The German XIV SS Corps in November-December 1944

Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski at a map briefing.

by Von Dem Bach-Zelewski

This is the complete text of Manuscript #MS B-252 obtained from the National Archives, Washington, D.C.

On 8 November while I was on leave I was ordered to report to Heinrich Himmler, in his special train in the Black Forest, in order to take over a new corps which was about to be activated. On 10 November I presented myself in the special train, which was at Triberg in a railway tunnel. Himmler had been appointed commander in chief of the Army Group Upper Rhine which was about to be constituted.

Himmler explained to me, with the help of a situation map, the catastrophic situation of our collapsed front in Alsace-Lorraine.

I was ordered to build up, as the XIV. SS Corps, a new defensive front in the German West Wall, on the eastern bank of the Rhine.

The right corps limit ran past and included Graben-Bruchsal. I was to establish contact with the army of General der Panzertruppen Balck. On account of the retreating movement of the front which was still continuing, the point of main effort in building up the new defensive front, on my right wing, was in the bridgehead of Karlsruhe–Maximiliansau–Maxau, situated north of the West Wall and in the development of Karlsruhe as a strongpoint under a generalleutnant, whose name I cannot remember, as commanding officer.

As left corps limit the Leopold Canal, inclusive, was decided on. My left neighbor, linking up with the Swiss frontier was the XVIII. SS Corps, to be newly organized by Waffen-SS Generalmajor Reinefarth.

The smaller bridgeheads of Drusenheim, Gerstheim and Rhinau, to the west of the Rhine, which were still held by isolated units of company strength reinforced by “Volkssturm” were to be abandoned even on small pressure by the enemy; the larger bridgehead in the harbor area of Strassbourg manned by one replacement training battalion of the army from Stuttgart was to be held. Adolf Hitler had reserved for himself the right to authorize blowing up of the large bridges Strassbourg-Kehl.

In the new corps area at first only, the following troops were on hand: four replacement training battalions of the Army in the area Kehl–Oberkirch, under the command of Generalleutnant Seeger; Recruiting Area Headquarters Stuttgart; a fortress construction engineer battalion, and an anti-aircraft artillery battalion in the Maximilian-sau–Maxau bridgehead. I was to build up the rest of the front by committing the local “Volkssturm” and collect all the split-up parts of the army and its rear formations which were streaming back over the Rhine. At the end of November the remnants of the 9th Volksgrenadier Division, destroyed by the Americans at Zabern were also transferred to the area of Baden-Baden for reconstitution, and were subordinated to the XIV. SS Corps. By the energetic combing out of all villages for [cut-off] units, and individual stragglers, the reorganization of battalions and regiments with a strength of about 12,000 men was gradually achieved.

The corps command post was established at Baden-Baden, advance corps command posts prepared at Leibersdung, Memprechtshofen and Kehl.

The corps headquarters staff consisted mainly of the personnel of the former operational staff of the chief of the anti-partisan formations. Police Colonel Goltz became Chief of General Staff.

Between the end of November and the beginning of December 1944 the troops of the XIV. SS Corps were organized as follows:

Right Sector

Improvised divisional staff, division commander Colonel of the Army von Witzleben, bearer of the Knight’s Cross, command post at Malsch, advance command post at Hügelsheim.

Regimental staff of the Positional Regiment No. 1 under a Lieutenant Colonel of the Army at Welsch. Two “Volkssturm” battalions at Graben and Leopoldshafen, which achieved a certain military coherence through having skeleton of non-commissioned officers and enlisted men from permanent West Wall personnel. The fortress construction engineer battalion in the Maximiliansau–Maxau bridgehead was placed under Regiment No. 1 as 3rd Battalion, also the Maxau anti-aircraft artillery battalion. The combat commander of Karlsruhe was subordinated directly to the XIV. SS Corps.

Positional Regiment No. 2, regimental command post in the barracks of Rastatt, regimental commander a major of the Army. Subordinated to it was one replacement training battalion of the Army and a battalion composed of the supernumerary supply train members of the 9th Volksgrenadier Division. As 3rd Battalion the permanent “Volkssturm” with its post at Elchesheim. The only heavy armament was an improvised battery with captured Russian guns, and a 2-cm anti-aircraft battery dependent on cooperation with the Regiment No. 2.

Left Sector

Division Generalleutnant Seeger—previously staff of the training division at Stuttgart—divisional command post at Oberkirch.

The right regiment as Regiment No. 3 the SS Police Regiment No. 2 with two battalions, reinforced by one battalion of Customs Frontier Guard as 3rd Battalion. The regimental command post was at Memprechtshofen, one company was sent forward to Drusenheim to man the bridgehead. Police Regiment No. 2 had a heavy armament company of its own, and in addition, I placed an improvised anti-tank company under it. An artillery battalion with captured Russian guns was being constituted and trained in the regimental sector.

