The German Attack on the USSR: The Destruction of a Legend

Ukraine, early days of Barbarossa.

by M. van Creveld

The decision over the hegemony of Europe,” Hit­ler told a select group of officers during a military conference on 5 December 1940, “will be taken in Russia.”[1]

The Führer, most historians will agree, was right; but not in the sense he expected. World War II was decided in Russia, and in that country’s favor. The result was Germany’s destruction and Hitler’s downfall.

When did Hitler lose the Second World War? From the purely military point of view, the time was probably December 1941, when Hitler’s hither­to invincible armored divisions finally ground to a halt at the very gates of Moscow. The story of why and how they got there has been told too often to be repeated here.[2] Planned as a Blitz­feldzug and expected to be over in three months, the German offensive against the Soviet Union got bogged down in the mud of the Russian autumn and then froze in the snow of the Russian winter. Consequently Hitler’s great gamble to knock out the Soviet Union before the United States could mobilize its full power against him had failed, and his thousand-year Reich was doomed.

Why did Hitler fail in his attempt to smash the Soviets before the advent of winter? Perhaps the most common answer is that he started too late. Ori­ginally, so runs the legend, Hitler had planned his Russian offensive to start on 15 May 1941. Cir­cumstances, however, forced him to postpone his invasion by five weeks to 22 June, with the result that the remaining season no longer sufficed to achieve a decisive victory in Russia. Historical opinion differs wildly as to the nature of the cir­cumstances that caused the delay, and the debate is not without certain political undertones. The Bri­tish prime minister in particular, with an eye to jus­tifying his otherwise disastrous decision of Febru­ary 1941 to transfer forces from Libya to Greece,[3] has claimed that, although ending in evacuation, the British adventure in the Balkans contributed suf­fi­ciently to the prolongation of Greek resistance in face of the German Wehrmacht to spoil the deli­cate timetable governing the coordination between Hitler’s invasion of Greece and his planned Rus­sian campaign. As we shall see, this view has some­thing to be said for it, although not quite in the way Churchill intended.

Conversely, Churchill’s opponents have denied that Hitler’s war against Greece had anything at all to do with the postponement of the Russian cam­paign. According to them, it was the sudden coup d’‚tat which overturned the government of Bel­grade on 27 March 1941 that, by causing Hitler to decide on the military liquidation of Yugoslavia and forcing him to bring up troops for the purpose, occasioned the delay. This view has been seized upon by the proponents of the coup in order to de­fend the act which led directly to a national dis­aster in the form of war against Germany and the subsequent occupation of Yugoslavia. By and large scholarship has tended to confirm this theory, claiming that Hitler’s decision to smash Yugoslavia forced the postponement of the Russian campaign by disrupting the build-up for the latter, making neces­sary the commitment of much stronger forces in the Balkans than originally envisaged, and de­lay­ing the start of the invasion of Greece.[4]

Vague attempts have also been made to blame the delay on the weather. According to the plans pre­pared by the German Army High Command (OKH), the starting date of the campaign against Rus­sia was to some extent dependent on the wea­ther, since it was impossible to start operations be­fore the morasses created in eastern Europe by melt­ing snow had dried up. The winter of 1940-41, it is sometimes claimed, was longer than usual, a fact which made it impracticable to start the cam­paign on 15 May as planned. Not surprisingly, this view is held especially by the commanders at the front.[5] The senior officers at OKH, on the other hand, do not mention it in their writings, a fact which may be accounted for by their determination to put the blame for every blunder committed by the German Army during the war on Hitler per­sonally.

The sum total of all these views is utter con­fusion. All these years after, there is probably no­body who can say with certainty whether it was Greece or Yugoslavia that was mainly responsible for the starting date, and therefore outcome, of the Russian campaign; what role was played by the wea­ther; and whether the delay was absolutely necessary. The only thing that everybody seems to be agreed on is that there was a delay. For the rest, it is generally assumed, rather than known, that he cause of this delay was Yugoslavia, not Greece. It is the purpose of this article to examine the es­sen­tial points of this ‘accepted’ view, and to offer an alternative explanation.

Is it true that Hitler had originally intended his Russian campaign to start on 15 May? His ‘Direc­tive No. 21’ for the preparation of the Russian cam­paign, on which this assumption is generally based, does not mention a starting date; it only says that those preparations requiring more than eight weeks should be completed by 15 May.[6] At the important military conference of 5 December, during which Hit­ler saw and approved the plans submitted to him by OKH, ‘end May’ was mentioned as the start­ing date.[7] On 24 January a memorandum on the oil situation assumed 1 June as the starting date,[8] while a Navy timetable issued on 12 March men­tions 22 May.[9] Furthermore, there is an entry in Halder’s diary, dated 24 February, in which the Army chief-of-staff raised the idea of securing the equip­ment of the reserves before that of the di­vi­sions to be supplied with French material which, ac­cording to this suggestion, was to be ready by 1 June.[10] Since five crucially important divisions are in­volved, the very fact that such a proposal could be raised shows that no date earlier than June was being considered for the beginning of the attack. May 15th, therefore, was nothing but a provisional terminus post quem, and explicitly defined as such.[11]

Next, what was the relationship between the Ger­man invasion of Greece (Operation Marita) and the offensive against Russia? According to the ‘traditional’ view the two operations, having been conceived more or less simultaneously towards the end of 1940, were coordinated with each other; and so they were, at least in principle. The aim of Marita, as conceived in December 1940, was to protect the southern flank of the Russian campaign against the possible establishment of a World War I style British front at Salonika.[12] For this reason, the latter could not be started before the aims of the former had been achieved. This fact was recog­nized by Hitler, who accordingly ordered the Armed Forces High Command (OKW) to prepare a timetable for 1941 in which the two operations would be incorporated.[13]

However, it soon turned out that this was easier said than done. Originally supposed to start on 11 February,[14] Operation Marita suffered almost two months’ delay because of bad weather in the de­ployment area in Rumania[15] and because the Bul­garians, whose territory had to be crossed in order to reach Greece, did their best to draw out the talks for the purpose for as long as possible.[16] Fur­thermore, political considerations—in the first place, Hitler’s fear of Soviet, Turkish and even Yugo­slav intervention—made it necessary to in­crease the number of divisions earmarked for Mari­ta from four to seven, twelve and finally eighteen,[17] causing grave concern to OKH, which reckoned that the forces committed in this operation could not be dis­pensed with for the Russian campaign.[18] Hitler ac­cordingly made several attempts to speed up the starting date, and therefore the termination of Marita; he tried to send his forces into Italian-occupied Albania,[19] to accelerate the build-up in Rumania by stopping all civilian traffic on the Rumanian railways,[20] and to open up the roads and railways of Yugoslavia.[21] All these attempts met with stiff resistance on the part of the states in­volved and had to be abandoned.

