Sinking of the Bismarck, 27 May 1941: Official Despatches

The sinking of HMS Hood.

This document is a modern transcription of a portion of Admiralty record ADM 234/509. It deals with various aspects of the mission to locate and sink battleship Bismarck in May 1941. This particular portion covers assorted dispatches.

Home Fleet,

5th July, 1941

No. 896/H.F. 1325

Sir,

Be pleased to lay before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty the following despatch covering the operations leading to the sinking of the German battleship Bismarck on Tuesday, 27th May, 1941. All times are zone minus 2.

First Reports of Enemy

In the second week of May an unusual amount of German air reconnaissance between Jan Mayen Island and Greenland was noticed. It seemed possible that the object of this reconnaissance was to locate the ice-limits either way with a view to an attack on Jan Mayen Island or to assist some ship to break in or out of the North Sea, through the Denmark Strait. On 14th May, accordingly, I asked the Flag Officer-in-Charge, Iceland for a report of the ice conditions round Jan Mayen Island. The report showed that that the approach was possible only from between south and south-west, with ice blocking all other directions. Reports of troop movements in Norway, a false alarm of an air invasion of Iceland and an air reconnaissance of Scapa Flow all continued to direct my attention towards the Denmark Strait; and on 18th May I instructed the Suffolk, who was on patrol, to keep a special watch on the passage in both directions close to the ice. The Rear-Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron, in H.M.S. Norfolk, sailed from Hvalfjord the next day and relieved the Suffolk, who returned to Hvalfjord to refuel.

Early on 21st May a report was received of 11 merchant vessels and 2 heavily-screened large warships northbound in the Kattegat the day before. Later in the day the warships were located at Bergen and identified from air photographs as one Bismarck class battleship and one Hipper class cruiser. There were indications that these two were contemplating a raid on the ocean trade routes (Admiralty message 1828/21st May), though, if this were so, it seemed unlikely that they would stop at a place so convenient for air reconnaissance as Bergen. Two other pointers were a report (unreliable) of a U-boat north of Iceland and an attack by a German aircraft on Thorshaven W/T station.

The following dispositions were made:

The Hood (Captain Ralph Kerr, C.B.E.; flying the flag of Vice-Admiral Lancelot E. Holland, C.B., Vice-Admiral Commanding Battle Cruiser Squadron) and Prince of Wales (Captain John C. Leach, M.V.O.), screened by the Electra (Commander Cecil W. May), the Anthony (Lieutenant Commander John M. Hodges), the Echo (Lieutenant Commander Cecil H. de B. Newby), Icarus (Lieutenant Commander Colin D. Maund, D.S.C.), Achates (Lieutenant Commander Viscount Jocelyn), and Antelope (Lieutenant Commander Roger B.N. Hicks, D.S.O.), were sailed from Scapa for Hvalfjord.

The Birmingham (Captain Alexander C. G. Madden) and Manchester (Captain Herbert A. Packer), on patrol in the Iceland-Faroes passage were ordered to fuel at Skaalefjord and resume patrol.

The Suffolk (Captain Robert M. Ellis), who had just arrived at Hvalfjord after being relieved by the Norfolk (Captain Alfred J.L. Phillips; flying the flag of Rear-Admiral William F. Wake-Walker, C.B., O.B.E., Rear-Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron) in the Denmark Strait, was ordered to rejoin the Rear-Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron, after completing with fuel. In order to conserve fuel, this movement was deferred, the Suffolk being sailed to arrive on patrol just before the earliest possible time of arrival of the enemy.

The Arethusa (Captain Alex C. Chapman), who was due at Reykjavik with the Vice-Admiral Commanding, Orkneys and Shetlands, on a visit of inspection to Iceland, was ordered to remain at Reykjavik at the disposal of the Rear-Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron.

The King George V (Captain Wilfred R. Patterson, C.V.O.; flying the flag of the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet), Galatea (Captain Edward W.B. Sim; flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Alban T.B. Curteis, C.B., Rear-Admiral Commanding, Second Cruiser Squadron), Aurora (Captain William G. Agnew), Kenya (Captain Michael M. Denny C.B.), Neptune (Captain Rory C. O'Conor) and the remaining three Home Fleet destroyers - Active (Lieutenant Commander Michael W. Tomkinson), Punjabi (Commander Stuart A. Buss, M.V.O.) and Nestor (Commander Conrad B. Alers-Hankey, D.S.C.) - were brought to short notice at Scapa. The Inglefield (Captain Percy Todd, DSO; Captain (D), Third Destroyer Flotilla) and Intrepid (Commander Roderick C. Gordon, DSO) arrived on 22nd May and joined this force, as did Hermione (Captain Geoffrey N. Oliver) on completing the repair of her fourth turret.

The sailing of Victorious (Captain Henry C. Bovell) and Repulse (Captain William G. Tennant, C.B., M.V.O.) in convoy W.S. 8B was cancelled by the Admiralty and they were placed at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet. The Victorious was already at Scapa and the repulse was ordered to sail from the Clyde to join.

The submarine Minerve (Lieutenant de Vaisseau P.M. Sommeville) on patrol off south-west Norway was moved to the vicinity of position 61° 53'N., 3° 15'E., And the P31 (Lieutenant John B. de B. Kershaw) was sailed from Scapa to patrol west of Stadtlandet.

A bombing attack by Royal Air Force aircraft was arranged for the dark hours and a reconnaissance of the coast from Trondheim to Kristiansand South for first light on 22nd May. Neither of these was able to establish definitely whether the enemy was still at Bergen, owing to fog and low cloud over the Norwegian coast, but some of the bombers attacked ships in harbor.

The Admiralty transferred 828 Squadron of Albacores to Sumburgh, to attack the enemy at Bergen. I had hoped to embark them in the Victorious in place of her Fulmars; but when it became known that the enemy had sailed, it was too late to do so.

The lack of further news about the enemy's movements was disturbing, and the need was felt of an air patrol similar to "Sentinel" (since established) across the route between Norwegian waters and the Northern Straits to report if the enemy left. Here, too, weather conditions were bad with large stretches of fog, but it would have been possible with the aid of A.S.V. to maintain some sort of watch.

This state of uncertainty continued until the evening of 22nd May, when the Commanding Officer, R.N. Air Station, Hatson (Captain Henry L. St. J. Fancourt), on his own initiative, dispatched an aircraft to try to break through the fog belt to the Norwegian coast. This aircraft carried Commander Geoffrey A. Rotherham, O.B.O., the executive officer of the station and a naval observer with much experience, and was piloted by Lieutenant (A) Noel E. Goddard, R.N.V.R. Flying almost at surface level, they succeeded in penetrating to the fjords and carried out a search of the position where the enemy ships had been photographed. Finding nothing there, they examined Bergen harbor, under heavy fire, and reported that the ships had sailed. This skillful and determined reconnaissance is deserving of the highest praise, as is the initiative of Captain Fancourt in ordering it.

The report of the departure of the warships and convoy reached me at 2000 on 22nd May and, in view of the qualifications of the aircraft crew, I had no hesitation in accepting it. There seemed to be four possible explanations of the enemy's intentions:

The convoy might contain important military stores for Northern Norway and have gone up the Leads. Movements of troops to Kilkenes had been reported for some weeks.

The convoy might contain a raiding force bound for Iceland, possibly with a view to capturing an aerodrome for operations against Reykjavik and Hvalfjord.

The battleship and cruiser might be trying to break out on to the trade routes. This theory had the support of Admiralty intelligence. If it were correct, the further question arose of which passage the enemy would select. Such information as was available suggested that on all previous occasions the Denmark Strait route had been taken, and this was therefore considered the most likely; but the passages between Iceland and Scotland could not be ruled out, especially in view of the enemy's stop at Bergen.

The battleship and cruiser may have covered and important convoy over the dangerous sea passage as far as the Inner Leads, and might now be returning to the Baltic.

The third possible move carried the greater menace to our interests and dispositions were therefore made to meet it. These dispositions also gave a reasonable possibility of interfering, before it was too late, with any attempted landing in Iceland.

The Suffolk was sailed to join the Rear-Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron, in the Denmark Strait.

The Arethusa was sailed to join Manchester and Birmingham in the Iceland-Faeroes passage. These ships were disposed by the Manchester in equal areas between 61° N., 10° 30' W., and 64° N., 15° W. Five trawlers were on their normal patrol west of these areas.

The Vice-Admiral Commanding Battle Cruiser Squadron, with his force, then on passage to Hvalfjord, was instructed to cover the patrols in the Denmark Strait and the Iceland-Faeroes passage, operating north of 62° north.

The King George V, Victorious, Galatea, Aurora, Kenya, Hermione and seven destroyers sailed from Scapa at 2245 to cover the passages operating south of 62°. The Lance (Lieutenant Commander Ralph W.F. Northcott) was completed to return to Scapa with boiler trouble, but the Repulse and three destroyers of the Western Approaches Command joined north-west of the Butt of Lewis on the forenoon of 23rd May. I had intended to detach two cruisers to patrol the Faroes-Shetlands passage, but I finally decided to keep all four in company with me.

Air reconnaissance of all the passages between Greenland and the Orkneys and of the Norwegian coast was asked for, as well as reconnaissance of forces approaching Iceland. An additional air patrol line about 260 miles west of the Iceland-Faeroes passage was also established by the Admiral Commanding Western Approaches.

It was desirable that the cruiser patrols in the passages, and the heavy ships as well, should be as nearly complete with fuel as possible when the Bismarck was located. The problem involved in ensuring this, during the long period between her location at Bergen and the report of her departure, was not an easy one. If the Bismarck had chosen the Iceland-Faeroes passage, the cruisers which were sent to refuel at Skaalefjord would only just have been in time to intercept her when they resumed their patrol. The force in me was likewise sailed at the latest possible moment for it was obvious that fuel would become a vital factor before the operation was completed.

The battlefleet proceeded to the north-westward until reaching latitude 60° N., far enough north to be in a position to deal with an attack on Iceland or a possible break back, and then steered west. There had been an interval of 29 hours between the time the enemy was last seen at Bergen and the time that they were found to have left. So no accurate estimation of their "furthest on" position could be made; but the time of their first sighting by the Suffolk showed later that they must have sailed on the evening of 21st May, soon after they had been photographed at Bergen and long before their departure was discovered.

First Sighting

The air patrols arranged for 23rd May were seriously depleted by weather conditions. The patrol in the Iceland-Faeroes gap was discontinued after two sorties, the more westerly one backing it up was maintained only from 1300 to 1700, while the Denmark Strait patrol did not fly at all, though I did not learn of this until later.

The rear-Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron, had issued the following signaled instructions to Norfolk and Suffolk:

Suffolk is to patrol within R.D/F distance of the ice-edge on line running north-east and south-west. Southern end of 3 hour beat to be on line 310° from Staalbierg Huk. The time at southern end to be 2200 and every 6 hours thereafter. When clear inshore Norfolk will patrol about 15 miles abeam of you. When thick inshore Norfolk will patrol to cover inshore passage. Norfolk will make contact with you at 1300B/24th May in position 66° 45' N., 26° W. to check position. Investigate ice cap up to minefield on parting company today Friday.

On the afternoon of 23rd May the atmospheric conditions in the Denmark Strait were unusual, being clear over and close to the ice, and misty between the ice and the land. The Suffolk took advantage of this to move further to the eastward across the top of the minefield than would otherwise have been prudent and kept close to the edge of the mist so as to have cover handy if the Bismarck were sighted at close range. The Norfolk patrolled 15 miles on the beam of the Suffolk's patrol.

Shortly after turning back to the south-westward on completing her investigation of the ice-edge, the Suffolk at 1922 sighted the Bismarck, followed by the Prinz Eugen. 7 miles on the starboard quarter, steaming the same course as herself. The Suffolk made an enemy report, increased to full speed and altered to 150° to take cover in the mist and make for the gap in the minefield if unable to round its northern edge. She was able, however, to keep under cover and to follow the Bismarck round the minefield, maintaining touch by R. D/F. Her alert look-out and the intelligent use made of the peculiar weather conditions enabled the Suffolk, after this short range sighting, to avoid being engaged. At 2028 she sighted the enemy again, reported them and once more retired into the mist. At the same time, the Norfolk, who had meanwhile been closing, also made contact, this time at a range of 6 miles. The Bismarck opened fire, but the Norfolk retired safely under a smoke screen, though some salvoes fell close enough to throw splinters on board.

This report from the Norfolk (2032/23rd May) was the first intimation that I received of the enemy being sighted, as none of the Suffolk's reports up to date had been received in the battlefleet. The two cruisers proceeded to shadow with great skill in very difficult conditions. There were rainstorms, snowstorms, ice-floes and mirage effects, which occasionally deceived the Suffolk into thinking that the enemy had closed to very short range. The Suffolk took up a position on the starboard quarter of the enemy within R.D/F range of the edge of the ice, to ensure that the enemy could not turn back unseen between her and the ice; the Norfolk on the port quarter covered any possible turn to the southward. The Rear-Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron, reports that a third, smaller, ship was thought to be present; but the Suffolk never saw this ship and in view of her position it is considered that its presence is not established. It is curious, however, that the Prince of Wales also obtained three echoes after meeting the enemy. It is possible that two separate R.D/F echoes were being received from Bismarck. Aircraft from Iceland were also sent to shadow.

Battlecruiser Force

The Hood and Prince of Wales and their screen were meanwhile closing at high speed. They arrived in the vicinity of the enemy sooner than I had expected. At 0205 the Vice-Admiral Commanding, Battle Cruiser Squadron, turned to a course nearly parallel to that of the enemy to wait for the relative positions to become clear and for daylight. The opposing forces were in close proximity at this time, and it is possible that the ship sighted by the Norfolk at 0229 was the Prince of Wales. During the rest of the night the Prince of Wales obtained frequent D/F bearing of the Norfolk and Suffolk and passed them in to the Vice-Admiral Commanding, Battle Cruiser Squadron. At 0340 the Hood and Prince of Wales increased to 28 knots and altered in to make contact.

It was the intention of the Vice-Admiral Commanding, Battle Cruiser Squadron, that the Hood and Prince of Wales should engage the Bismarck, leaving the Prinz Eugen to the cruisers, but the Rear-Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron, was not aware that the battlecruiser force was so near; the Norfolk and Suffolk, therefore, shadowing from the eastward and northward respectively at a range of about 15 miles, were not in a position to engage the Prinz Eugen who was now stationed ahead of the Bismarck on a course of 240°.

The Hood and Prince of Wales sighted the enemy at 0535 from a direction just before his beam and came into action at 0553 steering to close the range as fast as possible. All three ships opened fire practically simultaneously at a range of about 25,000 yards. The shooting of both the Hood and the Bismarck was excellent from the start and both scored hits almost at once. The Bismarck's second or third salvo started a fire in the Hood in the vicinity of the port after 4-in. mounting. This fire spread rapidly and, at 0600 just after the ships had turned together to open "A" arcs, the Hood was straddled again : there was a huge explosion between the after funnel and the mainmast and the ship sank in three or four minutes. She had fired only five or six salvoes. The loss by one unlucky hit of this famous ship with Vice-Admiral Lancelot Ernest Holland, C.B., Captain Ralph Kerr, C.B.E., and her fine company was a grievous blow.

