M16 Half-tracks in the Philippines: After Action Reports of the 209th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion

These narrative reports were obtained from the National Archives, Washington, D.C.

Battery A, 209th AAA Aw Battalion, 0320, 17 February 1945

Corporal James Robinson was on guard duty at No. 12 machine gun position on the Pasig River when at 0320 hours on 17 February 1945 he spotted a canoe coming down river about 25 yards away. He immediately opened fire with a Tommy gun from a position in a foxhole. The first two short bursts of four each wounded one of the three visible men in the craft. One man from the rear of the boat ran forward to help the wounded man and at this point Corporal Robinson could plainly hear the occupants of the boat jabbering. He then emptied his Tommy gun on the canoe which caused it to blow up with a tremendous explosion. Corporal Robinson was knocked down by the explosion and received a slight cut over the eye from a flying piece of bone. Private James McCarthy, who was on the half-track, was knocked off by the force of the explosion but was uninjured.

Corporal John Holmes ripped his way out of his hammock and leaped on to the half-track and into the gun turret. He immediately raked the river and banks expending eighty rounds of .50-caliber ammunition. Small arms were fired spasmodically until daylight at every floating object on the river. The gun section expended sixty rounds of small arms ammunition altogether.

The area around the gun was inspected at daybreak and fragments of human bodies were found all over the area. Bone fragments, pieces of flesh, skull fragments, and human entrails were found on the gun itself, in the hammocks, and all over the area in general. The force of the explosion broke window panes for 150 yards around and one piece of flesh was found 200 yards from the immediate scene of the action. The only damage incurred was the ripping of three jungle hammocks caused by the men themselves in their haste to get out. It is assumed that the enemy was attempting to blow up the pontoon bridge close by our position.

Battery A, 209th AAA AW Battalion (SP) Attached to 3rd Battalion, 63rd Infantry Regiment, 21-30 June 1945

21 June

At 0700, Provisional Platoon Battery A, consisting of seven M16 and two M15 Special half-tracks departed Luna, arriving at 6th Division command post at Solano at 2200. The battery was quartered at division command post that night and attached to 3rd Battalion, 63rd Infantry Regiment, which was located five miles north of Bagabag. Battery arrived at 3rd Battalion at 1300, 22 June, and reported to commanding officer, Colonel Mueller. There was no action on this date.

23 June

Supply trains had been ambushed on the morning of 22 June and our first mission was to accompany the supply train along with an armored car on the morning of 23 June. We used a personnel carrier half-track and two M16s. Major Samusson, S-2 of 63rd Regiment, and Major Wells, Executive Officer of 3rd Battalion, rode in a gun track. The enemy action of the previous day had everyone on the alert. There was no enemy action en route. Destination was the forward area of I and K Companies, 11 miles north of Bagabag on Highway No. 4. At this location the commanding officer of the 3rd Battalion designated an area that he wanted strafed. Working in shifts, two M16s strafed the area thoroughly. During the firing an explosion was heard and it is believed an ammo dump was hit by our fire. Firing was completed at 1230 and all tracks returned to our command post at 1300 hours. There was no enemy activity and we sustained no casualties or damage to material.

24 June

No action occurred.

25 June

1st Battalion requested two M16s for the morning of the 25th. Vehicles arrived at forward command post, 1st Battalion, located eight miles north of Bagabag on Highway No. 4 at 0700. At 0800 both half-tracks moved north up Highway No. 4 with squads of infantry covering both flanks. A pillbox was sighted at 800 yards. We opened fire and set it ablaze. At a point nine miles north of Bagabag, Company C, Captain Rainville commanding, joined us. Company C dispatched a patrol to take a hill on our right front. Captain Rainville directed one of our machine gun squads to strafe a draw on our forward left flank. Just before we opened fire an enemy sniper’s bullet ricocheted off a scout car and all took cover. As we opened fire a Japanese machine gun hit our track. The infantry patrol was pinned down by the machine gun and later withdrew 500 yards to reorganize. We returned to 1st Battalion command post and the two half-tracks remained there all night by order of Lieutenant Colonel Brunevolt, commanding officer of 1st Battalion. The damage to our half-track was negligible and there were no casualties.

26 June

No action occurred.

