by Jack Dukes
On the night of 10 August 1939, the British steamer City of Exeter docked in Leningrad harbor and disembarked several high-ranking British and French officers. After a brief rest the group, now accompanied by two Russian staff officers, took the night train to Moscow. The next day, they were enthusiastically greeted by Soviet Deputy Army Chief of Staff Smorodinov, Deputy Naval Chief of Staff Alafuzov, and a large diplomatic retinue. At a reception shortly thereafter, Commissar of Defense Voroshilov and Chief of the General Staff Shaposhnikov cordially received the Westerners.[1]
These visitors constituted the Anglo-French military mission which had come to Moscow reputedly to negotiate an agreement with the Soviets to deter any further aggression on the part of Nazi Germany. At this particular moment a casual observer might have anticipated the inception of Hitler’s demise: the Western powers and the Soviets were finally subordinating their respective differences and combining to resist Hitler’s search for “lebensraum.” Unfortunately, the alliance that might have preserved the peace of Europe never materialized; instead, the Nazi-Soviet Pact emerged, generating war and atrocity beyond the most grotesque imagination of twentieth century man. How does one explain the disastrous reversal in the Anglo-Franco-Russian relationship? Was the Western military mission destined to failure? Had the Russians elected to Join Germany in a partition of Poland before the mission’s arrival? Were the Soviets using the alliance negotiations to coerce the Germans into a more propitious settlement? Or was it the behavior of the Western powers that forced the Soviets to turn to Hitler? Less than ten days after the Nazi-Soviet Pact was signed, both Voroshilov and Molotov publicly stated that an Anglo-Russian-Franco alliance had not materialized because the West had been unwilling to fully consider Soviet security needs or to negotiate honestly on the basis of full reciprocity.[2] The purpose of this article is to examine the validity of these Soviet accusations, particularly as they apply to Great Britain.
Anglo-Soviet relations had never been cordial, and certainly Britain’s reluctance to consult or cooperate with Russia in opposing Fascist and Nazi aggression only reinforced Stalin’s negative attitude toward “capitalist” motives. As Hitler systematically altered Europe’s borders and its power structure, neither France nor Britain interfered. The argument was always proffered that the Versailles settlement was moribund even before Hitler had become Chancellor; moreover, Hitler’s actions concerned only Germans. The Sudetenland, for instance, was populated primarily by Germans. But what about the remainder of Czechoslovakia, the part left by the settlement of September 1938? No one could maintain that this was legitimately German. Here even Britain paid lip service to the view that further German encroachment against the “Czech rump” would be illegal and sufficiently provocative to warrant Europe’s resistance. Although no formal guarantee had officially been elaborated, Sir Thomas Inskip, British Minister for the Coordination of Defense, stated that:
His Majesty’s Government … feels under a moral obligation to Czechoslovakia to treat the guarantee as being now in force. In the event, therefore, of an act of unprovoked aggression against Czechoslovakia, His Majesty’s Government would certainly feel bound to take all steps in their power to see that the integrity of Czechoslovakia is preserved.[3]
By early March 1939, when it had become obvious that Germany intended to swallow the remainder of Czechoslovakia, Britain, despite her claims, again demonstrated no inclination to take action or even to consult with the Soviet Union. Such behavior was intensifying Soviet apprehensions that France and Britain hoped to force Russia into resisting Nazi imperialism without any Western commitment. In the past it had been Soviet Foreign Minister Litvinov who had embodied the effort to create a workable system of collective security against Fascism, but to this point, the West had been completely uncooperative. Stalin vented his suspicions on 10 March in a speech to the Central Committee of the Communist Party by bluntly warning that he “… was determined not to allow our country to be drawn into conflicts by warmongers who are accustomed to getting others to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them.”[4]
Just after the Nazi-Soviet Pact had been signed, Molotov toasted Stalin as having initiated the reversal in Russo-German relations through this speech on 10 March.[5] Although Stalin may have decided not to overlook the possibility of neutralizing Russo-German relations in the future, there was no diplomatic contact between the two powers on this question until mid-April 1939. On the contrary, Ivan Maisky, the Russian Ambassador to Britain, publicly indicated that despite all of the previous rebuffs, Russia still desired cooperation with Britain against Hitler. Even as the Germans were occupying the remaining independent areas of Czechoslovakia, he stated:
The foreign policy of the Soviet Government has always been a policy of universal peace. Not a peace at any price, but a peace based on law and order in international affairs …
Our two countries do not always see eye to eye as to the best methods for securing peace, but it is equally true—and the fact is of paramount importance—that at the present there is no conflict of interest between the USSR and the British Empire in any part of the world.
