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General Orders for the Atlantic Operation (Rheinübung)

Officers Eyes Only

Attachment 1 to Fleet Order 100/41 A1 Chefs.

General Orders for the Atlantic Operation.

1.) The object of the operation is to do the greatest possible damage to the enemy by destroying his merchant shipping, especially that proceeding towards England.

2.) The operation conducted with the battleships Gneisenau and Scharnhorst from January until mid-March 1941 showed that, in spite of information provided by the Intelligence Service regarding the sailing dates and routes of convoys, it is extremely difficult to intercept a convoy in the vast ocean spaces with the few units available for this purpose, and it depends on coincidence and luck.

Therefore, I do not intend to restrict the deployment of the ships exclusively for attacking convoys, but also from the outset for capturing or destroying ships steaming independently. However, as far as time permits, they will be deployed in the area of ​​operations in such a manner that there is a prospect of intercepting a convoy.

3.) Attacks on Convoys:
Some of the convoys encountered by the battleships during the operation were escorted by a battleship and, in one case, by two cruisers and two destroyers also. Escorts of comparable strength must be anticipated in the future. The operational directives of the Seekriegsleitung and Group West allow Bismarck only to tie down a battleship escorting a convoy, insofar as that is possible without fully engaging, and that only in the event such action gives Prinz Eugen the possibility of success against the rest of the escort or against the convoy.

Accordingly, when Bismarck and Prinz Eugen attack a convoy, they must do so from opposite sides. In every case, tactical and attack orders will come from the Fleet Commander.

Without coming into battle contact, the exact strength of a convoy's escort can usually be determined only by shipboard aircraft. This deployment is, however, dependent upon the tactical situation and the weather and therefore rarely possible on the Halifax-England route. It must, therefore, be anticipated that, in making an attack, Prinz Eugen will encounter escorting cruisers even if Bismarck succeeds in drawing off the big ship. In this event, the cruiser's attack on the convoy is to be broken off and an immediate report made. But even when only one big ship is escorting the convoy, the enemy, if he follows good tactics, will stay in the immediate vicinity of the convoy and protect it from all sides . In this case there can be no question of an attack by the cruiser; that may occur only if the big ship allows the Bismarck to draw her so far from her charges that the cruiser has a chance of getting within effective shooting range of the convoy.

If the ships are in search sectors and Prinz Eugen sights a convoy, she should report it by short signal at close range and stay at the extreme edge of visibility (smokeless). With respect to the necessity for later surprise attacks , it cannot be the task of the cruiser to ascertain the strength of the escort. That must be left to the Bismarck . In an attack to a convoy, the main objective must be to sink as many steamers as possible. When a weakly escorted convoy is attacked, the convoy commander will certainly disperse his charges. In this case, the first objective must be to disable the largest possible number of steamers by gunfire. (They can be sunk later). For this, all batteries are to open up with the exact firing directions and at the lowest possible range appropriate to the caliber. (Main and secondary batteries with nose-fuzed and base-fuzed projectiles, heavy flak with nose-fuzed). Steamers that have been disabled by gunfire are not to be sunk until there is not one steamer still moving within sight of the ship concerned. To conserve ammunition, the heavy flak is to be nose-fuzed and used in the following manner: close within 300-500 meters of the ship, then have the best gunners fire individual shots into the waterline. Fire only when the ship is on the up-roll. Shoot holes in all of the steamer's compartments (the largest room is the engine room). With 3.7-centimeter ammunition, shoot holes in the upper part of the steamer, so that during the flooding of the rooms, air can escape upwards.

Prinz Eugen also wants to use her torpedoes in an attack on a convoy . Against a strongly defended convoy, there will only be a short time, if any, available for the cruiser's attack. This must be exploited as fully as possible. In this case especially, everything will depend on speedy action. The steamers are therefore to be sunk primarily with torpedoes .

The work of destruction may not be delayed by rescue operations.