The Prince of Wales started off well for so new and unpracticed a ship and had straddled with her sixth salvo. She had been engaging the Bismarck, while herself being engaged by the Prinz Eugen. After emptying her aircraft in preparation for a night encounter, she had been unable to refuel it in time to fly off before contact was made. It was just about to be catapulted when it was hit by splinters and had to be jettisoned. As soon as the Hood had been disposed of, the Bismarck shifted her main and secondary armament fire quickly and accurately on to the Prince of Wales. The range was now about 18,000 yards and the Prince of Wales' starboard 5.25 inch battery had also come into action. Within a very few minutes she was hit by four 15-in, and three smaller, probably 8-in. shells; her compass platform was damaged and most of the people on it killed or wounded; both forward H.A. Directors and the starboard after one were out of action; one four-gunned turret had jammed and the ship was holed underwater aft. The Rear-Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron, reports that the Prince of Wales' salvoes were now falling short and had a very large spread. The Commanding Officer considered it expedient temporarily to break off the action and, at 0613, turned away under smoke. The range on ceasing fire was 14,600 yards.

The Suffolk reported that the Bismarck had suffered three hits, but neither the Rear-Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron, nor the Prince of Wales had been able to observe any hits for certain, though black smoke had been seen at times. Her fire at any rate was still very accurate. (It is now known that she did probably suffer three hits, one of which caused her to leave an oil track and may have had a considerable effect on her endurance.)

The Rear-Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron, ordered the destroyers in the area to search for survivors of Hood and told Prince of Wales to remain in company with him and maintain her best speed. By 0720 she had cleared away most of the debris on the bridge and resumed conning from the compass platform; two guns of "Y" turret were again in action and her best speed had been reported as 27 knots.

Decision to Break off the Action

The Commanding Officer of Prince of Wales in his report says:

Some explanation remains to be made as to my decision to break off the engagement after the sinking of H.M.S. Hood - a decision which clearly invites most critical examination. Prior to the disaster to the Hood I felt that, together, we could deal adequately with the Bismarck and her consort. The sinking of the Hood obviously changed the immediate situation, and there were three other considerations requiring to be weighed up, of which the first two had been in my mind before the action was joined namely:

The practical certainty that owing to mechanical "teething troubles" a full output from the main armament could not be expected.

The working up of the ship after commissioning had only just reached a stage where I felt able to report to the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, that I considered her reasonably fit to take part in service operations. This was the first occasion on which she had done so. From the gunnery point of view the personnel was immensely keen, but inexperienced.

The likelihood of a decisive concentration being effected at a later stage

In all the circumstances I did not consider it sound tactics to continue single-handed the engagement with two German ships, both of whom might be expected to be at the peak of their efficiency. Accordingly I turned away and broke off the action pending a more favorable opportunity.

The Rear-Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron, in his report says:

At 1545 Admiralty signal 1445 had been received. At that time I had no evidence that the enemy's speed was in any way reduced by damage and I did not consider it likely that he would fight or that we could catch him, as his policy was obviously evasion.

The question whether I should re-engage with Prince of Wales had been exercising my mind for some time before the receipt of this signal. The factors to be considered were as follows: In the first place the state of efficiency of Prince of Wales. I had seen her forced out of action after 10 minutes' engagement, at the end of which her salvoes were falling short and with a very large spread indeed. As a result of the action she was short of one gun and her bridge was wrecked. She was a brand-new ship, with turrets in which mechanical breakdowns had occurred and were to be expected, apart from damage, and she had had a bare minimum period of working up. I had been unable to observe for certain any hits on the Bismarck and her shooting had given a striking proof of its efficiency. To put it in a nutshell, I did not and do not consider that in her then state of efficiency the Prince of Wales was a match for the Bismarck.

This however, was in no way a deciding factor. My object was the destruction of the Bismarck and I knew that other forces were on the way to intercept her. I had therefore two broad alternatives, one to ensure that she was intercepted by the Commander-in-Chief, the other to attempt her destruction with my own force.

This second alternative involved my being able to bring her to action and this required an excess of speed. I had no evidence that, with the Prince of Wales reduced to 27 knots, I possessed it. If, however, the attempt had shown that we could overtake her I would have had to engage with the whole force and press the action to a range at which the 8-in. cruisers' fire would be effective - and could be spotted - namely 20,000 yards or less.

In view of the relative efficiency of the two heavy ships I was of the opinion that such an action would almost certainly result as follows. A gradual reduction of the Prince of Wales' gunfire due to material failures and damage, in return for which the Bismarck would receive some damage. That such damage, though it would affect her fighting efficiency, would also have any large effect on her speed I considered improbable, as in a modern well-protected ship the most that could be expected would be some loss of draught due to damaged funnels or fans or waterline damage forward or aft.

At the range to which the action must be pressed the cruisers might well be left to bear the brunt of Bismarck's and Prinz Eugen's fire and suffer a reduction of speed due to hits in their large and unprotected machinery spaces or waterline. I should then have a damaged Prince of Wales, and possibly damaged cruisers, with which to try and maintain touch with a Bismarck damaged but still capable of a high speed.

The alternative was to ensure her interception by the Commander-in-Chief. This I felt I had a good reason for thinking I could achieve. At this time I was expecting the Commander-in-Chief to be able to make contact about 0100 (This was a miscalculation. The earliest the Commander-in-Chief could arrive, even if he forecast exactly the enemy's movements, was between 0600 and 0700, 25th May) on the 25th - before dark - and I saw no reason why our success so far in keeping in touch should not continue. Even if we had to wait until the next day for the Commander-in-Chief, the conditions of darkness were no more difficult than those of low visibility with which we had been able to deal by use of R. D/F and it would only be dark from 0200 to 0500.

The decision was not an easy one. I appreciated that my force was superior in number and the weight of the moral factors involved. I could not feel, however, that the Prince of Wales in her then state of efficiency was worth her face value or that my extra cruiser would counterbalance her weakness. But for the probability of a T/B attack from the Victorious and interception by the Commander-in-Chief the situation would have been fundamentally different, and any other course but to re-engage could not have been considered.

As it was, however, the alternatives could be summed up as follows:

To engage with my whole force; this had possibilities varying from the highly problematical destruction of the enemy through the gamut of a long stern chase at high speed which would make interception by the Commander-in-Chief impossible, to that of being driven off with loss of speed and inability to keep touch.

Against this was the alternative of continuing to keep touch, with the possibility that we might fail to do so, though with the Prince of Wales in support I had no fear of being driven off.

Weighing these alternatives, I chose the latter. This did not preclude the possibility of attacking the enemy, but in doing so my object must be to ensure interception rather than attempt his destruction, and on this policy I acted.

Their Lordships' signal had enquired my "intentions" as regards re-engaging with Prince of Wales. I was careful in my reply to state my "opinions" and not my intentions, and I was grateful that They left the matter to my judgement.

After full consideration of the facts, I am of the opinion that this decision was justified and correct. Some of the factors affecting it require emphasis. The Prince of Wales, with many of the contractor's workmen still on board, had joined the Fleet on 25th March. It was not until 27th April that the last of her turrets could be accepted from the contractor and that practice drills with the whole main armament could be started. Captain Leach had been able to report on 17th May, shortly before the Fleet sailed for this operation, that he considered his ship fit to operate; but neither he nor I interpreted that report as implying that she was fully worked up. Her turrets, of a new and untried model, were known to be liable to teething -troubles and could already be seen to be suffering them. The effects of all this on her gunnery had been witnessed by the Rear-Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron, and he knew, in addition, that her bridge was seriously damaged, that she had taken in 400 tons of water aft and could not exceed 27 knots. The Bismarck and Prinz Eugen, on the other hand, after working up for many months under ideal conditions in the Baltic, had given evidence of a very high degree of efficiency: the Bismarck had been hit, but the Real-Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron, could see no sign of damage.

In these circumstances, the senior officer on the spot was clearly justified in his conclusion that he was more likely to achieve his object of ensuring the enemy's destruction, by keeping touch until the approaching reinforcements should arrive. If these powerful reinforcements had not been in the vicinity, the problem would, of course, have been a different one.

At 1445 the Admiralty asked the Rear-Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron, to report on the percentage ,fighting efficiency of the Bismarck and requested his intentions as regards the Prince of Wales re-engaging. The Rear-Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron, replied that the Bismarck's efficiency was uncertain but high, and that he considered that the Prince of Wales "should not re-engage until other heavy ships are in contact unless interception fails. Doubtful if she has speed to force action." From his reply I assumed that the Rear-Admiral Commanding, First Cruise Squadron, would not force action unless the situation changed materially, or instructions were received either from the Admiralty or myself. I had complete confidence in Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker's judgment, nor did I wish the enemy to be forced away to the westward.

Shadowing During Daylight on 24th May

After the action had been broken off, the three ships continued to shadow. The enemy proceeded on a south-westerly course, with minor alterations, until 1240. They tried hard, by frequent alterations of course and speed, to throw off the shadowers; and the rapid variations of visibility, between 2 and 17 miles, were of great assistance to them; but their efforts were without success. The Suffolk, using her R.D/F in a masterly manner to overcome the difficulties of varying visibility, shadowed from the starboard quarter to cover any attempt to break back along the ice; the Norfolk, with the Prince of Wales in company, kept out on the port quarter to ensure the detection of any alteration to the southward. About 1240 the enemy seem to have abandoned hope of evasion by daylight, for they turned south, presumably to gain sea room for another attempt by night, and reduced to 24 knots.

Movements of the Battlefleet

At the time the first import of the sighting of the enemy was received by me the King George V, with the Repulse, Victorious, Galatea, Aurora, Kenya, Hermione and nine destroyers in company, was in approximate position 60° 20' N., 13° W. I had always thought the enemy, when breaking out, might have long distance aircraft reconnoitering ahead of them, to give warning of any of our forces in a position to intercept: if either or both of our capital ship forces were reported, the enemy might turn back through the Denmark Strait or shape course and speed to avoid contact. I therefore altered course to 280° and increased to 27 knots, with the idea of reaching a position from which I could intercept the enemy to the eastward of the Denmark Strait, and at the same time be able to reinforce the Hood and Prince of -Wales if they were able to bring him to action and reduce his speed, or force him in my direction. As more information was received, it became clear that the enemy intended to continue his attempt to break out; thought there was still the chance that he would turn back when he encountered the Hood and the Prince of Wales or, if the Hood and the Prince of Wales were to the westward of him when contact was made, he might endeavor to break to the south or south-eastward.

The sinking of the Hood and the damage to the Prince of Wales made it unlikely that the enemy would be forced to turn back, and the best hope lay in interception by my force, though this would not become possible unless he reduced his speed. Course was altered accordingly to 260°, and later to 240°. Reports suggested that the enemy was keeping a few miles off the edge of the ice, possibly in the hope of finding thick weather. From my point of view the greatest danger lay in his bugging the coast of Greenland, and then making his way to the westward, where I suspected he might have an oiler: for, if he could refuel, he would be able to use higher speeds than the King George V could maintain and so get away.

The enemy's alteration to the southward and his reduction speed were a great relief, although there seemed a good chance that he was leading our forces into a concentration of U-Boats. It suggested that he did not know of my force and it made interception possible.

There was still a grave risk of his getting away by sheer speed, and though I knew the lack of experience of the crews of the aircraft in the Victorious and of the Victorious's own officers and ship's company, I decided I must call upon their aid in an endeavor to reduce the Bismarck's speed and to ensure my being able to bring her to action with the King George V and Repulse - a call they responded to with such splendid gallantry and success.

I therefore detached the Rear-Admiral Commanding, Second Cruiser Squadron at 1509, with the Victorious and the four cruisers, with instructions to steer the best course to get within 100 miles of the enemy and deliver a T/B attack. Though the Victorious would be of great value in company with me the next morning to locate the enemy if they escaped during the night, a reduction in speed was the more important object and could only be achieved by detaching her at this stage.

The King George V and Repulse steered an intercepting course with the object of bringing the enemy to action soon after sunrise with the sun low behind us. The situation at this time was as follows:

The enemy appeared to have settled down to a course of 180° at about 22 to 24 knots. They were, for no apparent reason, zig-zagging. They were shadowed by the Suffolk from astern and by the Prince of Wales and the Norfolk from the port quarter. The Bismarck had suffered some damage but retained her fighting efficiency, though an aircraft had reported that she was leaving an oil wake. Their reduced speed was probably dictated by the need for economy of fuel and to afford an opportunity of breaking contact by an increase of speed after dark. The Prince of Wales had two guns out of action and considerable damage to her bridge.

The King George V and Repulse were closing from the eastward and would, if the enemy held their course, make contact about 0830, half an hour after sunrise. The Repulse was short of fuel, but had just enough to fight a short action and then reach Newfoundland. By midnight all destroyers had left for Reykjavik to fuel.

The Rodney (Captain Frederick H.G. Dalrymple-Hamilton), with three destroyers, was approaching from the south-eastward and would join about 1000.

The Ramillies (Captain Arthur D. Read) was approaching from the south, steering to get to the westward of the enemy, and would make contact about 1100.

Attack by Aircraft of the Victorious

The Rear-Admiral Commanding, Second Cruiser Squadron, with his force proceeded at 28 knots on the course which would bring him soonest within 100 miles. He hoped to get near enough to launch the attack by 2100, but a short engagement with Prince of Wales caused the enemy to make ground to the westward; and became apparent that the Victorious could not be within 100 miles of them before 2300. The Rear-Admiral Commanding, Second Cruiser Squadron, therefore ordered the striking force to be flown off at 2200, some 120 miles from the objective.

The Victorious had only just commissioned. She was about to carry a large consignment of crated Hurricanes to Gibraltar, there to be assembled and flown to Malta, when she was put under my command for this operation. The only operational aircraft she had on board were nine Swordfish of 825 and six Fulmars of 820 Squadron. She had only had a week to work up and the Fulmar crews were far from fully trained. The Commanding Officer had decided that nothing less than the whole of 825 Squadron could be expected to produce any result in a torpedo attack. He realized that the Fulmars were far from ideal for shadowing, but decided to use them to maintain touch, in the hope of being able to launch another torpedo attack in the morning.

The nine Swordfish were flown off at 2210, followed at 2300 by three Fulmars and at 0100 by two more as reliefs. The weather was showery with squalls; wind north-westerly, fresh; visibility good, except during showers. Sunset was at 0052.

825 Squadron, by very good navigation and with the assistance of the ASV, located the Bismarck at 2330 and altered to the southward with the object of making their attack from ahead. The cloud was increasing and they lost touch, but after circling round for some time located the Norfolk and Prince of Wales and were redirected by the former. A few minutes later the ASV gear again indicated a ship and the squadron broke cloud to deliver their attack, only to find themselves over a United states Coastguard cutter. The Bismarck was six miles away and, observing this incident, opened H.A. barrage fire, keeping it up throughout the attack. Eight aircraft got in their attacks, the ninth losing touch in a cloud layer and failing to find the target. At least one hit was obtained.

This attack, by a squadron so lately embarked in a new carrier, unfavorable weather conditions, was magnificently carried out and reflects the greatest credit on all concerned. There can be little doubt that the hit was largely responsible for the Bismarck being finally brought to action and sunk. The value of ASV was once more demonstrated; without it, it is doubtful whether any attack would have been possible.

