Long Range Desert Group in the Mediterranean

‘T’ Patrol set out on a mission. The lead vehicle is armed with a Lewis Gun, Vickers, and Boys AT rifle.

by R. L. Kay

Series Note

It is the intention of this series to present aspects of New Zealand’s part in the Second World War which will not receive detailed treatment in the campaign volumes and which are considered either worthy of special notice or typical of many phases of our war experience. The series is illustrated with material which would otherwise seldom see publication. It will also contain short accounts of operations which will be dealt with in detail in the appropriate volumes.

H. K. Kippenberger, Major-General

Editor-In-Chief, New Zealand War Histories

Acknowledgments

The sources consulted in the preparation of this account were the war diaries and official records of A (New Zealand) Squadron, LRDG, amplified by the recollections of the officers and men who served with the unit, the dispatches of General Sir Henry Wilson and Vice-Admiral Sir Algernon Willis, Long Range Desert Group, by W. B. K. Shaw, Dust Upon the Sea, by W. E. Benyon-Tinker, and notes on the Aegean operations by Captain R. A. Tinker. The author is indebted to those who responded so readily to his requests for information. The maps are by L. D. McCormick, and the photographs come from many collections.

Raids Behind Enemy Lines

The three long-range patrols formed in July 1940 to reconnoiter in southern Libya and raid remote Italian outposts had developed by the end of 1941 into two squadrons of the Long Range Desert Group, operating in support of the Eighth Army offensive in Cyrenaica. A Squadron, LRDG, and the Special Air Service, working together in bold and skilful raids in the rear of the Axis forces, destroyed scores of enemy aircraft on the ground. The LRDG patrols transported the parachutists to within easy walking distance of enemy airfields, and took them back to their base when their work was completed.

A Squadron, commanded by Major D. G. Steele[1] and comprising T2, S1, and S2 patrols,[2] was joined by Captain A. D. Stirling’s[3] SAS troops at Gialo in December 1941, shortly after a British flying column, advancing nearly 300 miles from Giarabub, had captured the oasis from the Italians. The first attack from this base was made by a handful of parachutists taken by S1 patrol to Tamet, in the Sirte area, where they crept on to the landing ground at night, wrecked twenty-four aircraft with time bombs, and blew up a bomb dump. The same men returned about a week later and destroyed another twenty-seven aircraft, while a party traveling with S2 patrol accounted for no fewer than thirty-seven aircraft on a landing ground near Agedabia.

The parachutists taken by the New Zealand patrol (T2, led by Captain C. S. Morris[4]) to the vicinity of El Agheila discovered that the airfield there was deserted. With a captured Italian lorry leading their five patrol trucks, they then motored nine miles eastwards along the main road at night, passing forty-seven enemy vehicles on the way, until they reached the turn-off at Marsa Brega, a small anchorage used by enemy shipping. There they encountered twenty enemy lorries parked alongside the road, with about sixty men standing around them. Attacking for a quarter of an hour at very close range, the raiders killed at least fifteen of the enemy and wounded many others, without casualty to themselves. While the fighting was in progress, the parachutists placed time bombs on all the enemy vehicles.

The patrol then continued another ten miles along the road, which was flanked by salt marshes. To prevent pursuit, Corporal G. C. Garven,[5] who was in the last truck, laid mines in the potholes, which caused seven explosions and probably accounted for that number of vehicles. Before turning off to the south, the patrol cut the telephone wires and blew down many poles to disorganize traffic. Enemy aircraft searched all next day and twice passed overhead without seeing them. Their exploits on this raid earned Morris the MC and Garven the MM.

T2 patrol next took the parachutists to raid the airfields at Nofilia and Marble Arch, west of El Agheila. A Messerschmitt fighter, following the wheel tracks from Nofilia, strafed the patrol from a height of only forty feet, despite intense anti-aircraft fire, and killed the paratroop officer. Relays of Stuka dive bombers joined in the attack and bombed and strafed the patrol for six and a half hours. When all the trucks except one were destroyed, the aircraft continued to attack the men on the ground and machine-gunned every bush that might give them cover. The survival of this one truck was due largely to the courage of Private C. A. Dornbush,[6] who kept his machine gun in action throughout the attacks, although the truck was hit several times and he himself was wounded. He was awarded the MM.

The attacks ceased as it grew dark. Unable to locate the scattered crews of the destroyed vehicles, Morris returned to Gialo with several men in the one remaining truck. Two Englishmen and eight New Zealanders[7] were left without transport. Their entire resources were three gallons of water in a tin, a packet of nine biscuits, an emergency ration of chocolate, and a prismatic compass, which Trooper D. M. Bassett[8] had collected from his burning vehicle while it was still under heavy fire. They decided to walk to Augila, an oasis twenty miles from Gialo and 200 from where they were stranded; their only alternative was to go to the road and give themselves up.

The cold of mid-winter forced the ten men to march at night and to rest during the warmer hours of the day. Most of them were wearing sandals that soon went to pieces on the rough, stony ground, so they bound their feet with cloth from their jackets and greatcoats. A parachutist, who already had walked many miles in the raid on Nofilia and whose feet were almost raw, left the party at the Marada-El Agheila track on the third day of the trek, and was not seen again. Next day the others met four Arabs who gave them some dates and water and directed them to a spring. Seeing what they thought were two enemy vehicles approaching, they concealed them­selves, but discovered afterwards that the vehicles were those of a British reconnaissance party.

They sat around a fire that night and set off in the morning with their water can refilled. In their weakened condition, they found it necessary for teams of four men to carry the water in short relays. They lit another fire at the end of the fifth day, boiled some water and made a chocolate drink, which gave them fresh strength for they marched an estimated distance of forty miles the following night. They were very tired on the sixth day, but the cold weather kept them moving. Believing they were only twenty-five miles from Augila, they drank as much of the water as they could and abandoned the rest. In the final stages of exhaustion, they staggered through a dust-storm on the seventh day and reached Augila on the eighth. Arabs reported their arrival to the LRDG at Gialo. Bassett, who navigated for the party, was awarded the DCM, and Gunner E. Sanders,[9] who also had shown bravery on previous occasions, received the MM.

By the end of December 1941, the Axis forces had retreated from Cyrenaica to defensive positions among the salt marshes near El Agheila. The remainder of the LRDG moved forward from Siwa, which was now too far from the front line, to join A Squadron at Gialo. Rommel’s counteroffensive, begun on 21 January, and Eighth Army’s subsequent withdrawal, however, soon necessitated the return of the whole unit to Siwa, where it remained until the fall of Tobruk in June 1942.

The Road Watch

While based at Siwa the LRDG patrols ferried paratroops, commandos, and secret agents to and from many places in enemy territory, rescued escapees from prisoner-of-war camps and the crews of crashed aircraft, many of whom had been fed and sheltered by friendly Arabs, and watched traffic on the Tripoli-Benghazi road, along which the enemy brought nearly all his tanks and troop reinforcements.

The LRDG kept this road under observation day and night from 2 March until 21 July 1942. The site of the watch was five miles to the east of Marble Arch, at a point where the road crosses a flat plain a short distance to the north of a low plateau. The patrols found sufficient cover to make camp and camouflage their vehicles in shallow wadis running down from the plateau. Before dawn each day, two men went out on the plain to select a hiding place 300 or 400 yards from the road, where they concealed themselves as best they could on ground that was bare except for small, scattered bushes. Equipped with field glasses, books of vehicle silhouettes, and notebooks, they lay full-length all day, watching the traffic on the road and recording the details of lorries, tanks, armored cars, guns, and troops as they passed. When it was dark they approached to within twenty or thirty yards of the road and judged the types of vehicles by their sound and outline. Before daylight, they returned to camp, probably without seeing the two men who relieved them at the appointed time.

If tanks or large numbers of enemy troops were seen going towards the front, the patrol sent a wireless message to LRDG headquarters at Siwa, so that by the time the enemy tanks or troops were approaching Agedabia, the information would have reached General Headquarters in Cairo. When a patrol had been relieved and was clear of enemy territory, it sent a full report of all the traffic it had seen; this information was invaluable to General Staff Intelligence in assessing the enemy’s strength in Cyrenaica.

There was always the risk of discovery, and occasionally the watchers had to move farther back from the road, but they continued the task without serious interruption and without the loss of one man. Members of Italian repair gangs working on the road wandered about without noticing them, and Arabs who did see them did not betray them to the enemy. R1 patrol had a miraculous escape on 21 March, when an enemy convoy of about 200 troops in twenty-seven vehicles pulled off the road and camped for the night behind the watchers (Private F. R. Brown[10] and Trooper G. C. Parkes[11]). Although the nearest vehicle was only 150 yards away, the two New Zealanders, prostrate under their sheepskin coats, were not detected.

It took three patrols to do this work; while one was watching the road for a week or ten days, another was going out from Siwa to relieve it, and a third was returning to the base. The 600-mile route from Siwa to the site of the watch crossed the El Agheila-Marada track. The enemy must have become suspicious of LRDG movement in this area, for when R2 patrol was returning to Siwa in May, they saw men erecting a wire fence along the track. After that the patrols had to go to the south of Marada, which added a hundred miles of very soft going to the journey. Even on this route the enemy placed mines on tracks, which wrecked one truck, fortunately without injuring the crew.

The LRDG was also required by Eighth Army to interrupt enemy supply columns on the Tripoli-Benghazi road, a task that was incompatible with road-watching. Avoiding the sections of the road where raids would have resulted in the discovery of the watchers, T2 patrol (com­manded by Lieutenant N. P. Wilder[12] operated between Agedabia and Benghazi, and G1 patrol between Nofilia and Sirte. At first they tried to place time bombs on passing vehicles, but the speed of the traffic made this impossible, so they then reverted to the simpler method of shooting up transport. T2 had little success, owing to mechanical breakdowns, but G1, after being attacked by enemy troops, made a successful raid on a transport park.