Thus, even before 7 March 1941, when the British started landing forces in the Piraeus in order to help the Greeks, the question of the re­la­tion­ship between Marita and the Russian cam­paign was a complicated and difficult one. Al­though the British intervention had precious little effect on the course and duration of German opera­tions in the Balkans, as we shall see it did have an­other important result. While ordering the Greek operation in Directives Nos. 18 and 20, Hitler had mentioned the possibility that Marita, originally supposed to be limited to the occupation of the Aegean coast, would be extended to include the whole of Greece. However, OKH had not really taken this possibility into account when preparing the operation, and little was heard of it during the win­ter of 1940-41. With its objective limited to the Aegean coast, Marita was to last only one week.[22] Hitler’s decision to enlarge the operation meant that it would last considerably longer; also, that the distance which the troops would have to tra­verse on their way back from Greece to their re­freshment areas would be much larger. Finally, OKH insisted that in order to carry out Hitler’s order it needed more forces than had hitherto been al­located for active participation in Marita.[23] As a result, it became clear that not all the divisions of Marita would be back in time for the east.[24] It would therefore seem that, contrary to what is generally assumed, Churchill was right to a degree in asserting that his sending of British troops to Greece obstructed the start of the German cam­paign in Russia. It was not what the British did in Greece, but the very fact that they went there which did the trick.

We may next ask what was the relationship be­tween the German campaign in Yugoslavia (Op­era­tion ‘25’) and the attack on Russia. To answer this question in a satisfactory manner, it must be divided into two parts: the relationship between Operation ‘25’ and the German build-up for Russia, and the effect of Operation ‘25’ on Marita.

What then was the effect on the Wehrmacht’s build-up for Russia of Hitler’s decision of 27 March 1941, to smash Yugoslavia? It has generally been assumed that the latter was so sudden and un­expected that, to carry it out, large-scale disruption in the former could not be avoided. However, the evidence does not support this view. The Yugoslav campaign was not really as unexpected as the Ger­man generals, speaking after the war, have tried to make it look; all theoretical and some practical pre­parations for it had been made many months previously, a fact which greatly facilitated the opera­tion.[25]

Much ink has been split over the ‘disruption’ allegedly caused to the Russian build-up by Hit­ler’s decision to smash Yugoslavia and bring up troops in addition to those earmarked for Marita for the purpose. Such evidence as we possess, how­ever, does not indicate any such large-scale dis­ruption. At the time of the Belgrade coup, the build-up for Russia was proceeding “slowly and with large intervals.”[26] Out of the total of 17,000 trains comprising the build-up, only some 2,500 had already rolled to the east,[27] carrying mainly in­fantry divisions. The transportation of the Army troops (including artillery) to the east had only just begun,[28] while that of the bulk of the ‘fast’ (i.e., armored and motorized) divisions was still one month away. Indeed, it was only a few days since the OKW timetable for the transports had been made ready.[29] A look at the timetable reveals that, out of the twelve divisions whose diversion to the Bal­kans was brought about by the Belgrade coup, only four were on the point of being transferred to the east.[30] These forces could be, and were, replaced by others from the OKH reserves,[31] so that there was no need to suspend the build-up at all. As to the other eight divisions, mostly armored and motori­zed ones, they were not supposed to travel to the Russian frontier for another month, a fact which allowed OKH plenty of time to find alternative ar­rangements. Out of the total of twelve divisions which were brought up for Operation ‘25’ only one—the 14th Armored—came from the east.[32] From these facts, it is clear that any immediate delay caused to the Russian build-up by Hitler’s decision to smash Yugoslavia was limited to the time needed to pre­pare the OKH reserves for transportation in the place of those forces that had been sent to Yugo­slavia. Even this delay, however, could easily be made up for later on because of the extremely lei­surely pace at which the transports were rolling at this time.[33]

What was the effect of Operation ‘25’ on Ma­rita? According to a timetable issued on 19 February, the latter was to start on 6 April.[34] Fol­lowing Hitler’s decision to extend its objectives, however, OKH felt the need to advance this date and requested the commander in question, Field Mar­shal List of the 12th Army, to start his attack—subject to the weather—on or about 1 April.[35] Even after the Yugoslav coup, OKH still considered it pos­sible to start Marita on 2 or 3 April, that is with­out any delay as compared to the original time­table.[36] However, Operation ‘25’ also presented List with opportunities which OKH did not want him to miss. On 29 March, therefore, a conference was held in which List, the deputy chief of OKH, General Paulus, and the commander of the 2nd Army designed to carry out Operation ‘25,’ General Weichs, took part. I was decided to defer the attack on Greece until Weichs’s forces would be ready to open their own attack in order to achieve a better coordination between the two operations.[37] Con­se­quently OKH issued a new timetable, according to which the opening of both ‘25’ and Marita was postponed to 5 April, to make it possible for List to re-deploy his forces in such a way as to take ad­vantage of the opportunities of attacking Greece from Yugoslav territory which had been opened up by the Belgrade coup.[38] On 3 April Hitler overrode OKH and ordered a postponement of another 24 hours. Thus, it is clear that such delay as Operation ‘25’ caused to Marita was due not to any difficulty in bringing up additional forces, but to the desire to exploit the opportunity presented by the Belgrade coup in order to facilitate operations against Greece.