The rescue of survivors, especially those from a convoy that has been attacked, can expose our own ships to serious danger from enemy submarines and surface forces. In such cases, concern for our ships must take precedence over the rescue of survivors. If necessary, a small steamer is to be spared for the purpose of rescuing survivors.

4.) Ships Steaming Independently:
In the absence of orders to the contrary, all lone steamers encountered will be captured or destroyed. When weather conditions permit boats to be lowered, the steamers will be searched and, if they themselves are valuable or have valuable cargoes and they can get under way, brought home (examine fuel supply, commissions, etc.). In principle, tankers that can make more than 10 knots, refrigerator ships and fast motor ships, if they can get under way - whether they are loaded or not - are to be captured and brought by a prize crew over the designated course ( Group West Gkdos. 1803/41 AoP Chefs v. 14.4.41. Numeral 4i) into the mouth of the Gironde.

Experience has shown that it is best not to bring prizes immediately into the Bay of Biscay, especially those that have transmitted radio signals, but to wait a few weeks in a remote ocean area, then to set out for the Gironde at intervals so as to prevent the enemy from capturing them as they enter the Bay of Biscay. For this, in some circumstances it will be necessary to equip the prizes with extra commissions and send them to an escort tanker so that they can replenish. The start of the prizes' return voyage is to be reported by short signal (Short signal booklet page 20/21). The place and date of embarkation remains the same; instead, the correct arrival date of the prize in the port of destination must be added as a second group.

Prizes must not fall into enemy hands under any circumstances. In every case, therefore, as soon as it boards, the prize crew must take preparations for scuttling at short notice.

Eastbound 6 West, the prize crew paints the bow and stern of the prize on the upper deck red. (Red lead).

When your own aircraft approach, shoot green stars.

For searching steamers, a boarding party is to be organized. Each ship has three prize crews and must organize two others from its company. Equipment is to be stored within easy reach. Prize crews must be instructed on the mission they are to discharge on board the steamers. All books, code instruments, tables, and notes found on the bridge, in the charthouse, in the radio room, in the captain's pockets, and elsewhere are to be seized and examined on board the ship by officers qualified in the language.

On approaching a ship sailing independently, fly the British ensign and keep the turrets at zero degrees to avoid arousing suspicion. Signal her to stop and forbid her to use her radio. The transmission or completion of a radio warning signal must be prevented if possible. For this, the following measures are to be taken:

a.) If the steamer is radioing before the ship gets within firing range, the message must be interrupted by the sending of a prepared radio message (in the English language) or a radio weather report. As soon as the steamer is in effective range, open fire. Whenever possible take the bridge superstructure under fire. (On most steamers the radio room is behind or below the bridge.)

b.) If the steamer is radioing within the effective range of the heavy flak, open fire immediately and destroy her radio installation as in paragraph a.). (Flak with nose-fuzed.)

So that tankers and valuable ships come into our hands as intact as possible, do not fire any longer than is necessary to prevent the transmission of signals. Establish good connections between the radio room and the bridge.

Approach a steamer so that one side is to leeward, quickly bring the ship to a stop, and lower a boat immediately (launch with a long lead line).

The boarding party will take over all important points (bridge, charthouse, radio room, engine room) and have the crew of the steamer assemble immediately on the upper deck.

5.) Order for the war march.

a.) Combat turns are to be executed as soon as the order is understood.
At ship separations exceeding 3000 m, there is no need to wait for the advancing vessel to begin turning.
No reversible lights at night. Rudder position to the advancing vessel is to be determined by the UK.

b.) Check fogging systems frequently, especially during frost.

c.) The dimming status is checked daily after nightfall during joint marches. For this purpose, the rear boatman pulls up to the port side, moves in front of the boatman to the starboard side, drops down there, and then rejoins the boat. Result by UK.

d.) In order to prevent the enemy, especially enemy aerial reconnaissance, from determining the ships' route, bilge pumping, jettisoning of empty containers, and emptying of wastebaskets may only be carried out between sunset and two hours thereafter. Should it be necessary to pump outside of this time in exceptional circumstances, permission must be obtained from the fleet in each individual case.

e.) As long as the ships are operating together, both ships will be ordered to be on standby and ready for war.
This order is binding and cannot be changed in any way.

