 |
| As they continue to battle German troops for control of the Scheldt Estuary, Canadian soldiers traverse a flooded area in an amphibious vehicle. |
The Battle of the Scheldt in World War II was a series of
military operations by Canadian, British and Polish formations to open up the
shipping route to Antwerp so that its port could be used to supply the Allies
in northwest Europe. Led by Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, the battle took
place in northern Belgium and southwestern Netherlands from October 2 to
November 8, 1944.
The well-established Wehrmacht defenders staged an effective
delaying action, during which the Germans flooded land areas in the Scheldt
Estuary, slowing the Allied advance. After five weeks of difficult fighting,
the Canadian First Army, at a cost of 12,873 Allied casualties (half of them
Canadian), was successful in clearing the Scheldt after numerous amphibious
assaults, obstacle crossings, and costly assaults over open ground. Both land
and water were mined, and the Germans defended their line of retreat with
artillery and snipers.
Once the German defenders were no longer a threat, it was a
further three weeks before the first convoy carrying Allied supplies was able
to unload in Antwerp (on November 29, 1944) due to the necessity of de-mining
the harbors.
By September 1944, it had become urgent for the Allies to
clear both banks of the Scheldt Estuary in order to open the port of Antwerp to
Allied shipping, thus easing logistical burdens in their supply lines, then
stretching hundreds of miles from Normandy eastward to the Siegfried Line.
Since the Allied forces had landed in Normandy (France) on D-Day, June 6, 1944,
the British Second Army had pushed forward into the Low Countries and captured
Brussels (September 3-4) and Antwerp, the latter with its ports still largely
intact. Antwerp was, and still is, the third largest port in Europe, and was
the only port capable of providing the necessary supplies to sustain the Allied
advance into Germany. But the advance halted with the British in possession of
Antwerp, while the Germans still controlled the Scheldt Estuary, which connects
Antwerp to the North Sea.
As the American historian Gerhard Weinberg wrote: “The most
important single factor holding back the Allies was the supply situation. As
they had advanced rapidly in August, the Allied armies had been unable to seize
additional ports. Brest did not fall for months and then turned out to be so
badly wrecked that it was not reopened. Other ports continued to be held by
German garrisons deliberately left behind with instructions to hold on
precisely to prevent use of the port facilities...The other major port, and the
one which the Allies had counted on as the main base for a drive into Germany,
had fallen into their hands intact, but could not be used because the Germans
controlled its approaches...Although [a] system of motorized transport together
with the railroads and some airlift and barge traffic enabled the Allied force
to maintain their military effectiveness, these could not move enough material
to the front fast enough to sustain the August rate of advance. The great
arguments over a narrow versus a broad front in the West were largely academic
– like the dispute over the German advance in the East after late July 1941.
Until major ports, especially Antwerp, were operational and the railroad system
was functioning at a high level of efficiency, there was no prospect of a major
advance against the stiffening German resistance on either a broad or narrow
front.” The first plans for liberating Europe by the Anglo-American armies,
codenamed “Roundup,” had been drawn up in December 1941. They had stressed that
the port of Antwerp would be crucial for an invasion of Germany, as it was the
largest deep-water port close to Germany that the Allies could hope to capture
intact.
In September 1944, Field Marshal Montgomery of the 21st Army
Group ordered General Harry Crerar and his First Canadian Army to take the
following French ports on the English Channel; Calais, Boulogne and Dunkirk. On
3 September 1944 Adolf Hitler ordered the 15th German Army, which had been
stationed in the Pas de Calais region and was now marching north into the Low
Countries, to hold the mouth of the river Scheldt, depriving the Allies of the
use of the Antwerp port. Montgomery became aware of this on September 5, thanks
to Ultra intelligence. On September 4, Antwerp was taken by General Brian
Horrocks with its harbor 90% intact. However, the Germans had heavily fortified
Walcheren island at the mouth of the Western Scheldt, establishing well dug-in
artillery impervious to air attack and controlling access to the river. This
made it impossible for Allied minesweepers to clear the heavily mined river.
Hitler had personally designated the island “Fortress Walcheren,” which he
ordered to be defended to the last man. Walcheren island was held by mixture of
Kriegsmarine and Wehrmacht, with its garrison consisting of the 202nd Naval
Coastal Artillery Battalion, the 810th Naval Anti-Aircraft Battalion, the 89th
Fortress Regiment and the 70th Infantry Division commanded by General Wilhelm
Daser.
The Witte Brigade (White Brigade) of the Belgian resistance
seized the port of Antwerp before the Germans could blow the port as they were
planning. The Germans had been in the process of attaching explosives to the
port facilities such as its giant cranes, but the Witte Brigade had intervened
before the damage was done. Antwerp is a deep water inland port connected to
the North Sea via the river Scheldt. The Scheldt was wide enough and dredged
deep enough to allow the passage of ocean-going ships and was close to Germany.
On September 5, SHAEF’s naval commander, Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay advised
Montgomery to make taking the mouth of the Scheldt his main priority, stating
that as long as the mouth of the Scheldt was in German hands, it was impossible
for the Royal Navy minesweepers to clear the numerous mines in the river,
rendering the port of Antwerp was useless. Among the Allied senior leaders,
only Ramsay saw opening Antwerp as crucial to sustaining the advance into
Germany. On 6 September 1944, Montgomery told Canadian General Harry Crerar
that “I want Boulogne badly” and that city should be taken at once with no
regard to losses. By this point, ports like Cherbourg, which the Americans had
taken in June, were too far away from the front line, causing the Allies great
logistical problems.
From September on, Admiral Ramsay was deeply involved in
planning the assault on “Fortress Walcheren.” He appointed Captain Pugsley of
the Royal Navy, who landed the 7th Brigade of the 3rd Canadian Division on
D-Day, to the First Canadian Army headquarters to start preparations. Had
Montgomery secured the Scheldt Estuary in early September 1944 as Admiral
Ramsay had strongly advised him to do, Antwerp would have been opened to Allied
shipping far earlier than it was, and the escape of the German 15th Army from
France would have been stopped. As a part of Operation Fortitude, the deception
plan for Operation Overlord, the Allies had tricked the Germans into believing
they would land in the Pas-de-Calais region of France instead of in Normandy,
and as such, the Wehrmacht had reinforced the 15th Army in the Pas-de-Calais.
The importance of ports closer to Germany was highlighted
with the liberation of the city of Le Havre, which was assigned to General John
Crocker’s I Corps. To take Le Havre, the British assigned two infantry
divisions, two tank brigades, most of the artillery of the Second British Army,
the specialized armored “gadgets” of General Percy Hobart’s 79th Armoured
Division, the battleship HMS Warspite and the monitor HMS Erebus. On 10
September 1944, Operation Astonia began when RAF Bomber Command dropped 4,719
tons of bombs on Le Havre, which was then assaulted by Crocker’s men, who took
the city two days later. The Canadian historian Terry Copp wrote that the
commitment of this much firepower and men to take only one French city might “seem
excessive,” but by this point, the Allies desperately needed ports closer to
the front line to sustain their advance.
On 9 September, Montgomery wrote to Field Marshal Sir Alan
Brooke of the Imperial General Staff that “one good Pas de Calais port” would
be able to meet the logistical needs of the 21st Army Group only. Montgomery
further noted that “one good Pas de Calais port” would be insufficient for the
American armies in France, which thus forced Eisenhower, if for no other
reasons than logistics, to favor Montgomery’s plans for an invasion of northern
Germany by the 21st Army Group, whereas if Antwerp were opened up, all of the
Allied armies could be supplied. Montgomery had his eye on taking Berlin before
either the Americans or the Soviets took the capital of the Reich. Montgomery
ordered that the First Canadian Army take Calais, Boulogne and Dunkirk and
clear the Scheldt, a task that General Crerar stated was impossible because he
did not have sufficient troops to perform both operations at once. Montgomery
refused Crerar’s request to have British XII Corps under General Neil Ritchie
assigned to help clear the Scheldt because he needed XII Corps for Operation
Market Garden.