As it turned out, the use of Yugoslav territory for operations against Greece did in fact greatly speed up the termination of Marita. Instead of throwing his troops against the strong, modern Metaxas line protecting the Bulgaro-Greek fron­tier, List was enabled to outflank it by sending forces to Strumica and thence south through the Varder Valley to Salonika. His capture of that city on 9 April, only three days after the start of the of­fensive, cut off Greek Thrace from the rest of Greece and forced the Greek troops manning the Metaxas line to surrender. What was more, Hitler’s decision to liquidate Yugoslavia enabled List to out­flank the main Anglo-Greek defensive line on the Aliakhmon by means of a turning movement via the Monastir Gap. Coming from the north, his forces encountered the British—who had only just taken up positions—at the Veve Pass and, after two days of fighting, broke through on 12 April. After that the German campaign in Greece de­generated into little more than a rapid chase which, conducted with astonishingly few forces, did not end until an SS division reached the southern tip of the Peloponnese on 30 April. Thus, the net result of the Belgrade coup was to enable Hitler to throw the British out of Greece with much more ease than originally expected.[39]

To conclude our examination of the ‘traditional’ view of these events, a word should be said about the relationship between the Balkan campaign as a whole and the attack on Russia. The latter was one of the largest military operations of all time, em­ploying in all 152 divisions.[40] A comparison of this gigantic number with that of the forces which were in one way or another involved in the Balkan cam­paign—twenty-nine divisions, including those which had not seen action and even those, like the 19th Armored, which never even knew that they had been earmarked for the Balkans[41]—serves to put mat­ters into perspective.[42] Since three out of these twenty-nine divisions were to stay in Greece as occupation forces,[43] only twenty-six are left which could, prima facie, be relevant to the German offensive against Rus­sia. Of these, eleven were earmarked for the OKH re­serves, and would not therefore be needed during the initial assault; the offensive against Russia could have been, and was, started without waiting for them.[44] This leaves us with only fifteen divisions, or some ten per cent of the total number, to deal with. Di­vi­ded according to the sectors of the eastern front to which they were sent, the following picture emer­ges:

Southern Sector

northern wing of southern sector

9th Armored

11th Armored

16th Armored

100th ‘Light’

101st ‘Light’

SS ‘Adolf Hitler’

southern wing of southern sector

50th Infantry

72nd Infantry

76th Infantry

198th Infantry

Central Sector

8th Armored

14th Armored

19th Armored

SS ‘Reich’

Northern Sector

1st Mountain

While the central and northern sectors together received five divisions coming up from the Bal­kans, the southern one—the significance of its two wings will be seen in a moment—received ten, and was therefore the most affected by any delay which might have resulted from the Balkan cam­paign. It will be noted that of the five divisions designated for the central and northern sectors, three armored ones had formed part of the OKH re­serves for ‘25’ and had not seen action,[45] so that they did not have to be refitted and refreshed. The SS and mountain divisions did in fact see some action, but both were withdrawn from the cam­paign on 14 April and sent back to Germany. Since, on the average, each division required ten days for its march back to the refreshment area and three weeks for the actual refreshment it is clear that all these forces could easily have made the eastern front by 15 May.[46] In any case, their num­ber was far too insignificant in comparison with the grand total of ninety-seven divisions making up the cen­tral and northern sectors of the eastern front to cause any difficulties in the build-up for Russia; this is confirmed by the cautious Halder, as well as by the relevant army commanders.[47]

It is to the southern sector of the eastern front, therefore, that we must turn our attention. Here, we find that the armies stationed in this sector had forty-seven divisions between them, of which ten, or over twenty per cent, had to be brought up from the Balkans. This, however, is where the division of this sector into a southern and northern wing comes in. On 16 March, Hitler had decided that the 11th Army, stationed in Rumania and forming the right wing of the Russian front, was not to participate in the initial attack, but to confine itself to the protection of the oil fields.[48] For this purpose, the army dis­posed of considerable Rumanian forces, but did not receive German units until the end of June.[49] Even so, its tasks were far from urgent. Having received a total of seven divisions—four of which had marched all the way from Greece without reference to the grand timetable governing the rest of the eastern build-up[50]—the army proceeded to motorize the 72nd Infantry Division at its leisure, without in any way impeding the start of the Rus­sian campaign.[51] Four out of the ten divisions in question, therefore, were assigned by OKH to an army which did not, nor was supposed to, parti­ci­pate in the initial assault.

This leaves us with six divisions of the northern wing of the southern sector to deal with. Of these, the 16th Armored had seen no action; ori­gi­nally expected to supply flank protection against Tur­key, it was withdrawn from Bulgaria on 21 April and was back in Rumania for refreshment on approximately 25 April.[52] It must therefore have been ready for transportation to the east by 15 May. Both the 100th and 101st ‘Light’ Motorized Divisions, belonging as they did to the OKH re­serves for Yugoslavia, were recalled on 14 April without having seen action and must therefore have been able to make the eastern front at the same date. Can the remaining three divisions[53]—all of which were originally included in Marita, and therefore presumably coordinated with the Rus­sian campaign since November—have dis­rupted the gigantic build-up to such an extent as to cause a delay of five weeks at the start of the offensive? It seems unlikely.

To sum up this part of our examination, it is clear that the ‘traditional’ view of the relationship be­tween the German campaign in the Balkans and the attack on Russia does not hold water. To begin with, it is very doubtful whether Hitler even in­tended to start his Russian campaign before early June 1941. Second, whatever difficulties were caused by the Balkan campaign originated in Hit­ler’s decision to occupy the whole Greek mainland, and not in the Belgrade coup; the main effect of the latter seems to have been to fire a considerable injection to Operation Marita. Finally, it is doubt­ful whether the number of troops involved war­ranted a delay of three, not to mention five, weeks at the start of the war against the Soviet Union. To find out why Hitler’s Russian campaign started on the day it did, we shall have to look elsewhere.

Operations Marita and ‘25’ began on the morning of 6 April; two days earlier Colonel Heu­singer, chief of the operations department at OKH, had submitted a provisional timetable for the com­pletion of the eastern build-up to Halder. Like Hit­ler and the rest of OKH, Heusinger—on the basis of the experience of World War I—overestimated the fighting power of the Yugoslavs and based his calculations on the assumption that both Marita and ‘25’ would last until 30 April, an assumption which proved correct for the former but wrong for the latter.[54] After the end of operations in the Bal­kans Heusinger intended to distribute the infantry divisions involved between the OKH reserves for Russia and the 11th Army, a device which enabled him to subtract them from the forces that would have to be brought up before the beginning of the Rus­sian campaign. As to the ‘fast’ units, Heusinger calculated that their transportation back from Greece and Yugoslavia would, on the average, last ten days; another three weeks were required for the physical and technical refreshment of the troops. Thus, they would be ready for transportation to the east in the first days of June.[55] Accordingly, Heu­singer prepared the following transport scheme:

3rd echelon

(peacetime railway schedule) 8 April-20 May

seventeen infantry divisions from the Reich and west

4th (a) echelon

(maximum capacity railway schedule) 23 May-2 June

nine infantry divisions from the Reich and west

4th (b) echelon

(maximum capacity railway schedule) 3-23 June

twelve armored and twelve motorized divisions from the Reich, west and southeast[56]

This timetable then was based on the as­sump­tion that the ‘fast’ units from Greece and Yugo­slavia would not be ready for transportation to the east before 1 June. At the same time, for reasons of camouflage,[57] it also held back the rest of the ‘fast’ units earmarked for Russia until the last possible moment.