With T1 and T2 patrols under his command, Wilder later returned to the Agedabia-Benghazi road and divided his force to ambush different localities. At midnight on 7 June, T1 patrol, with lights shining, drove along the road and through an enemy check post at Magrun. Discovering that they were being followed by two vehicles, they turned out their lights, pulled off the road, and opened fire with all their weapons as soon as their pursuers drew level. They destroyed a troop-carrier and a truck loaded with troops and ammunition, and killed or wounded at least twenty of the enemy. At the sound of the shooting, some Italians farther along the road abandoned three lorries and a trailer heavily laden with timber and supplies. The New Zealanders also left these vehicles blazing fiercely. T2 patrol did not operate that night because of a damaged truck, but a few nights later, when both patrols met an enemy truck collecting troops who had been on picket duty in the Antelat area, they set fire to the truck, killed two of the enemy, and captured six Italians.

The fall of Tobruk on 21 June 1942 and Eighth Army’s retreat to Alamein made it necessary for the LRDG to leave Siwa. The evacuation was completed on 28 June, a few days before the Italians occupied the oasis. Major Morris took A Squadron to Cairo for supplies and then to Kufra, a base from which patrols continued to operate in northern Libya, while the rest of the unit withdrew to the coast between Alamein and Alexandria and then to Faiyum, about fifty miles to the southwest of Cairo.

The Alamein Line extended from the coast southwards to the cliffs of the Qattara Depression, a huge basin 150 miles in length, 450 feet below sea level at its deepest point, and passable to vehicles only where narrow ribbons of firm sand wind across its salt marshes. To penetrate behind the Axis positions at Alamein, the patrols based at Faiyum had to go through the Depression. Renewing their partnership with Major Stirling’s Special Air Service, they continued to attack the enemy from the rear.

Stirling evolved an alternative to blowing up aircraft with time bombs. Equipped with jeeps, each of which carried a driver and two gunners with twin-mounted Vickers guns, the raiding party, firing outwards from a hollow square formation, drove slowly round the target and shot up everything within range. Accompanied by a New Zealand patrol (Captain Wilder’s T1), the parachutists employed this technique one night on two landing grounds at Sidi Haneish, where they claimed twenty-five aircraft but probably destroyed many more. They were pursued after daylight by air and ground forces, and in the confused fighting that ensued, Gunner Sanders knocked out four enemy vehicles. The German attack was directed by a Fieseler Storch, which circled overhead and landed from time to time to confer with the ground troops. When it touched down near the patrol, two New Zealanders (Troopers K. E. Tippett[13] and T. B. Dobson[14]) captured the pilot and passenger (a German doctor) and set fire to the plane.

Plans were drawn up to disrupt the enemy’s supply lines by wrecking the ports of Benghazi and Tobruk, through which he received the bulk of his stores. Simultaneous attacks by land and sea were to be made at Tobruk, where commandos led by Lieutenant-Colonel J. Haselden were to seize the coastal defense guns, and troops landed from destroyers were to demolish the harbor installations. Lieutenant-Colonel Stirling was to take a force to Benghazi to sink ships in the harbor, and the Sudan Defence Force was to capture Gialo, to provide a base from which Stirling could make further raids in Cyrenaica, and to secure the line of withdrawal to Kufra. LRDG patrols were to guide the forces to their objectives at Benghazi, Tobruk, and Gialo, and were to attack subsidiary targets; at the same time an independent LRDG force was to raid Barce.

Y1 patrol conducted Haselden’s commandos from Kufra to Tobruk, where they arrived on 13 September. In a night attack, they captured the coastal defense guns, but lost them to a garrison that was much stronger than had been expected, and Haselden was among those killed. The sea­borne attack was repulsed with the loss of two destroyers and four motor torpedo boats.

The enemy was waiting for Stirling’s parachutists at Benghazi. A strong ambush near the suburb of Berka prevented them from reaching the port, and aircraft attacked them all next day. With many of their vehicles destroyed, they made their way as best they could back to Kufra. S1 and S2 patrols, under Stirling’s command for the operation, were to attack the airfields at Benina, but in the dark were led by an Arab guide into an impassable wadi, which delayed them so long that they had to abandon the attempt.

The action at Gialo was not planned to coincide with those at Tobruk and Benghazi, with the result that the enemy had time to prepare. The Sudan Defence Force, accompanied by Y2 patrol, reached the oasis in the evening of 15 September, but failed to take its objectives and was ordered to return to Kufra after several days of constant bombing and shelling. In support of this operation, R2 patrol (under Lieutenant J. R. Talbot[15] watched the northern approaches to Gialo. When the patrol was moving towards the oasis on 19 September, six enemy aircraft attacked with bombs, cannon and machine gun fire. Fighting back whenever possible, the six trucks dispersed in search of cover and lost contact with one another. Unable to find the rest of his patrol, Talbot returned to Kufra with two trucks that had joined Y2 patrol. The R2 wireless truck had overturned while swerving to avoid a bomb, but was replaced on its wheels and towed until it could be put in running order next day. All six trucks eventually reached Kufra, but with seven casualties.[16]

The Barce Raid

With orders to raid Barce town and airfield, ‘causing the maximum amount of damage and disturbance to the enemy,’ Major J. R. Easonsmith[17] left Faiyum on 1 September with T1 patrol (under Captain Wilder) and G1 patrol (under Captain J. A. L. Timpson[18]), a total of forty-seven men in twelve trucks and five jeeps. The outward journey, a distance of 1,155 miles, involved crossing the Egyptian and Kalansho Sand Seas. During the first crossing, Timpson fractured his skull and a Guards gunner injured his spine when a jeep capsized over the edge of a razor-back dune. They were flown to Cairo from a landing ground near Big Cairn.

From the northern edge of the Kalansho Sand Sea, the patrols crossed southern Cyrenaica to the foothills of Gebel Akhdar. Major Easonsmith took a British agent (Major V. Peniakoff) and two Senussi spies to within a few miles of Barce, where they were to learn all they could about the enemy before rejoining the patrols. After dark on 13 September, the raiding party drove northwards along a road through wooded, hilly country. They were challenged at a police post by a native sentry, who was immediately taken prisoner. A shout brought out an Italian officer, who had to be shot. The rest of the guard, leaving twelve horses in a stable, deserted the post. The sudden halt when challenged had caused two trucks to collide, one of them the truck carrying T1 patrol’s Breda gun, and as both vehicles were then unfit to go into action, they were stripped and left at the side of the road.

Peniakoff was waiting at Sidi Selim, but his two Arabs, who may not have had time, had not returned. The medical officer (Captain R. P. Lawson[19]) was left at this rendezvous with the T1 wireless truck to act as a rallying point after the raid. The patrols then drove on to the main road to Barce, where they met two small tanks. Not sure whether the approaching vehicles contained friends or foes, the enemy troops held their fire until the leading jeep was level. The LRDG then opened fire with all weapons and raced through unscathed.

The patrols separated at the entrance to the town, which they entered at midnight, T1 to attack the airfield and G1 the barracks. Captain Wilder led the New Zealanders in their four trucks and a jeep on to the airfield, where they set fire to a petrol dump and a tanker and trailer, which lit up the whole scene, and threw grenades through the windows of the mess building. Driving round the landing ground in single file, they fired incendiary ammunition at each aircraft in turn. Corporal M. Craw,[20] who was in the last truck, placed bombs on the planes that were not already burning and wrecked ten of them. The patrol claimed to have destroyed twenty aircraft and to have damaged another dozen, but the Italians later told a prisoner of war that they lost thirty-five. Although the enemy was shooting wildly from practically every angle and vantage point, the patrol spent an hour on the airfield without casualty. The burning aircraft lit up the whole town.

Expecting the narrow road by which they had reached the airfield to be blocked, T1 patrol drove out down the main street, but encountered very heavy fire from Italian armored fighting vehicles. Fortunately several tanks that were blocking the way were firing a little too high. The leading truck, driven by Captain Wilder, with Troopers D. S. Parker[21] and H. R. T. Holland[22] at the guns, charged the nearest tank at full speed, crashed it against the next, and cleared a passage. Wilder and Parker attempted to immobilize the tanks by tossing grenades under them, and, although Parker was severely wounded, they transferred from their damaged truck to the jeep, which was following close behind. Holland was seized by Italians before he could get away, and Lance-Corporal A. H. C. Nutt,[23] who had left the jeep to go to the assistance of the men in the truck, was also missing. Dazzled by tracer that Wilder was firing, the driver of the jeep (Trooper P. J. Burke[24]) steered into a curb at a street corner. The jeep overturned, pinning the crew under­neath, Wilder and Parker both unconscious and Burke injured. Private J. L. D. Davis’s[25] truck stopped to extricate the three men, who were revived before they reached the rendezvous.

Two men from another truck, Corporal Tippett and Trooper Dobson, put the tank Wilder had rammed completely out of action by climbing on to it and exploding grenades and bombs inside the turret, and also immobilized another tank with machine gun fire and by throwing a bomb under it. Dobson was wounded in the hand. Tippett’s truck then took the wrong turning, crossed a rubbish dump, and found a way out through a backyard to the main road.

Corporal Craw’s truck, at the rear of the patrol, stopped at Wilder’s abandoned truck, saw nobody there, and continued along the street. Craw and his crew tried to avoid two or three armored cars by turning down a narrow side street, but finding that they could not escape that way, decided to run the gauntlet. Their truck was set on fire and crashed into a concrete air raid shelter. The force of the impact threw Craw into the shelter, where he was overpowered by Italians. Trooper K. Yealands,[26] who was badly wounded, and Trooper R. E. Hay,[27] who stopped to extricate him from the burning truck, were also captured. Trooper T. A. Milburn[28] managed to get clear of the town before he too fell into enemy hands.

