World War 2 In Review: Soviet-Japanese Confrontation in Outer Mongolia: The Battle of Nomonhan-Khalkin Gol

Japanese light tanks moving towards the Khalkin River.

by Larry W. Moses

At dawn on 11 May 1939, a large force of Outer Mongolian cavalry clashed with border guards of the Japanese-Manchukuo 23^rd Division along the ill-defined eastern border of the Mongolian People's Republic. At first this incident appeared to be one more in an endless series that had taken place along the entire Manchurian border separating Manchukuo, Mongolia and the Soviet Union. They had taken place with regularity since the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931 and, since 1937, had also increased in intensity. Each spring saw the Japanese testing the Soviet defenses—first on the Amur in 1937, then at Lake Hassan in 1938, and finally at Nomonhan in 1939. Before Nomonhan, each of these summer incidents had been broken off by either the Russians or the Japanese after a short period of fighting. The rapidity with which the battle at Nomonhan developed into a modern, mechanized war and the tenacity with which the Japanese held to the offensive throughout the summer of 1939 suggests that the Japanese had at last initiated the long-planned campaign to establish a Mengkukuo to complement the Manchukuo established in 1931.

The war at Nomonhan which resulted from this direct challenge to the foreign policy of the Soviet Union has been lost to history in the maelstrom of World War II. Nomonhan-Khalkin Gol reverberates not at all in comparison with the cataclysmic battles of Stalingrad, Iwo Jima, and El Alamein. And yet, the significance of Nomonhan-Khalkin Gol for a greater Mongolia was as great as were those battles for the political existence of the Soviet Union, the United States and Europe. That summer war placed the final stamp of history on the separation of the Mongol peoples along the lines of today's Inner and Outer Mongolia (Mongolian People's Republic). The efforts of the Russians, the Japanese and the Chinese to each carve out for itself a sphere of influence in greater Mongolia culminated at Nomonhan in a final separation of the Mongols—the result hoped for by first Tsarist and then Soviet Russia. The Japanese forfeited by their complete defeat the last vestiges of their role as protectors and promoters of Mongol nationalism; a role which had begun to wane as early as 1937 due to the failure of the Japanese to recognize the great need for social reform in Mongolian Manchuria and Chinese Inner Mongolia. Despite the overtly imperialistic aims of the Japanese they remained, up until 1939, the only source of political power by which the Mongols of greater Mongolia could hope to attain unity; they themselves were not strong enough; the Russians did not desire such a unified state on their long eastern border; the Chinese lacked acceptance by any but a very small group of Inner Mongol princes, who were themselves unpopular with the Mongols.

This, then, was the setting for Nomonhan: the Japanese, with their dream of a Greater East Asia including Manchukuo and Mengkukuo, in direct conflict with the Soviet Union, which desired an isolated and divided Mongolia. Japan, aware that to conquer China she must isolate her from continental Russia, could only gain from the conquest of Outer Mongolia: the promises to the Young Mongol nationalists of Inner Mongolia would be fulfilled, assuring a strong ally on Japan's eastern flank; the troublesome Communist armies in Shensi would be circumvented; three of the four supply routes from the Soviet Union into China would be closed; Chinese Turkestan, the back door to China down the old Silk Route, would be open to the Japanese; the Trans-Siberian railroad would be vulnerable to a Japanese thrust along almost 1,000 miles of track stretching from Irkutsk to Vladivostok.

The Soviet Union, in this same period (1931-1939) held to a defensive position, refusing to follow up its military victories at Lake Hassan or Nomonhan. Its primary foreign policy objectives in northeast Asia were to prevent Japan from attacking the Soviet Union, to repel any attacks made, to maintain its Far Eastern borders and to enforce the "independence" of the Mongolian People's Republic.

Caught between them were the Mongols of the three Mongolias—mindful of the need of a powerful sponsor of their dream of a unified greater Mongolia but increasingly aware that none of three major powers surrounding them was willing to give sponsorship without also acquiring a restrictive tutelage over them.

By 1937, Inner Mongolia could survive only if Japan forced the creation of a Greater Mongolia—a Mengkukuo—which had to include Outer Mongolia. Without Mongolia, Mengkukuo would not have provided the Mongols an escape from the Chinese and likewise would not have been a viable economic entity. Most importantly, it would not have furthered Japan's aims for the continent.

War between Japan and the Soviet Union was seen as almost inevitable after 1931, by the Russians. Unable to defend the Far Eastern provinces and the long, single track Trans-Siberian railroad, the Soviet Union first pursued a conciliatory policy toward Japan. As the strength of the Soviet Far Eastern Army grew, this policy was gradually abandoned and replaced by one of intransigence. In November 1934, an oral agreement was effected between Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Union by which the latter proclaimed her readiness to defend the Mongolian People's Republic against outside aggression. In March 1936, a formal pact was signed between the two countries, which further strengthened the defense arrangements between them. The battle lines were now drawn: Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Union ranged against Japan's Kwantung Army and the silently acquiescent princes of Inner Mongolia.

The initiative in the Far East belonged by default to Japan. The Soviet Union was involved in an intricate series of diplomatic problems after 1936 and was intent upon securing her Far Eastern flank in order to devote her full attention to Europe. Her policy toward Japan therefore was somewhat contradictory: allow Japan to continually violate the Manchukuo-USSR borders and respond with only enough force to turn back their attacks but, once turned back, make no move to pursue the Japanese or widen the battles.