Little was done about the blocked port of Antwerp during
September because Montgomery chose to make the ill-fated Operation Market
Garden his key priority, rather than clearing the Scheldt. With Market Garden,
Montgomery intended to by-pass the West Wall and break into the north German
plain in order to take Berlin, but the British defeat at the Battle of Arnhem,
which proved to be the proverbial “bridge too far,” left the British forming an
exposed salient reaching deep into the Netherlands. In the meantime, German
forces in the Scheldt Estuary were able to deploy defensively and prepare for
the expected advance. The first attacks occurred on September 13. After an
attempt by the 4th Canadian Armoured Division to storm the Leopold Canal on its
own had ended in bloody repulse, General Guy Simonds, commanding the II
Canadian Corps, ordered a halt to operations in the Scheldt until the French
channel ports had been taken, reporting the Scheldt would need more than one
division to clear. The halt allowed the German 15th Army ample time to dig in
to its new home by the banks of the Scheldt.
On the German side, holding the Scheldt was regarded as
crucial. Hitler ordered planning for what became the Ardennes Offensive in
September 1944, the objective of which was retaking Antwerp. The 15th Army,
which was holding the Scheldt on the far right on the German line, was deprived
of supplies as the Wehrmacht focused on building up its strength for the
planned Ardennes offensive in December, while a number of newly raised
Volksgrenadier divisions were sent to replace the divisions lost in Normandy
and in Operation Bagration on the Eastern Front. However, the flat polder
ground of the Dutch countryside favored the defensive and was felt to
compensate for the 15th Army’s reduced numbers. It was assigned only two of the
Volksgrenadier divisions. Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt told General
Gustav-Adolf von Zangen: “Enemy supplies, and therefore, his ability to fight,
is limited by the stubborn defense of the Harbor, as intelligence report prove.
The attempt of the enemy to occupy the Western Scheldt in order to obtain the
free use of the harbor of Antwerp must be resisted to the utmost” (emphasis in
the original). In his orders to his men, Von Zangen declared:
Therefore,
I order all commanders as well as the National Socialist indoctrination officers
to instruct the troops in the clearest and most factual manner in the following
points: Next to HAMBURG, ANTWERP is the largest port in Europe. Even in the
First World War, Churchill, in person, traveled to ANTWERP in order to organize
the defense of the harbor because he appreciated it as of vital importance to
the struggle on the continent. At that time, Churchill’s plan was completely
shattered; the same must happen again. After overrunning the SCHELDT
fortifications, the English would finally be in a position to land great masses
of material in a large and completely protected harbor. With this material they
might deliver a death blow at the NORTH GERMAN plain and at BERLIN before the
onset of winter...The enemy knows that he must assault the European fortress as
speedily as possible before its inner lines of resistance are fully built up
and occupied by new divisions. For this, he needs the ANTWERP harbor. And for
this reason, we must hold the SCHELDT fortifications to the end. The German
people are watching us. In this hour, the fortifications along the SCHELDT
occupy a role which is decisive for the future of our people. Each additional
day will be vital that you deny the port of ANTWERP to the enemy and the
resources he has at his disposal. (signed) v. ZANGEN General der Infanterie.
In early October, after Operation Market Garden, Allied
forces led by the Canadian First Army finally set out to open the port of
Antwerp to the Allies by giving it access to the sea. As the Arnhem salient was
his major concern, Montgomery pulled away from the First Canadian Army (which
was under the temporary command of Simonds as Crerar was ill), the British 51st
Highland Division, 1st Polish Division, British 49th (West Riding) Division and
2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade, and sent all of these formations to help the 2nd
British Army hold the Arnhem salient. Simonds saw the Scheldt campaign as a
test of his ability, a challenge to be overcome, and he felt he could clear the
Scheldt with only three divisions of the 2nd Corps despite having to take on
the entire 15th Army, which held strongly fortified positions in a landscape
that favored the defense. Simonds not once registered complaints about his lack
of manpower, the fact that ammunition was being rationed as supplying the
Arnhem salient was Montgomery’s chief concern, and the lack of air support,
which was made worse by the cloudy October weather.
On September 12 and 13, 1944, the Canadian First Army, under
temporary command of Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, was given the task of
clearing the Scheldt once it had completed the clearing of the Channel ports,
particularly Boulogne, Calais and Dunkirk. Montgomery then decided that the
importance of Antwerp was such that the capture of Dunkirk could be delayed.
Under his command at that time were Canadian II Corps, with the Polish 1st
Armoured Division, 49th and 52nd Divisions attached, and the British I Corps.
Montgomery promised the support of RAF Bomber Command in attacking the German
fortifications and that of the USAAF 8th Air Force “[o]n the day concerned.”
The 51st (Highland) Infantry Division was to give up its transport to enable
the movement of forces into battle positions. Abandoning the capture of Dunkirk
freed the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division.
The plan for opening the Scheldt Estuary involved four main
operations, conducted over daunting geography:
Clearing
the area north of Antwerp and securing access to the South Beveland peninsula.
Operation
Switchback, clearing the Breskens Pocket north of the Leopold canal and south
of the Western Scheldt.
Operation
Vitality, the capture of the South Beveland peninsula, north of the Western
Scheldt.
Operation
Infatuate, the capture of Walcheren island, which had been fortified into a
powerful German stronghold. As part of the Atlantic Wall, Walcheren island,
with its strategic position just north of the Scheldt river mouth, was
considered to be the “strongest concentration of defenses the Nazis had ever
constructed.”
On September 21, the 4th Canadian (Armoured) Division moved
north roughly along the line of the Ghent-Terneuzen Canal, given the task of
clearing an area on the south shore of the Scheldt around the Dutch town of
Breskens, called the “Breskens Pocket.” The Polish 1st Armoured Division headed
for the Dutch-Belgian border further east and the crucial area north of
Antwerp.
The Canadian 4th Armoured Division advanced from a hard-won
bridgehead over the Ghent-Brugge Canal at Moerbrugge to find themselves the
first Allied troops facing the formidable obstacle of the double line of the
Leopold and Schipdonk Canals. An attack was mounted in the vicinity of
Moerkerke, crossing the canals and establishing a bridgehead before
counterattacks forced a withdrawal with heavy casualties.
The 1st Polish Armoured Division enjoyed greater success to
the east as it advanced northeast from Ghent. In country unsuitable for armor,
and against stiffening resistance, the division advanced to the coast by
September 20, occupying Terneuzen and clearing the south bank of the Scheldt east
toward Antwerp.
It became apparent to Simonds that any further gains in the
Scheldt would come at heavy cost, as the Breskens Pocket, extending from
Zeebrugge to the Braakman Inlet and inland to the Leopold Canal, was strongly
held by the enemy.
On October 2, the Canadian 2nd Division began its advance
north from Antwerp. Stiff fighting ensued on October 6 at Woensdrecht, the
objective of the first phase. The Germans, reinforced by Battle Group Chill,
saw the priority in holding there, controlling direct access to South Beveland
and Walcheren island.
There were heavy casualties as the Canadians attacked over
open, flooded land. Canadian historians Terry Copp and Robert Vogel wrote: “the
very name Woensdrecht sends shivers down the spines of veterans of the 2nd
Canadian Infantry Division.” Driving rain, booby traps and land mines made
advance very difficult. Attacking on 7 October in heavy mist, the Calgary
Highlanders came under heavy fire from German positions. As described in its
war diary, “the battle thickened...the Germans forces...hit back with a
pugnacity which had not been encountered in the enemy for a long time.” The
Régiment de Maisoneuve was halted 1,000 yards from their target while the next
day, The Black Watch of Canada was stopped in its attempt. On October 9, the
Germans counterattacked and pushed the Canadians back. The war diary of the
85th Infantry Division reported that they were “making very slow progress” in
face of tenacious Canadian resistance.
