The State of Strategic Intelligence, June 1941: The War with Russia: Operation Barbarossa

Heinz Guderian during the opening stage of Barbarossa, 1941.

Introduction

One of the least explicable incidents of the Second World War was the almost total surprise—strategic, operational, and tactical—that Germany achieved over the Soviet Union at the start of the Barbarossa campaign. Viewed in modern terms, in which the Soviet Union’s intelligence apparatus is sometimes viewed as all-seeing and all-knowing, the need to know why this failure occurred becomes all the more interesting. Much of the difficulty in accurately investigating the matter lies in the almost visceral abhorrence the USSR had toward seriously analyzing many of the events which occurred during the disastrous period between 22 June and 1 October 1941.

Much of the information that has come out of the USSR on the subject seems to indicate that the Soviet military leadership and the intelligence services were indeed fully aware of the imminence of the German attack; however, with a serious disregard for logic, these same sources assert that Stalin and Stalin alone was responsible for what became a general failure of the Red Army to do much more than try to stop the invasion by throwing units into the path of the rapidly advancing Wehrmacht and having them quickly ground into dust. Certainly much of the failure to publicly examine this major disaster—as the Pearl Harbor attack has been publicly examined in the United States—is due to the consideration that the Communist political system failed to accurately analyze and predict the future, attributes often ascribed to the political apparatus, and that this self-proclaimed omniscience would be exposed as a sham.

To make matters more difficult, information which is available from Soviet sources must be very carefully examined before it is used. Some of the information is patently folklore, such as Medvedev’s assertion that Luftwaffe aircraft were landing on numerous Soviet airfields en masse immediately before the attack and were allowed to go freely on their way in what might be viewed as mass incidents of “Wrong-Way Corriganism”[1] or a charmingly described incident in which an old Polish woman allegedly shouted a warning to NKVD border guards on the far side of the Bug River and who, when German troops appear, continues to give metaphorical warnings to the uncomprehending Soviets.[2]

Other available data was more subtle, but still indicated the possibility of an attack. An example cited in Soviet sources states that rumors were rife in the vicinity of Brest-Litovsk that an attack by the Germans was imminent and while the local people rushed to stock up on goods, deliveries to Soviet troops and sympathizers were deliberately delayed.[3]

Another example is the report that German consular officials in Leningrad canceled their orders with local tailors suddenly and without warning, and that therefore a German attack was imminent.

Still other data probably consists of deliberate forgeries. The claim by Soviet agent “Gordon Lonsdale” (K. T. Molody) that a Warsaw-based spy network of which he was a member had repeatedly passed information on the coming German attack to Moscow, and even gave 22 June as the date of the attack is a good example of this genre of disinformation.[4]

Further clouding the picture were the deliberate German efforts to confuse not only Soviet strategic intelligence apparatus, but the intelligence services of other countries as well. Some of these operations were penetrated by sophisticated ELINT (electronic intelligence) methods; some good examples are the detection of the transfer of 8. Fliegerkorps from its operational bases in southern Greece, where it had just supported the successful German airborne assault on Crete, to Germany for refitting during the early part of June,[5] or the American penetration of Japanese concealed signals traffic falling under the rubric of Enigma.[6] But the validity of much of the information was not so easily discerned, such as the Göring-orchestrated deception of a “German ultimatum”—in effect, a forced political solution—to be delivered to the Soviets in late June. This information was forwarded to its anticipated targets by, among others, his perennial dupe, Birger Dahlerus.[7]

Whatever the case, however, there are certain vital clues that can be discerned, however murkily, through the fog of details. The most significant of these is that the Soviets appear to have relied on human-based intelligence (HUMINT) excessively when developing their intelligence estimates; this author can find no credible evidence that the Soviets engaged in any electronic surveillance prior to 22 June and the opening of the Barbarossa campaign, nor that the Soviets had made any penetration of the Enigma machine ciphers before the attack. As an assessment of the value of HUMINT to the Soviets, it appears that there were some considerable distortions made in data transmissions to Stalin, especially by F. I. Golikov, head of Soviet military intelligence, as well as a number of other top intelligence commanders, which made a potentially valuable source of data far less reliable than it could have been to the Soviets during the crisis.

If ELINT in the sense we know it today was in its infancy, and seems not to have been used, or at least not to have been used extensively, by the Soviets, there does appear to be some evidence that air reconnaissance flights over the German-Soviet border area was carried out by the Soviets as was indicated by Jodl in his 23 April 1941 response to complaints of German over-flights of Soviet territory.[8] Furthermore, there are some oblique hints that cross-border forays on intelligence-gathering missions were not strictly a one-way street.

However, the main question remains: how were the Soviets so surprised at an attack whose dimension made concealment almost impossible? The answer is, as we shall see here, that the Soviet military and political command echelons were not only aware of the danger posed by the Germans, but had been carrying out countermeasures for some time before the actual attack. The surprise lay not in the fact that many Soviet units simply disintegrated under the impact of the attack, but that the failure to bring the troops to an advanced state of readiness was a direct result of the leaderships’ inability to accurately predict when the attack would occur and allow effective countermeasures to take place.

At this point, we should get down to cases and examine what intelligence data was available to the various national leaderships and to the Soviets in particular, what German actions were taken and when, and the Soviet response to these German actions.

The First Week, 1-7 June 1941

Possibly one of the most obvious responses to Soviet concern about a German attack is seen in the massive step-up in airfield construction in the border districts of the USSR, which began in the middle of April 1941. Some of the construction work had been delayed due to a very late spring in 1941, which created conditions in which the ground couldn’t be properly prepared for building activities; this climate-imposed delay has often been held responsible for the Red Air Force’s inability to properly employ even the obsolescent aircraft—which, however, could operate from muddy fields without special preparation—on 22 June. In spite of the delay, however, Soviet sources indicate that as many as 164 new airfields were readied for operation in a short three-month period.[9] There are only two reasonably acceptable interpretations for such mass airfield constructions: either it was done in anticipation of an attack from the west or was carried out to support an attack by the USSR against Germany; the fact that many of the airfields were built within light artillery range of the frontier is certainly strange and may indicate Stalin’s ultimate plans.

A more subtle clue is the fact that the Soviets were heavily involved in the evacuation of whole factories from the border areas and shipping this material off to the east. This evacuation of equipment and personnel possibly began as early as the end of April or beginning of May 1941.

On or about 1 June 1941, Soviet Naval Attaché in Berlin Rear Admiral M. A. Vorontsov transmitted a message to his commander that a German attack was likely during the latter part of June, and specifically named the period 20-23 June as the time of maximum danger.[10] It appears from other sources that his commander, Admiral Kuznetsov proceeded to deliberately distort the information and label it as a German provocation. He passed the report along to Stalin, who apparently dismissed it;[11] this is certainly evidence of one reason why HUMINT and intelligence management in the USSR failed the Soviets in a period of crisis, not because data wasn’t transmitted to the appropriate political and military leadership, but because the transmitters didn’t report the data accurately and didn’t refrain from inappropriate comment.

Other Soviet military estimates of German strength and intention were possibly more accurate than those of the Soviet Navy. Marshal Zhukov indicates that the German Wehrmacht had a strength of 8,500,000 combatants as of 1 June 1941 (actual: 7,900,000), and that there had been an increase of about sixty per cent in this strength since 1940; he further indicated that the strength of the Red Army at this time was about 5,000,000[12] although there are some grounds for suspicion that this is an ex post facto interpolation of fact. The buildup of a force of 3,500,000 of these soldiers along the German-Soviet border couldn’t go unnoticed, and it apparently didn’t. A few days into the month, the Soviets began the call-up of an estimated 750,000 reservists, the bulk of whom were shipped off in the general direction of the anticipated front, with at least 40,000 of them being used to reinforce the existing fortified areas along the border.[13]

If it appeared that the confusion was vanishing from at least some of the command echelons in Moscow, the fog was only deepening in Britain. The Foreign Office reported on 1 June that because there was no evidence of on-going German-Soviet negotiations in Moscow, which reinforced the idea that had been rife for some time in the British and other foreign ministries that the Germans would soon present an ultimatum to the Soviet government, the report concluded that this merely meant the negotiations were taking place in Berlin![14] It appears that the much-vaunted British diplomatic intelligence service was fooled by German deception operations for it to have made such a serious error in evaluating data, especially since that data had been integrated with military intelligence materials as well.

The Soviets certainly knew better. The Main Directorate of border troops of the NKGB reported on 2 June, the same day that the Foreign Office stated that German-Soviet negotiations were going on in Berlin, that by the end of May, the Germans had concentrated a force of eighty to eighty-eight infantry divisions, thirteen to fifteen motorized divisions, seven panzer divisions, sixty-three artillery regiments, and numerous other units, opposite the Soviet border;[15] if the report is accurate, there is very good reason to believe that the Soviets were more than slightly aware of the size and scope of the German build-up. This deployment data corresponds neatly with German deployment information for the same time and would apparently be a very important clue for the Soviet leadership.

On or about 3 June 1941, the withdrawal of the Soviet 16th Army from the Trans-Baikal Military District (MD) to the west which had been ordered about 13 May by the Red Army Staff,[16] began in earnest with armored elements the first to be pulled out under cover of darkness, then moved in sealed boxcars westward toward the anticipated front. The armored units were then followed by infantry units, and finally by the Army headquarters.[17] The fact is that this operation as well as the movement of two other Armies from interior areas at the same time gives a good indication that the Soviet military and political command was well aware that the Germans were planning major military operations against the USSR. The secrecy and timing of the moves is especially significant—the highest value combat units were moved first, followed by less important combat units, and finally by the headquarters, which was probably the most easily replaced element of the whole Army.

Soviet actions weren’t solely confined to military moves. In an apparent effort to placate the Germans and simultaneously signal their willingness to negotiate, the Soviet government withdrew recognition of the Greek government-in-exile. However, the action doesn’t appear to have established any great fund of good will with the Germans; in fact, the action—which followed a delay of over a year since the Italo-German conquest of Greece—was probably interpreted more as a sign of weakness and ill-resolve in the Soviet political leadership and probably encouraged the Germans in their estimates of Soviet will.

It appears that the Japanese were far more aware of the German threat; Ambassador Horikiri in Rome reported in a Magic intercept that German preparations for an attack on the USSR were completed;[18] furthermore, Hitler himself informed Japanese Ambassador Oshima during his visit to the Berghof on 3-4 June, that Germany would attack the USSR.[19] The British intercepted Oshima’s 4 June coded dispatch, in which he described this meeting to his government and gave considerable details of the Barbarossa operation. However, due apparently to a lack of either translators or interest in the subject matter, the report was not delivered by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee (JIC) to the appropriate authorities until 12 June.[20]

Another German ally was aware of the Barbarossa operation besides the Japanese. It is almost certain that by this time the Italian government was at least unofficially aware of the pending attack and was making plans to have some sort of Italian participation in the operation. This can be seen in major re-deployments of troops in the Balkans during this period. As an aside concerning unofficial Italian awareness of Barbarossa, it appears that Hungarian Prime Minister Bardossy was indirectly informed of the Barbarossa operation by Mussolini during his state visit to Rome on 4 June.

