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| Empty shell casings near gun section, Elsenborn Ridge, 1944. |
by Charles P. Biggio Jr., Colonel USA Ret
Facts About the German 88
Accounts on the Battle of the Bulge remind us that many of
the U.S. infantrymen who fought in the Bulge were woefully uninformed about the
German Artillery — and his own artillery as well. This is not surprising, since
the military training of most GIs had not included any formal instructions on
the artillery weapons, organization, or tactics of the German or the American
artillery.
What he picked up on his own about the artillery was
sometimes misinformation based on myth, rumor, unreliable press articles, and
"common knowledge." As a result, many infantrymen developed a
distorted view of the artillery of the two nations. Often, these views
exaggerated the power of the German weapons (especially the German 88mm gun) —
and tended to disparage the American weapons as obsolete and qualitatively
inferior to the Germans.
The purpose of this paper is to dispel some of those
misperceptions — and to provide my fellow veterans with a factual account of
the artillery of both sides in the Battle of the Bulge.
American Field Artillery in
1944: Obsolete or Modern?
Perhaps a brief review of the changes made in the U.S. Field
Artillery between the Great Wars will best answer this question.
During World War I the artillery arm of the AEF was equipped
entirely with French (mostly the famous French 75mm gun), and a few British
pieces. At that time the French weapons were technologically superior and were
plentiful.
After the war, the U.S. decided to equip its peacetime army
with the French World War I weapons. However, even before the war ended, some
American artillery officers found defects in the French guns — and the U.S.
Field Artillery School at Fort Sill OK, took the lead in calling for the
modernization of the U.S. Field Artillery — and the replacing of all foreign
weapons with improved weapons of American design. In response, several War
Department Boards examined the question — including, among other things,
replacing the French 75 with a new 105mm howitzer as the main division
artillery piece.
In the 1920s, progress on the modernization project was slow
due to limited funds, pacifism, and conservative tendencies in the Army, and
the availability of surplus weapons. Despite these obstacles some progress was
made on designing a new 105mm howitzer and other weapons. In the 1930s, the
Field Artillery School kept pushing for the new weapons and the pace of
modernization increased despite the effects of the Great Depression. However,
there was continued resistance from conservative senior officers to replacing
the 75 with a 105 howitzer. As late as 1939, General George C. Marshall still
opposed it because of the cost involved. Nevertheless, with encouragement from
the artillery school, innovative Artillery and ordnance officers continued in
the 30s to experiment with new gun designs — and by the end of the decade
prototypes had been developed for the howitzers and guns which saw action in
World War II. Also in the 1930s after much debate, a decision was made to begin
motorizing the Field Artillery (which was horse-drawn) — and by the end of the
decade 75 percent of the division artillery had been motorized.
In May 1940, the Germans easily defeated the French and
British with a new type of mobile armored welfare — and including the 105mm
howitzer as their main divisional artillery weapon. In June the U.S. War
Department finally announced that the U.S. division artillery would be armed
with the new 105mm howitzer and the 155mm howitzer. And in 1942, the decision
was made to fully motorize the U.S. Field Artillery. When the first American
combat troops landed in North Africa in Algeria in November 1942, the First
U.S. Infantry Division was armed with the new 105mm howitzer M2A1 — and by the
time the Division landed in Sicily in July 1943, it also had the new 155mm
howitzer, M1. Moreover, all of the Division's artillery was motorized.
By the Battle of the Bulge (hereinafter referred to as the
Bulge) in December 1944, all American artillery units had been equipped with
new American weapons. The new weapons entered the service on the following
dates:
105mm howitzer - November 1942
155mm howitzer - July 1943
155mm gun - December 1941
4.5-inch gun (originally of UK design)
90mm gun - 1943
8-inch howitzer - 1942
240mm howitzer - 1943
Self-Propelled:
105mm
howitzer - 1943
155mm
gun - 1944
Thus, in the space of just over two decades and against formidable
obstacles, the U.S. Army had managed to replace all of its World War I
artillery pieces with new, modern howitzers and guns — and to convert from
horse-drawn to motorized artillery. Ian Hogg, the noted British expert on World
War II artillery believes the U.S. was so successful with its weapon program
because its total focus was on creating new weapons. In contrast the German designers
tried to overhaul current service weapons while designing new ones — thus not
giving full attention to the new ones.