You will find that in the last resort the fate of peace or war in our time depends on the kind of relations which exist between London and Moscow.[6]
Despite Germany’s total occupation of Czechoslovakia and Maisky’s eloquent appeal, Britain evidenced no more willingness to resist Nazi expansion now than she had on previous occasions. Only when Rumania appeared destined to a fate similar to Czechoslovakia’s did the Chamberlain government make any effort to communicate with the Soviets.[7] This British initiative proved abortive, however, for the Rumanian government denied that the Germans were attempting any coercion. Whitehall at once abandoned the subject of cooperation with the Soviet Union. Although he believed the Rumanians had denied the rumor of coercion because of German pressure, and, despite his disgust with the British ambivalence, Litvinov took the opportunity to propose a conference of British, French, Russian, Polish and Rumanian delegates to discuss the possibilities of common action.[8] Halifax replied that Britain could not participate in a conference without guarantees that a collective security system mutually acceptable to all five powers would emerge and, since there was little possibility of obtaining such an agreement, a conference of this nature would only serve to antagonize the Germans.[9]
To the Soviets it undoubtedly appeared that Britain was again retreating in the face of the Nazi threat; articles in Pravda and Isvestia reflected this increasing apprehension. The papers maintained that the Munich “peacemakers” had abandoned the prospect of collective security in hopes of diverting the western advances of Fascist aggression eastward toward the Soviet Union.[10]
Finally on 31 March, Britain and France did act: they issued a joint guarantee of Poland. Halifax’s motive for this action was that a Western guarantee of Poland would give that nation confidence to regenerate the Polish-Rumanian alliance of 1921 which now lay dormant because of the non-committal attitude of the Polish Chief of State, Colonel Beck. If Halifax’s plan was successful, the foundation for a quadruple alliance between the two Eastern states and Britain and France would exist. Approaching a security system from this angle seemed to have one very definite advantage: by working through a Polish-Rumanian axis the balance between Russia and Germany might be preserved without Great Britain combining with Hitler’s traditional nemesis and thereby causing unnecessary antagonisms. Russian participation in such a combination was not possible since Poland and Rumania were just as distrustful of Stalin as they were of Hitler. But Halifax was overly optimistic; unfortunately the original Polish-Rumanian alliance was directed primarily at Russia, not Germany, and Beck was fearful that any alteration or reconstitution of that status would cause needless German animosity.[11]
Evidence that Beck was serious about maintaining a facade of neutrality came after Mussolini’s invasion of Albania on 6 April. No sooner had his troops landed on the Dalmatian coast than the Italian dictator began casting wistful glances at other parts of southeastern Europe. On 13 April, Britain and France issued guarantees for Greece and Rumania. Poland gave no indication of altering her original position. Again Britain consulted the Soviets but again Halifax asked only that they publish a unilateral guarantee of the east European states.[12] The British Foreign Secretary’s unwillingness to concert directly with the Soviet Union indicated that he still had not given up hope that Poland might eventually become more cooperative.
The Russians were extremely suspicious both of the guarantees and the British request of unilateral Soviet assurance for the security of east Europe. As Ambassador Maisky pointed out, the Anglo-French promise to support the guaranteed countries with “all the power at their command” could be limited or interpreted as the guarantors saw fit.[13] As far as unilateral guarantee was concerned, the Soviets obviously feared committing themselves and then being “left in the lurch” as had the Czechs.[14]
It was only at this point, with no concrete cooperative commitment from the West, that Stalin moved to examine the possibility of normalizing Nazi-Soviet relations. On 17 April 1939, the Russian Ambassador in Berlin told Ernst Weizaecker, the Under Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry, that ideological differences had not influenced Russo-Italian relations, and that they need not prove a stumbling block with Germany either. He added that Soviet Russia had not exploited the present friction between Germany and the Western democracies nor did she desire to do so. There was no reason for Russo-German relations to exist on anything other than “normal footing.” “And from normal, the relations might become better and better.”[15]
Stalin had not yet forsaken the West, however, for the day after the Wilhelmstrasse was approached, a second Soviet proposal was also presented to Great Britain. This plan called for a three-way mutual assistance pact between Britain, France, and Russia with the three powers guaranteeing the security of east Europe. Staff talks for military coordination among the three powers were to begin as soon as Britain and France approved the Soviet suggestion.[16]
Although they did not answer directly, the Germans were the first to reply to the Soviet overture. On 28 April, Hitler made a speech abrogating the Anglo-German Naval Treaty of 1935 and the German-Polish Non-aggression Pact of 1934. The latter annulment was particularly significant since this pact had originally signified the deterioration of Russo-German relations. In 1934 Hitler had hoped that cooperation with the Poles could be secured at Soviet expense; he now appeared ready to desert that policy. Also significant in the speech was the obvious omission of the usual reference to the Soviet “swine.”[17] On 5 May, the Soviets were allowed to fulfill previously concluded contracts with Czech arms manufacturers now under German control.[18] On 20 May, Hitler agreed to Russo-German conversations to help improve and expand commercial relations.[19]
There was a logical explanation for Hitler’s willingness to ameliorate Russia. As early as 3 April, he had ordered his army to prepare for an attack on Poland at any time after 1 September 1939.[20] Once committed to a concrete invasion schedule, the German Chancellor was more desirous of keeping Russia neutral.
