Fieseler Fi 103R Reichenberg: German Manned V-1 Flying Bomb

American soldiers with the fuselage of a Fieseler Fi 103R piloted flying bomb, on a trolley, c. April 1945. (Bundesarchiv photo Bild 141-2733)

 

The Fieseler Fi 103R, code-named Reichenberg, was a German manned version of the V-1 flying bomb (more correctly known as the Fieseler Fi 103). It was developed towards the end of the Second World War and was intended to be used as a human-guided bomb in suicidal attacks against the advancing Allies.

The Fi 103R started development in 1944 at a time when Germany was anticipating a major naval landing by the Allies in western Europe. It was believed that a disposable aircraft armed with 900 kilograms (2,000 lb) of explosives would potentially inflict heavy damage on important targets such as enemy shipping. However, these attacks would have very likely involved the death of the pilot, who was expected to exit the aircraft and parachute away mere moments before the aircraft's impact. These pilots were reportedly to be volunteers and aware of the risk to their own lives. The "Leonidas Squadron", V. Gruppe of the Luftwaffe's Kampfgeschwader 200, was established in early 1944 to conduct these attacks.

Initially, the development of a manned Fi 103 had been considered but passed over for the rival Messerschmitt Me 328 project. However, this aircraft had fundamental difficulties with its pulsejet propulsion, which led to officials opting to switch focus to the Fi 103R's development. Pilots were trained using gliders, including specially-adapted ones capable of high-speed diving. It was intended that their training would then continue with the R-III, a twin-seat powered model of the Fi 103R. In September 1944, the maiden flight of the Fi 103R occurred, which resulted in a crash; a second aircraft flown on the next day also crashed. One month later, development was shelved at the direct order of Hitler, who had been encouraged by Albert Speer and Werner Baumbach not to pursue suicide attacks.

General Information

Type: Manned missile

National origin: Nazi Germany

Manufacturer: Fieseler

Primary user: Luftwaffe

Number built: c. 175

Manufactured: October 1944

First flight: September 1944

Developed from: Fieseler Fi 103 (V-1 flying bomb)

History

Background

During the latter part of the Second World War, it was becoming increasingly clear that Germany was on the defensive and that increasingly drastic measures would be needed just to maintain the status quo against the Allies. In February 1944, Adolf Hitler was initially dismissive of the need to resort to tactics such as suicide attacks, as was advocated by figures such as Otto Skorzeny, Hanna Reitsch, and Hajo Herrmann, but he did authorize the formation of a squadron to prepare for such missions. Accordingly, the Leonidas Squadron, a part of Kampfgeschwader 200, was established to be this suicide squadron. Volunteers for this squadron were required to sign a declaration which said, "I hereby voluntarily apply to be enrolled in the suicide group as part of a human glider-bomb. I fully understand that employment in this capacity will entail my own death."

The concept called for an aircraft that would be armed with a single 900 kilograms (2,000 lb) explosive device that would detonate upon impact with the target, which was typically envisioned to be Allied shipping. Two different aircraft were quickly considered to be the most suitable options available, the Messerschmitt Me 328 and the Fieseler Fi 103 (better known as the V-1 flying bomb), although both required development work. Officials opted to pass over the Fi 103 in favor of the Me 328. Being largely composed of wood and conceived of as potentially suitable for using multiple means of propulsion, the Me 328 had been worked on since 1941.

However, difficulties were encountered in the Me 328 during prototype testing, the vibration caused by its pulsejet engines having been a particular source of issues, leading to work being suspended. The project had also encountered political opposition from figures such as the head of the SS, Heinrich Himmler, who sought the program's termination. The program was placed under the supervision of the SS, but was not terminated at this point; instead, Skorzeny, who had been investigating the possibility of using crewed torpedoes against Allied shipping, was personally briefed by Hitler to revive the project.

Skorzeny played a key role in the program's reappraisal, which included its reorientation towards the Fi 103. The project was given the codename "Reichenberg" after the capital of the former Czechoslovak territory "Reichsgau Sudetenland" (present-day Liberec), while the aircraft themselves were referred to as "Reichenberg-Geräte" (Reichenberg apparatus). It has been claimed that one reason for the switch towards the Fi 103R was its ability to offer the pilot a slim chance of survival.

DFS Development

In the summer of 1944, the Deutsche Forschungsanstalt für Segelflug (German Research Institute for Sailplane Flight) at Ainring took on the task of developing a crewed version of the Fi 103, an example was made ready for testing within days and a production line was established at Dannenberg.