By the middle of April, however, it was obvi­ous that the assumption on which these timetables were constructed was hopelessly and needlessly pessimistic; the war against Yugoslavia would be over long before the end of the month, while opera­tions against Greece were at this time being continued with only seven out of the eighteen divisions originally allocated to List.[58] On 12 April the OKH reserves for Yugoslavia were halted; on 13 April, those of the 2nd and 12th Armies; and, on the day after, a further three divisions.[59] According to the schedule allowing ten days’ transportation and three weeks’ refreshment before they could be ready for the east, all these forces—a total of eleven di­vi­sions, or almost exactly the number that had been diverted for Operation ‘25’—could have been shifted into the extremely leisurely timetable of the 3rd echelon. So, for that matter, could additional forces from the 4th (a) echelon, which had not been in­volved in the Balkans and which, assuming that the Russian campaign was in fact supposed to start on 15 May, should have been ready by 5 May at the latest. This change would in turn have made it possible to exploit the fact that the last forces en­gaged on Operation ‘25’ started their withdrawal on 23 April, a fact which, according to Heusinger’s schedule, should have made it possible for them to be incorporated in the last stages of the 4th (a) eche­lon. In short, the unexpectedly rapid termi­nation of Operation ‘25’ and the small number of troops still committed on Marita should have made it possible to move the entire transportation schedule forward. Indeed, such a change had been explicitly provided for by the commander-in-chief of the Army, who was only too well aware of the impossibility of exactly estimating the duration of operations in Greece and Yugoslavia.[60]

OKH also had another factor operating in its favor. Long before the start of Marita and ‘25’ it had, persistently but unsuccessfully, tried to open up the roads and railways of Yugoslavia to the German troops returning from Greece in order to speed up their availability for Russia.[61] Hitler’s de­ci­sion to occupy Yugoslavia as well as Greece made it possible to do precisely this; indeed, one of the Wehrmacht’s prime objectives in Yugoslavia was the important Belgrade–Nisch railway, the cap­ture of which would make it possible to trans­port troops by rail directly from Salonika to Graz or Klagenfurt.[62] Thus, the Belgrade coup made it possible for the 46th and 73rd Infantry, the 5th and 9th Armored and SS ‘AH” divisions, all of which had originally formed part of the 12th Army and would have to march back from Greece in any case, to return to the Reich by the much shorter way of Yugoslavia.[63]

The question, then, is why the timetables for the eastern build-up, which were submitted to Hit­ler on 30 April,[64] were not revised when it became clear that the operations in Greece and Yugoslavia were easier and less prolonged than had previously been expected. The answer is that, to some extent, this was done. Thus, a revised timetable drawn up on 22 April withdrew two infantry divisions from the 4th (a) echelon to the OKH reserves for Russia, replacing them by the 1st Mountain and the 101st ‘Light’ Motorized Divisions, both units that had been brought up for Operation ‘25’ and were re­leased on 13 April.[65] Also the 4th Mountain Di­vi­sion was incorporated in the 4th (b) echelon, but was taken out again when it became clear that the Hun­garians, from whose territory it was supposed to operate, would not join in the initial assault.[66]

An examination of the evidence, however, sug­gests that much more could have been done. Thus, the 14th Armored Division, after a very short vic­tory parade in Yugoslavia, was back in its re­fresh­ment area near Berlin on 3 May, and must there­fore have been ready for the east on the 24th of the same month. Nevertheless, it was sent there only on 6 June.[67] The 19th Armored, a division which was earmarked for the OKH reserves for ‘25’ but in fact never left its training camp near Augustdorf, was not shifted into the 3rd echelon but sent to the east only on 12 June.[68] SS ‘Das Reich,’ released from Yugoslavia on 14 April, was kept waiting un­til the same day,[69] while SS Infantry Regiment ‘Gross­deutschland’ had to wait four days longer.[70] Finally there are the cases of the 8th and 16th Ar­mored Divisions, which supply convincing proof that the Yugoslav operation should never have cau­sed the Russian campaign to be postponed by five weeks. The 8th Armored had originally been sup­posed to travel to the Russian border on 13 May; taken out of the eastern build-up to take part in Operation ‘25,’ it was free again on 23 April and must therefore have completed its refreshment about 24 May, or scarcely two weeks behind schedule. Yet it was kept waiting for another three weeks before being sent to the east on 14 June.[71] Still more interesting is the case of the 16th Ar­mored, a unit which, it will be remembered, had not seen action in the Balkans because its task con­sisted of guarding the Bulgaro-Turkish frontier. Re­leased by the 12th Army on 21 April, this di­vi­sion was back in Bucharest for refreshment four days later,[72] and must therefore have been ready to roll east on 15 May, that is, only three days later than the date originally envisaged for it within the frame­work of the original plan for the eastern build-up; yet it was sent there only between 6 ad 10 June.[73] These two examples make it abundantly clear that the refreshment of numerous forces from the Balkans, and particularly from Yugoslavia, was completed ten to twenty days before they were actually sent to the eastern front and only a short time behind the original schedule. Since it is im­possible to explain these facts away by the over­crowding of the railways or the rigidity of the timetables,[74] it seems clear that there must have been compelling reasons which prevented the full ex­ploitation of the unexpectedly early termination of the Yugoslav campaign.

