other support
craft was vital in providing covering fire and warding off German craft. The
low speed of the LCA made the navigation plans and timing of the infantry
assault more challenging due to the Scheldt's 4 and 5-knot (9.3 km/h) currents.
Still, No. 4 Commando got ashore from the bullet-proof LCA under heavy fire
with only two or three casualties. The LCA containing the heavier equipment was
sunk by an anti-invasion obstacle. Two hours later, the 5th King's Own Scottish
Borderers were also landed from LCAs at Flushing. During the balance of the
operations around Walcheren, LCAs were used to ferry troops through the river
network and the extensive flooded areas.
Postwar
Perhaps 1,500 LCAs survived the war in serviceable
condition. But many of these LCAs were discarded, as when the LSI HMS
Persimmon, returning to Britain from the Far East in 1946, dumped her lower
deck LCAs overboard to lighten ship and make better speed. Many LCAs used in
the Far East were not sent back to the United Kingdom. Damaged LCAs, along with
other damaged landing craft, were sunk rather than repaired. In Cochin, India,
at the shore establishment HMS Chinkara (home of the Landing Craft Storage,
Section 21), many LCA were towed out to the 10 fathom mark and sunk by various
means from axe to Bofors gun fire. In home waters, the end of the war meant the
merchant ships and passenger liners that had served as LSIs were returned to
their owners and refitted to civilian trim. This left an LCA surfeit that was
sold off for civilian uses. They were popular acquisitions among riparian
holiday-makers and canal enthusiasts in Britain. Their holds covered and ramps
sealed, LCAs became charming little houseboats.
Peace brought difficult challenges to Britain's armed forces
and the LCA was to suffer because of understandable changes in material
requirements. Most landing craft crews had been hostilities only and reserve
personnel who now returned to civilian life. Career minded personnel remaining
in the service naturally gravitated toward larger ships; so amphibious warfare
decayed. In addition, questions emerged about the feasibility of amphibious
warfare in the shadow of the atomic bomb just as, between the wars, the advent
of aircraft had been used as a reason not to develop amphibious capabilities.
One source reports 286 LCAs on Royal Navy books in 1947. In 1949, Admiral Maund
lamented the scrapping of so many landing craft. Following the war, all active
LCAs were crewed by the Royal Marines who were given the responsibility for all
landing craft and raiding in the post-war British armed forces. Flotillas were
retained in Royal Marine service through the 1960s.
The Suez Crisis
The Suez Crisis in 1956 caused a scramble for available
LCAs. A few were serviceable in the Amphibious Warfare Squadron stationed in
Malta. Twenty LCAs were pulled out of storage at Gareloch, in Scotland, and
returned to fighting trim in Greenock.
At 06:45 on 6 November, LCAs landing Nos. 40 and 42 Commando
touched down at Port Said. The water here was particularly shallow as the beach
shelved gently and the Commandos, having to wade through such a wide water gap,
were perhaps fortunate that LVT amphibians also participated in the landing.
Still, the LCA crews had done exactly what was required of them - landing the
assault force on target and on time. The weather and sea conditions had
cooperated; north-easterly winds blew up over the next eight hours that would
have made the landing less accurate (and by the next morning impossible).
Although the commandos' initial assault had been seaborne,
their follow on build-up arrived by Westland Whirlwind helicopter. The great
success of this, the first helicopter-borne assault, signalled the close of the
assault landing craft era. As amphibians became more seaworthy and helicopters
had demonstrated the ability to fly over fixed beach defenses, the day of
landing craft as initial assault transport was seen to have passed.
Indochina
As France began repossession of its southeast Asian colonies
after the war, the need for amphibious craft became apparent. In 1946, France
acquired 26 LCA and other landing craft from the Royal Navy supply at Singapore.
They were, "well liked for their armour protection and relatively silent
engines, slow speed and lack of endurance were their main drawbacks."
