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| A wounded soldier of the 35th Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division, is being assisted down a steep jungle hillside, then through the jungle to the Matanikau River and by boat and ambulance to a nearby hospital. Guadalcanal, January 15, 1943. (US Army photo) |
The Battle of Mount
Austen, the Galloping Horse, and the Sea Horse, part of which is sometimes
called the Battle of the Gifu, took place from 15 December 1942 to 23 January
1943 and was primarily an engagement between United States and Imperial
Japanese forces in the hills near the Matanikau River area on Guadalcanal
during the Guadalcanal Campaign. The U.S. forces were under the overall command
of Alexander Patch and the Japanese forces were under the overall command of
Harukichi Hyakutake.
In the battle, U.S.
soldiers and Marines, assisted by native Solomon Islanders, attacked Imperial
Japanese Army (IJA) forces defending well-fortified and entrenched positions on
several hills and ridges. The most prominent hills were called Mount Austen,
the Galloping Horse, and the Sea Horse by the Americans. The U.S. was
attempting to destroy the Japanese forces on Guadalcanal and the Japanese were
trying to hold their defensive positions until reinforcements could arrive.
Both sides experienced
extreme difficulties in fighting in the thick jungles and tropical environment
that existed in the battle area. Many of the American troops were also involved
in their first combat operations. The Japanese were mostly cut off from
resupply and suffered greatly from malnourishment and lack of medical care.
After some difficulty, the U.S. succeeded in taking Mount Austen, in the
process reducing a strongly defended position called the Gifu, as well as the
Galloping Horse and the Sea Horse. In the meantime, the Japanese decided to
abandon Guadalcanal and withdrew to the west coast of the island. From that
location most of the surviving Japanese troops were successfully evacuated
during the first week of February 1943.
Background
Eight months after the
beginning of the Pacific War, on 7 August 1942, Allied forces (primarily U.S.)
landed on Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Florida Islands in the Solomon Islands. The
landings on the islands were meant to deny their use by the Japanese as bases
for threatening the supply routes between the U.S. and Australia, and to secure
the islands as starting points for a campaign with the eventual goal of
isolating the major Japanese base at Rabaul while also supporting the Allied
New Guinea campaign. The landings initiated the six-month-long Guadalcanal campaign.
The Japanese were taken
by surprise. By nightfall on 8 August, the 11,000 Allied troops—primarily from
the 1st Marine Division of the United States Marine Corps under the command of
Lieutenant General Alexander Vandegrift—secured Tulagi and nearby small islands
as well as the Japanese airfield under construction at Lunga Point on
Guadalcanal. The Allies later renamed the airfield Henderson Field. Allied
aircraft operating out of Henderson were called the “Cactus Air Force” (CAF)
after the Allied code name for Guadalcanal. To protect the airfield, the U.S.
Marines established a perimeter defense around Lunga Point. Additional reinforcements
over the next two months later increased the number of U.S. troops at Lunga
Point on Guadalcanal to more than 20,000.
In response to the
Allied landings on Guadalcanal, the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters
assigned the Imperial Japanese Army’s 17th Army—a corps-sized command based at
Rabaul and under the command of Lieutenant General Harukichi Hyakutake—with the
task of retaking Guadalcanal. Units of the 17th Army began to arrive on
Guadalcanal on 19 August to drive Allied forces from the island.
Because of the threat
by CAF aircraft based at Henderson Field, the Japanese were unable to use
large, slow transport ships to deliver troops and supplies to the island.
Instead, the Japanese used warships based at Rabaul and the Shortland Islands
to carry their forces to Guadalcanal. The Japanese warships—mainly light
cruisers or destroyers from the Eighth Fleet under the command of Vice Admiral
Gunichi Mikawa—were usually able to make the round trip down “The Slot” to
Guadalcanal and back in a single night, thereby minimizing their exposure to
CAF air attack. Delivering the troops in this manner, however, prevented most
of the soldiers’ heavy equipment and supplies, such as heavy artillery,
vehicles, and much food and ammunition, from being carried to Guadalcanal with
them. These high-speed warship runs to Guadalcanal occurred throughout the
campaign and were later called the “Tokyo Express” by the Allies and “Rat
Transportation” by the Japanese.
Using forces delivered
to Guadalcanal in this manner, the Japanese tried three times to retake
Henderson Field, but they were defeated each time. First, a reinforced
battalion from the 28th Infantry Regiment was defeated in the Battle of the
Tenaru on 21 August. Next, the augmented 35th Infantry Brigade was defeated in
the Battle of Edson’s Ridge on 12–14 September. Finally, the 2nd Infantry
Division augmented by one regiment from the 38th Infantry Division was defeated
with heavy losses in the Battle for Henderson Field on 23–26 October.
Throughout the
campaign, the Japanese used Mount Austen (called Bear Height by the Japanese
and Mount Mambulu by the local Solomon Islanders), located west of the Lunga
River and about 6 mi (9.7 km) from Henderson Field, to observe the American
defenses around Lunga Point. Emplaced artillery on Mount Austen delivered
harassing fire on Henderson Field. The hill was also used as a defensive point
to protect their positions around the upper Matanikau valley as well as to
protect the Maruyama Road, which was a trail used by the Japanese to move men
and supplies into the interior of the island. Mount Austen—with a summit of
1,514 ft (461 m)—was not a single peak, but a mixed ridgeline of rocky exposed
and jungle-covered ridges and hilltops. After the defeat in the Battle for
Henderson Field, the Army Section of Imperial General Headquarters directed
Hyakutake to increase the numbers of troops and artillery emplaced on the
ridgeline to help prepare for the next planned attack on the Americans.