Positional Regiment No. 4 was in the Kehl sector, consisting of four replacement training battalions of the Recruiting Area Headquarters Stuttgart, regimental commander a particularly experienced major of the Army, regimental command post at Kehl. One battalion respectively at Kehl, Altenheim, Aünheim and as bridgehead unit in the harbor of Strassbourg. Four anti-tank guns in position on the bridges of Strassbourg, the bridges prepared for blasting and guarded by an engineer unit.

Positional Regiment No. 5 consisting of the Police School of Ettlingen and of two “Volkssturm” battalions, the regimental commander was the commandant of the police school, a lieutenant colonel of the police. The regimental command post was at Lahr, two bridgeheads in company strength at Gerstheim and Rhinau respectively.

In the area of Oberkirch–Kehl one improvised artillery battalion and two heavy railway guns in position subordinated directly to Division Seeger.

The combat commander of Offenburg, a brigadier general of the Army, was subordinated directly to the XIV. SS Corps.

Enemy pressure against the bridgehead of Strassbourg by continuous artillery fire and attacks by French infantry supported by tanks was very strong from the beginning. Our casualties, in the terrain which offered no cover and was overlooked by the enemy, were so considerable that the danger arose that a stronger attack by the enemy would allow the bridges to be captured intact.

On my urgent request to be allowed either to widen the bridgehead by way of attack or to evacuate it, I was finally authorized to evacuate and blast the bridges.

The blasting of the bridges was accomplished without hindrance, the withdrawal of our infantry only in part as the enemy pressed forward energetically after the blasting detonations. Half of our infantry were able to cross in assault boats, the other half was taken prisoner.

In the course of further expansion by the enemy from Strassbourg to the north and south, the small bridgeheads at Drusenheim, Gerstheim and Rhinau were also given up on weak pressure from the enemy, and the bridges were blasted as had been ordered.

The French sentries and single American tanks guarding the west bank of the Rhine being very sure of victory and therefore rather careless, rendered possible the maintenance of our stationary patrols on the western bank of the Rhine during the whole period in the wooded and marshy terrain between the enemy sentries.

Distant reconnaissance patrols were sent forward every night far into the enemy’s rear, some of them stayed out for several days and advanced as far as Hagenau.

Therefore, our picture of the enemy’s situation, including American tank movements was complete, which fact was to be of inestimable service to me during our own attack in January 1945. On the other hand, the information available to the Commander-in-Chief Upper Rhine Army Group, was miserable and my patrol activity was really its only source. The reason for this was that during the precipitate withdrawal of the German troops from Alsace, the German High Command omitted leaving behind any experienced net of agents. Subsequent improvisations could not be successful as the psychological effect of the German reverse did not leave the Alsatian population prepared to cooperate in favor of the Germans.

Enemy patrol activity east of the Rhine could not be ascertained. From this and from the fact that there was no evidence anywhere of enemy work for the construction of ferries or bridges it was clearly to be concluded that the enemy had no intention of attacking in my sector.

Therefore, the guarding of our bank of the river could safely be left more and more to the “Volkssturm”; the military units on the other hand, could be carefully trained and equipped.

When the German offensive in the Ardennes had come to a standstill, Adolf Hitler called a meeting, for 28 December 1944 at the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief West of the Army, with commanders and commanding generals intended to lead a new attack.

Field Marshal von Rundstedt announced the assembled generals to Adolf Hitler, whereupon the latter began to speak. He at once confessed frankly that the offensive in the Ardennes had failed. Hitler attributed this failure of the German offensive not to enemy air supremacy, but above all to German mistakes. In very sharp and plain words he exposed the alleged German mistakes. Hitler saw the principle reason of our coming to a standstill in the over-motorization of the German formations. This over-motorization had crowded everything together on the few roads, an advance in developed formation and hopelessly obstructed the roads. Only because of this could the enemy air force have such a decisive effect. In practice what had happened, was that the infantry divisions which simply went on marching beside the roads when these were obstructed, advanced more quickly than the fully mechanized formations.

From the failure of the offensive, Hitler drew the following operational decision:

The conditions necessary to continue the western offensive on a large scale existed no more, especially as the Russian offensive might begin at any moment. But it would be a great mistake to change over now to rigid defense and thereby give full liberty of action to the Western Powers. In this case the western enemy would concentrate his main forces against the Ruhr District. In order to divert and split up these enemy forces, but also because a German defensive would hold down the same amount of our forces as attack, if not more, the attacks were to be continued, although with limited objectives.