The American artillery weapons in the Bulge were not
retrograde pieces of World War I vintage, but were virtually new — and in fact
newer than many of the comparable German weapons of that day. How these new
American weapons compared in quality with like weapons in the German Army will
be discussed later in this paper.
Artillery Weapons and
Organization in the Bulge
In order to keep this article reasonably short — and to
facilitate comparisons of the artillery of the two nations, the discussion will
be limited to the artillery which participated in the Battle of Elsenborn;
i.e., the artillery of 6th Panzer Army on the German side and the artillery of
the opposing U.S. V Corps (-).
The Tactical Situation,
Elsenborn Sector, as the Battle Begins on 16 December 1944
For his counteroffensive Hitler decided to attack with three
Armies in the thinly held Belgian Ardennes. The main effort would be made on
the right by the tank heavy 6th Panzer Army in the Elsenborn Sector between
Monschau and Losheim — where the Germans expected to encounter only one
Infantry Division (the 99th) and a light Cavalry Group. Sixth Panzer Army
included four SS Panzer Divisions, four infantry divisions, and a large artillery
force — supported by a parachute drop and Skorzeney's Special Operations Group.
The four SS Panzer Divisions were charged with exploiting the gaps opened up by
the infantry divisions — and making a lightning dash to the Meuse River, Liege,
and Antwerp. They expected to easily penetrate the 99th's widely dispersed defenses.
Much to their surprise, the Germans soon learned that they
had failed to detect the presence of a second infantry division (the 2nd
Infantry Division) in the 99th's sector. Moreover, the Germans had not
anticipated that the Americans could reinforce the area with two additional
divisions (the 1st Infantry Division at Butgenbach and the 9th Infantry
Division at Monschau) by 19 Dec.
The Germans and American
Artillery "Order of Battle" — Elsenborn, 16 Dec. 1944
As the Battle of Elsenborn began on 16 Dec. 1944, the German
artillery of 6th Panzer Army greatly outnumbered the guns of the opposing U.S.
V Corps elements — 1,222 to 314. (Thus belying the myth that the American
artillery always outnumbered the Germans.)
The division artillery of the Germans and the American
infantry divisions were surprisingly similar — both in weapons and
organization. Both opted for a 105mm howitzer as the main close support weapon
and for a medium howitzer of about 150mm.
At the Corps level there were noticeable differences in both
weapons and organization. The Germans had a greater variety of cannon
(including some Russian) and a much larger number and variety of rockets and
very heavy guns. Organizationally, the Germans had no Corps Artillery
Headquarters as such — and their non-divisional artillery was grouped into
Volks Artillery Korps (VAKs), Werfer Brigades, and very heavy batteries.
The German 88mm guns were obviously not the main close
support weapon in the German Army — that function belonged to the 105mm
howitzer. In the entire 6th Panzer Army there were only 216 towed 88s out of a
total of 1,222 pieces — and most 88s were flak guns whose main mission was
anti-aircraft defense. And note that there were no 88s in any of the German
Infantry Divisions (VGDs).
One of the most notable advances in artillery weapons
technology in World War II was the proximity fuse. In both of the Great wars,
the fuses available for achieving air bursts were quit unsatisfactory —
requiring daily registrations and settings at the guns. Needed, was a fuse that
would explode the shell when it arrived in the proximity of the target —
without registrations and individual settings. The U.S. put some of its best
electronic and engineering experts on this very complicated problem. By 1944
the U.S. had built an operational proximity fuse for use against ground targets
and the artillerymen called it Pozit or VT (variable time). It consisted of a
tiny battery and a transmitter/receiver which sent and received electronic
emissions until the shell reached the optimum distance from the target — at
which instant it detonated the shell.