To distract attention while the New Zealanders were raiding the airfield, and to do as much damage as possible, the Guards patrol attacked the town barracks, where they killed and wounded a number of men. Major Easonsmith, with two jeeps, attacked other buildings, threw grenades among Italians in the streets, and wrecked a dozen vehicles in an unattended transport park. The LRDG then reassembled at the rallying point and retired to the south. T1 had lost six men, two trucks, and a jeep in Barce, and G1 had lost four men and a truck. Two of the Guardsmen later rejoined their patrol.

Shortly before dawn on 14 September, when the two patrols were approaching the police post to the south of Sidi Selim, enemy troops (150 Tripolitanians under three Italian officers), who had been waiting for their return, opened fire from both sides of the road. Their marksmanship was poor, but they succeeded in damaging a truck, which the patrols then had to tow in addition to the two they had left near the police post the previous evening. Just south of the post, the enemy’s fire wounded three men, including Major Peniakoff and Trooper F. W. Jopling.[29]

An attempt was made to get the three damaged trucks to go under their own power, but the Tripolitanians renewed the attack before the fitters could complete their work. Easonsmith, in his jeep, chased the enemy back two miles while the petrol and stores were removed from the damaged vehicles and time bombs placed in them. The force then continued its withdrawal until the Guards’ wireless truck stopped with a damaged rear axle. Before it could be moved under cover, a recon­naissance plane circled overhead. Six fighters were temporarily distracted by the explosions of the time bombs in the three abandoned trucks, but after strafing in the vicinity of these burning vehicles, they soon reached the area where the LRDG were ill-concealed under some scattered trees. From mid-morning until dusk, aircraft in varying numbers attacked the vehicles and men, mostly with incendiary and explosive ammunition. Wilder and a Guardsman were wounded and all the transport, except one truck and two jeeps, was destroyed. Captain Lawson remained on the surviving truck to shelter a severely wounded man during the attacks, and then managed to get most of the casualties to a safe place a mile or two away.

Jopling and nine Guardsmen began walking to Bir el Gerrari, where G1 patrol had left a vehicle on the way northwards to Barce. Lawson set off in the truck and a jeep with six wounded men (Wilder, Peniakoff, Parker, Dobson, Burke, and a Guardsman), a navigator (Davis), and a driver (Private D. P. Warbrick[30]). Easonsmith organized the remaining fourteen men into a walking party, who took with them rations and water in the other jeep. The doctor soon had to abandon his jeep because of a hole in the petrol tank, but his party reached Bir el Gerrari on 15 September and pushed on next day to a landing ground near the Kalansho Sand Sea, where they found Y1 patrol. In response to a wireless message, the RAF evacuated the wounded to Kufra and later to Cairo.

When Easonsmith’s party was approaching Bir el Gerrari on 17 September, having walked about eighty miles, they unexpectedly met S2 patrol. As the other walking party had not reached the rendezvous, Easonsmith and the Rhodesians combed the area for three days but found only eight men; Jopling and Guardsman Gutheridge were missing. Easonsmith later met the other Rhodesian patrol (S1), which had with it two Guardsmen who had walked out of Barce. The LRDG then withdrew to Kufra, arriving there during an air raid.

Although Jopling, whose leg wound had turned gangrenous, and Gutheridge, who was exhausted, had been unable to keep up with the other eight members of their party, they were not many miles from Bir el Gerrari when they were missed by the search parties. Believing that they could not reach the rendezvous in time, and desperately in need of water, they turned north towards the hills. They came to an Arab camp on the night of 20 September, and were picked up by a party of Italians and taken back to Barce on the 25^th, twelve days after the raid. Despite the condition of Jopling’s leg, the two men had walked at least 150 miles, mostly at night and navigating by the stars.

The raid on Barce cost the enemy many men killed and wounded, over thirty aircraft damaged and destroyed, and a number of vehicles. It cost the LRDG six men wounded, all of whom recovered, ten prisoners of war (seven[31] from T1 patrol and three from G1), several of whom were wounded, and fourteen vehicles. Their part in the operation won Easonsmith and Wilder the DSO, Lawson the MC, and Craw, Tippett, and Dobson the MM. Tippett’s and Dobson’s citations also refer to their capture of the Fiesler Storch after the Sidi Haneish raid.

The Eighth Army Advance

Following the defeat early in September 1942 of Rommel’s final attempt to break through the Alamein Line, Eighth Army proceeded with its preparations for an offensive. As Faiyum would cease to be a suitable base for the LRDG when the advance started, the whole unit was concentrated at Kufra. The battle began on 23 October and in ten days the shattered remnants of the Axis army were in full retreat to the west. At the request of General Staff Intelli­gence, the LRDG re-established a watch on the Tripoli-Benghazi road, again near Marble Arch. During the first spell of watching, carried out by Y1 patrol from 30 October to 8 November, less than a hundred vehicles passed both ways daily. By 10 November, when R1 had relieved Y1, the results of Eighth Army’s victory were apparent: enemy traffic streamed westwards at the rate of 3,500 vehicles a day, and the evacuation of Italian civilians with their furniture, as well as many thousands of troops, confirmed that Rommel did not intend to return.

When it became evident that the enemy intended to withdraw from El Agheila, the watch was transferred farther westwards to the Gheddahia-Tauorga section of the road. S1 patrol began the first spell in this area on 13 December, and T2 took over a week later. Second-Lieutenant R. A. Tinker,[32] leaving a rear camp about thirty miles to the southwest of Gheddahia, took nine men in two vehicles to the vicinity of Sedada. The watchers, who had great difficulty in passing on foot through enemy camps near the road, did not long escape discovery. Three German armored cars attacked and occupied their forward camp on 22 December. The men who were able to evade capture began to walk back to the rear camp, which Tinker and three others succeeded in reaching. Tinker withdrew his patrol next day, when eight German vehicles were seen approaching from the north. Five New Zealanders[33] and an Englishman were missing, but Trooper E. Ellis[34] and the Englishman (Private E. C. Sturrock), walking for days with no food and little water, made their way independently back to the British lines. They were both awarded the MM.

Long before Eighth Army began the advance from Alamein, the Intelligence branch of General Headquarters, Middle East, had secret agents operating in Tripolitania. LRDG patrols were required to carry these men, with their stores and their wireless sets, to a place from which they could complete their journey by camel or on foot. In August, R1 patrol, under Captain A. I. Guild,[35] took the first party of three men from Kufra to Bir Tala, about 120 miles to the south­east of Tripoli. Three months later the same patrol, led by Captain L. H. Browne,[36] repeated the 2,000-mile trip to deliver fresh stores and to relieve the wireless operator, who was ill.

On the way northwards on 17 November, R1 exchanged fire with an enemy patrol between Marada and Zella, and put two enemy vehicles out of action without loss to themselves. Next day, when attacked at Wadi Tamet by at least fourteen enemy aircraft, they took cover in the wadi banks and fought back with all their weapons. An officer of the Arab Legion attached to the patrol and the New Zealand navigator (Lance-Corporal N. O’Malley[37]) were killed, another New Zealander (Private M. F. Fogden[38]) was wounded, and two trucks were damaged beyond repair. Browne sent a party back to Kurta with the wounded man and, although wounded himself, carried on to Bir Tala with two trucks to complete his task.

When Rommel withdrew in December from his defensive positions at El Agheila, his retreat was hastened by a ‘left hook’ by the New Zealand Division around his southern flank. This out­flanking move involved crossing the Marada-El Agheila track, through country that had become well known to the LRDG during the road watch. Guided by Browne’s R1 patrol, the column reached the Bir el Merduma area, to the west of Marble Arch, in the evening of 15 December, but was unable to prevent Rommel’s Afrika Korps from breaking out to the west. R1 then led the Division in another outflanking movement at Nofilia on 17 December, but again the enemy escaped.

R1 patrol’s next assignment was to reconnoiter the country beyond Wadi Tamet. Browne was injured and a South African survey officer was killed on 22 December when their jeep struck a mine on a landing ground near the wadi. Browne, who had served the LRDG with distinction since the formation of the unit, was awarded the MC. With Second-Lieutenant K. F. McLauchlan[39] in command, the patrol continued the reconnaissance until ambushed by two German armored cars near the Gheddahia-Bu Ngem track on 27 December. The wireless truck, containing three New Zealanders[40] and an Englishman, and a jeep carrying a South African officer and his driver, were captured, but the rest of the patrol skillfully evaded the enemy.

While Eighth Army was driving into Tripolitania from the east, General Leclerc’s Fighting French Forces of Chad Province moved into the Fezzan from the south. This form of Anglo-French cooperation had been planned a year earlier, when R2 patrol, led by Second-Lieutenant C. H. B. Croucher,[41] had been dispatched to a French outpost in the Tibesti Mountains to act as a wireless link between the Allies. Rommel’s counteroffensive in Cyrenaica, however, had neces­sitated the postponement of the French advance and the recall of R2 patrol.

As Leclerc lacked the support of fighter aircraft for his operations, LRDG patrols, including R2, were sent to the Fezzan to destroy enemy aircraft on the landing grounds at Hon and Sebha, but unfortunately, because of heavy rain and very difficult going, their attempts failed. Although the French were exposed to air attack, they succeeded in capturing one Italian outpost after another, while the LRDG blocked the enemy’s line of retreat to the north. T1 (under Captain Wilder), Y2, and an Indian patrol[42] mined the roads, destroyed transport, killed a few Italians, and took a number of prisoners.