Nor were Japan and Italy the only German allies to be aware of the impending attack. Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) representatives Obersten Buschenhagen and Kinzel (Chief of Fremde Heere Ost [FHO]) were conducting joint military staff discussions with the Finns in Helsinki between 3 and 5 June, following up on the more extensive talks held between representatives of the two general staffs in Germany during May. Among the points covered in these discussions was the subject of coping with domestic Finnish opposition to a renewed war so soon after the conclusion of the Winter War of 1939-1940.[21]

As the German troop concentrations in the East continued to grow, so did Soviet knowledge of the deployment. Western Special Military District commander G. D. Pavlov was apparently presented with an intelligence summary on 4 June that indicated a major German troop concentration was being carried out opposite his command in the Ostrlenok–Krasnyshi–Mlva–Tserkhanov area. The report stated that two to three infantry divisions were moving into the area, as well as two SS panzer divisions (sic).[22] Given the post-war Soviet historians’ predilection for calling all unidentified motorized or mechanized units in the German Army “SS divisions,” this particular clue may very well be an interpolation of facts. The report went on to state that German air units were being concentrated in the area of Königsberg and Warsaw.

If 4 June was the first date that such a senior Soviet commander as Pavlov was made aware of the danger of a German attack, it was also the first time that many German officers were officially informed of the purpose of their concentration along the German-Soviet border. OKH’s Halder noted in his diary that he called a two-day conference of senior command chiefs of staff, officially informed them that Barbarossa would be executed in the near future, and explained the reasons why this action would be carried out. No one who heard the explanation gave any serious objections to the attack on any grounds.

While Italy was beginning unofficial moves in support of the coming attack on the USSR, if Hitler had been counting on direct or indirect Japanese support of the Barbarossa campaign as a result of his briefing of Ambassador Oshima on the attack, these hopes were dashed when German Ambassador Ott reported from Tokyo that the Japanese had totally dropped plans for a strike south against Singapore to force the British out of Southeast Asia.[23]

Strong military clues as to the possibility of major German military action in the east were certainly obvious in the execution of Blaufuchs I and Blaufuchs 2 by the Germans during the first two weeks of June. These operations involved the shifting of 36.Armee-Korps headquarters from the Oslo area to the vicinity of Oulu in Finland, and the movement of 169.Infanterie-Division from Stettin into the 36.Armee-Korps’ command area.[24]

One clue that this activity didn’t escape the attention of the highest levels of the Soviet intelligence and government community is found in the start of a new series of mass arrests, deportations, and murders in the Soviet-occupied areas of the Baltic states, Poland, and Bessarabia. Besides such normal targets of Soviet oppression such as former governmental officials, teachers, intellectuals, Red Cross members and employees, members of the local police force, and businessmen, the arrests were expanded to include anyone who had possibly had any contact with foreigners, no matter how innocuous. Thus, hoteliers found themselves hauled off to Siberia packed in boxcars, where they rubbed shoulders with such other patent dangers to the security of the Soviet Union as people who had traveled abroad, stamp collectors who corresponded with foreign collectors, and even such a deadly threat as people who studied Esparanto![25]

Not unnaturally, the local population reacted with violence. Soviet sources indicate that arson occurred in the forests—one especially fanciful source described the whole of the Baltic region as being under a cloud of smoke from these fires—and that attacks on Soviet military personnel, officials, and domestic traitors increased. When the Germans began insertions of trained personnel in these areas behind Soviet lines, they found willing helpers among the people forced to flee for their lives.

Coincident with this atrocity, the OKW issued its final Barbarossa order, setting out deceptive measures to be carried out by units, but noting that they would only be applicable until 18 June, because it assumed that even the Soviets would certainly have detected the troop movements by that time. An indication of the control the German Wehrmacht had or believed it had over the troops can be found in the fact that 1300 hours, 21 June, was set as the last possible time the cancellation of the operation (indicated by the code word Altona) could be ordered. The same order set B-Hour as 0330 for all troop units following the issue of Dortmund, the attack code word; the time was later moved to 0300 to take full advantage of the day’s first light (infra).[26]

As if to underline the German estimate of the situation, the Main Directorate of Border Troops again reported to Moscow that some 4,000,000 German troops, under the command of eight armies, were massing along the German-Soviet border, a figure that, while somewhat high, was very close to the actual count.[27] According to Soviet sources, no apparent action took place as a result of this report to counter a possible threat from the west, although we shall see that actions were already under way at the time the report was made.

Nor was any concrete action apparently taken the next day when 4th Army commander Major General A. A. Korobhkov informed Moscow that a force of some forty German divisions, including fifteen infantry, five panzer, two motorized, and two cavalry (sic; only the 1.Kavallerie-Division operated in the German Army as a partially horsed unit at the time) had been taking up positions along the frontier in the area of Brest-Litovsk. The source of the information is unknown, but the claims for the allegedly detailed information indicates a probable source as either line-crossing patrols sent out by the Soviet command or limited Soviet air reconnaissance.

If Moscow was apparently turning a deaf ear to warnings of troop movements, the British began picking up more information of a concrete nature. Enigma decrypts revealed that the Luftwaffe had recently deployed about two thousand aircraft into the east, and from this data, the Government Codes and Cyphers School (GCCS) made its 7 June conclusion, that a major operation was due to commence against the USSR in the near future. A tentative date was estimated for the start of the operation: sometime after 16 June, when all the elements of Von Richthofen’s 8.Fliegerkorps, which was then refitting in Germany, arrived ready for operations in the east. British intelligence was certainly well aware of the reputation of this unit for being one of the premier air support units in the Luftwaffe.

A major British diplomat was also made more certainly aware of the danger posed to the USSR from Germany, when on 7 June, Sir Stafford Cripps, British Ambassador to Moscow, dined in Stockholm with Erik Bohmeman, the Secretary-General of the Swedish Foreign Office. Cripps, who was on his way to London from Moscow for consultations, was told that the German ambassador would present a démarche to the Soviet government on or about 15 June, and that a failure to achieve a diplomatic solution to the matter could lead to war.[28] That the information was immediately accepted is due to two special circumstances: the first as Cripp’s certainty, even in the face of evidence to the contrary, that Germany planned to attack the USSR, and second, that the Göring deception mentioned above, involving Birger Dahlerus, was already in circulation in the European diplomatic community and was enjoying a certain life of its own. The fact that the Swedish government accepted, and would continue to accept, the deception as genuine is an eloquent testament to success of the German operation.

It’s probable that the Swedes were also the source of information passed along to Secretary of State Hull in Washington by the American Minister about the possibility of a German attack on the USSR sometime during the next two weeks. Hull sent this message to U.S. Ambassador Steinhardt in Moscow on 9 June, but there is no evidence that this was done for any purpose other than to get the Ambassador’s opinion of the report.[29]

The Second Week, 8-14 June 1941

If the first seven days of June ended on a bright note for American diplomacy, the next seven days started on a very poor note when, on 8 June, U.S. Chargé Leland Morris dispatched a prescient report from his observation post in Berlin indicating a German attack on the USSR was likely within two weeks. He then destroyed most of the significance of his report by using the rest of the message to hedge on conclusions, to downgrade sources and data, and finally, to give contradictory reports.[30] This intelligence failure by an American diplomat can be excused, since he was essentially isolated in the German capital due to what can be described in serious understatement as a chilly atmosphere in German-American relations.

British ELINT was busier than ever, however, recovering a vital piece of information via Enigma which gave a considerable clue to the importance the Germans were attaching to signals security in the days remaining before Barbarossa began. An 8 June message from 2.Luftflotte addressed to the highly talkative signals personnel of 8.Fliegerkorps to refrain from mentioning operational matters by either radio or land line until further notice was intercepted and deciphered. The ironic fact is that this warning signal was intercepted and decoded by the British, pointing out most clearly the exaggerated confidence the Germans had in the Enigma cipher machine.[31]

If the signals clues to German intent were lost on the Soviets because they didn’t pursue them, another clue could hardly have been lost. OKH’s Halder noted in his diary entry for 7 June, that approval had been granted for the extension of Rowehl high-altitude reconnaissance flights into the USSR, effective by 8 June. If we consider that the Soviets often claim to have detected almost every German overflight prior to this time, the sudden increase in the depth of these penetrations could hardly have been missed nor could it have failed to further alert the Soviet military and political leadership to the danger of German operations against the USSR.

Other intelligence services were quickly getting into the act of detecting signs of German attack as well. On 9 June, the French Air Attaché in Bucharest, Xavier de Sevin, reportedly informed the Deuxième Bureau of the Vichy Air Ministry that a war would break out between Germany and the USSR within the next eight days; he then adds that intelligence to the contrary by other French Embassy representatives was to be disregarded.[32] An interesting speculation could also be drawn as to the source of an American consular report of 8 June, which essentially gave the same indications.[33] If Vichy intelligence—and American—in the Balkans was aware of the potential for a German attack on the USSR, it appears that Hungarian intelligence was suffering from a severe case of confusion—or perhaps a desire to impress a senior partner. On 9 June, while in Budapest on a diplomatic mission, Italian Foreign Minister Ciano noted in his diary that Karoly Barth, Hungarian Defense Minister, had informed him that a German attack against the USSR was imminent. One can imagine the amusement with which the sardonic Ciano greeted this revelation.

While Ciano was being amused in Budapest, the British War Cabinet met to debate available evidence of German intentions toward the USSR and the possibility of passing some or all of the data along to the Soviets.[34] A very long discussion followed, in which it’s almost certain that the wisdom of revealing any information at all to the Soviets was intensely debated, as well as how the data that was to be passed along would be handled so that it would keep British penetration of the Enigma ciphers a secret from the Soviets; after all, the USSR was closely associated with Germany at that moment and had been known on previous occasions to pass confidential information along either via the newspapers or by more personal means. Some of the concern may have been generated by a JIC report of the same day which stated baldly that Germany would take about four to six weeks to occupy the Ukraine and capture Moscow;[35] we should note that the Germans and the Americans believed much the same sort of thing. in any case, it was finally decided that detailed material should be revealed to Soviet Ambassador Maisky the next day.

While British diplomats were debating the matter in London, German diplomats were being left with few, if any, illusions. On this date, the German Embassy staff in Moscow was instructed to send all non-essential personnel home at once.[36] A clue of this significance could hardly be missed in the closed diplomatic circles in Moscow, and it wasn’t, as will be seen later.

Hungarian diplomats were also coming closer to the truth—already known to their military counterparts—that a German attack on the USSR was imminent. Fenerc Keresztes-Fischer, Hungarian Minister of the Interior, was apparently informally told about Barbarossa during his meetings with German officials in Berlin on 10 June.

The Soviet military command continued to act, at least in a minor fashion; 42nd Rifle Division, 22nd Tank Division, and other units were ordered to the area of Brest-Litovsk for what were reported to be training exercises. While senior officers of 4th Army, the parent command, met to discuss and object to the order in the face of an apparent lack of concern in higher command, they failed to understand the move as planned.[37] While there may have been some grounds for complaints by these officers, they apparently failed to consider that their relocation to the Brest training area also put them far closer to the front line than they had previously been, and therefore their units, which would be in a heightened state of readiness for the training exercises, would be both more prepared and more accessible for intervention against any German attack. This is a good example of Soviet policy of counter-deployments to German troop movements.