These craft were fitted with overhead canvas covers, which provided the crews
some respite from the tropical rain and sun. They were armed with various
weapons, mostly 12.7mm heavy machine guns (mounted to face aft) and .303 Lewis
guns; these latter were replaced by more modern weapons as they became
available. The LCAs were used as patrol and assault craft until 1951. The
French Army and Navy created a number of river flotillas - sailors operated the
craft and soldiers manned the weapons - and in 1947 these flotillas were
designated as Divisions Navales d'Assaut. Two LCS(M)s were used in 1946–47 in Indochina.
These arrived unarmed, but improvised mounts enabled twin 7.62mm machine guns
to be carried in the turrets. Also, an 81mm mortar was installed in each craft.
Fittingly perhaps, considering that French troops were the first transported
into enemy fire by LCAs in 1940, these boats were the last LCAs to be recorded
in combat service.
Final Years in Service
The first amphibious craft of the Navy of the Federal
Republic of Germany were 10 LCAs obtained from Britain in October 1958. These
boats were viewed as well built by the German Navy, and were fitted with a
machine-gun and carried 25 soldiers. Though well regarded, they were small for
the tactical plans of the time and sometime about 1967 they were retired.
Perhaps the last operational use of LCAs by the Royal Navy
was in 1967 when boats from HMS Albion supported operations in Aden; an LCA
being the last craft to carry British personnel away from Aden.
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(1949). Assault From the Sea. London, UK: Methuen & Co. Ltd.
Milne, Gilbert A.
(1960). H.M.C.S. : One Photographer's Impressions of the Royal Canadian Navy in
World War II. London, UK: Thomas Allen.
Montgomery,
Bernard Law (1949). El Alamein to the River Sangro. London, UK: E. P. Dutton
& Co.
Otway, T. B. H. (1990).
The Second World War 1939–1945. London, UK: Imperial War Museum.
Porch, Douglas
(1991). The French Foreign Legion. New York: HarperCollins.
Robertson,
Terence (1967). The Shame and the Glory: Dieppe. Toronto: McClelland &
Stewart.
Saunders, Hilary
A. St. George (1943). Combined Operations: The Official Story of the Commandos.
New York: Macmillan.
Thompson, R.W.
(1957). At Whatever Cost: The Story of the Dieppe Raid. New York:
Coward-McCann.
Tooley, Robert
(1989). Invicta. Fredericton, New Brunswick: New Ireland Press.
U.S. Navy (1944).
ONI 226: Allied Landing Craft and Ships. US Government Printing Office.
U.S. War
Department (1945). Omaha Beachhead. US Government Printing Office.
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A newly-completed British Landing Craft Assault LCA ready for launching, 1942. |
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LCA (Landing Craft Assault) form line ahead as they move off from the landing ship Llangby Castle, carrying troops of the Winnipeg Rifles to Juno Beach, Normandy, June 6, 1944. |
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Royal Navy Beach Commandos aboard a Landing Craft Assault of the 529th Flotilla, Royal Navy, during a training exercise off the coast of England, 9 May 1944. |
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British Landing Craft Assault LCAs carrying Canadian troops located close to shore. |
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Reinforcements going ashore from a Landing Craft Assault (LCA) from HMCS Prince Henry off the Normandy bridgehead, June 1944. |
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Commandos loading ammunition aboard a Landing Craft Assault (LCA) of HMCS Prince David near Taranto, Italy, 13 September 1944. |
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Infantrymen in a Landing Craft Assault (LCA) going ashore from HMCS Prince Henry off the Normandy beachhead, France, 6 June 1944. |
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LCAs towing schools of rubber boats, approach their mother ship HMCS Prince Henry at the wind up of pre-invasion exercises off the shore of Italy. |
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Infantrymen of Le Régiment de la Chaudière in a Landing Craft Assault (LCA) from HMCS Prince David during a training exercise, England, 9 May 1944. |
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Infantrymen of Le Régiment de la Chaudière in a Landing Craft Assault (LCA) alongside HMCS Prince David off Bernières-sur-Mer, France, 6 June 1944. |
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Petty Officer Shipwright R. Abernethy repairing mine damage to one of the Landing Craft Assault (LCA) of HMCS Prince Henry on D-Day, France, 6 June 1944. |
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Infantrymen of the 1st Battalion, The Canadian Scottish Regiment, embarking in a Landing Craft Assault (LCA) alongside HMCS Prince Henry off the Normandy beachhead, France, 6 June 1944. |
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Infantrymen of Le Régiment de la Chaudière an a Landing Craft Assault (LCA) alongside HMCS Prince David off the coast of England, 9 May 1944. |
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Infantrymen of the 1st Battalion, The Canadian Scottish Regiment, at prayer before boarding a Landing Craft Assault (LCA) to go ashore from HMCS Prince Henry off the Normandy beachhead, France, 6 June 1944. |