For the first days of January, Hitler ordered, as the first such limited attack, that the Blaskowitz Army should start attacking from the area of Weissenburg in a west-southwesterly direction towards Wörth.

A few days after the beginning of the attack the XIV. SS Corps should form a bridgehead north of Strassbourg in order to draw the enemy reserves and by that to facilitate the advance of the Blaskowitz Army.

Under favorable circumstances the bridgehead of the XIV. SS Corps should aim at establishing contact with the Blaskowitz Army west of the forest of Hagenau.

After the issue of these orders by Hitler, Field Marshal von Rundstedt thanked him for his hard but just criticism and promised in the name of all generals present to take Hitler’s instructions to heart and to do his utmost in the coming battles.

Two days before, the XIV. SS Corps received orders to attack and form the bridgehead on 5 January 1945. Choice of the terrain of attack and the time left to me. Only the following were given to me in addition by the Army Group: an assault gun battalion, an anti-tank battalion, and material for the construction of one heavy and two light ferries. I had to organize the other attack groups from my improvised formations, including the 9th Volksgrenadier Division which had only been reconstituted up to forty per cent.

Considering the strained overall situation, however, the equipment of my unit with weapons, ammunition, motor vehicles and also with motor fuel could still be designated as being satisfactory. This had been achieved less by regular supply on the part of the Army Group than by meticulously picking up of all irregular reserves in the form of isolated troops and supply formations from the collapsed Alsace-Lorraine front, who had quartered independently in my sector.

My work of building up was very much facilitated in this case by the endeavors, which had become more and more pronounced during the whole war, of all formations to hoard their own “black” material and even personnel reserves, as they could rely less and less on the legal means of supply; in the end it was only success that counted and after a success nobody asked how the unit had been able to reorganize itself again so quickly for action. The formations concerned seldom ventured to complain of a confiscation as they were convinced themselves of the illegality of their “black” stocks.

As an assembly area, the XIV. SS Corps decided on the region between Freistett and Lichtenau. The bridgehead was to be in the area of Drusenheim, Offendorf and Gambsheim. I had chosen this region because the bank of the Rhine on this side was wooded and thus, by providing camouflage for the assembly position and above all for the construction of ferries, offered the possibility of surprise even in face of the strong enemy air reconnaissance; the western bank of the Rhine was especially favorable for the first critical days in the creation of the bridgehead, because here the wooded area was, in addition, traversed by a number of creeks to the Rhine. This seemed to me the removal of any danger of the bridgehead being destroyed by the enemy tank attack which was to be expected immediately, before a sufficient number of armor-piercing weapons had crossed. The two ferries were my most vulnerable spots in face of the enemy air superiority. Therefore, in the first few days, only the hours of darkness and in the early morning mist it would be suitable to operate the ferries.

For reasons of security I had the rumor spread among the population by alleged quartering of officers, that the “Volkssturm” would soon be relieved by GHQ troops in the line of concrete fortifications. The ferry construction took place only at night, the assembly areas were not occupied until the last night.

The corps command post was transferred forward to Memprechtshofen, the command post of the 9th Volksgrenadier Division to Scherzheim.

A special combat team was formed under the command of Captain of Armored Troops von Lüttichau, and an infantry battalion and an anti-tank battalion were subordinated to him in addition to his assault gun battalion. This combat team particularly was to bear the main weight of all attacks. The assembled two improvised infantry regiments were to be committed, according to their fighting qualities, only for the defense of the bridgehead.

The attack took place in the earliest morning twilight. The infantry battalion von Lüttichau and an infantry regiment crossed over in assault boats. After firing a few shots the enemy sentries retired immediately into the nearest villages and alerted the single American tanks standing there. These at once started counterattacking in small groups but they soon stuck fast among the mass of water-filled ditches. As we succeeded before it became real light, in ferrying across an 8.8-cm anti-aircraft artillery battalion and an anti-tank company, the small bridgehead was secured for the first twenty-four hours.

Simultaneously, with this main attack, a combat team composed only of an improvised infantry regiment and “Volkssturm” without heavy weapons under Colonel von Witzleben had, in order to create a diversion, started an attack in assault boats from the area of Hügelsheim against Fort Louis and Neuhausel. I had given Colonel von Witzleben a free hand to evacuate the enemy bank again immediately in case the enemy should counterattack. Surprisingly enough, the troops in Beinheim, Neuhausel, Fort Louis and Stattmatten, consisting only of French infantry, evacuated these places after a short engagement giving the impression that these villages in the outpost area of the Maginot Line had been occupied only by French rebels.

I ordered Colonel von Witzleben to prepare the occupied localities for defense, to resist weaker attacks and to send reconnaissance patrols forward towards the Maginot Line.