The Finns continued with preparations for their participation in the forthcoming operations as “comrades-in-arms” with the Germans. Among the most visible responses to the opening of Barbarossa was the activation of about 30,000 reservists on 10 June, an event that couldn’t be concealed with any sort of ease. Simultaneously, American Consul Schoenfeld met with Finnish Foreign Minister Rolf Witting to discover if Finland had been promised German aid as a condition to Finnish participation in an attack on the USSR. Witting replied that while there had been no discussions with him by the Germans concerning an attack on the USSR, there had been a promise given by Germany to support Finland in any instances in which the previously arranged transit rights agreement (for German soldiers traveling to and from northernmost Norway via Finland) became a point of conflict with the Soviets.[38] Thus it appears that the American representative in Helsinki was not only aware of the possibility of a war between Germany and the USSR and had evidence of a military mobilization, Finnish participation, but also believed the situation was serious enough to meet with the Finnish Foreign Minister to determine the facts in the matter. It is very possible that Blaufuchs, the movement of the German 36.ArmeeKorps (supra), provided both Schoenfeld and Witting with ready material for their discussion.[39]

British diplomats were likewise active. On this same day, Cadogan arranged to meet with Soviet Ambassador Maisky, as had been approved the day before by the British Cabinet, and revealed quite detailed evidence of the impending German attack on the USSR. As soon as Maisky saw the material, he reportedly became convinced of its validity and immediately relayed the details to Moscow; in what can only be described as the most short-sighted of fashion, Moscow never bothered to reply to the message.[40] It’s possible that the Soviets were convinced that the German deployment in the East was either aimed at other operations or was intended as a bluff to force a political settlement on them.

We’ve seen that the Soviets were already involved in extensive troop movements forward toward the frontier districts, and it may have been that the Soviet government decided it would be inappropriate to respond to Maisky’s information under the assumption that the fewer people who knew of the Soviet re-deployment, the less chance there would be of sensitive data being leaked. Another possibility, given the fact that other Soviet intelligence sources had material badly mangled by the reporting agencies, that someone in Soviet Commissariat of Foreign Affairs (NARKOMINDEL) either bastardized the report or simply filed and forgot it.

By 10 June, we can be sure that the Soviet General Staff was aware of the danger of an attack and had been taking measures to meet it. Thus, when Political Commissar A. A. Lobachev of 16th Army, which was being clandestinely moved westward from the Trans-Baikal MD (supra), reported to deputy of the General Staff Sokolovskii, he was told that the 16th had originally been programmed for deployment into the Trans-Caucasian MD, but was being deployed into the Kiev Special MD instead due to the threatening situation.[41] No evidence can be more convincing that the Soviets were responding to the danger of a German attack in a military fashion, according to a prearranged plan. Unfortunately for the front-line soldier, their planning wasn’t sufficient.

We should note that Admiral Kuszetsov, one of the severest postmortem critics of Stalin’s management of the crisis, appears to have failed to mention, or properly interpret, the 10 June commencement of the Warzburg mass mining operation which was carried out by Kriegsmarine elements in the Baltic Sea. These mine barrages were designed to block Soviet access to sensitive German training and transport areas and were extensive enough that there was little chance they could have been missed by an alert observer.

If military affairs were reaching the point where both sides were essentially aware of the other’s military movements, the political arena was about to receive another detail in the series of German rumors regarding the possibility of a German-Soviet political solution to the crisis. It was put out into the diplomatic rumor-mill in Berlin by SA-Gruppenführer Viktor Lutze, the titular head of a near-moribund SA, who spoke with Italian Consul-General Renzetti on 11 June, and told him that Stalin would soon be traveling to the capital to reach a political settlement with Hitler.[42] Certainly the choice of the Italian Consul-General was deliberate, given the German suspicion that the Italians were still maintaining close contacts in neutral capitals with the British. This particular deception is closely connected with both political settlement rumors and the bluff theory of the German troop concentrations in the East.

An indication of what the Soviets themselves may have believed—that the German troop assembly was being carried out to force them to take the first step and initiate hostilities—is found in an order issued by Red Army Chief of Staff Zhukov on 11 June, in which he states that a recent unauthorized occupation of forward defenses in the area of the Kiev Special MD by NKGB Border Guard detachments could provoke the Germans to combat and have unforeseen consequences. He canceled the order and demanded that the author of the directive be reported to him immediately.[43] If this incident is accurately reported, it illustrates the vast chasm that existed between the Border Troop and Army commands—and by analogy, between the Communist Party and the Red Army—which resulted in what was sometimes an almost complete lack of communications between the two combat formations over a matter as vital to the preservation of the State as the deployment of troops.

If Soviet combat formations lacked a method of mutual communications, the same lack of communications appears to have existed between Germany and certain allies. It wasn’t until their 11 June meeting that Hitler formally told Rumanian dictator General Ion Antonescu that an attack on the USSR would actually take place.[44] This was in spite of the fact that German General Eugen Ritter von Schobert, assigned to command 11.Armee during the forthcoming Barbarossa operation, had arrived in Bucharest weeks before for staff talks with his Rumanian opposite numbers. These talks were designed to secure Rumanian cooperation in the forthcoming campaign without revealing the imminence of the attack. In spite of many security precautions, considerable leakage of information did take place in Rumania, many of which had the potential of serious effects on B-Day. Hitler’s predilection for keeping the operational details restricted to as small a group of persons as possible continued to work in his favor in spite of leaks of information by minimizing their extent as much as possible.

It’s almost certain that information indicating a possible attack was not only available in Moscow, but was being acted on. German air reconnaissance flights had produced photographic evidence that by 11 June, the Soviets had massed a force of about 4,000 aircraft in the front line military districts.[45] Quantitatively, but not qualitatively, as it would later prove, the Soviets enjoyed a nearly two-to-one air superiority over the Luftwaffe in the frontier districts even before the campaign began. It’s certainly reasonable to conclude that, when the Soviet political and military command analyzed their situation vis-à-vis Germany, this sort of superiority would weigh heavily in their calculations.

It should be noted in connection with that situation analysis that it wasn’t until 12 June that the OKM issued orders canceling the sailing of merchant ships bound for ports in the USSR.[46] Thus, it would be several days before the effect became noticeable and that the clue reportedly obtained by Soviet analysis of ship traffic[47] was to the imminence of a German attack did not appear until later than 12 June, perhaps at so late a date as to be of little importance to high-level Soviet considerations and instead merely added some details to the growing evidence of German Intentions. A more important naval clue is found in the Finnish government’s 12 June order that British traffic inspectors be withdrawn from the port of Petsamo; had they remained in place, they could hardly have missed—and commented upon—the presence of German mountain troops from Gebirgskorps Norwegen who would soon move into and secure the area against Soviet attack.

Lisbon would seem to be an unlikely place for a Polish intelligence officer to discover the date Barbarossa would begin, but Colonel Jan Kowalewski, attached to the Polish ministry in Lisbon, appears to have gained valuable intelligence information from Hungarian Minister Andre de Vodianer, who told him that his government had alerted him to a German surprise that would explode the world sometime during the next ten days. Kowalewski alertly noted the information down, prepared an analysis of the salient points, and forwarded the information to his government in London. He reported that he believed this surprise would occur between 20 and 23 June.[48]

Simultaneously with this information, the British JICS produced a report which indicated that Hitler had made up his mind to attack the USSR and deal with the Soviet situation immediately. The report continues with the obfuscation that while it might be premature to set a date for the opening of hostilities, it was possible that the attack would occur in the last half of June.[49]

Some of the confusion may have been generated in the wake of the return of Sir Stafford Cripps, British Ambassador to Moscow. During the Cabinet meeting on 12 June, he reported that while he was unaware of any German-Soviet negotiations in Moscow, he did expect that the Germans would present Moscow with an ultimatum as soon as their military buildup was completed.[50] It is interesting to note that the German deception plan, which was designed to hint that a political settlement of the crisis would be sought before a military solution, had penetrated into the diplomatic colony in the USSR so deeply that even Cripps, a man certainly obsessed with the danger to the USSR of a German attack, had been fooled by the deception and had had the deception reinforced by the Swedish government only days before (supra). Appropriately enough, however, the intercept of Ambassador Oshima’s 4 June message to Tokyo arrived during the meeting and may have done much to dispel whatever doubts had been caused by Cripps’ analysis of the situation in Moscow.[51]

While London wrestled with the question of German intent and the imminence of an attack on the USSR, U.S. Ambassador Steinhardt in Moscow finished examining the materials passed along to him by Cordell Hull from the legations in Bucharest and Stockholm. While he replied to his chief’s request for a report, there is no hard evidence that the material was passed along to the Soviets.[52]

The question of whether or not this information was vitally important to the Soviets is moot; more than enough information was available to alert them to the possible danger, including eyewitness reports of the concentration of German troops along their mutual border for this American information to make much difference in either the long or short run. Furthermore, we have good reason to believe the Soviet political and military command was aware of the danger and was acting to counter the possible threat. This information could hardly have added to Soviet foreknowledge of Barbarossa as is evidenced by the fact that the Soviet High Command, starting on 12 June, ordered troops to be moved forward from their positions in depth to areas close to the frontier.[53]

It was on 13 June that Josef Goebbels produced an article in the Voelkischer Beobachter which very carefully pointed out how effective the Luftwaffe Fallschirmjäger had proven to be in the operations against Crete and gave the thinly veiled threat that this would soon be the eventual fate of Britain. Immediately after the issue hit the newsstands—and allowing for time for the article to get into circulation—police ostentatiously gathered up the remaining copies, while Goebbels disappeared into a conspicuous and an equally ostentatious self-exile.[54] The maneuver had obviously been a ploy to convince foreign observers that an attack against Britain was in the offing.

The British met with Soviet Ambassador Maisky in London again on 13 June, passing along further information on the situation in the east, and offering to end a military mission to the USSR if Germany should attack.[55] This was a good indication of British concern and their belief that an attack would soon bring the Soviets into the war. The Soviets, though, sent a signal of their evaluation of the British warnings by using TASS as a public forum to brand British Ambassador Cripps as an agent provocateur in an article which virtually seethes with rage at Perfidious Albion.[56]

Continuing Soviet military preparations for resisting the German attack hadn’t gone unnoticed; Fremde Heere Ost issued an intelligence appreciation on 13 June which indicated the Soviets had moved a force of five rifle divisions, two tank divisions, and a mechanized brigade to the front, raising the Soviet forces opposite the Wehrmacht to an estimated 150 rifle divisions, seven tank divisions, and as many as thirty mechanized brigades.[57]

The effect in Germany was scarcely noticed as the plans for Barbarossa shifted into high gear. On 14 June, Hitler addressed the assembled senior commanders of the German forces scheduled to participate in Barbarossa, explaining his reasons, opposition to the spread of communism the most publicly stated one, but which also included the theory that by removing the USSR as a military power, he could force the British to a settlement of the war while simultaneously deterring Washington from further naval provocations. It wouldn’t hurt Hitler to pick up a substantial quantity of land and labor as well. Hitler also found time from a busy schedule to order B-Hour set for 0300 local time, 22 June, instead of the previously programmed 0330. This was done to take full advantage of the early morning light.[58]

Even as Hitler was urging his commanders onward to maximum efforts, Hungarian Chief of Staff Werth issued a memo calling for his army’s participation in the forthcoming campaign[59] and the German military liaison staff in Helsinki informed the Finnish government that an attack on the USSR was certain. President Ryti and the Foreign Affairs Committee of Parliament approved military arrangements for future operations the same day.[60]

The British continued to gather considerable valuable ELINT material, including orders to 4.Luftflotte headquarters to be in its command post in the east and operationally ready by 17 June. There were other instructions to 5.Luftflotte units which were stationed in northern Norway and couldn’t be contacted via secure land lines that were connected with operations by Gebirgskorps Norwegen into northern Finland and later against the Kola Peninsula of the USSR.[61] The JIC also issued a report on the same day that again indicated the Germans would overrun the Ukraine and capture Moscow in a minimum of three weeks and a maximum of six weeks.[62] This sort of military analysis could hardly help to encourage the British government, which had offered just the day before to send a military mission to Moscow; certainly the specter of the Polish debacle, the French disaster, and the Greek collapse, as well as the incipient rout in North Africa weighed heavily on the British government. That justifiable worry goes far toward explaining why the JIC also reported that the Germans would be prepared to execute the invasion of Britain (Seelöwe) six to eight weeks after the conclusion of an Eastern campaign.

