Showing posts with label USS Evans DD-552. Show all posts
Showing posts with label USS Evans DD-552. Show all posts

Kikusui No. 6 and Its Prelude: The Epic Fight of USS Hugh W. Hadley (DD-774) 11 May 1945

The U.S. Navy destroyer USS Hugh W. Hadley (DD-774) after completion in the outer harbor of San Pedro, California (USA), on 11 December 1944. The ship is painted in camouflage Measure 32 Design 25D. Note the Consolidated PBY Catalina in the background.

by Samuel J. Cox, Director Naval History & Heritage Command

On 5 May 1945, the Japanese commenced the third Kaiten suicide submarine mission with the departure of the Shimbu (“God’s Warriors”) Mission, which consisted of only one submarine, I-367, configured to carry five Kaiten manned torpedoes, heading for Okinawa. I-366 hit a mine on 6 May and could not participate, returning to port for repairs.

Oberrender (DE-344) and England (DE-635) Knocked Out of the War, 9 May 1945

Japanese kamikaze attacks off Okinawa were not limited to the Kikusui mass raids. There was a near-constant threat from smaller groups of aircraft and even solo flights. On 9 May, U.S. ships conducting ASW screening operations north and northwest of Kerama Retto came under attack.

The destroyer escort Oberrender (DE-344), commanded by Lieutenant Commander Samuel Spencer, USNR, was on the outer ASW screen at dusk on 9 May. Oberrender was a veteran of the Leyte and Lingayen Gulf landings and had survived significant damage when the ammunition ship Mount Hood (AE-11) spontaneously exploded at Seeadler Harbor on 10 November 1944.

Oberrender went to general quarters at 1840, when enemy aircraft were reported in the area, subsequently sighting a single in-bound aircraft and commencing fire at 9,000 yards. Spencer maneuvered at flank speed to bring a maximum number of guns to bear, but despite hits, the plane would not go down. A near miss from a 5-inch shell-burst blew off a wing at 250 yards and deflected the aircraft, but not enough. The kamikaze crashed through the starboard forward 20-mm gun tub, killing the crew.

The plane’s bomb penetrated deep into the ship, exploding in the forward fireroom with such force that it nearly broke the ship in two, with hull plating blown out for nearly a quarter of the ship’s length. Oberrender lost all power and went dead in the water, suffering eight killed and 53 wounded. Damage control teams did great work and luckily the ship did not break apart. The rescue patrol craft PCE(R)-855 took off Oberrender’s casualties and the tug Tekesta (ATF-93) towed her into Kerama Retto. The damage was deemed not repairable and she was stripped of all useable gear, decommissioned on site, and sunk as a target just after the war.

Within minutes of Oberrender coming under attack, kamikaze went after destroyer escort England (DE-635) on ASW station B11 northwest of Kerama Retto. England was under the command of Lieutenant Commander John A. Williamson, who had been executive officer of the ship when she sank six Japanese submarines in 12 days in May 1944 (many accounts credit Williamson as the driving force in England’s ASW prowess and, by the way, he invented the “Williamson Turn” used for man-overboard recovery). England had also almost been hit by a kamikaze on 25 April 1945.

At 1851 on 9 May, three Japanese aircraft (identified as “Vals”) made a run on England with combat air patrol in hot pursuit. The fighters downed the two trailing aircraft while England engaged the lead with guns. Despite being hit and set on fire, the kamikaze just kept coming. The plane reportedly had two pilots, with the pilot in front slumped over the controls and the pilot in back apparently flying the plane (some Vals were modified as dual-control trainers late in the war).

The Val crashed into England’s forward superstructure on the starboard side just below the bridge, and the 250-pound bomb with a delayed-action fuze penetrated into the ship and went off a few seconds later. The after-action report also stated the plane carried two “fire bombs.” The explosion and resulting raging fire demolished wardroom country, the captain’s cabin, ship’s office, and radio room. The flying bridge and signal bridge were enveloped in flames and some crewmen were forced to jump over the side (and took wounded men with them, who wouldn’t have survived otherwise). Twenty-millimeter shells also cooked off and added to the casualties. Williamson was able to jump down from the bridge, make his way aft, and conn the ship via after steering.