In the main bridgehead the combat team of von Lüttichau succeeded within the first five days in occupying the villages of Herrlisheim, Ottendorf and Gambsheim against strong enemy resistance and thereby decisively enlarged the bridgehead.

In the next few days the villages did change hands again many times, as our infantry’s morale could not stand up to the American tank attacks. Our infantry losses were considerable, especially in prisoners, but von Lüttichau’s combat team always succeeded in recapturing the villages again.

The combat team took several hundred prisoners and was able to report in the first few days the disabling of twenty-two enemy tanks; altogether, during the first three weeks, the disabling of forty-eight enemy tanks.

As the enemy resistance in this main bridgehead was obviously stiffening, reconnaissance by the northern combat team of von Witzleben showed that there the American forces were only just beginning in the occupation of the Maginot Line and the relief of the French forces. I proposed in higher headquarters that we should take the fortifications of the Maginot Line west of Fort Louis, by bringing up a strong combat formation and thus gain the Maxau–Maximilian­sau–Lauterbourg–Seltz–Drusenheim road as a supply route on the western bank, to relieve the inadequacy of the ferrying operations.

My proposal was accepted, and the 10th Parachute Division was added to the XIV. SS Corps.

The newly activated 10th Parachute Division, under the command of Generalmajor Schulz, was inspired with an offensive spirit which was seldom still to be found in the year of 1944.

Its aggressive spirit was ample compensation for its lack of combat experience. With hard fighting, the villages of Roppenheim, Röschwoog, Aünheim and Dalhunden were taken, and the Maginot Line was thus pierced.

These successes induced the higher command to put the SS armored division “Frundsberg” under the command of SS-Brigadeführer Harmel into the bridgehead of Herrlisheim–Gambsheim, by the road now cleared from Lauterbourg via Seltz, then on the Rhine dam east of Drusenheim.

While the SS panzer division prepared for the attack against Bischwiller, Kurtzenhausen und Weyersheim, the 10th Parachute Division took Forstfeld, Kauffenheim, Leutenheim and Soufflenheim in a speeding advance, took several hundred American prisoners, among them a battalion staff and an American colonel and finally in combined action with the 9th Volksgrenadier Division, captured the strong point Drusenheim, stubbornly defended by American tanks, in house-to-house fighting at night.

This was the situation when I was ordered to the east with my corps headquarters staff, to take over the X. SS Corps in Pomerania.

General der Panzertruppen Decker took over my formation on the Upper Rhine. I was finally relieved by him on 25 January 1945.

Obergruppenführer der Waffen-SS und General der Polizei Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, 1943. In December 1944 he became commander of the XIV SS Corps in the Baden-Baden region and between 26 January and 10 February 1945 of the X SS Corps in Pomerania, where his unit was annihilated after less than two weeks. He then commanded from 17 February 1945, the Oder Corps under Army Group Vistula. After the war in Europe ended, Bach-Zelewski went into hiding and tried to leave the country. US military police arrested him on 1 August 1945.

 

General der Panzertruppen Hermann Balck, 1943. In September 1944 Balck was transferred from 4th Panzer Army in Poland to the Western Front to command Army Group G in relief of General Johannes Blaskowitz in the Alsace region of France. Balck was unable to stop the Allied advance under General George S. Patton, and in late December he was relieved of command of Army Group G and placed in the officer reserve pool. By the intervention of General Heinz Guderian he was transferred to command the reconstituted 6th Army in Hungary, which also had operational control of two Hungarian armies. Balck's unit surrendered to the U.S. XX Corps in Austria on 8 May 1945.

General der Panzertruppe Karl Decker. Decker was appointed commander of the XXXIX Panzer Corps that was attached to the 3rd Panzer Army and promoted to General der Panzertruppe on 1 January 1945. After his unit was relocated to the Western Front, his corps fought the Americans at Uelzen and in the Alsace. Here the 5th Panzer Army was subordinated to Army Group B. Decker committed suicide on 21 April 1945 after the defeat and encirclement of the Army Group in the Ruhr Pocket in April.

SS-Gruppenführer Heinz Reinefarth. In November 1944, Reinefarth was given command over the XIV SS Corps on the Upper-Rhine and in December 1944 over the XVIII SS Corps in the central Oder river area. Between January and March 1945, he commanded the defence of "Festung Küstrin" (Kostrzyn nad Odrą). He declined to defend it to the last man and Hitler found fault with the way he withdrew his troops. Himmler, acting on Hitler's order, had Reinefarth arrested at the end of March 1945. Later he was sentenced to death by a military court. However, the sentence was not carried out, and he continued to command those of his troops that managed to leave the fortress. He moved his troops to the west and surrendered to the British.