Message Orders for Operation "Rheinübung"

[Translated from the German by Google Translate.]  Fleet Command Gkdos 90/41 A4 Chiefs.

On board, April 21, 1941

Top priority
only by officer

Message orders for Operation "Rheinübung"

( Fleet Gkdos 100/41 A1 Chiefs. of 22.4.41 .)

A.) Radio service:

I.) With home: According to the communications order of Group Command North or West.

II.) Within the unit:

a) UK channels

1.) From departure until May 9, 24:00: 10
2.) From May 10, 00:00 to May 19, 24:00: 15
3.) From May 20, 00:00 to June 5, 24:00: 12
4.) From June 6, 00:00 to June 17, 24:00: 18
5.) From June 18, 00:00 to July 2, 24:00: 9
6.) From July 4, 00:00 to July 16, 24:00: 13
7.) From July 17, 00:00 until completion or until the ordered time: 18
8.) During the duration of fuel or resupply operations, Special channels are to be ordered for direct ship-to-troop vessel traffic. The currently valid channel remains in place as a cross-connection between the warships of the squadron as long as they are within UK range and the UK connection is necessary.

b) Longwave near zone for tactical cooperation with submarines:
1.) Mondays: Lucie Toni
2.) Tuesdays: Max Paula
3.) Wednesdays: Lucie
4.) Thursdays: Nanni
5.) Fridays: Paula
6.) Saturdays: Max Ida
7.) Sundays: Max Lucie
Wave change; unless otherwise ordered in individual cases, at 0800.

c) Longwave near zone for traffic of warships with reconnaissance and troop vessels :
1.) Lucie Emil Max
2.) Lucie Max (alternative welbe)
Cross sum allocation see Appendix 1.

III.) In cooperation with aircraft:

1.) Aircraft reconnaissance wave: Anton Dora
2.) Aircraft Bismarck wave: Anton Dora
3.) Aircraft Pr. Eugen wave: Anton Gustav
4.) Air reconnaissance wave
5.) Fighter wave
6.) Direction finding and evasion wave
7.) Communication wave for fighter protection
are ordered by the commanding group command with FT, unless specified in NB's.

IV.) Prize radio service: According to the special instructions of the OKM for prizes of domestic naval forces.

V.) Radio service of supply ships and escort tankers: according to Annex 2.

B.) Key service:

1.) According to the group commands' message orders.
2.) Special short signals for longwave near zone, see Annex 3.
3.) Radio traffic on longwave near zone encrypted.

C.) Special arrangements:

1.) The longwave short-range zone of section II b) is only to be used when submarines are involved in radio communications. Therefore, it is all located below 1000 meters.
2.) In optical, UK, and longwave short-range communications, as soon as a uniform ship's time is ordered for the entire convoy, this time must be used.

D.) Radio direction finding service:

1.) According to messages, orders from the group commands.
2.) SB requests are to be transmitted on coastal shortwave radio.

E.) ES service:

1.) According to ES regulations.
2.) Conning tower roofs within the area of ​​friendly combat air power are to be bright yellow, outside this area gray. The same applies to swastika flags painted on the bow and stern.
3.) Fl.SZ (colorful beacons) red : April, June. white : May, July.
Displayed on ships simultaneously upon UK order from the task force command. Deployed task forces are to be informed by the commanding group command. Fl.SZ (colorful beacons) are to be shown only when cooperating with combat, not escort, task forces.

Distribution list:

2nd Class Test Number   Group West Group North Fleet Commander-in-Chief Operations Commander-in- Chief 2nd Admiral Fleet Bismarck Pr. Eugen Gonzenheim Kota Penang Ermland Belchen Bremen Esso-Hamburg Spichern Reserve Lorraine

1 2-4 5-7 8-10 10-13 14-16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 28-30 27

On behalf of.
Signed: Bormann.

For accuracy:

[signed]

Oblt.MAuN1

---

Annex 1 to Fleet Gkdos 90/41 A4 Chiefs.v.21.4.