Eighth Army entered Tripoli on 23 January 1943. This advance of 1,400 miles in three months had made it necessary for the LRDG to move its base from Kufra 600 miles northwestwards to Zella, and later another 150 miles to Hon. The unit’s Heavy Section, equipped with 6-ton and 3-ton lorries, moved the base from one place to the next in a single journey. The heavy transport was usually employed in ferrying supplies to forward dumps, or from the nearest depot to the LRDG base—from Wadi Halfa to Kufra, from Mersa Matruh to Siwa, from Msus to Gialo, from Nofilia to Zella, and from Misurata or Tripoli to Hon. Transporting rations, petrol, ammuni­tion, and equipment over such great distances, created special problems for the quartermaster, Captain D. Barrett,[43] who received the MBE in recognition of his efficiency and capacity for hard work.

Reconnaissance in Tunisia

Some weeks before the fall of Tripoli, General Sir Bernard Montgomery explained to the commanding officer of the LRDG (Lieutenant-Colonel G. L. Prendergast[44]) that the patrols would be required to reconnoiter the country in southern Tunisia through which a column outflanking the Mareth Line would have to pass. To enable the patrols to operate so far from their base at Hon, dumps were established near the Tunisian frontier and arrangements made with Allied Headquarters at Algiers for supplies to be available at Tozeur, about a hundred miles to the west of Gabes.

In January and February 1943 the LRDG and the Indian LRS explored the territory to the south and west of the range of hills extending southwards from Matmata. They reported daily by wireless about the going, obstacles, cover, water supply, and sites for landing grounds, and on their return the patrol leaders conferred with Captain Browne at Headquarters New Zealand Division, where a model was made to demonstrate possible lines of advance.

Crossing the frontier on 12 January, T1 patrol, under Captain Wilder, were the first troops of Eighth Army to enter Tunisia. About thirty miles to the southwest of Foum Tatahouine, they found the pass through the hills that became known to Eighth Army as Wilder’s Gap; this was on the route followed by the New Zealand Corps two months later. Other patrols explored the country farther to the west, T2 in the area to the south of Djebel Tebaga, between Matmata and Chott Djerid, a huge salt marsh, and G2 in the area between the Chott and the Grand Erg Oriental, an impassable sand sea extending into southern Algeria.

T2 patrol, under Lieutenant Tinker, and accompanied by a party of ‘Popski’s Private Army’ (Peniakoff’s Demolition Squadron), established a base camp in a wadi about twenty miles to the south of Ksar Rhilane. Tinker and Peniakoff, each with two jeeps, then went north towards Djebel Tebaga, through country that was found to be suitable for the passage of a force of all arms. A natural corridor extended between Djebel Tebaga and the Matmata Hills towards the coast at Gabes; this was the Tebaga Gap through which the outflanking of the Mareth Line was to be accomplished. After avoiding German troops preparing defenses near Matmata, Tinker and Peniakoff parted to continue with their separate tasks, Peniakoff to carry out demolitions in the Matmata area and Tinker to examine the country in the direction of Chott Djerid. On the way back to the base camp, Tinker rejoined Peniakoff at Ksar Rhilane and learned that the camp had been shot up by enemy aircraft. All the vehicles had been destroyed and two New Zealanders landers (Lance-Corporals R. A. Ramsay[45] and R. C. Davies[46]) had been wounded.

Everybody except Sergeant Garven, a French officer and two Arabs of the PPA, who remained to keep a rendezvous with S2 patrol, had moved from the base camp to Ksar Rhilane, where there was a mixed gathering of thirty-seven men: sixteen of the LRDG, thirteen of the PPA, six French parachutists, and two SAS parachutists. The French had been following the route taken by Stirling’s SAS troops when one of their jeeps had broken down, and Stirling had left the other two men because of vehicle trouble. Not long afterwards Stirling and his party were captured near Gabes.

The LRDG had two jeeps, the PPA two, and the French one, but there was not sufficient petrol to take all five a hundred miles. With three jeeps, the wounded men, and petrol for 150 miles, Tinker set out for Sabria, an oasis near Chott Djerid, while the remainder of the men followed on foot, with their supplies in the other two jeeps. Tinker was to send back relief for the walkers, but if Sabria was not held by the Fighting French, he would have to go to Tozeur.

Sabria was in the hands of the Germans. An Arab guided Tinker’s party, without being detected, past the oasis to Sidi Mazouq, where the natives cared for them. At this stage they had traveled sixty miles and were still over a hundred from Tozeur. As there was not sufficient petrol to com­plete the journey around the shore of Chott Djerid, Tinker decided to cross the salt marshes by a camel track to Nefta, a village about sixteen miles from Tozeur. Where the surface was firm it was possible to drive at top speed, but where water seepage formed a quagmire the jeeps lurched through muddy pools on to hard lumps of coagulated salt and sand. They were the first vehicles ever to cross the Chott.

At Nefta, Tinker arranged by telephone for the French to supply petrol from Tozeur. He refueled two of his jeeps and sent them back to meet the walking party—they did not attempt to re-cross the Chott—while he went to Gafsa, about sixty miles to the northeast of Tozeur, to obtain transport from the United States Army and to report by wireless to Eighth Army. The Americans at Gafsa, unable to help, told him to go to Tebessa, a hundred miles to the northwest, in Algeria. Although not wholly convinced by Tinker’s story, the Americans at Tebessa lent him two jeeps and allowed him to report to Eighth Army. Tinker then went back to meet the walking party, whom he found near Sidi Mazouq and took to Tozeur. The two jeeps sent from Nefta had missed the walkers, but they arrived at Tozeur a day later, accompanied by an officer from S2 patrol. The Rhodesians had kept the rendezvous with Garven’s party. Tinker returned the borrowed jeeps to the Americans, who had a message from Eighth Army requesting his return by air. Leaving his patrol and attached troops in the hands of the British First Army, the United States II Corps, and the Fighting French, he flew from Tebessa to Algiers, and from there to Tripoli, where he reported at Eighth Army to assist in the preparations for the ‘left hook’ around Mareth. Tinker’s courageous leadership won him the MC.

The last task assigned to the LRDG by Eighth Army was the navigation of the New Zealand Corps during the outflanking of the Mareth Line. Appropriately, the task was performed by New Zealanders, Captain Tinker and three men from T2 patrol, in two jeeps.

The New Zealand Corps passed through Wilder’s Gap and remained at an assembly area while the route was plotted to the northwest. A wadi with steep, rocky escarpments presented a very difficult obstacle, but Tinker, accompanied by an officer[47] of the New Zealand Engineers, found a place where tracks could be made by machinery to get the Corps transport across. Meanwhile, the T2 navigator (Corporal Bassett) guided a New Zealand Provost party marking the ‘Diamond track’ along the line of advance. The Corps left the assembly area on 19 March, the day before Eighth Army launched its frontal attack on the Mareth Line, advanced to Tebaga along the route reconnoitered by the LRDG, and made contact with the enemy on the 21^st.

Reacting to this threat to his right flank, the enemy attempted to hold the Tebaga Gap with the 21^st Panzer and two other divisions. General Montgomery dispatched the 1^st Armoured Division to reinforce the New Zealand Corps. With powerful support from the RAF, this force broke through the gap on 26 March and left the enemy with no option but to abandon the Mareth Line. The New Zealanders entered Gabes three days later. When the Axis forces were driven back into a corner of Tunisia, there was no further scope for the LRDG, which therefore was released from Eighth Army and returned to Egypt to rest and reorganize.

The war in North Africa ended with the Axis surrender on 13 May 1943. During the two and a half years that the armies had advanced and retreated along the coast, the patrols of the LRDG, operating behind the enemy lines, had dominated the vast inner desert. Their next undertaking was in a different theatre of war, the Aegean Sea.

Invasion of the Dodecanese Islands

With the object of containing German forces in the eastern Mediterranean and diverting part of the enemy’s air force during the Allied invasion of Italy, and also of taking advantage of any weakness in the enemy defenses that might follow the Italian capitulation, British forces from the Middle East occupied the Dodecanese Islands in the Aegean Sea in Septem­ber 1943. The enemy’s command of the air, however, enabled him to counterattack and regain possession of these islands during the next two months. In the course of these operations, patrols of the LRDG were employed as raiding and reconnaissance parties in the enemy-held islands, and as garrison troops.

When Italy collapsed, the Germans assumed control of Crete, Rhodes, and Scarpanto. As a preliminary step to an assault on Rhodes and to harass the extended German garrisons, the British secured the islands of Cos, which had the only airfield, Leros, where there was a naval base, and Samos, which would be an advanced base in the north, as well as other small islands. Reinforce­ments were taken without opposition by air to Cos, by destroyer to Leros, and by small local craft to Samos and other islands.

Before going to this new theatre of war, the LRDG spent the summer of 1943 at The Cedars of Lebanon, where the men were trained in mountain warfare. The patrols traveled long distances as self-contained units, and received supplies dropped by the RAF under wireless direction. B (British and Rhodesian) Squadron also trained on the Levant coast to operate from submarines, but A Squadron, which included approximately 110 New Zealanders under the command of Major Guild, had no opportunity for amphibious training.

A Squadron, leaving Haifa ten days after B Squadron, sailed on the Greek destroyer Queen Olga on 21 September in convoy with three other destroyers and reached Portolago, Leros, during an air raid the following day. Little damage was done to the port, so work was begun immediately unloading stores and making camp at Alinda Bay, on the eastern side of the island. A few days later the Queen Olga and H.M.S. Intrepid were sunk at Portolago and the naval barracks were damaged in heavy air raids.