Japan, by the end of 1938, held all of China necessary to controlling trade and communication. All of the major coastal cities, lines of communication, and railroads of importance were controlled by the Japanese Army.

The Japanese Army, which had held the political initiative in Japan's expansion program since 1931, feared loss of this initiative to the Navy. The Navy, in turn, had long favored expansion to the south into Southeast Asia and was using criticism of the heavy casualties in the China war as a pretext to take control from the Army. The Army's program of expansion northeast into the Asian continent and eventual war with the Soviet Union was, by 1938, in danger of being put aside.

The lull in the China War in late 1938 and early 1939, gave the Army an opportunity to implement its ambitions for the Asian interior. The flank exposed to Outer Mongolia was the logical area for a strike, circumventing as it would the strong Chinese Communist forces in Shensi province. At the same time a direct conflict with the Soviet Union could be avoided if such a strike was not immediately met by Soviet retaliation. Careful testing of the border of Outer Mongolia began in December 1938, and continued with increasing rapidity and size throughout the winter of 1939. The area chosen was the vaguely defined eastern border area between Outer Mongolia and the Hsingan area of Manchukuo. The border claimed by Outer Mongolia ran 15 miles to the east of the Khalkin Gol (Khalkha River) and was marked by a series of earthen mounds called obos (border markers). The easternmost of these markers was that of Nomon-Khan-Bürd-Obo.

The plain of Nomonhan is a low-lying, grassy oasis, marshy in character, dotted with sand hills, which reach a height of 10 to 15 feet, and sand bunkers of about the same depth. The sector which was in contention between Manchukuo and Outer Mongolia is a narrow rectangle 50 miles long and 15 to 20 miles wide stretching along the Khalkha River. The entire area is commanded by the higher, western (Mongolian) bank of the river. A small hill, called Bain Tsagan, a short distance back from the river on the western side, presents a panoramic view of the lower, eastern (Manchukuo) bank of the river. Another hill, Khamar-Daba, further to the south near the eastward-turning bend of the river presents a similar view of the area to the south.

Bisecting the Khalkha and flowing into it, is a small tributary stream, the Khailstin Gol. This stream was the meridian line on either side of which the major battles of late August were fought. At the eastern end of the stream, 15 miles distant from the Khalkha River, two small hills flank either side of the Khailstin. On the summits of these two hills lie the two obos of Nomon-Khan-Bürd-Obo.

The summer war of 1939 developed in this area in four general stages. The first stage, beginning in December 1938, was marked by small patrol skirmishes in which the Japanese always retreated beyond Nomonhan when challenged by Mongol border patrols. The first stage ended about 28 May 1939 when the first large-scale Japanese offensive began. The second stage, commencing with this Japanese offensive, lasted until about 6 July 1939 and gave the Japanese their only victories of the war. After 6 July, the Japanese were thrown back across the Khalkha initiating the third stage of the war, a hiatus during which both sides brought up reinforcements for a final offensive. The Soviet-Mongol forces initiated the fourth stage with a massed artillery barrage on 20 August 1939. This final stage lasted only eight days and by the end of August had resulted in almost total annihilation of the Japanese-Manchukuo army.

The impetus for the war was the Japanese insistence on creating an incident based on their contention that the border had historically followed the Khalkha. A map issued by the Kwantung Army command, published by the Land Survey Department of the Japanese Imperial Army on 15 July 1937, showed the border of the Mongolian People's Republic and Manchukuo as lying on the Khalkha River from a point far south of Nomonhan to its entry into Lake Büir. This was the first official support for the Japanese contention that the border between the two areas was the Khalkin Gol and not to the east through Nomon-Khan-Bürd-Obo. The Japanese continued to insist, as late as the war crimes trials in 1946-48, that the border had historically followed the Khalkha River and not the more easterly course through Nomonhan.

Japanese publications, however, had long recognized the more easterly border through Nomonhan. A semi-official Japanese publication had, in 1932, produced a map clearly showing the oasis area as being within the border of the Mongolian People's Republic. Mongols from both sides of the border had moved freely into, and across, the oasis under the watchful eyes of both Bargut border guards at the Japanese border outpost at Nomonhan, and border guards of the Mongolian People's Republic on the western bank of the Khalkha. It was the practice of the Outer Mongols to regularly patrol the oasis area in relatively large numbers.

Outer Mongolia had officially declared its eastern border to be east of the Khalkha River in a map published for official use in 1926. That neither Manchukuo nor Outer Mongolia considered the area vital, is evidence by the fact that neither country had, by 1939, constructed fortifications, or structures of any sort, in the entire rectangle. Both, however, had built numerous border outposts at the edges of the rectangle.

Japan's probe in the Nomonhan area can be explained only as an exploratory thrust to test the willingness of the Soviet Union to fulfill the mutual aid pact of 1936. Japan had been preparing for this thrust for many years and in 1938 began large-scale preparations to support it. By 1935, they had completed a direct railroad line between Hsinking and T'aoan (Paichengtzu) which permitted movement of troops across the Hsingan mountain range to the vicinity of Nomonhan. In July 1938, the Japanese General Staff initiated preparations for a thrust in the direction of the Soviet Transbaikalia (Irkutsk) area by way of the Mongolian People's Republic.