27 June

At 0800 the two half-tracks proceeded up Highway No. 4 to a bridge one-and-a-half miles north of 1st Battalion command post. One section strafed the bridge approach and a mined area. The mined area was then cleared by engineers. The other half-track went past approximately one mile north and met Company G. From this point they strafed a hill designated by commanding officer of Company G. Both half-tracks returned to battery command post at 1530. No casualties or damage to material occurred.

28 June

Two half-tracks were sent north on Highway No. 4 to a point 11 miles from battery command post. An M4 tank was operating in this area and our mission was to support and cover the tank. There was no enemy action, however, a position thought to be an enemy machine gun was fired on by one of our half-tracks. Both half-tracks returned to battery command post at 1400. No casualties or damage to material.

29 June

Two half-tracks were sent north 11 miles on Highway No. 4. Due to impassable roads and difficult terrain vehicles were unable to continue with the infantry. A suspected enemy cave was sighted and fired upon at 20 yards range by one half-track, with unknown results. The half-tracks returned to battery command post at 1430. No casualties or damage to material.

30 June

Two half-tracks were sent north 11 miles to a point where a bridge had been washed out and vehicles could not pass. Half-tracks were relieved at 1600 and returned to battery command post. No enemy action.

 

M3 Gun Motor Carriage

Every man but the driver has a machine gun on this vehicle—clearly, snipers were more to be feared. The vehicle commander, standing alongside the driver, has a .30 caliber machine gun, and there are at least two .50 caliber machine guns; the fourth gun, the barrel of which is barely visible in the original photograph, mounted at the right rear, may be a .30 caliber machine gun. The ammo cans, non-standard for such weapons, were issued to the Navy for anti-aircraft machine guns. Although it is an M3 GMC, the carriage is actually an M2 Half-track. This vehicle has a front winch and is crudely painted in brown, green and yellow camouflage; note that the camouflage is carried over onto the inside of the side armored window cover, to match the overall pattern when it is folded down. Shown disembarking from an LST on the island of New Britain, 26 December 1943.

by Ned B. Barnett

With the outbreak of World War II on the European continent, the United States began a rapid re-evaluation of its armored warfare policy and the equipment it had on hand to fight an armored war. The success of Hitler’s panzers in Poland in 1939 underscored this need and the invasion of France ended doubts once and for all. After rejecting the notion of producing British-designed tanks—a wise move considering the problems Britain had with its tanks in 1940 and 1941—the Army began casting around for workable designs.

The M2 medium tank, a vehicle designed with trench warfare in mind, was upgraded and revised as the M3 Lee and Grant tanks, which featured a hull-mounted 75 mm gun of French design, an excellent America 37 mm dual-purpose gun, and several machine guns. This in turn led to the M4 Sherman, which continued to see service long after the war.

The M2A4 light tank, itself an outgrowth of the “Combat Car,” an all-machine gun armed tracked vehicle, led to the M3 and M5 Stuarts, which were fast, mobile, and adequately armed for the reconnaissance role—although it proved under-armed and under-armored to fulfill the battle tank role.

Under U.S. Army doctrine, this left a hole—there was a need for an anti-tank weapon, a tank destroyer. For unlike the Germans, the Russians and the British, the U.S. Army believed that tanks should fight infantry, not other tanks; hence, a tank destroyer was required.

The first such vehicles were authorized on 31 July 1941. Time was short, and the immediate solution seemed to be an “off-the-shelf” con-version of existing vehicles and weapons. The vehicle selected was an M3 half-track, and the weapon, the 75 mm gun M1897A4, which was based on the French 75 of World War I. This weapon had a commonalty with the weapon selected for the M3 Lee/Grant and the later M4 Sherman, an important consideration. Another important consideration was its immediate availability from stocks.

After more than 30 were built as test vehicles, designated T12, the Army standardized them and ordered them into production on 30 October 1941. By 31 December, 86 production vehicles had been delivered, pointing up the wisdom of ordering the weapon system from available components—the vehicle had been ordered, tested, approved and deliveries began in just six months! In 1942, 1,350 vehicles were produced, and in 1943 an additional 766 were produced, all by the Autocar Company. However, combat experience in North Africa showed the folly of sending lightly armored half-tracks against German tanks and also illustrated the inadequacy—in 1943—of a gun that was clearly inadequate in 1941. As a result, Autocar was contracted to convert first 113 M3 gun motor carriages back to M3A1 half-track personnel carriers; then it was ordered to make the same conversion to an additional 1,247 vehicles. Ultimately, only 842 M3 GMCs were available for combat.