The Fulmars, whose object was to shadow and to distract the enemy, were less successful. Only one of each group made contact and these did not succeeding holding the enemy for long. The crews were inexperienced, some of the observers finding themselves in a two-seater aircraft for the first time, with a wireless set tuned only on deck and no homing beacon. Night shadowing is a task which tries the most experienced of crews and it is not surprising in these difficult conditions that they failed to achieve it. The utmost gallantry was shown by the crews of these aircraft in their attempt. Two of the Fulmars failed to return, but the crew of one was rescued later by a merchant vessel.

The Rear-Admiral Commanding, Second Cruiser Squadron, meanwhile, had been steaming towards the position of the Bismarck, to shorten the return journey of the aircraft. The homing beacon of the Victorious had broken down and the return of the striking force unfortunately coincided with a rain squall round the ship. They missed her in the darkness and it was necessary to home them by D/F on medium frequency and to carry out an all-round sweep with a signal projector. It was with considerable relief that the Rear-Admiral Commanding, Second Cruiser Squadron, sighted them at 0155, one hour after they were due and uncomfortably close to the end of their endurance. The homing procedure was continued for the benefit of the missing Fulmars until 0250, when the Rear-Admiral Commanding, Second Cruiser Squadron, was regretfully ordered to order the Victorious to stop it. It was by then quite dark and searchlight sweeps in waters close to the enemy, and where attacks by submarines had to be expected, were too hazardous. Course was set to close the last reported position of the enemy, in preparation for a search at dawn; this course was also considered to be the best calculated to avoid an encounter before daylight.

First Cruiser Squadron and the Prince of Wales

Throughout the afternoon the Norfolk, Suffolk and Prince of Wales continued to shadow. The enemy's alterations of course to the southward and south-eastward and their reduction of speed were all in our favor. The Rear-Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron, endeavored further to delay them, and so to assist me to intercept, by engaging the enemy from astern; but the enemy must have made an alteration of course to the south-westward while the shadowing force was temporarily out of touch, for when he did come within gun range at 1840, the Rear-Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron, found himself still on the port quarter instead of astern. A few salvoes were exchanged at long range, and the brief action had the undesirable result of forcing the enemy further to the westward, away from my force. The unreliability of the Prince of Wales' armament was demonstrated once more, as two guns again went out of action.

The Rear-Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron, considered the possibility of working to the westward of the enemy to force them towards me; but the risk of losing touch altogether was too great and he continued shadowing as before, instructing the Prince of Wales not to open fire except in response to enemy fire.

Just when the torpedo attack by the aircraft of the Victorious was developing, the shadowing ships were confused by an American Coastguard cutter, which appeared on the bearing of the enemy, and touch was again temporarily lost. It was regained at 0115, but the light was very bad and only two salvoes were fired.

By 0140 it was getting dark and the Suffolk was ordered to act independently and keep touch by R.D/F, the Commanding Officer having previously been instructed to concentrate on the Bismarck if the enemy should separate. Experience had suggested that the R.D/F of the Prince of Wales was not reliable, the R.D/F type 286 fitted in the Norfolk had the disadvantage of working on limited bow bearings only, so that she would lose touch at once if forced to turn away. The Rear-Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron, therefore, with the Norfolk and Prince of Wales, maintained a position in close support of the Suffolk.

Loss of Touch

The loss of touch, when it came, was caused primarily by over-confidence. The R.D/F had been giving such consistently good results and had been used so skillfully that it had engendered a false sense of security. The attention of the Rear-Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron, had been drawn, both by the Admiralty and by me, to the evident danger of U-Boat attack, and he had ordered the ships in company to zig-zag. The Suffolk was shadowing from the extreme range of her instrument, losing touch on those parts of her zigzag which took her furthest from the enemy. The enemy altered sharply to starboard while the Suffolk was moving to port and, by the time she got back, had gone. It is of interest that on both her last two contacts, at 0229 and at 0306, the Suffolk detected two ships; it would appear that the Prim Eugen was still in company with the Bismarck.

Search – Morning of 25th May

The Suffolk searched towards the enemy's last bearing until it became certain that they had succeeded in evading and then reported the fact (at 0401). The Commanding Officer decided that it was essential first to allow for an increase of speed, coupled with a small alteration to starboard, since failure to do so now could not subsequently be retrieved. He acted accordingly. By 1100 his curve of search had covered enemy courses up to 220°. The Rear-Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron, informed me that the enemy had probably made a 90° turn to the west, or had turned back and cut away to the eastward under the stern of the shadowers. At 0620 he detached the Prince of Wales to join me and himself searched to the westward, north of the Suffolk.

When I heard that the enemy had succeeded in breaking away from the shadowing force, it seemed probable that they would either make for an oiler or they would make for a dockyard. If the former, they would probably steer north-west towards the Davis Strait, which offered an excellent hiding-place for an oiler, or southwards towards where an oiler was suspected to be operating in about 25° 90' N., 42" W. If they were making for a dockyard port, they could steer north-east for the North Sea or south-east for Brest, the Straits of Gibraltar or Dakar. In view of the limited capabilities of the Victorious, I had insufficient forces to search all the possible courses of the enemy. I therefore decided to cover the possibility that they were joining a tanker, for these two ships, refueled, at large in the Atlantic would constitute a much more serious and immediate menace to our interests than they would, damaged, in a French or German port.

The enemy's courses west of south were being covered by the Suffolk and, to a lesser extent, by the Norfolk and the Prince of Wales. The King George V worked across to the south-westward to cover a southerly course, allowing for an increase of -speed by the enemy. Consideration was given to flying off the Walrus from the King George V to search the perimeter astern of the ship and so cover a south-easterly course of the enemy; but the swell was such that the sacrifice of the aircraft would almost certainly result, and I did not wish to expose the King George V to U-Boat attack whilst picking up the crew. Subsequent analysis shows that such a search might possibly have located the Bismarck.

The Rear-Admiral Commanding, Second Cruiser Squadron, was ordered by signal to organize an air and surface search, with the Victorious and his four cruisers, north-west of the last known position of the enemy. When I issued these instructions, I estimated that the Rear-Admiral Commanding, Second Cruiser Squadron, and the Victorious were well to the northward of this position; but in point of fact he had been steaming south at high speed and was now dose to it. It is probable therefore that the air search carried out did not extend as far as the circle on which the enemy now was, and would not have found them even if the aircraft had searched to the eastward, as the Rear-Admiral Commanding, Second Cruiser Squadron, and the Commanding Officer of the Victorious had originally intended.

This completed the immediate search, leaving a sector between north and south-east unwatched. The search was backed up to a certain extent by the ships which had been detached by the Admiralty from Various other duties and which were approaching the scene. The Rodney recovered her screen, which had earlier been forced by bad weather to drop astern, and took up an extremely well-chosen position on the route for the Bay of Biscay. The Ramillies patrolled to the southward of the King George V and Prince of Wales. The Edinburgh (flying the flag of Commodore Charles M. Blackman, DSO, Commodore Commanding, Eighteenth Cruiser Squadron), who had been patrolling off the Bay of Biscay and had been sent by the Admiralty to act as relief shadower, was near the track for Gibraltar. In addition, some degree of search was provided by the Repulse, whom I had been compelled to detach to Newfoundland for fuel, and by the London (Captain Reginald M. Servaes, C.B.E.), who had been instructed by the Admiralty to search for an enemy tanker believed to be in the area round 25° 30' N., 42° W. Force "H," some 1,300 miles to the south-eastward, had been instructed by the Admiralty to steer to intercept the Bismarck from the southward.

The track of the Bismarck as drawn on the attached strategical plot is probably reasonably accurate. It shows how narrowly she avoided contact with the various British forces during her run east. She started by crossing about 100 miles astern of the King George V at 0800 on 25th May and then passed about 50 miles from the Rodney and 45 miles from the Edinburgh. On the next day she passed 85 miles under the stern of Convoy W.S. 8B and 25 - 30 miles ahead of the Captain (D), Fourth Destroyer Flotilla, who had parted company with this convoy. It is understood that the Captain (D), Fourth Destroyer Flotilla, had disposed the convoy escort to the westward of the convoy in the hope that the Bismarck would be deflected if she appeared steaming towards it.

At 1090 on 25th May, a series of D/F bearings was received from the Admiralty which indicated that the enemy was breaking back across the Atlantic. The signals appeared to come from the same ship which had transmitted several signals soon after the T/B attack of the night before; they could therefore reasonably be attributed to the Bismarck. These bearings as plotted in the King George V, showed a position too far to the northward, which gave the misleading impression that the enemy was making for the North Sea. I broadcast this position of the enemy and instructed all Home Fleet forces to search accordingly. The Prince of Wales had not yet joined, but the course of the King George V was altered to 055°, 27 knots, to make for the Iceland-Faeroes gap.

A position of the enemy transmitted by the Admiralty made it clear that the enemy was making for a French port and had a lead of about 100 miles. The accuracy of the information which was issued by the Admiralty throughout this stage of the operation and the speed with which it was passed out were beyond praise. The situation could be clearly envisaged by all the forces concerned and I was able to preserve wireless silence.

The King George V, Rodney, Norfolk, Edinburgh and Force "H" all proceeded at their best speed towards the Bay of Biscay: and a sweep was flown in the evening by Coastal Command flying boats as far as longitude 30°° W. When this failed to locate the enemy, two cross-over patrols by flying boats were arranged to start at 1000 on 26th May, across his probable track. In addition to these forces, the Cossack (Captain (D), Fourth Destroyer Flotilla), with the Sikh (Commander Graham H. Stokes), Zulu (Commander Harry R. Graham, DSO), Maori (Commander Harold T. Armstrong, D.S.C.), And the Polish ship Piorun (Commander E. Plawski) were detached by the Admiralty from Convoy W.S. 8B early on 26th May and instructed to join and screen the King George V and the Rodney, to be joined by the Jupiter (Lieutenant Commander Norman V. J. T. Thew) from Londonderry; and the Dorsetshire (Captain Benjamin C. S. Martin), on receipt of the first enemy report, reported that she intended to leave Convoy S.L. 74, which she was escorting, and came up from the south-west to intercept and shadow.

Other Dispositions

Meanwhile, those forces which could not reach the most probable track of the enemy were moving to cover alternative possible movements. The Manchester and the Birmingham took up the Iceland-Faeroes patrol, and the Arethusa that of the Denmark Strait, with air patrols of all the northern passages to assist. The Rear-Admiral Commanding, Second Cruiser Squadron, in the Galatea, with the Victorious, Kenya, Aurora and Hermione in company, proceeded towards the Iceland-Faeroes passage, carrying out air searches on the way. The cruisers had not enough fuel left to escort the Victorious to the Bay and she could not be allowed to proceed unescorted.

Two Swordfish aircraft were lost during the air searches on 25th and 26th May; but the crew of one of them had a remarkable escape. The aircraft landed alongside a ship's lifeboat, unoccupied but complete with provisions and water, and the crew spent nine days in the boat before being picked up by a merchant vessel. One of the Fulmar crews was also rescued by a merchant vessel.

The Prince of Wales also proceeded towards Iceland; and destroyers were sent out to screen her and the Victorious. The Suffolk, after her search, was too short of fuel to steam at the high speed necessary to come up with the Bismarck; considerable forces were better placed than she was for intercepting an enemy movement to the south-eastward and the Commanding Officer considered he would be better employed covering the Victorious in the northern area, where there was nothing more powerful than a 6-in. cruiser. He therefore set course to the north-eastward until he was instructed, on 26th May, to proceed to an area in the Davis Strait south-west of Cape Farewell and search for enemy supply ships.

Two other precautions were taken by the Admiralty: The Flag Officer Commanding, North Atlantic, was instructed to arrange air and submarine patrols to prevent passage of the Straits of Gibraltar, the Nelson being sailed from Freetown to reinforce; The London was recalled from her search for a tanker and instructed to escort Convoy S.L. 75, which was approaching the area west of the Bay of Biscay.

At 1100 on 25th May, when in position 41° 30.,' 17° 10' W the Flag Officer Commanding, Force "H" (Vice-Admiral Sir James F Somerville, K.C.B., DSO) in the Renown (Captain Rhoderick R McGriggor), with the Ark Royal (Captain Loben E.H. Maund) and Sheffield (Captain Charles A.A. Larcom) in company, was instructed by the Admiralty to act on the assumption that the enemy was proceeding to Brest. Course was set for a favorable initial position and a comprehensive scheme of air search to cover all enemy speeds between 25 and 15 knots, was prepared for the following day.

No information had been received since 23rd May of the two German battlecruisers at Brest, so a security patrol was flown off in the morning to search to the west and northward in case one or both of these ships should be at sea in support of the Bismarck. Ten Swordfish were flown off at 0835 on 26th May for the first search, whose western edge was next to the flying boat patrols arranged by the Admiralty. It had been hoped to thicken the search with Fulmars, but the weather conditions rendered this impracticable. The wind was from 320° , force 7, sea rough, sky overcast, visibility 10 - 12 miles; the round down of the Ark Royal was rising and falling 56ft. And the handling of aircraft on deck was extremely difficult. While the search was in progress Force "H" proceeded to reach a position to windward, so that the operation of the aircraft would not be impeded by subsequent movements of the Bismarck, if the latter were located.

The Bismarck Located

At 1030 on 26th May, one of the Coastal Command flying boats on cross over patrol sighted and reported the Bismarck. The Flag Officer Commanding, Force "H," on receipt of this report, ordered the Ark Royal to fly off two shadowing aircraft fitted with long range tanks to gain touch, as he feared that the flying boat's position might be inaccurate in view of the weather conditions and the distance from her base. (It was, in fact about 35 miles in error.) Three-quarters of an hour after the first sighting, one of the Ark Royal's searching aircraft also located the enemy, followed shortly by another. The flying boat reported at this time that her hull had been holed by shrapnel and soon after she lost touch. The reports of the aircraft from Ark Royal placed the enemy about 20 miles north of her correct position, but this error was due to the reference position passed out by the Flag Officer Commanding, Force "H," and was corrected later in the day.

The Bismarck was shadowed continuously by aircraft from the Ark Royal for the rest of the day and excellent reports were made. Particular credit is due to the crews of these aircraft whose part, though unspectacular and often forgotten, is as important and frequently as dangerous as that of the aircraft which attack with torpedoes. The Flag Officer Commanding, Force "H," maneuvered his force throughout the day to maintain the weather gauge for flying operations, to avoid loss of bearing on the Bismarck and to keep within 50 miles of her facilitate the launching of T/B attacks. He was instructed by the Admiralty that the Renown was not to become engaged with the Bismarck unless the later was already heavily engaged by either King George V or the Rodney.

The first report of the Bismarck placed her about 130 miles south of me steering a south-westerly course at 22 knots. It was evident that she had too great a lead for the King George V to come up with her unless her speed could be further reduced or she could be deflected from her course; our only hope lay in torpedo attacks by aircraft of the Ark Royal.