Therefore, Hyakutake directed some of the units that were retreating from the
Henderson Field battle area to fortify Mount Austen and nearby hilltops. The
forces deployed to Mount Austen included the 124th Infantry Regiment under
Colonel Akinosuka Oka and several artillery units. Later, surviving troops from
the 230th Infantry Regiment—which had taken heavy losses during the Koli Point
action and subsequent retreat—joined Oka’s forces around Mount Austen.
Reinforcement and
Resupply
On 5, 7, and 8
November, Tokyo Express missions landed most of the 38th Division’s 228th
Infantry Regiment and the 1st Battalion, 229th Infantry Regiment on
Guadalcanal. On 10 November, Japanese destroyers landed Lieutenant General
Tadayoshi Sano—commander of the 38th Infantry Division—plus his staff and 600
more troops from the 38th. Hyakutake used the newly arrived troops to help stop
an American attack west of the Matanikau from 8–11 November, then sent the
228th and 229th Regiment’s units on 11 November to reinforce Oka’s forces.
Japanese Major General Takeo ItÅ—commander of the 38th Division’s Infantry
Group—later took command of the defenses around Mount Austen.
An attempt by the
Japanese to deliver the rest of the 38th Division and its heavy equipment
failed during the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal on 12–15 November. Only
2,000–3,000 of the remaining 7,000 troops from the division reached the island
and most of their supplies, ammunition, and equipment were lost. Because of
this failure, the Japanese canceled their next planned attempt to recapture
Henderson Field.
As December began, the
Japanese experienced considerable difficulty in keeping their troops on Guadalcanal
resupplied because of Allied air and naval attacks on the Japanese supply chain
of ships and bases. The few supplies delivered to the island were not enough to
sustain Japanese troops, who by 7 December 1942, were losing about 50 men each
day from malnutrition, disease, and Allied ground or air attacks. The Japanese
had delivered almost 30,000 army troops to Guadalcanal since the campaign
began, but by December only about 20,000 of that number were still alive. Of
those 20,000, about 12,000 remained more or less fit for combat duty. On 12
December, the Japanese Navy proposed that Guadalcanal be abandoned. Despite opposition
from Japanese Army leaders, who still hoped that Guadalcanal could eventually
be retaken from the Allies, Imperial General Headquarters, with approval from the
Emperor, on 31 December, agreed to the evacuation of all Japanese forces from
the island and establishment of a new line of defense for the Solomons on New
Georgia. The Japanese titled the evacuation effort of their forces from
Guadalcanal Operation Ke and planned to execute the operation beginning on 14
January 1943.
In the meantime, the
U.S. continued to deliver additional troops to Guadalcanal. The three infantry
regiments of the U.S. Army’s Americal Division, the 164th, the 182nd and the
132nd, were delivered to Guadalcanal on 13 October 12 November, and 8 December,
respectively. In addition, the U.S. Army’s independent 147th Infantry Regiment
plus the 2nd Marine Division’s 8th Marine Regiment landed on 4 November. The
reinforcements also included additional artillery, construction, aviation,
naval, and support units.
On 9 December, U.S.
Army Major General Alexander Patch—commanding general of the Americal Division—succeeded
Vandegrift as commander of Allied forces on Guadalcanal and Tulagi. That same
day, the 5th Marine Regiment departed the island, followed by the rest of the
1st Marine Division by the end of the month. Patch was ordered to eliminate all
Japanese forces remaining on Guadalcanal. Patch told his superior—Millard
Harmon, who commanded all U.S. Army forces in the South Pacific—that he needed
more troops to accomplish his mission. In response, Harmon ordered the 25th
Infantry Division—which was in the process of relocating from Hawaii to the
South Pacific area—to ship directly to Guadalcanal. The 25th’s units would
arrive at Guadalcanal in stages during the last two weeks of December and the
first week of January 1943. In addition, the rest of the 2nd Marine Division’s
units—including the 6th Marine Regiment—were ordered to Guadalcanal during the
same time period. By 7 January, American forces on Guadalcanal would total just
over 50,000 men.
Battles
First Battle of Mount
Austen
On 12 December 1942, a
small group of Japanese soldiers from the 38th Field Engineer Regiment successfully
infiltrated the American lines from the south, destroying a fighter aircraft
and a fuel truck on Henderson Field before escaping back to friendly lines. Two
days later, a U.S. Army patrol from the 132nd Infantry Regiment skirmished with
a group of Japanese on the eastern slopes of Mount Austen. On 15 December, in
yet another night infiltration raid onto Henderson Field, a Lieutenant Ono led
four men equipped with picric acid blocks past American sentry positions
destroying several P-39 Airacobra fighters. Throughout the Guadalcanal
campaign, Japanese forces would continue night infiltration tactics against
U.S. forces, but causing few American casualties.