Back at SHEAF headquarters, Admiral Ramsay, who was more
concerned about the problems facing the Canadians than their own generals,
complained to Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight Eisenhower that the
Canadians were having to ration ammunition as Montgomery made holding the
Arnhem salient his main priority. After Ramsay raised the issue with
Eisenhower, the latter informed Montgomery on October 9 about “the supreme
importance of Antwerp. It is reported to me this morning by the Navy that the
Canadian Army will not repeat not be able to attack until November 1 unless
immediately supplied with ammunition.” Montgomery replied by writing: “Request
you will ask Ramsay from me by what authority he makes wild statements to you
concerning my operations about which he can know nothing repeat nothing...there
is no repeat no shortage of ammunition...The operations are receiving my
personal attention.”
Field Marshal Walter Model, who was commanding Army Group B,
ordered: “The corridor to Walcheren will be kept open at any price; if
necessary, it will be regained by forces ruthlessly detached from other
sectors.” Model, a tough and ruthless National Socialist fanatic known for his
devotion to Hitler, was called “the Führer’s Fireman” because Hitler always
gave him the toughest jobs. Model sent the 256th Volksgrenadier division and
assault gun companies to allow the release of Battle Group Chill, the “fire
brigade” consisting of 6th Paratroop Regiment and assault gun companies. On
October 10, the Royal Regiment of Canada launched a surprise attack against the
German lines at Woensdrecht, but for the next days was engaged in heavy
fighting against counterattacks from Battle Group Chill. Major-General Charles
Foulkes of the 2nd Division sent the Black Watch to support the Royal Regiment.
The German forces at Woensdrecht greatly outnumbered the Canadians and had
Model known of this, he might have launched a counter-offensive. Instead he
used attrition tactics by making piecemeal counterattacks. During this time,
war diaries of the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry noted “many snipers in the
houses and hedges” had been encountered while the weather was “cold and wet
with high winds. Floods rising again.”
Simonds had planned to commit the 4th Division to assist the
3rd Division with clearing the Breskens Pocket, but problems faced by the 2nd
Division forced Simonds to start peeling off units from the 4th Division. On 9
October 1944, the South Alberta Regiment was ordered to “protect the right
flank of 2 Division and present infiltration between 2 Div and 1 Polish Armd.
Div.” The next day, Simonds ordered General Harry Foster of the 4th Division
“to send 4 Cnd Armd Bde to the Antwerp area at the rate of one get a day,
beginning 11 Oct.”
On October 13, on what would come to be known as “Black
Friday,” the Canadian 5th Infantry Brigade’s Black Watch was virtually wiped
out in an unsuccessful attack. The Black Watch attacked German positions,
already known to be well defended, while the rest of the 2nd Division was not
engaged, suggesting that neither Foulkes nor Simonds had taken seriously the
problem of fighting by the river Scheldt. The Black Watch, whose officers had
come from Montreal’s Scottish elite, had billed itself as the most exclusive
regiment in the Canadian Army. Despite this reputation, the Black Watch was
considered to be a “jinxed” regiment which had had more than its fair share of
misfortune. One officer of the Black Watch reported that the soldiers sent to
replace the Black Watch men killed and wounded in France “had little or no
infantry training, and exhibited poor morale” and that the men of C Company had
“all been killed or taken prisoner” during “Black Friday.” The Black Watch had
already taken very heavy losses at the Battle of Verrières Ridge in July 1944
and its heavy losses on “Black Friday” almost finished the regiment. The
Calgary Highlanders were to follow up with a more successful action, and their
Carrier Platoon succeeded in taking the railroad station at Korteven, north of
Woensdrecht. Fighting at Hoogerheide also ensued. On October 16, The Royal
Hamilton Light Infantry, known as the “Rileys,” under the command of Lieutenant
Colonel Denis Whitaker, attacked Woensdrecht at night, taking much of the
village. However, they were unable to pass beyond the ridge to the west of
Woensdrecht. The “Rileys” took losses equal to those suffered by the Black
Watch on “Black Friday,” but as they had taken Woensdrecht while the Black
Watch had been thrown back, the fighting on October 16 is not remembered as
“Black Monday.” By October 16, Woensdrecht was secured, cutting the land link
to South Beveland and Walcheren. The Canadians achieved their first objective
but had suffered heavy casualties.
On 14 October Field Marshal Montgomery issued “Notes on
Command” that were highly critical of Eisenhower’s leadership and asked he be
made Land Forces commander again. On the next day, Eisenhower replied that the
issue was not the command arrangement, but rather the ability and willingness
of Montgomery to obey orders, saying he had ordered him to clear the Scheldt and
warned if he was unable to obey orders, he would be fired. Stung by
Eisenhower’s message, a chastised Montgomery promised: “You will hear no more
from me on the subject of command...Antwerp top priority in all operations of
21 Army Group.” On October 16, Montgomery issued a directive along that line.
To the east, the British Second Army attacked westward to clear the Netherlands
south of the Maas River, securing the Scheldt region from counterattacks.
As part of his newly focused efforts to assist Simonds,
Montgomery assigned the 52nd Lowland Division of the British Army to the First
Canadian Army. The 52nd division, recruited in the Lowlands of Scotland, was a
mountain division, requiring men with unusual strength and stamina in order to
fight in the mountains, making it into something of an elite division within
the British Army. Simonds greatly appreciated having the Lowlanders under his
command and told Major-General Edmund Hakewill-Smith that the 52nd was to play
the decisive role in taking Walcheren island. As such, Simonds ordered
Hakewill-Smith to start preparing an amphibious operation as Simonds planned to
land the 52nd division on Walcheren at the same time the Canadians attacked the
island.
Between October 23 and November 5, 1944, the U.S. 104th
Infantry Division experienced its first battle while attached to the British I
Corps. The division succeeded in pushing through the central portion of North
Brabant against resistance from German snipers and artillery.
Meanwhile, Simonds concentrated forces at the neck of the
South Beveland peninsula. On 17 October, Major-General Harry Forster announced
4th Division would attack on 20 October to take Bergen op Zoom. The offensive
began in the early morning of October 20 and was led by the Argyll and Lake
Superior regiments. On October 22, the Lincoln and Welland Regiment, known as
the “Lincs” in the Canadian Army, and The Algonquin Regiment took Esschen in a
surprise attack. On October 23, the German 85th Division launched a
counterattack led by some self-propelled (SP) guns. The Sherman tanks of the
Governor-General’s Foot Guards and the Lake Superior Regiments were decimated
by the German SP guns. For the next days, there occurred what the 85th
Division’s war diary called “extremely violent fighting.” The war diary of the
Canadian Argyll and Sunderland Highlanders regiment spoke of “nightmarish
fighting” at Wouwsche Plantage. The fighting at Wouwsche Plantage was
considered so important that Field Marshal Montgomery arrived at the headquarters
of the 4th Canadian Division to press Forster for speed, but Forster protested
that the flat polder country made speed impossible. One company of the Lincoln
and Welland Regiment lost 50% of its men in a single day’s fighting, while an
advance company of the Algonquin Regiment was cut off and surrounded by the
Wehrmacht, requiring desperate fighting to break out. The Canadian advance
towards Bergen op Zoom forced Rundstedt to redeploy the elite 6th Parachute
Regiment, which until then had been blocking the 2nd Canadian Division on the
Beveland isthmus to the defense of Bergen op Zoom.