Conflicting reports exist concerning use of the M3 GMC on Guadalcanal, but it is clear that many such vehicles were committed to use in North Africa and later in Sicily and Italy. In 1943 and early 1944, surviving vehicles were turned over to the British in this theater of war. At that stage, they were being used primarily as fire support vehicles, as were many of the M4 Sherman tanks, and their inadequacy against German armor was unimportant in that role.

In the Pacific theater, where the enemy fielded relatively fewer tanks and lighter weapons, the M3 GMC proved to be an effective vehicle and was used through the end of the war. Its mobility enabled hard-fighting Marines and soldiers to have close-range artillery on hand to tackle bunkers, and the crews often festooned the vehicles with light and heavy machine guns to provide covering fire. The Marines appeared especially adept in locating and mounting machine guns, and more than one vehicle had a .50-caliber M2 Browning machine gun for each crew member except the driver. In a fight, no one wanted to be without a gun!

The weapon system proved itself to the Marines in the hard fighting in the Solomon Islands, on Bougainville and New Britain, and carried it with them in other battles throughout the Pacific.

 

The 3rd Field Artillery Battalion (Provisional) in the Philippines, 1941-1942

75mm Gun Motor Carriage T12, Philippines, late 1941.

by George R. Reed, Captain, Field Artillery, U.S. Army

This was originally prepared as a manuscript by the author in 1948 and submitted to The Adjutant General (Historical Section), Washington, D.C. Copy obtained from the National Archives, Washington, D.C.

•

Provisional Field Artillery, Self-Propelled Mounts, Fort Stotsenberg, Pampanga

First Battalion

Commanding Officer: Major D. S. Babcock

Battery Commanders: Captain John Curtis, Lieutenant Murray M. Day, Lieutenant Brunette, Lieutenant Corrigan

Second Battalion

Commanding Officer: Major Joseph Ganahl

Battery Commanders: Lieutenant William Jones, Lieutenant Travis Perrenot, Lieutenant Daniel W. Cranford, Lieutenant Peck

Third Battalion

Commanding Officer: Major J. R. Lindsay

Battery Commanders: Lieutenant Wayne Fisher, Lieutenant George A. Reed (the author of this work), Lieutenant Van de Lester, Lieutenant Svobodny

The self-propelled mount was the only piece of modern artillery materiel in the Islands. Fifty of them had arrived in Manila the previous month (November) and had only been brought to Stotsenberg four days before war was declared. Two of them were still in Manila. Essentially, the self-propelled mount is a French 75-mm gun mounted on a half-track scout car. The car is stiff and unwieldy in handling as well as being very vulnerable from the front. In spite of this these guns proved to be very valuable during the retreat into Bataan.

The personnel of this group was drawn from a number of sources: battalion and battery commanders were American officers; junior officers were from the Philippine Army; the firing battery was from the Philippine Army; the half-track drivers were from the 14th Engineers (Philippine Scouts); and the ammunition truck drivers were from the 200th Coast Artillery Corps (National Guard).

My assignment at Fort Stotsenberg was to Battery E, 24th Field Artillery (Philippine Scouts), as the battery executive. For a short period before the war I was attached to the 21st Field Artillery (Philippine Army) as adjutant of American instructors. The camp was located at Sta. Ignacia, Tarlac. Colonel Catalan was the Philippine Army commander and Col. R. C. Mallonee was the commanding officer of American instructors.

On 6 December 1941, Col. H. N. Lockwood, S-3 of the Field Artillery Brigade, arrived in camp at Sta. Ignacia with orders to report to the brigade commander without delay. That same day I reported to Col. Louis R. Dougherty who ordered me to report to Maj. D. S. Babcock. That evening Maj. Babcock gave me command of the Fourth Field Battery. The next day, 7 December 1941, being Sunday no work was scheduled, however, Maj. Babcock suggested I go to the gun park and familiarize myself with the weapon, which I did.