To carry out the thrust a new Japanese division—the 23^rd Infantry Division—was transferred from Northern Kyushu to Manchukuo with duty station at Hailar 100 miles north of Nomonhan. This division was one of the most modern in the Japanese Army and was organized along western military rather than the more traditional Japanese lines.

The first stage of the war, that of testing of the Mongol border and of Mongol-Soviet responses began in December 1938 with the first small Japanese-Bargut patrol into the rectangle. The patrols continued through the winter of 1938-39 gradually increasing in size to about forty men. In April 1939 a large element of about three thousand men of the 3^rd Division, called the Yasuoka Unit, moved from Hailar to sites near the border.

Throughout April and early May, the Japanese regularly pushed patrols past Nomonhan toward the Khalkha River. Up until this time, the cavalry patrols had been quickly driven back by the Mongol patrols without fighting. The Japanese made no attempt to hide their actions and were constantly observed by the Mongol outposts spaced fifteen kilometers apart on the western bank of the Khalkha.

On 11 May 1939 there occurred the first large-scale penetration of the border. A force estimated at more than two hundred cavalry, swept almost to the river and engaged a Mongol patrol of fifty men. After a short skirmish in which several Mongols were killed, the Japanese-Bargut cavalry withdrew from the rectangle.

The news of the large-scale Japanese penetration was relayed to Tamtsak-Bulak, about 100 miles inside the Mongolian People's Republic. The 6^th Mongol Cavalry Division stationed there had been reinforced in March by a mixed detachment of Russians under Senior Lieutenant A. E. Bykov. Bykov's detachment, which included two mechanized rifle companies, a battery of 45-mm guns, and several armored cars, was the closest Soviet force to the border.

Bykov, after consulting with the Soviet Command in Ulanbatar, was ordered to take a platoon to the border to reconnoiter. After crossing the river on 22 May, he was immediately attacked by Japanese-Bargut cavalry and forced back across the river. The Japanese had now occupied the rectangle in force, thus violating the Mongolian People's Republic border as defined by Outer Mongolia and the USSR. The Soviet Union had been clearly challenged to fulfill the promises made in the Mutual Aid Pact of 1936.

On 25 May, the 6^th Mongol Cavalry Regiment (250 men) crossed the Khalkha and took up defensive positions five miles east of the river. On 26 May, the bulk of Bykov's unit, about 1,200 men, also crossed the river and reinforced the Mongol positions. Opposing them were Japanese forces which included Colonel Yamagata's Special Detachment, the 64^th Infantry Regiment of the 23^rd Division, a reconnaissance unit under Lieutenant General Azuma, a motorized company under Captain Kawano, the 8^th Japanese Cavalry Unit, and the 1^st and 7^th Bargut Cavalry Regiments. This force totaled about 4,500 men—three times the Soviet-Mongol forces.

The Soviet-Mongol preparations were greatly hampered by the remoteness of the area. Whereas Japanese railroads were but 100 miles removed at Hailar and 60 miles away at Solun Handagai, the nearest Soviet railroad was almost 500 miles away at Borzya, on a spur from the Trans-Siberian Railroad. In addition, the Japanese had constructed two hard surface roads to Nomonhan while the rear of the Mongolian People's Republic lines had only one undeveloped trail paralleling the border. The difficulties of supply were greatly hampered in the early stages by constant Japanese air strikes.

On 21 May General Lieutenant Kamatsubara, commander of the 23^rd Division, issued the orders which began the second stage of the war. The orders were to encircle and destroy the Soviet Mongol forces in the rectangle. All operations were to be completed in seven to ten days. The offensive began on the morning of 28 May north of the Khailstin Gol. The Japanese attempted a flank movement north and west of the Soviet-Mongol entrenchments in order to pin them into the corner of the Khalkha-Khailstin confluence. Heavily outnumbered in men and light weapons the Soviet army fell back under the protection of their artillery massed across the river on Bain Tsagan hill. Late in the evening of the 28^th, the 149^th Rifle Division under Major Remizov arrived, after a forced march, and was immediately thrown into battle. This, plus the commanding fire of the Soviet artillery, turned back the Japanese offensive.

During the month of June both sides brought up massive reinforcements. Most of the action in June took place overhead where Japanese and Russian air units fought continuous dog-fights with both sides claiming fantastically lopsided victories. No reliable figures exist for actual planes brought down. Each side managed, however, to test its very latest fighter planes.

By the start of July Japanese forces had reached a total of more than twenty thousand infantry and 4,700 cavalry supported by 158 emplaced machine guns, 170 guns of 75-mm or more, 124 anti-tank guns, ninety-eight guns of less than 75-mm, 130 tanks, and six armored cars, and two Air Divisions totaling 225 planes. Opposing them were 12,500 Soviet-Mongol troops, of which probably no more than five hundred were Mongols. Supporting them were 139 stationary machine guns, eighty-six light and heavy guns, twenty-three anti-tank guns, 186 tanks and 266 armored cars. It can easily be seen from these figures that the Japanese envisioned a trench war similar to World War I. Their twenty thousand troops were entrenched along a 50-mile front by July, with artillery massed to the rear with a minimum of armored mobility. By contrast, the Soviet forces were highly mobile with almost five hundred armored vehicles at their disposal. This mobile superiority played an immediate role in early July.