By October 24, Allied lines were pushed out further from the
neck of the peninsula, ensuring German counterattacks would not cut off the 2nd
Canadian Division, by then moving west along it towards Walcheren island. On
October 26, 1944, Field Marshal von Rundstedt ordered to “forestall an enemy
breakthrough and economize with our strength, I hereby authorize Fifteenth Army
to withdraw to the general line Bergen op Zoom/Roosendaal/Breda/Dongen/west of
‘s-Hertogenbosch.” The 4th Canadian Armoured Division moved north from the Leopold
Canal and took Bergen op Zoom. The South Alberta Regiment and The Lincoln and
Welland Regiment, which liberated Bergen op Zoom, reported “the reception of
the people of Bergen Op Zoom was as enthusiastic and wild as any yet seen.”
The second main operation, Operation Switchback, opened with
fierce fighting to reduce the Breskens Pocket. Here, the Canadian 3rd Infantry
Division encountered tenacious German resistance as it fought to cross the
Leopold Canal. An earlier failed attempt by the Canadian 4th Armoured Division
at Moerbrugge had demonstrated the challenge they faced. In addition to the
formidable German defenses on both the Leopold Canal and the Schipdonk Canal,
much of the approach area was flooded.
The Bresken pocket was held by the 64th Division commanded
by General Knut Eberding, an infantryman with extensive experience on the
Eastern Front who was regarded as an expert in defensive warfare. When the 15th
Army had retreated from the Pas des Calais region of France across the Low
Countries in September 1944, an enormous number of guns and ammunition ended up
in the Breskens Pocket, including one hundred 20 mm anti-aircraft guns. They
were used by the Wehrmacht as a sort of “super-heavy machine gun” and were much
dreaded by the Canadian infantry. 20-mm guns could shred a man to pieces within
seconds. Besides the 20-mm guns, the 64th Division had 23 of the famous 88 mm
flak guns, known for their power to destroy an Allied tank with a single direct
hit, together with 455 light machine guns and 97 mortars.
While Montgomery focused on Operation Market Garden in
September 1944, Eberling used three weeks of quiet to have his men dig in. He
later expressed amazement about the Allied air forces hardly ever bombing the
Breskens Pocket in September, allowing his men to build defensive works with
barely an effort to stop them. The flat, swampy polder country made the
Breskens Pocket into an “island,” as much of the ground was impassable with
only a few “land bridges” connecting the area to the mainland. The Wehrmacht
had blown up dykes to flood much of the ground so that the Canadians could only
advance along the raised country roads. Eberling reported that the polder
country was “a maze of ditches, canalized rivers and commercial canals, often
above the level of the surrounding countryside...which made military maneuver
almost impossible except on the narrow roads built on top of the dykes. Each of
these roadways were carefully registered for both artillery and mortar fire.”
It was decided that the best place for an assault would be
immediately east of where the two canals divided: a narrow strip of dry ground,
only a few hundred meters wide at its base beyond the Leopold Canal (described
as a long triangle with its base on the Maldegem-Aardenburg road and its apex
near the village of Moershoofd some 5 km (3.1 mi) east). Despite the fact that
the Ultra intelligence provided by Bletchley Park had revealed that the 64th
Division was digging in for a hard fight and that Eberding had ordered a fight
to the death, Canadian military intelligence underestimated the size of the
German forces by 100%. They expected Eberding to retreat to Walcheren island
once the 3rd Canadian division started to advance. However, Simonds appreciated
the problems imposed by the polder country and the Germans concentrating their
forces at the few “land bridges.” He planned to use amphibious vehicles known
as “Buffalos” to travel across the flooded countryside to outflank the German
forces. Simonds planned to strike both at the Leopold canal and at the rear of
the Breskens Pocket via an amphibious landing at the Braakman inlet.
A two-pronged assault commenced. The Canadian 3rd Division′s
7th Brigade made the initial assault across the Leopold Canal, while the 9th
Brigade mounted the amphibious attack from the northern (coastal) side of the
pocket. The 7th Brigade was known as the “Western Brigade” in the Canadian Army
as its three regiments were all from western Canada with the Canadian Scottish
Regiment coming from Victoria area, the Regina Rifles from the Regina area, and
the Royal Winnipeg Rifles from the Winnipeg area, while the 9th Brigade was
known as the “Highland brigade” as its three regiments were all Highland
regiments with two coming from Ontario and another from Nova Scotia. The North
Shore Regiment made a diversionary attack across the Leopold Canal, while the
Regina Rifles regiment and the Canadian Scottish Regiment made the main
assault. The Royal Montreal Regiment, which had never seen action yet, were
pressing to get into the fight, and as such, the B company of the Regina
Rifles, nicknamed the “Johns,” agreed to step aside so one company of the Royal
Montreal Regiment could take their place.
The 9th Highland Brigade, however, was unable to land at the
same time as expected, owing to their unfamiliarity with amphibious vehicles.
The assault began on October 6, supported by extensive artillery and
Canadian-built Wasp Universal Carriers, equipped with flamethrowers. The 7th
Brigade was supposed to be on their own for 40 hours, but instead faced 68
hours of the Germans using everything they had to try the stop the Canadians
from crossing the Leopold canal.
Simonds had planned to take the Wehrmacht by surprise by
avoiding a preliminary bombardment and instead having the Wasps incinerate the
German defenders with a “barrage of flame.” The Wasps launched their barrage of
flames across the Leopold Canal, allowing the 7th Brigade troops to scramble up
over the steep banks and launch their assault boats. However, the Germans had
dug in well and many escaped the flamethrowers. One company of the Royal
Montreal Regiment was almost destroyed on the edge of the Leopold canal. The
Germans brought down heavy machine gun and mortar fire and only a few of the
Montrealers made it to the other side. The A company of the Regina Rifles did
not attempt to cross the canal as the volume of machine gun fire, convinced the
experienced “Johns” that it was too dangerous to try to cross the canal in
daylight. The Royal Montreal Regiment company held their precious “bridgehead”
for several hours before being joined by the “Johns” three hours later when D
company of the Regina Rifles crossed the canal. They were joined by C and A
companies in the evening. By that time, most of the men of B company of the
Royal Montreal Regiment, who had been anxious to get into action, were dead. By
contrast, the “barrage of flame” worked as expected for the Canadian Scottish
Regiment, who were able to cross the Leopold canal without much opposition and
put up a kapock footbridge within the first hour of crossing the canal.
Two precarious, separate footholds were established, but the
enemy recovered from the shock of the flamethrowers and counterattacked, though
they were unable to move the Canadians from their extremely vulnerable
bridgeheads. Brigadier J.C. Spraggree became worried that the Regina Rifles
might be destroyed by the Germans’ ferocious defense, leading him to order his
reserve, the Royal Winnipeg Rifles, to cross over the Canadian Scottish
Regiment’s bridgehead and link up with the Regina Rifles. The polderland, which
limited avenues of advance, proved to be a major difficulty as the Germans
concentrated their fire along the few raised roads. At the same time, the
Regina Rifles came under heavy counterattacks and were barely hanging on.
Canadian losses were so heavy that a squadron of tankmen from the 17th Hussars
Regiment were given rifles and sent to fight as infantrymen. The Canadian
historians’ Terry Copp and Robert Vogel wrote the fighting ...”was at close
quarter and of such ferocity that veterans insist that it was worse than the
blackest days of Normandy.” The war diary of the Royal Winnipeg Rifles reported:
“Heavy casualties were suffered by both sides and the ground was littered with
both German and Royal Winnipeg Rife dead.” The war diary of the Canadian
Scottish regiment sardonically noted: “The grim fighting was such that Piats
and Bazookas were used to blow down walls of houses where resistance was worst.
These anti-tank weapons are quite handy little house-breakers!” By October 9,
the gap between the bridgeheads was closed, and by early morning on October 12,
a position had been gained across the Aardenburg road.