Despite the fact that Russia had emphasized the necessity of speed in replying to her proposal of 18 April, Halifax made no response until 6 May. The British reply merely reiterated the previous suggestion that Russia should guarantee the east European states unilaterally.[21]
This British response did mark one significant alteration in Anglo-Soviet relations, however. From this point until the end of August, London and Moscow consulted regularly on a means of providing security for eastern Europe. Again, the casual observer might have anticipated progress towards an East-West entente. The British dispatched a special envoy, Sir William Strang, to Moscow to aid Ambassador Seeds with the negotiations and during May, June, and early July, proposals and counter-proposals were exchanged and several points of agreement on a Franco-British-Russian alliance were reached, e.g., accord on the problem of a separate peace, the degree of cooperation with the League of Nations, and the countries an alliance might guarantee. By early July, however, it became obvious that there was one point on which harmony seemed impossible: the question of “indirect aggression.”
Britain refused to accept the Soviet definition of indirect aggression which maintained that the Anglo-Franco-Russian alliance should become operational not only if one of the guaranteed states should be attacked, but also if an internal coup should give Germany control of the country, i.e., if a coup d’etat or similar event would cause the reversal of a particular country’s policy in the interest of Germany.[22] The bloodless acquisition of Czechoslovakia by Germany made this Russian demand inevitable.
The Soviet position was distasteful to Great Britain, but Halifax’s resistance to Molotov’s demand was reinforced by leaders of the smaller east European states who wished no connection with the Soviets, especially no “guarantee” against an internal coup. Eastern Europe as well as Britain and France were gravely concerned that the Soviet cure for Nazi imperialism might prove worse than the original disease. Poland, in particular, refused to have any affiliation with the Soviet proposal since Colonel Beck felt that this might actually provoke a German attack. The Polish Chief of State wanted correct relations with both Germany and Russia, but alliance or involvement with neither.[23]
Apparently Halifax still believed that Britain could protect eastern Europe by working for and then through a Polish-Rumanian defense pact, but this could not be accomplished if Britain antagonized the Poles by coercing them into dealing with the Soviets. Neither Halifax nor Beck yet recognized either the magnitude of the German threat or even that Germany constituted a greater danger than did Soviet Russia. By 6 July, Halifax felt that the Anglo-Soviet negotiations were nearing an inconclusive end.[24] Shortly thereafter Chamberlain told the American Ambassador, Joseph Kennedy, that his patience with the Russians was exhausted. The Prime Minister declared his conviction that the Russians were interested in agreement with no one, but intended to sit back and watch everyone else tear themselves apart.[25]
Why did Britain put so much more faith in alignment with Poland than with Soviet Russia? Perhaps among the most important reasons was the view of the Western powers that the Soviet army was unreliable. William Bullitt, the American Ambassador in Paris, was told on 9 March by both the French Foreign Minister and the Polish Ambassador that
… the Soviet Union was to be counted on for nothing. They both felt that it was certain that internal conditions in the Soviet Union would prevent the Red Army from taking any active part in any war anywhere and both agreed that no reliance could be based on any promises of Soviet support in the form of supplies to Poland or Rumania.[26]
On 22 March, the British military attaché in Warsaw concurred with the French and Polish view. He wrote:
Though the courage and endurance of the rank and file (of the Red Army) is considerable, and tactical training of smaller units is often of a high level, the purge of higher commanders has often resulted in a mushroom growth of promotion which must react unfavorably on leadership and morale of the army. Communications are, moreover, still a factor of great weakness in any large scale operation and the internal political and economic situation is so difficult as greatly to increase the hazards of a major war. Thus, while seriously to be reckoned with in the defense it is doubtful whether an offensive war would or could be undertaken by the Red Army with any hope of final success.[27]
A few days later Chamberlain reflected this view when he stated, “I have no belief whatever in her (Russia’s) ability to maintain an effective offensive, even if she wanted to.”[28] In early April Halifax told Joseph Kennedy that Russia had no military value outside her own borders.[29]
In addition to finding Russia useless as an ally in the military defense of eastern Europe, Chamberlain intensely distrusted the Russians. Just prior to the guarantee of Poland he wrote:
I must confess to the most profound distrust of Russia. And I distrust her motives, which seem to me to have little connection with our ideas of liberty, and to be concerned only with getting everyone else by the ears. Moreover, she is both hated and suspected by many of the smaller States, notably by Poland, Roumania, and Finland.[30]
It was not so much that Britain had any positive reason for working with Poland, but the presumption of Soviet military inadequacy in addition to a distrust of her motives left a security system built around Poland as the only alternative. For this reason the Poles could not be coerced or antagonized.