When the German offensive began on 16 December 1944, General
Eisenhower quickly released the new fuse for use in the ETO — and at Elsenborn
it was first used on 19 December at Monschau. The new fuse was employed
tentatively at first because of fears that it would endanger friendly troops
and aircraft. (It could not discriminate between friend and foe.) Therefore,
the fuse was not fully exploited at Elsenborn during the Bulge. Nevertheless,
the Pozit Fuse was one of the great technological achievements of World War II.
(Note: Over the years, the U.S. Field Artillery resolved the safety problems
and during the ongoing war in Iraq, the Pozit fuse has been used with excellent
results.)
Quality of the Weapons: A
Comparison
Since many Americans believe that the German artillery
weapons firing at them were superior in quality to those of the Americans, we
shall compare the close support weapons; that is, those guns which did most of
the firing against enemy personnel — of both nations by assessing their
respective characteristics.
Since this article focuses mainly on the close support
weapons, only the principle light and medium pieces of the divisional artillery
will be considered.
There was not much difference in the quality of the
divisional weapons of the two sides. The American pieces have the edge in shell
power, range, elevation, and transport — while the German weapons were slightly
lighter (desirable for close support missions) and had more on-carriage
traverse. In many cases the American weapon was as good as its counterpart in
the German Army — and in some cases was better. The notion that the American
guns/howitzers of the division artillery were somehow inferior to those of the
Germans in the Bulge is without merit.
Three Basic Artillery Functions
A significant aspect of the American artillery's performance
in the Ardennes (and elsewhere) was not so much in the number of its tubes, but
in its excellence in performing the three basic functions of the field
artillery: shoot, move, and communicate.
The "Shoot" or
Gunnery Function
The Americans called the shooting aspect of their mission
gunnery. This function involved all of the activities incident to placing
artillery fire on the target. Gunnery in World War II was the area where the
American artillery made its most significant contribution — and particularly
its use of massed fires.
Massed Fires
As a result of experiences in World War I, the major powers
had seen the need to improve their abilities to mass the fires of their
division artillery. However, most nations were bounded by tradition and habit
and were slow to make the necessary changes to bring this about. Only the U.S.
was willing to make a clean break with the past and to restructure its entire
artillery command and control structure in pursuit of a mass fire capability.
Leading the way for the Americans was the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill,
Oklahoma, where in the 1920s a group of farsighted, innovative young officers
became convinced that achieving such a capability should be a top priority.
After much deliberation, they decided that in order to mass the fires of a
division it would be necessary to make two major structural changes.
First, fire control within the battalion would have to be
centralized at battalion headquarters rather than remain decentralized to the
firing batteries. Hence the battalion commander would exercise fire control
instead of the firing battery commanders. This idea caused great dismay among
older artillery officers who liked the old arrangement and adamantly opposed
diluting the authority of the firing battery commander. Despite high-level
opposition to their ideas well into the 1930s, the officers at Ft. Sill knew
that centralization was key to their success — so insisted on this change.
Secondly, to provide the battalion commander with the means
to control the fires of the three batteries, Ft. Sill created a fire direction
center (FDC) on the battalion staff to be manned by highly trained gunnery
experts. All requests for fire would be funneled to the FDC where they would be
processed, and fire commands relayed directly to the firing battery exec at the
howitzer position. By 1934 Ft. Sill had developed a prototype FDC and in 1940
an innovative new graphical firing table was invented to help the FDC speed up
its calculations.
With war looming in 1941, the war department finally
approved the FDC system for the divisions — and FDCs were installed throughout
the artillery. Refinements in the system continued to be made at Ft. Sill and
in the units from 1941 to 1943. One of the most notable refinements was the
time-on-target (TOT) mission in which not only are all batteries concentrated
on one target, but the projectiles are programmed to arrive at the target at
nearly the same moment. Hence, enemy personnel in the open are engulfed before
they can take cover.