 

 

Fleet Commander's Operational Order for the Atlantic Operation with Bismarck and Prinz Eugen

[Translated from German by Google Translate.] 

Fleet Command
B.No. Gkdos. 100/41 A1 bosses.

 

On board, April 22, 1941

Top priority only by officer

Top secret!

Fleet Commander's operational order for the Atlantic operation with Bismarck and Prinz Eugen
(deck designation: "Rhine exercise")


I.) Enemy intelligence: see Operations Order Group North B.No. 237/41 Aop. Gkdos. Chiefs. of 22 April 1941, Operations Order Group West Gkdos. 1803/41 Aop. Chiefs. of 14 April 1941 and Annexes 2 and 3.

Enemy intelligence gathered through decryption during the operation is continuously relayed directly by radio message to the B.-Leitstelle (B.-Control Center). These radio messages bear the signature "B.-Leitstelle" (B.-Control Center). Radio messages containing B.-Dienst (B.-Service) documents for a B.-Dienst group embarked on board also bear the additional notation "för B.-Dienst" (for B.-Service) at the beginning.

II.) Own armed forces:

A.) Participants:
"Bismarck"
"Prinz Eugen"
On the North-South route: The submarines operating there.
On the HX route from the end of May: 4 submarines.
Reconnaissance vessel "Gonzenheim"
Reconnaissance vessel "Kota Penang"
2 support vessels
5 escort tankers

B.) Securing:
Mine protection on the forced route from Green 03 (Arkona) to Red 20 for "Bismarck" by barrier breaker 13, for "Prinz Eugen" by barrier breaker 31.

Destroyers attach themselves to "Prinz Eugen". Mine escort through the Skagen barrier from Schwarz 21 to 21a by the 5th MS Flotilla. After passing this barrier, submarine escort by "Z 23", "Z 24", "Lody" and "Fr. Eckholdt".

C.) Own separately operating armed forces,
aerial reconnaissance,
fighter escort,
close security,
provision of air combat units and briefing of those eligible to the air units.
(see Operational Order Group North and Group West .)

III.) Task:

A.) Sailing through the Belt and North Sea into the North Atlantic.

B.) Attack on the supply line running through the North Atlantic. The area of ​​operations is bounded to the south by the equator, to the west (northeast) 20°N by the American neutral zone, which runs along the 60th meridian to the latitude of Halifax and from there to the coast. To the south 20°N, only a 300 nautical mile wide strip along the coast is to be considered neutral.

C.) After completing task B.), put into ports in western France to replenish ammunition and supplies. If longer repairs or a planned overhaul are necessary, return to home if possible.

IV.) Intention:

A.) Unnoticed breakthrough through the Denmark Strait into the North Atlantic.

B.) Attack on the HX route. Further decisions depending on the situation.

V.) Implementation:

A.) Command structure:
Operational command see Operational Order Group West .
Leadership: Fleet commander on "Bismarck".

B.) Timeline of the operation:

1.) On the afternoon of April 28th, departure in formation from Gotenhafen so that Point Green 03 is reached at 10:00 AM on April 29th. From there, march behind the breakers, "Bismarck" behind [breaker] 13, "Prinz Eugen" behind 31, on a forced course so that the formation is at Point Red 05 by 9:30 PM. From there, march through the Belt according to the order of BSO Gkdos. 33/41 Commanders of April 22nd . At Point Red 20, the breakers are released, and the march continues in the buoyed channel, previously searched by breakers, at a distance of 17 nautical miles via Black 18, so that Point Black 21 is reached at 12:30 PM. (Barrier breakers follow at maximum speed.) From there escort through the barrier gap (5th MS Flotilla) to Schwarz 21 a.