It would be interesting to speculate that these reports, as well as the 12 June Finnish order for British observers to leave Petsamo, had an influence on the 14 June decision to refuse to issue NAVICERTS (Navigation Certificates) for ships sailing to Petsamo, Finland. This effectively resulted in a blockade of Finland. However, the timing was probably mere coincidence, since the British had been pressuring the Finns for some time prior to this to deter them from entering any war against the USSR, no matter how justified the Finnish actions might be.[63] It was probably not merely coincidence that the United States government also issued orders the same day that departure permits were to be denied Finnish vessels from that point on.[64]

On 14 June, Pravda[65] ran its famous news release which stated that information Germany was about to attack the USSR was a provocation, since both nations were scrupulously observing the terms of the German-Soviet Pact of 1939. Interestingly enough, the article goes on to state that the deployment of German troops along the mutual border was not connected with any threat to the USSR, but rather was connected with other German operations. This is a clear indication that the Soviets were substantially aware of the German eastward deployment, were willing to tell the Germans that they were aware of their deployments, and were not planning to be taken by surprise by the Barbarossa attack.

The German Embassy was aware of the spate of rumors about the German-Soviet crisis that were circulating in the closed Moscow diplomatic community, as well as rumors circulating among the general Soviet population. Ambassador von der Schulenberg reported that there were three major rumors: that Germany was supposed to have made a number of political and economic demands on the USSR and that negotiations—possibly aimed at establishing a closer German-Soviet cooperation—were under way; that the Soviets had refused these demands and that consequently Germany had begun the concentration of troops along the border to force a military conclusion; and finally that the USSR had begun concentration of large numbers of troops along the border in preparation for an attack on Germany.[66] These rumors apparently didn’t prevent the Germans from premiering a film on the Balkan blitzkrieg in Moscow, allegedly repeating the same sort of heavy-handed propaganda that preceded the occupation of Norway the year before.[67] This report may well be a garbling of another report that the Peoples’ Commissar of Defense showed a German newsreel on the Balkan campaign shortly before Barbarossa began (infra). Certainly the least significant warning was the 14 June opening of Tamerlane’s sarcophagus in Samarkand; legend held it that the grave contained the source of a great war.

Some indication of the degree of American awareness of the pending Barbarossa campaign and the then-current diplomatic and military planning is found In the fact that at the same time Axis assets in the United States were frozen,[68] the State Department issued a memo setting out its program of relations with the USSR during a war.[69]

In line with its policy of preparing to resist a German attack, the Peoples’ Commissar of Defense began selective issue, on 14 June, of orders to command elements of frontier military districts to begin occupation of their forward command posts commencing on or about 21 June and continuing through 25 June.[70] This certainly indicates that the Soviets knew an attack was coming, but it also appears to indicate that the Soviets misjudged the timing of the attack and, as we will see, continued to misjudge the timing up to the very last hours of 21 June.

The Third Week, 15-21 June 1941

On 15 June, Erdmannsdorff, German Ambassador in Budapest, was informed by von Ribbentrop, who happened to be in Venice on the occasion of the Croatian adherence to the Tripartite Pact, that Germany would soon be compelled to deal militarily with the USSR as a result of increasing concentrations of Soviet military forces along the common frontier. He added the suggestion that Hungary should take steps to secure its frontier, then took the time to reinforce the deceptions and rumors already in operation by stating that an ultimatum would be delivered to the Soviets by the beginning of July.[71] Ciano noted that day in his diary that von Ribbentrop still had not informed Italy officially of Barbarossa, citing the Führer’s sole responsibility in this matter.

Perhaps prompted by the rumors that a diplomatic settlement of the crisis would be reached between the Germans and Soviets, on 15 June the Finnish government requested some assurances that Germany would guarantee Finnish independence, perhaps including a restoration of the pre-Winter War borders, German economic assistance, and a pledge of non-interference in domestic Finnish affairs.[72]

A far more concrete action took place the same day in connection with Finland, when British ELINT intercepted a 5.Luftflotte signal to an aircraft observation unit, ordering it to move into Finland as soon as specific orders were received.[73] Not detected at that time was the activation of the German Armee Norwegen forward command post at Rovaniemi, Finland, as a part of operations against the USSR, nor the subordination of 3rd (Finnish) Corps to that Army the same day.[74] There was certainly a good reason for missing some details, since the Battleaxe offensive against Halfaya (“Hellfire”) Pass had opened in North Africa and the available signals intercept and translation facilities were probably being stretched to the limit to cope with the demands of managing that battle.

That the word was abroad in Japan, at least on an unofficial level, was seen in a report in the newspaper Nichi Nichi Shimbun which stated that General Yamashita (soon to be known as the “Tiger of Malaya”) had reported from Berlin that a great event was in the offing;[75] Yamashita and a number of Japanese senior officers had been visiting both Germany and Italy starting early in 1941, on a military mission. As if that source wasn’t enough, Soviet spy Richard Sorge, operating on information obtained from within the German Embassy in Tokyo, probably reported this very same day that Germany would attack the USSR on 22 June.[76]

Moscow’s uncertainties over the timing were revealed as a result of a General Staff order that began circulation 15 June to the frontier commands. Troop concentrations in the frontier areas were forbidden, as was any firing on German reconnaissance aircraft over-flying Soviet territory;[77] nothing was said about the concentration of troops in reserve positions, however. That the order apparently contradicted other Soviet actions can be explained by the fact that the frontier strip was under command of the Border Troops during peacetime, and that by using these political troops as a tripwire instead of regular Red Army troops, the Soviets would avoid the slightest hint of having provoked a German attack thereby enabling the Soviets to claim “clean hands”—ignoring for the moment mass murders of Soviet and non-Soviet citizens, the invasion of Poland, the rape of the Baltic States and Bessarabia—in future dealings with the Anglo-Americans, who would be virtually compelled to become de facto, if not de jure, allies of the USSR. There is some oblique confirmation of this theory, since it has been reliably reported that the Border Troop Administration even went so far as to bar Red Army fortification engineers from inspecting forward defenses because they lay within the jurisdiction of the rival armed forces. It might also be assumed that the highly politicized and equally highly disciplined Border Troop units would be more likely to obey specific orders not to engage in any action against the Germans than troops of the Red Army.

If the military organizations of the USSR suffered from poor mutual communications, there was no lack of communications between foreign diplomats in Ankara on the subject of the hour—the potential invasion of the USSR. During after-dinner conversation on 16 June with American Ambassador John van A. MacMurray, former Yugoslav Ambassador to Moscow, Dr. Milan Gavrilovic stated that Hitler had personally told Prince Paul of Yugoslavia, during their meeting at the Berghof on 4 March 1941, that he would attack the USSR late in June or early in July of 1941. MacMurray didn’t report the conversation until 22 June, and then dispatched it via sea mail to Washington, where it arrived 10 July.[78] Whatever reason that prompted the Ambassador to delay sending the dispatch, MacMurray turned out to have done the correct thing when the incident is examined in retrospect. German records of the Prince Paul-Hitler conversations don’t indicate any mention of an attack on the USSR was made.[79] Furthermore, it’s very unlikely that Hitler would have informed so prominent a monarchist, who not only was the regent of a country that was persistently blocking Hitler’s efforts to end the Italian disaster in Greece by military action, but was also the leader of a precariously balanced country not allied in any substantial degree with Germany. Finally, as we know, Barbarossa was originally programmed for execution in the middle of May 1941, and the date change to 22 June was something that happened long after this alleged revelation was made as a direct result of unforeseen events in the Balkans and the east. These were, specifically, the overthrow of Prince Paul’s government and its replacement with a pro-British ruling clique, an event which made necessary a German military occupation of Yugoslavia, as well as the very late spring and consequent poor campaigning conditions in the USSR that would have prevented a major military campaign in any case.

Meanwhile in London, the British, by virtue of ELINT processed through their intelligence apparatus, came as close to predicting a date for the German assault as any intelligence service is likely to come, when GCCS suggested that the attack could come any time after 19 June. In what was probably accidental confirmation, military intelligence simultaneously issued a report stating that the attack would come no earlier than 18 June.[80]

As a further indication that all was not well within the upper levels of the Soviet military intelligence service, according to one Soviet memoirist, Intelligence Summary Number 8 issued this date was published by V. Novobranets in defiance of Golikov. Novobranets reportedly forged approvals for the report and issued it without Golikov’s knowledge. It would have been a serious understatement to claim that Golikov was disturbed by the matter; he had Novobranets arrested and shipped off to a psychiatric hospital near Odessa.[81] It is difficult to believe that high-ranking military officers would have to indulge in such subterfuges to bring a matter of such vital importance to the attention of their political leadership. The incident also apparently indicates that Golikov not only ruled Soviet military intelligence with an iron hand, but that he would tolerate no one else’s opinion nor allow them access to the political decision-makers.

If there was deliberately created confusion in Moscow, Tokyo enjoyed a clearer view of what was about to happen. During the Imperial Liaison Conference of 16 June, Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka reported that as a result of the report supplied by Oshima on his conversations with Hitler that Germany would be at war with the USSR within a week. He accurately predicted that Churchill would cast aside his well-known anti-Communist pose and leap to the aid of the Soviets, and that Roosevelt wouldn’t be far behind. The Imperial General Staff, trying to manage both the conflict with China and the occupation of French Indochina, was asked to prepare a study of the possible problems which could arise from such a conflict.[82]

Possible evidence of American pressure, either to force Germany to declare war on America or to deter Germany from going to war with the USSR appeared that same day, when the State Department ordered all German consulates and other offices in the U.S. closed and their personnel out of the country by 10 July at the latest. Reportedly, this action was due to conduct not in keeping with their legitimate functions. German Chargé Thomsen noted in his report that this didn’t break off German-American relations, but instead left that action to the Germans, thereby keeping FDR’s hands clean. He also notes that the order was apparently a psychological ploy aimed at giving some aid and comfort to the British, since the U.S. wasn’t capable of doing anything more at that moment.[83]

If in fact the American action was aimed at deterring Germany from starting a war with the USSR, the effort failed miserably. On 17 June, OKW issued its confirmation of the Barbarossa timetable (supra).[84]

German diplomacy seems to have fared little better than American diplomacy in some areas. German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop met with Japanese Ambassador Oshima on 17 June and, during their conversation over the forthcoming Barbarossa operation, told Oshima that a diplomatic solution to the crisis was impossible. He then obliquely suggested that the Japanese could give welcome support in the Far East by tying down the British with operations against the great British naval base at Singapore. The ever-obliging Oshima replied that it would be done and, when asked about the timing of the operation, suggested the attack would occur in two to three weeks. On the very same day, General Yamashita and his military mission left for home; it is unknown just what thoughts raced through Yamashita’s mind as he rode past clearly visible evidence of German intentions in the East, but we shall soon see that they clearly occupied his mind.[85]

However, if the Japanese Ambassador was willing to promise what couldn’t—or wouldn’t—be delivered at the time, the Finns were far more helpful. The Finnish General Staff issued orders on 17 June for a clandestine general mobilization to begin, following confirmation from OKW that 22 June would be B-Day. Even operating with the tightest security, however, such an action would be difficult to conceal and, as we shall see, probably wasn’t concealed from the Soviets to any substantial degree.[86]

The situation in the Baltic was apparently well-known to many people on all levels of responsibility. It’s alleged that the Finnish newspaper Heksinken Sanomat contained an article in its 17 June edition by former Foreign Affairs Minister Erkko to the effect that the situation in the Baltic was such that surprising events, which would affect Finland’s future were about to occur, but gave no further details. The man certainly appears to have been correct.[87]

The Finns weren’t the only ones moving troops forward to the front. Timoshenko gave permission for Kiev Special Military District commander Lieutenant-General M. P. Kirponos to begin moving five rifle corps forward toward the border.[88] This is certainly a continuation of the Soviet policy of moving troops into forward positions from which they could intervene after a German attack.