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Troops in LCA, Ex Fabius III. |
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LCAs launched by HMCS Prince Henry during a training exercise for D-Day, May 1944. |
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Infantrymen of the 1st Battalion, The Canadian Scottish Regiment, in a Landing Craft Assault (LCA) of the Landing Ship Infantry (LSI(M)) HMS Queen Emma during Exercise FABIUS, England, ca. 29 April - 4 May 1944. |
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Empty davits for LCAs. |
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LCA, rubber craft and crew by shoreline, 1944. |
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LCA, rubber craft and crew by shoreline, 1944. |
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South of France invasion, ĂŽle du Levant. German prisoners unloading supplies from LCA, August 1944. |
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South of France invasion, ĂŽle du Levant. German prisoners unloading supplies from LCA, August 1944. |
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Troops on LCA, south of France invasion, August 1944. |
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LCA with troops, ca. 1944. |
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An LCA towing a school of rubber boats. August 24, 1944. |
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American and Canadian troops which took part in the pre-invasion exercises for the Mediterranean Operation, loll around on a LCA as they return to Prince Henry, the mother ship who waits out in the stream. August 22, 1944. |
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LCA from Prince Henry ferrying medical personnel to island during exercise a few days before invasion of Southern France. Taking troops ashore in rubber boats, this is what a marshaling looks like, all confusion while the LCAs make fast towlines. August 1944. |
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Landing Craft, Assault (LCA) 518, 6 June 1944. |
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Infantrymen of the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade coming ashore from a Landing Craft Assault (LCA) during a training exercise, England, 12 April 1944. |
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Survivors from a LCA which conveyed during the invasion. June 1944. |
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Survivors from a LCA which conveyed during the invasion. June 1944. |
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LCA leave HMS Rocksand for the island of Nancowry, the first step of the British occupation of the Nicobar Islands. |
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During Operation Archery, a wounded Commando is brought to a LCA. In the steering shelter, the coxswain appears to be keeping the craft nosed onto the beach by keeping the engines gently ahead while a seaman is preventing the craft from broaching to with a quant pole, December 27, 1941. |
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British troops disembarking from an assault craft on the west coast. The operation, to prevent Japanese forces from capturing the island, lasted some months against light Vichy French opposition. Australian warships supported the operation. Tamatave, Madagascar, May 1942. |
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American troops landing on the beach at Arzeu, near Oran, from a landing craft assault (LCA 26), some of them are carrying boxes of supplies. November 1942. |
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Indian troops embarking from the cruiser HMS Kenya in a landing craft assault (LCA 346) to take over from the Royal Marines, South of Ramree, Burma. Royal Marines of the East Indies Fleet made a successful landing on Cheduba Island under protection of a bombardment by cruisers and destroyers and air cover provided by the Fleet Air Arm. |
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Commandos of the 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division of the British Army coming ashore from LCA at Gold Beach near La Rivière-Saint-Sauveur, Normandy, France, on 6 June 1944. |
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A fleet of Landing Craft Assault passing a landing ship during exercises prior to the invasion of Normandy. King George VI (not visible) is taking the salute on board the headquarters ship HMS Bulolo at Beaulieu Roads. The numbers of several of the LCAs are visible, they are LCA 654, LCA 1254, LCA 926, LCA 1025, LCA 1009, LCA 920, LCA 602, LCA 656, LCA 921, and LCA 1043. Off Beaulieu, 24 May 1944. |
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American troops manning their landing craft assault from a doorway in the side of the liner Reina del Pacifico. Two of the landing craft are numbered LCA 428 and LCA 447. |
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American troops on board a LCA heading for the beaches at Oran in Algeria during Operation Torch, November 1942. |
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Troops disembarking from a landing craft assault (LCA 164) in Tamatave harbor, Madagascar’s principle port. |