Finally on 24 July, it was Molotov who broke the stalemate. He suggested that Britain and Russia should change the emphasis of their conversations to military planning; if military plans to accompany an alliance could be devised, then perhaps political questions such as “indirect aggression” could be more easily resolved.[31]
A substantial reason for Britain to continue negotiations was the obvious evidence that the Soviets were moving toward improved relations with the Germans and that the Germans were moving closer to aggressive action against Poland. Two months earlier on 3 May, Maxim Litvinov, so long associated with a pro-West, anti-Fascist attitude, was replaced by Vyacheshav Molotov, then an unknown quantity. Shortly afterwards and almost directly proportional to the difficulty the Soviets were encountering in the negotiations with the West, reports of improving German-Soviet relations increased. On 31 May, Molotov publicly announced that Germany and the Soviet Union were considering a restoration of economic relations.[32] On 28 June, a correspondent of the British paper, News Chronicle, reported that Germany soon would offer Russia a 25-year non-aggression pact.[33] This story apparently originated from reliable sources in the German Foreign Office. The following day a Pravda article attacked Britain and France, stating that the West did not wish to sign a treaty of equality with Russia but merely hoped to be the “laughing third party” in a Russo-German war.[34] On 4 July, the French Consul in Hamburg reported that Russia and Germany were near agreement on a non-aggression pact.[35] On 21 July, TASS publicly announced that Russo-German trade negotiations had resumed. On 27 July, “reliable” French sources maintained that Germany planned to take Danzig sometime between 20 August and early September.[36] By 3 or 4 August at the latest, the British and French governments would know absolutely that Russia and Germany were considering a non-aggression pact.[37]
Halifax agreed to Molotov’s proposal of 24 July, and shortly thereafter it was decided that an Anglo-French military mission would proceed to Moscow. There were three obvious indications, however, that Britain still was not enthusiastic about collaborating with the Russians despite growing evidence of a Russo-German rapprochement. A first indication was that the military representatives designated for the mission were unknown even to the British public. Admiral Sir Reginald Drax was ranked eighth among naval personnel; Air Marshall Sir Charles Burnett ranked tenth among air force personnel; Major General John Heywood was forty-seventh on the army list. Compare these relative unknowns with the Soviet representatives: Marshall Voroshilov, Commissar of Defense and member of the Politburo; Army Chief of Staff Shaposhnikov; Admiral Kuznetsov, Commissar of the Navy; and General Loktenov, Air Force Chief of Staff.[38] The Russians could not avoid being skeptical, especially since General Ironside, Inspector General of British Overseas Forces, had just visited Poland.[39] The mission’s means of transportation to Russia was a second indication of the importance the British accorded the project: a steamer whose top speed was 13 knots.[40] A third outward indication of Britain’s apathy was that the negotiators were not allowed plenipotentiary powers.[41]
Although not at once obvious to the Russians, the most concrete manifestation of Britain’s lack of zeal for the military talks was the official instructions provided for the negotiators. It was still argued that Russian military strength was a negligible offensive force. The general evaluation of the three Russian services was as follows:
Firstly, there is little doubt that the Russian Services have suffered as a result of the recent purge. The institution of political control into the Services has resulted in effect in dual control. The inherent desire of the Russian to shirk responsibility is given full scope under this system and has resulted in discipline, which was formerly good, being now of an indifferent standard. Furthermore it has directly resulted in the disappearance of the few experienced Commanders in the USSR.
Secondly, the numerical total of the armed forces of Russia is, to some extent, misleading. On paper these figures appear formidable, but the almost insurmountable difficulties of maintaining these large forces in the field, owing to inadequate reserves and inferior communications, must not be overlooked.[42]
The instructions were also replete with comment on the distrustful and undependable character of the Soviets.[43] Even if agreement were reached there seemed little likelihood from the British view that the Soviets would fulfill their commitment. The mission was further reminded that neither Poland nor Rumania would court any relation with Russia unless first directly attacked by Germany.[44] Since it was still believed Russia was of little military value and that she could not be trusted, Britain still seemed committed to a security system based on a Polish-Rumanian axis in eastern Europe.
For these reasons, the British negotiators were cautioned to move slowly, taking careful note of any matters that the Russians might divulge about themselves, but giving as little information as possible regarding British dispositions. Any concrete commitments would of necessity have to be broad and vague. Until the matter of “indirect aggression” could be settled, no serious contemplation could take place. This stall and delay process would be facilitated by the negotiators’ need to constantly consult London since they possessed no decision-making powers themselves.[45]
Instructions to the military mission were a synthesis of many views in British diplomatic circles. It was William Strang’s belief that months would be required to reach a valuable agreement with the Russians.[46] Ambassador Seeds was pessimistic about a military pact being concluded at all.[47] Arthur Henderson, the British Ambassador in Berlin, was perhaps the strongest critic of a pact with the Soviets. Henderson argued that an alliance with Russia would only convince Hitler that Russia was in fact militarily impotent outside her own borders and sought alliances to protect herself. As for further aggressive action in east Europe, Hitler was only bluffing to assuage German public opinion; he preferred to bluff from a position of strength, so it could not later be said he yielded because of weakness. Henderson argued, however, that the German Chancellor would be dangerous if faced with an overt show of force that threatened his prestige, that is a Franco-British-Russian alliance.[48]
Halifax himself was not optimistic about military conversations with the Soviets until the problem of “indirect aggression” had been satisfactorily resolved.[49] Why then did he agree to send the mission to Moscow? The answer was simple: the complete breakdown of negotiations might drive Russia into rapprochement with the Germans. Continuing negotiations would make the Germans wary of further aggression, but since nothing concrete was likely to result, Hitler would not be sufficiently antagonized to act irrationally.[50]
Another aspect of British diplomacy also undermined the willingness of Chamberlain’s government to reach a quick agreement with the Soviets. Just as the Soviet Union was engaged in secret talks with the Germans, so was Britain involved in her own further effort at appeasement. Two specific examples can be mentioned which seriously undermined the prospects for a successful Anglo-Russian-Franco alliance. During July, while ostensibly attending an international whaling conference in London, Helmuth Wohltat, an economist of ministerial rank in Hitler’s government, was told by Robert Hudson, Secretary of British Overseas Trade, and Sir Horace Wilson, one of Chamberlain’s closest advisors, that Germany and Britain should divide the world into spheres of interest for cooperative economic exploitation. Wilson also suggested that an Anglo-German non-aggression pact would facilitate this goal.[51] Unfortunately for Britain, the talks leaked prematurely and Chamberlain was forced to disclaim their existence.[52] Despite this repudiation, the British public, the Russians, and the French all felt that the Chamberlain government had made an attempt to bribe Hitler.[53]
This fiasco did not end Britain’s effort to deal with Germany unilaterally. In early August, a secret meeting engineered by the Swedish industrialist, Birger Dahlerus, brought together several influential British businessmen and members of Parliament with Herman Göring. This group agreed that a conference of the Munich signatories should be reconvened to discuss the Danzig question and German-Polish relations.[54] Nothing materialized from the suggestion for Hitler’s position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union was revolutionized shortly, and there was no longer the necessity of dealing with the West.[55] The real significance of these efforts to come to term with Germany indicates that influential circles in Great Britain were still convinced that Hitler could be dealt with and that there was no need to go so far as an alliance with the Soviets.