The V-1 was transformed into the Reichenberg via the addition of a compact cockpit at the point of the fuselage that was immediately ahead of the pulsejet's intake, where the compressed-air cylinders were fitted on a standard V-1. This cramped cockpit was outfitted with only basic flight instrumentation, along with a bucket seat composed of plywood. The single-piece canopy incorporated an armored front panel and opened to the side to allow entry. The two displaced compressed-air cylinders were replaced by a single one, fitted in the rear in the space which normally accommodated the V-1's autopilot. At no point was any landing gear fitted to the aircraft. The wings were fitted with hardened edges that would cut the cables of barrage balloons.

It was proposed that a He 111 bomber would carry either one or two Reichenbergs beneath its wings, releasing them close to the target. The pilots would then steer their aircraft towards the target, jettisoning the cockpit canopy shortly before impact and bailing out. It was estimated that the chances of a pilot surviving such a bailout were less than 1% due to the proximity of the pulsejet's intake to the cockpit.

Operational History

Training

Trainees were initially prepared using ordinary gliders to get them used to handling unpowered flight; specially-adapted gliders with shortened wings would be used to provide more advanced training. Amongst other things, these adaptations enabled them to dive at speeds of up to 300 kilometers per hour (190 mph). Once sufficient proficiency had been demonstrated, the last stage of training would be conducted using the dual-control R-II. According to Christopher, there was no shortage of volunteers for the program despite the open acknowledgement that the mission involved their near-certain demise.

Training began on the R-I and R-II and, although landing them on a skid was difficult, the aircraft handled well and it was anticipated that the Leonidas Squadron would soon be using the machines. On 28 July 1944, Albert Speer wrote to Hitler, stating his opposition to the wasting of both men and machines on the Allies in France and suggested their deployment to be more worthwhile against Soviet power stations on the Eastern Front. These were not the only alternative targets that were proposed; other potential uses for the Fi 103R included ramming enemy bombers. Such was the interest in this latter role that formal evaluations were conducted in the final months of the conflict.

Test Flights

During September 1944, the first real flight was performed at the Erprobungsstelle Rechlin, the Reichenberg being dropped from a Heinkel He 111. However, this flight ended in a crash, which was attributed to the pilot having lost control of the aircraft after accidentally jettisoning the canopy. The next day, a second flight was conducted that also ended in a crash. The technical department struggled to explain these losses, although there were suspicions that the Fi 103R's flight characteristics could make landing particularly challenging.

Seeking to avoid further accidents while also hoping to uncover the source of these difficulties, further test flights were carried out by Heinz Kensche and Hanna Reitsch, both of whom were particularly accomplished test pilots. Reitsch herself experienced several crashes, which she survived unscathed. On 5 November 1944, during the second test flight of the R-III, a wing detached from the aircraft due to the vibrations; Kensche managed to parachute to safety, albeit with some difficulty due to the cramped cockpit. It was concluded that the Fi 103R had a relatively high stall speed and that pilots, unaware of this, had been attempting to land at speeds that were too slow for the aircraft to maintain stable flight.

Cancellation

During October 1944, Werner Baumbach assumed command of KG 200, and quickly opted to shelve the Reichenberg in favor of the Mistel project. By this point, the Allies had consolidated their position in France and thus the value of attacking potential invasion fleets was no longer considered to be as pressing as dealing with land warfare. On 15 March 1945, in a meeting between Baumbach, Speer, and Hitler, the latter was convinced that suicide missions were not part of the German warrior tradition; later that same day, Baumbach ordered the disbandment of the Reichenberg unit.

Variants

There were five variants. 

R-I: The basic single-seat unpowered glider.

R-II: Unpowered glider; had a second cockpit fitted where the warhead would normally be.

R-III: A pulsejet-powered two-seater.

R-IV: The standard-powered operational model. By October 1944 about 175 R-IVs were ready for action.

R-V: Powered trainer for the Heinkel He 162 (shorter nose).

Aircraft on Display

Flying Heritage Collection, Everett, Washington

Canadian War Museum (collected by Farley Mowat, under restoration 2009).

Lashenden Air Warfare Museum, Headcorn, Kent (restored N° 85)

La Coupole, Saint-Omer, France (restored N° 126)

Schweizerisches Militärmuseum Full, Full-Reuenthal, Switzerland, (restored N° 27)

Stinson Air Field, San Antonio, Texas, United States (replica).