On the morning of 8 December, we heard by radio of the bombing of Pearl Harbor and the declaration of war.

Fourth Field Battery, 3rd Provisional Battalion, Field Artillery (SPM)

Commanding Officer: First Lieutenant George A. Reed, USA

Executive Officer: Second Lieutenant Amador Lim, PA

Supply Officer: Third Lieutenant Amado Santiago, PA

Liaison Officer: Third Lieutenant Romero, PA

I reported to Maj. Babcock at the half-track park opposite the ordnance shop immediately after hearing the news over the radio. The drivers of the tracks from the 14th Engineers, Philippine Scouts, were also present. With their help I began to draw equipment for the guns and tracks. These guns were to be completely equipped. At 10:00 a.m. Maj. Babcock received the following message from brigade headquarters: “Japanese planes have been sighted over Lingayen Gulf.” Battery commanders were ordered to take their guns and place them under cover in various parts of the post and then return for further orders. I took my battery to the rear of 2nd Battalion, 24th Field Artillery, and on returning to Maj. Babcock I was told that I could pick up my ammunition trucks and drivers in the rear of the brigade motor shop, after which I was to draw 300 rounds of ammunition for each gun at the magazine. I found the trucks behind the motor shop, but the drivers were absent. I found they were having lunch at their barracks. At approximately noon Lt. Langlois and I watched sixty-four planes bomb Clark Field. After the bombing the drivers returned. We then took the trucks, drew the ammunition and returned to the rear of the 24th Field Artillery barracks. Returning to Maj. Babcock I was ordered to take my guns and trucks to the forage farm under cover of darkness. This order was carried out and all elements were placed under cover. On the completion of this move I reported to Col. J. T. Tacy at Camp Del Pilar where I received my quota of Philippine Army personnel.

The time until 20 December was spent in training and equipping the Philippine Army personnel of the battery. These men had had six weeks of training at Camp Del Pilar before the war. During this period also, Maj. Ganahl with three batteries left for north Luzon, Lt. Perrenot was attached to the 26th Cavalry, Philippine Scouts, and Maj. Babcock with four batteries left for southern Luzon.

On the evening of the 20th of December Maj. Lindsay ordered all battery commanders to place their guns so as to be able to repel an attack of parachute troops on Clark Field. I placed my guns under a line of trees on the east side of the buildings of the forage farm and established an observation post on Lone Hill.

Early on the morning of 21 December, I received orders to proceed to Carmen, Pangasinan, where I would defend the bridge over the Agno. This move was completed without any difficulty and the guns were placed as shown in Figure 1. [Editor’s Note: None of the figures mentioned in this work were available.] In the afternoon Gen. W. E. Brougher, Commanding General, 11th Division, Philippine Army, visited the line at Carmen and named Capt. Robert Besson as combat team commander. We encountered some trouble in getting the half-tracks over the levee and into their positions. I asked Capt. Besson if he would like a tank block on the road to Rosales. He replied in the affirmative and that night we moved the guns on the right of the bridge to the positions marked 1 and 2. Two Japanese planes dropped bombs at the bridge that afternoon but failed to hit it. On the 22nd, Maj. Lindsay passed through Carmen on his way to Rosales to see Lt. Van de Lester. I saw Lt. Fisher, who had a badly infected foot, trying to contact the battalion commander.

On the 23rd of December two Japanese planes dropped five bombs at the bridge, one of which struck the span next to the bank dropping that span, which had been prepared for dynamiting, into the river. I made an inspection of the guns immediately after the bombing, and when I reached number four gun I found that a piece of steel from the bridge had gone through the hood of the track, taking off a corner of the cylinder head, passing through the instrument panel, the door, and then dropping to the ground. In addition, steel from the bridge had punctured the radiator and tires of an ammunition truck which was nearby. I sent both back to Stotsenberg to the ordnance shop, telling them to stop at Maj. Lindsay’s command post on the way back. Later in the day the battalion commander contacted for a report in order to find out what had happened to the mount, and before leaving promised to replace the ammunition truck. I moved the gun by the hotel to the position formerly held by the damaged gun.

