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| Joachim Peiper. |
U.S. Army
The following is a reprint of ETHINT 11, prepared by the U.S. Army. Copy obtained from the National Archives, Washington, D.C. Answers were re-transcribed by the interviewer.
According to captured maps depicting the axis of advance for 1 and 12 SS Panzer Divisions, the latter is given three routes and the former two. The most southern 12 SS Panzer Division route lies from Losheim to Losheimergraben to Buellingen to Butgenbach, etc. Obst. Peiper has stated that his regiment’s route lay from Scheid to Losheim to Losheimergraben to Huenningen to Honsfeld. This would appear to leave 12 SS Panzer Division two poor “penetration” routes into the Rocherath area through heavily forested terrain from the direction of Hollerath and Neuhof. The map also shows the northern route of 1 SS Panzer Division as springing from Lanzerath, but Obst. Peiper states that this route was taken only after the Losheim – Losheimergraben route proved to be unusable because of resistance and the blown bridge. Can Obst. Peiper explain this further? Was the Losheim – Losheimergraben route taken away from 12 SS Panzer Division and given to 1 SS Panzer Division, thus changing the original plan?
The route from Losheim to Honsfeld was that designated for 1 SS Panzer Division; however, Buellingen was on the route of 12 SS Panzer Division. Due to the conditions of the road west from Honsfeld through Hepscheid to Moderscheid, Obst. Peiper chose the better route and proceeded through Buellingen to Richelsbusch to Moderscheid. At the time, 1 SS Panzer Regiment was considerably in advance of the elements of 12 SS Panzer Division. Therefore the road would not be congested by two columns, one from each division. In addition, Peiper knew that large stores of gasoline were in the town of Buellingen. In the town they captured some 30,000 gallons (liters?) [In ETHINT 10, Obst. Peiper speaks of capturing 200,000 liters of gasoline in Buellingen, or about 52,500 gallons.] of gasoline in cans. Some artillery fire and direct fire was received from the high ground and woods about two kilometers northwest of the town. After refueling, the column continued to the southwest and closed upon its originally designated axis of advance. At the time of the initial assault, the tanks had only enough gas for approximately 50 miles of operation—approximately one-half of the basic load, without any reserve.
Did elements of 12 SS Panzer Division use the Lanzerath route to reach Buellingen after 1 SS Panzer Division had moved on to the west?
The elements of 12 SS Panzer Division were stopped by an American counterattack north of Buellingen, where they were halted and unable to advance. The 12 SS Panzer Division was later withdrawn from the vicinity and sent to follow the axis of the penetration of 1 SS Panzer Regiment. To Peiper’s knowledge, 12 SS Panzer Division did not pass through Buellingen. It circled, instead, and came into the axis of advance of 1 SS Panzer Regiment at Honsfeld. [12 SS Panzer Division did not enter Buellingen from the direction of Rocherath but moved up from Lanzerath to Honsfeld to Buellingen. —First Lieutenant George M. Tuttle]
Did 1 SS Panzer Regiment make any attempt to move up into Butgenbach from Buellingen? If no attempt was made in force, were reconnaissance elements sent from Buellingen in the direction of Butgenbach? In the direction of Wirtzfeld?
No reconnaissance was sent toward Butgenbach from Buellingen, as they [1 SS Panzer Regiment?] were receiving heavy resistance from that direction. Peiper’s orders were to penetrate as far as possible and exploit his breakthrough. Therefore, he did not attempt to smash resistance on his flanks, as he expected 12 SS Panzer Division to move up and cover his northern flank. Peiper lost one Royal Tiger [King Tiger] tank west of Buellingen.
Was the bulk of 3 Fallschirmjäger Division left to hold the front between Waimes and Butgenbach? Did it follow immediately in the path of 1 SS Panzer Division? (It is understood that small elements of 3 FS Division were with 1 SS Panzer Regiment.) Where was the rest of 3 FS Division?