If information about one set of troop movements was correct, other information wasn’t. The British Special Information Service reported that Polish sources stated that large-scale German troop movements to France were about to begin. As a result, the British made the decision to retain their troops to counter a possible German Seelöwe amphibious assault instead of deploying them to other, more threatened areas.[89] This information could have been a German plant, used to suggest that rumors Germany was going to use troops deployed in the east against other—i.e., British—targets, as had been suggested by the Goebbels newspaper deception, as well as by the Soviets in their Pravda message of 14 June, were accurate.

It appears that the Soviets still weren’t fooled at their highest political and military command levels by the German deceptions. On 17 June, the Border Troops command reported that a German attack could be expected during the night of 21-22 June.[90] A possible source of this detailed and accurate information may have been a cross-border foray by NKVD commandos, to capture a German who was aware of the timing of the attack and bring him back for interrogation.

It appears, however, that the Soviet historians may be attempting to fool their readers with an incident which reportedly occurred on 17 June. Allegedly a German reconnaissance plane flew at very low altitude over the naval base at Polyarni a number of times and the anti-aircraft gunners, obedient to their orders, did not fire on the intruder for fear of causing confusion.[91] The operation would have been carried out by reconnaissance elements attached to 5.Luftflotte in the far north of Norway and, as we have seen, this unit had to conduct its communications via radio and the signals were being intercepted and decoded by the British. This clue is in direct conflict with a British report that lifted German air reconnaissance restrictions only on 20 June (infra)!

According to V. Morozov, 11th Army commander, he personally ordered measures taken by the troops under his command to improve their ability to resist a German attack. Among other things, he ordered four rifle divisions into their forward positions along the border. This unilateral move in defiance of specific orders, brought down the justifiable wrath of Baltic Special Military District commander Colonel-General F. I. Kuznetsov.[92] However, it is possible Kuznetsov was more concerned with the fact that unauthorized combat-ready units were being moved into the front line than the fact that the units had been brought to full alert status. This interpretation supports the assumption that the Border Troops were being deliberately used as a tripwire.[93]

During the early morning hours of the day, the first of two German deserters crossed the border near Kovel and turned himself over to troops of the local rifle corps. During his interrogation, the deserter revealed that the German Army would attack on 22 June at 0400. This seems to be an error, because we know that the attack had been scheduled for 0330 originally, and was later changed to 0300; interestingly enough, however, 0400 Moscow time is 0300 Kovel time, and it may be that some of this data is an interpolation of facts by the Soviets. If the report is accurate, the man didn’t turn traitor for any great ideological reasons. Instead, he said he struck an officer while drunk, and fled in the hope that the Soviets would treat him better than his own countrymen would. Pathetically, he added that his father was a Communist. It was a sad and barely explicable comment on the lasting effects of a German political movement that had so closely rivaled Hitler in his bid for power, and polled so many votes in various elections that the first warning by a German soldier was carried to the homeland of Communism by a drunkard and coward, and not a man holding the faith to his ideology.[94]

London continued to gather clues from its ELINT operations, especially from messages issued by 5.Luftflotte. On 18 June, the GCCS decrypted several messages concerning the establishment of a special operational staff at Kirkenes and information on Soviet camouflage and dispersal procedures that clearly indicated German intentions.[95]

German intentions were also the subject of conversation in London’s diplomatic circle as well, when Ambassador Cripps met with Polish leader General Sikorski to discuss the possibilities of a German-Soviet war. One can only imagine the torn feelings that Sikorski experienced at the thought that the two nations which had crushed Poland in concert less than two years before were about to go to war with one another. Sikorski listened while Cripps stated he believed the British government would immediately go to the aid of the USSR—a bitter pill considering British posturing about having entered the war to save Poland. Sikorski replied that the Red Army purges under Stalin’s direction had torn the heart out of the armed forces and that Timoshenko hardly measured up to the murdered Tukhachevskiy. He tried to curb Cripps’ hopes for an extended Soviet resistance by saying that the Red Army would not be able to withstand the shock of a German attack.[96]

No less a personage than Khruschev himself alleges that the Soviet Embassy in London had learned that Cripps believed very strongly in the probability of a German-Soviet conflict in the near future and that it would be impossible to avoid and also made mention of Cripps’ meetings with the Swedes (supra) as well.[97] Moscow apparently didn’t bother to reply to the ambassador.

However, more concrete actions were taking place in the USSR. The most significant was the order placing Border Troop detachments in the frontier districts in an advanced state of alert, the sort of move which would be expected in the case where national leadership was not only preparing to defend the border but also to establish a tripwire designed to prove unequivocally who was responsible for initiating hostilities. Furthermore, Red Army command issued Order #0219, which dealt with, among other things, increased document security for units throughout the Red Army.[98] While this sort of order is often considered normal in normal times, when we realize that the Red Army command was aware of the impending attack, and were taking measures to meet it, this particular order assumes a far greater significance as a clue to the concern in the senior staffs over maintaining operational security and secrecy.

A far more significant clue is the order putting anti-aircraft troops in the Baltic Special Military District (and perhaps other military districts as well—?) on an alert starting 18 June;[99] it appears that the order was canceled in the Baltic Special Military District due to an extended Red Air Force training exercise in the area held from slightly before 21 June through the early hours of 22 June. At about the same time, orders were issued throughout the Baltic Special Military District that blackout conditions were to be observed as well. The anti-aircraft units found a variety of difficulties during their alert, primarily due to a lack of crewmen for available weapons, and a lack of trained officers to control the batteries. The first excuse is probably of no consequence—peacetime tables of organization are almost always bloated and tended to peel down later under the stress of war without a loss of efficiency. The lack of brained officers is more significant and is probably the result of the military purges that began several years before with the arrest of Marshal Tukhachevskiy and then continued through the war years.

German deception operations continued to be reinforced. Birger Dahlerus met with Victor Mallet, the British Minister in Stockholm, late in the day on 18 June, and relayed the essence of a conversation that he had had with Göring earlier in the day. According to Dahlerus, Göring stated that Germany needed secure sources of raw materials to survive, and that these could only be obtained in the USSR. The catch was that the supplies would have to be taken before the Soviets became too strong for Germany to pressure with military threats. The Reichsmarschall went on to outline the demands that he had drafted personally, that would be presented to Hitler for approval; among the demands were: Soviet demobilization; independence for the Ukraine; German control of the Baku oil fields; access to the Pacific; and other impossible demands. The British diplomat passed the information along to London immediately after the meeting ended.[100]

In line with Hitler’s policy of not informing German allies until the last possible moment, it wasn’t until 19 June that Halder of the OKM met with General Paul Ott, Chief of the German Military Mission to Slovakia, in Bratislava and informed him that Hitler wanted the Slovakian armed forces put on the alert for possible future participation in an operation against the USSR.[101] Interestingly enough, as we will see (infra), Otto delayed until as late as 21 June before he passed the information along to Hans Ludin, German Minister to Slovakia; thus, it was not until sometime on 21 June that Slovakian reserves were actually mobilized.

If the Slovakians were not made aware of German planning until 21 June, the Rumanians were well aware of the operation, and had been leaking the information—either accidentally or deliberately—to many foreign observers in Bucharest. Thus, U.S. Ambassador Franklin Mott Gunther reported to Washington in a 19 June dispatch that Vichy French Air Attaché Xavier de Sevin was openly predicting that Germany would attack the USSR.[102] Given the close relationship that existed between the French Republic and Rumania for years following the end of World War I, it’s very possible that some of the contacts developed during that time were passing information along. The inexplicable question is why de Sevin believed that the B-Day would be 21 June, a date which had never been considered by the Germans.

More explicable was the report that resulted from a meeting between representatives of the Rumanian Foreign Ministry and Japanese Minister Tsutsui. Tsutsui was informed that the Rumanians had placed quarters in a nearby village at the disposal of the Japanese Legation and staff for use in the event attacks were made against Bucharest. The Japanese astutely asked what would be the last possible date for him to take full advantage of the new location, and was told that 2400 on 21 June was the last possible time. Tsutsui immediately informed his superiors that 22 June would be the date of the German attack on the USSR.[103]

Other diplomats were being equally successful in their situation analysis. Soviet Ambassador P. G. Orlov in Helsinki, after observing evidence of both Finnish and German troop movements, concluded war was imminent. He immediately went to the Soviet naval base on the Hango Peninsula—part of the Soviet spoils from Finland in the wake of the Winter War—and warned garrison commander Kabanaov of the danger he perceived.[104] It appears that a request was made for a ship to evacuate dependents of military personnel, but other measures would have to wait until almost the last minute as we shall see (infra).

It was fortunate that this request was made when it was, since 1.Luftflotte received orders on 19 June approving aerial mining operations in Soviet waters before the opening of Barbarossa.[105]

Other evidence that the Soviets were aware of and preparing to meet a German attack continued to surface. After a nearly continuous series of pleas to be allowed a measure of operational freedom, Timoshenko approved the movement of Kiev Special Military District headquarters into its forward fortified command post complex at Tarnopol by 22 June; some Soviet sources indicate that all border military district headquarters received the order to move into forward command posts at the same time.[106]

Meanwhile, the Swedish government passed along information that it had acquired on German intent in the east to the British Foreign Office. Based on what information they had at that time, the Swedes believed that Germany would present an ultimatum to the Soviets within a week.[107] It appears that the Swedes had been taken in by German deception operations, especially the Göring deceptions involving Birger Dahlerus (supra).

However, the British were as confused as the Swedes appeared to be, since their Air Intelligence service reported that the recent reduction in the German air effort against Britain could very well be part of a German strategy which would stage simultaneous, massive attacks against the USSR and Britain.[108] This British intelligence failure is particularly difficult to explain since they had reportedly made considerable penetrations into the Luftwaffe order of battle by this time and it should have been obvious that there simply weren’t enough German aircraft to carry out two major air campaigns at the same time.

If the British were doubtful about the ultimate aim of German operations, the Soviets appear to have been far less uncertain. On or about 19 June, the Soviet Navy (VMF) was ordered to an advanced stage of alert; the move was made somewhat ineffective by the instructions that VMF units were to avoid any provocations.[109] At the same time, the minelayer Sokrushitelnyi was ordered to sortie and assume a station near the south of the White Sea, but without commencing mining operations.