Two A Squadron patrols were dispatched from Leros on 25 September for the Cyclades, a chain of islands off the southeast coast of the Greek mainland, to watch and report on the movements of enemy shipping and aircraft. A party from T1 patrol went to Kithnos and M1[48] patrol to Giaros. In addition, a Rhodesian patrol (S1) was sent to Simi, a small island off the coast of Turkey and about fifteen miles to the north of Rhodes, and M2 patrol to Stampalia. The remainder of the LRDG, together with the Special Boat Squadron and some commandos, were concentrated on the island of Calino, two or three miles to the south of Leros. On their arrival on 25 September they received a tumultuous welcome from the Greeks, who had been oppressed by the Italian garrison.

The enemy already had begun his air attacks on Cos, the only island from which fighter aircraft could operate to protect the sea and land forces in the Aegean. The number of fighters that could be based on the Cos airfield was not sufficient to ward off for long the determined attacks of a strongly reinforced German Air Force. The enemy invaded Cos by sea and air on 3 October and, despite the stubborn resistance of a battalion of the Durham Light Infantry, overwhelmed the garrison next day.

The troops on Callao, six miles away, were given no warning of the invasion, and as a result the LRDG narrowly escaped losing a patrol. Captain Tinker had set out on 28 September with a composite patrol of twelve men to investigate some mysterious signaling to Turkey from Pserimo, a small island midway between Calino and Cos. The signaler, who was sent back to Calino for interrogation, was found to be a Greek in British pay as an agent.

The invasion fleet bound for Cos, including merchant ships and landing craft, escorted by flak ships and three destroyers, arrived in a cove on the south coast of Pserimo before dawn on 3 October and began the assault on Cos half an hour later. The enemy put eighty troops ashore at Pserimo to establish headquarters and dressing stations. They quite unexpectedly encountered Tinker’s men, who left hurriedly for the high ground, hustled on by heavy volleys of fire from the escort ships. Enemy patrols searched the island that day and the next, but Tinker’s party was taken off in the late afternoon of 4 October and returned to Calino with the loss of only one man captured.

The LRDG had been ordered to counterattack Cos the previous night—an impossible task—but this order was cancelled and all the troops on Calino, which was now considered untenable, were instructed to return to Leros. Stores and troops were loaded into every available craft and a strange fleet of little ships struggled out from Calino in the evening. They reached Leros at various times throughout the night and, in anticipation of air attacks, unloaded and moved the stores away from the wharves before daylight. A dive-bombing raid by fifty-five aircraft began at 5.30 a.m. and lasted four hours. An Italian gunboat and several small craft were sunk and buildings and installations destroyed.

The garrison on Leros comprised Headquarters 234 Brigade, a battalion of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, a company of the Royal West Kents, and the Raiding Forces (about two hundred men of the LRDG, 150 men of the SBS, and thirty commandos). The only anti-aircraft defenses, 40-millimeter Breda guns, and the five coastal defense batteries, each of four 6-inch naval guns (off British ships), were Italian. Five LRDG patrols were dispatched to the battery positions to stiffen the morale of the Italian allies and if necessary prevent them from turning their guns against brigade head­quarters. The task of seeing that the gun crews were at their posts, and that they manned their guns, called for tact, patience, and even force. The Italian communication system, inefficient in any case because of the demoralization of the signalmen, was damaged by bombing, and in the later stages before the invasion the only communications were the LRDG wireless links.

The bombing attacks were continued every day, often by sixty or more aircraft, and the coastal batteries were among the targets selected. The battery on Mount Marcello, in the northwest, where Y2 patrol was stationed, was put out of action on 8 October, and the battery on Mount Zuncona, to the east of Portolago Bay, where R1 (under Lieutenant D. J. Aitken[49]) was stationed, was put out of action next day. Aitken’s patrol was then withdrawn to A Squadron headquarters.

German landing craft were seen entering the bays of Calino on 10 October, and next day the coastal batteries shelled the enemy from Leros. The LRDG sent parties of two or three men to Calino to gather information about enemy activity there. On one occasion a New Zealander (Sergeant R. D. Tant[50]) failed to return to the rendezvous. Captured by the enemy, he was taken from Calino to Cos, but escaped to Turkey and arrived back at Leros after being missing for a fortnight. He was again taken prisoner, however, during the invasion of that island, by the same company of German paratroops.

The loss of the Cos airfield was a major setback; for without air cover merchant shipping could not enter the Aegean with the anti-aircraft guns, transport, and stores needed for the defense of Leros and Samos, and the Navy could avoid unacceptable losses only by operating at night. It was doubtful whether Leros and Samos could be held indefinitely without the capture of Rhodes, a major operation for which the resources were not available in the Middle East. Nevertheless, the Commanders-in-Chief of the three services decided to hold Leros and Samos as long as supplies could be maintained.

Destroyers, submarines, and smaller craft brought troops, supplies, six 25-pounder guns, twelve Bofors guns (which were strapped on submarines), jeeps and trailers. Mortars, machine guns, ammunition, wireless equipment, and other stores were dropped by parachute. The garrison was reinforced by 400 men of the Buffs, who were the survivors of the troops on three destroyers sunk by mines off Calino on 24 October, and by a battalion of the King’s Own.[51]

Patrols in Outlying Islands

The invasion of Leros had been expected to follow the fall of Cos, but bombing attacks on enemy airfields in Greece, Crete, and Rhodes by Allied aircraft based in North Africa and Cyprus, and offensive sweeps against enemy shipping in the Aegean, delayed the assault until mid-November. So that an invasion force might be anticipated and if possible intercepted, LRDG patrols were stationed in the outlying islands astride the sea and air routes to the Dodecanese to watch the movements of enemy shipping and aircraft. Acting on information Sent by T1 patrol from Kithnos, the Navy sank on 7 October a convoy consisting of six landing craft, an ammunition ship, and an armed trawler. There were only ninety survivors from 2,500 troops. The destruction of this convoy prevented the enemy from making an immediate assault on Leros.

Captain C. K. Saxton[52] and six men of T1 patrol were taken to Kithnos in an 18-ton caique[53] of the Levant Schooner Flotilla, which made the voyage in three stages at night and was concealed during daylight against the shores of two intermediate islands. Kithnos was occupied by a garrison of between fifteen and twenty Germans in charge of a permanent observation post and wireless direction-finding station. At first it was intended that T1 should stay a fortnight, but so valuable was the information they obtained that it was decided to leave them on the island for a month. The enemy knew they were there, but Saxton’s men avoided discovery by changing their hiding-places, which were mostly in stock shelters, and by moving at night. Sergeant J. L. D. Davis, who had some knowledge of their language, obtained from several of the local Greeks reliable information about the enemy dispositions in the neighboring islands and about shipping routes. His conduct throughout the Aegean operations won Davis the BEM.

Kithnos was admirably situated for observing the routes from Greece to Crete and the Dode­canese Islands. T1 patrol, which kept a constant watch for shipping and aircraft, sighted a convoy passing between Kithnos and Siros islands in the afternoon of 6 October, and reported by wireless its size, speed, air cover, and probable route; this was the convoy sunk by the Navy off Stampalia. The LSF caique returned with supplies and took Saxton and the wireless operator to a small island off Seriphos to charge the wireless batteries, a noisy operation that might have betrayed them to the enemy. While they were away, Davis, who was left in command of the observation post on Kithnos, saw two small convoys moving at night.

After capturing Cos, the enemy consolidated his position in the Cyclades by occupying many of the islands. Believing that they were cut off and would have to find their own way back, T1 planned to escape to Turkey by capturing a German caique or by taking a local fisherman’s boat, but before they attempted to do this T2 patrol arrived by LSF caique to relieve them. Saxton’s patrol, with two of the Greeks who had helped them, returned safely to Leros on 23 October.

T2 (five men under Second-Lieutenant M. W. Cross[54] were disembarked at Seriphos because that island was thought to be safer than Kithnos, which the enemy patrolled with seaplanes. A Greek helped Cross’s party to find a suitable hiding place in an abandoned goat house on top of a 300-foot cliff at the northern end of the island, from which they had a magnificent view. The local inhabitants kept the patrol constantly informed about the movements of the enemy garrison, reported to be between twenty and fifty strong, in the town about four miles away. The postmaster passed the information by telephone to a monastery, and a priest sent a runner to the New Zealanders’ hideout. T2 spent three weeks on Seriphos without being observed, although once the enemy sailed so close inshore below their cliff that they could have dropped a stone in the boat.

They saw only one vessel, a steamer of about 6,000 tons, but when the enemy began an airlift from Athens to Rhodes with four large flying boats escorted by seaplane fighters, they reported the times that the aircraft passed the island. Six Beaufighters shot down the flying boats when they appeared one day without fighter escort. T2 was relieved by a British patrol and returned to Leros on 9 November with three Greeks.

Seven men from R1 patrol, under Lieutenant Aitken, spent seventeen days on Naxos, one of the largest of the Cyclades Islands, to which they were taken by motor launch. They confused the garrison of 650 Germans, who undoubtedly knew they were on the island, by making long cross-country treks. The local inhabitants, as on the other islands, warned the patrol of the enemy’s movements and were at times embarrassingly friendly. The patrol saw single ships but no convoys, and reported a concentration of shipping in Naxos harbor, which was attacked by two Mitchell bombers escorted by two Beaufighters. The RAF sank two ships, but at the cost of two aircraft shot down. The pilot and navigator of a Beaufighter that crashed in the sea were rescued by Greeks and taken into the town, where their wounds were dressed by a doctor and they were hidden until the LRDG patrol could smuggle them out under the noses of the enemy. R1 took the two airmen back to Leros, where they arrived on 6 November without casualty.