General Patch, however,
was convinced that these events illustrated an unacceptable risk to Henderson
Field by Japanese troops stationed on and around nearby Mount Austen. Thus, on
16 December, in preparation for a planned general offensive to try to destroy
all Japanese forces remaining on Guadalcanal, Patch elected to first secure the
Mount Austen area. He therefore ordered the 132nd Infantry Regiment to
immediately seize the objective. While the 132nd Infantry Regiment had little
modern combat experience aside from jungle skirmishes and patrols, it was proud
of its combat history, having participated in both the Civil War and World War
I, and its young reserve officers and NCOs considered themselves skilled in
rifle and machinegun tactics and marksmanship.
The 132nd’s
commander—Colonel Leroy E. Nelson—directed his 3rd Battalion to lead the
American assault on the first of several hills, followed by the regiment’s 1st
Battalion. Artillery support was provided by 105 mm howitzers from the U.S.
Army’s 246th Field Artillery Battalion and the 75 mm pack howitzers of the 2nd
Battalion 10th Marines.
The exposed hills
making up the Mount Austen complex were arbitrarily numbered by the Americans
for reference purposes (see map at right). On 17 December, Nelson’s 3rd
Battalion—commanded by Lieutenant Colonel William C. Wright—advanced south of
Hill 35 and began to climb toward Mount Austen’s summit near Hills 20 and 21.
In order to achieve its timetable set by the division commander, the battalion
was forced to leave behind many of its support weapons, such as heavy mortars
and machine guns, and to take only limited quantities of ammunition and
supplies, all of which had to be hand-carried along hacked-out paths through
thick jungle. At 09:30 on 18 December, as Wright’s lead elements approached,
Japanese defenders pinned down the Americans with machine-gun and rifle fire.
Exhausted and dehydrated by their trek through the thick jungle, Wright’s
troops—unable to deploy quickly out of column formation—made no headway against
the Japanese defenses.
The next morning, after
an artillery barrage and air strike from the CAF, Wright went forward with
several artillery observers to investigate the terrain in front of his forces.
Using concealed fire lanes, a Japanese machine-gun team killed Wright with a
burst of fire at 09:30. Wright’s second in command, Major Louis Franco, was unable
to get forward and take command until late in the day, preventing the battalion
from continuing the attack. At the same time, Japanese riflemen infiltrated the
American positions and effectively harassed the command posts of both the 3rd
and 1st Battalions as well as the column of heavily loaded American supply and
engineer parties on the hacked-out jungle trail linking the battalions with the
Lunga perimeter. Both U.S. battalions dug in for the night while artillery
bombarded the Japanese positions.
Between 20 and 23
December, the Japanese apparently withdrew from the area, as aggressive U.S.
Army patrols encountered no more enemy in the area of Hills 20 and 21 and
further to the south. Nelson ordered the two battalions to move west to Hill 31
and then attack south towards Hill 27. On 24 December, the 3rd Battalion was
halted on the slopes of Hill 31 by intense machine-gun fire from well-concealed
positions.
Facing the Americans
was the most strongly fortified Japanese position on Guadalcanal, nicknamed
“the Gifu” (after Gifu Prefecture in Japan) by the Japanese. The Gifu position
sat between the summits of Mount Austen and Hills 27 and 31 and consisted of a
1,500 yd (1,400 m) line of 45–50 interconnected, mutually supporting,
well-camouflaged pillboxes dug into the ground and forming a horseshoe shape
with the open end to the west. Only about 3 ft (0.91 m) of each pillbox was
above ground with walls and roofs, constructed from logs and dirt, up to 2 ft
(0.61 m) thick. Each pillbox contained one to two machine-guns and several riflemen;
some were sited underneath huge jungle trees. Each of these pillbox
emplacements was sited to provide mutual support to the others. Numerous
foxholes and trenches provided additional support and cover for additional
riflemen and machine-gunners. Behind the pillboxes, the Japanese had sited 81
mm and long-range 90mm mortars. The Gifu was commanded by Major Takeyoshi
Inagaki with around 800 men from the 2nd Battalion, 228th Regiment and the 2nd
Battalion, 124th Infantry.
Between 25 and 29
December, the Japanese defenders prevented the Americans from making any
headway in their attempt to overrun the Gifu position. While the U.S. 3rd
Battalion—with artillery support—conducted frontal attacks against the position
to pin the defenders, the U.S. 1st Battalion attempted to flank the Gifu on the
east. However, as the Japanese defenses were fully integrated, the flanking
attempt was unsuccessful. By 29 December, U.S. losses had reached 53 killed,
129 wounded, and 131 sick, though morale remained high. Assisting the Americans
in this battle were Fijian commandos led by officers and non-commissioned
officers from the New Zealand Expeditionary Force.
On 2 January, Nelson
added his 2nd Battalion—commanded by Lieutenant Colonel George F. Ferry—to the
offensive and sent them on a march around the Gifu toward Hill 27. The
battalion reached the lower slopes of the hill by 16:00 without meeting serious
resistance from the Japanese. This same day, Nelson—who was physically and
mentally exhausted and may have been suffering from malaria—was replaced as
commander of the 132nd by Lieutenant Colonel Alexander M. George. Sources are
unclear whether he requested his own relief or was ordered to relinquish
command.