These reasons are not far to seek. In essence, they had nothing to do with either Greece or Yugo­slavia; their origin is to be found in Hitler’s order of August 1940 to enlarge the Army from 120 to 180 divisions. As the reorganization got under way OKH discovered in November 1940 that the pro­ductive capacity of German industry was simply not large enough to supply the material for the newly formed units, a fact which made it necessary to introduce certain changes in the original pro­gram.[75] As the Russian campaign approached, it gra­dually became clear that not all the forces would be ready in time. As early as 3 April Halder was aware that the last infantry division would not be ready before 20 May, and even this could be achieved only by supplying a number of armored and motorized divisions with captured French ma­terial.[76] Throughout May Halder was recording the difficulties in supplying such diverse units as the 100th Armored Brigade, the 13th, 17th and 18th Armored Divisions and the 14th and 18th Motori­zed Divisions, none of which had anything at all to do with the Balkan campaign.[77] Indeed, it is hardly possible to open a history of any ‘fast’ unit that took part in the war against Russia without being struck by the belatedness with which it was sup­plied with its full complement of motor vehicles. This, the so-called Panzerzüge, the construction of five of which had been decided upon before the Yugoslav coup, were only ready for transportation to the east in mid-June, after finally receiving their French material.[78] The 10th Motorized Division did not receive its equipment until after marching to the east on 10 June, and even then the vehicles had to be collected piecemeal from Germany, Belgium, Holland and France.[79] The 20th Armored, 14th, 18th, 25th and 36th Motorized Divisions were all supplied with French vehicles, but even so the post­ponement of their transportation to the east was again being considered on 20 May.[80] Indeed, the problems caused by the general shortage of equip­ment, particularly motor vehicles, were not limited to the ‘fast’ units only. At the time of the German offensive against Russia, no less than ninety-two—or forty per cent—of the Army divisions had to be sup­plied, wholly or in part, with French material.[81] Since the losses in material resulting from the Bal­kan campaign were negligible,[82] it is quite clear that the lack of equipment of all kinds would not have permitted the Russian campaign to start be­fore the end of June even if neither Marita nor ‘25’ had ever been undertaken.

To some extent, this hypothesis is borne out by the timetables for the eastern build-up. Thus, we have already noted the remarkable fact that two in­fantry divisions, neither of which had anything at all to do with the Balkans, were for some un­ex­plained reason taken out of the 3rd echelon build-up to which they had originally belonged and re­ferred first to the 4th (b) echelon and then to the OKH reserves.[83] On 25 May, moreover, the time­table of the 4th (b) echelon underwent a thorough re­vision. On the one hand, the 4th Mountain Di­vi­sion was taken out and referred to the OKH re­serves; on the other, seven new divisions were ad­ded to the echelon, raising the total number of units it consisted of to twenty-four, minus one, plus seven, equals thirty divisions. The units added to the 4th (b) echelon were: the 3rd, 9th, 12th and 13th Armored, the 8th Infantry, the 3rd and 20th Motorized Divisions.[84] Of these, the only one whose belated appearance in the time­table may be ascribed to the Balkan campaign is the 9th Armored which had been released by the 12th Army on 13 April. As to the others, we pos­sess some remarkable information. An entry in Hal­der’s diary, reading “the last infantry division will be ready on 20 May,”[85] may very well explain the otherwise incomprehensible inclusion of an in­fantry division in an echelon that, for reasons of camouflage, had been supposed to consist of ‘fast’ units only. About the 13th Armored Division we know that it was ready for the east only “at the last moment,” which in this case was 28 May.[86] As to the 3rd Motorized Division, its belated incor­pora­tion in the timetable is explained by the fact that it received its motor vehicles only at the last moment before traveling to the east on 6 June.[87] Thus, it is possible to explain the late appearance of three out of the six divisions in question in terms of their imperfect material preparation. As to the other three, we have no information; but it is interesting that on 29 May a further delay in the transportation to the east of yet another six units (the 20th Ar­mored, 3rd, 10th, 14th, 18th and 25th Motorized) was being considered,[88] and that the date of arrival of the last division for Russia, in its deployment area, SS ‘AH,’ was dictated not by any trans­por­tation difficulties but by the fact that the general shortage of vehicles prevented its timely refresh­ment.[89] These facts make it quite clear that, ir­re­spec­tive of the Balkan campaign, the offensive against Russia could not have started much earlier than it did.

With this conclusion, we must return to our starting point. Since the war, it has often been alleged that Hitler lost World War II because one or both of the otherwise secondary German Balkan cam­paigns of spring 1941 forced him to postpone his scheduled invasion of the USSR, thereby mak­ing it impossible for him to complete the conquest of that country before the advent of winter. In par­ticular, his ‘fatal’ decision to invade Yugoslavia is supposed to have ‘disrupted’ preparations for the Russian campaign to such an extent that a post­ponement of the attack on her became inevitable. Behind these views there is not only sloppy scholar­ship which failed to examine the facts, but also wishful thinking based in part upon con­si­dera­tions that have nothing to do with historiography.

An examination of the evidence suggests that almost every part of the ‘traditional’ view on these problems is wrong. The delay in the beginning of Hitler’s offensive, it turns out, amounted to at most three weeks, instead of five. The British landing in Greece on 7 March did in fact contribute towards in­creasing the difficulties of starting the Russian cam­paign on time, although not quite in the way its originator expected. The main effect of Operation ‘25’ in this context was to facilitate and accelerate Ger­many’s Balkan adventure as a whole.

However, the fact that OKH neglected to exploit the unexpectedly early termination of opera­tions in Yugoslavia proves beyond doubt that there existed other factors which were responsible for the selection of the starting date of the Russian campaign. These factors, it has been suggested, are to be found in the general shortage of materiel from which the German Army was suffering at this time. Hitler’s late start of, and subsequent defeat in, the Russian campaign did not therefore result from this or that ‘fatal’ decision; rather, it stemmed from the inability of German industry to supply the ne­cessary material on time. The fact that Hitler, de­spite the advanced season and the total lack of re­serves, decided to carry out the attack points to that unlimited hubris which, in the end, was to lead to his downfall.

Adolf Hitler led Germany during World War II.

 

Joseph Stalin led the Soviet Union during World War II.

Contemporary political cartoon.

“Drang Nach Osten” began at dawn from Prussia’s forests.

By July the Germans had marched 400 miles into Russia, but the glow of battle was still constant on the somber, endless horizon.

Victory-seasoned German armor sheared through the Russian forests and, with Stuka support, cut off whole armies at Minsk.