National Military Museum (Soesterberg) Netherlands (restored N° 24)

Muzeum Molke, Ludwikowice Kłodzkie, Poland (replica)

Specifications (Fi 103R-IV)

Crew: 1

Length: 8.00 m (26 ft 3 in)

Wingspan: 5.72 m (18 ft 9 in)

Gross weight: 2,250 kg (4,960 lb)

Powerplant: 1 × Argus As 109-014 pulsejet, 2.9 kN (660 lbf) thrust - static thrust: 2.2 kN (500 lbf); max thrust: 3.6 kN (800 lbf)

Cruise speed: 650 km/h (400 mph, 350 kn) at 2,400 m (8,000 ft)

Never exceed speed: 800 km/h (500 mph, 430 kn)

Range: 329 km (204 mi, 178 nmi) from point of launch, cruising at 2,500 m (8,200 ft)

Endurance: 32 minutes

Armament: 850 kg (1,874 lb) high-explosive warhead

Bibliography

Bishop, Chris (2002). The Encyclopedia of Weapons of World War II. Sterling Publishing.

Christopher, John (2012). The Race for Hitler's X-Planes. The History Press.

Green, William (1970). The warplanes of the Third Reich (1st 1973 reprint ed.). New York: Doubleday. pp. 170–171.

Hyland, Gary; Anton Gill (1999). Last Talons of the Eagle. Headline.

Kay, Antony L. (1977). Buzz Bomb. Boylston: Monogram Aviation Publications.

Kay, Antony L.; J. Richard Smith; Eddie J. Creek (2002). German Aircraft of the Second World War. Naval Institute Press.

Mantelli - Brown - Kittel - Graf (2017). Wunderwaffen - The secret weapons of World War II. Edizioni R.E.I.

O'Neill, Richard (1981). Suicide Squads: Axis and Allied Special Attack Weapons of World War II : Their Development and Their Missions. London: Salamander Books.

Renneberg, Monika; Mark Walker (1999). Science, Technology, and National Socialism. Headline.

Young, Richard Anthony (1978). The Flying Bomb. New York: Sky Book Press.

Zaloga, Steven J.; Jim Laurier (2005). V-1 Flying Bomb 1942–52. Botley, Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing.

Further Reading

Reitsch, Hanna (2009). The Sky My Kingdom: Memoirs of the Famous German World War II Test Pilot. Casemate.

 

 

Fieseler Fi 103.

 

British soldiers examine a Fi 103R which is minus its warhead, 1945.

  

A "Reichenberg" captured by the British on the grounds of the Neu Tramm air munitions depot near Dannenberg, 1945.

 

On April 23, 1945, the U.S. 5th Armored Division captured the Neu Tramm air ammunition depot near Dannenberg on the Elbe River. In the process, the Americans seized a large number of single- and two-seat "Reichenberg" missiles. These were manned versions of the Fieseier Fi-103, designed for suicide missions.

 

Cockpit of a Fieseler Fi 103R Reichenberg, 1945.

 

Fi 103R.

 

Fieseler Fi 103R-4, found in sheds at the V-bomb assembly plant, waiting for shipment to launching sites, 1945.

 

Fieseler Fi 103R Reichenberg Re IV (Wk. Nr. 6/2080), BACP91, on display at Farnborough, United Kingdom, November 1945. 

 

Fieseler Fi-103R Reichenburg Re IV flying bomb on display on Air Force Day at RCAF Rockcliffe, Ontario, 16 June 1947. This piloted version of the "Buzz Bomb" was brought to Canada in 1945 by Captain Farley Mowat's Intelligence Collection Team. This Re IV is currently preserved in the Canadian War Museum, Ottawa, Ontario. (Library and Archives Canada Photo, MIKAN No. 3584067)

 

Fieseler Fi 103R Reichenberg Re IV piloted flying bomb at RCAF Station Trenton, Ontario, 9 June 1951. This piloted version of the "Buzz Bomb" was brought to Canada in 1945 by Captain Farley Mowat's Intelligence Collection Team.  This aircraft has recently been put on display in the Canadian War Museum, Ottawa, Ontario. 

 

Fieseler Fi 103R Reichenberg Re IV piloted version of the V1 flying bomb, USA FE-082, on display at Freeman Field, Indiana, post war.