24 December

Lieutenant Van de Lester was reported killed in action at Binalonan. Knowing Lt. Van de Lester to be dead I stopped an SPM which was on its way to him. The track was stripped. There was no sight, ammunition, equipment or oil in the recoil cylinder and the gun was full of cosmoline. The driver and I cleaned the gun. We furnished it with a panoramic sight and ammunition, but had no filler pump with which to fill the recoil cylinder. The tanks had none and I was unable to find one anywhere since there are no other SPMs near. Repair of the bridge to permit traffic was begun with Maj. S. Malevich, Gen. Wainwright’s staff, in charge of construction.

Generals J. R. N. Weaver, tank commander, J. M. Wainwright, Northern Luzon Force Commander, and G. M. Parker, Southern Luzon Force Commander, had a conference in Carmen on Christmas Day.

I received the information too late to contact Lt. Perrenot who was over the river and was unable to cross as bridge repairs were incomplete. I sent the extra SPM back to Maj. Lindsay. There was a great amount of motor traffic moving to the rear. Major Lindsay inspected the gun positions and approved of them. Bridge repairs were completed. Lieutenant Perrenot picked up members of his battery who had been dropped off at my position that morning.

At dawn on 26 December we received our first hostile machine gun fire from the north bank of the river. During the day we received 40-mm fire from a tank which was eventually put out of commission by Lt. Lim’s gun. For a time we were under fire from what I believe was a self-propelled mount, possibly one of Lt. Van de Lester’s guns. A shell from this gun struck our ammunition truck on the road. The driver, Pvt. Robert Arledge, 200th Coast Artillery Corps, was killed. Captain Besson received orders from Gen. Brougher to retire at nightfall. During the afternoon we received heavy mortar fire which soon had Carmen in flames. Shortly after noon friendly, indirect, artillery fire from the right rear was directed at the bridge over the river. This fire fell short of the target. Most of the shells fell in the area between the river and the road running parallel to it. I ascertained later that this fire had been directed by the 91st Field Artillery, Philippine Army. Lieutenant Lim’s gun was hit in front by a 40-mm shell, the driver, Pedro Sarabia, 14th Engineers, Philippine Scouts, was killed and the tracks torn from the mount. Lieutenant Lim destroyed the gun and set it afire. We retired at nightfall as far as San Miguel looking for Maj. Lindsay’s command post as my rear echelon had gone there that morning. We fed the battery with the maintenance company of the 192nd Tank Battalion and then started north again. I found the command post north of Tarlac, Tarlac, and was ordered to report to Gen. Brougher at Victoria, Tarlac. We had hardly started when the driver of the SPM drove it off the road into a dirt bank. The motor refused to start, so I hitched the track on behind one of my 6x6 ammunition trucks and towed it to Victoria, where we arrived about dawn. We traveled about eight miles an hour.

I reported to Gen. Brougher who gave me orders to report to the combat tea commander at the road intersection north of Guimba, Nueva Ecija. On arrival at the road intersection I saw Capt. Dysterhoff who told me to use my gun as I saw fit. (See Figure 2). I asked Capt. Dysterhoff what he would do if he were hard-pressed, since the bridge to the south which had been bombed by the Japanese several days before, cut off all retreat to the direct rear and left only the road to Pura as a way out for us. This road, which lay directly across the front of the Japanese advance, was not open to me for retreat since my maximum speed was only eight miles an hour. So we pioneered a road down to the creek and winched all our trucks across. About this time my other gun was pulled to a point one kilometer south of the bridge by A Company, 192nd Tank Battalion. The engine had no power because of a torn gasket on the cylinder head. I was able to obtain one from Lt. Hurd, commanding officer of A Company.