Fuel

The shortage of fuel in the Home Fleet battleships was a matter of grave anxiety; the King George V had only 1,200 tons (32 per cent) remaining, and the Rodney reported that she would have to part company at 0800 the next morning. When these ships joined company later in the day they had to share an A/S screen of three destroyers - the Somali (Captain Clifford Caslon), Tartar (Commander Lionel P. Skipwith) and Mashona (Commander William H. Selby) and even these were due to leave that night for lack oil fuel. There were known to be several U-Boats in the area and it was safe to assume that every available destroyer and U-boat in the ports of western France would also be ordered to sea. The Admiralty had also warned me to expect heavy air attack. It was therefore essential to allow a sufficient reserve of fuel to enable the battleships to return to United Kingdom ports at a reasonably high speed. The loss of the Hood and the damage to the Prince of Wales had left the King George V as the only effective capital ship remaining in Home waters. I was not prepared to expose her unscreened at low speed to almost certain attack by U-boats unless there was very good prospect of achieving a result commensurate with the risk. I therefore decided that unless the enemy's speed had been reduced, the King George V should return at 2400 on 26th May to refuel.

The speed of the King George V was reduced to 22 knots at 1705 on 26th May to economize fuel, and the Rodney, who had by then been overhauled, was formed astern. I had recommended the Flag Officer Commanding, Force "H," to remain with the Ark Royal, he was maintaining his position on the beam of the Bismarck and had detached the Sheffield to shadow. The visual signal ordering this latter movement was not repeated to the Ark Royal, an omission which, as will be seen later, had serious consequences.

A striking force of 15 Swordfish, one of which had to return, was flown off at 1450; they were armed with duplex pistol set to 30 ft. instead of 34 ft., in consequence of the doubt which then existed in the Ark Royal whether the enemy ship was the Bismarck or the Prinz Eugen. The weather was particularly bad in the vicinity of the target and reliance was placed on the ASV set carried in one of the aircraft; this aircraft located a ship at 1550, about 20 miles from the expected position of the enemy, and an attack through the cloud was ordered. The ship detected was the Sheffield, of whose presence near the Bismarck the striking force was not aware, and eleven torpedoes were dropped at her. Two of the torpedoes exploded on hitting the water, and three more on crossing the wake, the remainder being successfully avoided by the Sheffield who, with great forbearance, did not fire a single round in reply.

The flying boat was still shadowing, though her reports now differed widely in position from those of the aircraft of the Ark Royal. Her signals were made on H/F and her position could not therefore be checked by D/F. She reported twice during the afternoon that she was being attacked by enemy aircraft, but these were probably shadowing Swordfish from the Ark Royal.

A second striking force of 15 aircraft was launched at 1915. Owing to the limited number of serviceable aircraft, it had been necessary to re-arm and refuel most of those which had taken part in the first attack. In view of the apparent failures with duplex pistols in the first attack, contact pistols were employed on this occasion. The striking force was ordered to make contact with the Sheffield before launching the attack and the latter was instructed to home the striking force by D/F.

The aircraft approached the Sheffield below the clouds, and then climbed to 6,000 ft. to make their final approach. The weather in the vicinity of the Sheffield appeared to be ideal for a synchronized torpedo attack, but when the aircraft came near the Bismarck, they found that she was under a cold front. A thick bank-of cloud with base about 700 ft. and top between 6,000 and 10,000 ft. was encountered and the force became split up. The torpedo attacks had therefore to be made by sub-flights or pairs of aircraft over a long period in the face of intense and accurate fire; they were pressed home with a gallantry and determination which cannot be praised too highly, One aircraft, having lost touch with his sub-flight, returned to the Sheffield for a fresh range and bearing of the enemy and went in again by himself in the face of very heavy fire to score a hit on the port side of Bismarck. At least two hits were scored, one of which so damaged the Bismarck's rudders that she was unable to keep off the wind, which was providentially was from the north-west, for any length of time; a result which the Ark Royal and her aircraft crews had well-earned and which ensured my being able to bring the Bismarck to action next morning.

When I received the first report that the Bismarck had altered course to 340° I dared not hope that it was more than a temporary alteration to avoid a T/B attack; a further report four minutes later that she was steering 000° suggested, however, that her rudders had been damaged and that she had been forced up into the wind towards the King George V and Rodney, I immediately turned towards our estimated position of the Bismarck in an endeavor to make contact in time to engage her from the eastward in the failing light. But with frequent rain squalls and gathering darkness the light conditions became too unreliable, and with no certainty of the enemy's position or of that of our own forces, but with confirmation of the damage to the enemy and the knowledge that the Fourth Destroyer Flotilla was shadowing, I decided to haul off to the north-north-eastward and work round to engage from the westward at dawn.

The Flag Officer Commanding, Force "H," had informed me that no further T/B attacks were possible that evening and that he was preparing all remaining Swordfish for a strong attack at dawn. He was instructed to keep not less than 20 miles to the southward of the Bismarck so as to be clear of my approach.

Night Shadowing and Attack by Destroyers

The Sheffield made her last enemy report at 2140 on 26th May." At this time the Bismarck turned and fired six accurate 15-in. salvoes at her, at a range of nine miles. The Sheffield turned away at full speed and made smoke, but suffered a few casualties from splinters. The turn caused her to lose touch, but shortly afterwards she made contact with the Captain (D), Fourth Destroyer Flotilla (Captain Philip L. Vian, DSO), in the Cossack, who with the Maori, Zulu, Sikh and the Polish destroyer Piorun, was approaching the Bismarck. The Captain (D), Fourth Destroyer Flotilla, as I knew he would, had decided to shadow and attack the Bismarck, instead of screening the King George V and Rodney , and was wisely proceeding at high speed, in spite of fuel shortage, to get in touch before dark. Ships were spread 2-5 miles apart at right angles to the estimated bearing of the enemy. The approximate bearing and distance of the enemy was obtained from the Sheffield, and, in view of the heavy sea running, speed was reduced and the flotilla maneuvered to avoid a high speed end-on contact.

The Bismarck was sighted by the Piorun, on the port wing, at 2238, just after the last shadowing aircraft left to return to the Ark Royal; destroyers were ordered to take up stations for shadowing; at 2242 the enemy opened a heavy fire on the Piorun, who made a spirited reply before turning away under smoke. It was evident to the Captain (D), Fourth Destroyer Flotilla, that the enemy's speed had been so seriously reduced by the torpedo bomber attack that interception by the battlefleet was a certainty, provided that the enemy could be held. He therefore decided that his main object was to keep touch and his secondary object to attack with torpedoes if he thought this would not involve the destroyers in serious losses. He ordered the destroyers to attack independently as opportunity offered.

Throughout the night and until 0845 on 27th May, when the battlefleet came into action, these destroyers maintained touch, in spite of heavy seas, rain squalls and low visibility. They were frequently and accurately engaged by the main and secondary armaments of the Bismarck, who was apparently firing by R. D/F; but by skillful handling they avoided serious damage and suffered a very small number of casualties. The four ships of the Seventh Division all delivered torpedo attacks during the night, the Cossack and Maori making two each; hits were scored by the Cossack and by the Maori, the latter's torpedo causing a fire on the forecastle of the Bismarck; the Sikh may also have scored a hit.

The Commanding Officer of the Piorun had not worked with the Fourth Destroyer Flotilla before and he therefore decided to wait until last to deliver his attack, as he did not wish to interfere with the flotilla and was not fully conversant with their methods. He had drawn the Bismarck's fire for an hour during the period of dusk, hoping that this would assist the other destroyers to get in their attacks, but after dark he retired to a distance of some six to eight miles to wait for them to finish. He had not succeeded in regaining touch with them when, at 0500, he was ordered by the Captain (D), Fourth Destroyer Flotilla, to proceed to Plymouth to fuel if not in contact with the enemy. The Captain (D), Fourth Destroyer Flotilla, knew that Commander Plawski would certainly attack the enemy as soon as he could find him; conditions as light came would not be easy and the Captain (D), Fourth Destroyer Flotilla, was concerned lest a valuable ship and a fine crew should be lost without need. The Piorun continued to search until 0600 and left an hour later.

The conduct of the night operations by these five destroyers under the Captain (D), Fourth Destroyer Flotilla, was a model of its kind. In heavy weather, frequently under fire, they hung on to their prey with the utmost determination, hit her with torpedoes and delivered her to me the next morning, without suffering damage, other than splinters, to any of their ships.

During the night the Norfolk arrived in the area and made her way round to the north-eastward of the enemy, ready to flank mark for the battleships in the morning; the Edinburgh was compelled to leave for Londonderry owing to lack of fuel (she arrived there with 5.5 per cent remaining); and the Dorsetshire was also approaching, to arrive soon after the battlefleet joined action. The King George V and Rodney worked round to the westward ready to engage at dawn.

The Bismarck was making frequent alterations of course, possibly involuntarily, and it was difficult to gauge her progress from the frequent course reports which were received. As was only to be expected with forces which had been widely separated in weather unsuitable for taking sights, considerable differences in reckoning were now apparent. I instructed destroyers to fire star shell to indicate the position of the enemy, but frequent rain squalls prevented these from being seen in the King George V, while the Captain (D), Fourth Destroyer Flotilla, reported that the reactions of the Bismarck to this practice were unpleasant. Destroyers in touch were then instructed to transmit on medium frequency so that bearings might be obtained by D/F, but some had their aerials shot away and the Zulu had a smashed deck insulator, which caused enough sparking when transmitting to illuminate the whole ship. It became evident that the relative positions were not known with sufficient accuracy for a dawn approach to be practicable. The visibility, too, was uncertain; and I decided to wait for full light.

Action of 27th May 1941

Weather: Wind - Northwest, force 8; overcast; rain squalls.

Visibility: 12 - 13 miles.

Sea and swell: 45.

Sunrise: 0722

Choice of Tactics

It was clear from the reports of the ships which had come under her fire that, in spite of the damage she had already received from guns and torpedoes, the gun armament and control of the Bismarck were not seriously affected. Everything suggested, however, that her rudders had been so seriously damaged that she could not steer; in the strong wind prevailing, she could, by working her engines, haul off the wind only for short periods. So it was possible for me to select the direction and time of my approach and close to whatever range I chose. The experience of the Fourth Destroyer Flotilla made it clear that the Bismarck had R. D/F which ranged accurately up to 8,000 yards; by day, she could range very accurately up to about 24,000 yards, either by means of the excellent stereoscopic rangefinders the Germans have always had or possibly by R. D/F.

I decided to approach with the advantages of wind, sea and light as nearly end-on as possible, so as to provide a difficult target and to close quickly to a range at which rapid hitting could be ensured. I hoped that the sight of two battleships steering straight for them would shake the nerves of the rangetakers and control officers, who had already had four anxious days and nights.

The Approach

Between 0600 and 0700, D/F bearings of a series of reports by the Maori enabled the relative position of the enemy to be deduced with reasonable accuracy. The Bismarck had settled down to a course of about 330°, at 10 knots. The horizon to the north-eastward was clear and the light good, but south of east were rain squalls and a poor background. The strong wind and heavy sea made it most undesirable to fight to windward. I decided to approach on a bearing of west-north-west and, if the enemy held his course, to deploy to the southward, engaging him on an opposite course at a range of about 15,000 yards and subsequently as events might dictate. At 0737, when the enemy bore 120°, 21 miles, course was altered to 080° to close; Rodney was stationed on a bearing of 010° and instructed not to close within six cables of me and to adjust her own bearing. The Norfolk was shadowing from the north-westward, ready to carry out flank marking for the battleships; and at 0820 she came insight and provided me with a visual link. It had been necessary to alter course on the way in to avoid rain squalls and to allow for the reported alterations of course of the Bismarck, but at 0843 she came in sight, bearing 188° , 25,000 yards, steering directly towards us, our course at this time being 110°.

The Action

The Rodney opened fire at 0847, followed one minute later by the King George V and then by the Bismarck. The Bismarck had turned to starboard to open "A" arcs, and directed her fire at the Rodney. This turn of the enemy made it look as if it would be better for us to deploy to the north-eastward, and I hoisted the signal to turn to 085° ; the Bismarck, however, almost immediately altered back to port, so the negative was hoisted and I indicated my intention to turn to 170°. The Rodney, who wished to open her "A" arcs had anticipated the hauling down of the first signal and started to alter course to port; the King George V also had altered 20° to starboard to open her distance from the Rodney; so that the ships were well separated, which was entirely in accordance with my wishes. The Bismarck's fire was accurate at the start, though it soon began to fall off; she made continual alterations of course, but it is doubtful whether these were deliberate.

The range was now 20.000 yards and decreasing rapidly, the general trend of the enemy's course being directly towards us. Shortly after our turn to the southward, the Bismarck shifted her fire to the King George V. By 0905 both the King George V and the Rodney had their secondary armaments in action. At this stage the effect of our gunfire was difficult to assess, as hits by armor-piercing shell are not easily seen; but after half an hour of action the Bismarck was on fire in several places and virtually out of control. Only one of her turrets remained in action and the fire of this and her secondary armament was wild and erratic. But she was still steaming.

Some interference from our own funnel and cordite smoke had been experienced, and at 0917 the course of the battlefleet was altered towards the enemy and right round to north, the Rodney again anticipating the signal. When the turn had been completed, the lines of fire of the King George V and Rodney were approximately at right angles; a heavy volume of fire could be produced without interference in spotting between the two ships. The Dorsetshire had been firing intermittently since 0902 from the other side of the enemy, as had the Norfolk from her flank marking position.

In order to increase the rate of hitting, the battleships continued to close, the range eventually coming down to 3,300 yards. By 1015 the Bismarck was a wreck, without a gun firing, on fire fore and aft and wallowing more heavily every moment. Men could be seen jumping overboard, preferring death by drowning in the stormy sea to the appalling effects of our fire. I was confident that the Bismarck, could never get back to harbor and that it was only a matter of hours before she would sink.

The shortage of oil fuel in the King George V and the Rodney had become acute. It was not merely a matter of having sufficient oil to reach one of our harbors: I had to consider the possibility of damage to fuel tanks by a near miss from a bomb or a hit by a torpedo; this might easily result in the ship being stopped in an area where U-boats were known to be concentrating, and where I had been warned to expect heavy air attack. Further gunfire would do little to hasten the Bismarck's end. I therefore decided to break off the action with King George V and Rodney, and instructed any ships still with torpedoes to use them on the Bismarck. The Dorsetshire anticipated my order and torpedoed the Bismarck at close range on both sides; she sank at 1037 at position 48° 09'N ., 16° 07'W. Although her sinking had been seen from the after director control tower in the King George V, the fact did not become known to me until 1100 and I informed the Flag Officer Commanding, Force "H," that I could not sink the Bismarck with gunfire; this signal (1045/27th May), which was perhaps unfortunately phrased, was addressed only to him and was intended to ensure that he should take any steps which might help to hasten her sinking; when intercepted by others, it may have caused some misunderstanding.

The Bismarck had put up a most gallant fight against impossible odds, worthy of the old days of the Imperial German Navy, and she went down with her colors still flying. The Dorsetshire picked up four officers, including the Third Gunnery Officer, and 75 ratings; the Maori picked up 24 ratings; but at 1140 the Dorsetshire sighted a suspicious object, which might have been a U-boat, and ships were compelled to abandon the work of rescue. Some of the remaining survivors may have been rescued by the Spanish cruiser Canarias.

From the information available, it appears that the Bismarck suffered three hits by gunfire on 24th May, one hit by aircraft torpedo on 25th May and two on 26th May, two hits by destroyer torpedoes early on 27th May, one by Rodney's torpedo, and the subsequent heavy pounding by gunfire. At the end of this she was in a sinking condition, and the final torpedoes from the Dorsetshire only hastened her end. A few casualties and slight damage from splinters were incurred in the Sheffield and the destroyers of the Fourth Destroyer Flotilla during the night of 26th/27th May; there were no casualties or damage to any of our ships during the subsequent day action.