 

Fieseler Fi 103R Reichenberg Re IV piloted version of the V1 flying bomb.

 

Fieseler Fi 103R.

 

Fieseler Fi 103R-IV Reichenberg outside the Continental hotel Antwerp Belgium. (City Archive Antwerp and Felixarchive)

 

Fieseler Fi 103R-IV Reichenberg in the summer of 1945 outside the Continental hotel, Antwerp in Belgium.

 

A Fieseler Fi 103R Reichenberg piloted missile, assembled by the United States Navy Technical Mission - Europe from parts captured by the U.S. Army at the Karlwitz munitions depot for analysis. Note that the warhead casing of this aircraft is believed to be a plywood mockup instead of an operationally representative item. Late spring 1945.

 

Testing the Argus pulse-jet engine on a Fieseler Fi 103R-IV.

 

Fi 103R trainer variants. Top and middle, dual cockpit with instructor in front and trainee in rear cockpit. Bottom, solo trainer. All have skids for landing after flight.

 

Fi 103R-I and Fi 103R-II.

 

Fieseler Fi 103R-III and Fi 103R-IV.

 

Fieseler Fi 103R-IV sub-launched variant.

 

Fi 103R-IV sub-launched variant.

 

Fieseler Fi 103R-IV Reichenberg.

 

Hanna Reitsch next to a Fieseler Fi 103R-IV.

 

Fieseler Fi 103R-IV.

 

Fieseler Fi 103R-IV.

 

Fieseler Fi 103R-IV in bogus camouflage scheme and markings.

 

Fieseler Fi 103R-IV on display at Farnborough, United Kingdom, November 1945. 

 

Fieseler Fi 103R on display at the Lashenden Air Warfare Museum in Ashford, Kent.

 

Fieseler Fi 103R on display in Allentown, Pennsylvania, 1945.

 

Another view of the Fieseler Fi 103R on display in Allentown, Pennsylvania, 1945.

 

Another view of the Fieseler Fi 103R on display in Allentown, Pennsylvania, 1945.

 

Another view of the Fieseler Fi 103R on display in Allentown, Pennsylvania, 1945.

 

Captured Fi 103R on its transport dolly.

 

Attaching a wing to a Fieseler Fi 103R.

 

Captured Fi 103R in Port Allegany, Pennsylvania, fall 1945, during a Victory Bond drive.

 

Captured Fi 103R on its transport dolly with wings detached.

 

 

The Nazi "Kamikazes": German Leaders Failed to Recognize a New Counteramphibious Tactic

A postwar report on German efforts to develop a suicide corps to attack the Allied invasion fleet, from the Intelligence Bulletin, June 1946.

One of the most hushed-up secrets of the war, back before the surrender of Japan, was the damage and inconvenience caused by the suicide-bent Kamikaze pilots of the Japanese Air Force. Troops who sailed to the invasion of Okinawa remember the Baka bomb, the winged aerial torpedo with its human pilot. But not until the end of the war, when intelligence officers began nosing around in the former Nazi domain, was it disclosed that a small group of fanatical Nazis had also organized a suicide corps for the purpose of breaking up the seaborne invasion of the Continent with a German version of the Japanese Baka.

In fact, there is much evidence to indicate that the Nazi suicidists were laying their plans long before their Japanese allies conceived the idea for this unconventional tactic. Only bureaucratic inefficiency, and disinterest in official circles as high as Hitler himself, forestalled the appearance of the Nazi kamikazes in the air over Normandy on D-Day.

The inception of this strange project goes back to the year 1943, when the fortunes of war were beginning to turn against the hitherto victorious German Army. At that time, many people in Germany were beginning to see that the Fatherland would ultimately go down to defeat, unless some miraculous event produced a severe setback to the Allied cause. Among these thinking Germans was a small group of idealists who were determined to do something about it. These people, who at first numbered no more than thirty or forty persons, came together from all walks of life. Some of them were from the Army, others were civilians, and one of the leaders was a well-known German woman flyer.

It was the common belief of these people that the war was lost unless a most decisive blow could be struck against the Allies. They believed that this could only be accomplished by the complete disruption of the eventual Allied assault upon the Continent, thus convincing the Allied leaders that Germany was secure and impregnable within her "fortress Europe."