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Men of 6th Battalion, the Green Howards in an LCA during Exercise Fabius, 5 May 1944. |
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Troops charge ashore from an LCA during combined operations training in the presence of the King at Inverary in Scotland, 9 October 1941. |
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Commandos charge ashore from a LCA during training in Scotland, 28 February 1942. |
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Commandos in an LCA during an exercise, April 1942. |
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Camouflaged troops in an LCA during combined operations training in the canal zone, Egypt, 2 August 1941. |
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British troops in a LCA, invasion of Sicily, July 9, 1943. |
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Landing craft leaving the assault ships off Tamatave, Madagascar’s principle port. |
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Army assault troops landing from LCA 57 as naval beach parties and commandos train at HMS Saunders, Kabrit, Bitter Lakes near the Mediterranean. |
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Troops landing on the beach from an LCA during pre-invasion fleet exercises in the English Channel in the Portsmouth and Isle of Wight area. A Duplex Drive Valentine tank is driving up the beach whilst in the foreground troops leave a landing craft assault. |
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LCAs returning to the Empire Halberd (LSI) after landing their troops on to the beaches during pre-invasion fleet exercises in the English Channel, Portsmouth and Isle of Wight area. |
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Wooden hulled assault craft with Marines on board nearing the beach at Cheduba, South of Ramree, Burma. Royal Marines of the East Indies Fleet made a successful landing on Cheduba Island under protection of a bombardment by cruisers and destroyers and air cover provided by the Fleet Air Arm. |
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Royal Marines of HMS Kenya dashing ashore as their wooden hulled assault craft touch down on the beach at Cheduba, South of Ramree, Burma. Royal Marines of the East Indies Fleet made a successful landing on Cheduba Island under protection of a bombardment by cruisers and destroyers and air cover provided by the Fleet Air Arm. |
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In the distance a destroyer is laying a smoke screen around one of the transports off Oran. Two LCAs and one landing craft personnel (ramped) can be seen in the foreground, LCA 85, LCA 394 and LCP (R) 838. Operation Torch, North Africa, November 1942. |
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LCA 1050 leaving side of HMCS Prince David, loaded with soldiers of the Régiment de la Chaudière, 9 May 1944. |
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Final exercise prior to assault landing at Dieppe. Note the early style of naming. |
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Final training exercise prior to D-Day. |
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LCA (landing craft, assault) boat manned by Royal Marines are co-operating with AIF in amphibious landing training. These LCAs were used in the landing on D-Day at Normandy and were manned by Royal Marines. On arriving at this locality in Australia, the Royal Marines were issued with Australian felt hats and wear them with their famous Marine badge in place of the rising sun. Queensland. 22 January 1945. |
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LCA (landing craft, assault) boat manned by Royal Marines are co-operating with AIF in amphibious landing training. These LCAs were used in the landing on D-Day at Normandy and were manned by Royal Marines. On arriving at this locality in Australia, the Royal Marines were issued with Australian felt hats and wear them with their famous Marine badge in place of the rising sun. Queensland. 22 January 1945. |
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Unity Beach, Queensland, 13 November 1944. A LCA from HMS Empire Spearhead carrying troops from 2/5 Field Ambulance beaching shortly after H hour on Uncle Green Beach during the amphibious training exercise Ooctopus. The LCI in the background approaches the beach. Identified personnel are: Private W. Stack; Staff Sergeant V.J. Behan. |
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Group portrait of Royal Marines on their LCA boat. The two center marines are wearing the new Australian issue felt hats with their famous Marine badge in place of the rising sun. The other four are wearing the Royal Marine beret and badge. Royal Marines who took part in the landing on D-Day on the Normandy front, are still manning the same landing craft used on that landing and are co-operating with famous AIF Divisions in amphibious landing operations in Australia. Queensland. 22 January 1945 |
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Three Royal Marines now training with AIF wearing their new issue of Australian felt hats with their famous Marine badge in place of the rising sun. LCA boats manned by Royal Marines were used in the landing on D-Day at Normandy and were manned by the same Royal Marines. Queensland. 22 January 1945. |
