War Warnings: Deliberately Confused Messages

To General Short

 “Negotiations with Japanese appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the U. S. desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to Japanese hostile action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur, you will carry out task signed in Rainbow Five as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.”

To Admiral Kimmel

 “Consider this dispatch a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan is expected to make aggressive move within the next few days. An amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo is indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of their naval task forces. You will execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46 only. Guam, Samoa and Continental Districts have been directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Inform naval district and Army authorities. British to be informed by Spenavo.”

Analysis

One message says negotiations have ended and the other says they may continue.

The Navy message emphasizes conflict and the Army message avoiding conflict.

The Navy message points attention away from Hawaii and mentions sabotage. The Army message says not to alarm the civilian population which means the lowest level of alert.

The Navy plan implements War Plan WPL-46 only, which forced Kimmel to use the few long-range patrol planes he had to scout the Marshall Islands to the southwest.

The Army message forbids the first overt act. Those are the words of FDR. They are also words that denote knowledge of the coming attack, because Hawaii wasn’t about to attack Japan.

The sabotage fig leaf was to distract the Hawaiian commanders from understanding the meaning of ‘overt act.’ But no one could allow sabotage, so it cannot have referred to that. What ‘overt act’ do you think FDR was referring to? Since attacking Japan and sabotage were impossible, that leaves only one possibility—Japan attacking Hawaii. The words “overt act” prove that FDR knew Japan would attack Hawaii.

The President’s own commission on Pearl Harbor declared that the Hawaiian commanders needed to “consult and confer with the other respecting the meaning and intent of the warnings” because they were so confusing. These messages were held by the Roosevelt administration as sufficient warning to Hawaii both before and after 7 December. No other defense was raised for denying IQ and not sending warnings to Hawaii. The Navy Court and Army Board found them totally inadequate, as indeed they are.

 

The Change of Command Ceremony for the Commander of the Pacific Fleet. This ceremony took place on Saturday morning, February 1, 1941 aboard the USS Pennsylvania. In the center of the photo is Admiral Husband E. Kimmel extending his hand to outgoing Admiral Richardson.

 

Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, USN, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and Pacific Fleet, (center) confers with his Chief of Staff, Captain William W. Smith, (right) and his Operations Officer and Assistant Chief of Staff, Captain Walter S. DeLany (left), at Pearl Harbor, 1941.

 

General Short.

 

Admiral Kimmel.

 

Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, seen here in his Pearl Harbor headquarters in 1941, would spend the rest of his life in a quixotic quest for exoneration. The historical debate continues as to the level of blame he should shoulder for the disaster.

 

Left to right front row: Lt. General Walter Short, Lord Louis Mountbatten, Admiral Husband Kimmel. Left to right back row: Major General Frederick Martin and Rear Admiral Patrick Bellinger.

 

Vice Admiral Joseph “Bull” Reeves, Waikiki Beach, December 1941. 

 

Browning .50-caliber anti-aircraft machine gun, water-cooled, flexible, on a runway at Wheeler Field, Oahu, in the Hawaiian Islands. Early in December 1941 all the U.S. troops, including anti-aircraft batteries, were returned to their stations from field maneuvers to await the signal for riot duty.

 

Infantrymen during a field inspection in the Hawaiian Islands, January 1941. From 1935 on the U.S. garrison in the Hawaiian Islands was larger than any other American overseas outpost. However, by 1940 there was a shortage of modern equipment and trained personnel, and not until February 1941 did troop reinforcements and up-to-date equipment begin to arrive in Hawaii. The United States was not prepared for war and the men and equipment did not meet the necessary requirements.

 

4.2-inch chemical mortar crew in action during maneuvers in Hawaii. As in all U.S. military commands, the Hawaiian Department was faced with the problem of training the largely inexperienced forces available at the time.

 

A 75-mm gun M1917A1 in a camouflaged position in Hawaii.

 

Coast Artillery battery training in Hawaii. Man at left is placing a round in the manual fuse setter of a 3-inch anti-aircraft gun M1917M2. A plan for the defense of the Hawaiian Islands had been set up and joint maneuvers (land, air, and naval forces) were held periodically to test the various security measures.

 

Rear Admiral Patrick L. Bellinger, Pearl Harbor's Air Defense officer, who predicted the Japanese attack.

 

American B-17 bombers fly over Hawaii, December 1941.

 

This assortment of aircraft parked on the outer edge of the Ewa Marine Corps Air Station includes SB2U Vindicator bombers. In the distance are the lower slopes of the Waianae mountains. It is presently the community known as Makakilo.

 

An aerial photograph of Pearl Harbor taken in May 1940. Visible are the aircraft carrier USS Yorktown (lower left), ten battleships, 17 cruisers, two light cruisers, and more than 30 destroyers.