Cross sum allocation for radio communications of tankers and troopers.

21   22   23   24   25   26   27   28   29   30   31   32   33   34

Bismarck Pr.Eugen Gonzenheim Kota Penang Ermland Belchen Bremen Esso-Hamburg Lorraine Spichern Gneisenau Scharnhorst Heide Weissenburg

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Annex 2 to Fleet Gkdos 90/41 A4 Chiefs.v.21.4.41

Radio service of the troop ships and escort tankers.

I. Radio communication with the homeland:
according to the communications orders of the group commands.

II. Radio communication with naval forces:
With partial amendments to the orders originally issued by the group commands, the following is commanded:

a) Direction finding for rendezvous:
Troopers and escort tankers occupy the long-wave shortwave band for 30 minutes at the times they are scheduled to rendezvous according to operational orders.

The ship to be rendezvous, the lead ship in a convoy, initiates radio communication on this wave, if necessary, by transmitting "ww w" with an interspersed five-digit number group, the digital root of which is specified [assigned] to it in operational orders, beginning with the lowest transmission power. The call lasts 1 minute.

The following minute is reserved for the responding station. Battleships use only the odd minutes until contact is established , troopers and escort tankers use the even minutes, regardless of the time the radio communication begins.

If no answer is received in the second minute, the call should be repeated in the third minute with a slightly higher transmission power. As soon as the called radio station has received the call, it should reply in the following even minute with "ww w" and an interspersed five-digit number group, the digital root of which corresponds to the name of its vessel.

The reply should also begin with the lowest transmission power, which should be increased to 50 percent output in the next transmission minute until the reply has been received. The calling radio station responds with its five-digit code and, using the traffic abbreviation, indicates the volume at which it is receiving the trooper, enabling the trooper to adjust its transmission power accordingly. The connection is considered established when both stations are receiving at volume 2.

Skilled petty officers should be assigned to this radio communication, and the best receivers with the volume fully turned up should be used.

A direction-finding radio message from the trooper or escort tanker is requested by the receiving vessel using the traffic abbreviation "qobs".

At this moment, the minute allocation is complete.

The requested radio station transmits a direction-finding message consisting of approximately 10-12 five-digit number groups, the first and last of which must equal the digital root assigned to the transmitting support vessel or escort tanker. No acknowledgment of receipt is given for this direction-finding message; a new request is made by transmitting the traffic abbreviation "qobs" again.

Until visual contact is established and the radio link is thus completed, the settings on the transmitters and receivers with which the radio link was established must not be changed in order to ensure that radio communication can be resumed at any time without having to initiate a new call procedure.

b) Radio message exchange:
Radio communication is established as described in II a), unless it has already been established. The transmission of a radio message is to be announced by the traffic abbreviation "qtc", confirmed by the receiving station with "k". Radio message transmission according to the relay radio procedure. Keying according to M - General domestic waters. Radio names according to GFL.

c) Frequency change is ordered with the traffic abbreviation "qlns"...." = Switch from the longwave near zone to ....kHz

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3 Annex to Fleet Gkdos 90/41 A4 Chiefs.v.21.4.41

Special short signals for longwave near zone.

Beta   Epsilon   Bruno   C�sar   Nanni   Otto   Ulli   �se Jot   �se Karl   �se Lucie

Collect according to astronomical cutlery. Collect according to coupled cutlery (numbers included = collection square). Do you have astronomical cutlery? Yes No Take-off clearance for onboard aircraft No take-off clearance Reconnaissance according to plan ..... by onboard aircraft Reconnaissance according to plan ..... by onboard aircraft Reconnaissance according to plan ..... by onboard aircraft

All signals must be transmitted securely and repeated by the receiver. Introductory signal: period.

 

General Orders for the Atlantic Operation (Rheinübung)

Officers Eyes Only

Attachment 1 to Fleet Order 100/41 A1 Chefs.

General Orders for the Atlantic Operation.

1.) The object of the operation is to do the greatest possible damage to the enemy by destroying his merchant shipping, especially that proceeding towards England.