If the VMF was taking what would be viewed as excessive precautions in naval matters, the Kriegsmarine wasn’t. During the evening of 19 June, the auxiliary minelayers Pruessen, Grille, Skaggerrak, and Versailles, supported by several small minesweepers, began laying the Wartburg I-III mine barrages off the coast near Memel and Oland.[110]

In spite of apparently not spotting this operation, the Soviets were taking other precautions by 19 June. Specific orders were issued to forward commands that airfields were to be camouflaged, as were military cantonments and other important targets. Aircraft, tanks, and other vehicles were to be painted in camouflage and all aircraft were to be dispersed.[111] These actions are still more evidence that the Soviets were clearly aware of the danger of a German attack and were taking measures to meet it.

Perhaps this was the reason why Japanese General Yamashita, on his way home from an extended military mission to the Axis countries, found Timoshenko and Zhukov very distracted and eager to see Yamashita on his way when he paid a courtesy call on them. Taking the hint, Yamashita returned to the Japanese Embassy and met with Ambassador Tatekawa and Colonel Tomaoka, the military attaché, to discuss the situation. Both the men stationed in Moscow believed that Germany would present a démarche to the USSR and that the Soviets would give in. Yamashita, obviously correctly interpreting what he had seen during his trip through the border districts, continued to press the other two men, apparently filling them in on details he had personally observed; finally, they conceded that there would soon be a war between Germany and the USSR.[112]

As an aside, it should be noted that there may have been another reason for Timoshenko’s and Zhukov’s concerns. At some time during 19 June, they, along with Vatutin and Kazakov had seen German newsreel footage of the recently concluded Balkan campaign. All those present betrayed a curious racism by declaring the film to be a forgery; after all, it showed people—fellow Slavs—welcoming the Germans to their villages.[113] Perhaps these men would recall these scenes with a shudder when the invasion finally did occur and other Slavs, Russian Slavs, rushed out to greet the German invaders with bread and salt.

While the Soviet leadership at the center was aware of the danger posed by German troop concentrations along the border, it appears that some other politicians, even those in the most sensitive posts, were being kept in the dark. Andrei Zhdanov, Secretary of the Leningrad Communist Party and member of the Leningrad Military Soviet, left town in his private train for a vacation in the Black Sea resort at Souchi; those with long memories will recall that Stalin had done a similar thing to his rival Trotsky during the crisis caused by Lenin’s death. What makes this incident particularly ironic is that Zhdanov, when Soviet war hysteria was being whipped to a fever pitch before the Winter War, had declared he could clearly hear the Fascist wolf howling at the gate of his lonely outpost on the Baltic.

An incident which allegedly occurred on 20 June, was the dramatically described message sent from Danzig by the radioman of the Soviet freighter Magnitogorsk. According to one source, a frantic message arrived “en clair” from the radioman to the headquarters of the Baltic Merchant Fleet warning that his ship and others were being seized by the Germans. When the merchant shipping office tried to contact other Soviet ships in German harbors, they received no answers. The incident was described to Moscow, but no action was taken.[114]

Unfortunately for this story, the Magnitogorsk was actually captured in the early hours of 22 June.[115] It’s very doubtful that the Germans would suddenly decide to give the Soviets a gratuitous two days’ strategic warning in exchange for a 3,566 GRT rust-bucket of an old Tsarist freighter. It appears likely that it is just another case of Soviet rewriting of history.

Further confirmation of the fantasy nature of this story can be found in another incident involving another Soviet merchant ship. Soviet Ambassador Maisky had requested—ironically enough, on the same day that the Magnitogorsk was allegedly seized by the Germans, and certainly after the alleged report on the seizure was in Soviet hands—that the Yelna, loaded with seamen from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, who had been stranded overseas following the Soviet invasion and occupation of their homelands and were being repatriated to the USSR, would be placed in danger if the ship sailed as scheduled. Two days later, a reply arrived from Moscow dated 21 June that ordered the Yelna to sail as previously ordered.[116]

Another diplomat was involved in interesting proceedings as well. The U.S. Minister in Helsinki, H. J. Arthur Schoenfeld, met with Finnish Prime Minister Ryti to see if reports of German and Finnish troop movements throughout the country toward the Soviet border were accurate. Ryti replied that the German troop movement was being carried out to relieve congestion in the far north. Further, he stated that should there be a German-Soviet war—a tacit admission retrospectively that the conflict would occur—he believed the Soviets would immediately seize the Aaland Islands and might even launch surprise attacks against Helsinki and Turku. Schoenfeld sent his report of the conversation to Washington, and reported that Finnish mobilization was probably a response to fear of Soviet attack.[117]

While the American representative in Finland wrestled with the question of possible Finnish participation in a German attack on the USSR, the Soviets were proceeding under no illusions. On 20 June, Leningrad Military District was ordered to begin mining the Karelian frontier with Finland, and make other preparations for meeting an attack.[118] Other troop movements within the jurisdiction of the Leningrad Military District were also carried out, particularly in the area of Petrozavodsk and Murmansk, probably as a result of direct orders from Red Army command.

It was about this time that the British GCCS decrypted a radio signal giving permission for Luftwaffe air reconnaissance units attached to 5.Luftflotte to cross the Soviet border for the first time, but only when the aircraft flew at high altitudes.[119] This German order is in direct contradiction to Soviet assertions that low-flying German reconnaissance aircraft buzzed the naval base at Polyarni several days before. Also included in this order was a notation that since air mining operations would proceed the attack, surprise would not be possible.

OKW issued the code word Dortmund during the evening, signifying that the planned operation would begin as planned on 22 June.

Soviet Ambassador Dekanoozov went to the German Foreign Ministry on 21 June to deliver a note from his government protesting numerous violations of Soviet airspace by German aircraft, and adding that the depth of their penetration—100 km to 150 km—precluded any accidental straying across the border. It’s difficult to appreciate the concealed mirth with which this protest may have been received, considering that a statement—the closest Germany would ever come to formally declaring war on another nation—had already been dispatched to Moscow and that von Ribbentrop told his top associates personally about the attack scheduled for the next day.[120]

The fact that the German naval attaché, who had been brought home from Moscow as a result of the earlier Soviet recall of their naval attaché, spent considerable time with Hitler during 21 June, detailing the near-panic condition which prevailed in Moscow, and of the ominously sealed trains of prisoners being deported from the border areas eastward to their fate in Siberia, certainly must have hardened Hitler’s resolve. It must certainly also have convinced him that the Soviet leadership was still confused and therefore vulnerable to a surprise move on his part.

However, there were still some Soviets who hadn’t received the word, a not unusual experience in wartime. Guderian, commander of 2.Panzergruppe, reportedly observed troops from the 42^nd Rifle Division bashing the parade ground in close-order drill to the accompaniment of their regimental band during 21 June;[121] other German sources and reports indicate much the same situation prevailed in military units all along the front.

While some of the people who would be most intimately affected by the development of events were unaware of what was going on, other people were being officially made aware of the situation. It was during 21 June that letters were dispatched to both Horthy, Regent of Hungary, and Mussolini, informing them of the German decision to attack the USSR.

Furthermore, it was on 21 June that Slovakian Minister President Tuka and State President Father Tiso were told about the German plan to attack the USSR. During a conference with Hans Ludin, German Minister to Slovakia, General Hans Otto, who had been instructed by Halder to have the Slovakian armed forces standing by for possible operations back on 19 June (supra), finally told his civilian opposite number about his meeting. Ludin, without express orders, then informed the Slovaks.[122]

Following this, the Slovak armed forces began mobilization, a fact that did not escape the notice of the Soviets. The same Soviet source indicates that the Swedes likewise began intensive military preparations—possibly an obvious hint that the Swedes had anti-Soviet designs as well.[123]

It appears that on 21 June, Ambassador Cripps asked Soviet Ambassador Maisky to come back from a pleasant day in the country to meet with him at about 1700 hours; he wanted to pass along information that the British thought an attack on the USSR would happen on 22 June—a Sunday—or at the very least 25 June. Then, in what apparently was an effort to convince Maisky of his sincerity, Cripps added that Maisky undoubtedly knew that Hitler always attacked on Sundays (a puzzling statement—Hitler’s diplomatic coups often happened on Sundays, but none of his prior campaigns, not the Polish, Norwegian, French, or Balkan, began on a Sunday). It was at this point that Maisky gave his most telling and indirect evaluation of the British as an information source. He made his report to Moscow, then returned to the countryside.[124]

Perhaps the Ambassador wouldn’t have been so unconcerned had he known about a GCCS intercept which revealed a signal from 4.Luftflotte to its subordinate formation, 4.Fliegerkorps, giving a detailed target list for operations on B-Day.[125]

At this point, we must make some mention of the efforts of German-sponsored guerrillas and of Lehr-Regiment Brandenburg z.b.V. 600, the World War II German equivalent of the modern Green Berets. Considerable numbers of these men, both German and foreign allies, operated behind Soviet lines for up to a month or more before B-Day. These personnel, under direct OKW/Abwehr command, had been tasked with special operations of all types, including interrupting Soviet land-line communications, spreading false orders and alarms in the Soviet rear, interdicting Soviet rear-area movement by carrying out ambushes of signals repair parties who were attempting to restore communications and against key personnel (such as the one which almost killed Fedyunninskii, the 15^th Rifle Corps’ commander during the night of 21-22 June),[126] artillery spotting, and the capture of certain bridges and destruction of other bridges.

Insertions occurred via the traditional ground routes, past Soviet border guards stations, and also involved insertions by sea and air with light aircraft. Substantial numbers of infiltrators succeeded in crossing the border; according to Soviet sources, at least 1,300 of them may have been killed or wounded in skirmishes while involved in their insertion or during preliminary behind-the-lines operations.[127] In many cases, the Soviets make the ‘ex post facto’ claim that most of these operations were stopped before they could do any significant damage. However, the majority of German and German-sponsored infiltrators not only penetrated the Soviet border, but also succeeded in carrying out all their substantive objectives.[128] Confirmation of this success comes obliquely from Soviet sources. During the early morning hours of 22 June, while 4.Fliegerkorps elements attacked Sevastopol—the main Soviet naval base on the Black Sea—Soviet observers reported that sabotage made the local land lines useless throughout the area.[129]

The commander of the most sensitive of the forward military districts—Pavlov of Western Special Military District—spent the evening at the theater, along with his chief of staff and the deputy commander. In spite of being informed by the military district’s chief of intelligence during the show that firing had occurred along the frontier and the Germans were about to attack, Pavlov remained in his comfortable seat and watched the end of a thoroughly forgettable performance.[130] His decision was made in spite of his having been told about the German troop concentrations opposite his front as early as 4 June.

It was during the afternoon of 21 June that a second German deserter crossed the border near Sokal and made his way to a Soviet border guard post. He was taken to the local military headquarters for interrogation and revealed during the questioning that Germany would attack the USSR the next day at dawn; the information was passed along to the Center. It was at about this time that another alleged defection from the German side occurred. According to this report, a Lithuanian national deserted to the Soviets, then spent his time in their hands gloating about how the Germans would crush the Red Army. The desertion story is doubtful; if the man actually existed outside Soviet historiography, he was more likely an infiltrator who had the bad tuck to be captured.