The mission’s arrival in Moscow on 11 August, then, did not represent a great change in British policy; the British intention was merely to scare the Germans and hold out enough prospects to the Soviets to undermine any Nazi-Soviet cooperation. On the other hand, Ambassador Seeds reported from Moscow on 13 August that “… all indications so far go to show that Soviet military negotiators are really out for business.”[56] This view was also shared by leaders of the British and French missions.[57] From the outset of the talks, contradiction between Soviet and British purposes led to problems. Admiral Drax could not long conceal that he held no plenipotentiary powers as did the Russians or the French, nor did he have any concrete military plan in case of conflict as did the Russians. The Russians were also disturbed by the fact that Britain could only initially commit five divisions to Continental service in case of war.[58]
Because he believed in the sincerity of the Russians, Seeds urged his government to come to terms with the Soviets as soon as possible.[59] Halifax did agree to relax his original instructions to the British mission, but matters still moved slowly.[60] The situation was complicated by the insistence of the Soviets that the Western powers convince Poland to allow Russian troops on Polish soil at once. Voroshilov saw no advantage in an alliance that would deny Russia the opportunity to oppose a German invasion in western Poland. This demand was undoubtedly precipitated by the Soviet’s view that Germany was about to invade Poland and the British revelation regarding the small size of her initial commitment at the outbreak of a war.[61]
After the first several days of talks, Admiral Drax was quite pessimistic. Near the end of the first week of negotiations he wrote:
We have conferred for five successive days and have discussed a great variety of subjects but have not yet found a single point on which we can reach a definite agreement. The initial conditions under which we started were not favorable to success. The French Ambassador, who is shrewd and intelligent, expressed the opinion when we arrived that the duration of our stay would be either two days or two years. Soviet Russians speak contemptuously of Britain and France as yielding (or surrendering) Powers.[62]
The British were still unwilling to urge the Poles to accept the Soviet demands even though the French at this point were desperately trying to obtain Beck’s cooperation. Since the French action was unilateral, Beck undoubtedly felt he could resist the pressures. Either Halifax was very naive, or he still believed that coercion of the Poles was not yet necessary. On 16 August, he stated the belief that Hitler was still anxious to avoid war.[63]
On the following day, however, the Foreign Secretary underwent a conversion; he now determined it was necessary to attain Polish agreement to the Soviet demands.[64] He undoubtedly felt the effect of an increasing public pressure in Britain not to bypass further opportunities to resist Nazi aggression. After all, Poland and Rumania had not combined as anticipated to present any formidable alliance. There was also French pressure to fulfill the Soviet demands. Perhaps most influential was the report from the Washington embassy that the Soviets and the Germans were very close to signing a non-aggression pact.[65] The report from Washington gained credence when the talks in Moscow were adjourned on 17 August at Soviet insistence because of the Western mission’s reluctance to accept their demands. Voroshilov did not appear anxious to revive the negotiations at all until adherence to the Soviet position was forthcoming.[66]
Halifax’s conversion was evidenced by his directions to the British Ambassador in Warsaw to secure Polish adherence to the Soviet demands,[67] but even though he had now determined to pressure the Poles, Colonel Beck proved to be a very obstinate man. Efforts to gain his cooperation failed completely.[68]
At this point time finally caught up with the Western powers. As early as 27 May, Hitler had decided to actively cultivate better relations with the Soviets in hopes of preventing an Anglo-Russian-French combination.[69] On 27 July, Karl Schnurre, head of the Eastern Section of the German Foreign Office, presented the Soviets with an extremely effective case for an improved Russo-German relationship.