The next day, elements
of the 132nd’s 2nd Battalion occupied the summit of Hill 27, surprised and
killed a Japanese 75 mm artillery crew, and successfully repulsed, with help
from heavy artillery fire, six Japanese counterattacks on their positions. By
this time, the soldiers atop Hill 27 were running extremely short of ammunition
and grenades, with Japanese forces returning 10 shots to each one fired by the
Americans, and medical supplies were exhausted. The 2nd’s efforts to improve
its position were made more difficult by the hard coral underneath the hill’s
sod, which made the digging of foxholes difficult. The remainder of the 2nd
Battalion, carrying ammunition, food, and medical supplies, reached Hill 27 and
joined the battle, where they soon gained combat superiority over the attacking
Japanese. At the same time, with the infusion of new leadership by Lieutenant
Colonel George, the 1st and 3rd Battalions attacked and pushed a short way into
the Gifu, killing 25 Japanese in the process, then closed the gaps between
their units and consolidated their positions, while killing many of the
Japanese defenders. One officer from the 2nd Battalion—who had brought his
personal sniper rifle to the battle—witnessed the final disintegration of
Japanese units attacking Hill 27 with a final flurry of suicidal frontal
charges. The Japanese soldiers in the Gifu, who had apparently not been
resupplied or replenished during the battle, consumed their last remaining food
rations on 1 January.
Since the beginning of
its offensive on Mount Austen, the 132nd had lost 115 killed and 272 wounded.
The relatively high number of combat deaths were caused in part by wound
infections in the tropical conditions and inability to evacuate men wounded in
the early stages of the operation. Even after intervention by the 2nd Battalion,
wounded men continued to die, unable to withstand the arduous and slippery
portage back down improvised jungle trails on a stretcher carried by two men.
These losses, plus the effects of tropical diseases, heat, and combat
exhaustion, temporarily rendered the 132nd’s 1st and 3rd Battalions incapable
of further offensive action. Thus, on 4 January, the 1st and 3rd Battalions
were ordered to dig in and hold positions surrounding the Gifu on the north,
east, and south.
Reviewing the first
Mount Austen offensive, former Marine officer and historian Samuel B. Griffith
concluded, “As the thoroughly butchered Mount Austen operation dragged on into
January, it became apparent that both Major General Patch and his assistant
Division commander [Brigadier General Edmund Sebree] had much to unlearn, and
perhaps even more to learn.” However, while Patch’s decision to attack Mount
Austen was criticized, one participant noted the difficulties faced by the
132nd Regiment and its commanders, including the terrain, limited equipment
(light mortars and machineguns with limited ammunition supply, no flamethrowers
or pole charges), and the necessity of assaulting thoroughly integrated,
prepared, and roofed-over Japanese defenses, which resisted direct hits by 75
mm and in some cases 105 mm shells.
For its part, once the
132nd was able to treat its wounded, morale remained high in the newly blooded
regiment, which played a significant role in later combat operations on
Guadalcanal. The 2nd Battalion, with just 27 killed, was immediately assigned
to further offensive combat operations.
Losses among the Gifu
defenders are unknown, but were estimated by one 2nd Battalion officer as of 9
January 1943 at 500 killed and wounded; most of the latter would later die of
their wounds when combined with illness and starvation. A Japanese officer’s
recovered diary stated that the Japanese had suffered heavy casualties.
Japanese prisoners captured in later operations referred to the combat at Hills
27 and 31 as The Battle of the Mountain of Blood.
Arrival of American
Reinforcements
On 2 January, with the
arrival of the U.S. Army’s 25th Division and the rest of the U.S. Marine 2nd
Division, all of the American units on Guadalcanal and Tulagi were together
designated as the XIV Corps with Patch in command. Sebree took over as
commander of the Americal Division. On 5 January, Patch issued his plan to
begin operations to clear Guadalcanal of Japanese forces. The 2nd Marine
Division was to push westward from the Matanikau River along the coast while
the 25th Division was to finish clearing Mount Austen and to secure the
hilltops and ridges located around the inland forks of the Matanikau. The
Americal Division and the 147th Regiment would guard the Lunga perimeter.
The deep river ravines
of the Matanikau’s upper forks naturally divided the U.S. 25th Division’s
operations area into three distinct areas, with one main terrain feature
dominating each area. East of the Matanikau was Mount Austen. In the wedge
between the southeast and southwest forks of the Matanikau Hills 44 and 43 together
formed a terrain feature that the Americans called the “Sea Horse,” because of
its shape when viewed from above. Between the Matanikau’s southwest and
northwest forks was a much larger hill mass labeled, also because of its shape,
the “Galloping Horse.”
Major General J. Lawton
Collins—commander of the 25th Division—assigned his 35th Infantry Regiment to
clear the Gifu, secure the rest of Mount Austen, and to capture the Sea Horse.
He ordered the 27th Infantry Regiment to seize the Galloping Horse from the
north. The 35th and the 27th were then to link up on Hill 53 (the Galloping
Horse’s “Head”) to finish clearing the nearby hills and ridges. Collins placed
his 161st Infantry Regiment in reserve. Ammunition and supplies for the
attacking troops would be transported along rough jeep trails as far forward as
possible and then carried the rest of the way by native Solomon Islanders.