2.) Continue the march through the Skagerrak under submarine escort by the destroyers, so that the flotilla reaches Point Black 26 (Kristiansand-South) by 7:00 PM. Continue the march according to Operational Order Group North . BSO is requested to keep the blockade breakers ready until 12:00 PM on April 30th.

3.) BSO [Commander of Baltic Sea Security] initiates the SB measures in the Belt.

4.) Ships and barrier breakers switch to UK [Ultra Shortwave] channel 17.

5.) The following transit times are expected:

a.) Green 03  

April 29th, 10:00 AM

b.) Red 05 Trip 10 sm

"9:30 PM

c.) Red 20

30.4. 00:30

d.) Zealand Revenue Lock

" 0530 am

e.) Black 21

"12:30 pm

f.) Black 21 a

" 1400

g.) Black 26 (Kristiansand-South)

" 7:00 PM

h.) Skagerrak Dam Kristiansand South, outer barrier gap.

"8:30 PM

i.) Stavanger Broad

1.5. 0230 Uhr

j.) Korsfjord (Marstein)

" 0630 am

k.) Hjelte Fjord from

" 10:00 PM

l.) Breite Drontheim

2.5. 0600 Uhr

6.) While anchored off Bergen, fuel was replenished by the "Prinz Eugen" and the destroyers. Before breaking out into the Atlantic, fuel was expected to be replenished by the tanker Weißenburg at 70°N, 1°W.

C.) Readiness levels:

1.) April 29, 10:00 AM until darkness: Eased anti-aircraft watch.

2.) April 30th: From daylight, anti-aircraft watch; after passing the Skagen barrier, additional military watch. After passing the Kristiansand-South barrier: all-arms watch.

3.) 1.5. 0400: Ship must be ready for service until full daytime visibility is achieved. Orders will follow thereafter.

4.) From 29.4. 1000 am, war march closure status.

D.) War march conditions, war march stages:

1.) Gotenhafen to Grün 03: War march condition 3, War march speed level: 20 nm.

2.) From Green 03: War march condition 2, War march speed level: 18 nautical miles.

3.) From Red 20: War march speed level: 20 nautical miles.

4.) From Schwarz 21 a: War march condition 1, War march speed level: 25 nautical miles.

5.) After passing Skagen barrier: War march speed level: 27 nautical miles.

E.) Communications orders:
see Operational Order Group North and West and Fleet Gkdos 90/41 A4 Chiefs. of 21.4.41 .

F.) Special provisions:

1.) When encountering mines or in fog, follow orders.

2.) In the event of submarine and aircraft attacks, the affected ship will independently carry out the necessary defensive and evasive maneuvers without receiving a signal order. Likewise, the destroyers deployed for escort must conduct anti-submarine warfare without delay and using all available means.

3.) Distribution of tankers to the individual sea areas a. Operational orders of the groups. Details regarding the tankers' loading will follow.

4.) In addition to the ammunition loaded on the tankers, the following is also stored:

a.) In Drontheim:
1200 rounds 15 cm C28
, 120 rounds 15 cm Lg
, 8235 rounds 10.5 cm,
170 rounds 10.5 Lg.
Storage of 20.3 cm and 38 cm ammunition has been requested.

b.) In Brest:
1 full set of equipment for a heavy cruiser
2400 rounds 15 cm C 28
8000 rounds 10.5 cm

c.) A request has been made to store 38 cm ammunition in St. Nazaire.


The following are enclosed:

1.) Appendix 1: General Order for the Atlantic Operation .
2.) Appendix 2: Special Enemy Situation of Group West dated April 19, 1941.
3.) Appendix 3: Strength and Distribution of the British Submarine Fleet.
4.) Appendix 4: Overview of Berths for Battleships and Cruisers in West French Ports and in Trondheim.

Signed: L � tjen s.