October 10, 11 and 12 were days of intense struggle while
the men of the 7th Brigade with the Royal Winnipeg Rifles took, lost and then
retook a group of houses known as Graaf Jan and the Regina Rifles found
themselves pinned down by a group of well dug-in pillboxes that seemed to be
resilient to artillery. The Germans had ample artillery, together with an
immense number of artillery shells, and brought down heavy fire on any Canadian
advance. Making the fighting even more difficult was the heavy rain that
started the day after the crossing of the Leopold canal, with a post-operation
report on Operation Switchback stating: “In places the bridgehead was little
bigger than the northern canal bank. Even protection was slight: slit trenches
rapidly filled with water and had to be dug out many times a day.” The
Canadians could not advance beyond their bridgehead on the Leopold canal, but
Eberding, not content with stopping the Canadians, decided to “annihilate” the
7th Brigade by launching a series of counterattacks that cost the German 64th
Division dearly, as Canadian artillerymen were killing German infantrymen as
proficiently as German artillerymen were killing Canadians. Simonds’ plan
failed when the 9th Brigade did not land at the same time as the 7th Brigade
crossed the Leopold Canal and the 64th Division decisively stopped the advance
of the 7th Brigade. In the end, only Eberding’s determination to wipe out the
7th Brigade allowed Simonds’ plan to work. In terms of numbers lost as a
percentage of those engaged, the battle of the Leopold Canal was one of the
bloodiest battles for Canada in World War II, with 533 killed and another 70
men breaking down due to battle exhaustion. Copp and Vogel wrote: “One in every
two men who crossed the Leopold became a casualty!” The men who broke down
under battle curled up in a fetal position and refused to move, speak, eat or
drink as their spirits had been broken by the stress of the fighting. On 14
October 1944, Eberding, a man deeply committed to National Socialism, ordered
that German soldiers who retreated without orders were to be regarded as
deserters and summarily executed, and ...”where the names of deserters are
ascertained their names will be made known to the civilian population at home
and their next of kin will be looked upon as enemies of the German people.”
The Canadian 9th Brigade conducted an amphibious operation
with the aid of Terrapin (the first use of the vehicle in Europe) and Buffalo
amphibious vehicles, crewed by the British 5th Assault Regiment of the Royal
Engineers. The brigade planned to cross the mouth of the Braakman Inlet in
these vehicles and to land in the vicinity of Hoofdplaat, a tiny hamlet in the
rear or coastal side of the pocket, thus exerting pressure from two directions
at once. An “after action” report described the scene on the Terneuzen Canal:
“As darkness fell only tail lights showed. The locks at Sas Van Gent proved
difficult to negotiate, for the Buffaloes were not easily steered when moving
slowly. Their aeroplane engines created a sound so like the roar of aircraft
that over Flushing the anti-aircraft guns fired sporadically...Because of the
damage to the locks near the ferry (at Neuzen) it was necessary to cut ramps in
the bank and by-pass the obstacle. Not only was this a slow progress, but many
craft were damaged. The decision was therefore taken to postpone the operation
for 24 hours.” The delay allowed for Admiral Ramsay to volunteer the services
of Lieutenant-Commander R.D. Franks of the Royal Navy to serve as a pilot,
guiding the Buffaloes expertly down the river Scheldt without the Germans
noticing. Franks reported: “It was nearly ideal night, calm and quiet with a
half-moon behind a light cloud, but a bit of haze which restricted visibility
to a mile at most. We were quite invisible from the north shore of the Scheldt,
where all was quiet...Our touchdown was planned to be on either side of a
groyne...we were able to identify it and then lie off flicking our lamps to
guide the LVTs in. They deployed and thundered past us...I could see through my
binoculars the infantry disembark on dry land and move off.”
In spite of difficulties in maneuvering vehicles through the
canals and the resulting 24-hour delay, the Germans were taken by surprise and
a bridgehead was established. The North Nova Scotia Highland regiment landed
with no resistance and woke up nine sleeping German soldiers at their dug-out,
taking them prisoner. The Highland Light Infantry regiment’s major problem at
the landing site was not the Wehrmacht, but mud. After the initial landing, the
Cameron Highlanders and the Stormont, Dundas and Glengary Highlanders were
landed by Franks. Once again, the Germans recovered quickly and counterattacked
with ferocity; however, they were slowly forced back. Upon hearing of the
landing at the Braakman Inlet, Field Marshal Model reacted promptly, telling
Hitler: “Today, the enemy launched a decision-seeking attack on the Breskens
bridgehead.” Living up to his reputation as the “Führer’s Fireman,” Model
ordered Eberding to immediately “annihilate” the Highland Brigade.
Starting on daybreak on October 10, the Highland Brigade
came under counterattack with the Stormont, Dundas and Glengary Highland
regiment, known as the “Glens” in the Canadian Army, spending two days fighting
for the village of Hoofdplaat with a loss of 17 dead and 44 wounded. The North
Nova Scotia Highlanders took three days to take the village of Driewegen, with
the regimental war diary reporting: “The artillery is kept busy and this dyke
to dyke fighting is very different to what we have been doing. It appears the
enemy are a much better type than we have been running into lately.” The
Canadian Army was known for the quality of its artillery, which took a heavy
toll on the German counterattacks by day, with the war diary of 15th Field
Regiment for 12 October reading: “Today we were the busiest we have been since
Cormelles and Falaise pocket days.” The Germans’ nightly attacks enjoyed more
success, with the Highland Light Infantry losing and then retaking the village
of Biervliet during a confusing night battle. Canadian Major-General Daniel
Spry of the 3rd Division changed the original plan to commit the 8th Brigade in
support of the 7th Brigade, and instead sent the 8th Brigade to link up with
the 4th Division and then come to the support of the 9th Brigade.
The Canadian 10th Brigade of the 4th Armoured Division
crossed the Leopold Canal and advanced at Isabella Polder. Then the 3rd
Division′s 8th Brigade was called to move south from the coastal side of the
pocket. This opened up a land-based supply route into the pocket. Eberding used
his reserves in his counterattacks and reported to the Oberkommando der
Wehrmacht that some units of the 64th Division had “been reduced to one third.”
Between October 10 and 15, the 64th Division staged a “fighting retreat,” as
Eberding called it, to new pocket designed to shorten his lines, since so many
of his units were now under-strength. The Canadian Scottish Regiment found the
village of Eede empty and abandoned, entered the village and promptly came
under heavy artillery bombardment. The Queen’s Own Rifles regiment, leading the
advance of the 8th Brigade, found the village of IJzendijke “well defended” on
October 15, but abandoned the next day. The Highland Light Infantry and the
“Glens” broke through the main German line, but General Spry, unaware of this,
ordered a withdrawal, in order to concentrate greater forces.
The German officers explained away their retreat by claiming
they were being overwhelmed by tanks, but in fact there were only four,
belonging to the British Columbia Regiment, operating north of the Leopold
canal. The presumed tanks were actually the M10 self-propelled anti-tank guns
of the 3rd Canadian Anti-Tank Regiment which provided fire support to the
Canadian infantry. Joining the Canadians on October 20 were the 157th Highland
Light Infantry Brigade of the 52nd Division, which allowed Spry to group the
three brigades of the 3rd Division for the final push.
Since the summer of 1944, the Canadian Army experienced a
major shortage of infantrymen, owing to policies of Prime Minister William Lyon
Mackenzie-King. In order to defeat Maurice Duplessis, the Union Nationale
premier of Quebec who called a snap election in 1939 to seek a mandate to
oppose the war, Mackenzie-King had promised that only volunteers would be sent
to fight overseas and that there would be no overseas conscription. With only
so many Canadians willing to volunteer, especially as infantry, the Canadian
Army ran seriously short of infantrymen, as their losses were not compensated
by replacements. In planning the final push, Spry favored a cautious,
methodical approach, emphasizing firepower that was designed to save as many of
the lives of his men as possible.