During the afternoon artillery to the east on the road to the Cagayan Valley moved from our front to our rear. I contacted Lt. Howard Amos, liaison officer of the 91st Field Artillery, Philippine Army, whom I had known at Stotsenberg. It was his opinion as well as my own that the attack would not be pushed along the road we were defending. Orders were received from Gen. L. R. Stevens, Commanding General, 91st Division, to retire at 9:00 p.m. About sunset I was contacted by Lt. Robert McDowell, commanding officer of the Second Platoon, Company B, 192nd Tank Battalion, who had been sent by Gen. Brougher to pull my foremost gun out by way of Pura to Stotsenberg to be repaired. Lieutenant McDowell had no extra cable and would not split his platoon to pull my other gun out, so I arranged with Lt. Hurd for one of his tanks to pull the track out to Baloc Junction. Lieutenant Amos and I in my sedan led A Company out to Baloc Junction. I took the gun there, dropped Lt. Amos at Santa Rosa, and proceeded to San Isidro, arriving there about 5:00 a.m. The motor sergeant began to put the new gasket on the cylinder head while I reported to Gen. Stevens who told me that I would find Gen. Brougher at Magalang. I proceeded to Magalang, but found that the 11th Division command post was not there. After gassing all motor vehicles I picked up Maj. Joseph Ganahl who was also looking for the division command post and we proceeded north to Concepcion where he located Gen. Brougher’s headquarters. I was ordered to join other elements of the Provisional Field Artillery at La Paz, Tarlac. The following morning (29 December) I placed my gun in support of a gun under Lt. Peck on the road to Cabanatuan. (See Figure 3.)

During the day we heard considerable artillery fire to the north. Major Lindsay contacted me in the later afternoon, ordered me to turn my gun over to Lt. Peck, locate the Fifth Battery somewhere north of Capas and to take over from Lt. Fisher who would go to the hospital. I contacted Lt. Fisher that night at San Miguel, Tarlac.

Fifth Field Battery, 3rd Provisional Battalion, Field Artillery (SPM)

Lieutenant Fisher left immediately for the hospital. I made an inspection of the gun positions before turning in and found them to be satisfactory. (See Figure 4.)

Early on the morning of 30 December I inspected the guns and found them to be in a deplorable mechanical condition. There were only thirty-five rounds of ammunition, none of which were even ready to be fused. The bodies of all the tracks, which should have been kept clear, were piled high with unopened ammunition boxes, duffel bags, food and other impediment. The ammunition cylinders beneath the breech were covered and it would have been difficult to fire the gun. I had the duffel bags and all impediments, which could be spared, placed in the supply truck. I supplied each gun with one hundred rounds of ammunition stored in opened boxes ready for firing.

I found Lt. McDowell with three tanks present in the barrio. We heard considerable firing well to the north.

On 30 December I received a note from Col. R. C. Mallonee, senior American instructor of the 21st Field Artillery, Philippine Army, to the effect that I was attached to the 21st Division, Philippine Army, Gen. Capinpin, commanding. I reported to Col. Mallonee at the division command post, who ordered me to report to Col. G. H. McCafferty, senior instructor of the 22nd Infantry, Philippine Army, and coordinate my retreat with the last element of the 22nd Infantry. I contacted Col. McCafferty and then arranged with Lt. McDowell for the defense of the road until the infantry was well to the rear. In the retreat the SPMs took up positions one kilometer apart and leap-frogged front to rear all the way to the next defense line. The first elements of the 22nd Infantry began to pass through San Miguel at sundown. The last troops had passed by 12:00 a.m. That night we retired to the Bamban River line without incident. (See Figure 5.)

On 31 December, we are out of contact with the Japanese. All was quiet. The Japanese seem to have a policy of limited objectives. If they had only known what was holding up their advance they wouldn’t have hesitated but would have pushed us back into Bataan immediately. The bridge over the Bamban was dynamited on the night of the 31st of December.

1 January 1942

There was a conference at the division command post in Mabalacat to coordinate the retreat which was to take place the following night. My policy would be the same. There was a division of elements at Angeles, some were to go by way of the San Fernando-Guagua road while others were to retire by road. On the morning of 1 January, I leap-frogged number one gun to the rear. It was too close under the heights of the north bank of the Bamban. The gun fired on Japanese machine gun patrols before moving. There was heavy fire on the hills to the left flank. They are the only point of observation within our lines and they overlooked the Japanese advance. The retreat was carried out without incident, and on the morning of the 2nd I placed my guns in depth along the road south of Hacienda Pio. (See Figure 6.) I reported to Col. Mallonee at the division command post, San Jose, and was informed there would be no move tonight. On the way to the command post I had noticed a tank platoon, Lt. McDowell commanding, off the road in some trees a good distance behind the lines just east of Kalantas. While in San Jose I found Capt. Donald Haynes, commanding officer, B Company, 192nd Tank Battalion, who was using his radio to maintain contact with his platoons, of which Lt. McDowell’s was one. I asked him for a note placing his platoons at my disposal and received the same.