On 2 July the Japanese launched their largest offensive to date. After a heavy artillery barrage, tank and infantry units commanded by General Lieutenant Yasuoka struck at the Soviet-Mongol center and succeeded in pushing back the left (northern) flank of the Soviets to the southwest. At the same time, General Kobayashi crossed the Khalkha, 150 yards wide, north of the fighting and seized the bridgehead behind the battle. Here he concentrated his strike force of infantry, supported by sixty tanks, and on the morning of 3 July took the artillery position on Bain Tsagan hill. In the process he lost thirty of his tanks, however, and was seriously short of armor or defensive fire power. The Soviet forces across the river were seriously threatened—outnumbered and without artillery. The war had now definitely moved into the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic.

The Soviet-Mongol commander, General Zhukov, the hero of Stalingrad three years later, immediately used his mobile armored superiority to cut off and isolate the Japanese on Bain Tsagan. The 11^th Tank Brigade, under brigade commander Jakovlev, was sent to the north base of the hill, the 24^th Motorized Infantry Regiment to the northwest, and the 7^th Armored Brigade, which had just arrived, to the southern flank. The Japanese on the hill, now completely surrounded, launched attack after attack to break out but the armored ring held. Soviet aircraft were brought in to support the final Soviet drive up the hill. At noon on 3 July the 1^st and 3^rd Battalions of the 11^th Tank Brigade attacked from the west and northwest driving the Japanese before them. At three o'clock of the same day the Japanese were driven from the hill into the Soviet-Mongol lines and destroyed. By Soviet estimates, the Japanese lost almost four thousand men in this battle. The Japanese offensive stage was largely ended by 6 July and from then until late August the initiative was with the Soviet forces.

From 8 to 12 July the Japanese tried repeatedly to gain a foothold on the western bank but were unsuccessful. The remainder of the third phase, lasting until 20 August, was, for the most part, marked by continuous artillery barrages and air strikes. By 25 July the Japanese were increasingly pressed by Soviet thrusts and had begun constructing defensive fortifications.

About this time, the Japanese High Command had decided to increase the Japanese commitment at Nomonhan. Organizationally a new army was created—the Sixth Army—and Lieutenant General Rippei Ogisu was moved from command of the 13^th Division in central China and made commander of the Sixth Army, Kwantung Army Command. His orders were to make preparations for winter encampment at Nomonhan. Three new divisions, about sixty thousand men, were to be transferred to Nomonhan in late August for a final offensive.

Two of the divisions were to come from China and one from the mainland. The Japanese would then have had almost one hundred thousand men concentrated on the border. Obviously there was no intention of abandoning the war. But before the Japanese could regain the initiative other events outran them.

With the Japanese temporarily on the defensive, the Soviet command decided to take the offensive and clear the Japanese from the Nomonhan rectangle. Reinforcements poured down from Borzya. The 82^nd and 57^th Infantry Divisions, one regiment of the 152^nd Infantry Division, the 6^th Tank Brigade, the 126^th Artillery Regiment, the 85^th Anti-aircraft Artillery Regiment, several companies of flame-throwing tanks, the 212^th Airborne and another Mongol Cavalry Division were moved to the front. Because of the complete absence of railroads or highways, all the reinforcements were carried in cars and light trucks. At the start of August over 2,600 cars were shuttling back and forth to the theater of operations from Borzya.

Japanese reinforcements also moved to the front in the first weeks of August. All of the 23^rd Division was committed to the battle as was part of the 7^th Division, the entire Manchurian Mixed Brigade (Koreans, Inner Mongolians, Manchurians), three regiments of Barguts, three regiments of heavy artillery, and all of the anti-tank batteries of the 1^st Infantry Division. By this time the Soviet-Mongol forces were clearly superior in all categories, and to an overwhelming degree in armored vehicles.

The battle front on 20 August 1939 followed the curve of the Khalkha River for almost 50 miles. The Soviet-Mongol forces stood with their backs to the river facing east toward the Japanese lines. The Japanese were evenly distributed on either side of the Khailstin Gol. The Soviet artillery on the high western bank of the Khalkha still commanded the entire front and their armor moved freely from one bank to the other.

The Soviet Command of the First Army Group decided to develop its offensive around its armored superiority. For perhaps the first time in military history an armored double flanking encirclement was undertaken. The plan called for armored strikes around the left (northern) and right (southern) flanks with a link-up behind the Japanese at Nomonhan. At the same time a massive blow would be struck at the center of the Japanese front to split it apart along the Khailstin meridian.

To effect this plan all the Soviet-Mongol forces were organized into three groups—the Southern Group, the Northern Group, and the Central Group. The make-up of the two strike groups, the Northern and Southern, clearly shows the heavy Soviet reliance on mobile armor. The Southern Group was composed of the 8^th Mongol Cavalry, the 8^th Mechanized Armored Brigade, the 6^th Tank Brigade (minus two battalions), the 1^st Battalion of the 11^th Tank Brigade, the 1^st Division of the 185^th Artillery Regiment, the 37^th Anti-tank Division, and the 57^th Infantry Division.