Low-flying Stukas constantly harassed the primitive, horse-drawn caravans retreating along the bleak dirt roads to Moscow.

Rolling through villages of the Ukraine, German columns made Hitler overseer of the “Black Earth,” Russia’s historic wheatland.

After the Smolensk battle, wounded Russian captives and wrecked armor swelled the Germans’ bag to 300,000 prisoners and 3,000 tanks.

At Mogilev German troopers disarmed the captured garrison. When cut off, Russians fought on stubbornly, slowed down the blitz.

Still on the road to Moscow, battle-weary Germans halted at Yelnya, where the Red Army threw them back for the first time.

Panzerkampfwagen III, Operation Barbarossa, 1941.

German wartime painting of German motorized troops moving along a road in Russia.

“The maps we were given were all wrong,” Rundstedt wrote of the Russian invasion. “The roads that had been marked nice and red and thick on a map turned out to be tracks… Even railroads which were to be used by us simply did not exist… I realized soon after the attack had begun that everything that had been written about Russia was nonsense.”

The corpses of victims of Stalin’s NKVD murdered in last days of June 1941, just after outbreak of war.

Soviet children during a German air raid in the first days of the war, June 1941, by RIA Novosti archive.

Russia, 1941. SS Cavalry Brigade.

A column of Soviet POWs captured near Minsk is marched west.

A mixture of German cavalry and infantry move along a road past a halted motorized column, Russia.

Messerschmitt Bf 110 provides air cover for German armored force in Russia.

German armored force in action, Russia.

Ruins of Minsk were Russian-made. Before withdrawing from the city the Red Army carefully set fires in these buildings and left not even a roof for the Germans.

Soviet infantrymen advance under fire.

A wounded Russian soldier receives care in a hospital.

An anti-aircraft gun in action (right), as Russian citizens run to escape the German bombing of their city.

A Russian woman with all she owns in a suitcase on her back, walks past the remains of a town’s buildings.

Columns and chimneys are all that remain of a Russian village.

Scorched earth. A village is burned to prevent it being of use to the Germans.

German Waffen-SS troops celebrate with some liberated spirits.

Russian citizens preparing defenses.

Soviet soldiers leave their bunker after surrendering to German panzergrenadiers.

Soviet soldier leaves his bunker after surrendering to German panzergrenadiers.

Soviet prisoners are escorted by German panzergrenadiers after their surrender.

---

[1] F. Halder, Kriegstagebuch, Stuttgart, 1963, cit: KTB/Halder, II, page 214, entry for 5 December 1940.

[2] For the why, see A. Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie, Frank­furt am/Main, 1965; for the how, A. Philippi and F. Heim, Der Feldzug gegen die Sowitunion, 1941 bis 1945, ein opera­tiver Uberblick, Stuttgart, 1962.

[3] Disastrous because it halted the British advance in North Africa and, by allowing the Germans to come in, pro­longed the war there by two years.

[4] E.g. B. H. Liddell-Hart, The German Generals Talk, New York, 1964, pages 169-84.

[5] G. Blumentritt, Von Rundstedt, the Soldier and the Main, Lon­don, 1952, page 101; H. Guderian, Panzer Leader, Lon­don, 1952, page 154; Liddell-Hart, op.cit., pages 170, 173.

[6] Hitler’s War Directives, edited by H. R. Trevor-Roper, Lon­don, 1964, pages 48-52.

[7] KTB/Halder, ii, page 214.

[8] OKW/W. Rü/LIV/Qu/FHQu, 24 January 1941 (un­num­bered), bundle No. MI/14/688 at the Imperial War Museum, London.

[9] Marine Archiv. ‘Barbarossa’: OKW Weisungen, Vol. I. No. 44277/41 g. Kdos Chefsache, 12 March 1941, Ger­man Foreign Ministry (GFM) Records/M175/ 00511-16.

[10] KTB/Halder, II, page 292.

[11] Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Frank­furt am/Main, 1965, cit: KTB/OKW, I, page 211, entry for 6 December 1940.

[12] K. von Tippelkirsch, “Der deutsche Balkanfeldzug 1941,” Wehr­wissenschaftliche Rundschau, IV, 1954, pages 145-56.

[13] KTB/OKW, I, page 179, entry for 19 November 1940.

[14] KTB/Halder, II, page 193, entry for 25 November 1940.

[15] Ibid., pages 242-43, entry for 24 December 1940; KTB/OKW, I, page 247, entry for 6 January 1940. For the vari­ous timetables of Marita, each mak­ing the operation start later than the previous one, see KTB/OKW, I, page 224, entry for 11 December 1940; KTB/Halder, II, pages 238, 242-43, entries for 20, 24 December 1940; OKL/Obdl/Gen. Qu./Genst. 4. Abt. (I) No. 76/40 g. Kdos, 28 De­cember 1940, ‘Zeittafel Marita’; OKW/WFSt/Abt. L No. 33 460/41 g. Kdos Chefsache, 6 January 1941, and ‘Un­ternehmen Marita, both from item No. MI/14/655 at the Imperial War Museum; and Ob. Kdo. d. deutsche Trup­pen in Rum„nien/Ia to the German Army mission in Rumania, No. 59/41 g. Kdos, 13 January 1941, German Mili­tary Records (GMR)/ 426/8004486).

[16] Ph. W. Fabry, Balkan-Wirren, 1940-1941, Darm­stadt, 1966, pages 146-47.

[17] KTB/Halder, II, pages 165, 167, entries for 4 and 6 No­vem­ber 1940; Directive No. 18, printed in Hit­ler’s War Directives, pages 38-43; KTB/Halder, II, page 188, entry for 18 November 1940.

[18] Ibid., pages 176, 188, entries for 12 and 18 Novem­ber 1940; KTB/OKW, I, page 179, entry for 19 Novem­ber 1940.

[19] For the planned German operation in Albania, see C. B. Bur­dick, “Operation Cyclamen: Germany and Al­bania,” Journal of Central European Affairs, XIX, 1959, pages 71-86. However, this paper does not make use of the important Italian material in­cluded in Italian Military Records, Reel No. 129.

[20] Fabricius (German minister in Bucharest) to Foreign Mini­stry, 21 December 1940, Documents on German Foreign Policy (cit: DGFP), D, XI, No. 544; Jodl direc­tive, 21 December 1940, ibid., No. 556; KTB/Halder, II, pages 242-43, entry for 24 De­cem­ber 1940.