Stalin was wasting no time during this period of crisis. He summoned top CPSU leaders Shcherbakov and Pronin to his offices at about 1700 hours and instructed them to send messages to Raikom and higher party officials to remain at their posts due to the danger of a German attack.

At some time shortly after 1700 hours Moscow time, Timoshenko and Zhukov were summoned into Stalin’s presence to discuss the danger. Whatever actually happened during the conference, no orders were issued to bring Red Army units along the frontier to full alert, in spite of the fact that the border guards had been standing by at full alert for several days. Sometime later Zhukov was informed about the German deserter mentioned above and, after gathering up Timoshenko and Vatutin, went with them to the Kremlin in a final effort to get permission to alert the troops.

The hour of decision had arrived. Information—often voluminous and usually quite accurate—was in the hands of Soviet political and military commanders. Actions had been taken to move regular Red Army troops forward into the border districts. Orders for camouflage of equipment and installations had been issued, as had instructions to disperse aircraft several days before this meeting. Huge supply dumps, which would soon help to supply and arm the advancing Germans, had been established close to the border area. A substantial airfield network had been established and was nearing completion even as the Soviet leaders discussed their response to knowledge of the German attack.

Even at this late a moment on the day before the attack, the Red Army and Red Air Force could have been brought to a more advanced state of alert; there was still time left to deliver at least some sort of warning, to do something to prevent a complete disaster. Instead these leaders, who were ultimately solely responsible for both political and military decisions and the safety of the Soviet state failed to follow through on what was apparently their plans made days before.

Although Stalin had personally ordered Moscow anti-aircraft units brought to a state of “75 per cent” readiness earlier on 21 June, now he began to hesitate, stating that there was a danger of provocations by the German military—a sort of whistling in the dark, as if Stalin really believed that the Wehrmacht would or could carry out such extensive preparations without knowledge of their actions reaching Hitler. The debate continued while the German Army advanced to its jumping-off points. Finally, Zhukov handed a draft order to Stalin, which he dismissed; finally, after much amendment of the original draft, the warning message was transmitted to senior commands just after midnight (at 0030 hours), presumably via the VCh telephone system.[131]

Perhaps Stalin had been waiting for Molotov’s report on the meeting between Commissar of Foreign Affairs Molotov and German Ambassador von der Schulenburg at about 2130 hours. The discussion was ostensibly about the overflights that had been occurring with greater frequency over the USSR; in this effort, Molotov essentially repeated the representations made by Ambassador Dekanozov in Berlin earlier in the day at the Auswaertiges Amt. After a certain amount of pro forma discussion, Molotov got down to business by asking why German Embassy personnel had been evacuated from the USSR and why German businessmen were leaving and not returning. The German, aware of the message he would have to deliver to this same man within a few hours, denied everything and anything. Molotov then asked what was the matter that relations between their two nations had come to such a pass.[132] It was an altogether pathetic performance from so powerful a man as Molotov.

Around 2300 hours, Admiral Kuznetsov was summoned to Timoshenko’s office and told an attack was imminent. After some discussion, he dispatched an aide to naval headquarters with orders to issue an alert to the Fleet; Kuznetsov followed at a more leisurely pace with permission to fire on intruders. If this report is accurate, it appears that the VMF was the first element of the Soviet armed forces to receive an alert of any kind. Interestingly enough Kuznetsov, in his amendments to his memoirs, has also said that he sent the alert to the fleets at various times both before and after this meeting with Timoshenko.[133] In any case, by about 2400 hours, all VMF fleet headquarters had been alerted to the danger; the fact that they seem to have been alerted in series between about 2300 and 2400 hours may indicate that VMF headquarters also had access to the VCh telephone network, since the use of the Baudot Telegraph could have alerted the fleets essentially simultaneously.

If the VMF wasn’t ordered to an alert until late in the day, the Kriegsmarine hadn’t been wasting time in its operations off the Soviet-held coast. Minelaying sorties were conducted by motor torpedo boats setting out the Coburg and Gotha mine barrages off the Soelo and Moon Sound entrances to the Gulf of Riga. The minelayers Tannenberg, Drummer, and Hansestadt Danzig, escorted and supported by light surface units, laid the Apolda mine barrage in the vicinity of Fanofjord and Dago in spite of attacks by Soviet aircraft and sightings by guard vessels. The Irben Strait was the site of the Eisenach mine barrage laid from motor torpedo boats. The auxiliary minelayers Cobra, Kaiser, and Koenigin Luise and their smaller escorts laid the Corbetha mine barrage off Pakerort. Finally, motor minesweepers laid the Erfurt and Weimar mine barrages off the Soviet ports of Windau and Pillau.[134] In spite of Soviet awareness of the operations, none of these barrages were unfinished by B-Hour; the barrage in the Irben Strait would shortly begin taking a toll of major VMF units as they sortied out of the Gulf of Riga and managed to steam into the middle of the Eisenach barrage that they had been tasked with sweeping with thoroughly predictable results.

While naval personnel were receiving their instructions, Major General Kabanov, commander of the Hango Naval Base, ordered two regiments forward to the Finno-Soviet border in accordance with the orders of Red Banner Baltic Fleet command; interestingly enough, these units and their supporting coast defense batteries, were probably the first Red Army units to fire shots in anger, commencing at around 0315 hours on 22 June. Furthermore, the Soviet base personnel’s dependents were loaded onto a fast passenger ship which had arrived at the base (in response to the warning from Soviet Ambassador Orlov on 19 June—?) and evacuated. Light naval vessels and submarines based at Hango were ordered evacuated to Paldiski, as well as vessels in other forward Baltic ports such as Libau.[135]

Some Speculations and Conclusions

As we have seen, there is a lot of oblique evidence that the Soviets were fully aware of Barbarossa at the highest political and military levels, and had developed a strategy involving considerable efforts to meet the threat. Unfortunately, none of the Soviet leadership left genuine records of their thoughts and plans for this period, and those that were written have the unfortunate effect of being affected by the worst aspects of Soviet historiography by the cult of Stalin initially, then the Great Rewriting caused by Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization process, and then later on the renewed approval of the Stalinist line. What follows is a speculation on Soviet intentions.

The Soviet leadership probably wanted to have the newly arrived troops moved into positions in the frontier border districts that would be close enough to the front that they could intervene in the battle once troops already stationed along the frontier halted—or at least slowed—the German attack.

At that point, the troops being held in deep reserve would be committed in overwhelming mass against the shattered remains of the frontier and the network of airfields close to the front, would drive the short distance to Warsaw and beyond, thereby eliminating the Fascist menace forever.

Political questions were not being neglected in the rush to prepare militarily to meet the German attack. The Soviets were careful to warn all units on the frontier not to fire on any German units to avoid giving them an excuse to claim that the Soviets had actually started the war; in fact this was a common element of almost all Soviet orders issued prior to the attack and would continue to appear in some order’s issued after the Germans actually crossed the border in force.

Border guard detachments had been on the alert for some time to resist an attack. These troops were lightly armed—personal weapons, light machine guns and mortars—and could hardly be expected to resist a German attack for very long. However, they were in an excellent position to provide a tripwire to show with their dead bodies that German troops had attacked first, and were so lightly armed that no one could claim they assaulted German positions in advance of the attack. Certain other extremely vital areas—the Brest-Litovsk fortress immediately springs to mind—would be garrisoned by regular Red Army troops, with full knowledge of the risks involved in the decision, simply because the areas were far too vital to national interests to risk on the chance that border guard detachments could continue to hold them until relieved by the advancing Red Army.

The Soviet leadership realized full well the political advantage they have by being able to show that Germany had attacked them just as they had attacked so many other countries—without warning or mercy or declarations of war. They would be able to demonstrate that they had clean hands and were innocent victims of aggression. In this way, they would be able to get the material and moral aid from Britain and the United States that they would need to pursue a war against Germany.

Unfortunately for many Soviet soldiers, the plan was subject to two major failures, the first of which became obvious on 21 June, that the Soviet leadership had misjudged the timing of the attack—the famous quote of a signal coming from a Soviet frontier unit that it was under German fire, and the reply questioning the sanity of the signalers, can be interpreted not so much as surprise that the attack had occurred, but instead that the timing of the attack was the complete surprise.

This theory would fit neatly with the confusion that followed in Moscow, in which a series of orders were issued that bore no relation to the facts of the German attack and seemed instead to be a random flailing out by the Soviet command in response to total surprise. For the Soviets, the military adage that order, followed by counter-order, produces disorder would become terrifyingly close to reality as the plans outlined before the attack were put in operation and proved to be a complete disaster under the crushing impact of the German attack.

This isn’t to say that Stalin welcomed the attack as a method of destroying Fascism as was the thesis of at least one “instant book” that followed in the wake of Barbarossa, but rather that he was aware of the danger, realized that there was nothing which could avert the attack except near-complete resignation of Soviet national sovereignty, and therefore he would have to meet it with the best plan possible.

Where the plan failed is obvious: at the troop level, where the Red Army simply collapsed along almost the entire front line. The military purges that Stalin had instituted in 1937 wiped out most of the high-ranking officers of the Soviet armed forces not once but several times. A good example of the problem was that the majority of the senior officers of the Red Army had never attended any of the higher military educational institutions. The art of military command takes time to learn, especially at the senior levels, something that no amount of political zeal can substitute for; if you want to have on-the-job training for senior military officers, the cost will be terrible in blood and suffering for the men these leaders lead.

At the junior officer level, the place where individual battles are most often won or lost, many men preferred to simply follow orders rather than risk acting on their own initiative, and making a mistake that could be fatal for them and their families. Robbed of confidence and knowledge at the top, with little initiative at the bottom, the Soviet defense plan failed as officers frantically looked to their sealed packets of orders for instructions, and when they were found to be useless, stood mute and stolid, uncomprehendingly wondering what should be done in the absence of some command from above. It was nearly the end of the Red Army.

 

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[1] Roi A. Medvedev, Let History Judge, Knopf, New York, 1971, page 450. [Note: Wherever possible, these notes refer to English language translations of original material to allow the reader to more easily examine the source materials. A non-standard format has been followed in reference to personal diaries cited and also to materials contained in Documents on German Foreign Policy (DGFP), Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (NCA), and the relevant volumes of Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS). Mention is merely made of the well-known Halder and Ciano diaries, and because the volumes are thoroughly indexed, material in DGFP, NCA, or FRUS is merely cited in that fashion.

[2] Vladimir Petrov, editor, “June 22, 1941”: Soviet Historians and the German Invasion, University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, South Carolina, 1968, page 212.

[3] Ibid, page 197.

[4] “Gordon Lonsdale,” Spy: Twenty Years in Soviet Secret Service, Hawthorne, New York, 1965, pages 28-30, passim.

[5] F. H. Hinsley, et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War, Volume I, HMSO, London, 1979, page 473.

[6] U.S. Department of Defense, The “Magic” Background to Pearl Harbor (eight volumes), USGPO, Washington, D.C., 1977.

[7] Sir Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, HMSO, London, 1970, pages 620-623.

[8] DGFP.

[9] M. N. Kozhevnikov, The Command and Staff of the Soviet Army Air Force in the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945, A Soviet View series, USGPO, Washington, D.C., 1977.

[10] Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov, “Before the War,” International Affairs, 2/67, pages 99-100.

[11] Anonymous, “Discussion of A. M. Nekrich’s Book, 22 June 1941,” Survey, 4/67, page 175. The comment is ascribed to V. A. Anfilov.

