by Colonel Conrad H. Lanza
Published in 1944
Finland
On 19 September the German forces in Finland, estimated at seven divisions, were divided into south and north groups. The south force was withdrawing north from a line along the Oulung River (Oulungjoki), the north one was holding a north-south line extending south from the east shore of the Rybachi (Fisher) peninsula. A Finnish army was about to attack the south force, and a Russian army had already commenced an attack against the north one. The Germans had no intention of resisting; they were evacuating Finland.
No serious fighting took place during September. By the end of the month the south force had withdrawn to north of Kemi, where it made a stand and repulsed the Finns who were following. It is not yet known whether these Germans were seeking to embark on transports at the port of Tornio, but this appears to have been the intention. This was stopped by a Finn amphibious expedition, which unexpectedly landed in Tornio on the night preceding 1 October.
A series of sharp clashes then occurred in which the Germans sought to retake Tornio. The German attack failed, the Finns managing to hold on to the seized port. At the same time they attacked along the shore road northward from Kemi.
The Germans thereupon gave up the attempt to take Tornio, but held on to the surrounding country until after their troops from Kemi had cleared the Tornio sector. Thereafter the Germans withdrew northward. They are apparently headed for north Norway, the nearest German base being about 300 miles away, beyond a barren intervening country. Due to the early winter the ground is generally frozen early in October, facilitating movements of vehicles.
On 7 October the Russians launched an attack against the north German front, previous operations having been restricted to exploratory raids. The initial Russian attacks, although strongly pressed, failed to make substantial progress. To speed the advance an amphibious expedition was sent from Murmansk, which landed on 10 October on Rybachi peninsula in rear of the German lines.
The Russians failed to encircle the Germans but they forced the abandonment of their positions. The Germans fell back to before Petsamo. The Russians followed closely.
Superior in strength to the Germans, the Russians now sought to encircle their positions from the south. The Germans avoided this by abandoning Petsamo which was entered by the Russians on 15 October. According to German reports the Russians have used very large air forces in this campaign and have had an unusual number of planes downed. This runs from fifty to eighty a day, and in general exceeds all other claimed Russian air losses over the remainder of the very long front.
On 18 October the line was in south Finland, almost just on the Arctic Circle; in north Finland, a north-south line just east from Kirkenes.
The Germans have a highway from Kirkenes to north Norway. There is no regular road available for the south force.
The Baltic States
On 19 September the line was Johvi (German) – Iiasaku (G) – Lake Peipus – Ema River – Lake Virts – Valga (G) – Smiltene (G) – Jaungelgava (Russian) – Jelgava (R) – Zagare (R) – Siauliai (R) – Raseinai (R) – Vilkaviskis (R).
Germany’s loss of three allies (Finland, Romania, and Bulgaria) and her reverses in France resulted in a new plan of defense against the converging attacks of the Americans and British on the west and the Russians on the east. The decision was to evacuate large areas in order to secure a shorter line which might be held by the number of German divisions now available. This included a withdrawal from France and from the Balkans (including the Aegean Islands). It further included abandonment of the three small Baltic States, less some small areas.
The retreat from Estonia began in early September, largely by water transportation. It seems to have escaped Russian observation for a time. On 16 September the Russians had started a large scale offensive on a 160-mile front between Lake Peipus and the Daugava (Dvina) River, with forty infantry divisions in line plus an unascertained number of armored troops and artillery divisions. When this account opens the Russians had reached the line indicated above, with the 3rd Baltic Army Group (Col. Gen. Ivan S. Maslanikov) on the north and the 2nd Baltic Army Group (Gen. Andrei I. Yeremenko) on the south.
Simultaneous with the above offensive the 1st Baltic Army Group (Col. Gen. Ivan C. Bagramian) which was south of the Daugava River was attacking in south Latvia and in Lithuania.