[21] Ritter (Ribbentrop’s chef de cabinet) to Ribbentrop, No. 23/41 g. Kdos Chefsache, 5 February 1941, Botschafter Rit­ter, Griechenland, IV, GFM/962/ 302216; KTB/Halder, II, page 261, entry for 28 January 1941; KTB/OKW, I, page 285, entry for 29 January 1941.

[22] OKH/Genst. d. H/Op. Abt. No. 225/41 g. Kdos Chef­sache, 14 February 1941, item No. AL 835 at the Imperial War Museum.

[23] KTB/Halder, II, pages 314, 315, entry for 16 March 1941; AOK, 12/Ia No. 517/41 g. Kdos, 12 March 1941, GMR/ 426/8005040; KTB/OKW, I, page 363, entry for 18 March 1941.

[24] KTB/OKW, pages 360-61, entry for 18 March 1941.

[25] KTB/Halder, II, pages 131, 134, 140, 143, entries for 10, 12, 15, and 18 October 1940; Trials of Major War Crimi­nals, International Military Tribunal Nurem­berg, 1949, VII, pages 331-32; P. Bor, Gespr„che mit Halder, Wies­baden, 1950, page 182; G. Blau, The German Campaigns in the Balkans, Spring 1941, Washington, D.C., 1953, page 47.

[26] B. Mueller-Hillebrand, Der Zusammenhang zwis­chen den deutschen Balkanfeldzug und der Invasion in Russland, Koenigstein/TS, Ms. No. C-101 at the Imperial War Muse­um, cit: Mueller-Hillebrand, Zusam­menhang, page 14. Mueller-Hillebrand was Halder’s ADC.

[27] KTB/Halder, II, page 311, entry for 14 March 1941.

[28] OKH/Genst. d. H/Op. Abt. (III) No. 340/41 g. Kdos Chef­sache, 7 March 1941.

[29] KTB/OKW, I, page 340, entry for 8 March 1941.

[30] Anlage 2a, 2b, 2c and 2 d zu OKH/Genst. d. H/Op. Abt. (IN) No. 050/41 g. Kdos Chefsache, 31 January 1941, GMR/430/6401931, 6401932, 6401933, and GMR/335/ 6291487.

[31] KTB/Halder, II, page 347, entry for 4 April 1941; Muel­ler-Hillebrand, Zusammenhang, pages 15-16.

[32] R. Grams, 14. Panzerdivision, Podzun, 1957, page 16.

[33] Mueller-Hillebrand, Zusammenhang, page 16.

[34] Anlage zu OKW/WFSt/Abt. L No. 33 460/41 g. Kdos Chef­sache, 19 February 1941, ‘Zeittafel Marita,’ item No. MI/14/655 at the Imperial War Museum.

[35] OKH/Genst. d. H/Op. Abt. (I) No. 492/41 g. Kdos Chef­sache, 22 March 1941, ‘Erganzende Weisung für 12. Armee,’ GMR/329/6285495-500.

[36] OKW/WFSt/Abt. L No. 44 382/41 g. Ldos Chefsache, 28 March 1941, ‘Vorschlag, für die Uberein­stim­mung der deutschen ... Operation gegen Jugo­sla­wien,’ item No. MI/ 14/626 at the Imperial War Museum.

[37] Blau, op.cit., page 30.

[38] OKW/WFSt/Abt. L No. 44 406/41 g. Kdos Chefsache, 31 March 1941, item No. MI/14/655 at the Imperial War Mu­seum; also KTB/Halder, II, page 337, entry for 30 March 1941.

[39] OKW/WFSt/Abt. L No. 44 450/41 g. Kdos Chefsache, 3 April 1941, item No. MI/14/655 at the Imperial War Mu­se­um; also KTB/Halder, II, page 343, entry for 3 April 1941.

[40] Including 123 in Poland and Rumania, 21 in reserve, and eight in Norway; B. Mueller-Hille­brand, Das Heer 1939-1945, Frankfurt am/Main, 1956, II, page 102.

[41] A. Krull, Das Hannoverische Regiment 73, Han­nover, Regimentkameradschaft 73, n.d., pages 90-92. The 73rd Regiment was part of the 19th Armored Division.

[42] For lists of the Balkan divisions, Mueller-Hille­brand, Das Heer, pages 155-56.

[43] The 5th and 6th Mountain Divisions, as well as the 164th Infantry Division stayed in Greece. Yugo­slavia was to be occupied by four ‘security divisions’ newly constructed for the purpose. KTB/OKW, I, page 398, entry for 30 May 1941.

[44] These divisions included two armored, one motor­ized, one mountain and seven infantry units. KTB/Halder, II, page 387, entry for 30 April 1941.

[45] KTB/Halder, II, pages 349-50, entry for 5 April 1941; ibid., page 362, entry for 13 April 1941; Muel­ler-Hille­brand, Das Heer, II, page 156; Mueller-Hillebrand, Zu­sam­menhang, page 17.

[46] Mueller-Hillebrand, Zusammenhang, page 19; KTB/Halder, II, page 353, entry for 7 April 1941.

[47] Bor, op.cit., page 192; Liddell-Hart, op.cit., page 180; Muel­ler-Hillebrand, Zusammenhang, page 10; W. Erfurth, Die Geschichte des deutschen General­stabes von 1918 bis 1945, Göttingen, 1957, pages 267-68.

[48] A decision based on the results of a war game, which had demonstrated the difficulties of crossing the Pruth. KTB/Halder, II, pages 314-15, entry for 16 March 1941; KTB/OKW, I, page 361, entry for 18 March 1941; DGFP, D, XII, No. 195.

[49] G. Tessin, Verb„nde und Truppen der deutschen Wehr­­macht und Waffen-SS, Frankfurt am/Main, n.d., II, page 83.

[50] These were the 50th, 72nd, 76th and 198th Infantry Divi­sions. For their movements, see AOK. 12/Ia No. 1127/41 g. Kdos, 4 May 1941, GMR/427/8005280-81; AOK. 12/Ia No. 1166/41 g. Kdos, 18 April 1941, ibid./8005299; and AOK. 12/Ia No. 1008/41 g. Kdos, 20 April 1941, ibid./8005297-98. Also, Philippi-Heim, op.cit., page 52.