The Northern Group, of almost equal strength, was composed of the 6^th Mongol Cavalry Division, the 7^th Mechanized Armored Division, two tank battalions of the 11^th Tank Brigade, one battalion of the 6^th Brigade, the 82^nd Howitzer Artillery Regiment, the 87^th Anti-tank Division, and the 601^st Infantry Regiment of the 82^nd Infantry Division. The bulk of the strength of the two strike divisions, therefore, was not infantry but mobile armored forces with mechanized artillery support.

The Central Group, which was to strike at the Japanese center and hold its attention while the flanking movements developed, was made up of the 82^nd Infantry Division (minus the 601^st Regiment), the 36^th Mechanized Infantry Division, and the 5^th Infantry Machine Gun Brigade.

The reserve forces, which were concentrated at Khamar-Daba Hill to the southwest of the Khailstin-Khalkha confluence, were composed of the 212^th Airborne Brigade, the 9^th Mechanized Infantry Brigade, a tank battalion of the 6^th Tank Brigade and various Mongol units.

Opposing the Northern Group were 72^nd, 64^th, and 26^th Japanese Infantry Regiments, while the 71^st and 28^th Infantry Regiments faced the Southern Group. The Japanese artillery was massed in stationary positions behind the center of the Japanese lines. Japanese headquarters at the high rise of Nomonhan overlooked the battlefield from the east while Soviet headquarters behind the Khalkha on Khamar-Daba hill directed the artillery fire and observed the flanking operations.

The Mongol cavalry units were largely excluded from the battle, either relegated to reserve duty or "securing the outer flanks of the Southern or Northern Groups." Some of the Mongols had in fact been transferred out of the area of the fighting after the 2 July Japanese offensive.

In addition to the mobile artillery units, the Soviets also massed artillery along the entire high western bank of the river to complement that stationed on Bain Tsagan and Khamar-Daba hills. Almost six hundred artillery pieces were ranged along the front, reaching a density of five pieces per kilometer. Soviet artillery at this time was capable of twice the firing rate of Japanese artillery.

The massed artillery was to open the Soviet offensive with a two-hour-and-forty-five-minute barrage. At the conclusion of the barrage the Japanese center was to be engaged. South of the Khailstin meridian the 57^th Infantry Division was to turn in the Japanese flank enabling the Southern Group to strike toward Nomonhan. At the same time the 82^nd Infantry Division was to press back the Japanese northern flank allowing the Northern Group to also move toward Nomonhan. If successful both Japanese flanks would be enveloped, completely encircling the Japanese forces. Almost exactly the same double flanking armored encirclement was used at Stalingrad in 1942.

At 5:45 on the morning of 20 August 1939, Soviet aircraft began bombing the Japanese positions. At 7:00 o'clock the artillery began its mass bombardment of the Japanese center and rear artillery positions. At 8:45 a fifteen-minute massed fire barrage was carried out against the Japanese center directly below Bain Tsagan. Exactly on schedule at 9:00 o'clock the Soviet infantry engaged the Japanese along the entire front. Overhead continuous dog-fights began as the Japanese attempted to counter the developing Soviet offensive with air strikes.

Soviet headquarters envisaged two stages in the offensive: the first stage from 20 to 23 August was intended to split off the Japanese flanks and destroy them; the second stage, from 24 to 31 August was to completely encircle and destroy the main force. The link-up behind the Japanese at Nomonhan would cut off retreat and interdict reinforcements.

On 23 August the Northern and Southern groups linked up at Nomonhan exactly on schedule. The encircled Japanese forces were unable to break out of the ring and were quickly isolated in small pockets. Reinforcements were too far from the scene because the Japanese High Command had not intended to undertake a major operation until the end of August.

By 31 August 1939 the Japanese threat to Outer Mongolia had ended. The Japanese lost 52-55,000 men of which almost twenty-five thousand were killed. About ten thousand dead were from the Japanese 23^rd Division, and almost the same number were killed from the 7^th Division. Soviet-Mongol losses were estimated at nine thousand killed, but no really reliable casualty figures exist.

For the Soviet Army, Nomonhan was a highly successful test of contemporary Soviet military strategy. Before World War II Soviet theory held that the initial period in any war would be marked by a covering operation carried out by a minimal force with the main emphasis in this initial period on waging a battle for air superiority. During this period the main forces would be mobilized, concentrated, and deployed. This in part explains the early successes and rapid reversals of the Japanese forces in all of the Soviet-Mongol border incidents from 1935 until 1939; each time the Japanese interpreted the small Soviet border force as either a measure of the lack of Soviet commitment to a particular area or saw a chance to seize an undefended portion of territory quickly and present the Soviet Union with a fait accompli.

Soviet strategy was also strongly vindicated by Nomonhan. A present-day Soviet military strategist summarizes the military strategy of World War II as follows:

Different techniques were used to encircle major enemy formations. The most characteristic were simultaneous strikes in two areas, enveloping the flanks of the enemy forces and advances in depth in converging directions, and one strong enveloping attack aimed at trapping the enemy forces against hard to cross natural barriers. In some cases the encirclement of large enemy formations was accomplished by penetration of the front at several points.