Subsequent combat operations proved the value of the massed
fire and TOT techniques. In the Bulge, American divisions had no problem massing
the fires of their 48 organic pieces of artillery. Although the massing of
fires was normally limited to the fires of one division, at Elsenborn, by 20
December there were four divisions defending the critical hinge of the northern
shoulder. The V Corps Artillery Commander, Brig. Gen. Helmick, seized the moment
and authorize the 2nd Division Artillery to coordinate the fires of all four
divisions. On 22 December, the fires of three divisions (129 available guns)
were massed by the 2nd Infantry Division on a single target. (It never became
necessary during the battle to mass the fires of all four divisions.) On the
22nd, the 2nd Division fired 63 TOTs — mostly with 44 guns per mission.
The distinguished military historian, Trevor N. Dupuy
believed that the U.S. FDC system was perhaps the most important reason why the
U.S. artillery, by the end of World War II was "best in the world."
The Germans too were aware of the advantages of massed fires
and tried to develop a capability during the Russian campaign. By February of
1944, their system had failed and they decided to design a new one. The new
system involved a "fire control battery" to be attached to and to
control the fires of each Volks Artillery Korps (VAKs). This system got its
first test in the Bulge but ran into problems at the start. For example, there
was only one fire control battery available in the 6th Panzer Army during the
entire campaign — and it was not particularly effective. It was readily
apparent to experienced American artillerymen that the Germans at Elsenborn
were not massing their fires effectively in support of their attacks.
Air Observation
Another aspect of the gunnery was observation. Artillery
fire is most accurate when it can be adjusted to the target by a trained
observer. To ensure that they had good observation during World War II, armies
employed both ground and air observers. Air observation had the advantage of
being able to see deeper into enemy lines (and better detect targets like enemy
artillery) — but the disadvantage of being limited by the weather. An artillery
air observation capability was desired by all armies of that period.
In June 1942, the War Department decided that the field
artillery should have an air observation capability, and two Piper Cub planes
were authorized at battalion and higher levels.
In the Bulge, whenever the weather permitted, the American
artillerymen made maximum use of their observation planes — with excellent
results. German General Thoholte later noted that American artillery directed
by air observation was "exceptionally good" and fire directed by air
observation "usually knocked out" its target.
On the German side at Elsenborn, the situation was quite
different because they no longer could fly cub planes in daylight because of
U.S. air superiority. Therefore, the artillery of 6th Panzer Army had no air
observation capability in the Battle of the Bulge.
Mobility
In addition to being able to shoot, the field artillery must
be capable of moving — and mobility was especially desired for the close
support units of the division artillery. Mobility is required not only to
transport the howitzers from one position to the next — but also to resupply
the units with ammunition, fuel, and food. As noted earlier, howitzers are not
much use if they cannot be supplied with ammunition.
In World War I, field artilleries were horse-drawn. In the
1920s the reformers at Fort Sill began urging that the U.S. Field Artillery be
motorized. Despite considerable opposition to the idea, by 1935 the U.S. Army
had begun to replace its horses with trucks. When the Germans demonstrated in
1940 what could be accomplished with highly mobile forces, the U.S. Army
accelerated the pace of its motorization. By 1942, all American field artillery
units had been fully motorized.
At Elsenborn, the excellent mobility of the artillery of the
99th and the 2nd Infantry Divisions enable them to minimize their losses when
Col. Peiper's Panzers broke through on their right flank.
The mobility of the German artillery was quite another
story. Americans have been led to believe by World War II film documentaries
that the whole German Army in the Bulge was highly mobile. However, in the
1930s, the Germans had decided not to motorize the infantry divisions. Hence,
for most of World War II the artillery of the German infantry divisions was
horse-drawn. In 1944, some of the light battalions were provided with captured
and other vehicles — but the 150mm howitzer units remained horse-drawn and
about half of the light battalions of the VAKs. Some units resorted to using a
single prime mover for every three or four pieces.