For the accuracy

[signed]

First Lieutenant (V) and 1st Fl. Adj.

Distribution list:

Naval Command

Price No.

1 - 3

Mar. Group Command West

"

4 - 5

Mar. Group Command North

"

6 - 7

Fleet Command, 2nd Adm. d. Fl.

"

8

Command of the cruisers

"

9

Battleship "Bismarck"

"

10 - 11

Cruiser "Prince Eugene"

"

12 - 13

Battleship "Scharnhorst"

"

14 - 15

Fleet Staff

"

16 - 20

reserve

"

21 - 25

 

 

News Order for Rheinübung Exercise

[Translated from the German by Google Translate.] 

Marine Group Command North
B.No. G.Kdos. 240/41 bosses.

 

Command post, April 22, 1941

"Top priority!", "Officer only!"

To
    According to distribution list.


    News order for Rhine exercise. 
I. The messaging order applies to the battleship "Bismarck," the cruiser "Prinz Eugen" until they cross the line from the southern tip of Greenland to the northern tip of the Hebrides, to all tankers deployed in the operational area of ​​Group North, and to the destroyers and torpedo boats deployed for escort.

II. Radio communication.

A. For the battleship "Bismarck" and the cruiser "Prinz Eugen."
    1.) From departure to 59° North according to NBN, radio circuit diagram C (page 9).

    a) Fleet shortwave

    b) Wave for repeating reconnaissance reports, air reconnaissance, also communication wave Group North-Air Commander North,
    day wave: 0j 5835 kHz (51.41 m)
    night wave: kx 4645 kHz (64.60 m).

    On this wave, all important reconnaissance reports of Air Commander North or Air Commander North are repeated.

    c) Wave for fighter escort and close cover, as well as call signs and code names for this traffic, are communicated in a timely manner by Group North.

    d) UK Channel 17

    e) Radio station "Anton" according to NBN page 8.
    Manning the "Anton" radio station is permitted only for the purpose of training radio crews.
    Commands for Group North until the station change according to II B are issued exclusively on the fleet shortwave band.

    f) Coastal shortwave bands in the relevant sea area according to NBN page 5, item 2 d to g and page 7 (Radio Station Group North).
    Use of the coastal shortwave bands for transmitting purposes is permitted for reasons of concealment.
    The Baltic Sea coastal shortwave network also serves for communication with forces of the BSO.

    2.) In operational area 59 North:

    a) Radio circuit "Anton" according to NBN page 8 and NBN circuit diagram part II, Appendix 5, page 27 a and b)

    b) Longwave near zone: according to Fleet order (for tankers, attached as Appendix 1).

    3.) The transition from one circuit to the other is ordered by Group North.
B. For security forces.
    1.) Security forces activate the fleet shortwave radio.
    This remains active until the ship returns to port after the operation is completed (at least by a patrol boat).

    2.) Activation of corresponding coastal frequencies as instructed by the flotilla commander or senior commander.

    3.) UK Channel 17.
C. For tankers.
    1.) Tankers shall continuously man the "Anton" radio channel in accordance with Section II A 2 a) during deployment and while in the operational area. This order also applies to tankers on standby in the skerries.

    2.) Upon approaching the Norwegian coast, the corresponding coastal frequency for Norway, in accordance with NBN page 5, section 2 e to g and page 7, Radio Channel Group North, shall be activated on the receiving end.
D.
    1.) In the event of a failure of the Kootwijk transmitters, or in the case of insufficient operational reliability of the "Anton" radio network, or for reasons of concealment, the "Extended Local and Long-Distance Service Norddeich Radio" (according to NBN pages 26 and 27, with a continuous reception range of 2290 m), the Atlantic long-distance communication wave, and the submarine long-distance communication wave can be used to transmit messages to home.

    2.) In the event of a prolonged failure of the Kootwijk transmitters, Group North will issue orders via the "Extended Local and Long-Distance Service Norddeich Radio".
III. Key equipment.
Key documents for domestic waters on all shafts.