These tactics were used over and over in World War II but comparison with the Nomonhan campaign as described in this article shows that all were combined at Nomonhan in what was the first test of Soviet strategy since the Russian civil war. The Japanese were therefore fighting a World War I battle against World War II tactics. This in part explains the fantastic losses suffered by the Japanese. Japan admitted, in an official announcement in November 1939, that at least eighteen thousand had been killed at Nomonhan making this the heaviest casualty figure admitted by the Japanese from 1931 until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.

Despite the staggering Japanese losses the plan of the Kwantung Army Command to bring up three new divisions still held firm. Soviet forces made no move to follow up the victory, but maintained their positions inside the border at Nomonhan. In the midst of the preparations, however, came the news of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact, which had been signed on 24 August 1939, during the greatest fighting at Nomonhan. The news stunned all Japan but the effect on the Kwantung Army was even greater. It was faced with the possibility of a Soviet offensive not just at Nomonhan, but in all Manchukuo.

The result was a complete turn-about of Japanese policy, in Inner Asia in particular. The total defeat of the Japanese at Nomonhan, combined with the retreat forced by the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact, temporarily ended the Japanese Army's total control of the direction of Japanese foreign policy. The temporary shift of power to the Navy turned Japan's attention southward to the Asian empires of France and Great Britain. The Army, forced into a period of realignment and re-examination, was, for the moment, powerless to support or further Inner Mongol nationalism. Events of the next five years in Asia did not again allow an opportunity for forcing a Mongol Union. By 1945 the last possible support for Mongol union—the Japanese—had been destroyed.

Nomonhan marked the high point of Japanese expansion in Northeast Asia. Had the thrust into Outer Mongolia been successful and not been challenged by the Soviet Union, the Inner Mongol hope for Mengkukuo might well have become a reality. Instead the Mongols of Inner and Outer Mongolia were effectively and finally split apart by the Japanese defeat. Six years later the cleavage of the two Mongolias was formally recognized by the Yalta agreement by which the Great Powers recognized the independence of Outer Mongolia.

The powerful demonstration at Nomonhan of the Soviet Union's willingness to commit large forces to the defense of the territorial integrity of the Mongolian People's Republic established the de facto existence of the Mongolian People's Republic as a separate, independent state. Border negotiations between Japanese-Manchukuoan and Soviet-Mongol representatives over the next ten months (September 1939-June 1940) served to confirm the existence of a Mongol nation made up of an area defined by Tsarist ministers in 1915. The Soviet Union had thus tested its eastern buffer zone, Outer Mongolia, in battle, and subsequently tested it politically at Yalta. The Protocol of Proceedings of the Crimea (Yalta) Conference says simply: "The status quo in Outer Mongolia (The Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved."

This recognition of Outer Mongolia as an independent entity confirmed the Soviet sphere of influence there and, in effect, the separateness of Inner and Outer Mongolia.

For Inner Mongolia, Nomonhan symbolized Japan's inability to fulfill her promises of a greater Mongolia. It also heightened the disillusionment with the Japanese, which had been building since 1935. In 1939 Japan began encouraging movement of Chinese settlers into Manchuria and remained adamantly opposed to Prince Teh's appeals for a nation of Hsingan and his own Meng Chiang, established in 1937. Prince Teh, who has wrongly been termed a Japanese puppet in the image of Wang Ching-wei, continued to work for Mongol union; if not of all the Mongols then at least the Mongols of Chinese Inner Mongolia.

Prince Teh, in the extremely difficult position he occupied between Russia, China, and Japan, remained above all else a Mongol nationalist. His political activities were always predicated on the hope that some formula could be arrived at by which his people could gain political autonomy and protection from Chinese encroachment. Of all the Mongol leaders of Inner Mongolia of the period, he remains the most sympathetic and most devoted to the ideal of Mongol union. Only events outside of Inner Mongolia ended his efforts.

The political demands of the great powers determined the fate of Inner Mongolia, as have great power politics in every instance since 1911. Chinese Communist successes in establishing a strong base of power in northern China during the war years meant the Soviet Union now had even further reasons for opposing a greater Mongol union. The Inner Mongols who hoped for a Pan-Mongol nationalist movement under the aegis of the advancing Soviet-Outer Mongolia forces in 1945 were doomed to further frustration and disappointment. Soviet-Chinese Communist negotiations had, by 1945, already established that the Chinese Communists were to have full authority in Inner Mongolia.

The military advance of the Russians was therefore largely an empty gesture for the Inner Mongols. It differed from the possible political significance of the Nomonhan campaign in that it served only to allow the Soviet Union the opportunity to establish which Chinese army was to control Inner Mongolia; Nomonhan had at least offered the possibility of Mongol union even though under Japanese dominance.

Inner Mongolia's futile efforts up to 1949 to establish autonomy were doomed by the political needs of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists. There was no way in which an autonomous Mongol area could be established in Chinese Inner Mongolia and western Manchuria without seriously hampering Soviet post-war aims for Manchuria and Chinese Communist plans for all China.

Strategic map of "Hoshukin-ron", the Japanese plans for a potential attack on the Soviet Union.

Picture of an original Russian diagram of the Soviet attack at the Battle of Khalkhin Gol, August 1939. Diagram kept at the G.K. Zhukov Museum, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia.