What could England offer Russia? At best, participation in a European war and the hostility of Germany, but not a single desirable end for Russia. What could we offer, on the other hand? Neutrality and staying out of a possible European conflict and, if Moscow wished, a German-Russian understanding on mutual interest, which just as in former times, would work out to the advantage of both countries.[70]
On 15 August, when negotiations with the West seemed deadlocked, Molotov was informed that Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister, was willing to come to Moscow “to lay the foundations for a definite improvement in German-Soviet relations.”[71] The following day, the German Ambassador in Moscow, Count Schulenburg, was instructed to inform Molotov that
… in view of the present situation, and the possibility of the occurrence any day of serious incidents (please at this point explain to Herr Molotov that Germany is determined not to endure Polish provocation indefinitely), a basic and rapid clarification of German-Russian relations and the mutual adjustment of pressing questions are desirable.[72]
Since no headway in providing for Russian security had as yet emerged from the talks with the West and since the Germans definitely seemed to be moving toward conflict with Poland, Molotov offered to consider a Soviet-German non-aggression pact if guarantees for the Baltic states would be included and if the Wilhelmstrasse would use its influence to moderate Japan’s attitude toward Russia.[73] Ribbentrop immediately agreed to the Soviet qualifications.[74]
Inasmuch as the Germans were willing to provide all the security assurance which Stalin demanded, there was no need to postpone agreement with the Germans any longer, if, in fact, the Soviet alliance negotiations with the West had been merely a gimmick to extract the maximum concessions from the Germans.[75] But it was only when Hitler mobilized the Slovak Army on the Polish border on 19 August, thereby increasing the exigency for a decision on the part of the Soviet Union, that Molotov agreed to see Ribbentrop. The decision to allow Ribbentrop to come to Moscow had one substantial qualification; he was not to arrive until 26 or 27 August.[76] This move on the part of the Soviet Union gave the Western powers additional time to secure Polish cooperation while at the same time keeping the Germans temporarily on the “hook.” in case Colonel Beck proved uncooperative.
On 21 August, however, two events occurred which decisively altered Soviet flexibility. When the military talks with the British and French were reconvened that day, Admiral Drax was forced to admit that Poland had not yet accepted the Soviet demands.[77] Combined with this revelation was a dispatch directly from Hitler to Stalin stating that German-Polish relations had become intolerable and a clarification of Nazi-Soviet relations was needed immediately.[78] This message indicated to the Soviet Premier that war might erupt at any moment. It was, therefore, agreed that Ribbentrop would be received in Moscow on 23 August.[79] Since no alteration in the Polish position was obtained on 22 or 23 August, Molotov signed the non-aggression pact with Germany the night of 23 August.[80] The fate of Poland was sealed.
Britain’s attitude toward the Soviet Union had undergone only minor positive alterations between March and mid-August 1939. When in mid-August a meaningful reformation of opinion occurred, the rapidly changing political conditions nullified any favorable effect. Even at this critical point, the situation might have been saved had the British previously evidenced a willingness to negotiate in reasonably good faith with the Soviets. But such had not been the case for the Chamberlain government could not make the decision to sit on a Russian stool or a German stool, the result was that it fell between the two. The accusations of Molotov and Voroshilov were true to a very substantial degree, for the West made little effort to test Russia’s pretensions of good faith.
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| Agreement on joint actions of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic and His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom in the war against Germany. |
[1] John Erickson, The Soviet High Command, London, 1962, page 524.
[2] Jane Degras, editor, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, London, 1953, Volume III, pages 361-363, 363-371.
[3] Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, Series 5, Volume 339, 28 September-6 October 1939, column 303.
[4] Degras, op.cit., pages 315-322.
[5] Raymond Sontag and James Stuart Beddie, editors, Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941, Washington, D.C., 1948, memo on the conversations between Ribbentrop, Stalin and Molotov, Moscow, 24 August 1939, pages 72-76; henceforth referred to as N-SR.
[6] W. P. and Zelda K. Coates, A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations, London, 1944, pages 603-604; quoted from the Daily Telegraph of 16 March 1939.
[7] E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, editors, Documents on British Foreign Policy, Series 3, London, 1951, Volume IV, Halifax to Seeds, London, 17 March 1939, no. 389, pages 360-361; henceforth referred to as BD.
[8] BD, IV, Seeds to Halifax, Moscow, 19 March 1939, no. 421, page 385.
[9] BD, IV, Halifax to Seeds, London, 19 March 1939, no. 433, page 392.
[10] BD, IV, Seeds to Halifax, Moscow, 21 March 1939, no. 475, page 446.
[11] BD, IV, Kennard to Halifax, Warsaw, 22 March 1939, no. 479, pages 453-454; IV, Conversation among Chamberlain, Halifax, Cadogan, Phipps, Strang, Bonnet, Corbin and Bressy, London, 22 March 1939, no. 484, pages 457-463; V, Halifax-Beck conversations, London, 4-6 April 1939, nos. 1 and 2, pages 1-19; Roman Debicki, Foreign Policy of Poland 1919-1939, London, 1963, pages 38-39, 140.
[12] BD, V, Halifax-Beck conversations, London, 4-6 April 1939, nos. 1 and 2, pages 1-19; V, Halifax to Kennard, London, 12 April 1939, no. 50, pages 97-99; V, Kennard to Halifax, Warsaw, 14 April 1939, no. 165, pages 200-201; V, Seeds to Halifax, Moscow, 15 April 1939, no. 182, page 215.