The Germans did not seriously contest these offensives. The terrain was much cut up by lakes and streams which restricted advances to certain spaces. There was much forest in the land. By destroying bridges, felling trees over roads, planting extensive mine fields, and by the judicious use of rear guards the Germans managed to withdraw their main bodies without serious losses. Special attention was given to anti-tank protection, as Russian spearheads were habitually largely composed of armored troops. A tank disabled about a bridge or in a narrow road, became a temporary road block. When the situation appeared favorable a certain number of German counterattacks were delivered. This was especially the case in the area around Jelgava, where the Germans had only a 15-mile corridor along the Gulf of Riga as the only land connection to Riga and beyond. It was essential to German plans to keep this open until after the rear guards had cleared Riga. Much of the German withdrawal was by water, however.
The Russians extended their attack on the north to include the isthmus between the Gulf of Finland and Lake Peipus. This sector was occupied by the Leningrad Army Group (Marshal Leonid Govorov). Pushing straight ahead this force reached the port of Tallinn (Reval), which was also the capital of Estonia, on 22 September.
By 27 September the Russians had reached the sea from Tallinn west and south to north of Riga. They had secured some booty, but less than usually taken and very few prisoners. There had been no substantial change in the line south of Riga. Along the entire front since the commencement of the offensive on the 15th, about a hundred Russian divisions had been in line. According to German reports their tank losses exceeded one thousand, or an average of eighty a day. This is probably a moderate loss for a front of 225 miles under modern conditions.
On 3 October the Russians started to occupy the islands across the entrance to the Gulf of Riga. The first island, Dago (Dagoe or Hiiu), was taken without difficulty on that day.
On 5 October the 1st Baltic and 3rd White Russian Army Groups started a large scale offensive due west from Siauliai on a 130 mile front with a view of driving to the coast and separating the German forces around Riga from their home country. An attack on Riga was continued at the same time. That city was fortified; progress against it was slow. At the same time the attack against the Riga Bay islands continued. An amphibious expedition landed on the north end of Oesel Island on the 6th. The German garrison retreated slowly southward, abandoning the island except the Svorbe peninsula at the south end. This contains batteries controlling the main ship channel to Riga. The Russians have since repeatedly attacked this peninsula, and have attempted to land troops in rear of the German land defense line. None of these efforts has succeeded.
On 10 October the Russians reached the Lithuanian coast at Palanga, about 16 miles north of Memel. At this date the attack on Riga was still being held by the enemy and the German corridor along the south side of the Gulf of Riga was open. Sea communication to Riga was available due to the Germans’ holding the south end of Oesel. From Palanga the Russian line extended almost in a straight line to Jelgava to the northeast, while to the south it ran close to and parallel to the frontier of East Prussia. This was found to be heavily defended, with indications that the enemy intended to hold it.
Riga fell on 13 October. At date of writing it appears that the Germans withdrew partly by sea, and partly by the corridor. As there was no further use for the corridor the Germans immediately withdrew westward from that sector, as far as the Lielupe River.
On 18 October the line was Lielupe River – Jelgava (R) – Zagare (R) – Mazeikiai (R) – a point on the sea 12 miles south of Liepaja (Libau). German beachhead on south (Svorbe) peninsula of Oesel Island.
The area north of the above line constituted a large German beachhead about the ports of Liepaja and Ventspils (Windau).
The line continued on along sea coast from south of Liepaja to Palanga (R) – Taurage (R) – Sakiai (R) – Vilkaviskis (?) – Suvalki (G).
Poland
On 19 September the line was Suvalki (G) – Augustow (G) – Osovets (R) – Narew River to vicinity of Warsaw, with small Russian and German bridgeheads at various points – Praga (R) – Vistula (Wista) River (with Russian bridgeheads south of the Pilica and in vicinity of Sandomierz) – Mielec (R) – Rseszow (R) – Jaslo (G) – Duklo (G).
The Polish front has been relatively tranquil.
In Warsaw there was a Polish insurrection in progress under Gen. Boromorowski (usually called “Bor” for convenience). On 21 September the Russians made an attempt to cross the Vistula at Warsaw. This was a complete failure. Thereafter the reduction by the Germans of the Poles proceeded methodically. On 2 October they surrendered with the honors of war.
In early October the Germans commenced operations to reduce a Russian bridgehead near Pultusk, while the Russians attempted to reduce a German one near Warsaw. Neither attempt was fully successful.