In the King George V W/T transmission on power on certain wave lengths interfered with reception on R. D/F. For this reason I was unable during the action to keep the Admiralty fully informed of its progress, especially in view of the fact that I had been warned to expect heavy attack by enemy aircraft, and I did not wish to risk being fixed by D/F. The Bismarck's sinking was reported as soon as it was known and a description of the engagement was deferred until it was practicable to transmit a long signal by wireless. This limitation applies in some degree to all ships and will have to be borne in mind in the future.

Return of the Fleet

The King George V and the Rodney with the Cossack, Sikh and Zulu proceeded to the northward. The Dorsetshire and the Maori rejoined at 1230, and the screen was augmented by the Jupiter during the afternoon. Nine further destroyers had joined by 1600 the following day. Several signals were received on 28th May, indicating that air attacks on the fleet were impending, but only four enemy aircraft appeared. One of these bombed the screen without effect, while another jettisoned its solitary bomb on being attacked by a Blenheim fighter. The Mashona and the Tartar, 100 miles to the southward, were heavily attacked, the Mashona being sunk at noon, with the loss of one officer and 45 ratings; the Tartar shot down one of the attacking aircraft. The Piorun underwent six attacks by aircraft on her way back to Plymouth; all were driven off by gunfire.

The Rodney, screened by the Maori, Sikh and Columbia (Lieutenant Commander Somerville W. Davis), was detached to the Clyde at 1700; the Dorsetshire was detached to the Tyne at 2316; the King George V was delayed by fog, but eventually anchored in Loch Ewe at 1230 on 29th May. The Galatea (Rear-Admiral Commanding, Second Cruiser Squadron), Aurora and Prince of Wales arrived at Hvalfjord on 27th May, as did the Victorious; the Edinburgh (Commodore Commanding, Eighteenth Cruiser Squadron) arrived at Londonderry on 28th May and the Norfolk (Rear-Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron) at the Clyde on 29th May; Force "H" returned to Gibraltar.

Conduct of Officers and Men

Although it was no more than I expected, the co-operation, skill and understanding displayed by all forces during this prolonged chase gave me the utmost satisfaction. Flag and Commanding Officers of detached units in variably took the action I would have wished, before or without receiving instructions from me. The conduct of all officers and men of the Fleet which I have the honor to command was in accordance with the traditions of the Service. Force "H" was handled with conspicuous skill throughout the operation by Vice-Admiral Sir James F. Somerville, KCB, DSO, and contributed a vital share in its successful conclusion.

Supply of Information and Disposition of Forces

The accuracy of the enemy information supplied by the Admiralty and the speed with which it was passed was remarkable, and the balance struck between information and instructions passed to the forces out of visual touch with me was ideal. The disposition of Force "H," the Rodney and the other forces placed at my disposal, completed my own dispositions and enabled me to avoid breaking W/T silence at a time when this was particularly important.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

JACK C. TOVEY,

Admiral, Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet.

Appendix 1 to Home Fleet No. 396.H/F. 1225 of 5th July 1941

List of courses, speeds and positions: 22nd to 28th May, 1941

H.M.S. "King George V" (the Flag of the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet)

(All times are Zone minus 2)

22nd May

2307: Passed Hoxa Gate

23rd May

0800: 58° 57'N., 07° 20'W, Course 320° , 18 knots. Zigzag No. 15

0830: Recovered paravanes

1200: 59° 40'N., 08° 32' W

1500: Obs. Position 60° 17.5' N., 09° 30.0W

1536: altered course 270°

In company:

C.S.2

Galatea

Aurora

Arethusa

Kenya

Victorious

Repulse

Screen

2000: 60° 24' N., 12° 08' W

2040: Received first enemy report.

2105: altered course 295° , 25 knots. Leg zigzag.

2116: altered course 280°

2121: 27 knots

24th May

0045: Obs. Position 60° 41' N., 15° 49' W

0410: Obs. Position 60° 57' N., 18° 47' W

0740: altered course 310° to avoid H.X. 126

0755: altered course 280°

0800: 61° 17' N., 18° 08'

0810: altered course 260°

1050: altered course 240°

1200: 60° 47' ., 25° 31' W

1507: altered course 212° (Victorious and C.S. 2 detached)

1650: altered course 210°

2000: 58° 11' N., 30° 14' W

25th May

0515: 24 knots

0740: altered course 270°

0800: 54° 00'N., 35° 02' W

0830: altered course 240° (Repulse detached)

1047: altered course 030°

1056: 27 knots

1104: altered course 065°

1200: 53° 55' N., 35° 55' W

1548: altered course 113°

1612: altered course 080° , 25 knots

1735: Commenced continuous swing zigzag (U-boat area)

1810: altered course 117°

1939: Obs. Position 54° 34' N., 30° 34' W

2000: ceased zigzag

26th May

0800: 52° 11' N., 22° 39' W

1100: altered course 150°

1152: altered course 130°

1200: 51° 18' N., 20° 37' W

1313: Obs. Position 50° 58' N., 20° 00' W

1510: altered course 140°

1517: altered course 130°

1527: altered course 128°

1705: altered course 110° , 22 knots (Rodney joined)

2000: 49° 37' N., 16° 27' W

2036: 21 knots

2144: altered course 135°

2149: altered course 190°

2153: altered course 170°

2258: altered course 140°

2310: altered course 120°

2319: altered course 140°

2329: altered course 110°

2336: altered course 030°

27th May

0030: 19 knots

0108: altered course 230°

0122: altered course 270°

0221: altered course 220°

0411: altered course 180°

0501: altered course 260°

0719: altered course 190° (approach)

0723: altered course 150° together

0728: altered course 125° together

0737: altered course 080° together

0750: altered course 140° together

0759: altered course 105° together

0800: 48° 13' N., 16° 38' W

0806: altered course 085° together

0826: altered course 175° together

0833: altered course 110° together

0852: altered course 130° (Action)

0855: 17.5 knots

0859: altered course 175°

0910: swung 20° to starboard (to 195° ), 19 knots and back.

0915: altered course 150°

0917: altered course 000°

0926: altered course 310°

0930: altered course 000°

0932: 20 knots. Altered course 040°

0934: altered course 010°

0939: altered course 290°

0941: altered course 010°

0952: altered course 200°

1001: altered course to port (180° )

1006: 14 knots

1008: altered course 070°

1014: altered course 027°

1016: altered course 000°

1018: Swung to port and back.

1021: altered course 000°

1022: altered course 027° , 19 knots

Noon: 48° 33' N., 15° 44' W (Retirement)

1233: altered course 150° to secure forecastle

1303: altered course 022°

In company: Rodney, Dorsetshire, screen

1328: 17 knots

1415: altered course 037°

1419: 19 knots

1638: Obs. Position 49° 27' N., 14° 43' W

2200: Commenced zigzag No. 10 (Dorsetshire detached)

28th May

0200: altered course 007°

0800: 53° 14' N., 11° 32' W

0919: altered course 045° (More screen joined)

1100: altered course 040°

1229: Obs. Position 54° 27' N., 10° 29' W

1300: altered course 053°

1428: altered course 065° (More screen joined)

1600 Made Aran Island, Ireland and thence as requisite to Loch Ewe, arriving at gate 1227, having been delayed 6 hours by fog in the Minches. Rodney detached at 1830 on 28th May to Clyde.

HMS Suffolk Operations, 23-26 May 1941

From: The Commanding Officer, H.M.S. Suffolk

Date: 11th June 1941

Ref. No. 1706/006.

To: The Rear-Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron.

Submitted

Report on operations against the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen is being rendered as follows:

Enclosures

No. 1. Narrative

No. 2. Remarks

No. 3. Copy of previously signaled report.

No. 4. Signals made.

No. 5. Recommendations for Awards.

No. 6. Strategical Plot. (One copy only.)

No. 7. Tactical Plots.

It is regretted that, owing to the ship having been continuously at sea on other operations since the above until 9th June, only Enclosures Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 are ready and are forwarded herewith.

The others will be forwarded as soon as possible.

N. M. ELLIS,

Captain

[Enclosure No. 1 to the Commanding Officer, H.M.S. "Suffolk's" No. 1706/006, dated 11th June, 1941.]

HMS Suffolk Operations: 23rd May 1941 to 26th May 1941

Narrative (1), Friday, 23rd May, 1941,

Period on Patrol

1100 (B). Parted company from Norfolk to comply with C.S.1's 1008 (B)/23. Last fix (on land) at 1040 (B).

1425 (B). Reached main edge of ice pack, 66° 50' N., 25° 34' W. Searched thence through position 67° 06' N., 24° 27' W., to 67° 12' N., 24° 26' W., the last six miles being through broken ice.

The main ice edge ran from 66° 50' N., 25° 34' W., through 67° 05' N., 24° 46' W., to 67° 13' N., 24° 51' W., and thence out of sight approximately 070° apparently clear of Q.Z.X. 366.

Note. On 13th May the ice had drifted over most of Q.Z.X.366, breaking loose many mines of which over 70 were counted floating eastwards of the area in the next few days; but had since receded.

1810 (B). Turned through south to 1900 (B) position 67° 02' N., 24° 38' W., and set course 240°, 18 knots, clear of the broken ice.

Adjusted arc of sweep of Type 284 as requisite to cover bearings on which visibility was below 8 miles. Type 279 kept listening watch but was not used for transmitting.

At 1915 (B) the arc of sweep was made Green 40° to Red 170°, there being mist between those bearings which, however, was tending to clear ahead and extend northwards.

Period from Sighting Enemy until 2359 (B)/23

Phase 1922 (B) to 2028 (B) . (Tactical Plot Diagram 1)

1922 (B). Sighted Bismarck, followed by a large cruiser (Prinz Eugen), bearing 020° (Green 140°), 7 miles, course 240°; Suffolk's position 66° 59' N., 24° 51' W.

Made first sighting report on 210 kc/s, 8,290 kc/s, 500 kc/s and 138 kc/s.

1923 (B). Full speed ahead; altered course to 150° to take cover in the mist, and to make for gap between Q.Z.X. 241 and Q.Z.X. 363 if unable to round Q.Z.X. 363 while keeping out of sight.

1930 (B). Altered course to mean course 210°, and adjusted speed as requisite, to round the north-west end of Q.Z.X. 363 while keeping in the mist, which proved possible.

1934 (B) to 2023 (B). Obtained Type 284 ranges and bearings as requisite. Those used for making deductions of enemy's position, course and speed are shown on the tactical plot.

Note. The bearings shown on the tactical plot herewith have been corrected to "mid-bearings," though at the time those taken at 1944 and 1953 were actually "right cut-off bearings" and were plotted without correction to mid-bearing; the consequent error being 5° and 3° respectively. The 1934 and 2023 bearings were observed (accurate) mid-bearings, and reported and plotted as such.

The plot gave enemy's initial speed as 20 knots (period 1922-1934); and his speed by 1953 as 28 knots (period 1934-1953).

2000 (B). Having rounded Q.Z.X. 363, maneuvered as requisite to work unseen on to enemy's port quarter.

2017 (B). Altered course 310° to steer out of the mist to sight the enemy.

Reports. Made reports at 1922, 1934, 1948, 1957, 2024 and 2026 during the above phase; all except the 1922 (first-sighting) report being based on information from Type 284.

Phase 2028 (B) to 2258 (B). (Tactical Plot Diagrams II and III)

2028 (B). Re-sighted enemy, bearing 265°, 10 miles; and at once hauled round through north and east to open the range and regain the mist.

2031 (B). Bismarck opened fire, possibly not at Suffolk.

2033 (B). Altered course to shadow from fine on the port quarter. Enemy was too close to the ice to be able to break back to starboard undetected.

2043 (B). Emerged from the mist and reported the enemy in sight bearing 250°, 14 miles. Shadowed by sight from 15 miles to 18 miles distance, gradually working astern of an enemy whose mean course was now 220°, 28 knots.

2152 (B). Enemy altered course to starboard in the edge of a distant rainstorm.

2154 (B). Enemy bearing 231° momentarily observed at inclination 0° or 180°, looking more like the latter. It was thought he might be abandoning his operation and steering back the way he had come.

Altered course at once to keep well ahead of enemy, should this be the case; intending to make for the gap between Q.Z.X.366 and the ice where, by use of gunfire and smoke and by simulating torpedo fire, the enemy might be diverted into the minefield.

2158 (B). As by 2158 the enemy had not emerged from the rainstorm, it was concluded that he had not reversed course but had resumed his previous course, and Suffolk altered course to 230° to continue shadowing from astern.

Enemy remained out of sight, in the rainstorm, until 2254.

Reports. Made reports at 2046, 2116, 2129, 2152, 2209 and 2214 during the above phase.

Phase 2258 (B) to 2359 (B). (Tactical Plot Diagram IV)

2258 (B). Re-sighted enemy bearing 232°, 18 miles (course 232°).

2258½ (B). Enemy firing, possibly at aircraft to northward, where occasional distant white smoke puffs had been appearing in the clear sky at intervals for some 40 minutes.

2258 (B) to 2341 (B). No change; enemy being kept in sight. Plot showed enemy course and speed to be 230°, 28 knots.

2341 (B). Enemy bearing 232°, 18 miles. Enemy altered course 20° to port as he disappeared into some mist. (Reported.)

2343 (B). Enemy momentarily re-sighted bearing 230°, making white smoke.

2346 (B). Enemy momentarily re-sighted bearing 226°.

2350 (B). Very large puff of white smoke shot some 300 ft. into the air, bearing 221°; indicating when plotted that the enemy had altered course some 50° to port in all (not reported), but possibly now altering back to starboard.

2352 (B). Enemy momentarily re-sighted, steering 200°, 28 knots, and then disappeared into distant snowstorm. (Reported.)

Suffolk followed at 29½ knots to gain R.D/F contact.

Norfolk approximately ten miles to port of Suffolk, out of sight (from her 2311 (B)/23).

Reports. Made reports at 2258, 2306, 2341, 2349 and 2359 (B)/23, and at 0009 (B)/24, of events during above phase.

Saturday, 24th May, 1941

Phase 0001 (B) to 0321 (B). (Tactical Plot Diagrams IVA and V)

0015 (B). Entered snowstorm; mean course 200°. Visibility until 0315 averaged one mile.

0028 (B). Suffolk's position 65° 39' N., 28° 01' W., course 200°, speed 29 ½ knots.

0037 (B). Altered course to 180° to avoid detached ice floes (these being an indication that the main edge of the ice pack was no far to leeward).

0053 (B). Resumed course 200°.

0113 (B). Altered course to 220° to close to within R.D/F (Type 284) range of the main edge of the ice, so as to preclude the enemy doubling back undetected to starboard, and also to move fine on to the enemy's starboard quarter, Norfolk being (from her position reports) to port.

0151 (B). Resumed course 200°.

0246 (B). Type 284 gained contact with one ship.

0247 (B). One ship "right cut-off bearing" 180°, 19,200 yards; presumed from the range to be a battleship. (This bearing was initially plotted without correction to "mid-bearing," error 5°, bit was subsequently corrected before enemy course and speed deductions were made.)