Topographic map of the Khalkhin Gol battle area.

The location of the Nomonhan Incident.

This chunk of lifeless steppe never played any actual strategical importance to either side, nor had it any natural resources.

MPR cavalry charge during the Battle of Khalkhin Gol.

Mongol cavalrymen in the Hingan Army at Nomonhan.

Hingan Mongol soldiers race into battle at Nomonhan.

Japan's 72nd Infantry Regiment, 23rd Infantry Division approaches Nomonhan.

Japanese officers observing the Nomonhan Front, 1939.

General Georgy Zhukov, 1941.

Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army Cavalry, 1939.

Red Army soldiers advance behind a tank, 1939.

A Japanese soldier poses with a captured Russian goat, 1939.

Japanese tank crew on a break near the Mongolian border, 1939.

Soviet officers pose with captured Japanese soldiers, Khalkhin Gol, 1939.

Soviet BT-7 tanks at the battle of Khalkin Gol, August 1939.

Mongolian soldiers fighting against Japanese troops on the western beach of the river Khalkhin Gol, 1939.

Japanese soldiers cross the Khalkhin Gol.

Soviet BA-10M armored car during the Battle of Khalkhin Gol, 1939.

Destroyed Soviet plane, Khalkhin Gol, August 1939.

Japanese pilots pictured on a Toyota KC starter truck.

The commander of the Soviet 149th Rifle Regiment before the offensive.

Soviet tanks cross Khalkhin Gol river, August 1939.

Soviet T-26 light tanks of the 36th Motorized Rifle Division.

Japanese Nakajima Ki-27s, Nomonhan.

Japanese tank Type 95 Ha-Go captured by Soviet troops after battle of Khalkhin Gol.

Disabled Soviet BA-10 Armored Car.

Soviet 45mm 53-K anti-tank gun captured by Colonel Tamada's 4th Tank Regiment on June 30th.

Type 95 Ha-Go under command of Tamada's 4th Regiment.

Japanese Type 97 Chi-Ha tank.

Painting illustrating the night assault on the Soviet lines by Tamada's regiment.

Damage done to one of the Ha-Go tanks under Tamada.

This photograph was taken during an experiment after the battle showing the damaging results of piano wire entanglement.

Tamada's Regiment performing maintenance work.

BT-7 tanks at Khalkin-Gol, 1939. Tanks with both conical and cylindrical turrets can be seen in this photo.

Japanese cavalrymen, Khalkhin Gol.

Japanese 37mm Type 94 anti-tank gun.

Japanese 75mm Type 41 regimental pack gun.

Japanese 70mm Type 92 battalion gun.

Japanese Type 92 Jyu Sokosha.

Manchukuoan cavalry.

Soviet BA-6 medium armored car and its crew, 7th Armored Brigade, Khalkhin-Gol area, 1939.

Two Soviet BA-27 armored cars leading a column of BA-I armored cars.

Soviet BA-I in Red Square.

Soviet BA-6 armored car.

Soviet BA-10 armored car.

Soviet BA-20 armored cars, Khalkhin Gol.

Soldiers of a Soviet rifle machine gun battalion of the 9th Armored Brigade near their GAZ-AA staff bus.

Soviet BA-6 of the 9th Armored Brigade, captured by the Japanese army in July.

Soviet BA-10 armored car commanded by P. Moroz (right), of the 9th Mechanized Brigade.

Commander 2nd rank G. M. Stern, Marshal of the Mongolian People's Republic, H. Choibalsan, and Corps Commander G. К. Zhukov at the command post of Hamar-Dab, Khalkhin Gol, 1939.

Soviet and Japanese officers at the Khalkhin Gol ceasefire talks.

Japanese soldiers pose with weapons captured in the battles of Khalkhin Gol. One of the Japanese soldiers holds the Soviet 7.62-mm tank machine gun Degtyarev DT-29.

A colonel of the Red Army inspects a Japanese 20mm anti-tank gun Type 97 captured at Khalkhin Gol.

Military personnel of 8th Motor Brigade with a BA-20 armored car and a BA-10 armored car (background) during the fighting at Khalkhin Gol.

A female soldier covers a wounded soldier lying on a stretcher with her greatcoat, next to the door of a camouflaged Douglas DC-3 aircraft while loading the wounded onto the plane.

Headquarters tent of the forward command center of the air force of the 1st Army Group of the Red Army on Khamar-Daba mountain.

A group of Soviet pilots in flight uniforms in front of a I-16 fighter at an airfield near the Khalkhin Gol. From left to right: Lt. I.V. Shpakovsky, M.V. Kadnikov, A.P. Pavlenko, Captain I.F. Podgorny, Lieutenants L.F. Lychev, P.I. Spirin.

Soviet aviators pose with a captured Japanese Kurogan command vehicle at an airfield in Mongolia. The photo was taken after the end of hostilities at Khalkhin Gol.

Red Army soldiers near a BA-20 armored car observe air combat at Khalkhin Gol.

View of the command post of the Soviet Air Force on Hamar-Daba mountain at Khalkhin Gol.