On 10 October a general Russian attack began along the Niemen River, with center opposite Rozan, just south of which the Russians had a bridgehead on the north side of the river. On the first two days only small gains were made, and fresh divisions were sent in on the 12th with very strong artillery and air support. The Germans also employed large air forces whose mission was to relieve the ground troops by suitable attacks on advancing enemy parties. This battle died down temporarily after the 13th, without having materially changed the front. It restarted on the 15th.
Next day a new attack was launched. It was apparently a diversion for a more important one just north of Suvalki. This had a front of only 25 miles but was in great force. This made progress, although it was slow. On 18 October this attack had reached the border of East Prussia.
With this exception, the line had not substantially changed during the period.
Hungary
A very determined effort has been made by the Russians to eliminate Hungary from the war. The shift of Romania from the Axis to the Allies had given the Russians twelve Romanian divisions, and a new front along the south side of Hungary. First measures were to clear the enemy out of Transylvania.
The 4th Ukraine Army Group (Col. Gen. Ivan Y. Petrov) was in line on the east of Hungary, and the 2nd Ukraine Army Group (Marshal Rodio Y. Malinovsky) was on the south. The enemy were mixed Hungarians and Germans. The line on 19 September was Dukla (?) – Jasliska (R) – Dolina (R) – Nadworna (R) – Delatyn (R) – Kuty (R) – Radauti (G) – Suceava (R) – Falticeni (R) – Gheorgheni (R) – Odorhei (R) – Targul Mures (G) – Turda (G) – Huedin (G) – Beius (G) – Ineu (?) – Arad (G).
The general form of the front was a German salient occupying a large part of Transylvania.
At the beginning of the period about thirty Russian and Romanian divisions were engaged in an offensive between Turda and Gheorgheni, both inclusive on a front of about 125 miles. A secondary effort was an attack against the Dukla and adjacent passes, on the opposite side of Transylvania.
Notwithstanding continuous attacks the Russian advance was for a time slow. Romanian troops entered Targul Mures on 28 September, thereby opening a route across the Muresul River. They then pushed on at once with main effort toward Reghin further up the valley. The Russian offensive was now extended westward along the entire line to Arad. Due to the terrain, and partly to lack of troops, this front was not entirely continuous; the battles centered about the main lines of communication. Main Russian efforts were toward Reghin, Cluj, Oradea, and Bekescaba.
After considerable minor fighting the Russians launched a major offensive on 3 October in the sector from Arad to Oradea. At the time the frontier between Hungary and Transylvania was entirely in Axis hands. German and Hungarian troops met the attack by strong counterattacks particularly in the vicinity of Oradea, where the terrain was suitable for operations of armored troops. For three days there was heavy fighting, with the Russians gaining west of Arad only. On 6 October their incessant attacks began to make appreciable progress. Next day the advance in the center reached the line Oroshaza – Bekescaba. The flanks had not kept up and were in rear.
The Axis commander now ordered a retreat to in rear of the Koeroes River, which involved withdrawal of his right and center but not his left, which at Oradea was already on this line. This maneuver tended to cover Budapest, which it seems was presumed to have been the Russian objective.
Next day—the 18th—the Russians forced a crossing of the Koeroes River west of Oradea. Armored troops dashed across. Instead of marching toward Budapest they went north toward Debreczen. They arrived opposite that city on the 9th.
There were strong German and Hungarian armored forces in this area, which is generally flat and excellent for maneuvers of motorized forces. These intercepted the Russians southwest of Debreczen. A long battle resulted with both armored forces seeking to encircle its opponent.
Other Russian forces reached the line of the Koeroes River on the 9th and established a bridgehead on the west bank south of Csongrad. The Axis managed to find troops to seal this operation. German GHQ issued orders for the evacuation of all of Transylvania, where there was a large German-held salient. It seems probable that the line to which the withdrawal was directed was the Tisza (Theiss) River. This would shorten the front by 175 miles, and release fifteen or more divisions. At this time most of the salient was under daily Russian attack, and some withdrawal had already been forced.