Having observed the
arrival of the American reinforcements to the island, the Japanese were expecting
the offensive. Hyakutake ordered the units on the hilltops around the Matanikau
and in the Gifu to hold in place in their prepared positions. The Japanese
hoped that as the Americans surrounded and intermingled with the Japanese
defensive pockets that the close quarters fighting would prevent the Americans
from employing their superior firepower in artillery and close air support. At
night, the Japanese planned to infiltrate the American rear areas and interdict
their supply lines to prevent the American assault forces from receiving
sufficient ammunition and provisions to continue their attacks. The Japanese
hoped to delay the Americans long enough for more reinforcements to arrive from
Rabaul or elsewhere.
Galloping
Horse
Viewed from overhead
with north upward, the Galloping Horse appeared upside down, with Hills 54 and
55 forming the horse’s rear legs and Hill 57 forming the front legs. From east
to west, Hills 50, 51, and 52 formed the horse’s body with the 900 ft (270 m)
high Hill 53 at the head. Colonel William A. McCulloch—commander of the 27th
Regiment—ordered his 1st Battalion to attack Hill 57 and his 3rd Battalion to
assault Hills 51 and 52 from Hill 54, which was already in American hands.
Defending the Galloping Horse and the nearby fork of the Matanikau were 600
Japanese soldiers from the 3rd Battalion, 228th Infantry Regiment under Major
Haruka (or Haruja) Nishiyama.
The American attack
commenced at 05:50 on 10 January with a bombardment by six battalions of
artillery and airstrikes by 24 CAF aircraft on suspected Japanese positions in
the valley between Hill 57 and the jumping-off point for the 1st Battalion.
Beginning their advance at 07:30, the 1st Battalion successfully gained the
summit of Hill 57 by 11:40 against light resistance.
From Hill 54, the 3rd
Battalion’s attack route was in the open and dominated by the high ground of
Hills 52 and 53. At 06:35, the battalion commenced its assault and occupied
Hill 51 without resistance. Continuing its advance, the battalion was stopped
by heavy Japanese machine-gun fire 200 yd (180 m) short of Hill 52’s summit.
After an airstrike by six CAF aircraft on Hill 52 and an artillery bombardment,
the 3rd Battalion resumed their attack and successfully captured the summit by
16:25, destroying six machine-gun positions and killing about 30 Japanese on
the hill.
At 09:00 on 11 January,
the 3rd Battalion began its attack on Hill 53. The Japanese quickly stopped the
American advance with machine-gun and mortar fire. The Americans—who had not
received adequate replenishment in water—began to suffer extensive heat
casualties. In one platoon, only 10 men remained conscious by the afternoon.
The next day, the
27th’s 2nd Battalion took over the assault on Hill 53. Advancing up the hill,
the Americans were stopped short of Hill 53’s summit. During the night,
Japanese infiltrators cut the telephone line between the 2nd Battalion and its
regimental headquarters, affecting unit communications. On 13 January, the Americans
renewed the attack but were again halted by heavy Japanese machine-gun and
mortar fire.
A knoll on the south
edge of the ridge (the “horse’s neck”) leading to Hill 53 was the fulcrum of
the Japanese defenses. The knoll contained several machine-gun and mortar
positions which had effectively held off the American attacks across the ridge.
The 2nd Battalion’s executive officer—Captain Charles W. Davis—volunteered to
lead four other men against the knoll. Crawling on their bellies, Davis and his
party crept to within 10 yd (9.1 m) of the enemy position. The Japanese
defenders threw two grenades at them, but the grenades failed to explode. Davis
and his men threw eight grenades at the Japanese, destroying several of their
positions. Davis then stood up, and while shooting his rifle, then pistol with
one hand, waved his men forward with the other as he advanced further onto the
knoll. Davis and his men then killed or chased away the rest of the Japanese on
the knoll. Silhouetted against the sky during the action, Davis was visible to
the Americans all up and down the ridge. Inspired by his actions, plus
replenished with water by a sudden thunderstorm, the American troops “came to
life” and quickly assaulted and captured Hill 53 by noon. The Americans counted
the bodies of 170 Japanese soldiers on and around the Galloping Horse. The
Americans suffered fewer than 100 killed.
Between 15 and 22
January, the 161st Infantry Regiment hunted the remainder of Nishiyama’s
battalion in the nearby gorge of the southwest Matanikau fork. In total, 400
Japanese were killed defending the Galloping Horse and surrounding area. Two
hundred Japanese survivors, including Nishiyama, escaped to friendly lines on
19 January.
Sea Horse
In the last week of
December 1942, Colonel Robert B. McClure – the commander of the U.S. 35th
Infantry Regiment – was assigned to capture the Sea Horse and complete the
reduction of the Gifu on Mount Austen. For this operation, the 3rd Battalion of
the 182nd Infantry Regiment—commanded by Lt. Col. Roy F. Goggin—and the 25th
Division’s Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop were attached to the 35th Infantry.
Colonel
McClure—commanding the 35th Infantry—ordered the 35th’s 2nd Battalion and the 25th’s
Reconnaissance Troop to relieve the 132nd Infantry Regiment at the Gifu, with
orders to pressure that strong point and keep in touch with Goggin’s 3rd
Battalion, 182nd on the right. The 35th’s own 3rd Battalion—commanded by Lt.