IV. Short signal service according to the Fleet Short Signal Booklet.
For operational acknowledgment and confirmation of the short signals, see NBN page 18, item 10. V.

Weather service.
In addition to the weather station broadcasts by Norddeich Radio on 2400 m, a weather forecast for the relevant sea area is issued daily by the Group Command.

VI. ES service according to ES regulations.
On OKM 2./Skl. Na 676/41 g.Kdos. dated 1.4.41. (Reference is made to Annex No. 2 to the General Order of Group North No. 8 of April 9, 1941).

VII. Radio beacons on the Norwegian coast according to NBN page 61, II a). The radio beacons are to be ordered by the naval forces themselves before departure or requested via Group North.

VIII. Time indications.
According to German legal time.

IX. After the transfer of command to Group West according to the Group West communications order.


Annex 1 to Group North 240/41 Gkds. Chiefs.

Radio service of the support vessels and escort tankers.

I. Radio communications with the home front:
according to the communication orders of the group commands.

II. Radio communications with naval forces:
With partial modification of the orders originally issued by the group commands, the following is commanded:
    a) Direction finding for rendezvous:
    Troopers and escort tankers occupy the long-wave shortwave band for 30 minutes at the times they are scheduled to be at the rendezvous point according to operational orders.

    The ship to be rendezvous, or the lead ship in a convoy, initiates radio communication on this wave, if necessary, by transmitting "ww w" followed by its five-digit number group, the digital root of which is specified in section IV, beginning with the lowest transmission power. The call lasts one minute. The following minute is reserved for the responding station. Battleships use only the odd-numbered minutes until contact is established ; troopers and escort tankers use the even-numbered minutes, regardless of the time the radio communication begins. If no answer is received in the second minute, the call is to be repeated in the third minute with a slightly higher transmission power. As soon as the called radio station has received the call, it answers in the following even minute with "ww w" and an interspersed five-digit number group, the digital root of which corresponds to the vessel in question according to section IV). The answer is also to begin with the lowest transmission power, which is to be increased to 50% of the transmission power in the next minute until the answer is received. The calling radio station responds with its five-digit code and, using the traffic abbreviation, indicates the volume at which it is receiving the trooper, enabling the trooper to adjust its transmission power accordingly. The connection is considered established when both radio stations can hear each other at volume 2. Skilled petty officers should be assigned to this radio communication, and the best receivers should be used with the volume turned all the way up. Silence in the radio room! A direction-finding radio message from the trooper or escort tanker is requested by the receiving vessel using the traffic abbreviation "Qobs". At this moment, the minute allocation is complete. The requested radio station transmits a direction-finding message consisting of approximately 10 to 12 five-digit number groups, the first and last of which must equal the cross sum assigned to the transmitting troop vessel or escort tanker. No acknowledgment of receipt is given for this direction-finding message; a new request is made by transmitting the traffic abbreviation "qobs" again. Until the vessel is sighted and the radio contact is thus concluded, the settings on the transmitters and receivers with which the radio contact was established must not be changed in order to ensure that radio communication can be resumed at any time without a new calling procedure.

    b) Radio message exchange:
    Establishing radio contact is done as described in II, a), unless already established. The transmission of a radio message is to be announced by the traffic abbreviation "qtc", confirmed by the receiving station with "k". Transmission of the radio message after transmission of the radio procedure. Keying according to M-General for domestic waters. Radio names according to GFL

    c) Frequency change is ordered with the traffic abbreviation "qlns"......" "Switch to the longwave near zone ..... kHz"
III. Waves for local traffic:
Lucie Emil 133 kHz (2256 m)
Alternate wave: Lucie Max 186 kHz (1613 m)

IV. Digital root of the five-digit call sign groups.
"Bismarck": 21
"Prinz Eugen": 22
"Weissenburg": 34
"Heide": 33