England’s crew kept the fires from spreading further and, at 1919, the minesweeper Vigilance (AM-324) came alongside to help put out the fires after picking up some of the overboards. Destroyer-minesweeper Gherardi (DMS-30) came alongside and put a doctor and medical team aboard England. Although England was capable of steaming under her own power, with her entire bridge area burned out and demolished and it being night, Williamson opted to be towed into Kerama Retto, with three officers and 24 enlisted men dead, ten missing, and 27 wounded (final tally of dead was 35 or 37 depending on the account). The bodies of both Japanese pilots were recovered on board and much was made of the fact they were both wearing parachutes. (However: In fact, kamikaze pilots generally flew in full regulation gear, parachute and all, even on one-way missions.)

After temporary repairs, England made her way to Philadelphia Shipyard, where she commenced repair and conversion to a fast transport, which was halted when the war ended and never completed. Although Fleet Admiral King had stated after England’s ASW exploits that “there’ll always be an England in the U.S. Navy,” this has only been true during the service of the cruiser USS England (CG-22) from 1963 to 1994.

Kikusui No. 6: The Epic Fight of Hugh W. Hadley (DD-774) and Evans (DD-552), 11 May

Kikusui No. 6 launched the morning of 11 May from Japanese airfields in Kyushu. It consisted of 150 kamikaze aircraft, including 70 from the navy and 80 from the army. Like Kikusui No. 5, it included a hodgepodge of virtually every type of aircraft in the Japanese inventory (and resulted in wildly inaccurate recognition calls by U.S. ships and aircraft). Radar Picket Position No. 1 lucked out this time. The main Japanese attack came in further west over RP15, located 40 nautical miles northwest of the Transport Area off the southwest coast of Okinawa.

At RP15, was the new Allen M. Sumner–class destroyer Hugh W. Hadley (DD-774), with a Fighter Direction Team embarked, and commanded by Commander Baron J. Mullaney. Also at RP15 was the Fletcher-class destroyer Evans (DD-552), named after the first commander of the Great White Fleet, Rear Admiral Robley “Fighting Bob” Evans (“The Fighting Bob” became the ship’s nickname). Evans was commanded by Commander Robert J. Archer. Four amphibious vessels were on station, including LMSR(R)-193 (the lessons of the loss of three LSM[R]s on 3 and 4 May having not yet taken hold). Three large support landing craft, LCS(L)-83, 83 and 84, were also at RP15.

At dusk on 10 May, the two destroyers had combined to shoot down a Japanese aircraft at 1935. Other single aircraft were detected passing by to Okinawa in the darkness and could not be engaged, but caused the crews being at general quarters for much of the night.

On the morning of 11 May, Hugh W. Hadley’s fighter direction team had control of 16 F6F Hellcats of VF-85 off the newly arrived new-construction Essex-class carrier Shangri-La (CV-38). Hadley also had control of two Marine F4U Corsairs of VMF-323 flying from airfields on Okinawa captured from the Japanese (Kadena and Yontan). The combat air patrol tactics at the Radar Picket Stations were becoming more standardized: The Navy aircraft from the Fast Carrier Task Force (TF 58) would be vectored to intercept incoming Japanese raids between 25 and 50 nautical miles out, while the Marine fighters would hold close to the ships at the picket station to deal with any leakers from the “outer air battle.”

About 0730, radar on Hugh W. Hadley and Evans began picking up many Japanese aircraft approaching from the north. Commander Mullaney looked at the radar picture in the combat information center (CIC) that the CIC evaluator assessed to show five major groups with an estimated total of 156 aircraft, which wasn’t far off. The Navy CAP were vectored to intercept (other TF 58 fighters would join in), resulting in the largest air-to-air action of the Okinawa campaign. Communications between Hugh W. Hadley and the CAP became increasingly challenging due to the intensity of the action, but, by 0800, it was estimated that 40–50 Japanese aircraft had been shot down by Navy fighters, but somewhere around 100 were still coming through.

The Marine fighters were vectored to intercept and, before long, they were engaged in dogfights ranging up to 10 to 20 miles from the ship; the numbers of Japanese aircraft were just overwhelming. The Marines shot down several planes and even after they ran out of ammunition continued to harass Japanese aircraft, forcing at least some of the inexperienced Japanese pilots to crash into the ocean.

USS England (DE-635): Damage from a kamikaze hit received off Okinawa on 9 May 1945. This view, taken at the Philadelphia Navy Yard on 24 July 1945, shows the port side of the forward superstructure, near where the suicide plane struck. Note scoreboard painted on the bridge face, showing England''s Presidential Unit Citation pennant and symbols for the six Japanese submarines and three aircraft credited to the ship. Also note fully provisioned life raft at right (80-G-336949).