[13] BD, IV, Halifax to Seeds, London, 31 March 1939, no. 589, pages 556-558.
[14] BD, V, Seeds to Halifax, Moscow, 1 April 1939, no. 597, pages 574-575.
[15] N-SR, Weizaecker memo, Berlin, 17 April 1939, pages 1-2.
[16] BD, V, Seeds to Halifax, Moscow, 18 April 1939, no. 201, pages 228-229.
[17] BD, V, Henderson to Halifax, Berlin, 28 April 1939, no. 307, pages 360-361; V, Phipps to Halifax, Paris, 30 April 1939, no. 323, page 381.
[18] Paul R. Sweet, Margaret Lambert and Maurice Baumont, editors, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series D, London, 1956, Volume VI, Schnurre memo, Berlin, 5 May 1939, no. 332, page 429; henceforth referred to as GD.
[19] N-SR, Schulenburg memo, Moscow, 20 May 1939, pages 5-7.
[20] GD, VI, Keitel to Wehrmacht High Command, Berlin, 3 April 1939, no. 149, pages 186-187.
[21] BD, V, Halifax to Seeds, Moscow, 6 May 1939, no. 397, page 450.
[22] BD, VI, Seeds to Halifax, Moscow, 4 July 1939, no. 227, page 251.
[23] BD, VI, Hoare to Halifax, Bucharest, 2 April 1939, no. 602, page 579; V, Beck-Halifax conversations, London, 4-6 April, no. 1, page 1-9; VI, Halifax to Orde, London, 12 June 1939, no. 37, pages 48-49; VI, Hoare to Halifax, Bucharest, 2 April 1939, no. 602, page 579; VI, Halifax to Orde, London, 12 June 1939, no. 37, page 49; VI, Halifax to Seeds, London, 6 July 1939, no. 253, pages 277-278.
[24] BD, IV, Halifax to Seeds, London, 6 July 1939, no. 253, pages 277-278.
[25] United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1939, Volume I, Washington, 1939, Kennedy to Hull, London, 20 July 1939, pages 287-288; henceforth referred to as AFR.
[26] BD, IV, Perth to Halifax, Rome, 20 March 1939, no. 376, page 351.
[27] BD, IV, Halifax to Seeds, London, 19 March 1939, no. 433, page 392.
[28] Keith Feiling, The Life of Neville Chamberlain, London, 1946, page 403.
[29] AFR, I, 1939, Kennedy to Hull, London, 6 April 1939, pages 113-144.
[30] Feiling, op.cit., page 403.
[31] BD, VI, Seeds to Halifax, 24 July 1939, no. 414, pages 456-460.
[32] BD, V, Seeds to Halifax, Moscow, 1 June 1939, no. 689, pages 743-746.
[33] David J. Dallin, Soviet Russia’s Foreign Policy 1939-1942, New Haven, 1942, page 35.
[34] GD, VI, Schulenburg to Foreign Ministry, Moscow, 29 June 1939, no. 582, pages 808-809.
[35] French Government, The French Yellow Book: Diplomatic Documents, 1938-1939, New York, 1949, Garreau to Bonnet, Hamburg, 4 July 1939, no. 155, page 201.
[36] BD, VI, Campbell to Halifax, Paris, 27 July 1939, no. 464, page 509.
[37] George Bilainkin, Maisky: Ten Years Ambassador, London, 1944, page 274.
[38] The Times, London, 5 August 1939, page 12; BD, VII, Minutes of the first Anglo-French-Soviet Delegations, 12 August 1939, Moscow, 12 August 1939, no. 1, pages 561-562.
[39] Roderick Macleod and Denis Kelly, editors, Time Unguarded: The Ironside Diaries, 1937-1940, London, 1963, pages 81-82.
[40] BD, VI, Campbell to Halifax, Paris, 29 July 1939, no. 490, page 535.
[41] BD, VI, Instructions to British Military Mission to Moscow, August 1939, unplaced, undated, page 762.
[42] BD, VI, Instructions to British Military Mission to Moscow, August 1939, London, 27 July 1939, pages 782-783.
[43] BD, VI, Instructions to British Military Mission to Moscow, August 1939, unplaced, undated, pages 783, 788-789.
[44] BD, VI, Instructions to British Military Mission to Moscow, August 1939, unplaced, undated, page 764.
[45] BD, VI, Instructions to British Military Mission to Moscow, August 1939, unplaced, undated, pages 762-764.
[46] BD, VI, Strang to Sargent, Moscow, 20 July 1939, no. 376, page 425.
[47] BD, VI, Seeds to Halifax, Moscow, 24 July 1939, no. 378, pages 427-429.
[48] BD, VI, Henderson to Halifax, Berlin, 5 August 1939, no. 570, pages 615-617; VI, Henderson to Halifax, Berlin, 8 August 1939, no. 585, page 626; VI, Henderson to Halifax, Berlin, 8 August 1939, no. 592, page 632; VI, Henderson to Cadogan, Berlin, 8 August 1939, no. 594, page 634; VI, Henderson to Halifax, Berlin, 10 August 1939, no. 614, page 657; VI, Henderson to Sargent, Berlin, 28 June 1939, pages 709-710; VI, Henderson to Halifax, Berlin, 9 July 1939, pages 711-713.