The 3rd Division fought additional actions to clear German
troops from the towns of Breskens, Oostburg, Zuidzande, and Cadzand, as well as
the coastal fortress Fort Frederik Hendrik. When advancing, the Canadians
proceeded very slowly and used massive firepower via air strikes and artillery
bombardments when faced with opposition. The shortage of infantry replacements
meant that Canadian officers were loath to engage in operations that might lead
to heavy losses. On October 24, Field Marshal Montgomery arrived at the
headquarters of the 3rd Division. Despite the fact that Montgomery had chosen
to fight the Battle of Arnhem instead of clearing the Scheldt in September
1944, thus having allowed the Germans to dig in, he criticized the 3rd Canadian
Division for its slow advance, saying the Breskens Pocket should have been
cleared weeks ago and calling the Canadian officers cowards for their
unwillingness to take heavy losses. As a result, the 157th Brigade was
withdrawn as a punishment and the 3rd Division was ordered to press on with
“all speed.”
Despite the fact that the Canadians could not afford heavy
losses, the 3rd Division began a period of “intense combat” to clear out the
Breskens Pocket. The Régiment de la Chaudière attacked the town of Oostburg on
October 24, losing an entire company, but since they had been ordered to take
Oostburg at “any price,” the “Chads” dug in to hold their ground while the
Queen’s Own Rifles came to their aid. On October 25, the Queen’s Own Rifles
took Oostburg after what its war diary called “a wild bayonet charge” amid
“fairly heavy” casualties. Lieutenant Boos of the A company of the Queen’s Own
Rifles was awarded the Military Cross for leading what should have been a
suicidal bayonet charge on the Oostburg town gates but ended with him and his men
taking the gates. Despite tenacious German opposition, inspired at least in
part by Eberding’s policy of executing soldiers who retreated without orders,
the Canadians pushed the Germans back steadily. In the last days of the battle,
German morale declined and the number of executions of “deserters” increased as
many German soldiers wished to surrender rather than die in what was clearly a
lost battle. The Régiment de la Chaudière, which could ill-afford the losses,
seized a bridgehead on the Afleidingskanaal van de Lije (Derivation Canal of
the Lys), over which the engineers built a bridge.
On November 1, the North Nova Scotia Highlanders stormed a
pillbox and captured Eberding, who despite his own orders to fight to the death
for the Führer, surrendered without firing a shot. After being taken prisoner,
Eberding met Spry and accused him of not being aggressive enough in taking
advantage of “opportunities,” saying any German general would have moved far
more swiftly. Spry responded that having lost about 700 men killed in two
“aggressive” operations within five days, he preferred a methodical advance
that preserved the lives of his men. Eberling replied that this showed
“weakness” on the side of the Canadians, noting that Wehrmacht generals were
only concerned with winning and never let concern with casualties interfere
with the pursuit of victory.
Operation Switchback ended on November 3, when the Canadian
1st Army liberated the Belgian towns of Knokke and Zeebrugge, officially
closing the Breskens Pocket and eliminating all German forces south of the
Scheldt. Montgomery also bestowed the nickname “Water Rats” on the 3rd Canadian
Infantry Division, a play on the Desert Rats title the 7th Armoured Division
had earned in the Western Desert. General Harry Crerar reportedly hated the
term, though it was meant as a tribute to their success in amphibious
operations in Normandy and the Scheldt.
On the afternoon of October 22, Major-General Foulkes, as
acting commander of the 2nd Canadian Corps told the 2nd Canadian Division that
the start of Operation Vitality, the operation to take the South Beveland
peninsula, had been pushed forward by two days by the “express orders from
Field Marshal Montgomery who had placed this operation at first priority for
the British and Canadian forces in this area.” Major Ross Ellis of the Calgary
Highland Regiment told Foulkes that the men were tired after the hard fighting
earlier in October, only to be informed that the operation would go through.
Morale in the 2nd Division was poor, with only the Royal Regiment of Canada,
the Essex Scottish Regiment, the Cameron Highland Regiment and the Calgary
Highlanders being anything close to assembling four rifle companies. The attack
was to be led by the 6th Brigade consisting of the Cameron Highlanders, the
battered South Saskatchewan Regiment and the even more battered Fusiliers
Mont-Royal, who despite being very under-strength were assigned to lead the
attack on the center. This third major operation opened on October 24, when the
2nd Canadian Infantry Division began its advance down the South Beveland
peninsula. The Canadians hoped to advance rapidly, bypassing opposition and
seizing bridgeheads over the Kanaal door Zuid-Beveland (Canal through South
Beveland), but they too were slowed by mines, mud and strong enemy defenses.
The war diary of the Fusiliers Mont-Royal reports simply
that the regiment had taken “heavy casualties,” the Cameron Highlanders
reported “stiff opposition” from the 6th Parachute Regiment of the Luftwaffe,
while the South Saskatchewan Regiment reported: “The county over which we had
come was not the kind you dream about to make an attack in as it was partly
wooded, partly open, and it had many buildings, ditches, etc.” Joining the 6th
Brigade later that day were the 5th Brigade, with the Calgary Highlanders
leading the assault and reporting the “remnants” of two platoons that had
advanced beyond the dyke to be joined by the Black Watch when night fell. The
Royal Regiment had seized its start-line during the night and in the early
morning was joined by the Essex Scottish Regiment and the Fort Garry Horse
Regiment to make a slow advance supported by heavy artillery fire. On October
25, the Essex Scottish Regiment reported that 120 Germans had surrendered and
that the “tough shell of defenses at the narrowest point of the peninsula was
broken.” On October 26, the 70th Infantry Division’s commander General Wilhelm
Daser reported to Rundstedt that the situation was untenable, and that retreat
was unavoidable.
An amphibious attack was made across the Western Scheldt by
the British 52nd (Lowland) Division to get in behind the German′s Canal through
South Beveland defensive positions. The 156th West Scottish Brigade described
the Dutch countryside as “extremely difficult,” but also noted that German
morale was poor, stating that they had expected the Wehrmacht to fight harder
and that most of their casualties were coming from mines and booby-traps. With
the formidable German defense outflanked, the Canadian 6th Infantry Brigade began
a frontal attack in assault boats. The engineers were able to bridge the canal
on the main road.
With the canal line gone, the German defense crumbled and
South Beveland was cleared. The third phase of the Battle of the Scheldt was
now complete. Daser ordered his men to retreat and make a stand on “Fortress
Walcheren.”
As the fourth phase of the battle opened, only the island of
Walcheren at the mouth of the Scheldt remained in German hands. The island’s
defenses were extremely strong: heavy coastal batteries on the western and
southern coasts defended both the island and the Western Scheldt Estuary, and
the coastline had been strongly fortified against amphibious assaults.
Furthermore, a landward-facing defensive perimeter had been built around the town
of Flushing (Dutch: Vlissingen) to defend its port facilities, should an Allied
landing on Walcheren succeed. The only land approach was the Sloedam, a long,
narrow causeway from South Beveland, little more than a raised two-lane road.
To complicate matters, the flats that surrounded this causeway were too
saturated with sea water for movement on foot but had too little water for an
assault in storm boats.
To hamper German defense, Walcheren island’s dykes were
breached by attacks from RAF Bomber Command. Due to the high risks for the
local population, the bombings were sanctioned at the highest level and
preceded by leafleting to warn the island’s inhabitants. The first bombing was
on October 3 at Westkapelle, on the western shore of the island. The Westkapelle
dyke was attacked by 240 heavy bombers, resulting in a large gap that allowed
the seawater to enter. This flooded the central part of the island, allowing
the use of amphibious vehicles and forcing the German defenders onto the high
ground surrounding the island and in the towns. The bombing at Westkapelle came
with severe loss of life, with 180 civilian deaths resulting from the
bombardment and the resulting flooding. Attacks on other dykes had to ensure
that the flooding could not be contained. On October 7, dykes in the south were
bombed, west and east of Flushing. Finally, on October 11, northern dykes at
Veere became a target. Bombing against the island defenses was hampered by bad
weather and requirements for attacks on Germany.
The island was then attacked from three directions: across
the Sloedam causeway from the east, across the Scheldt from the south, and by
sea from the west.