In the Bulge, an acute shortage of gasoline further reduced
the mobility of the German artillery. Because of the lack of transport and
fuel, the German field artillery was not able to keep up with the advancing
Panzers. For example, it took the 388th VAK four days to move its six
battalions to the next position — a distance of only 12 miles. And only about
half of the German Corps Artillery was able to follow in the wake of the
offensive.
During the offensive, both armies at Elsenborn faced problem
of re-supplying their firing batteries with ammunition — the Germans because of
transport and fuel shortages, and the Americans because their main supply route
was cut early — and their ammunition dump was endangered and evacuated. The
Germans were unable to solve their ammo re-supply problems — while the
Americans, thanks to their superior mobility, were able to solve theirs quite
handily.
Communications
To perform its shooting (gunnery) function the field
artillery must be able to communicate with higher, lower, and supported units.
When the FDC system was being developed it became evident that in order to
exercise the control necessary to mass fires the FDC would have to be provided
with an elaborate, redundant, and reliable communication network involving the
forward observers, FDC, and the gun batteries. Moreover, it should be an independent
artillery system which did not rely on the infantry for wire links.
In World War II the primary means of communications was by
phones — field wire in the infantry divisions. Radio was considered a
"back up" means. During the Bulge, the American communication system
generally performed well. During the first few days, there were some
disruptions to wire lines cut by shell fire — but these were usually repaired
with dispatch.
Regarding German artillery communications during the Bulge
not much information is available at the division level. We do know that the
senior artillery officer of 6th Panzer Army did not have independent artillery
wire/radio links to his subordinate units — such as the system available to his
counterpart in U.S. V Corps, Brig. Gen. Helmick.
The German 88mm Gun
Introduction
The German 88mm gun is the best known artillery weapon of
World War II. American combat veterans of the ETO have strong feelings about
this particular weapon because they firmly believe that the 88 was the
artillery piece that did most of the firing against them. Veterans tend to
describe the 88 as a "super gun" "terrifying,"
"pervasive," and "scourge of the battlefield." By the
Battle of the Bulge, the 88s had attained an almost mythical aura with the GIs
and almost all German incoming artillery rounds, regardless of caliber, were
referred to as "88s" by the troops.
But did these beliefs represent an accurate assessment of
the 88 as a field artillery weapon — or were they an exaggeration of its role
as an anti-personnel weapon?
The following is my attempt to answer this question — and
hopefully, to provide some interesting facts about the 88s to my fellow
veterans:
Development of the 88mm FLAK
gun
In 1925, the German Luftwaffe anticipated the need for a
heavy anti-aircraft gun. Because of restrictions of the Versailles Treaty, the
first gun was not produced until 1933 as the 88mm Flak 18. As war loomed in the
mid-30s's, efforts were made continually to upgrade the Flak 88s — and new
models were introduced in 1936, 1939, and 1942. As anti-aircraft guns, these
weapons were placed under the Luftwaffe — with the mission of defending against
enemy aircraft in both the Homeland and on the battlefields. During World War
II the Germans built about 18,000 88s.
The 88mm Flak 18: Entered the service in 1933. The gun
featured a single-tube barrel on a pedestal, and an ingenious semi-automatic
breech and a cruciform platform carriage.
The 88mm Flak 36: Entered the service in 1936. Because of
flaws in the Flak 18, the Germans redesigned the weapon and produced the Flak
36. This gun had a new three-piece barrel so the section near the chamber could
be replaced separately. The basic mounting was changed from an octagonal to a
square shape — and the piece was provided a new carriage.
The 88mm Flak 37: Entered the service in 1939. It employed a
new improved data transmission system for finer control. And a simpler barrel
construction of only two segments.