Col. William J. Mullen, Jr.—was to advance southwest from Hill 27 (south of the
Gifu on Mount Austen), and then swing north to seize Hills 43 and 44. Lt. Col.
James B. Leer’s 1st Battalion was to be initially in regimental reserve,
following about a half-day’s march behind Mullen’s battalion. The 3rd
Battalion, 182nd Infantry, was assigned the task of protecting the 25th
Division’s artillery positions on the open ground north of Mount Austen and
east of the Matanikau by advancing south from Hill 65 to block the river gorge
and the ravine between Hills 31 and 42 against Japanese infiltration.
Maintaining contact with the 27th and 35th Regiments, Goggin’s battalion was to
assault Sea Horse Ridge in concert with the other two regiments. By 30
December, Goggin’s 3rd Battalion, 182nd was in action against Japanese forces
atop Sea Horse Ridge.
Colonel McClure next
assigned his 2nd Battalion to the assault on the Gifu and sent his 1st and 3rd
Battalions on a long march through the jungle to attack the Sea Horse from the
south. Defending the Sea Horse and nearby valleys were the Japanese 124th
Regiment’s 1st and 3rd Battalions, with Oka’s command post located nearby. The
Sea Horse consisted of two hills, Hill 43 on the south with Hill 44 adjoining
to the north.
After taking a 7,000 yd
(6,400 m) circuitous route through the jungle around Mount Austen, at 06:35 on
10 January, McClure’s 3rd Battalion launched its attack on Hill 43. As the
Americans closed on Hill 43 from the south, a group of Japanese soldiers near
Oka’s command post spotted the U.S. soldiers as they crossed a stream and
attacked immediately, threatening the flank of the American column. Two
American soldiers—William G. Fournier and Lewis Hall—successfully repelled the
Japanese attack with a machine-gun but were killed in the process. Making
progress against light resistance, the 3rd Battalion dug in for the night about
700 yd (640 m) short of Hill 43’s summit.
The next day, the 1st
Battalion of the 35th was added to the attack and the two units—with artillery
support—drove through several Japanese machine-gun positions and took Hill 43
by early afternoon. Continuing on towards Hill 44 against light opposition, the
Americans captured the rest of the Sea Horse by nightfall, cutting off Japanese
forces in the Gifu. The native Solomon Islanders who had been man-packing supplies
to the two American battalions during the attack were having difficulty
delivering sufficient food and ammunition over the long trail between the Sea
Horse and the Lunga perimeter. Thus, B-17 Flying Fortress heavy bombers were
now used to air drop supplies to the American troops around the Sea Horse.
On 12 January, the two
American battalions of the 35th continued their attack to the west toward the
Galloping Horse, but were stopped by a Japanese strongpoint on a narrow ridge
about 600 yd (550 m) west of their point of departure. After trying to flank
the position for two days, the Americans were able to smash the strongpoint
with mortar and artillery fire, killing 13 Japanese defenders, and advanced to
a ridge overlooking the southwest fork of the Matanikau by 15:00 on 15 January.
That same day, Japanese survivors from the Sea Horse battle—including Oka and
most of the 124th’s headquarters staff section and the 1st Battalion—were able
to slip past the American forces and reach friendly lines further west. The
Americans counted 558 Japanese dead around the Sea Horse, mostly from the
124th’s 3rd Battalion, and captured 17.
Second Mount Austen
On 9 January, McClure’s
2nd Battalion—commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Ernest Peters—replaced the three
battalions from the 132nd Regiment and prepared to assault the Gifu. Over the
next four days, the Americans tried to feel out the Japanese positions with
patrols. At the same time, the Gifu defenders attempted to wear down the
Americans with night infiltration attacks. By 13 January, the 2nd Battalion had
lost 57 killed or wounded. The battle casualties plus malaria reduced the
battalion to 75% of its effective strength by the next day. To assist the
battalion, the 35th Regiment’s anti-tank gun company personnel were attached to
the battalion as infantry.
With the capture of the
Sea Horse by the Americans, the Japanese in the Gifu were now isolated from the
rest of the 17th Army. In a last message over his field phone before the line
was cut, Inagaki refused an order from Oka to abandon his position and attempt
to infiltrate back to friendly lines, instead vowing that his command would
“fight to the last.” Inagaki apparently refused the order because to do so
would have meant leaving his sick and injured men behind.
An American attack on
the Gifu by the entire 2nd Battalion on 15 January was completely repulsed by
the Japanese. In response, McClure relieved Peters of command on 16 January and
replaced him with Major Stanley R. Larsen. Larsen decided to completely
surround the Gifu and try to reduce it with a massive artillery bombardment on
17 January.
In the meantime, the
Americans used a loudspeaker to broadcast a surrender appeal in Japanese to the
Gifu’s defenders. Only five Japanese soldiers responded. One of the five
reported that his company actually gathered to discuss the appeal, but decided
not to surrender because they were too weak to carry their injured,
non-ambulatory comrades with them to the American lines. Instead, they elected
to perish together as a unit. One Japanese officer defending the Gifu wrote in
his diary, “I heard the enemy talking in Japanese over a loud speaker. He is
probably telling us to come out – what fools the enemy are. The Japanese Army
will stick it out to the end. Position must be defended in all conditions with
our lives.”