0252 (B). Enemy "mid-bearing" 192°, 17,400 yards. Altered course and speed as requisite to open and maintain the range at ten miles, shadowing by Type 284.

0256 (B). Type 284 gained contact with second ship. Both ships now presumed to be the enemy.

0257 (B). Enemy "mid-bearing" 192° , battleship 19,800 yards and cruiser 17,500 yards. Deduced course from plot 240°, 28 knots.

0315 (B). Visibility rapidly improving.

0319 (B). Enemy battleship "mid-bearing" 188°, range 24,000 yards, cruiser 185°, 22,500 yards. Deduced course 235°, 27½ knots (but reported 240°, 28 knots).

0321 (B). Sighted enemy bearing 185°, 12 miles, course 240°.

Reports. Made reports at 0028, 0101, 0131, 0231, 0247, 0256, 0319 and 0321 during the above phase.

Phase 0321 (B) to 0550 (B). (Tactical Plot Diagrams V, VI and VII)

0325 (B). Enemy appeared to be altering course to starboard, so circled to northward to open the range to 15 miles, and continued shadowing by sight from enemy's starboard quarter. (Norfolk known, and B.C.S. assumed to be to port of enemy).

Note. During the turn at 0325 the wind, now force 6, carried away the securing gear of the controls of the only aircraft on board, which was on the catapult, causing damage necessitating extensive repairs which took some days to complete. The aircraft was thus wholly unserviceable at a time when it might have been of decisive value.

0330 (B). Appreciated that enemy's alteration of course at 0325 must have been a small one to port, not a large one to starboard, though appearances had at first suggested the latter. Enemy's new course proved from the plot to be 220°, 27½ knots.

0332 (B). Set courses (200°-230°) and speed as requisite for shadowing from 15-16 miles on enemy's starboard quarter. Enemy sometimes obscured, but visibility gradually increasing.

0447 (B). Enemy bore 186°*, 15 miles, course 220°, speed 27-28 knots and bore 196° at 0456 (B).

0520 (B). Enemy bore 203°, 15 miles, possibly increasing speed; and shortly afterwards altered course 30° to port and then back to starboard.

0542 (B). Received Norfolk's 0541 reporting sighting enemy, followed by Prince of Wales' 0537 and Hood's 0543. The mean of these placed the enemy some 280°, 14 miles from Suffolk's plot position, and sights obtained shortly afterwards confirmed this. As, however, the Battle Cruiser Squadron was now in touch with the enemy, no amending position report was made at this point.

Enemy appeared to be approaching, and in case he had reversed course at 0538 (being "turned" by the Battle Cruiser Squadron), Suffolk circled to keep northward of enemy. It was soon realized, however, that the enemy was not approaching, the appearance being due to mirage, which also explains the similar (false) appearances at 0325.

Reports. Made reports at 0447, 0456, 0522, 0533 and 0538 during the above phase.

Phase 0550 (B) to 0851 (B)

0550 (B). Suffolk's course 220°, 29 knots, following the enemy.

0553 (B). Heavy gun flashes bearing 185°. Half a minute later Bismarck opened fire to port.

0556½ (B). Prinz Eugen opened fire to port.

0559 (B). Hood blew up.

0600 (B). Enemy bore 208°.

0605 (B). Course and speed as requisite to keep on enemy's starboard quarter.

0612 (B). Firing ceased, except for some A.A. fire by Bismarck. During the action three hits were observed on Bismarck from the heavy ships' fire.

0615 (B) and 0616 (B). Enemy (bearing 210°) altered course to starboard.

0616 (B). Although the plot showed the enemy to be outside gun range, Prinz Eugen appeared at this time to be closing (now realized probably due to mirage), and at the same time Type 284 reported an echo at range 19,000 yards while trained on the Prinz Eugen.

0619 (B). Opened fire (six broadsides) using Type 284 range (initially 19,400 yards).

0623 (B). Type 284 ranges started decreasing rapidly.

0624 (B). Type 284 range 12,400 yards. Ceased fire as there was clearly something wrong.

A large aircraft had just been sighted closing the ship from the enemy's direction, which turned across the line of fire at about six miles distant at 0624½, and it was then appreciated that this aircraft (not showing I.F.F.) was the object on which Type 284 had been ranging while trained on the enemy.

0629 (B). Bismarck bore 206°, Prinz Eugen bore 208°, 18 miles, course 240°.

Enemy then appeared to be altering course. Circled to northward to maintain distance.

0638 (B)-0734 (B). Course and speed as requisite for following enemy in general direction 210°, at 18 miles distance, and for working on to his starboard quarter, Norfolk being (from her reports) to port.

*Not 184° as incorrectly given in Suffolk's 0447.

0734 (B). Enemy bore 186° ; Bismarck appearing to be on fire and losing fuel, which left a broad track for miles. Speed apparently 22 knots, later increasing to 26 knots.

0814 (B). Enemy making large alterations of course and emitting considerable smoke.

0837 (B). Bismarck bore 193°, 18 miles, Prinz Eugen 195°, 19 miles ; course 205°, 28 knots.

0851 (B). Adjusted plot to 0800 Reference Position received at 0832 from C.S. One, the transfer being 290°, 20½ miles.

Reports. Made reports at 0629, 0756, 0757, 0814, 0819, 0824, 0826 and 0837 during above phase. The first two of the above contained minor errors (2-3 miles) in own position given.

Phase 0851 (B) to 1757 (B)

Continued shadowing from 15-20 miles on enemy's starboard quarter.

0909 (B). Enemy bore 202°, 20 miles, course 205°, speed 24 knots, making fairly frequent small turns.

1044 (B). Enemy bore 214°, 17 miles, course 215°, speed 24 knots, making good 220°, 22 knots.

1150 (B). Lost sight of enemy in decreasing visibility. Started Type 284 sweeping and proceeded to close the enemy and take up a position from which to detect any break away to starboard.

Norfolk's 1205, 1323, 1349 and 1514 showed she had the enemy still in sight, and that the enemy had turned south to 180°.

Adjusted plot to 1531 Reference Position from C.S. One ; transfer 226°, 11½ miles, at 1531 (Norfolk bearing 082°, 11 miles), pending receipt of amended signal ; and a further 271°, 4½ miles at 1711.

1609 (B). Type 284 reported contact, 140°, 21,000 yards, with one ship.

1616 (B). Type 284 reported contact with second ship.

1622 (B) - 1700 (B). Type 284 temporarily out of action. Visibility clearing from north-westward. Opened out distance from enemy.

1711 (B). Re-sighted both enemy ships right ahead.

1716 (B). Norfolk in sight bearing 076°, 12 miles.

1757 (B). Norfolk in sight bearing 075°, 10 miles, and Prince of Wales 077°.

Reports. Made reports at 0909, 0932, 1016, 1029, 1037, 1044, 1045, 1213, 1609, 1616, 1642, 1712, 1716 and 1734 during above phase.

Phase 1757 (B) to 2359 (B)

1803 (B). Enemy bearing 145°, 15 miles, course 190°, disappeared into mist, and a few minutes later white smoke to westward of that bearing was seen.

1834½ (B). Type 284, now sweeping, reported contact ahead at 20,400 yards.

1835 (B). Increased speed and altered course to eastward to open the range and to comply with C.S. One's 1823 (B), received at 1834.

Since 1803 the enemy had made good 235° (10 miles), apparently attempting, in the mist, to waylay Suffolk approaching from a clear direction.

1839 (B). Sighted Bismarck bearing 190°, 10 miles, course 240°.

1841 (B). Bismarck opened fire.

1842 (B) - 1846 (B) and 1851 (B) - 1855 (B). Maneuvered and made smoke as necessary to avoid gunfire and then to comply with C.S. One's 1823 (B), the nearest enemy salvo falling 100 yards short and right with one or two shots close enough to start rivets in an after W.T. compartment by under-water concussion.

Fired 9 broadsides in return- three to starboard, three to port and three to starboard, all spread for line ; the third of which straddled at G.R. 21,125 yards (Type 284, range 20,700 yards).

Blast from "B" turret shattered all the glass and blew away parts of the flimsy covering fitted to the bridge in 1940 in lieu of the previous windscreens, so that the wind and spray now drive straight in over the coaming.

1856 (B). Prinz Eugen opened fire, which was returned with three broadsides at G.R. 27,500 - 28,900 yards.

1900 (B). Continued shadowing enemy, who had resumes course 180° during the above engagement, while conformingly generally to C.S. One's movements, Bismarck being only occasionally visible, beyond the cruiser.

Suffolk was now on the enemy's port quarter, in consequence of the enemy's westward movement from 1805-1835 and of own subsequent maneuvers.

2015 (B). Adjusted plot to 2000 reference position received at 2013 (B) from C.S. One. Transfer 193°, 11 miles.

2312 (B). From Type 279 contact (showing I.F.F.) reported to C.S. One Victorious' striking force approaching from 124° as friendly. (Distance 14 miles, aircraft flying low).

Reports. Made reports at 1839, 1858, 1923, 1937, 1939, 2234 and 2327 ; reports by V/S to C.S. One only at 1909, 1921, 2205, 2217, 2233, 2327, 2330 and 2332, during above phase.

Sunday, 25th May, 1941

Phase 0001 (B) to 0600 (B)

0007 (B). Enemy A.A. gun-flashes bearing 222° indicated that the air attacks on Bismarck had begun.

0014 (B) - 0018 (B). C.S. One hoisted "enemy in sight 212°" and "Open fire." Suffolk could not immediately identify the target, and then the A.D.P. reported a "merchant ship" in sight bearing 205°. Owing to the uncertainty, fire was not opened. (The bridge did not see this vessel).

0112 (B). As dusk was coming on, proceeded ahead to gain R.D/F contact with the enemy, in accordance with C.S. One's 2145/24. Enemy's course now 160°.

Decision, which lay between simply closing the enemy's port quarter (as was done) and working round to his starboard quarter, was based on the Suffolk's being already 40° on the enemy's port quarter at 15 miles range,* upon uncertainty as to the visibility westward of the enemy against the light horizon, and upon the time factor.

0124 (B). Type 284 detected one vessel bearing 215°, 21,000 yards.

0130 (B). A brief engagement took place between Prince of Wales (now following Suffolk) and the Prinz Eugen, bearing 210°, the latter having hauled over to port. The German's fire was from two turrets only and was a long way short. On his retiring, Type 284 lost contact.

0210 (B). Adjusted plot by the amount of the difference between Norfolk's reported 0122 (B) position and her visible position relative to Suffolk. Transfer 232°, 9½ miles.

0213 (B). Type 284 contact 195°, 22,000 yards.

0225 (B). Deduced enemy's course 160°, 20 knots.

0229 (B). Both ships "mid-bearing" 192°, 20,900 yards (cruiser) and 25,500 yards (battleship) respectively. Set course parallel to the enemy.

0236 (B). Having established the enemy's position, course and speed, decided to resume zig-zagging in view of the lightness of the night and of own now comparatively moderate speed.

Night visibility at this time was about six miles.

*Wrongly reported to C.S. One as 20 miles at 0110.

0306 (B). Re-established Type 284 contact. No change.

Zig-zagged 30° out for ten minutes, and back, during which time Type 284 contact was lost.

0326 (B) - 0401 (B). Searching towards enemy's last bearing, until it became certain he had either turned round to starboard and worked eastwards under the stern of the shadowers, or he had altered course south-westward to draw ahead and away.

This took rather long to conclude, partly because of the onset of fatigue (Suffolk have been steaming at considerable speed either in pilotage waters or following the enemy for four consecutive nights), and partly because night R.D/F tactics were still only experimental.

0401 (B) - 0600 (B). Decided it was essential to search first towards likely enemy courses 180° to 200°, since failure to do so now would not be subsequently retrievable ; and acted accordingly, reporting the situation at 0401 (B) and 0441 (B) and confirming contact lost at 0505 (B).

Remainder of Sunday, 25th May, and Monday, 26th May, 1941

0610 (B)/25. Having proposed a curve of search westwards at 0600, proceeded as ordered in C.S. One's 0605 to cover more westerly enemy courses.

1120 (B)/25. By 1100 had covered all enemy courses up to 220° at 22 knots, and was about to report these clear when Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet's 1047 (B)/25 was received.

Proceeded towards position ordered.

1600 (B)/25. Not having yet located the enemy, decided to search towards the Faroes-Iceland passage rather than towards the French ports for the following reasons:

This would also cover Victorious, who had only 6 in. cruiser escort; it being thought feasible for the enemy to send one or more 8 in. cruisers or "pocket battleships" (possibly with destroyers and minesweepers) to meet a retreating ship near the Faeroes. At that time there was no heavy British ship anywhere near that area.

There were considerable forces (including Force "H") better placed than Suffolk for intercepting retreat south-eastwards, but none except Victorious and escort and two 6 in. cruisers for intercepting or over-taking retreat north-eastwards.

Suffolk's long distance from the nearest possibly overtaking point south-eastwards.

1158 (B)/26. Concluded this operation and reversed course on receipt of Admiralty's 1015 (B)/26th May.

N.M. ELLIS

[Enclosure No. 2 to the Commanding Officer, H.M.S. Suffolk's No. 1706/006, dated 11th June, 1941.]

Remarks: Intentions and Reasons for Action Taken

These are indicated in the narrative, except the following:

On Friday, 23rd May, afternoon, the atmospheric conditions were unusual, being clear over and close to the ice and misty between the ice and the land. Suffolk took advantage of this to move much further across the top of the minefield, in investigating the ice as ordered by C.S. One's 1008(B)/23/5, than would otherwise have been prudent.

The effect of mirage, making a hull-down ship occasionally appear hull above the horizon, will be noted. The appearance which it caused led me to two or three times into what was perhaps over-caution about maintaining distance. This would be undesirable unless at least two shadowers were present, as contact might easily be so lost.

R.D/F Type 284 is used in preference to Type 279 for tactical range and bearing finding, since the limit of the R.B. Unit L.10 on Type 279 is only 14,000 yards, and its bearing discrimination is less precise. Also, there is less conflict between the calls of gunnery and tactics upon the Type 284 than there is between those of tactics and air lookout upon Type 279.

What is really wanted, however, is a separate tactical set, with a mast-head position; of power sufficient to ensure R.D/F contact outside effective enemy gun range.

A separate report will be rendered on the technique evolved for accurate (± ½°) bearing finding, and for fixing the ship's position on the land.

Fixes at 15 miles, accurate to within one mile, have been regularly obtained off the steep-to and high coast of Iceland and landfall was made on Baccalieu Island and Cape St. Francis, Newfoundland, at 15 miles by this means when proceeding there to fuel after this operation, giving a precise fix.

The primary difficulty in R.D/F work on unseen objects is being sure of each object's identity. Constant and accurate plotting of successive contacts is essential (and this applies to Type 279 reports of aircraft, also) for identifying the respective movements of more than one object on similar bearings.

Its other principle limitation, especially for night work, is that its scan is not an all-round view but the view of a very limited arc, at any one moment. A nice balance between keeping contact with one object and sweeping round for others is necessary, but not easy to achieve. (For Type 284 sweep in Suffolk, 60° a minute has been found a suitable rate of sweep.)

The outstanding lesson learned from Suffolk's failure to maintain R.D/F contact on the early morning of 25th May is to keep (visibility permitting) at least 25 per cent. inside the extreme R.D/F range of the object being shadowed ; and to reduce own departure from a course and speed similar to the enemy's as much as possible.