At 0740, a Japanese E13A Jake float plane (normally launched from battleships or cruisers) approached Hugh W. Hadley undetected by radar and pursued by a CAP fighter. The Jake was hit and blew up in a large explosion. Evans also reported shooting down a Jake at about the same time (0753); it is likely the same aircraft and uncertain whether Hugh W. Hadley, Evans or, CAP was responsible for its destruction.

Many more Japanese aircraft then came in view with the lead elements seemingly intent on flying past the destroyers in order to reach the transport area; Hugh W. Hadley shot down four. Subsequently, a very large number of Japanese aircraft turned their attention to the ship and to Evans and, by 0830, both were in a desperate fight against overwhelming odds, with each being attacked repeatedly by groups of 4–6 aircraft. In their frantic maneuvering, a gap of as much as two to three miles opened up between Hugh W. Hadley and Evans and the supporting amphibious ships so that mutual support became less effective. By 0900, Hugh W. Hadley had shot down 12 Japanese aircraft, many on kamikaze attack runs and some crashing close aboard in near misses. These included one dive-bomber that crashed 20 feet astern at 0835 and another Val that had its wing shot off and crashed 100 yards away. So far, Hugh W. Hadley was not seriously damaged, but urgent calls were going out on the radio for CAP to return overhead to support.

Meanwhile, Evans was putting up a terrific fight of her own, but would be less lucky. Planes attacked her from all different directions between 0830 and 0900, and she shot 15 of them down and assisted in downing four more. At 0830, three Kate torpedo bombers were sighted boring in from the port quarter and Evans shot down all three of them. Over the next 15 minutes, Evans’ gunners downed a mix of seven aircraft identified as Kates, Jills, and Zekes (Navy dive and torpedo bombers and fighters), and Tonys (Army fighter). One of the Kates got close enough to drop a torpedo before it went down. Commander Archer ordered a hard left rudder and the torpedo missed ahead of the bow by only 25 yards. Following the torpedo attack, an army Tony was shot down by both Evans and Hugh W. Hadley, crashing 3,500 yards from the former. Then, a Val dive-bomber on a suicide dive was hit and the pilot lost control, missing Evans and crashing 2,000 yards beyond. An army Ki-43 Oscar fighter dropped a bomb that missed and was shot down while attempting to crash into Evans. An army Oscar and a navy Jill torpedo bomber made a run in from the port side and both were shot down close aboard. A few minutes later, Evans shot down a Tony fighter on an attack run.

Evans’ extraordinary run of good luck (and obvious anti-aircraft skill) ran out at 0907, when a Judy dive-bomber came in from the port bow and crashed into the ship at the waterline, holing the her and causing flooding in the forward crew’s berthing compartment. Nevertheless, Evans’ guns kept firing and another Tony was knocked down at 8,000 yards by a direct hit from a 5-inch shell.

In the smoke of intense anti-aircraft shell bursts, it became increasingly hard to spot incoming aircraft and, at 0911, Evans took her second hit by a kamikaze, which crashed portside amidships in a bad hit just below the waterline that flooded the aft engine room. Then, two Oscar fighters hit Evans in quick succession. The first Oscar released a bomb in a near-vertical dive that exploded deep in the ship in the forward fireroom, destroying both forward boilers, while the crashed plane ignited gasoline fires. The second Oscar hit the ship from the starboard side, starting more fires and inflicting additional severe damage. At 0925, as Evans went dead in the water, two Corsairs chased a Japanese aircraft into range of Evans’ guns, which hit the plane, causing it to miss overhead the bridge and crash close aboard on the other side. At this point, apparently believing Evans was done for, Japanese aircraft focused on the other ships. This gave Evans’ crew a respite to save their ship, including resorting to bucket brigades and portable fire extinguishers, as pumps and fire mains were mostly out of action.

As Evans was being hit by four kamikaze in quick succession and being effectively knocked out of the battle, Hugh W. Hadley was facing a coordinated attack by ten Japanese aircraft. At 0920, four kamikaze came in from the starboard bow, four more from the port bow, and two from astern. In one of the most astonishing displays of gunnery prowess, Hugh W. Hadley’s gunners shot all ten down without taking a hit. Then, her luck ran out and she was hit by a bomb and three kamikaze in quick succession.