An Idea Is Born

From this line of reasoning, the idea of a suicide corps was born. It was thought that a weapon could be devised in the form of a flying bomb which, when piloted to its target, could sink a large warship or troop transport. Enough of these, the idealists believed, could completely wreck any seaborne invasion with an expenditure of less than a thousand volunteer pilots. The members of this strange group were ready to volunteer. They asked only that they be given a weapon which would be certain to achieve its end, and they felt there were persons among their membership who had the skill to design such a weapon.

By October 1943, under the leadership of the woman flyer, a doctor of the Institute of Medical Aeronautics at Rechlin, and a first lieutenant of the Luftwaffe, organizational plans had advanced to a point where it was necessary to obtain official recognition and cooperation in conducting the project further. Because of her unique position in German aviation circles, this duty fell to the aviatrix.

The woman first presented the idea to the Luftwaffe High Command, and met with immediate rebuff. The German Air Force was not interested in an idea they considered to be the unstable reasoning of a group of psychopaths. After much delay, the Luftwaffe was bypassed, and the aviatrix went directly to Field Marshal Milch, at the time the head of the German Air Ministry. Again no progress was made.

After more weeks had passed, the woman determined to exploit her position and reputation in German aviation circles, and succeeded in gaining a hearing before the German Academy of Aeronautics. This academy had the power to assemble the necessary scientists, technicians, and air tactical authorities, and eventually a meeting was called by the Director of the German Aeronautical Research Council. After a lengthy conference, the committee of authorities decided that the idea was indeed operationally sound.

With this authoritative evidence in hand, the next step for the group of idealists was to obtain official support and leadership for the suicide plan. Application was made for an interview with Hitler, and in February 1944, the woman leader of the project was summoned to Berchtesgaden for a three-hour discussion with the Führer.

Interview with Hitler

Hitler did not approve. He objected to the philosophy of suicide entailed in the plan, and pointed out that there was no precedent in German history like it. Therefore, he said, the whole idea was not in keeping with the character of the German people. The woman countered this with the argument that never before in German history had the fate of the country been in such a precarious position. This, apparently, was the wrong thing to say, for Hitler replied emphatically that the position was not precarious, and that if it ever became so, then he, Hitler, would personally give the orders for such desperate measures to be taken.

The interview was anything but successful, but before she left, the aviatrix did obtain Hitler's permission to continue with the development and planning so that the organization would be ready to operate if ever the Führer felt the time had come to take such desperate steps. His parting remark was to the effect that he did not want to be bothered with the idea again until the time for action was ripe.

Meanwhile, the group of suicide volunteers had grown to about seventy or eighty members. As yet no concerned recruiting effort had been made, and such volunteers as were accepted were a very select group. Once accepted, a candidate for membership in the suicide corps was required to take a pledge to the effect that "I hereby volunteer as a pilot of the manned glider-bomb. I am convinced that this action will end with my death."

On the basis of Hitler's permission to continue with the development of the program, the matter was laid before the Chief of the General Staff of the German Air Force. He half-heartedly assigned the official direction of the project to the commander of a Luftwaffe bomber wing that was engaged in all sorts of special operations and clandestine activities. At first it appeared that the plan was finally on the road to fruition, but it soon became evident that the new commander accepted the assignment mostly because he saw in it the means of receiving the glory and credit which would be brought by the self-sacrifice of the volunteers under him.

The Weapon

But at the same time, the German Air Ministry was ordered to perfect the technical preparations which would be necessary to put the plan into effect. The Messerschmitt Me 328, originally designed as a fighter or fighter-bomber, was selected as the flying weapon to be used by the volunteers. Production of the plane was ordered, but proceeded so slowly that the volunteers began to suspect that some sort of official sabotage was afoot. As a result, the suicide group began to look around for another weapon—one which was easy to produce and would be available on short order. The V-1 "buzz bomb," rebuilt to carry a pilot, was decided upon. In less than three weeks, four types of this piloted missile were ready for testing.

Contrary to the wishes of the volunteer group, the Luftwaffe testing division insisted upon using their own pilots for the test flights. The two Luftwaffe men were soon seriously injured, and it was then that the woman pilot was called in and permitted to do the test flying. It was not an easy proposition. In order to train the suicide pilots, a two-seater "buzz bomb" had been built. Of course, it was necessary to land this model, if trainees were to be kept alive for the D-Day mission. But since it was necessary to glide to a landing without power, and since the missile was not of conventional aircraft or glider design, the approach had to be made at speeds approaching 155 miles per hour.