At 14:30 hours on 17
January, twelve 155 mm and thirty-seven 105 mm guns opened fire on the Gifu.
Over the next one and a half hours, the American artillery fired 1,700 shells
into an area about 1,000 yd (910 m) square. Because of the lateness of the
hour, the Americans were unable to follow the barrage with an immediate attack
but instead had to wait until the next day, which allowed the Japanese time to
recover. On 18 January, the Americans attacked into the weaker west side of the
Gifu, making some headway and destroying several Japanese pillboxes over the
next two days until heavy rain stopped the attack on 20 January. That night, 11
Japanese were killed trying to escape from the Gifu.
On 22 January, the
Americans were able to move a light tank up their supply trail to Mount Austen.
The tank proved to be the decisive factor in the battle. At 10:20, the
tank—protected by 16–18 riflemen—blasted three Japanese pillboxes and penetrated
into the Gifu pocket. Proceeding onward, the tank completely traversed the Gifu
and destroyed five more pillboxes, breaching a gap 200 yd (180 m) wide in the
Japanese line. The American infantry surged through the gap and took positions
in the middle of the Gifu.
That night, around
02:30, apparently realizing that the battle was lost, Inagaki led his staff and
most of the remaining survivors of his command—about 100 men—in a final charge
on the Americans. In the charge, Inagaki and the remainder of his troops were
killed almost to the last man. At sunrise on 23 January, the Americans secured
the rest of the Gifu. Sixty-four men from the American 2nd Battalion, 35th
Infantry were killed during the assaults on the Gifu between 9 and 23 January,
bringing the total number of Americans killed taking Mount Austen to 175. The
Americans counted the bodies of 431 Japanese in the remains of the Gifu’s
fortifications and 87 elsewhere around Mount Austen. Total Japanese losses in
the Sea Horse and both Mount Austen battles were probably between 1,100 and
1,500 men.
Coastal Drive
At the same time that
the U.S. Army offensive was taking place in the hills around the upper
Matanikau, the U.S. 2nd Marine Division—under the command of Brigadier General
Alphonse DeCarre—was attacking along the north coast of Guadalcanal. Facing the
Marines in the hills and ravines south of Point Cruz were the remains of the
Japanese 2nd Infantry Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Masao Maruyama,
plus the 1st Battalion, 228th Infantry Regiment from the 38th Infantry Division
under Major Kikuo Hayakawa.
On 13 January, the 2nd
and 8th Marine regiments began their offensive with the 8th Marines attacking
along the coast and the 2nd Marines advancing further inland. The Japanese were
pushed back in some places but held in others, with heavy fighting occurring at
several locations in the hills and ravines near the coast. On 14 January, the
2nd Marines were relieved by the 6th Marine Regiment under the command of
Colonel Gilder D. Jackson.
The Marines renewed the
offensive on 15 January. The Japanese stymied the 8th Marines’ advance along
the coast. Inland, however, the 6th Marines were able to successfully advance
about 1,500 yd (1,400 m) and threatened the flank of the Japanese forces emplaced
in front of the 8th Marines. At 17:00, Maruyama ordered his troops to retreat
to a pre-coordinated line about 1,300 yd (1,200 m) to the west.
Early on 16 January, as
many of Maruyama’s men attempted to comply with the order to retreat, the 6th Marines
turned and drove to the coast, trapping most of Maruyama’s 4th and 16th
Regiments between themselves and the 8th Marines. By 14:00 on 17 January, the
Marines had destroyed the Japanese forces trapped in the pocket, killing 643
and capturing two.
Aftermath
On 15 January, an IJA
representative from Rabaul reached Guadalcanal on a Tokyo Express mission and informed
Hyakutake of the decision to withdraw Japanese forces from the island.
Grudgingly accepting the order, the 17th Army staff communicated the Ke
evacuation plan to their forces on 18 January. The plan directed the 38th
Division to disengage and withdraw towards Cape Esperance on the western end of
Guadalcanal beginning on 20 January. The 38th’s retirement would be covered by
the 2nd Division and other units, which would then follow the 38th westward.
Any troops unable to move were encouraged to kill themselves to “uphold the
honor of the Imperial Army.” From Cape Esperance the Japanese navy planned to
evacuate the army forces over the last few days of January and first week of
February with a projected completion date of the evacuation of 10 February.
The U.S. and its Allies
mistook Japanese preparations for Ke as another reinforcement attempt. With
this in mind, Patch ordered his forces to launch another offensive against the
Japanese forces west of the Matanikau. On 21 January, the 27th and 161st
Regiments pushed westward from the area of the Galloping Horse. The
Americans—unaware that the 38th Division was withdrawing in preparation to evacuate
the island—were surprised to encounter light resistance. Advancing more quickly
through the inland hills and ridges than the Japanese had anticipated, by 22
January the Americans were in position to capture Kokumbona on the coast,
headquarters of the 17th Army, and completely cut off the remainder of the 2nd
Division.
Reacting quickly to the
situation, the Japanese hurriedly evacuated Kokumbona and ordered the 2nd Division
to retire westward immediately. The Americans captured Kokumbona on 23 January.
Although some Japanese units were trapped between the American forces and
destroyed, most of the 2nd Division’s survivors escaped.