The 3 FS Division was responsible for holding the north flank behind the advancing armored columns. The 10 FS Regiment [5, 8 and 9 FS Regiments were organic to 3 FS Division. However, this division was engaged in the Ardennes Offensive, and 4 FS Division, to which 10 FS Regiment was assigned, was not; therefore the regiment in question must have been one from 3 FS Division], 3 FS Division, was attached to follow 1 SS Panzer Regiment. The remainder of the division moved northward after the armor had passed to the west and held a line generally between Butgenbach and Waimes. The 3 FS Division had been annihilated in previous campaigns in Normandy and at the time of the Ardennes attack was composed of a large number of air force personnel who were former ground and flight crews. [Paratroopers in the Wehrmacht were a part of the Luftwaffe; thus much of the personnel did not have suitable infantry training.] The commanding officer of 10 FS Regiment was a Luftwaffe staff obst. with little if any ground force experience. Obst. Peiper was an obstlt. at the time and was more or less outranked. The new result was that the armored column did not obtain efficient cooperation with the infantry. One battalion of infantry, however, worked in close cooperation with the tanks in the capture of Honsfeld, and elements amounting to about a reinforced company were still riding the tanks when Peiper’s forces reached Stavelot. The remainder of 3 FS Division moved up to hold the line on the north flank, as previously stated.
Was any attempt made to return to the Losheim–Losheimergraben road after moving north out of Lanzerath on the night of 16/17 December 1944? If it had been possible to cross the railroad and move up into Losheimergraben, the possibility of withdrawal for 99th Infantry Division (U.S.) elements would have been seriously interfered with, if not completely eliminated. (It is understood that this was not the mission of 1 SS Panzer Division.) Was this known at the time? Did the possibility, if known, enter into Obst. Peiper’s plans?
Peiper was aware of the fact that he could have cut off a battalion, approximately one thousand men, of 99th Infantry Division (U.S.), in the woods east of Lanzerath. However, he did not do so because it was of prime importance to exploit his breakthrough and drive on for gasoline. Therefore, Peiper did not deviate from his axis of advance.
In the move to the west, did any elements of 1 SS Panzer Division, reconnaissance or otherwise, enter Faymonville or Waimes? What information on his northern flank did Obst. Peiper have at the time?
Reconnaissance was not sent into Faymonville or Waimes because no resistance was received from the northern flank, and Peiper, who was out of contact with 12 SS Panzer Division, believed that his right flank would be covered by 12 SS Panzer Division. In addition, insufficient gasoline prohibited any needless reconnaissance.
Can Obst. Peiper remember what elements were supposed to have stopped the regiment of 3 FS Division three times in its attempt to attack from Lanzerath toward Honsfeld on 16 December 1944? (Only elements of 3rd Battalion, 394th Infantry Regiment [U.S.], were north of Lanzerath, and being in a supposedly safe reserve position, they could not have been occupying well organized positions; Honsfeld was being used as a rest center by 99th Infantry Division [U.S.].) Who was there to stop them (3 FS Regiment)?
Obst. Peiper said the FS regiment supporting his unit was repulsed three times by elements of 99th Infantry Division (U.S.), consisting of what he thought was a battalion. The unsuccessful attack was due in his opinion to the lack of experience and infantry training of the commanding officer of the regiment a great many of his men, as mentioned in answer to one of the previous questions. Obst. Peiper’s tanks met no resistance when they pushed through 10 FS Regiment in the attack.
Just what method was used to move the German armored columns forward from Lanzerath on the night of 16/17 December 1944? Were vehicles led into Honsfeld by an enlisted man carrying a flashlight? (The night was exceptionally dark, according to an interview with one of the Honsfeld defenders who also claims that German tanks entered the town in this manner before any firing took place by other defenders positioned outside of the town on the Lanzerath road.) Under what conditions was the night march from Lanzerath to Honsfeld conducted?
Obst. Peiper moved out of Lanzerath at approximately 2400 on the night of 16 December 1944 and went through the woods towards Honsfeld, without encountering any opposition. Approximately one battalion of paratroopers provided flank protection on either side of the road, as the tanks moved through the woods. During the night some interdiction fire fell in the woods; however, none was effective. Some artillery fire came close as the tanks emerged from the woods toward Honsfeld. It was daylight, about 0500 or 0600, when this column reached Honsfeld. The occupants of the town were taken by complete surprise. The march was conducted under normal blackout conditions, with guides leading each tank holding a white handkerchief for identification, and flanking infantry on either side to protect the tanks from ambush. The march was made without incident except for sporadic artillery fire, which was not effective.