Accounts vary widely as to the type of aircraft and order of hits. I rely primarily on the Navy Bureau of Ships (BUSHIPS) final damage report, which differs in some significant ways from Commander Mullaney’s initial after-action report and even from Morison, particularly in regards to whether the Hugh W. Hadley was hit by an Ohka rocket-assisted manned flying bomb. According to the initial after-action report, a Betty bomber flying at low altitude (600 feet) astern launched an Ohka that hit the ship amidships. The BUSHIPS report discounts this for several reasons: the aircraft engine and bomb tailfin found in impact areas, indications that the impact came from forward of beam, and that the Ohka launch profile was usually at 20,000 feet. Moreover, a direct hit amidships by a 2,600-pound warhead probably would have sunk the ship in short order. Nevertheless, a very large explosion (with no smoke, flash, or noise other than a dull thud) occurred well under the keel at the same time as a kamikaze plane impacted the ship. The BUSHIPS report cannot conclusively identify the source of this large explosion, postulating that it might have been an “influence” torpedo, or more likely a very large bomb that passed through the ship, out the bottom, and detonated a significant distance below the keel. The damage was severe, hogging the keel by over 50 inches and flooding both engine rooms and the aft fireroom.

According to the BUSHIPS report, at 0920, a kamikaze of unconfirmed type passed through Hugh W. Hadley’s rigging, carrying away wires and antenna, and crashing close aboard to port (this is listed in accounts as a “kamikaze hit” although a “near-miss shoot down” may be more accurate). A few minutes later, a kamikaze (originally reported as a “Baka Bomb”—an Ohka) hit the starboard side at the waterline at the after fireroom. The plane’s bomb went through the ship, resulting in “extremely severe flexural vibrations running through the ship for 20 seconds.” The three after engineering spaces flooded to the waterline immediately and the ship lost headway, taking on a five-degree list and starting to settle by the stern. Then, a third kamikaze, approaching from astern, dropped a small bomb that hit the aft port quad 40-mm gun (mount 44) and then crashed into the superstructure aft of the No. 2 stack and starting an intense fire in officers’ country. (In other accounts, the crew of mount 44 fired on the plane until the bitter end, with the mount’s gun captain’s last words being, “We’ll get the SOB.”)

Shock, fragment damage, and smoke rendered the ship’s 5-inch and 40-mm batteries entirely inoperable. As flooding spread to shaft alley and the machine shop, and the list increased to seven degrees, the commanding officer, concerned that the ship might capsize,  gave a “prepare to abandon ship order.” (From the safety of Washington, DC, the BUSHIPS report assessed that the ship might very well have sunk, but there was minimal risk that it would capsize given the nature of the damage.)

Casualties from USS Evans (DD-552) are transferred to rescue patrol craft PCER-855 from USS Ringness (APD-100), after Evans was damaged by kamikaze attacks while on radar picket duty off Okinawa on 11 May 1945. Photographed from PCER-855 (80-G-331077).

Fortunately, at this point the CAP cavalry arrived and shot down many Japanese aircraft while Hugh W. Hadley was in an extremely vulnerable state, dead in the water with a fire raging amidships setting off munitions, listing to starboard with the fantail awash, and with the risk looming that the Torpex explosive in the torpedoes might explode. At this point, Commander Mullaney gave orders to hoist all available colors: “If this ship is going down, she’s going with all flags flying.” Mullaney also ordered most of the crew and the wounded over the side into life rafts, while 50 officers and men remained on board to make an attempt to save the ship. Torpedoes, depth charges, and unexploded ammunition was jettisoned (there wasn’t much ammunition left, Hugh W. Hadley had fired 801 rounds of 5-inch, 8,950 rounds of 40-mm, and 5,990 rounds of 20-mm ammunition). Topside weight was also jettisoned from the starboard side to try to correct the list. The forward boilers were secured so that they wouldn’t explode.

Initially, the Japanese aircraft focused on the two destroyers and the LSM(R) and three LCS(L)’s that provided what anti-aircraft support they could (the LCS[L]s had radar-directed fire control, but the LSM(R) did not). However, soon the amphibious vessels were fighting for their own lives.