2.) The operation conducted with the battleships Gneisenau and Scharnhorst from January until mid-March 1941 showed that, in spite of information provided by the Intelligence Service regarding the sailing dates and routes of convoys, it is extremely difficult to intercept a convoy in the vast ocean spaces with the few units available for this purpose, and it depends on coincidence and luck.

Therefore, I do not intend to restrict the deployment of the ships exclusively for attacking convoys, but also from the outset for capturing or destroying ships steaming independently. However, as far as time permits, they will be deployed in the area of ​​operations in such a manner that there is a prospect of intercepting a convoy.

3.) Attacks on Convoys:
Some of the convoys encountered by the battleships during the operation were escorted by a battleship and, in one case, by two cruisers and two destroyers also. Escorts of comparable strength must be anticipated in the future. The operational directives of the Seekriegsleitung and Group West allow Bismarck only to tie down a battleship escorting a convoy, insofar as that is possible without fully engaging, and that only in the event such action gives Prinz Eugen the possibility of success against the rest of the escort or against the convoy.

Accordingly, when Bismarck and Prinz Eugen attack a convoy, they must do so from opposite sides. In every case, tactical and attack orders will come from the Fleet Commander.

Without coming into battle contact, the exact strength of a convoy's escort can usually be determined only by shipboard aircraft. This deployment is, however, dependent upon the tactical situation and the weather and therefore rarely possible on the Halifax-England route. It must, therefore, be anticipated that, in making an attack, Prinz Eugen will encounter escorting cruisers even if Bismarck succeeds in drawing off the big ship. In this event, the cruiser's attack on the convoy is to be broken off and an immediate report made. But even when only one big ship is escorting the convoy, the enemy, if he follows good tactics, will stay in the immediate vicinity of the convoy and protect it from all sides . In this case there can be no question of an attack by the cruiser; that may occur only if the big ship allows the Bismarck to draw her so far from her charges that the cruiser has a chance of getting within effective shooting range of the convoy.

If the ships are in search sectors and Prinz Eugen sights a convoy, she should report it by short signal at close range and stay at the extreme edge of visibility (smokeless). With respect to the necessity for later surprise attacks , it cannot be the task of the cruiser to ascertain the strength of the escort. That must be left to the Bismarck . In an attack to a convoy, the main objective must be to sink as many steamers as possible. When a weakly escorted convoy is attacked, the convoy commander will certainly disperse his charges. In this case, the first objective must be to disable the largest possible number of steamers by gunfire. (They can be sunk later). For this, all batteries are to open up with the exact firing directions and at the lowest possible range appropriate to the caliber. (Main and secondary batteries with nose-fuzed and base-fuzed projectiles, heavy flak with nose-fuzed). Steamers that have been disabled by gunfire are not to be sunk until there is not one steamer still moving within sight of the ship concerned. To conserve ammunition, the heavy flak is to be nose-fuzed and used in the following manner: close within 300-500 meters of the ship, then have the best gunners fire individual shots into the waterline. Fire only when the ship is on the up-roll. Shoot holes in all of the steamer's compartments (the largest room is the engine room). With 3.7-centimeter ammunition, shoot holes in the upper part of the steamer, so that during the flooding of the rooms, air can escape upwards.

Prinz Eugen also wants to use her torpedoes in an attack on a convoy . Against a strongly defended convoy, there will only be a short time, if any, available for the cruiser's attack. This must be exploited as fully as possible. In this case especially, everything will depend on speedy action. The steamers are therefore to be sunk primarily with torpedoes .

The work of destruction may not be delayed by rescue operations.

The rescue of survivors, especially those from a convoy that has been attacked, can expose our own ships to serious danger from enemy submarines and surface forces. In such cases, concern for our ships must take precedence over the rescue of survivors. If necessary, a small steamer is to be spared for the purpose of rescuing survivors.