The Assault on Levita

The survivors of the enemy convoy sunk on 7 October were landed on Stampalia, where the LRDG had M2 patrol. A small naval craft (the Hedgehog) dispatched from Leros to bring back ten prisoners of war for interrogation, called with engine trouble at Levita, about twenty miles to the west of Calino. A party sent by motor launch to the assistance of the Hedgehog found only a smoldering wreck and was fired on from the island. As the possession of Levita was considered essential to the Navy, and as it would be useful as an observation post, the commander of 234 Brigade ordered the LRDG to capture the island. Major Guild and Captain Tinker urged that a reconnaissance should be made before the assault force was landed, but permission to do this was not granted.

It was decided to attack with forty-eight men under the command of Captain J. R. Olivey,[55] the force including twenty-two from A Squadron under Lieutenant J. M. Sutherland,[56] and the remainder coming from B Squadron. Sutherland’s patrol (R2), was withdrawn from the coastal battery on Mount Scumbardo, in southern Leros, and was joined by a few men from R1 and T2 patrols. The B Squadron party included Y2 and part of S1 patrol. In case the enemy should be occupying both ends of Levita, B Squadron was to land to the west of the port, which is on the south coast, and A Squadron to the east. The objective was to reach the high, central ground over­looking the port.

The landings were to be made from two motor launches in small, canvas boats, but as these had been punctured in air attacks, the troops had to patch them with sticking plaster before they could practice rowing in them. The force had four infantry wireless sets for inter-communication between the two parties and with the launches, and a larger set for communication with Leros. When they were about to leave at dusk on 23 October, however, it was discovered that the A Squadron set had not been ‘netted in’ with the others.

Most of the men were violently seasick before they reached Levita. It took A Squadron a long time to float the canvas boats from the tossing launch, but they eventually got away and landed on a very rugged coast, where the men rescued as much of their gear as they could from the rocks and dragged it up a cliff face. Sutherland told his wireless operator to try to get in touch with Olivey, but at no stage was he able to do so.

After disembarking the two parties, the motor launches were to shell a house thought to be occupied by the enemy in the center of the island. Instead of shelling this building, however, they concentrated on an old hut on a ridge in front of A Squadron. When the shellfire ceased, Sutherland’s party moved towards the ridge and discovered nearby the burnt-out hull of the Hedgehog. They then came under machine gun fire from the rear, presumably from somewhere near their landing place. This kept them pinned down on bare ground until they were able to get together and rush the gun position, which they captured with a dozen prisoners. Trooper H. L. Mallett[57] was severely wounded and died despite the efforts of the medical orderly (Private B. Steedman[58]) to save him.

Although they again came under machine gun fire, A Squadron continued to advance and secured the ridge before daylight. They flushed the enemy out of the hut, but did not occupy it because it was in a vulnerable position. Trooper A. J. Penhall[59] was mortally wounded, but Trooper R. G. Haddow,[60] although severely wounded in the stomach, recovered as a prisoner of war. Several other men received minor wounds.

At the first streaks of daylight, three or four seaplanes began to take off from the Levita harbor. The New Zealanders, who overlooked the harbor from the ridge, opened fire, and for a moment it seemed that Trooper L. G. Doel[61] had put one seaplane out of action with his Bren gun, but it moved out of range and took off after some delay. When the seaplanes came overhead and began to strafe, the men returned the fire, but as their bullets only bounced off harmlessly they decided not to waste ammunition.

Having met no resistance on landing, 13 Squadron was within 500 yards of the enemy head­quarters by dawn and could hear fighting on the other side of the island. Had Sutherland been able to make contact with Olivey by wireless, he would have advised him of his position, and B Squad­ron could have gone ahead without fear of firing on A Squadron. The Germans, who received reinforcements during the day, isolated the New Zealanders on the ridge with air attacks and machine gun and mortar fire, while they encircled and captured most of the B Squadron party.

Having disposed of B Squadron, the enemy was then able to employ his full strength against A Squadron, which was holding three positions on the ridge. Sutherland had with him the wireless operator, the medical orderly, the wounded, three or four other men, and the German prisoners. Sergeant E. J. Dobson[62] was in charge of a party in a central position, armed with a Bren gun, a Tommy gun, and some rifles, and farther away on high ground, Corporal J. E. Gill[63] had the third party. Trooper J. T. Bowler,[64] who went down to the landing place for water, and a man who attempted to deliver a message from Gill to Sutherland, were not seen again and were presumed to have been killed. The enemy eventually overwhelmed Sutherland’s force, but Gill and three men avoided capture for four days by hiding among some rocks. They were unable to attract the attention of a launch that circled the island and, as they were without food and water, had to give themselves up to the enemy.

With instructions to evacuate the force from Levita, the commanding officer of the LRDG (Lieutenant-Colonel Easonsmith)[65] arrived by launch during the night 24-25 October, but found only Captain Olivey, the medical officer (Captain Lawson), and seven men of B Squadron at the rendezvous. Olivey returned with Major Guild the following night to search for the missing men, but found nobody. The LRDG lost forty men on Levita.

Easonsmith conferred with the senior officers of A and B Squadrons on 28 October about the future of the LRDG. It was recommended that, with the exception of the patrols in the Cyclades. Islands watching for the movement of enemy invasion forces, the LRDG should return to the Middle East to train reinforcements and reform. Major Guild left by destroyer for Egypt on 31 October to endeavor to have the LRDG withdrawn. On his arrival he learned that the New Zealand Government had already raised the question of recalling the New Zealand Squadron, which had been committed to an operational role in the Aegean without the Government’s knowledge, although the usual procedure was to consult it before committing New Zealand troops to a new theatre of war. The Commander-in-Chief, Middle East (General Sir Henry Wilson), stated that it was impossible to replace the New Zealand Squadron at such short notice, and asked that it remain with the LRDG until replacements could be trained. It was agreed that the squadron should be withdrawn as soon as the tactical situation allowed.

The Battle of Leros

Only part of A Squadron was withdrawn from Leros before the invasion began. Lieutenant Aitken and twenty men from R1 patrol and squadron headquarters left for Palestine by destroyer on 7 November. R2 patrol, reconstituted with eight New Zealanders and two Englishmen under Second-Lieutenant R. F. White,[66] relieved T1 at the Scumbardo coastal defense battery position on 8 November, and T1 moved to an olive grove on the northern side of Alinda Bay, where they were joined by T2 when they returned from Seriphos next day.

Despite the delays imposed by the Navy and the Allied Air Force, the enemy succeeded in assembling an invasion flotilla at Cos and Calino for the assault on Leros, which he began at dawn on 12 November after two days’ intensified bombing. The Scumbardo coastal defense battery shelled a convoy at maximum range, but the batteries in the north, which allowed the invasion force to get closer than the minimum range of their guns before opening fire, were unable to prevent the enemy from landing. Five hundred Germans were disembarked on the northeast coast of the island, where they gained possession of the high ground between Palma and Grifo Bays, including Mount Vedetta, but were held throughout the day by the Buffs and patrols of B Squadron. Another 150 troops who were landed at Pandeli Bay, to the southeast of Leros town, after making some progress were counterattacked by a company of the Royal Irish Fusiliers and were pinned down on the lower slopes of Mount Appetici.

A warning had been received the previous day that German airborne troops were assembling at Athens. In anticipation of a parachute attack, Captain Saxton’s T1 patrol and Lieutenant Cross’s T2 patrol moved inland from Alinda Bay, and were joined by a British patrol and some SBS troops to make a force thirty-odd strong. Early in the afternoon of 12 November, thirty-five Junkers transport planes, escorted by Stukas, seaplanes, and other types of aircraft, approached at a low altitude from the west and dropped 500 paratroops on the narrow strip of land between Gurna and Alinda Bays, where they were engaged immediately by the troops in the area, including the composite LRDG-SBS group. Major Redfern, who led the LRDG in this action, was killed by a parachutist. Fierce fighting developed around the Rachi ridge, but although temporary successes were gained the paratroops could not be dislodged.

Throughout the battle perfect cooperation existed between the enemy air and ground forces. Except for a brief period during the airborne invasion, the German Air Force, which flew more than 500 sorties in the day, met no anti-aircraft opposition because of the lack of ammunition.

By occupying the Gurna-Alinda isthmus, the enemy could isolate the northern sector from the rest of the island. He reinforced the Pandeli landing during the night and had possession of Mount Appetici by midday on 13 November. A strong counterattack in the center of the island drove the enemy into a pocket between Rachi ridge and Alinda Bay, a gain that might have had a decisive effect on the battle had not the arrival of fresh paratroops caused an unexpected reverse. Two of the fifteen Junkers transports were shot down and a third released the troops from such a low altitude that their parachutes could not open, but those who landed safely were able to restore the position. Meanwhile, in the northeast, the enemy occupied Mount Clidi, where the LRDG blew up the Italian coastal defense guns, and Captain Olivey sent his last message at 3 p.m., saying ‘Germans here.’

After the failure of a night counterattack against Appetici by a company of the King’s Own, supported by a naval bombardment, the enemy drove southwards from that feature towards Charing Cross. Although this thrust was held on 14 November, the Germans secured a foothold on Meraviglia, at the top of which Fortress Headquarters was located in tunnels. The Buffs and the LRDG patrols in the north recaptured Clidi, but the Royal Irish Fusiliers and the King’s Own, although they took 200 prisoners and inflicted fairly heavy casualties, still were unable to drive the enemy from Rachi ridge. The German Air Force flew more than 400 sorties, mostly against Clidi, the positions south of Rachi, Meraviglia, and Windmill ridge (between Meraviglia and Mount Giovanni), where the 25-pounders and Bofors guns were located. Most of the guns were knocked out, together with their meager supplies of ammunition. Lieutenant White’s R2 patrol on Scumbardo directed the Italian coastal defense battery to shoot landwards against targets to the north of Rachi and on Appetici. The shells passed over a ridge on Meraviglia with only about ten feet to spare, but some accurate shooting was reported at a jetty in Alinda Bay. The battery engaged enemy positions, including a castle near Leros town, until all its ammunition was spent on the last day of the battle.