Over the next week, the
Japanese rear-guard—assisted by difficult terrain—effectively delayed the American
advance westward from Kokumbona. General Patch—still believing that a Japanese
reinforcement effort was imminent—kept most of his forces back to guard
Henderson Field, sending only one regiment at a time to continue the advance.
Thus, the majority of the surviving Japanese army forces were able to gather at
Cape Esperance by the end of January. On 1, 4, and 7 February, Japanese
warships successfully evacuated 10,652 army troops from the island. On 9
February, the Americans discovered that the Japanese were gone and declared Guadalcanal
secure.
In hindsight, some
historians have faulted the Americans—especially Patch and Admiral William
Halsey, commander of Allied forces in the South Pacific—for not taking
advantage of their ground, aerial, and naval superiority to prevent the successful
Japanese evacuation of most of their surviving forces from Guadalcanal. Halsey
had just been recently repulsed at the Battle of Rennell Island. Patch and
Harmon’s insistence on taking Mount Austen has been cited as one of the factors
that delayed the American’s main attack to the west, giving the 17th Army a
chance to escape. Said Merrill B. Twining of the Japanese forces deployed on
and around Mount Austen, “Theoretically these Japanese did offer a threat to
our major force advancing westward along the coast, but as a practical matter
these isolated groups were composed of sick and starving men unable to do
anything more than die in place. Under the circumstances disclosed by
subsequent events, it is obvious that Mt. Austen was just part of the scenery
and of no significant import to either of the antagonists.”
Nevertheless, the
larger successful campaign to recapture Guadalcanal from the Japanese was an
important strategic victory for the U.S. and its allies. Building on their
success at Guadalcanal and elsewhere, the Allies continued their campaign
against Japan, ultimately culminating in Japan’s defeat and the end of World
War II.
Depictions in Media
James Jones wrote his
novel The Thin Red Line based on his experiences during the battle of the Galloping
Horse, the Sea Horse, and Kokumbona which he renamed “The Dancing Elephant,”
“The Sea Slug,” and “Bunabala.” The novel has spawned two film adaptations: one
by Andrew Marton in 1964, and one by Terrence Malick in 1998.
References
Dull, Paul S. (1978). A
Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941–1945. Naval Institute Press.
Frank, Richard (1990).
Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle. New York: Random
House.
George, John B. (1981).
Shots Fired in Anger: A rifleman's view of the war in the Pacific, 1942–1945, including
the campaign on Guadalcanal and fighting with Merrill's Marauders in the
jungles of Burma. National Rifle Association of America.
Gilbert, Oscar E.
(2001). Marine Tank Battles in the Pacific. Da Capo.
Griffith, Samuel B.
(1963). The Battle for Guadalcanal. Champaign, Illinois, US: University of
Illinois Press.
Jersey, Stanley Coleman
(2008). Hell's Islands: The Untold Story of Guadalcanal. College Station,
Texas: Texas A&M University Press.
Morison, Samuel Eliot
(1958). The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942 – February 1943, vol. 5 of History
of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Boston: Little, Brown and
Company.
Rottman, Gordon L.
(2005). Japanese Army in World War II: The South Pacific and New Guinea,
1942–43. Dr. Duncan Anderson (consultant editor). Oxford and New York: Osprey.
Twining, Merrill B.
(1996). No Bended Knee: The Battle for Guadalcanal. Novato, California:
Presidio Press.
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| U.S. Americal Division commander, MajGen Alexander M. Patch, Jr., watches while his troops and supplies are staged on Guadalcanal's beaches on 8 December, the day before he relieved Gen Vandegrift and his wornout 1st Marine Division. (USMC photo) |
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| U.S. forces move on Gifu pocket and Mt. Austen on Guadalcanal, December 18-27, 1942. (US Army) |
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| A Japanese defensive position after the battle of the Gifu pocket on Guadalcanal, January 1943. The position consists of a bunker with a covered foxhole in front of it. (US Army photo) |
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| U.S. forces capture Hill 27 during assault on Gifu pocket on Guadalcanal, January 2, 1943. (US Army) |
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| U.S. forces planned assault towards Matanikau River on Guadalcanal, January, 1943. (US Army) |
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| U.S. Army soldiers push supplies up the Matanikau River to support the 25th Infantry Division’s offensive on Guadalcanal in January 1943. (US Army photo) |
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| U.S. forces attack Japanese positions on "Galloping Horse" on Guadalcanal, January 10, 1943. (US Army) |
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| U.S. forces attack Japanese positions on "Galloping Horse" on Guadalcanal during the drive towards the Matanikau, January 12-13, 1943. (US Army) |
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| U.S. forces assault Japanese positions on "Seahorse", Guadalcanal, January 8-11, 1943. (US Army) |
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| An American casualty from the front-line fighting is being transferred from a makeshift stretcher to a real one, before being taken through the jungle and down the Matanikau River. The men are members of the U.S. Army’s 35th Infantry Regiment, 25th Division. 15 January 1943. (US Army photo SC 163970) |
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| U.S. forces advance on Matanikau River, Guadalcanal, January 13-18, 1943. (US Army) |
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| U.S. forces capture Kokumbona on Guadalcanal, January 23-25, 1943. (Miller, John Jr. (1949). Guadalcanal: The First Offensive. United States Army in World War II. Center of Military History, United States Army, US Government Printing Office) |