4.) Ships Steaming Independently:
In the absence of orders to the contrary, all lone steamers encountered will be captured or destroyed. When weather conditions permit boats to be lowered, the steamers will be searched and, if they themselves are valuable or have valuable cargoes and they can get under way, brought home (examine fuel supply, commissions, etc.). In principle, tankers that can make more than 10 knots, refrigerator ships and fast motor ships, if they can get under way - whether they are loaded or not - are to be captured and brought by a prize crew over the designated course ( Group West Gkdos. 1803/41 AoP Chefs v. 14.4.41. Numeral 4i) into the mouth of the Gironde.

Experience has shown that it is best not to bring prizes immediately into the Bay of Biscay, especially those that have transmitted radio signals, but to wait a few weeks in a remote ocean area, then to set out for the Gironde at intervals so as to prevent the enemy from capturing them as they enter the Bay of Biscay. For this, in some circumstances it will be necessary to equip the prizes with extra commissions and send them to an escort tanker so that they can replenish. The start of the prizes' return voyage is to be reported by short signal (Short signal booklet page 20/21). The place and date of embarkation remains the same; instead, the correct arrival date of the prize in the port of destination must be added as a second group.

Prizes must not fall into enemy hands under any circumstances. In every case, therefore, as soon as it boards, the prize crew must take preparations for scuttling at short notice.

Eastbound 6 West, the prize crew paints the bow and stern of the prize on the upper deck red. (Red lead).

When your own aircraft approach, shoot green stars.

For searching steamers, a boarding party is to be organized. Each ship has three prize crews and must organize two others from its company. Equipment is to be stored within easy reach. Prize crews must be instructed on the mission they are to discharge on board the steamers. All books, code instruments, tables, and notes found on the bridge, in the charthouse, in the radio room, in the captain's pockets, and elsewhere are to be seized and examined on board the ship by officers qualified in the language.

On approaching a ship sailing independently, fly the British ensign and keep the turrets at zero degrees to avoid arousing suspicion. Signal her to stop and forbid her to use her radio. The transmission or completion of a radio warning signal must be prevented if possible. For this, the following measures are to be taken:

a.) If the steamer is radioing before the ship gets within firing range, the message must be interrupted by the sending of a prepared radio message (in the English language) or a radio weather report. As soon as the steamer is in effective range, open fire. Whenever possible take the bridge superstructure under fire. (On most steamers the radio room is behind or below the bridge.)

b.) If the steamer is radioing within the effective range of the heavy flak, open fire immediately and destroy her radio installation as in paragraph a.). (Flak with nose-fuzed.)

So that tankers and valuable ships come into our hands as intact as possible, do not fire any longer than is necessary to prevent the transmission of signals. Establish good connections between the radio room and the bridge.

Approach a steamer so that one side is to leeward, quickly bring the ship to a stop, and lower a boat immediately (launch with a long lead line).

The boarding party will take over all important points (bridge, charthouse, radio room, engine room) and have the crew of the steamer assemble immediately on the upper deck.

5.) Order for the war march.

a.) Combat turns are to be executed as soon as the order is understood.
At ship separations exceeding 3000 m, there is no need to wait for the advancing vessel to begin turning.
No reversible lights at night. Rudder position to the advancing vessel is to be determined by the UK.

b.) Check fogging systems frequently, especially during frost.

c.) The dimming status is checked daily after nightfall during joint marches. For this purpose, the rear boatman pulls up to the port side, moves in front of the boatman to the starboard side, drops down there, and then rejoins the boat. Result by UK.

d.) In order to prevent the enemy, especially enemy aerial reconnaissance, from determining the ships' route, bilge pumping, jettisoning of empty containers, and emptying of wastebaskets may only be carried out between sunset and two hours thereafter. Should it be necessary to pump outside of this time in exceptional circumstances, permission must be obtained from the fleet in each individual case.

e.) As long as the ships are operating together, both ships will be ordered to be on standby and ready for war.
This order is binding and cannot be changed in any way.