At daybreak on 15 November the enemy forces were confined to the Rachi and Appetici areas, except for a few men cut off on the cliffs of Clidi. Further efforts were made to capture Rachi, but despite the help of reinforcements from the Royal West Kents, brought by the Navy from Samos Island, little headway could be made. Undoubtedly the relentless onslaught of the enemy air force contributed to this failure. Communications were disrupted, making control and movement difficult, the fighting deteriorated into small skirmishes, and the troops were showing signs of fatigue.

Lieutenant-Colonel Easonsmith, with two or three men, reconnoitered Leros town to see whether the enemy was infiltrating around that side of Meraviglia. He found no enemy, but when he returned to make a second reconnaissance his party was ambushed and he was killed.

The Germans launched a heavy attack on Meraviglia at first light on 16 November. All types of aircraft, including Stukas and outmoded seaplanes, flew more than 600 sorties against the British positions and strafed anything that moved, without a shot being fired in return except by small arms. The ground assault, which came from the east, met stubborn resistance and seemed to have spent itself before midday. This would have been the time to counterattack, but the troops at Fortress Headquarters were too few, and the disruption of communications prevented other forces being moved up for the purpose. No doubt appreciating the helplessness of the British situation, the enemy renewed the attack with great vigor and overran Meraviglia.

Fortress Headquarters and Headquarters LRDG destroyed their documents and wireless equipment before withdrawing to Portolago. An attempt was made to rally all the troops in the south of the island for a counterattack but morale by this time was very low and the result was a dismal failure. Organized resistance collapsed and silence descended on the island later in the afternoon. The fortress commander ordered the surrender of Leros about 6 p.m. Troops wandered around without knowing what to do, and the Germans made no attempt at that late hour to round up the stragglers.

The LRDG patrols in the north were cut off from their headquarters in the south. Major the Earl Jellicoe[67] had taken command of the composite LRDG-SBS group, which was manning machine gun posts on the northern coast, in case the enemy should land further reinforcements there. When news of the capitulation was received about midnight, the men in the vicinity were rounded up with the aid of two jeeps. A party of about twenty-five, including T1 and T2 patrols, took possession of an Italian caique and small motor boat in Parteni Bay, persuaded the Italians to open the harbor boom, and sailed to a small island north of Leros, where they hid during daylight. They reached Bodrum next night and joined an old minesweeper, in which they made a three-day voyage down the Turkish coast and across to Haifa.

After the surrender, most of Headquarters LRDG dispersed in the south near Mount Patella. Colonel Prendergast, Captain Croucher, Captain Tinker, and several others, including two men from R2 patrol, hid on Mount Tortore. The remainder of R2 escaped that night in two parties. Lieutenant White and four men bailed out a little rowing boat that had been sunk at Serocampo Bay and made a perilous journey to join other escapees near Bodrum. Colonel Prendergast’s party remained hidden on Leros until 22 November, when they were evacuated by an RAF air-sea rescue launch. Small groups continued to escape up to a fortnight after the surrender.

The LRDG did everything that could be expected of it during the fighting on Leros, often setting an example to the other troops, and when the island fell the men endured many hardships in order to escape. In the end, only two men of A Squadron were captured on Leros. This was the last operation in which the New Zealand Squadron participated. It was disbanded on 31 December 1943 and most of its members, after a spell at the New Zealand Armoured Corps Training Depot in Egypt, were posted as reinforcements to the Divisional Cavalry with the 2^nd New Zealand Division in Italy.

The Author

R. L. Kay, who is a member of the staff of the War History Branch, was a newspaper reporter before the war and served with the 2^nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force Public Relations Service in the Middle East. He graduated BA at Victoria University College in 1948.

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[1]      Lieutenant-Colonel D. G. Steele, OBE, m.i.d.; farmer; Rotorua; born Wellington, 22 March 1912; patrol commander, LRDG; commanding officer A (New Zealand) Squadron, LRDG, 1941-42; commanding officer 22^nd New Zealand (Motorized) Battalion, 1944; commanding officer 27^th New Zealand (Machine Gun) Battalion, 1944.

[2]      The LRDG included four New Zealand patrols (R1, R2, T1 and T2), two Guards patrols (G1 and G2), two Yeomanry patrols (Y1 and Y2), and two Southern Rhodesian patrols (S1 and S2). Each patrol consisted of an officer and fifteen to eighteen men in five or six 30-cwt. trucks. Later they were equipped with jeeps as well as trucks.

[3]      Lieutenant-Colonel A. D. Stirling, DSO; Scots Guards; commanding officer Special Air Service; prisoner of war, January 1943.

[4]      Major C. S. Morris, MC; branch manager; Christchurch; born Fairlie, 6 April 1905; patrol commander, LRDG; commanding officer A (New Zealand) Squadron, LRDG, 1942; chief instructor New Zealand AFV School, Waiouru, 1944.

[5]      Sergeant G. C. Garven, MM; farmer; Otorohanga; born Wellington, 16 April 1918.

[6]      Private C. A. Dornbush, MM; truck driver; Mangaweka; born New Zealand, 16 June 1917; prisoner of war, December 1942.

[7]      Corporal G. C. Garven, Gunners E. C. Stuttered, E. Sanders, and T. E. Walsh, and Troopers D. M. Bassett, A. C. Martin, F. S. Brown, and R. A. Ramsey.

[8]      Second Lieutenant D. M. Bassett, DCM; farmer; Rangiora; born Christchurch, 6 February 1944.

[9]      Sergeant E. Sanders, MM; seaman; born Christchurch, 29 December 1915.

[10]   Private F. R. Brown, MM; laborer; born Taumarunui, 11 August 1913; died in New Zealand, 23 December 1944.

[11]   Trooper G. C. Parkes; laborer; born New Zealand, 28 May 1910.

[12]   Lieutenant-Colonel N. P. ilder, DSO; farmer; Waipukurau; born New Zealand, 29 March 1914; patrol commander, LRDG; commanding officer,2^nd New Zealand Division Cavalry, 1944; wounded 14 September 1942.

[13]   Corporal K. E. Tippett, MM; car painter; Te Awamutu; born Lyttelton, 27 September 1914.

[14]   Trooper T. B. Dobson, MM; farm laborer; Seddon; born New Zealand, 25 February 1916; wounded 14 September 1942.

[15]   Captain J. R. Talbot; storekeeper; Motueka; born South Africa, 4 June 1910; patrol commander, LRDG; prisoner of war, 15 January 1943.

[16]   Sergeant L. A. Willcox, Lance-Corporal A. D. Sadgrove, and Troopers L. A. Ellis, E. J. Dobson, and M. W. Stewart were wounded in air attacks, Willcox and Private J. E. Gill were injured when a truck crashed over a sand dune on the way back to Kufra, and an English signalman was injured when the wireless truck capsized.

[17]   Lieutenant-Colonel J. R. Easonsmith, DSO, MC; Royal Tank Regiment; patrol commander, LRDG; commanding officer, LRDG, 1943; killed in action, 16 November 1943.

[18]   Captain J. A. L. Timpson, MC; Scots Guards; patrol commander, LRDG.

[19]   Captain R. P. Lawson, MC; Royal Army Medical Corps; medical officer, LRDG.

[20]   Lance-Sergeant M. Craw, MM; farmer; Manawatu; born Auckland, 4 October 1915; prisoner of war, 14 September 1942; escaped 13 September 1943.

[21]   Sergeant D. S. Parker; derrickman; Gisborne; born New Zealand, 24 February 1918; wounded, 14 September 1942.

[22]   Sergeant H. R. T. Holland; insurance superintendent; born Wellington, 29 March 1910; prisoner of war, 14 September 1942.

[23]   Lance-Corporal A. H. C. Nutt; farmer; Motukarara; born Christchurch, 25 August 1911; prisoner of war, 14 September 1942; escaped September 1943.

[24]   Trooper P. J. Burke; taxi driver; born Gore, 4 September 1917; wounded, 14 September 1942 and 25 November 1942.

[25]   Sergeant J. L. D. Davis, BEM; clerk; Stratford; born Taumarunui, 9 January 1914.

[26]   Trooper K. Yealands; truck driver; Blenheim; born Blenheim, 16 April 1921; wounded and prisoner of war, 14 September 1942.

[27]   Sergeant R. E. Hay; painter; Dunedin; born Dunedin, 11 December 1913; prisoner of war, 14 September 1942; escaped, September 1943.

[28]   Trooper T. A. Milburn; stock agent; Port Chalmers; born Dunedin, 6 February 1918; prisoner of war, 14 September 1942; escaped September 1943.

[29]   Trooper F. W. Jopling; farm hand; Auckland; born England, 15 April 1913; wounded, 14 September 1942; prisoner of war, 25 September 1942.

[30]   Corporal D. P. Warbrick; cartage contractor; Taupo; born Taupo, 8 March 1908.

[31]   Four of them, Craw, Nutt, Milburn, and Hay, escaped a year later.

[32]   Captain R. A. Tinker, MC, MM, mi.d.; motor driver; Timaru; born New Zealand, 13 April 1913; patrol commander, LRDG; now in New Zealand Regular Army.

[33]   Troopers Ellis, L. R. B. Johnstone, and J. L. Reid, and Privates C. A. Dornbush and J. M. Simonsen. Reid walked for a week before he was captured, and later escaped from a prisoner of war camp in Italy.