[12] Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov, The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov, Delacorte, New York, 1969, page 217.

[13] K. A. Meretskov, Serving the People, Progress, Moscow, 1971.

[14] Hinsley, op.cit, page 472.

[15] Petrov, op.cit, page 196.

[16] Zhukov, op.cit, page 218.

[17] A. A. Lobachev, Trudnymi Dorogami, Voenizdat, Moscow, 1960, pages 123-125, passim.

[18] Ladislas Farago, The Broken Seal: The Story of “Operation Magic” and the Pearl Harbor Disaster, Random House, New York, 1967, pages 196, 201, 412, passim.

[19] Dr. Alvin D. Coox, “Japanese Foreknowledge of the Soviet-German War, 1941,” Soviet Studies, 4/72, page 364.

[20] Hinsley, op.cit, page 478.

[21] H. Peter Krosby, Finland, Germany, and the Soviet Union, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1968, pages 174-175, passim.

[22] Petrov, op.cit, page 195.

[23] DGFP.

[24] KTB, 36.Armee Korps, passim, and KTB, 169.Infanterie-Division, passim.

[25] Interview data.

[26] NCA, Volume V, pages 857-867.

[27] Hinsley, op.cit, page 474.

[28] David Kahn, The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing, Macmillan, New York, 1967, page 483. See also: Sir Llewellyn Woodward, op.cit, Volume I, page 620, passim.

[29] FRUS.

[30] FRUS.

[31] Hinsley, op.cit, page 473.

[32] Xavier de Sevin, “Souvenirs de Roumanie (1939-1941),” Revue des Deux Mondes, 15 October 1963, page 545.

[33] FRUS.

[34] Hinsley, op.cit, page 478.

[35] Ibid, pages 478-482, passim.

[36] Gustav Hilger with Alfred G. Meyer, The Incompatible Allies: A Memoir-History of German-Soviet Relations, 1918-1941, Macmillan, New York, 1953, pages 334-336.

[37] John Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad: Stalin’s War with Germany, Harper and Row, New York, 1975, pages 90-91.

[38] FRUS.

[39] William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1960, page 843 (footnote).

[40] Hinsley, op.cit, page 478. See also: Sir Alexander Cadogan (David Dilks, editor), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, OM, 1938-1945, Cassell, London, 1971, and Ivan Maisky, Memoirs of a Soviet Ambassador, Scribner’s, New York, n.d., pages 148-149.

[41] Lobachev, op.cit, pages 125-126.

[42] “Leonardo Simoni,” Berlino: Ambasciata d’Italia, 1939-1943, Migliaresi Editore in Roma, Rome, n.d., page 237.

[43] Seweryn Bialer, editor, Stalin and His Generals: Soviet Military Memoirs, Pegasus, New York, n.d., page 245 (via Bagramian).

[44] DGFP.

[45] David J. C. Irving, Hitler’s War, Volume I, Viking, New York, n.d., page 289.

[46] FRUS, Appendix A.

[47] Kuznetsov, op.cit, #2, page 100.

[48] Judith, Countess Listowell, Crusader in the Secret War, Christopher Johnson, London, 1952, page 97.

[49] J. M. A. Gwyer, Grand Strategy, Volume III/I, HMSO, London, 1964, page 83.

[50] Hinsley, op.cit, pages 478-479.

[51] Ibid, page 478.

[52] FRUS.

[53] P. N. Pospelov, et al., Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945, Progress, Moscow, 1970, 1974, page 45.

[54] Ronald Wheatley, Operation Sealion, Clarendon, Oxford, 1958, pages 97-98, passim. Also: Walter Ansel, Hitler Confronts England, University of North Carolina Press, Durham, n.d., page 305.

[55] Hinsley, op.cit, page 479. Also: Maisky, op.cit.

[56] TASS, 13 June 1941.

[57] FHO Lageberichte, 13 June 1941.

[58] DGFP; Keitel and Halder diaries.

[59] Mario D. Fenyo, Hitler, Horthy, and Hungary: German-Hungarian Relations, 1941-1944, Yale, New Haven, 1972, page 15.

[60] Earl Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, 1940-1945, USGPO, Washington, D.C., 1959, page 134, passim.

[61] Hinsley, op.cit, pages 479-480.

[62] Ibid, pages 481-482.

[63] Krosby, op.cit, page 179, passim.

[64] FRUS; New York Times.

[65] Pravda, 14 June 1941.

[66] DGFP.

[67] Petrov, op.cit, page 202.

[68] FRUS; New York Times.

[69] George C. Herring Jr., Aid to Russia, 1941-1946: Strategy, Diplomacy, The Origins of the Cold War, Columbia University Press, New York, 1973, pages 28-29.

[70] Kozhenikov, op.cit, page 19.

[71] DGFP.

[72] Ziemke, op.cit, page 134.

[73] Hinsley, op.cit, page 479.

[74] KTB.

[75] Coox, op.cit, page 568.

[76] Barton Whaley, Codeword Barbarossa, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1973, page 72. See for a closely reasoned analysis as to why the 6 November 1964 Pravda report is almost certainly in error.

[77] V. A. Anfilov, Nacalo Velikoi Otechestvoenni Voiny, Voenizdat, Moscow, 1962, pages 45-46.

[78] FRUS.

[79] DGFP.

[80] Hinsley, op.cit, page 480.

[81] Petro G. Grigorenko, Memoirs, W. W. Norton, New York, 1982, page 119.

[82] Coox, op.cit, page 567.

[83] New York Times.

[84] NCA, Volume VI, page 1001.

[85] Coox, op.cit, pages 568, 576.

[86] Krosby, op.cit, pages 170-176.

[87] Petrov, op.cit, page 205.

[88] I. Kh. Bagramyan, Tak Nachinalas Voina, Voenizdat, Moscow, 1971, pages 68-70, passim.

[89] Hinsley, op.cit, page 482.

[90] Erickson, op.cit, page 94.

[91] Petrov, op.cit, page 204.

[92] V. Morozov, “Osovobozhdeniye Sovetskoi Pribaltiki,” Voyenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal, 1/62, passim.

[93] DGFP.

[94] I. I. Fedyuninsky, Podnyatuye Po Trevoge, Voenizdat, Moscow, 1961, pages 10-12.

[95] Hinsley, op.cit, page 479.

[96] Woodward, op.cit, pages 601-607, passim.

[97] Bertram D. Wolfe, Khruschev and Stalin’s Ghost, Praeger, New York, 1957, page 168.

[98] Anfilov, op.cit, page 524; Erickson, op.cit, page 94.

[99] Anfilov, op.cit, page 47.

[100] Woodward, op.cit, page 620.

[101] DGFP; Halder diary.

[102] FRUS.

[103] Coox, op.cit, page 567.

[104] Harrison Salisbury, The 900 Days: The Siege of Leningrad, Harper and Row, New York, 1969, page 74 (note).

[105] Hinsley, op.cit, page 480.

[106] Istoria Velikoi Otechestvennoi Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945, Volume VI, Voenizdat, Moscow, 1960, page 135; Pospelov, op.cit, page 45.

[107] Hinsley, op.cit, page 480.

[108] Ibid, page 482.

[109] Admiral Friedrich Ruge, The Soviets as Naval Opponents, 1941-1945, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1979, page 14.

[110] J. Rohwer and G. Hummelchen, Chronology of the War at Sea, 1939-1945, Arco, New York, 1972.

[111] Kozhevnikov, op.cit, page 19.

[112] Coox, op.cit, page 569.

[113] Bialer, op.cit, page 188.

[114] Salisbury, op.cit, page 13.

[115] Juerg Meister, Soviet Warships of the Second World War, Arco, New York, 1977, page 282.

[116] Maisky, op.cit, pages 150-151.

[117] FRUS.

[118] B. V. Bychevsky, Gorod-Front, Voenizdat, Moscow, 1963, page 8.

[119] Hinsley, op.cit, page 479.

[120] DGFP.

[121] Generaloberst a.D. Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader, Zenger, Washington, D.C., 1979, page 153.

[122] DGFP.

[123] Petrov, op.cit, page 210. Personal sources indicate that the Swedish Army had been placed on alert—not an unwise precaution when dealing with leaders like Hitler and Stalin—but that no specially or specifically anti-Soviet mobilization was begun at this or any other point.

[124] Maisky, op.cit, page 156.

[125] Hinsley, op.cit, page 480.

[126] Petrov, op.cit, page 164.

[127] Bialer, op.cit, page 240.

[128] Author’s personal knowledge.

[129] I. I. Azarov, “Nachalo Voiny Sevastopole,” Voenny-Istoricheskii Zhurnal, 6/66, pages 60-65.

[130] I. V. Boldin, Stranitsy Zhizni, Voenizdat, Moscow, n.d., pages 81-87 for a complete description of the events in the Western Special Military District; Boldin was serving as deputy military district commander at the time.

[131] Zhukov, op.cit, pages 231-233, passim.

[132] Hilger and Meyer, op.cit, pages 335-336.

[133] Kuznetsov, Nakanune, Voenizdat, Moscow, 1966, pages 324-340.

[134] Rohwer and Hummelchen, op.cit.

[135] Yu. A. Panteleyev, Morskoi Front, Voenizdat, Mosc0ow, 1964, pages 31-33.

 

Model and Guderian discuss details of the operation. June 1941.

German troops move along a road during the early stages of Operation Barbarossa.

Soviet wartime painting of the defense of Brest.

German soldiers marching in Russia during Operation Barbarossa.

German anti-tank gun crew in action in Russia during Barbarossa.

German mototrized column advancing in Russia.

German troops during street fighting.

Luftwaffe attacking a Russian airfield.

German troops in Russia.

Soviet soldiers captured during Barbarossa.

German armored forces in Russia, July 1941.

German cavalry crossing a bridge in Russia, summer 1941.

German armored forces advance through a burning village in Russa.

German armored forces in Russia, summer 1941.

Destroyed Russian and German planes during Barbarossa. In the front is a Russian Polikarpov UTI-4, a two-seater training version of Soviet I-16 fighter. In the background is a Henschel Hs 126.

Germans inspecting Russian planes. The plane in the front is Yakovlev UT-1 and the one in the background is the same UTI-4 as seen in the previous photo.

German soldiers fighting in Russia, summer 1941.

German armored forces advance in Lithuania, summer 1941.

German soldiers advancing into Russia encounter a group of captured Russian soldiers on the way to the rear and captivity.

German troops advance in Russia, summer 1941.

A German infantryman walks toward the body of a killed Soviet soldier and a burning BT-7 light tank in the southern Soviet Union in in 1941, during the early days of Operation Barbarossa.

An Sd.Kfz. 250 half-track in front of German tank units, as they prepare for an attack, on 21 July 1941, somewhere along the Russian front, during the German invasion of the Soviet Union.

A German half-track driver inside his vehicle in Russia in August 1941.

German infantrymen watch enemy movements from their trenches shortly before an advance inside Soviet territory, on 10 July  1941.

German soldiers cross a river, identified as the Don River, in a stormboat, sometime in 1941, during the German invasion of the Caucasus region in the Soviet Union.

With a burning bridge across the Dnieper River in the background, a German sentry keeps watch in the recently-captured city of Kiev, in 1941.

Russian prisoners of war, taken by the Germans on 7 July 1941.

Finnish soldiers storm a soviet bunker on 10 August 1941. One of the Soviet bunker's crew surrenders, left.