Just west of Pio I picked up Lt. Grover C. Richards, an instructor with the 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry, Philippine Army, who told me that the command post of the 21st was surrounded. I parked my car on the line of 2nd Battalion, 21st Field Artillery, Philippine Army, guns, and Sgt. Hagedorn, Lt. Richards, and I started to walk forward. As we did so, a platoon of tanks passed us going forward. We had not walked 200 yards when the same tanks came charging back. I turned to Richards and said, “Those tanks should have stayed up there.” He replied, “They’re not doing my command post any good.” I told him to go forward to my first gun and wait there while I went back and contacted the tanks.

I went back to the woods and after some persuasion and showing the note from Capt. Haynes, Lt. McDowell agreed to bring his tanks up with my guns. I started back and was a good distance in advance of the tanks when I was fired on by a Japanese machine gunner at the bamboo line. I jumped out of the car, threw a grenade, and got my rifle. The tanks had come up by this time and they began to throw 37mm, .50- and .30-caliber into the bamboo. I climbed on top of the leading tank and used the turret gun until it jammed. I then jumped off the tank, got them to stop firing, and lead them up the road on foot and placed a tank with each of my guns.

With some of the men from the tanks I made a scouting trip to where the ground dropped off in order to be sure there were no Japanese nearby. When I returned to my first gun, Lt. McDowell stuck his head out of the turret and asked me if I expected him to stay where he was that night. I replied in the affirmative.

He said, “But we are vulnerable at night.”

“So are my guns,” I replied.

“I won’t stay,” he answered.

“Oh, yes, you will.”

“No, I have a platoon coming up to relieve me. We don’t stay in the front line more than twenty-four hours.”

“Well,” I answered, “the man who relieves you will.”

Sergeant Hagedorn and I then drove to Hacienda Pio to meet Lt. Harrison. While there firing broke out nearby and Filipinos began to run past. Hagedorn and I drove out to the road. There was much confusion; only one machine gun was firing; the personnel of the 21st were lying down behind their guns; whereas one shell would have ended the Japanese penetration.

At the intersection to the main road I found the tanks, 2nd Platoon, B Company, retreating. I stopped them and asked Lt. Jennings where he was going.

“To the rear. The Japanese have broken through.”

“How about staying with my guns?” I asked.

“No!” he replied.

I threatened him with a court-martial, but it didn’t do any good and he went on to the rear. I stopped the sergeant of the next tank with a few hard words and put his tank and the other two in position with my guns again. Not long afterwards Lt. Jennings returned and asked me where I wanted his tank. After that things quieted down. The 21st command post had been relieved in the afternoon when the tanks came up with my guns.

4 January

There is heavy artillery fire on the main road to the south. The Japanese have apparently given up their attempted flank movement here. Firing is sporadic. There is Japanese and Philippine Scout cavalry in the mountains to the north. Captain Fowler, 26th Cavalry, Philippine Scouts, contacted me to tell me of the presence of his troops in the vicinity so that my guns would not fire on them before ascertaining their identity. When on the Bamban Line I had received orders to fire on any cavalry, since none of ours was in the vicinity at the time. Colonel Mallonee ordered me to follow my same procedure in covering the retreat of the infantry tonight.

The retreat began at nightfall and by noon next day we were in Dinalupijan, Bataan. At the command post Col. Mallonee ordered me to place my guns on the road to Guagua at nightfall and to follow the 26th Cavalry across the Lyac Junction Bridge into Bataan, at which time I would revert to the command of the Provisional Field Artillery (SPM). He did not know the rendezvous area of the SPMs. I crossed the bridge sometime around 11:00 p.m. and met Maj. Ganahl who was looking for some SPMs that had gotten lost. He told me the rendezvous area was on the Pilar-Bagac Road near Bagac. I found the area the next day and reported to Col. Babcock.

Two days later, 8 January 1942, I turned the battery over to Lt. Daniel W. Cranford and became S-1 and S-4 of the 1st Provisional Battalion, Field Artillery (SPM), Maj. Joseph Ganahl commanding.