[34]   Corporal E. Ellis, MM; shepherd; Masterton; born Temuka, 6 June 1913.

[35]   Major A. I. Guild; farming student; Christchurch; born Temuka, 19 February 1916; patrol commander, LRDG; commanding officer, A (New Zealand) Squadron, LRDG, 1942-43.

[36]   Captain L. H. Browne, MC, DCM, m.i.d.; accountant; London; born England, 8 July 1908; patrol commander, LRDG; GSO III, G (Ops), GHQ MEF, 1942; Intelligence officer, LRDG, 1943; wounded 11 January 1941, 31 January 1941, 18 November 1942, and 22 December 1942.

[37]   Lance-Corporal N. O’Malley; shepherd; born Havelock, 9 October 1910; killed in action, 18 November 1942.

[38]   Sergeant M. F. Fogden; farmer; Auckland; born Lower Hutt, 19 August 1915; wounded and prisoner of war, Sidi Rezegh, 23 November 1941; released 25 December 1941; wounded 18 November 1942.

[39]   Captain K. F. McLauchlan, MM, m.i.d.; civil engineer; Wellington; born Invercargill, 20 June 1912; patrol commander, LRDG.

[40]   Lance-Bombardier C. O. Grimsey, Private K. C. J. Ineson, and Trooper R. D. Hayes.

[41]   Captain C. H. B. Croucher, mi.d.; Merchant Navy; Feilding; born England, 25 February 1910; commissioned British Army; patrol commander, LRDG; GSO III, G (Ops), GHQ MEF, 1942; adjutant, LRDG, 1943; Intelligence officer, LRDG, 1943; Intelligence officer, Raiding Forces, 1944; Intelligence officer, LRDG, 1944.

[42]   An Indian Long Range Squadron of four patrols came under the command of the LRDG in October 1942.

[43]   Captain D. Barrett, MBE, m.i.d.; clerk; Napier; born Paeroa, 8 December 1909; adjutant and quartermaster, LRDG.

[44]   Colonel G. L. Prendergast, DSO; Royal Tank Regiment; commanding officer, LRDG, 1941-43; second-in-command, Raiding Forces, 1943.

[45]   Lance-Corporal R. A. Ramsay, EM; farmer; Huntly; born Hamilton, 21 September 1917; wounded 28 January 1943.

[46]   Sergeant R. C. Davies; clerk; Picton; born Picton, 3 May 1915; wounded, 28 January 1943.

[47]   Captain J. A. Goodsir.

[48]   M1 and M2 were British patrols formed during the training period in Lebanon. M1 was under the command of A Squadron and M2 was led by a New Zealander (Lieutenant K. H. Lazarus) in the British Army.

[49]   Major D. J. Aitken, mi.d.; slaughterman; New Plymouth; born Leeston, 11 October 1917; patrol commander, LRDG; J Force, 1946; now in New Zealand Regular Army.

[50]   Sergeant R. D. Tant; clerk; Christchurch; born Christchurch, 20 March 1919; prisoner of war, 16 November 1943.

[51]   The King’s Own Royal Regiment.

[52]   Major C. K. Saxton, mi.d.; commercial traveler; Dunedin; born Kurow, 23 May 1913; patrol commander, LRDG.

[53]   These small local craft were fitted with tank engines, giving them a speed of six knots, and manned by the Navy with a crew of three. They were camouflaged with their masts down so that they could not easily be detected when lying close inshore.

[54]   Captain M. W. Cross, MM; farmer; Palmerston North; born Balclutha, 16 April 1917; patrol commander, LRDG.

[55]   Captain J. R. Olivey, MC; Sherwood Foresters; patrol commander, LRDG.

[56]   Captain J. M. Sutherland; farmer; Waimate; born Waimate, 9 April 1913; patrol commander, LRDG; prisoner of war, 25 October 1943.

[57]   Trooper H. L. Mallett; lorry driver; born New Zealand, 3 April 1914; died of wounds, 24 October 1943.

[58]   Private B. Steedman; laborer; Auckland; born New Zealand, 21 August 1915; prisoner of war, 25 October 1943.

[59]   Trooper A. J. Penhall; shepherd; born New Zealand, 14 March 1910; prisoner of war, 25 October 1943; died of wounds while prisoner of war, 28 October 1943.

[60]   Sergeant R. G. Haddow; film booker; Wellington; born New Zealand, 9 July 1921; wounded and prisoner of war, 25 October 1943; J Force, 1946.

[61]   Trooper L. G. Doel; freezing works employee; North Auckland; born Whangarei, 10 March 1915; wounded, 22 July 1942; prisoner of war, 25 October 1943.

[62]   Sergeant E. J. Dobson; laborer; born New Zealand, 15 August 1910; wounded 19 September 1942; prisoner of war, 25 October 1943; died while prisoner of war, 6 April 1945.

[63]   Corporal J. E. Gill; contractor; Matamuta; born New Zealand, 1 July 1912; prisoner of war, 29 October 1943.

[64]   Trooper J. T. Bowler; shepherd; born Napier, 25 September 1914; killed in action, 24 October 1943.

[65]   Easonsmith became the commanding officer of the LRDG on 17 October 1943, when Colonel Prendergast was appointed second-in-command of the Raiding Forces in the Aegean.

[66]   Captain R. F. White; farmer; Hororata; born England, 21 March 1910; patrol commander, LRDG.

[67]   Major the Earl Jellicoe, DSO, MC; Coldstream Guards; commanding officer, Special Boat Squadron in the Aegean.

The Libyan Desert.

Tunisia and Tripolitania.

Aegean Sea.

Leros.

The Road Watch: How they watched.

The Road Watch—What they saw. Enemy transport on the Tripoli-Benghazi road.

The Road Watch—How they hid. Two patrol trucks under camouflage.

Raid on Barce—G1 patrol. A jeep armed with twin-mounted Vickers guns.

Raid on Barce—A sand dune typical of the country through which the raiding force passed on the way to Gebel Akhdar.

Raid on Barce—T1 patrol before the raid.

Raid on Barce—In Gebel Akhdar. Captain N. P. Wilder explains the plan of attack.

Raid on Barce—A British agent, Major V. Peniakoff.

Raid on Barce—After the raid a truck burns during the air attacks while another escapes with the wounded.

Into Tunisia—The first troops of Eighth Army to enter Tunisia, T1 patrol on the border on 12 January 1943.

Into Tunisia—On the edge of the impassable Grand Erg Oriental.

In the Aegean—An LRDG patrol on a caique.

In the Aegean—The island of Naxos.

In the Aegean—R1 Patrol’s wireless position on Leros. The wireless was put out of action by bombs.

In the Aegean—German bombs fall on Leros.

In the Aegean—Italian 6-inch naval guns on Mount Scumbardo, where R2 Patrol was stationed during the invasion.

In the Aegean—The Turkish port of Bodrum. Here an escape organization assisted the evacuation of troops from Leros.

In the Aegean—The rowing boat in which Lieutenant R. F. White’s party reached Turkey.

In the Aegean—On a minesweeper from Turkey to Haifa. On the left are the New Zealanders J. L. D. Davis, C. A. Yaxley and M. D. Richardson. Captain C. K. Saxton of T1 Patrol is at right in rear.

LRDG badge.

A ‘T1’ Patrol Chevrolet 1533X2 30 cwt: the small drum behind the fender is the radiator condenser and the truck’s sand channels are mounted on brackets on the rear bodywork. The weapons are the Lewis gun (left) and a .303 Browning Mk II (right).

LRDG Chevrolet 30 cwt trucks.

LRDG Chevrolet 30 cwt trucks.

LRDG Chevrolet 30 cwt trucks.

‘Y’ and ‘R’ Patrol Chevrolets meet in the desert, mid-1942. Note the amount of equipment carried on the nearest ‘R’ Patrol trucks.

LRDG Headquarters Section (note markings on “Louise”) of Chevrolet 30 cwt. The first two vehicles are armed with Vickers guns, and have canvas sand mats rolled up and stored on the front wheel arches.

‘R’ Patrol Chevrolet WB radio truck; the rod antenna can be seen on the right. The man at the rear is manning a Boys anti-tank rifle.

A Chevrolet WB with a Bofors 37 mm anti-tank gun mounted at the rear.

A Vickers K-armed jeep of ‘G’ Patrol on the way to Barce during Operation Caravan, September 1942.

A radio operator of ‘R1’ Patrol. The rod aerial is just above his head. The four wooden support poles for the Wyndom dipole antenna are carried on brackets on the wooden ‘greedy boards.’ The canvas sand mat can be seen rolled up on the right hand vehicle.

Heavily laden Chevrolets of ‘R1’ Patrol setting out from Jalo oasis in 1942. The unit insignia of a Māori Hei-Tiki can just be seen on the bonnet of the lead vehicle, which carries its individual number “R4” on a dark square on the left fender.

“Te Anau II” of ‘T1’ Patrol was the only remaining Chevrolet to survive air attack during the withdrawal from Operation Caravan. The vehicle is armed with two twin Browning machine guns.

Using sand mats to aid crossing loose sand. The mats shown do not appear to have a red and white side.

Breaking out the sand channels for some deep sand recovery. Note the Lewis Gun behind the passenger side seat.

Crew camouflage applying nets.

Bofors truck with a view of the mount for the gun.

Cooking over an open fire somewhere out in the desert.

Setting off on a mission that may have involved a thousand miles and many days away.

Letting the engines cool on a hot day.

Taking a break.

LRDG commanding officer Lieutenant Colonel John Richard Easonsmith, DSO, MC, was killed in action during the battle of Leros.

LRDG Memorial at Papakura Military Camp, New Zealand.

LRDG Chevrolet WB, Imperial War Museum (2007).