The 88mm Flak 41: Entered the service in 1942. This version
of the Flak 88 was designed to enhance the weapon's capability as an
anti-aircraft weapon by significantly increasing its maximum range. The Flak 41
could reach almost 9,000 feet higher than the Flak 37. It also had improved
ballistics, an increase in the rate of fire, a new, longer tube, and new
mounting and ammunition.
Uses of the FLAK Guns: 1936
to 1945
The Flak 18 was originally built to be an anti-aircraft gun
and initially that was its only function. However, during the Spanish Civil War
in 1936-37 it was discovered that the 88 could be used effectively as an
anti-tank gun. However, it was not till 1941-42 that Rommel fully exploited its
anti-tank capability with great success in the North African campaign. There,
the treeless, flat terrain was ideal for the high velocity, flat trajectory weapon.
Another advantage was that the Germans had many 88s while the Allies had no comparable
heavy anti-tank gun. This disparity — plus German propaganda, helped trigger
the "myth of the 88s."
The Flak 36 also was basically an anti-aircraft gun — but by
the time it came on line, it was seen as a multiple purpose gun; that is, both
as an anti-aircraft and anti-tank/field gun. However, during the invasion of
Belgium and France in 1940 the flak guns were used mostly as anti-aircraft
weapons — and only occasionally for anti-tank and anti-pillbox purposes.
The Flak 37 was a modification of the 36. By this time it
was anticipated that large numbers of Flak 88s would be needed to defend the
Homeland — and to provide the field units with both aircraft and tank defenses.
In 1943, during the large tank battles in Russia, the Germans made good use of
their 36s and 37s as heavy anti-tank weapons. And again when the Allies landed
in Normandy, the Flak 88s were in great demand both as anti-aircraft and as
anti-tank/field guns. During the Battle of the Bulge, when the weather cleared
on 24 Dec., German armored formations looked to the Flak 88s to protect them
from Allied planes which had air superiority. In addition, some anti-tank
missions were fired — and a lesser number of close support missions. In the
Bulge the German Flak 88 still greatly outnumbered the American heavy
anti-aircraft guns. The excellent new 90mm gun performed the same multiple
tasks as the Flaks — but were much fewer in number.
The Flak 41 had been built primarily to improve the
anti-aircraft defense of key installations in the Homeland — and they were used
for that purpose. Only a few of the Flak 41s ever saw action with the ground
forces — and those were rarely used in the anti-tank/field role in the Bulge.
Development of the 88mm PAK
Gun
As early as 1941 the German Army began expressing a requirement
for an 88mm gun which would be used exclusively as a heavy anti-tank/field gun
— with no anti-aircraft capability. Krupp came up with an excellent gun — the
88mm Pak 43 which entered the service in 1943. The next year a new version was
available, the Pak 43/41 — and it was a superior anti-tank weapon. In the
Battle of the Bulge two units of the 6th Panzer Army were equipped with the
43/41. The 388 VAK had one battalion of 18 guns — and the 683 Panzer Jaeger Abt
had 36. The hilly, broken terrain of the Ardennes was not ideal for the
employment of a heavy anti-tank gun like the deserts of North Africa had been,
or the plains of Russia. Moreover, there were too few 43/41s to make much
difference in the Bulge.
In summary, in the Battle of the Bulge the Germans employed
two different types of towed 88s — a Flak and a Pak. The Flag guns were by far
the more numerous and the gun performed three roles on the battlefield:
anti-aircraft, anti-tank, and close support. As an anti-aircraft gun it was a
good weapon. As an anti-aircraft gun it was superior. And as a close support
gun it was only fair (as compared to the 105mm howitzer). The Paks were
strictly anti-tank/field guns and were a superior anti-tank weapon. A late
entry in the war, the Paks participated in the Bulge, but in limited numbers.