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LCAs of the Royal Navy in line ahead. The second vessel in line is LCA 96. |
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LCAs returning to the landing ship, infantry HMS Empire Spearhead in the background viewed from an LCA from HMS Glenearn. The craft are supporting the amphibious training exercise Octopus. Unity Point, Queensland, November 13, 1944. [Unity Point was the code name for Buchan Point.] |
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Members of 42 Landing Craft Company who played a heroic part in evacuating 31/51 Infantry Battalion troops from Porton plantation. Pictured are the crew of the only LCA to get in and out without being stranded on the first night of the evacuation. Identified personnel are: Cpl Henry, engineer; Ravi, the head boy of the native pilots; Sapper P.C. Gardner, wireless; Capt S. Leslie, skipper and officer commanding the unit; Sapper B. Balhorn, coxswain; Cpl A. Seiler coxswain of LCA 730 and the only member of its crew that escaped injury. Soraken area, Bougainville, June 12, 1945. |
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Beach Landing Craft (LCA) for winter storage at the end of the summer training period. 11 Beach Recovery Section REME, 264 Beach Brigade (TA driver and crew training with RN co-operation with craft). |
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Newly completed Landing Craft Assault (LCAs) being handed over to the Royal Navy by builders, Elliotts of Reading, Berkshire, England. It is believed the photographs were taken in September 1944. Mike Taylor was involved in testing the craft on the river prior to handover and he can be seen standing between and behind a naval officer and Mr. Elliott, one of the directors of the firm. The person in the white coat was Reg Hemmings who later became a director. It is believed the other civilians in the photos were also in the employ of Elliotts having played their part in the construction of the craft. |
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The six landing craft assembled prior to handover ceremony. |
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Repositioned for ease of access in readiness for the handover ceremony. |
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After the ceremony the craft were taken down the river by a mixture of naval personnel and Elliott’s staff. Family folklore suggests that Cyril Taylor was amongst those delivering the craft to London. |
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The craft just below Reading Bridge heading off towards London. |
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In Weymouth harbor, LCA and LCI (Landing Craft Infantry) await departure for Normandy. |
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The well deck of the British LCA with three rows of benches for embarked troops. |
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Infantry of the Regiment de la Chaudiere disembarking from Royal Navy LCA, on Nan sector of Juno Beach. |
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Troops and ammunition for light guns being brought ashore from a LCA 428 on Arzeau beach, Algeria, North Africa, whilst LCA 287 approaches the beach. |
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Bodies and beached landing craft in front of the sea wall on Nan Red beach, Juno area, near St Aubin-sur-Mer, 6 June 1944. LCT 518 is on the right. LCA 522 on the left. |
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LCA (right) landing at a beachhead, Burma, 1945. The troops are disembarking and forming chains to unload food and water containers. |
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LCA (right) landing at a beachhead, Burma, 1945. The troops are disembarking and forming chains to unload food and water containers. |
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Royal Navy landing craft churn through the waters of a British port, taking American troops to a waiting ship during preparations for the Normandy invasion, circa May-June 1944. The nearest craft is LCA 1377. Letters PB on the boat’s side indicate that it is assigned to the HMS Prince Baudouin. |
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Launching an LCA. |
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Palm Beach area, Queensland, 21 October 1944. A LCA carrying troops of 2/14 Infantry Battalion proceeds ashore after leaving the Landing Ship Infantry HMS Glenearn. |
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British Landing Craft Assault LCA. |
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Assault Landing Craft (ALC [LCA]). |
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Assault Landing Craft (ALC [LCA]). |
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British Landing Craft Assault LCA 1008. |
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British Landing Craft Assault LCA 1063. |
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British Landing Craft Assault (LCA). |
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British Landing Craft Assault (LCA). |