But as the technical development of the weapon went on with fair success, the rest of the program began to go astray through the bungling of the Luftwaffe officers put in charge of the volunteers. Although the suicide group at first believed the Luftwaffe wing commander—the one who had been appointed their official leader—was fully behind their plan, it soon became evident that he had little interest in the project. What was worse, he appointed a staff of other Luftwaffe officers to responsible planning and operational positions. These officers apparently had no conception of the original mission of the volunteers—to destroy the eventual Allied invasion fleet. Instead, they were continually fostering half-baked ideas, such as suicide attacks upon Soviet ammunition trains on the Eastern Front. Although the volunteers were willing to give their lives to deliver a smashing blow to the Allies, they were reluctant to die on some comparatively non-essential mission. Meanwhile, the training program had also bogged down. Much time was spent in physical education and pistol shooting, but little attention was paid to establishing a sound flight training program. The Luftwaffe lieutenant, one of the original volunteers and who had been the spark plug behind the whole idea, found himself helpless because of his low rank. Although he tried repeatedly to make improvements, he could do nothing but take orders.

Again the woman flyer was called upon to use her influence to try and revive the rapidly failing program. This time she went to Himmler, in hopes that he might be able to do some good for the cause of the suicide volunteers. Himmler was not much help. He was not opposed to the suicide idea, but he was of the opinion that the membership of the corps should be made up of criminals and the incurably diseased. He offered to take over the program if one of his officers was permitted to assume the leadership of the entire plan. It was evident that under Himmler the plan would not receive any better treatment than it was getting under its present supervision, so his offer was turned down.

D-Day Arrives

About this time, the Allies took a hand in things by staging their invasion in Normandy. Neither the suicide weapon, nor adequately trained suicide pilots were available, greatly because of the mishandling the whole program had received from its selfish or uninterested directors. The disappointment of the volunteer group was profound. Within six or seven days after D-Day, they realized that the invasion was a success, and that the moment for which they had been preparing had passed.

But, several days after the invasion had started, and all other efforts to halt it had failed, Hermann Göring suddenly remembered that somewhere in his Luftwaffe there was a group of pilots who had volunteered for a suicide mission. In due course, Göring reached the commander of the bomber wing under whom the volunteers had originally been placed. The commander, a colonel, immediately declared that the group was ready for action. The volunteers were astounded. They knew that no planes or "buzz bombs" were available, and that only a few of the men had any more than the briefest of pre-flight training. Nonetheless, the commander and his technical assistants, without consulting the volunteers, set to work on plans to use a Focke-Wulf FW 190, carrying a 4,000-pound bomb, to crash into selected targets. Now no one in the German Air Force had ever flown this plane with such a large bomb load, and it was highly doubtful that the plane would be able to get off the ground without crashing. Consequently, regular test pilots declined the honor of testing this experimental makeshift aircraft. Undaunted, the commander announced that his suicide pilots—none of whom had ever flown an Fw 190, if any other plane—would within the next few days conduct the test flights themselves. If they were killed, he said, their names and loyal sacrifice would be recorded in German history with the same honor they would have received if they had crashed their plane onto the deck of an enemy ship. Any enthusiasm that had remained among the volunteers disappeared completely at this point.

Fortunately for these men, Hitler heard about the plans for using the Fw 190, and ordered the project abandoned. The bomber commander was removed, eventually, and his successor set about trying to salvage some of the finer ideas of the original project. But by then it was too late. The Allies were established in force on the Continent, the hour to strike had passed, and so the group of suicide volunteers was disbanded.

"And so," to quote the woman flyer, "did an idea that was born of fervent and holy idealism, only to be misused and mismanaged at every turn by people who never understood how men could offer their lives simply for an idea in which they believed."

Conclusion

Were it not for the grievous damage done to our fleet units a year later by the Japanese Kamikaze corps, this German project might be passed off as just another unconventional tactical venture which the German leaders were smart enough to recognize was nothing but foolishness. But in the light of our later experience with the Japanese, it is possible to draw the conclusion that the Nazi command failed to realize they were being offered an impressive counter-weapon to seaborne invasion. It is useless, in retrospect, to attempt a reconstruction of what might have happened off Normandy on D-Day, if the Nazi command had recognized the potentialities of these volunteers and their piloted bomb. Although it is unlikely that the suicidists could have defeated the invasion, the introduction of such an unconventional tactic, if exploited on the scale later used by the Japanese, would certainly have offered another serious threat to an already difficult amphibious operation.