LCS(L)-82 shot down three aircraft and assisted in downing two more. At 0837, LCS(L)-82 fired on and hit a Jill torpedo bomber heading for Evans. The Jill’s flight profile became erratic before it dropped a torpedo that missed Evans just before the plane crashed into the sea (this is probably the same aircraft noted above). At 0845, LCS(L)-82 assisted LCS(L)-84 in shooting down a Tony on the port side. Then, an Oscar came in from the starboard bow and gunners on LCS(L)-82 hit it repeatedly. As the plane passed overhead at 1,000 feet, it broke apart and debris fell toward LCS(L)-82. The skipper, Lieutenant Peter Beierl, adroitly maneuvered the vessel so that wings and engine fell in the wake. At 0940, a Val being pursued by CAP fighters passed astern and LCS(L)-82 gunners hit it, causing it to narrowly miss Evans, although some errant “friendly fire” hit Evans’ forecastle and started a fire. LCS(L)-82 then went alongside Evans to assist.

LCS(L)-83 shot down three Zekes and a “Tojo” (army fighter) between 0900 and 0939. LCS(L)-84 saw a Zeke diving on LCS(L)-83 and shot it down.

Despite LSM(R)-193’s less-than-optimum anti-aircraft capability, she also gave a good account of herself. At 0845, a Kate torpedo bomber dove on Evans, but missed and aimed for Lsm(R)-193 instead, but was shot down by 5-inch and 40-mm gunfire. At 0859, LSM(R)-193 shot down another Kate and then at 0912 shot down a Hamp (a Zeke variant). The LSM shot down a fourth plane and then assisted in shooting down yet another that was headed for Hugh W. Hadley. LSM(R)-193 subsequently went alongside her to assist in fighting the fire and tending to wounded.

When the Japanese attacks finally ended, LCS(L)-82 and LCS(L)-84 were alongside assisting the crippled Evans while Lsm(R)-193 and Lcs(L)-83 were alongside equally wounded Hugh W. Hadley. The combined efforts brought the fires and flooding on both destroyers under control. The destroyer Wadsworth (DD-516), fast transport Barber (APD-57), and fleet tug ATR-114 soon arrived to assist with rescue and towing. Evans was towed to Kerama Retto for emergency repairs and then towed across the Pacific to San Francisco, where she was decommissioned and later sold for scrap. Hugh W. Hadley was also towed to Kerama Retto and spent time in the floating drydock (ARD-28) before she was also towed across the Pacific, encountering heavy weather, but arriving at Hunters Point, California, where she, too, was determined to be too damaged to repair.

Evans’ casualties included 30 men killed and 29 wounded. Hugh W. Hadley’s losses were 30 killed and 68 wounded. The amphibious vessels suffered a number of wounded.

Given the volume of fire from all the ships and the chaos of battle, it is difficult to confirm which ship shot down which airplanes, and in many cases the credit would have to be shared. In most accounts, Evans is credited with shooting down 14 or 15 Japanese aircraft, and assisting with a number of others. The number usually cited for Hugh W. Hadley is 23 Japanese aircraft destroyed, although that number includes the three that crashed into her. Other accounts give a number of 19 or 20. Regardless, any of those numbers for Hugh W. Hadley represent the “all-time” U.S. Navy record for aircraft downed by a ship in a single engagement.

Both Hugh W. Hadley and Evans were awarded Presidential Unit Citations and their skippers, Commander Baron Mullaney and Commander Robert Archer, were each awarded a Navy Cross. The gunnery officer on Hugh W. Hadley, Lieutenant Patrick McGann, was also awarded a Navy Cross. The crew received seven (or eight) Silver Stars and eight Bronze Stars, and several other lesser awards. Crewmen on Evans probably received similar awards (but I can’t find a record). The four amphibious vessels were awarded Naval Unit Commendations, and the skipper of LSM(R)-193, Lieutenant Donald Boynton, was awarded a Silver Star. The skipper of LCS(L)-82, Lieutenant Peter Beierl, was awarded a Bronze Star, and so probably were the skippers of the other LCS(L)s whose names I can’t find.

As any good skipper would, Commander Mullaney of Hugh W. Hadley gave full credit to his crew, writing:

No Captain of a man of war ever had a crew who fought more valiantly against such overwhelming odds. Who can measure the degree of courage of men who stand up to their guns in the face of diving planes that destroy them? Who can measure the loyalty of a crew who risked death to save the ship from sinking when all seemed lost? I desire to record that the history of the U.S. Navy was enhanced on 11 May 1945. I am proud to record that I know of no record of a Destroyer’s crew fighting for one hour and 25 minutes against overwhelming enemy aircraft attacks and destroying 23 planes. My crew accomplished their mission and displayed outstanding fighting abilities.”

As the Director of Naval History, I can second Commander Mullaney’s motion.