In the meantime the great tank battle south of Debreczen continued. Each side claims to have inflicted extraordinary tank losses on the opposite side. There was no decision. The Russians could not take Debreczen, and the Germans were unable to drive them off. It became a battle of attrition.
On 12 October the Russians organized a new attack to turn Debreczen from the south. This forced a crossing of the Koeroes River 45 miles southwest of Debreczen, when armored troops dashed 35 miles forward to Abadszalok on the Tisza River before being intercepted.
The Russian left captured Szeged on the 11th, affording another bridgehead over the Tisza River. Until 18 October there was no further material change in the line, although the great tank battle, near Debreczen kept on. The German retreat from Transylvania, according to their accounts, proceeded without interference.
The line at the end of the period was Dukla Pass (G) – southeast along the Carpathian Mountains with all passes in Russian hands to Raho (Rachov) (G) – Sighet (?) – Baia Mare (G) – Valea-lui-Mihai (?) – Debreczen (G) – Hajduszoboszlo (R) – Abadszalok (R) – Mezoetur (G) – Koeroes River – Tisza River (with Russian bridgeheads south of Csongrad and at Szeged).
Yugoslavia
At the beginning of the period the line was Arad (G) – Timisoara (G) – east boundary of Yugoslavia to include the Bulgarian frontier.
The Russian forces belonged to the 3rd Ukrainian Army Group (Gen. Feodor Tolbukhin). He was aided by a large force of Yugoslav Partisans belonging to Marshal Tito’s command, and by the regular Bulgar Army, which had recently shifted sides in the war.
At the beginning of September, the Germans had commenced to evacuate Greece and the Aegean Islands. Much of this movement passed through Salonika. From there the line of communications lay via the Vardar and Morava valleys through Belgrade. There were a good road and a railroad. An alternative route diverged at Skoplje to the northwest, and with both road and railroad passed through Sarajevo and on into Germany. On account of mountain grades this was a less desirable line, but it was practicable. Yugoslav partisans often attacked this line, but had never succeeded in closing it. The Russian mission was to close the main German line of communications, and if possible cut off all German forces to the south.
The Russians were not immediately prepared to undertake a serious offensive. They did not move until 27 September, when they started to force a crossing of the Danube River in the vicinity of Orsova. At this point a large bend in the river extends into Romania. It was possible for the Russians to attack three sides of this salient, and they effected their crossing, although not without considerable losses. It took until the 30th before the Russians were solidly across.
This offensive was supplemented by another which on 2 October attacked westward north of the Danube toward the line Vrsac – Bela Crkva. The latter point was taken on the first day. This Russian force contained numerous motorized troops and their objective was Belgrade (Beograd). The south attack contained mountain troops. It advanced almost due south following a railroad, and reached Zajecar on the 6th. On the same day the north attack not having met strong resistance arrived within 10 miles of Belgrade, on the north side of the Danube.
German reinforcements counterattacked in both areas on the 9th without making any gains. Some of the fighting was savage.
The south Russian attack shifted its main effort to its right. This advanced across country and cut the Belgrade and Nish railroad near Palanka (well north of the junction where the German alternate line turns off). At the same time the Russians continued to push their left toward Nish. Bulgar forces now joined and extended the Russian left to east of Nish. Other Bulgar forces assumed the offensive along each pass on their west border.
The south Russian attack continued to expand; its right came opposite to Belgrade on the south side of the Danube on the 14th. The north attack had in the meantime not made progress. On the same day Bulgar forces entered Nish but did not clear it until the 16th.
On 15 October the Russian south attack entered the south part of Belgrade. The north attack spread northward in the area south of Szeged.
On 18 October the line was Szeged (R) –Subotica (R) – Senta (R) – Tisa River – Belgrade (?) – Morava valley to Nish (R) – Leskovac (G) – Kriva Palanka (?) – Stip (G) – Strumica (Strumnitza) (G) – Kilkis (G) – Stavros (G).
This left the Germans the use of the alternate line of communications from Salonika to the north via Skoplje and Sarajevo.
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