The 2nd Canadian Infantry Division attacked the Sloedam
causeway on October 31. Post-war controversy exists around the claim that there
was a “race” within the 2nd Division for the first regiment to take the
causeway to Walcheren island, implicating that the failure to take the causeway
on October 31 was due to reckless determination to win the “race.” Colonel C.P.
Stacey wrote about the “race” in the official history of the Canadian Army, a
charge that was vehemently disputed by Copp and Vogel in the Maple Leaf Route.
The 4th Brigade of the 2nd Division had advanced rapidly up
to the causeway, which led to Brigadier Keefler giving orders to take the
causeway while the task of taking the Beveland end of the causeway had been
given to the 52nd Division. The Royal Regiment took the eastern end of the
causeway in a night attack. As there seemed an actual chance of taking the
entire causeway, orders were sent to the 5th Brigade of the 2nd Division to
launch an attack, to be led by the “jinxed” Black Watch who were to advance
down the causeway while the Calgary Highlanders and Le Régiment de Maisonneuve
were to advance by boat. An initial attack by the Black Watch was rebuffed
while it discovered the waters in the channel were too shallow for the 2nd
Division to cross it, leaving a company of the Black Watch stranded on the
causeway under heavy German attack. The Calgary Highlanders then sent a company
over which was also stopped halfway across the causeway. During a second attack
on the morning of November 1, the Highlanders managed to gain a precarious
foothold. A day of fighting followed and then the Highlanders were relieved by
the Régiment de Maisonneuve, who struggled to maintain the bridgehead. The
Régiment de Maisonneuve finally did secure the bridgehead, only to find that it
was useless for an advance, since the German defenses in the polderland were
too entrenched for an advance to be made.
General Foulkes ordered Major-General Hakewill-Smith to
launch the 52nd Division into a frontal attack on Walcheren, which
Hakewill-Smith protested strongly. The “Maisies” withdrew onto the Causeway on
November 2, to be relieved by the 1st Battalion, Glasgow Highlanders of the
52nd Division. Instead of launching a frontal attack as ordered by Foulkes,
Hakewill-Smith outflanked the Germans by landing the Cameronian regiment at the
village of Nieuwdorp, two miles south of the causeway, and linked up with the
Glasgow Highlanders the next day. In conjunction with the waterborne attacks,
the 52nd continued the advance. The battle for the causeway had caused the 2nd
Division 135 dead in what has become of the most controversial operations of
the 2nd Division, with much criticism centering on the decisions of Foulkes.
Despite the fact that Lieutenant-General Simonds and Foulkes were both British
immigrants to Canada, the two detested one another and Simonds often spoke of
his wish to sack Foulkes, believing him to be incompetent.
Because of port shortage, Captain Pugsley of the Royal Navy
had to improvise heavily to provide the necessary shipping for the landings on
Walcheren island. Despite the refusal of Bomber Command to strike various
German fortifications on Walcheren, opening up the Scheldt was regarded as so
important that during a meeting on October 31 between Simonds, Foulkes, and
Admiral Ramsay, it was decided that the landings on Walcheren were to go ahead.
Captain Pugsley, aboard the command ship HMS Kingsmill, was given the final
decision, with orders to cancel the operation if he thought it was too risky.
At the same time, Simonds ordered two Canadian artillery regiments to
concentrate 300 guns on the mainland, to provide fire support for the landings.
The amphibious landings were conducted in two parts on November 1.
Operation Infatuate I consisted mainly of infantry of the
155th Infantry Brigade (4th and 5th battalions King’s Own Scottish Borderers,
7th/9th battalion, Royal Scots) and No. 4 Commando, who were ferried across
from Breskens in small landing craft to an assault beach in the south-eastern
area of Flushing, codenamed “Uncle” Beach. With the Canadian artillery opening
fire, the 4th Commando were carried ashore in twenty Landing Craft Assaults, to
be followed by the King’s Own Scottish Borderers regiment who attacked
Flushing. During the next few days, they engaged in heavy street fighting
against the German defenders, destroying much of Flushing. The Hotel Britannia,
which before the war had catered to British tourists, was the headquarters of
the German 1019th Regiment holding Flushing and became the scene of
“spectacular fighting” described as “worthy of an action film” when the Royal
Scots regiment engaged to take the hotel, which finally fell after three days.
Operation Infatuate II was the amphibious landing at
Westkapelle, also conducted on the morning of November 1. To cross the shallow
water required a daylight assault with fire support provided by the Support
Squadron Eastern Flank (SSEF) commanded by Commander K.A Sellar, with
additional support from the battleship HMS Warspite and two monitors, HMS
Erebus and HMS Roberts. Air support was limited due to weather conditions. With
no air support, no spotter aircraft to guide the guns of his ships, and the
Germans fully alerted with their coastal artillery already firing at the
British ships, Captain Pugsley was faced with the difficult decision to cancel
or proceed, and after some deliberation, sent out the message reading “Nelson,”
which was the code name to land. The radar-guided guns of the German coastal
artillery took a heavy toll on the SSEF, which lost 9 ships sunk and another 11
that were so badly damaged that they had to be broken up for scrap as they were
beyond repair. After a heavy bombardment by the Royal Navy (a battleship and
two monitors, plus a support squadron of landing craft carrying guns), troops
of 4th Special Service Brigade (Nos. 41, 47, and 48 Royal Marines Commando and
No. 10 Inter Allied Commando, consisting mainly of Belgian and Norwegian
troops) supported by the specialized armored vehicles (amphibious transports,
mine-clearing tanks, bulldozers, etc.) of the 79th Armoured Division were
landed on both sides of the gap in the sea dyke, using large landing craft as
well as amphibious vehicles to bring men and tanks ashore. The Royal Marines
took Westkapelle and Domburg the next day. Anticipating the fall of “Fortress
Walcheren,” on November 4, Admiral Ramsay ordered that mine-sweepers start the
work of removing the German mines from the river Scheldt, a task that was not
completed until 28 November.
Heavy fighting ensued in Domburg as well before the ruins of
the town were captured. On 3 November, the Royal Marines had linked with the
52nd Division. Part of the troops moved south-east toward Flushing, while the
main force went north-east to clear the northern half of Walcheren (in both
cases along the high-lying dune areas, as the center of the island was flooded)
and link up with the Canadian troops who had established a bridgehead on the
eastern part of the island. Fierce resistance was again offered by some of the
German troops defending this area, so that fighting continued until November 7.
On November 6, the island capital Middelburg fell after a
calculated gamble on the Allies’ part when the Royal Scots attacked Middelburg
with a force of Buffaloes from the rear. Since Middelburg was impossible to
reach with tanks, due to the inundations, a force of amphibious Landing Vehicle
Tracked (“Buffaloes”) were driven into the town, forcing an end to all German
resistance on November 8. General Daser portrayed the Buffaloes as tanks,
giving him an excuse to surrender as he was faced with an overwhelming force.
Meanwhile, the Canadian 4th Armoured Division had pushed
eastward past Bergen-op-Zoom to Sint Philipsland where it sank several German
vessels in Zijpe harbor.
With the approach to Antwerp clear, the fourth phase of the
Battle of the Scheldt was complete. Between 20 and 28 November Royal Navy
minesweepers were brought in to clear the Scheldt Estuary of naval mines and
other underwater obstacles left by the Germans. On November 28, after much
needed repairs of the port facilities, the first convoy entered Antwerp, led by
the Canadian-built freighter Fort Cataraqui.
At the end of the five-week offensive, the Canadian First
Army had taken 41,043 German prisoners. Complicated by the waterlogged terrain,
the Battle of the Scheldt proved to be a challenging campaign in which the
losses suffered by the Canadians exacerbated another conscription crisis.