[49] BD, VI, Halifax to Seeds, London, 21 July 1939, no. 378, pages 427-429.
[50] BD, VI, Seeds to Halifax, Moscow, 24 July 1939, no. 416, pages 460-461; VI, Instructions to British Military Mission to Moscow, August 1939, unplaced, undated, page 762.
[51] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Documents and Materials Relating to the Eve of the Second World War, Moscow, 1948, Volume II, Dirksen memo, no. 13, pages 67-72.
[52] Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Series 5, Volume 350, 17 July to 4 August 1939, columns 1026-1027.
[53] BD, VI, Campbell to Halifax, Paris, 26 July 1939, no. 458, page 495.
[54] Arnold Toynbee, editor, Documents on International Affairs, 1939-1946, Oxford, 1951, Volume I, pages 422-424.
[55] Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott, The Appeasers, Boston, 1963, pages 278-287.
[56] BD, VI, Seeds to Halifax, Moscow, 13 August 1939, no. 647, pages 682-683.
[57] BD, VII, Further material on the Anglo-Franco-Soviet Military Conversations in Moscow, August 1939, London, 23 August 1939, pages 558-560.
[58] Ibid., pages 558-614.
[59] BD, VII, Seeds to Halifax, Moscow, 15 August 1939, no. 1, pages 1-3.
[60] BD, VII, Halifax to Kennard, London, 15 August 1939, no. 6, page 8.
[61] BD, VII, Minutes to the Anglo-Franco-Soviet Delegations in Moscow on 13, 14, 15, 16 August 1939, pages 567-570, 570-575, 575-581, 581-584.
[62] BD, VII, Drax to Chatfield, Moscow, 16 August 1939, no. 34, pages 32-33.
[63] BD, VII, Halifax to Osborne, London, 16 August 1939, no. 23, pages 23-24; VII, Halifax to Kennard, London, 16 August 1939, no. 30, page 28; VII, Henderson to Halifax, Berlin, 16 August 1939, no. 32, pages 29-32.
[64] BD, VII, Halifax to Kennard, London, 17 August 1939, no. 38, page 39; VII, Halifax to Kennard, London, 17 August 1939, no. 39, page 40.
[65] BD, VII, Lindsay to Halifax, Washington, 17 August 1939, no. 41, pages 41-42.
[66] BD, VII, Minutes of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet Delegations in Moscow on 17 August 1939, pages 584-588.
[67] BD, VII, Halifax to Kennard, London, 17 August 1939, no. 38, page 39; VII, Halifax to Kennard, London, 17 August 1939, no. 39, pages 40-41; VII, Halifax to Seeds, London, 17 April 1939, no. 44, pages 44-45.
[68] BD, VII, Kennard to Halifax, Warsaw, 18 August 1939, no. 52, pages 53-54; VII, Kennard to Halifax, Warsaw, 18 August 1939, no. 60, page 61; VII, Kennard to Halifax, Warsaw, 19 August 1939, no. 70, pages 69-70; VII, Minutes of the Meeting of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet Military Delegations in Moscow on 21 August 1939, pages 589-595.
[69] GD, VI, Weizaecker to Schulenburg, Berlin, 27 May 1939, no. 446, pages 597-598.
[70] N-SR, Schnurre memo, Berlin, 27 July 1939, page 34.
[71] N-SR, Ribbentrop to Schulenburg, Berlin, 14 August 1939, pages 50-52.
[72] N-SR, Ribbentrop to Schulenburg, Berlin, 16 August 1939, page 58.
[73] GD, VII, Schulenburg to Foreign Ministry, Moscow, 16 August 1939, no. 70, pages 76-77.
[74] GD, VII, Ribbentrop to Schulenburg, Berlin, 16 August 1939, no. 75, pages 84-85.
[75] N-SR, Ribbentrop to Schulenburg, Berlin, 14 August 1939, pages 50-52; Schulenburg to Foreign Ministry, Moscow, 16 August 1939, pages 52-56; Schulenburg to Weizaecker, Moscow, 16 August 1939, page 57.
[76] New York Times, 20 August 1939, page 1; N-SR, Schulenburg to Foreign Ministry, Moscow, 19 August 1939, page 63.
[77] BD, VII, Minutes of the Meeting of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet Military Delegations in Moscow on 21 August 1939, pages 589-595.
[78] N-SR, Ribbentrop to Schulenburg, Berlin, 20 August 1939, pages 66-67.
[79] N-SR, Schulenburg to Foreign Ministry, Berlin, 21 August 1939, page 68.
[80] Arnold and Veronica M. Toynbee, editors, Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946, London, 1958, Volume 10, pages 492-493; N-SR, Ribbentrop to Foreign Office, Moscow, 23 August 1939, pages 71-72; Memo on Ribbentrop, Stalin, and Molotov conversations night of 23 August 1939, Moscow, 24 August 1939, pages 72-78.