Enemy Interference with R.D/F and W/T

No interference with R.D/F or W/T was experienced at all during the operations.

On two occasions, 4½ hours and 20 minutes respectively, before encountering the enemy, there was a litter ephemeral interference on Type 279, taking the form of an interlaced or wavy line on the elliptical trace. The amplitude maxima were on bearing which were about at right-angles to the then probable direction of the enemy, and which pointed towards the W/T stations at Reykajavik and Bolungarvik. On the whole, I think this interference was internal, not external ; and even if external it is most unlikely to have had anything to do with Bismarck or Prinz Eugen.

Nothing similar occurred on Type 284 at any time.

Bridge and Air Defense Position

These positions in Suffolk are the worst I have known in any ship. A loss of up to 25 per cent efficiency of the bridge and look-out personnel occurs when steaming into the wind or sea, especially when officers and men are already fatigued.

A separate report will be rendered if, as I fear will be the case, the efforts now being made by the ship's staff to improve matters are not successful.

N.M. ELLIS

HMS Norfolk's Gunnery and RDF During Operations Against Bismarck

From: The Rear-Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron,

Date: 7th June, 1941.

To: The Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet

No. K.856/196

The following remarks on gunnery and R.D.F. during the operations against the Bismarck are forwarded, separate from my report, while the events are still fresh in my memory.

Gunnery

German Gunnery

The first impression of the sinking of the Hood is naturally that the German gunnery is very good from which it is but a short step to the thought that it is better than ours. I feel sure that a close analysis of these incidents will show this conclusion to be false.

I do not know what Suffolk was able to observe, but from the Norfolk the enemy's fire was seen on the following occasions:-

2030 on 23rd May

The enemy was met on a closing and opposite course. Norfolk had time to turn away before the first salvo from the 8-in cruiser fell. It fell close on the port quarter and splinters hit "X" turret. I saw this salvo fall and it appeared to me as a broad wall of smoke and water at right angles to our line of fire, and I think that the spread for range and line was very small. On our side of this, the water was pocked with fragments and one complete burnished shell made what I think was its second bounce 50 yards our side of the salvo and ricocheted over the bridge.

Two or three other salvos were fired. I only saw one, and that was very compact and fell astern fine on the starboard quarter when we had turned away and were hidden by our smoke. The range was 12,000 to 14,000 yards.

Action with Hood and Prince of Wales

Both ships seemed to straddle early, but after Hood sank, Prince of Wales sustained the fire of both enemy ships with remarkably little damage but for the unlucky hit on the bridge. As the range came down to 15,000, this points to very poor shooting.

At the end, Prince of Wales had a spread of 2,000 yards at least and was going short. Her shots were evenly spaced out along the spread.

1830 on 24th May

At 20,000 yards Bismarck fired on Suffolk. Her salvos fell short and had a large spread. She shifted her fired but Prince of Wales thought she was not fired at. Three salvos were seen from Norfolk to fall short. Prince of Wales' second salvo appeared a good straddle, and the range was over 30,000 yards.

0115 on 25th May

Prince of Wales fired two salvos by R.D.F. The reply consisted of a single gun salvo and then a 4-gun salvo, both a long way short. Range was about 16,000 yards and Prince of Wales fired some time before the reply.

27th May

The condition of the enemy by this time both as regards morale and material was probably low; at any rate he did not succeed in hitting our ships, though I should say he was not hit himself for several salvos.

In the early stages I thought that the fire of King George V and Rodney was good and Bismarck was soon straddled.

I think that these instances show that except for the opening stages of the action with Hood the enemy's shooting was distinctly poor. No doubt with practice in the use of R.D.F. and realistic training in range-finding we can improve the accuracy of our opening ranges, but I feel most emphatically that the spectacular loss of Hood should not be allowed to lead to an over-estimation of the enemy's efficiency.

Flank Markings

Norfolk could have flank marked on 24th May and attempted to do so on 27th May. Her team lacked experience and I fear the results were not of great value. I feel it is important that all cruisers should have a well-drilled and experienced flank-marking system, and that when firings are taking place at Scapa ships should go out and flank mark even if the results are not used.

R.D.F.

Norfolk had just been fitted with type 286M, which had given trouble; it was working during the operations, though it had to be carefully nursed as all spare valves had been used.

It failed to detect the enemy on 23rd May when first met by Norfolk. Range must have been less than 14,000 yards. It was useful for keeping in touch with Prince of Wales and Suffolk during the night of 24th/25th May, though these ships were never actually out of sight.

Should the enemy turn on his pursuers when being shadowed from the quarter by a ship using this set, the shadower must act at once, but in turning away he loses R.D.F. touch astern and is very liable to get caught or retire too far.

Enemy R.D.F.

I was always wondering if the enemy were using R.D.F. to locate us, but I have the feeling that his R.D.F. is linked with his gun control and does not search independently. Otherwise the cruiser should have been prepared for us at 2030 on 23rd and on various other occasions when clearing visibility brought us in sight at ranges from 8 to 13 miles. That he does fire at unseen targets is shown by the experience of the aircraft and destroyers when actually fired at under those conditions.

This was, I fancy, the first occasion that R.D.F. has been used for shadowing and the supreme value of it for this purpose cannot be over emphasized. Suffolk made good use of it but I think the long ranges she obtained during the day must have made her a little over-confident during the night when she must have been near the limit of the R.D.F. range. This left no margin to cover a sudden change of course of the enemy such as was likely during the dark hours. Unless it brings the shadower within effective gun range of her quarry, it is considered that at night touch should be kept within 25 per cent of the ascertained R.D.F. range in hand.

W.F. WAKE-WALKER,

Rear Admiral

HMS Prince of Wales' Gunnery Aspects of the Bismarck Pursuit

From: The Commanding Officer, H.M.S. Prince of Wales

Date: 12th June, 1941. No. 3 D./001B.

To: The Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet.

Herewith is forwarded a "Gunnery Appendix" to the ship's narrative of events which occurred during the ship's engagement with Bismarck.

The following enclosures are attached:

Form S.1146 (f). Summary of Salvoes Fired

F/C Signals received from Hood prior to First Action

Report on events which occurred in 14-in Turrets - 23rd to 25th May

Two Track Charts showing track of Prince of Wales and probable track of Bismarck, with Fall of Shot as they were spotted in Prince of Wales.

J.C. LEACH

Captain

Gunnery Narrative of Events

Events prior to First Action

Thursday, 22nd May. B.C.1 indicated the gunnery policy to Prince of Wales in the following signal:-

"If enemy is encountered and concentration of fire is required, the policy will be G.I.C.; if ships are spread when enemy is met, they are to be prepared to flank mark described in H.W.C.O. 26."

A range and inclination exercise was carried out with Hood during the forenoon and R.D.F. sets worked well.

Friday, 23rd May. Another range and inclination exercise was carried out during the forenoon with R.D.F. Sets again working well.

During the afternoon the 14-in. cages were loaded as is described in Enclosure (III).

Events during First Action

24th May. Enemy was sighted at 0537, range about 38,000 yards. The similarity between the two enemy ships was amazing and with the smaller ship "nearer," it was difficult at first to distinguish which was Bismarck.

This difficulty was evidently experienced in Hood as B.C.1 signaled GSB/337/L1 at 0549 (engage left-hand ship bearing 337° ), followed by GOB1 (shift target one ship right) just before opening fire.

The ships were at an inclination of about 130° and Gunnery and Spotting Officers in the fore D.C.T. both agreed at the time that at long range Prinz Eugene (sic) looked exactly like Dunkerque when "X" and "Y" turrets were "merged" into the after superstructure.

The rangefinders failed to develop a satisfactory range plot before opening fire; the fore D.C.T. 15-ft rangefinder was the only rangefinder which had a reasonable chance; the closing rate was very high and "A" and "B" rangefinders were able to see the enemy's superstructure for a short time only before "table turning." Conditions for ranging on the enemy's masts were not easy. As a result it required two down ladders to find the target.

No results were obtained from either Type 281 or 284 R.D.F.; it is understood that Signal School Officers are now of the opinion that Type 281 suffered interference and Type 284 was defective, although it appeared at the time that 284 was also suffering from interference.

Fire was opened at 0553, half a minute after Hood. A list of fire control signals made prior to opening fire is attached, as is also the zone time of each salvo fired by Prince of Wales on Form S.1148(f) with the number of guns fired in each salvo.

Salvoes 1 and 2 were spread for line, salvo 1 falling right and salvo 2 in line over. Salvoes 3 and 4 were fired as a down ladder and fell over. Salvoes 5 and 6 were fired as a further down ladder; 5 fell over and 6 straddled. It had been decided after Prince of Wales' last firing to use a 200-yard as opposed to a 100-yard zigzag, as the spreads were in the nature of 350 yards. Accordingly salvoes 7 and 8 were fired as a 200-yard zigzag about salvo 6's range. Both 7 and 8 were observed as over and salvoes 9 and 10 were fired as a regaining down ladder. Salvo 9 was seen to straddle, 10 short, and salvoes 11 and 12 were fired as a 200-yard zigzag about salvo 9's range. Both of these were spotted as short, and salvoes 13 and 14 were fired as a regaining ladder up: 13 appeared to straddle, 14 went over, and a further zigzag was fired with salvoes 15 and 16 about salvo 13's range; both of these appeared as short and salvoes 17 and 18 were fired as an up regaining ladder. The fall of shot of these salvoes is not certain, but it is probably that they went short; evidence of the Rate Officer's observations and settings and the fall of shot points to the fact that the enemy started altering away gradually at about salvo 14. Line was held throughout. A large line spread appeared temporarily in salvoes 11 and 12 and one or two shots fell ahead during this time. Spreads for elevation are not known, but it is thought that salvoes 17 and 18 were ragged as the ship was under full wheel at the time; the ship was listing heavily and it is known that there was considerable movement on both elevation and training pointers.

The true range on opening was 25,000 yards. The true range on ceasing fire was 14,500 yards.

No hits were observed, but it is likely from results observed that fire was effective between salvoes 5 and 16.

When the Fore Director was wooded during the turn away after salvo 18, the main switch in the T.S. was put over to after director. This director was also unable to see the enemy due to the ship's smoke screen, and the Officer of "Y" turret, using his own initiative, went into local control and fired three salvoes as he was able to see under the smoke.

The fall of shot of these three salvoes is uncertain.

"Y" turrets' shell ring jammed during the turn away and the turret was out of action until 0825, as has been described in Enclosure (III).

The 5.25-in. armament opened fire at a range of 18,600 yards. After firing a deflection triple, a 15-in. shell passed through the superstructure supporting the H.A. directors.

The shot caused the director to jam temporarily in training and the Control Officer of the latter ordered all turrets to go into "aft control." This was carried out, but about the same time a 15-in. shell burst on the boat deck and seriously upset the after starboard H.A. director. The crew of this director had already been considerably blasted by "Y" turret firing on a forward bearing. The 15-in. shell burst threw the Control Officer off his feet, broke his telephone lead, and a splinter hit his earphones and very slightly wounded him. By the time he had regained control of the situation, the target was lost behind smoke astern.

A careful inquiry has been held into the reason why the fore H.A. director jammed and no satisfactory explanation has been arrived at; the director was found to be "free" after the action and it is possible that the locking bolt jumped down and the Control Officer was too hasty in ordering "after control." This fact has not, however, been proved and it is also possible that the severe shaking the director had caused it to "bind" temporarily in training.

Events during Second Action

24th May. Fire was opened at Bismarck at 1846 at a range of 30,300 yards. The table was tuned to ranges obtained from the fore D.C.T. rangefinder and "fine inclination spotting rules" were adopted, each double salvo being spread one unit apart. Salvoes 1 and 2 both fell right; salvoes 3 and 4 were fired as a further line bracket and both fell in line and short. UP 800 was ordered and salvoes 5 and 6 were fired spread one unit apart. Both these appeared in line and over; the range was then 33,000 yards and check fire was ordered. Prince of Wales then turned towards and opened fire again at 1853.5, with salvoes 7 and 8 fired as a deflection double with the table re-tuned to the fire D.C.T. rangefinder. "Y" turret was not bearing after salvo 6. Again, both these appeared right, and salvoes 9 and 10 were fired as a further line bracket. Both appeared in line and short; UP 800 was ordered and salvoes 11 and 12 were fired spread one unit apart; 11 was observed right and 12 over. Fire was then ordered to be checked by C.S.1 as the enemy turned away and there was a danger of forcing him westward.

It is understood that one of these salvoes was observed to "straddle" by Norfolk.

Events during the Third Action

25th May. One double salvo was fired at 0131 at a range of 20,000 yards at an enemy ship which might have been Bismarck or Prinz Eugen. A good R.D.F. range was obtained but the target was then lost in funnel smoke and mist and fire could not be continued.

It is possible that a hit was obtained from these two salvoes as in addition to enemy gun flashes, a different type of explosion was seen at the same time as shots were due to fall. The splashes of our own salvoes were not seen due to the visibility.

Notes on Enemy Gunnery

Spreads. The small size of the enemy spreads was remarkable. The driving bands of the 15-in. projectile discovered in Prince of Wales are in a perfect state of repair and appear tougher and larger than those of our shell. Although this may assist the accurate ranging of their guns, it is likely that such driving bands cause the guns to wear more quickly.

Method of Fire. Bismarck appeared to fire the whole of her fore group (i.e. "A" and "B" turrets), followed by the whole of her aft group ("X" and "Y" turrets). Towards the end of the morning action, guns in a group were definitely observed to "ripple" as if one or more turrets were in gunlayers' firing.

All enemy cruisers and capital ships appear to have their large rangefinders mounted considerably higher than in our ships. Provided vibration can be eliminated, this fact should be kept in mind in future designs of our ships.

Notes on Own Ship's Gunnery

Application of Spotting Rules. These were applied successfully in the T.S. during the first action.

Cross-levelling gear. This was used throughout both the first and second actions with success.

A.F.C.T., Mk IX. The 14-in. table was run continuously for 32 hours and proved most reliable. The only incidents which occurred were as follows:

During the first action after firing salvo 12, a heavy hit was felt on the starboard side and the director setting mechanical pointer was seen to be oscillating violently. At the same time a fuze was noticed to blow at the panel in the 14-in. T.S. The director setting control trigger was used to move off the mechanical pointer. On release, the pointer settled in line with the indicator pointer and no further trouble was experienced.

Immediately after the third action, the safety diaphragm in the air supply to the motors, blew with a loud report and the T.S. was filled with blue smoke caused by vaporized oil in the air system. A double diaphragm was inserted to prevent recurrence.

Communications between Bridge and D.C.T. Great difficulty was found in using the voice pipe communication with the high wind blowing past the director. A direct sound power hand-set has now been rigged by ship's staff and is recommended for future construction.

General remarks on the behavior of the 14-in. Turrets. During the working up period numerous minor mechanical defects have been experienced in spite of unremitting efforts on the part of the Ordnance staff, and during the operations against Bismarck this state of affairs persisted.

In the circumstances the output achieved might well have been lower. That this was not so was due to the continual efforts of the Ordnance staff and with one exception, to good loading drill in the turrets.

The presence in each turret of one of Messrs. Vickers Armstrong's erecting staff was of the greatest assistance.