 

 

Fleet Commander's Operational Order for the Atlantic Operation with Bismarck and Prinz Eugen

[Translated from German by Google Translate.]  Fleet Command B.No. Gkdos. 100/41 A1 bosses.

On board, April 22, 1941

Top priority only by officer

Top secret!

Fleet Commander's operational order for the Atlantic operation with Bismarck and Prinz Eugen
(deck designation: "Rhine exercise")

I.) Enemy intelligence: see Operations Order Group North B.No. 237/41 Aop. Gkdos. Chiefs. of 22 April 1941, Operations Order Group West Gkdos. 1803/41 Aop. Chiefs. of 14 April 1941 and Annexes 2 and 3.

Enemy intelligence gathered through decryption during the operation is continuously relayed directly by radio message to the B.-Leitstelle (B.-Control Center). These radio messages bear the signature "B.-Leitstelle" (B.-Control Center). Radio messages containing B.-Dienst (B.-Service) documents for a B.-Dienst group embarked on board also bear the additional notation "för B.-Dienst" (for B.-Service) at the beginning.

II.) Own armed forces:

A.) Participants:
"Bismarck"
"Prinz Eugen"
On the North-South route: The submarines operating there.
On the HX route from the end of May: 4 submarines.
Reconnaissance vessel "Gonzenheim"
Reconnaissance vessel "Kota Penang"
2 support vessels
5 escort tankers

B.) Securing:
Mine protection on the forced route from Green 03 (Arkona) to Red 20 for "Bismarck" by barrier breaker 13, for "Prinz Eugen" by barrier breaker 31.

Destroyers attach themselves to "Prinz Eugen". Mine escort through the Skagen barrier from Schwarz 21 to 21a by the 5th MS Flotilla. After passing this barrier, submarine escort by "Z 23", "Z 24", "Lody" and "Fr. Eckholdt".

C.) Own separately operating armed forces,
aerial reconnaissance,
fighter escort,
close security,
provision of air combat units and briefing of those eligible to the air units.
(see Operational Order Group North and Group West .)

III.) Task:

A.) Sailing through the Belt and North Sea into the North Atlantic.

B.) Attack on the supply line running through the North Atlantic. The area of ​​operations is bounded to the south by the equator, to the west (northeast) 20°N by the American neutral zone, which runs along the 60th meridian to the latitude of Halifax and from there to the coast. To the south 20°N, only a 300 nautical mile wide strip along the coast is to be considered neutral.

C.) After completing task B.), put into ports in western France to replenish ammunition and supplies. If longer repairs or a planned overhaul are necessary, return to home if possible.

IV.) Intention:

A.) Unnoticed breakthrough through the Denmark Strait into the North Atlantic.

B.) Attack on the HX route. Further decisions depending on the situation.

V.) Implementation:

A.) Command structure:
Operational command see Operational Order Group West .
Leadership: Fleet commander on "Bismarck".

B.) Timeline of the operation:

1.) On the afternoon of April 28th, departure in formation from Gotenhafen so that Point Green 03 is reached at 10:00 AM on April 29th. From there, march behind the breakers, "Bismarck" behind [breaker] 13, "Prinz Eugen" behind 31, on a forced course so that the formation is at Point Red 05 by 9:30 PM. From there, march through the Belt according to the order of BSO Gkdos. 33/41 Commanders of April 22nd . At Point Red 20, the breakers are released, and the march continues in the buoyed channel, previously searched by breakers, at a distance of 17 nautical miles via Black 18, so that Point Black 21 is reached at 12:30 PM. (Barrier breakers follow at maximum speed.) From there escort through the barrier gap (5th MS Flotilla) to Schwarz 21 a.

2.) Continue the march through the Skagerrak under submarine escort by the destroyers, so that the flotilla reaches Point Black 26 (Kristiansand-South) by 7:00 PM. Continue the march according to Operational Order Group North . BSO is requested to keep the blockade breakers ready until 12:00 PM on April 30th.

3.) BSO [Commander of Baltic Sea Security] initiates the SB measures in the Belt.