Throughout the Battle of the Scheldt, battle exhaustion was
a major problem for the Canadians. The 3rd Canadian Division had landed on D-Day
on 6 June 1944 and had been fighting more or less continuously since. During
the Normandy campaign, the 3rd Canadian Division had taken the heaviest losses
of all the divisions in the 21st Army Group, with the 2nd Canadian Division
taking the second-heaviest losses. A psychiatric report from October 1944
stated that 90% of battle exhaustion cases were men who been in action for
three months or longer. Men suffering from battle exhaustion would go catatonic
and curl up in fetal position, but the report found that after a week of rest,
most men would recover enough to speak and move about. According to the report,
the principle cause of battle exhaustion “seemed to be futility. The men
claimed there was nothing to which to look forward to – no rest, no leave, no
enjoyment, no normal life and no escape.... The second most prominent
cause...seemed to be the insecurity in battle because the condition of the
battlefield did not allow for average cover. The third was the fact that they
were seeing too much continual death and destruction, loss of friends, etc.”
The Canadian government policy of sending only volunteers overseas had caused
major shortages of men, especially in the infantry regiments. Canadian units
were too under-strength to allow leave, where U.S. and British units could.
This stretched the soldiers tremendously. A common complaint of soldiers
suffering from battle exhaustion was that the Army was to trying to “get blood
from a stone,” with the under-strength units being pushed relentlessly to keep
fighting, without replacements for their losses and no chance to rest.
After the first ship reached Antwerp on November 28, convoys
started bringing a steady stream of supplies to the continent, which began to
re-energize the stalled Allied advance from Paris to the Rhine. Germany
recognized the danger of the Allies having a deep-water port and in an attempt
to destroy it – or at least disrupt the flow of supplies – the German military
fired more V-2 rockets at Antwerp than at any other city. Nearly half of the
V-2s launched during the war were aimed at Antwerp. The port of Antwerp was so
strategically vital that during the Battle of the Bulge, the last major German
offensive campaign on the Western Front, one of the primary German objectives
was to retake the city and its port.
The Battle of the Scheldt has been described by historians
as unnecessarily difficult, as it could have been cleared earlier and more
easily had the Allies given it a higher priority than Operation Market Garden.
American historian Charles B. MacDonald called the failure to immediately take
the Scheldt “[o]ne of the greatest tactical mistakes of the war.” Because of
the flawed strategic choices made by the Allies in early September 1944, the
battle became one of the longest and bloodiest that the Canadian army faced
over the course of the Second World War.
The French Channel ports were “resolutely defended” like
“fortresses” and Antwerp was the only viable alternative. But Field Marshal
Montgomery ignored Admiral Cunningham, who said that Antwerp would be “as much
use as Timbuctoo” unless the approaches were cleared, and Admiral Ramsay, who
warned SHAEF and Montgomery that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary
with ease.
The Antwerp city and port fell in early September and were
secured by XXX Corps under the command of Lieutenant General Brian Horrocks.
Montgomery halted XXX Corps for resupply short of the wide Albert Canal to the
north of the city, which consequently remained in enemy hands. Horrocks
regretted this after the war, believing that his corps might have advanced
another 100 miles (160 km) with the fuel available. Unknown to the Allies, at
that time XXX Corps was opposed by only a single German division.
The pause allowed the Germans to regroup around the Scheldt River,
and by the time the Allies resumed their advance, General Kurt Student’s 1st
Parachute Army had arrived and set up strong defensive positions along the
opposite side of the Albert Canal and Scheldt river. The task of breaking the
strengthened German line, which stretched from Antwerp to the North Sea along
the Scheldt River, would fall to the First Canadian Army in the month-long,
costly Battle of the Scheldt. The Canadians “sustained 12,873 casualties in an
operation which could have been achieved at little cost if tackled immediately
after the capture of Antwerp. .... This delay was a grave blow to the Allied
build-up before winter approached.”
The British historian Beevor was of opinion that Montgomery,
not Horrocks was to blame for not clearing the approaches, as Montgomery “was
not interested in the estuary and thought that the Canadians could clear it
later.” Allied commanders were looking ahead to “leaping the Rhine...in
virtually one bound.” Despite Eisenhower wanting the capture of one major port
with its dock facilities intact, Montgomery insisted that the First Canadian
Army should clear the German garrisons in Boulogne, Calais and Dunkirk first,
although these ports had all suffered demolitions and would not be navigable
for some time. Boulogne (Operation Wellhit) and Calais (Operation Undergo) were
captured on 22 and 29 September 1944; but Dunkirk was not captured until the
end of the war on 9 May 1945 (see Siege of Dunkirk). When the Canadians
eventually stopped their assaults on the northern French ports and started on
the Scheldt approaches on 2 October, they found that German resistance was far
stronger than they had imagined, as the remnants of the Fifteenth Army had had
time to escape and reinforce the island of Walcheren and the South Beveland
peninsula.
Winston Churchill claimed in a telegram to Jan Smuts on
October 9 that “As regards Arnhem, I think you have got the position a little
out of focus. The battle was a decided victory, but the leading division,
asking, quite rightly, for more, was given a chop. I have not been afflicted
with any feeling of disappointment over this and am glad our commanders are
capable of running this kind of risk.” He said that the risks ...” were
justified by the great prize so nearly in our grasp” but acknowledged that
“[c]learing the Scheldt Estuary and opening the port of Antwerp had been
delayed for the sake of the Arnhem thrust. Thereafter it was given first
priority.”
 |
| The Northern Front, 16 October-10 November 1944. |
 |
| Battle of the Scheldt, October-November 1944. |
 |
| The Battle of the Scheldt, October-November 1944. |
 |
| Battle of the Scheldt (Breskens pocket). |
 |
| The Walcheren Causeway, 31 October-2 November 1944. |
 |
| The Capture of Walcheren, 1-8 November 1944. |
 |
| The Commander of 21st Army Group, General Sir Bernard Montgomery, during his first press conference for Allied war correspondents after the Allied invasion of Normandy, June 11, 1944. |
 |
| Captain W.A. Teed (foreground) of the North Shore Regiment, Embarkation Staff Officer of the 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade, talking with Captain C.J. Aendry, commanding officer of an Alligator amphibious vehicle, near Terneuzen, Netherlands, October 13, 1944. |
 |
| Landing craft and vehicles of the Canadian First Army engaged in clearing the Scheldt estuary near Antwerp. |
 |
| Amphibians (Buffalos) coming ashore at Westkapelle. |
 |
| The occupation of Walcheren Island is going fast. Flushing is in the hands of the British and troops fanning out to the West are close to the Marine Commandos coming down from the Westkapelle beachhead (where these pictures were taken). This image shows 3” mortars in action from behind the cover of amphibious tanks. The commandos are wearing Denison smocks. |
 |
| In the Breskens Pocket across the West Scheldt from Walcheren Island, German soldiers man a machine gun position that is partially camouflaged with tree branches. |
 |
| Canadian soldiers of the Calgary Highlanders march past a German Sturmgeschütz assault gun that has been knocked out during earlier fighting. This photo was taken in South Beveland during the advance against stubborn German resistance on Walcheren Island in October 1944. |
 |
| Personnel of the Toronto Scottish Regiment (M.G.) aboard a motorboat en route from Beveland to North Beveland, Netherlands, November 1, 1944. |
 |
| Sherman and Stuart tanks, Priest and assorted other vehicles of the 5th Canadian Armoured Division. |
 |
| As the sound of sniper fire rings out, Scottish soldiers of the 52nd Lowland Division crouch behind a piece of heavy equipment in Flushing on Walcheren Island. |
 |
| As the hard-fought campaign to clear the Scheldt Estuary of German resistance draws to a close, British commandos round up surrendering enemy soldiers in Westkapelle. |
 |
| Lt.General Wilhelm Daser, Commander of the 70th Infantry Division and Fortress Commander of Walcheren, led into captivity accompanied by Major Hugh Johnston of the Royal Scots. |