[Enclosure (I)] Summary of Forms S.1146 (F)

	Total Time	No. of Salvoes	Total Guns fired	Total Guns Able to fired	Salvoes Per Min.	E.F.G. Salvoes Per Min.	Percentage Loss of output
	Min. sec.
First Action	8 58	18 (b)	55 (a)	74	1.895	1.41	25.65
Second Action	12 02	12	41 (c) (d)	48	0.915	0.783	14.45
Third Action		5 rounds only fired (e)

 

Notes:

a.   A. 1 gun out of action after one salvo.

b.   In addition "Y" turret fired four rounds in local control after 18th salvo: shell ring then jammed.

c.   A. 1 gun out of action from 5th salvo onwards.

d.  A. 3 gun temporarily out of action after 11th salvo.

e.   "A" turret shell ring jammed.

[Enclosure (II)] F/C Signals Made on F/C Wave - 24th May 1941

Ships: Hood 1

Prince of Wales 2

Time Signal

'0103 - 0543 Preliminary testing

'0544 2 v 1 PP GCW ? 43

v 2 IMI X

0546 2 v 1 PP GCW 0548

V 2 R

0548 2 v 1 PP GCW 0550

V 2 R

0550 2 v 1 GCW 0550

2 INT GCW

v 2 GCW

'0551 2 GIC

(approx)

2 v 1 GIC

v 2 R

'0552 2 v 1 GOB - 1

(approx)

R

-------------- Nil more heard -------

No intercommunication of ranges.

V/S F.C SIGNALS

'0550 GSB 337 - L1

ADM 234/509

[Enclosure (III)] Report on Events Which Occurred in 14in Turrets, 23rd to 25th May

Friday, 23rd May

Events prior to First Action

The order to load the cages was given late in the afternoon. In the course of loading the following defects developed:-

"A" Turret

No. 2 gun loading cage: Front flash doors could not be opened fully from the transverser compartment and the cage could not be loaded. Examination showed that the front casing had been badly burned by being struck by the lugs carrying the guide rollers on the gun loading rammer head when the latter was making a "withdrawing" stroke.

This was cleared by filing and the other gun loading cages were examined for the same defect. Slight burring was found in some cases and was dressed away.

No. 1 gun: On ramming shell the second time after the order "Load," the shell arrestor at the shell ring level jammed out and could not be freed before the first action.

While steaming at high speed, large quantities of sea water entered "A" turret round the gun ports and through the joints of the gunhouse roof. It became necessary to rig canvas screens in the transverser space and bale the compartment.

"B" Turret

No. 2 central ammunition hoist: Arrestor at shell ring level would not withdraw after ramming shell. It is impossible to strip this in place in the Mark II mounting, and the arrestor was removed complete. The axis pin of the pinion driving the inner tube of the arrestor had seized. There does not appear to be any effective means of lubricating this pin. The pin was drilled out and removed and the arrestor re-assembled. It was not, however, possible to replace the arrestor before action stations was ordered, because at this stage a defect developed in the hinge trays of the forward shell room as described below. This latter defect was taken in hand immediately in order to free the revolving shell ring and was completed a few minutes after action stations. It was not then considered advisable to proceed with replacing the arrestor.

Hinge trays at forward shell room fouled the locking bolt on the revolving shell ring: both trays being bent.

Saturday, 24th May

During the early hours hydraulic pressure failed on the revolving shell ring ship control in "B" turret. This was due to the pressure supply to the turret from the starboard side of the ring main being isolated. The revolving shell ring ship control is fed from the starboard side only, and the non-return valves on the pressure main adjacent to the center pivot prevent pressure being fed to the starboard side and the revolving shell ring ship control from the port side in the event of the former being isolated from the ring main. Similar conditions exist on the port side of "A" and the starboard side of "Y." It is considered essential that a cross connection be fitted in the shell handling room with two non-return valves so that the revolving shell ring ship control can be supplied from either side of the ring main.

Events during the First Action

The following defects developed in "A" turret:

"A" Turret

On several occasions the shell ring rammers fouled the brackets on the hinge trays for No. 11 interlock. Shell could not be rammed until the bearing of the turret was changed. This also occurred in "Y" but did not prevent ramming.

No. 1 gun only fired one salvo, due to the events described in A (i).

After the second salvo, No. 24A interlock failed on No. 2 shell ring rammer. It was tripped after a short delay and thereafter assisted by hand.

About halfway through the firing, the tappets operating the shell ring arrestor release gear on No. 4 rammer failed to release the arrestor. Subsequent examination has shown that the shaft carrying the levers operating these tappets had twisted. The rammer was kept in action by giving the tappets a heavy blow at each stroke.

Shortly after this, a further defect occurred on No. 4 shell room rammer. When fully withdrawn the rammer failed to clear No. 7 interlock and the ring could not be locked. This was overcome by operating the gear with a pinch-bar at every stroke.

Throughout the engagement the conditions in "A" shell handling room were very bad; water was pouring down from the upper part of the mounting. Only one drain is fitted and became choked; with the result that water accumulated and washed from side to side as the ship rolled. The streams above and floods below drenched the machinery and caused discomfort to the personnel. More drains should be fitted in the shell handling room and consideration given to a system of water catchment combined with improved drainage in the upper parts of the revolving structure. Every effort is being made to improve the pressure systems and further attempts will be made as soon as opportunity occurs to improve the mantlet weathering, but a certain amount of leaking is inevitable.

"B" Turret

No mechanical defects.

"Y" Turret

The following defects occurred in "Y" turret:

Salvo 11 - No. 3 central ammunition hoist was raised with shell but no cordite; No. 25 interlock having failed to prevent this. The interlock was functioning correctly before the engagement. There has been no opportunity to investigate this. It is also reported that the reason no cordite had been rammed was that the indicator in the cordite handling room did not show that the cage had been raised after the previous ramming stroke. This caused the gun to miss salvoes 15 to 20.

Salvo 12 - Front flash doors of No. 2 gun loading cage failed to open and cage could not be loaded. Flash doors on transfer tubes were working correctly and investigation showed that adjustment was required on the vertical rod operating the palm levers which open the gun loading cage doors. To make this adjustment, three-quarter inch thread had to be cut on the rod. This defect was put in hand after the engagement had been broken off and was completed by 1300. It would appear that the operating gear had been strained, possibly by the foreign matter in the flash door casing making the doors tight. The doors were free when tried in the course of making the repair. This caused the gun to miss salvo 14 onwards.

Salvo 20 - Owing to the motion of the ship, a shell slid out of the port shell room and fouled the revolving shell ring while the latter was locked to the trunk and the turret was training. The hinge tray was severely buckled, putting the revolving shell ring out of action. The tray was removed, but on testing the ring it was found that No. 3 and 4 hinge trays of the starboard shell room had also been buckled and were fouling the ring. The cause of this is not yet known. The trays were removed and as the action had stopped by this time, No. 4 tray was dressed up and replaced. The ring was out of action until 0825.

Events Subsequent to First Action

During the day in "A" turret, No. 1 central ammunition hoist shell arrestor was driven back with the intention of carrying on without it by ramming cautiously. The gun and cages were then loaded, but owing to the motion of the ship the round in the central ammunition hoist cage slid forward until its nose entered the arrestor, putting the hoist out of action again. Subsequent examination has shown that the anti-surging gear in this cage was stiff and consequently did not re-assert itself after ramming to traverser.

Events During the Second Action

"A" Turret

No. 1 gun fired only two salvoes owing to central ammunition hoist being out of action as described above in C, para 1. At salvo 9, No. 3 central ammunition hoist shell arrestor jammed out.

"B" and "Y" Turret

Clean shoot.

Events Subsequent to Second Action

"A" Turret

No. 3 central ammunition hoist shell arrestor was removed complete from the hoist. Time did not allow of it being stripped and made good, but it was intended to use the hoist without it. The gun and cages were loaded in this manner.

Third Action

"A" Turret

First Salvo - Shell rammed short into No. 3 central ammunition hoist cage. In trying to remedy this a double ram was made, putting the shell ring out of action. The second shell was hauled back by tackle, clearing the ring. The base of the shell in the central ammunition hoist cage was jamming against the upper edge of the opening in the hoist. This could not be cleared as the central ammunition hoist control lever could not be put to lower. After much stripping the trouble was located in a link in the control gear which was found to be out of line.

"B" Turret

Clean shoot.

General

With pressure being kept on shell room machinery for a long period, much water has accumulated in the shell rooms and bins. Suctions are fitted from 350-ton pumps only and these are not satisfactory for dealing with relatively small quantities of water. Drains are urgently required. It is suggested that a drain be fitted at each end of each shell room and larger drain holes be made in the bins; present drain holes being quite inadequate and easily choked.

The drains should be led to the inner bottom under the cordite handling room. Non-return valves and flash-seals could be fitted if considered necessary.

On passage to Rosyth after the action, two further hinge trays in "Y" shell handling room were buckled by fouling the revolving shell ring.

Report of the Scouting and Search for Bismarck by Ensign Smith

Issued by the Intelligence Division

Office of Chief of Naval Operation

Navy Department

Intelligence Report

Serial 1066 Monograph Index Guide No. 1005-600

From: Naval Attaché at London, England Date: 9 June, 1941

Source: Personal Observation & Experience Evaluation: Reliable

Subject GREAT BRITAIN AVIATION Scouting & Search by PBY-5.

Ensign Smith

BISMARCK

Report of Scouting and Search of PBY-5 No. AH545 "Catalina" for Bismarck 26 May, 1941.

Following 0325 take-off from Lough Erne, it was necessary to climb to 3000' through overcast before proceeding to West Coast of Ireland. We took departure at 0430 from Eagle Island, altitude 500' on westerly course. Weather conditions were undesirable, ceiling varying from 100' to 1000' and visibility ranging from 5 miles to zero. Wind 30-35 from N.W. which reduced ground speed to approximately 80 knots.

The plane carried four depth charges (500 lbs. each) and capacity gas load (1750 U.S. gallons). Aircraft at Lough Erne are always armed with depth charges and the British felt it a waste of time and effort to remove them before this flight. There is no special (ASV) equipment aboard.

The trip to the assigned search area was uneventful other than several course changes which were necessitated by weather conditions. We arrived at our area at 0945 and immediately started search. Following is a diagram of sectors assigned to Squadrons 209 & 240 from Lough Erne.

One aircraft from each squadron was to cover each sector, ours (209) being DEFG. I assume that similar areas were assigned to other groups in order to cover all western approaches of Europe. Upon examination, it will be found that in reality this area (DEFG) is two of our familiar "Pie shaped" Vectors joined at the vertex. Flight plan. Search leg DE; EG; GF; FD and repeat.

Weather at search area was somewhat better than that encountered on trip out. Horizontal visibility below 800' was good up to 8-10 miles. Misty conditions prevailed between 800' and 2000' where cloud lane covered 5/6 of sky. Visibility between 800-2000 was about 4 miles and at 2000 about 1-2 miles.

We started leg EG of area at 1000 and at 1010 I sighted what was first believed to be Bismarck, bearing 345 at 8 miles. Definite recognition was impossible at the time due to visibility. I immediately took control from "George" (automatic pilot); started slow climbing turn to starboard, keeping ship sited to Port, while the British officer [Dennis Briggs] went aft to prepare contact report. My plan was to take cover in the clouds, get close to the ship as possible; making definite recognition and then shadow the ship from best point of vantage. Upon reaching 2000' we broke out of a cloud formation and were met by a terrific anti-aircraft barrage from our starboard quarter.

Immediately jettisoned the depth charges and started violent evasive action which consisted of full speed, climbing and "S" turns. The British officer went aft again to send the contact report. When making an "S" turn I could see the ship was a BB [battleship] and was the Bismarck, which had made a 90 starboard turn from its original course, (This was evident from wake made by his maneuvering), and was firing broadsides at us. The A.A. [anti-aircraft] fire lasted until we were out of range and into the clouds. It was very intense and were it not for evasive action we would have been shot down. The barrage was so close that it shook the aircraft considerably (one man was knocked from his bunk) and the noise of the burst could be hear above the propeller and engine noise. Numerous bursts were observed at close quarters and small fragments of shrapnel could be heard hitting the plane. The fitter came forward to pilots compartment saying we were full of holes. As soon as we were well clear of Bismarck we investigated the damage, which consisted of a hole in after port hull (about 2" in diameter) and one in bottom hull directly below instrument panel (about 1" in diameter). No other damage was visible at the time. I made short flight test (several turns, checked engines, etc) and finding everything satisfactory returned to area to resume shadow of Bismarck.

From this encounter it was obvious that there were two German warships in company on same course (140 true) and the leading ship was not identified but was of BB or CV [aircraft carrier] class.

The 240 squadron plane had intercepted our contact report and set is course to intercept the ship from the position given in our contact.

As we had lost contact with the ship we returned to position of the Bismarck. The navigation was somewhat in error, due to evasive action, etc., and we could not find the ship the second time. According to reports that we intercepted from 240 plane, he was being attacked by enemy aircraft. We immediately set course to intercept him. We joined up with him and he was in contact with Bismarck. We stayed in company for 45 minutes and then took departure for Lough Erne at 1530; the time specified by Group Operations Officer.

We landed at 2130 with approximately 250-300 gal. of gasoline remaining.

Conclusion and Recommendations

On a mission of this nature, after contact has been made and reported, a torpedo attack by a patrol plane is entirely feasible. In any event, it would have been better to carry a torpedo in lieu of depth charges. The Bismarck evidently had some type of aircraft detector device. This is evident by the fact that she had turned 90 and opened fire on us as we emerged from a cloud and had thus known our position before actual sighting us.

Prepared by [signed] Leonard B. Smith, Ensign, U.S. Navy.

Forwarded by: [signed] C.A. LOCKWOOD, Jr., Capt., USN., Naval Attaché.

Prinz Eugen.

HMS Hood.

HMS Suffolk in May 1941.

One of Bismarck's 15 cm gun turrets.

HMS Rodney.

HMS Sheffield.

The Swordfish aircrews that torpedoed the Bismarck rewarded (HMS Ark Royal).

HMS King George V.

The end of Bismarck, she is sinking and nearly all guns are silent.

Bismarck on fire, at the closing stages of the battle.

Seaman R Tilburn of Roundhay, Leeds, one of the three survivors of HMS Hood out for a walk with his young brother, June 1941.

A reconstruction of the sinking of the Royal Navy battlecruiser HMS Hood in Denmark Strait. HMS Hood sinks under a pall of black smoke and flame while another Royal Navy warship sails past in the foreground.

A reconstruction of a night scene at sea with three Royal Navy ships at sail in succession. The battleship HMS King George V is towards the foreground, the aircraft carrier HMS Victorious is in the middle distance and the battlecruiser HMS Repulse is just visible on the horizon.

A reconstruction of the pursuit of the German battleship Bismarck in the North Atlantic. The Bismarck, which has a few black and white chevrons painted on its side, sails from right to left with its port side and stern visible. There are numerous puffs of smoke above the water level as the ship is under attack from British Swordfish aircraft.

A reconstruction of the pursuit and sinking of the German battleship Bismarck. In the foreground the Royal Navy destroyer HMS Zulu is under fire from Bismarck, just visible in the right background. A large plume of water rises to the side where a shell has fallen and Zulu lists heavily to the side. Sailors on deck are visible in the immediate foreground.