The Myth of the 88
The myth was born in North Africa with Rommel's great
success with the 88 as an anti-tank gun. At that time the Germans had plenty
88s while the U.S. and the UK had no comparable heavy anti-tank gun. German
propaganda publicized it as an all-conquering super-weapon. The U.S. and UK
infantrymen somehow came to believe the 88 was a major threat not only to tanks
but to the infantry as well. In 1943 reports from the big tank battles in
Russia extolled the prowess of the 88s as the only anti-tank gun that could
stop the new Russian T-34 tank. By the Bulge in 1944, most U.S. combat
infantrymen were fully persuaded that the 88 was their main nemesis on the
battlefield — and they invariably yelled "88s" upon hearing an
incoming round. Ian Hogg, the noted English expert on the artillery of World
War II, noted this tendency in his book on the German artillery of World War
II. And I personally noticed it as a forward observer at Elsenborn.
Myth vs. Reality
Did the myth represent the truth about the 88s threat to the
infantry? Was the 88 the main anti-personnel artillery piece in the German
Army? The role of firing against opposing front line troops was the
responsibility of the German Division artillery — which included several light
battalions mostly of 105mm howitzers, a medium battalion, and an anti-aircraft
battalion. The Panzer division's anti-aircraft element included a heavy 88
battalion which occasionally fired anti-personnel missions. But in the Panzer
divisions there were about twice as many 105 howitzers as there were 88s. In
1944, the German Infantry (Volksgrenadier) Division had no heavy anti-aircraft
unit and there was not a single 88 gun in the entire division in the Bulge.
Conclusions
The U.S. Field Artillery in World War II
There is no merit to the allegations that the U.S. Field
Artillery fought World War II with obsolete weapons of inferior quality. All of
the American howitzers and guns were virtually new and compared quite favorably
with those of the Germans — and they were more highly motorized. In the area of
artillery technology, the American proximity fuse was an achievement unmatched
by the Germans, though the Germans were ahead in missile technology.
In the area of artillery operations, the Americans were
noticeably more effective at controlling the fires of the artillery by mastery
of the massed fire techniques.
The German 88s
Early in the war, the American infantry was misled into
believing the 88 was more dangerous to men in the front lines than was actually
the case. A myth developed and spread widely — and by the Battle of the Bulge,
the U.S. infantrymen were persuaded that just about every artillery round fired
at them were 88s. Actually, the 105mm howitzer was the German's main anti-personnel
weapon — and fired many more rounds at the infantry than did the 88s — and with
a larger shell.
Acknowledgements
My deep gratitude goes to the following for their
assistance: Richard C. Anderson Jr., Danny Parker, Dan Rosen, Sue Thompson,
Margaret A. Weaver, Ian Hogg, Boyd Dastrup, Rich Boyland, Dan Crowley, Charles
Biggio III, and Lt. Gen. (USA-Ret) David E. Ott.
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| A 105mm howitzer from the 2nd Infantry Div. provides support during December 1944. |
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| 8-inch howitzer in action during the Bulge. |
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| A 105mm howitzer section during the Bulge, 591st Field Artillery Battalion, 106th Infantry Division. |
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| 155mm Long Tom gun firing during the Battle of the Bulge. |
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| White phosphorus shells fired on German positions during the Bulge. |
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| 155mm battery during the Battle of the Bulge. |
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| 8 inch howitzer on the move during the Bulge. |
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| No matter what your job, it was dangerous. Artillery battalion mess sergeant lies dead after a German barrage, April 1945. |
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| M7 Self-propelled 105mm ("Priest") near La Gleize, Belgium during the Battle of the Bulge. |
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| Captured German 88mm Gun. |
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| M1 155mm towed gun being set up for firing during the Bulge, December 1944. |
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| Corporal Tony D'addio of Battery D, 460th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion labors to sight in a 75mm pack howitzer outside the Belgian town Logbierme, Belgium, December 18, 1944. |
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| Abandoned artillery position of the U.S. Army during the Battle of the Bulge. The St. Vith area, Belgium, December 1944. |
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| Gunners of the 244th Field Artillery Battalion fire a captured 88mm gun, 26 December 1944. American forces captured dozens of German artillery pieces. |