4.) Ships and barrier breakers switch to UK [Ultra Shortwave] channel 17.

5.) The following transit times are expected:

a.) Green 03	April 29th, 10:00 AM
b.) Red 05 Trip 10 sm	"9:30 PM
c.) Red 20	30.4. 00:30
d.) Zealand Revenue Lock	" 0530 am
e.) Black 21	"12:30 pm
f.) Black 21 a	" 1400
g.) Black 26 (Kristiansand-South)	" 7:00 PM
h.) Skagerrak Dam Kristiansand South, outer barrier gap.	"8:30 PM
i.) Stavanger Broad	1.5. 0230 Uhr
j.) Korsfjord (Marstein)	" 0630 am
k.) Hjelte Fjord from	" 10:00 PM
l.) Breite Drontheim	2.5. 0600 Uhr

6.) While anchored off Bergen, fuel was replenished by the "Prinz Eugen" and the destroyers. Before breaking out into the Atlantic, fuel was expected to be replenished by the tanker Weißenburg at 70°N, 1°W.

C.) Readiness levels:

1.) April 29, 10:00 AM until darkness: Eased anti-aircraft watch.

2.) April 30th: From daylight, anti-aircraft watch; after passing the Skagen barrier, additional military watch. After passing the Kristiansand-South barrier: all-arms watch.

3.) 1.5. 0400: Ship must be ready for service until full daytime visibility is achieved. Orders will follow thereafter.

4.) From 29.4. 1000 am, war march closure status.

D.) War march conditions, war march stages:

1.) Gotenhafen to Grün 03: War march condition 3, War march speed level: 20 nm.

2.) From Green 03: War march condition 2, War march speed level: 18 nautical miles.

3.) From Red 20: War march speed level: 20 nautical miles.

4.) From Schwarz 21 a: War march condition 1, War march speed level: 25 nautical miles.

5.) After passing Skagen barrier: War march speed level: 27 nautical miles.

E.) Communications orders:
see Operational Order Group North and West and Fleet Gkdos 90/41 A4 Chiefs. of 21.4.41 .

F.) Special provisions:

1.) When encountering mines or in fog, follow orders.

2.) In the event of submarine and aircraft attacks, the affected ship will independently carry out the necessary defensive and evasive maneuvers without receiving a signal order. Likewise, the destroyers deployed for escort must conduct anti-submarine warfare without delay and using all available means.

3.) Distribution of tankers to the individual sea areas a. Operational orders of the groups. Details regarding the tankers' loading will follow.

4.) In addition to the ammunition loaded on the tankers, the following is also stored:

a.) In Drontheim:
1200 rounds 15 cm C28
, 120 rounds 15 cm Lg
, 8235 rounds 10.5 cm,
170 rounds 10.5 Lg.
Storage of 20.3 cm and 38 cm ammunition has been requested.

b.) In Brest:
1 full set of equipment for a heavy cruiser
2400 rounds 15 cm C 28
8000 rounds 10.5 cm

c.) A request has been made to store 38 cm ammunition in St. Nazaire.

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The following are enclosed:

1.) Appendix 1: General Order for the Atlantic Operation .
2.) Appendix 2: Special Enemy Situation of Group West dated April 19, 1941.
3.) Appendix 3: Strength and Distribution of the British Submarine Fleet.
4.) Appendix 4: Overview of Berths for Battleships and Cruisers in West French Ports and in Trondheim.

Signed: L � tjen s.

For the accuracy

[signed]

First Lieutenant (V) and 1st Fl. Adj.

Distribution list:

Naval Command	Price No.	1 - 3
Mar. Group Command West	"	4 - 5
Mar. Group Command North	"	6 - 7
Fleet Command, 2nd Adm. d. Fl.	"	8
Command of the cruisers	"	9
Battleship "Bismarck"	"	10 - 11
Cruiser "Prince Eugene"	"	12 - 13
Battleship "Scharnhorst"	"	14 - 15
Fleet Staff	"	16 - 20
reserve	"	21 - 25