 

How Effective Were Sandbags on a Sherman?

The most common argument made about why these sandbags were added were mostly around the idea that these sandbags were a great protection against Panzerfaust or Raketenpanzerbüchse 54 "Panzerschrek".

However, here's something that many people missed when trying to reason this; these sandbags had little to no effect when it comes to stopping these rounds. In fact, both the Panzerfaust and Panzerschrek required about 1 meter of air gap to substantially reduce the penetrating capability of the warhead, which effectively not only rendered a sideskirt useless, but also made the idea of adding sandbags a moot point as well.

The shaped charge warhead isn't actually shooting a "molten copper jet" as many believed, but rather copper disc in the warhead that was formed by force into a high-velocity superplastic jet/penetrator due to the the Munroe/Neumann effect; focusing of blast energy by a hollow or void cut on a surface of an explosive.

All you did was provide a false sense of security while overburdening the vehicle with extra weight which significantly shortened the lifespan of the tank's suspension.

There's the Panzerfaust/Panzerschreck threat, and then there's another more equal threat that the American tanks would face in the ETO: the towed anti-tank gun.

While not produced as numerous as a handheld shaped charge projectile launcher, the presence of an anti-tank gun in the combat zone is still numerous enough to cause great threat. Remember that the European combat zone wasn't mostly an urban combat zone, but also between bocage and open field.

Anti-tank guns were more numerous and more "conniving" than a tank since they posed even greater threat because of their low profile and easily camouflaged feature which can be hard to spot in the air or on the ground at a distance. And these sandbags were also ineffective in stopping rounds from the guns.

However, the sandbags sometimes worked in dislodging shells, especially when the moisture inside the sandbag froze during winter, making it as hard as concrete. Several accounts were recorded where high-velocity anti-tank rounds were defeated by frozen sandbags. But in doing so the moisture, if frozen, added more weight to the tank which increased the chance for the tank to breakdown. 

Airfield Construction in the CBI

Airfield Construction in the CBI: Though roaring motors assail their ears, Chinese airstrip builders are too busy to glance up at an arriving Douglas C-47 Skytrain (though several manage to take a glimpse at the photographer).

 

Historical Record of the Engineer Section

Construction Service - Services of Supply

United States Army Forces in China-Burma-India and United States Forces in India-Burma Theater

March 1942 - August 1944

With the arrival in India of United States Army Forces in 1942 the Services of Supply immediately began preparation of facilities for their use. Since the greater portion of these forces were made up of Air Corps units one of the major facilities that had to be provided was air fields for their use. In accordance with the policy established upon arrival in the Theater of utilizing to the fullest possible extent facilities and supplies available here, arrangements were made for the construction of air fields by the British.

Air Corps requirements were submitted to SOS which placed requests to the British for the necessary construction; maintained close liaison with GHQ(I) in order to secure administrative approval of projects; supervised the construction work through the Engineer Sections of the Base and Advance Sections, which had been set up to expedite problems of administration and supply. In certain areas where a large amount of construction work was planned Engineer Areas, directly responsible to Headquarters SOS were set up to supervise and coordinate the construction work. By August 1942 work had begun on the Agra Air Depot and fields at Chabua, Gaya, Chakulia, Nawadih and Gushkara.

The actual construction work was in most cases done by Indian contractors using the casual, unhurried working methods of the country. Cement was mixed up by hand and conveyed to forms on the heads of a slow-moving procession of coolies. In many cases the quality of the concrete produced in this fashion was poor.

Later in 1942 construction work was begun on several airfields in the Assam area some of which were for use of air freight lines to China. It became apparent in January 1943 that immediate action would be necessary if these fields were to be ready for the operation of planes which were scheduled to arrive in a short time. Although they were informed of the situation the British failed to provide adequate labor and the work continued far behind schedule.

On May 9, General Wheeler was directed by the War Department to take immediate charge of rehabilitation and expansion of these Assam airfields and to push repair and construction at top speed. The urgency of the matter was emphasized as in addition to a major effort and increase in Hump tonnage the fields would later be used by V.L.R. bombers due to arrive in the Theater in a few months. The British then directed that construction of the Assam airfields be given first priority. The target date for their completion was set at 1 July 1943. In the meantime construction of other airfields in the area was begun. Finally on 31 July due to the vital necessity to hasten construction on the Assam bases General Wavell was persuaded to give the work a rating in Priority Group XX which ranked above Priority Group I and gave the airfields precedence over all other defense works.