 

Aerial view of the U.S. Naval Operating Base, Pearl Harbor, Oahu, Hawaii, looking southwest on 30 October 1941. Ford Island Naval Air Station is in the center, with the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard just beyond it, across the channel. The airfield in the upper left-center is the U.S. Army's Hickam Field. Paired cruisers in the immediate foreground, nests of destroyers to the right. The white ship is the hospital ship Solace.

 

This aerial view of Pearl Harbor was taken circa 1940. It shows the Pacific Fleet well dispersed with an assortment of battleships moored alongside Ford Island. To the right center is the submarine base and left center is the location of the naval shipyard.

 

Looking north over Ford Island, October 10, 1941. This aerial view shows the variety of naval aircraft facilities located on the Ford Island Naval Air Station. The famous Battleship Row can be seen on the right side of the shore line. The massive hangars that occupy the southern point of Ford Island would be where the initial attack would fall upon the PBY ramp. In the center of the island is the main runway. Ford Island was formally known as Luke Field when it was possessed by the Army Air Corps.

 

Pearl Harbor and Hickam Field, October 30, 1941. Cropped version of previous photo with notations. Many Japanese torpedo planes flew along the East Loch to get the longest possible straight runs for dropping their torpedoes. This put the battleships USS Oklahoma and USS West Virginia in an almost direct line. Of the 40 torpedoes dropped by Japanese aircraft, approximately 14 hit these two ships.

 

Ford Island, October 10, 1941.

 

Aerial of U.S. Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, Supply Base, Magazine Island (lower enter), Navy Yard Submarine Base (right center). Photograph received August 22, 1941. U.S. Navy photograph, now in the collections of the National Archives.

 

Aerial of U.S. Navy Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Photograph released October 16, 1941. U.S. Navy photograph, now in the collections of the National Archives.

 

Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, October 16, 1941. Aerial view showing the fuel depot, Merry Point, and upper tank farm, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, taken by aircraft from Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor. U.S. Navy photograph, now in the collections of the National Archives.

 

Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, October 16, 1941. Aerial view showing the fuel depot, coal docks, and upper tank farm, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, taken by aircraft from Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor.

 

Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, October 16, 1941. Vertical view of the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, taken by aircraft from Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor. U.S. Navy photograph, now in the collections of the National Archives.

 

Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, October 16, 1941. Aerial view, looking south, of the submarine base at the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, taken by aircraft from Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor. U.S. Navy photograph, now in the collections of the National Archives.

 

Pearl Harbor Navy Yard, Oahu, Territory of Hawaii, aerial view shows fuel depot and coal docks, October 16, 1941. Official U.S. Navy photograph, now in the collections of the National Archives.

 

Pearl Harbor Navy Yard, Oahu, Territory of Hawaii, aerial view looks south, October 13, 1941. Official U.S. Navy photograph, now in the collections of the National Archives.

 

Pearl Harbor Navy Yard, Oahu, Territory of Hawaii, submarine base, looking north, October 13, 1941. Official U.S. Navy photograph, now in the collections of the National Archives.

 

Pearl Harbor Navy Yard, Oahu, Territory of Hawaii, Haleima Field, January 20, 1941. Official U.S. Navy photograph, now in the collections of the National Archives.

 

Radar Plot from Station Opana, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, circa 1941.

 

Tatsuta Maru, flagship of the NYK [Nippon Yusen Kaisha] Line, view taken circa 1940, with neutrality markings prominently displayed on the sides of her hull, forward. The Tatsuta Maru (16,975 grt, 584 ft. long) commenced her maiden voyage between Yokohama and San Francisco in April 1930. The transliteration of her name was changed to Tatuta Maru in 1938. In December 1941 Tatsuta Maru was part of an elaborate Japanese deception plan to mask the unannounced attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor.

 

Tatsuta Maru, marked with symbols of safe passage while working as a repatriation ship as seen through the periscope of the U.S. Navy submarine USS Kingfish (SS-234) in October 1942. Subsequently, with the start of the Pacific War, the Tatsuta Maru was requisitioned for use as a troopship for the Imperial Japanese Navy. She ended her days in 1943 when sunk by a U.S. submarine off Mikurajima, 120 miles south of Tokyo Bay. Her sistership the Asama Maru was near-identical, whereas a half-sister, the Chichibu Maru, was slightly larger with only one funnel. In 1942, the Tatsuta Maru and two other NYK vessels - Asama Maru and Kamakura Maru - provided transport for exchange of U.S., British, and Japanese diplomats.

 

Tatsuta Maru marked with symbols of safe passage while working as a repatriation ship. She sailed from Yokohama on 2 December bound for San Francisco with the task of exchanging American evacuees from East Asia for Japanese nationals in the United States. She was scheduled to reach the U.S. on 14 December and despite rumors of war the American press wrongly concluded that meant nothing was likely to happen for some time. The master of the ship had sealed orders to turn around at midnight on 7 December and return to Japan while maintaining radio silence.