Obst. Peiper speaks of only one route having been used by 1 SS Panzer Division, i.e., the one which he took stemming from Lanzerath to Stavelot. We believe that there is evidence to conclude that this division had planned and did use another route also, i.e., one which had its origin in the vicinity of Krewinkel and whose axis of advance led through Wereth, Heppenbach, Mirfeld, Ambléve, Diedenberg, Born, Recht, and Trois Ponts. Does Obst. Peiper agree that a part of 1 SS Panzer Division took this route? If not, can he offer any explanation for the appearance of armor generally along this axis of advance?
The route mentioned: Wereth – Heppenbach – Mirfeld – Ambléve – Diedenberg – Born – Recht – and Trois Ponts was taken by other elements, which comprised the infantry regiment of 1 SS Panzer Division and the assault gun battalion. Other foot elements of the division followed this route to avoid congestion on the main axis of advance. The southern group met considerable resistance, losing eight or nine of their assault guns; however, it knocked out thirty American tanks. This group eventually was to reinforce Oberst Peiper but was held up and never made contact with him.
Oberst Peiper also mentioned that 2 Panzer Division was on his southern flank. It is known that this division was in the southern part of First (U.S.) Army zone, and that it crossed the Our River at Dasburg, due east of Clerf and 40 kilometers south of Malmédy. Who was on Oberst Peiper’s flank?
At Trois Ponts Oberst Peiper was out in front with no one on either flank. He was out of communication with his own division and due to technical difficulties with his radios and terrain could not communicate with all elements of his own columns, which was some 25 kilometers long.
Just what was known of the gas installations immediately south of Spa, and was there any intention to move north from Stoumont to capture these dumps? (Oberst Peiper denied that any of his men moved toward these dumps, but small columns went up both the valley and the ridge road from La Gleize toward these dumps, and one group actually hit the south edge of the dump.)
Before the start of the offensive Oberst Peiper was given a map marked with known American headquarters and supply installations. He knew of the gas in the one dump near Spa and also of the gasoline at Buellingen. He did not know of the presence of the other dump south of Francorchamps.
Why was no reconnaissance sent by Oberst Peiper’s group into Malmédy? Ordinarily wouldn’t flank reconnaissance be sent, even though the town was not in 1 SS Panzer Division zone of action?
Gas was getting low as Oberst Peiper’s column approached Stavelot. This reason and the fact that 12 SS Panzer Division was expected to move along the right flank, plus the fact that no resistance was being received from the north, made reconnaissance unnecessary. Heavy resistance from the towns of Ligneuville and Stavelot was the focus of Peiper’s attention. Later, the tanks were practically out of gas at Stoumont.
Give more detail on the column which crossed south of L’Ambléve River and headed for Werbomont, especially about the blowing of the bridge at Habiemont, the size of the force south of the river, and what alternate route was taken to cross the Lienne River.
The bridge over the Ambléve River was blown just in front of the leading tank. Reconnaissance was sent both north and south of the position. Small bridges were found; however, it was reported that they were too small for the 72-ton Royal Tiger tanks. The size of the force used was one reconnaissance company supported by several assault guns. The same force was sent to cross the Lienne River. It found a bridge which was too narrow to accommodate the heavy tanks; however, it crossed with its half-tracks and ran into a minefield in the area west of Chevron. This force also met heavy resistance from infantry and was annihilated. Only a few men from the force returned. The exact route taken by the reconnaissance was not known to Peiper, since he received negative information from the leaders of the unit.
Why did your columns even try to continue northwest from Stoumont up the valley road toward Aywaille, when it was obviously such a narrow road with steep gorges, which meant that even several tanks could stop you if placed at the right points?
The northwest route from Stoumont to Aywaille was chosen simply because it was the shortest route. The shortage of gasoline did not permit the selection of any alternative. Though the terrain was unfavorable for armor in view of all considerations, the shortage of gasoline prohibited any other choice. In addition, Peiper wanted to capture the bridge at Aywaille, which was one of the prime objectives in his original mission.