In September 1943, preliminary plans were made for the XX Bomber Command project and soon SOS began negotiations with the British for procurement of fields. Plans called for five fields in the Calcutta area located at Kharagpur, Piardoba, Lalaikunda, Chakulia and Dudhkundi. Late in November headquarters of the Bengal project was established to handle construction of airfields for the VLR bombers. Final order forms covering the fields required by the XX Bomber Command were turned over to SOS on 11 December 1943 at which time grading and clearing operations were already in progress.

During February 1944, the 930th Engineer Regiment (less three battalions), the 1875th Engineer Aviation Battalion, the 1877th Engineer Aviation Battalion, and the 879th A/B Engineer Aviation Battalion which had just arrived in the theater were attached to SOS and immediately put to work on the project. These engineers worked side by side with Indian labor. Batteries of concrete mixers were swung into action, earth was moved by the cubic yard rather than by the basketful.

By 1 June 1944, the target date, all of the fields were ready for limited operation, except Kalaikunda. Due to engineering difficulties involved this field was placed in a priority second to that of the other fields so that work could be pushed to complete at least four fields by the target date.

In connection with the construction of these VLR fields plans were drawn up for the supply of the large quantities of aviation gasoline which would be required. The estimated requirements for the months from March through August in U.S. gallons were:

March: 4,736,000

April: 3,536,000

May: 3,536,000

June: 7,027,000

July: 7,077,000

August: 10,608,000

Since supply by any other method would have been extremely difficult and would have been an additional burden on already overtaxed transportation system, pipelines were decided upon. The project called for approximately 70 miles of 6" pipeline from Budge Budge, the oil tanker terminal near Calcutta, to the vicinity of Kalaikunda and approximately 100 miles of 4" pipeline to feed various fields. Storage facilities at each field were to be sufficient for 1,470,000 U.S. gallons.

The project was approved on 17 December 1943 and work was immediately begun by American troops and 2000 Indian laborers provided through negotiation with the Government of India. The troops provided the necessary technical supervision of the work. Progress was rapid and by 13 March 1944 the 6" line had been laid and the 4" extension to Chakulia so that pumping to the storage tanks at Kharagpur and Chakulia could begin. The entire project was completed on 6 October 1944.

From these fields the first land-based air operation against Japan was initiated.

The first problem confronting SOS in the construction of airfields in China were those of improving existing fields in use by Chennault's Flying Tigers so that they could be used by heavy bombers and transport planes and the building of additional fields for use of Hump transport planes. The work was handled through China's Commission on Aeronautical Affairs or Ministry of Communication. All operational construction was handled through this agency which let contracts for the work and paid for it. SOS engineers supervised the construction. All non-operational construction was accomplished by SOS through direct contract.

Due to distances involved, location of the Chinese Government, and other factors, airfield construction in most instances was handled with it reference to Headquarters, SOS. The SOS Advance Sections dealt directly with Forward Echelon Headquarters, USAF in CBI, located in Chungking where approval for all proposed construction had to be secured from Chinese Government. In November 1943 airfield construction in China was made the responsibility of the Air Forces.

In Burma the construction of airfields was made the responsibility of the Air Forces at the same time. However, the engineers building the Ledo Road constructed all the fields adjacent to the road. It should be noted that most of the Air Force Engineer units arriving in the theater prior to February 1944 were assigned to the Ledo Road project. The airfields constructed served as an aid in relieving the difficult supply situation as the road construction progressed.
 

Chinese hammering rock, turn the good earth into an 8,700-foot runway for American aircraft.

 

To build airbases for American aircraft, for bulldozers the Chinese use water buffalos; for power shovels, their bare hands.

 

Bamboo poles bend like bows under buckets of mud, the glue that binds the 8,700-foot runway being built by Chinese workers for American aircraft.

 

An American pays a candy bonus to his Chinese labor gang for helping to build an airbase for American aircraft.

 

Chinese mixers ankle-deep in mud deliver "cement" to buckets for building an American airbase.

 

At noon a human triangle, connected by poles, carries rice to Chinese workers on the runway being built for American aircraft.

 

On a discarded film wrapper a Chinese female working on an airfield for American aircraft looks in vain for a picture.