[51] KTB/OKW, I, page 404, entry for 16 June 1941.

[52] Mueller-Hillebrand, Zusammenhang, page 17; KTB/Hal­der, II, pages 322, 353, entries for 19 March and 7 April 1941.

[53] The 9th and 11th Armored, and SS ‘AH.’

[54] KTB/Halder, II, page 327, entry for 4 April 1941; Bor, op.cit., page 182.

[55] KTB/Halder, II, page 395, entry for 5 May 1941.

[56] Mueller-Hillebrand, Zusammenhang, page 19.

[57] Philippi-Heim, op.cit., page 52; Mueller-Hillebrand, Das Heer, II, page 108.

[58] H. Greiner, Die oberste Wehrmachtführung, Wies­baden, 1951, page 282.

[59] KTB/Halder, II, pages 362, 364, 465, entries for 12, 13 and 14 April 1941; Mueller-Hillebrand, Zusam­men­hang, page 17; Blau, op.cit., pages 150-51.

[60] ObdH/Genst. d. H/Op. Abt. (IaIM) No. 644/41 g. Kdos Chefsache, 7 April 1941, GMR/430/6402054-59.

[61] Cf. in particular KTB/OKW, I, page 348, entry for 8 March 1941.

[62] F. von Paulus, Ich Stehe hie auf Befehl!, Frankfurt am Main, 1955, page 125.

[63] For these units, see AOK. 12/Ia No. 1155/41 g. Kdos, 3 May 1941, GMR/427/ 8005285; AOK. 12/Ia No. 1146/41 g. Kdos, 4 May 1941, GMR/8005203; AOK. 12/Ia No. 1218/41 g. Kdos II. Ang., 11 May 1941, GMR/8005190; AOK. 12/Ia No. 1086/41 g. Kdos, 1 May 1941, GMR/ 8005292; and AOK. 12/Ia No. 1123/41 g. Kdos, 3 May 1941, GMR/8005279.

[64] KTB/Halder, II, page 387, entry for 30 April 1941; Mueller-Hillebrand, Zusammenhang, page 20.

[65] OKH/Genst. d. H/Op. Abt. (IM) No. 722/41 g. Kdos Chef­sache, 22 April 1941, GMR/430/6402064.

[66] OKH/Genst. d. H/Op. Abt. (III) No. 975/41 g. Kdos Chef­sache, 25 May 1941, GMR/6402127-33; also KTB/Halder, II, page 446, entry for 7 June 1941. The division, no longer needed for the initial attack, was referred to the OKH reserves.

[67] Grams, op.cit., pages 22-23.

[68] Krull, op.cit., page 92; also OKH/Genst. d. H/Op. Abt. (III) No. 975/41 g. Kdos, 25 May 1941, GMR/ 430/ 6402127-33.

[69] Ibid., ibid.; KTB/OKW, I, page 383, entry for 21 April 1941.

[70] Ibid., ibid.; KTB/OKH/Genst. d. H/Op. Abt. (Ia), entry for 29 May 1941, GMR/306/6259708.

[71] Ibid., ibid., and Anlage 2d zu OKH/Genst. d. H/Op. Abt. (IN) No. 050/41 g. Kdos Chefsache, 31 January 1941, GMR/335/6291487.

[72] Mueller-Hillebrand, Zusammenhang, page 21.

[73] Anlage 2d zu OKH/Genst. d. H/Op. Abt. (IN) No. 050/41 g. Kdos Chefsache, GMR/335/6291487; and OKH/Genst. d. H/Op. Abt. (III) No. 975/41 g. Kdos, 25 May 1941, GMR/6402127-33.

[74] At this time, the capacity of the railways was far from be­ing fully exploited; Mueller-Hillebrand, Zusam­menhang, page 21. Also, there are indications that the timetables were not as rigid as is usually believed; KTB/OKW, I, page 332, entry for 21 February 1941, and KTB/Halder, II, pages 338, 354, entries for 31 March and 7 April 1941.

[75] KTB/OKW, I, page 160, entry for 8 November 1940; KTB/Halder, II, page 301, entry for 19 November 1940.

[76] KTB/Halder, II, page 343, entry for 3 April 1941.

[77] Ibid., pages 395, 417, 424, 427, entries for 5, 17, 20, 21 and 22 May 1941.

[78] The Panzerzüge were freight trains adapted to the carrying and fast unloading of armor and material to facilitate the rapid occupation of bridges, strong­holds, etc. Cf. OKH/ Genst. d. H/Op/ Abt. (IN) No. 517/41 g. Kdos Chefsache, 26 March 1941, GMR/430/6402022; OKH/Genst. d. H/ Op. Abt. (I) No. 1042/41 g. Kdos Chefsache, 28 May 1941, GMR/430/6291920; and OKH/Genst. d. H/Op. Abt. (III) No. 8225/41 g. Kdos, 10 June 1941, GMR/430/ 6291921.

[79] A. Schmidt, Geschichte der 10. Division, Bad Nau­heim, Pod­zun, 1963, pages 88-89.

[80] KTB/Halder, II, page 421, entry for 20 May 1941.

[81] Mueller-Hillebrand, Das Heer, II, page 105.

[82] Mueller-Hillebrand, Zusammenhang, page 24; KTB/Hal­der, II, page 381, entry for 25 April 1941.

[83] See supra, Note 65.

[84] OKH/Genst. d. H/Op. Abt. (III) No. 975/41 g. Kdos, 25 April 1941, GMR/335/6402127-33.

[85] KTB/Halder, II, page 343, entry for 3 April 1941.

[86] Ibid., page 471, entry for 17 May 1941; Tessin, op.cit., II, page 206.

[87] G. Dieckhoff, 3. Infanterie Division, 3. Infanterie Division (Mot.), 3. Panzergrenadier Division, Göt­tin­gen, 1960, pages 90-91.

[88] OKH/Genst. d. H/Op. Abt. (I) No. 947/41 g. Kdos Chef­sache, 29 May 1941, GMR/430/6402124.

[89] KTB/Halder, II, pages 458, 459, entries for 20 and 21 June 1941. The fact that this division—whose pre­sence was con­sidered crucial to the start of opera­tions—did not go in­to action until 27 June lends credence to the view that the Russian cam­paign could have been started before the arrival of the last division.