The officers of the Red Army Air Force who participated in the battles at Khalkhin Gol. In the photo from left to right: Major Sergei Ivanovich Gritsevets (1909 - 1939), military engineer of the 1st rank Ivan Andrevich Prachik, commander of the 22nd Fighter Aviation Regiment, Major Grigory Panteleevich Kravchenko (1912 - 1943), P.М. Korobov, Alexander Ivanovich Smirnov (1920 - 2009).

Soviet officer and soldiers inspect the remains of a Japanese aircraft during the fighting at Khalkhin Gol.

Japanese soldiers captured during the fighting at Khalkhin Gol. The Soviet commander in the foreground has a military rank of major. The Soviet military personnel are wearing cotton hats for hot areas, which have survived to this day with minimal changes.

Soviet mortar crew at a 82mm battalion mortar during the shelling of the Japanese positions of the 6th Kwantung Army.

Zhukov at Khalkin Gol.

Soviet pilots play a game in front of an I-16 fighter while waiting for a mission.

Japanese fighters undergo maintenance under shade.

Soviet I-16 at Khalkin Gol.

Soviet troops examine captured Japanese artillery piece.

Zhukov and other Soviet officers examine another captured Japanese artillery piece.

Battle of Khalkhin Gol command representatives during armistice on 1 October 1939 (after the armistice at Moscow on 16 September 1939). The head of representatives: Commander of the Soviet Southern Group Kombrig Mikhail Ivanovich Potapov and Chief of Staff of the Japanese Sixth Army Major General Tetsukuma Fujimoto.

Japanese soldiers pose with a damaged Maxim machine gun seized from the Soviets in the Battle of Khalkhin Gol.

A Mongolian soldier stands among Japanese POWs in the Khalkhin-Gol river area on 2 September 1939.

Mongolian soldiers at Khalkhin Gol.

Soviet soldiers inspect a Japanese Ha-Go tank, Khalkhin Gol.

Japanese forces cross the Khalkin Gol.

Japanese soldiers check over their weapons and make final preparations as they prepare to land in Manchuria.

Japanese soldiers take advantage of a pontoon bridge and cross the Halha River on 3 July 1939.

Dug into the landscape of mainland Asia, these Japanese machine gunners scout the horizon for signs of enemy movement.

Japanese soldiers inspect a Soviet flame-throwing tank that has been knocked out by well-placed artillery fire.

A Japanese water purification unit goes to work. Aside from the Holsted River, there was little potable water to be found.

Soviet troops take cover behind various rocky outcroppings at Rezimov Hill in the Khalkin Gol.

Painting of Khalkin-Gol scene after a battle.

Soviet troops manning machine guns at Khalkin-Gol.

Soviet artillery in action at Khalkin-Gol.

Soviet I-16 fighters ready for the next mission at Khalkin-Gol.

Soviet troops examine a crashed Japanese aircraft at Khalkin-Gol.

Soviet artillerymen take a break and listen to some news at Khalkin-Gol.

Japanese soldiers and captured Soviet BT-5 tank and BA-3 armored car, Khalkin Gol.

Japanese soldiers crawl forward past Soviet armored car, Khalkin Gol.

Japanese propaganda photograph of Soviet BT-5 tank crew surrendering at the battle of Khalkin Gol.

Soviet BT tanks, Khalkin Gol.

Soviet soldiers with a captured Japanese Type 95 command car at Khalkin-Gol.

Captured Japanese guns being examined by Soviet troops.

Nakajima Ki-27b of Kenji Shimada, commander of the 1st Chutai of the 11th Sentai, Battle of Khalkhin Gol, June 1939.

Japanese anti-aircraft gun position during Khalkin Gol.

Japanese Nakajima Ki-27 at Khalkin Gol.

Soviet pilots Kurbatov and Moshin in front of a Polikarpov I-16, Khalkhin Gol.

Japanese ground crew with a Nakajima Ki-27, Khalkin Gol.

Nikishov, Voronov and Zhukov during the battle of Khalkin Gol.

Tupolev SB 2M-103 of the 38th SBAP, Summer 1939.

Soviet troops marching towards Khalkhin Gol, August 1939.

Soviet BT tanks, Khalkin Gol.

Japanese troops celebrate on top of captured Soviet BT tanks, Khalkin Gol. Note that on the one in the foreground its tank tracks have been removed and placed on the side fenders allowing the tank to travel on its roadwheels. The tank in the background has its tracks installed on the running gear.

Japanese Ki-27 fighters, Khalkin Gol.

Soviet I-16 fighter after a bad landing, Khalkin Gol.

Soviet soldiers examine a Japanese Ki-27 fighter shot down at Khalkhin Gol. Note that some of the soldiers are wearing camouflage SSh-39 helmets.

Soviet soldier with a banner "От боевых подруг" on a hill sometime during the Battle of Khalkhin Gol.

Japanese soldiers examining a BT-5 captured at Khalkhin Gol, 1939.

Soviet BT-7 tanks of the 6th Tank Brigade, Khalkhin Gol region, August, 1939. Note the white air recognition stripes painted on the turret.

Soviet tanks attack, Khalkin Gol, 1939.

Tankers of the 11th Soviet Tank Brigade with a BT-5 tank, Khalkhin Gol.

Soviet officer holding a Japanese officer's sword (Guntō) next to a Type 92 heavy machine gun, captured in the Battle of Khalkhin Gol, Mongolia, August 1939.