Navy Cross citation for Commander Baron Mullaney, commanding officer of Hugh W. Hadley (DD-774):

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to Captain (then Commander) Baron Joseph Mullaney, United States Navy, for extraordinary heroism and distinguished service in the line of his profession as Commanding Officer of Destroyer USS HUGH W. HADLEY (DD-774), Radar Picket Ship, during an attack on that vessel by more than one hundred enemy Japanese planes off Okinawa, Ryukyu Islands on the morning of 11 May 1945. Fighting his ship against waves of hostile suicide and dive-bombing planes attacking from all directions, Captain Mullaney skillfully directed his men in delivering gunfire to shoot down nineteen enemy aircraft and, when a bomb and three kamikazes finally crashed on board and left the ship in flames with three of the engineering spaces flooded, persevered in controlling the damage until HADLEY could be towed sagely to port. Captain Mullaney’s leadership and professional skill in maintaining an effective fighting unit under the most hazardous conditions reflect great credit upon himself and the United States Naval Service.

Presidential Unit Citation for USS Hugh W. Hadley (DD-774):

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the Presidential Unit Citation to the United States Ship USS HUGH W. HADLEY (DD-774) for service as set forth in the following citation; For extraordinary heroism un action as Fighter Direction Ship on Radar Picket Station Number 15 duirng an attack by approximately 100 enemy Japanese planes, forty miles northwest of the Okinawa Transport Area on 11 May 1945. Fighting valiantly against waves of hostile suicide and dive-bombing planes plunging toward her in all directions, the USS HUGH HADLEY sent up relentless barrages of anti-aircraft fire during one of the most furious air-sea battles of the war. Repeatedly finding her targets, she destroyed twenty planes, skillfully directed he Combat Air patrol in shooting down at least 40 others and, by her vigilance and superb battle readiness avoided damage herself until subjected to a coordinated attack by ten Japanese planes. Assisting in the destruction of all ten of these, she was crashed by one bomb and three suicide planes with devastating effect. With all engineering spaces flooded and with a fire raging amidships, the gallant officers and men if the HUGH W. HADLEY fought desperately against insurmountable odds and, by their indomitable determination, fortitude and skill, brought the damage under control, enabling their ship to be towed to port and saved. Her brilliant performance in the action reflects the highest credit upon the HUGH W. HADLEY and the United States Naval Service.

Navy Cross citation for Commander Robert J. Archer, commanding officer of USS Evans (DD-522):

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to Captain (then Commander) Robert John Archer, for extraordinary heroism and distinguished service in the line of his profession as Commanding Officer of the Destroyer USS Evans (DD-552) in action against enemy Japanese forces while assigned to Radar Picket duty off Okinawa on 11 May 1945. When his ship was subjected to attacks by an overwhelming force of enemy aircraft for one and one half hours, Captain Archer directed the gunfire of his batteries in shooting down fifteen enemy planes and assisting in the destruction of four others. Although the EVANS was severely damaged by hits from four suicide planes and in sinking condition, he led his crew in determined efforts to save the ship and bring her safe to port. His professional ability, courage and devotion to duty upheld the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

Also on 11 April, Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher’s flagship, Bunker Hill (CV-17), was hit by kamikaze aircraft in a devastating blow that resulted in the most deaths aboard a ship due to a kamikaze attack. I will cover this and the continuing rain of kamikaze on U.S. Navy ships in May and June 1945 in a future H-gram.

Sources

U.S. Navy Bureau of Ships Final Damage Report on HUGH W. HADLEY (National Archives)

Kamikaze Attacks of World War II: A Complete History of Japanese Suicide Strikes on American Ships by Aircraft and Other Means, by Robin L. Rielly (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Co., Inc., 2010)

Desperate Sunset: Japan’s Kamikazes Against Allied Ships, by Mike Yeo (London: Bloomsbury Press, 2019)

The Little Giants: U.S. Escort Carriers Against Japan, by William T. Y’Blood (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1987)

Dictionary of American Fighting Ships (DANFS)

History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. XIV: Victory in the Pacific, by Samuel Eliot Morison (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1961)

USS England (DE-635). Damage from a Kamikaze hit received off Okinawa on 9 May 1945. This view, taken at the Philadelphia Navy Yard, Pennsylvania, on 24 July 1945, shows the port side of the forward superstructure, near where the suicide plane struck. Note scoreboard painted on the bridge face, showing her Presidential Unit Citation pennant and symbols for the six Japanese submarines and three aircraft credited to England. Also note fully provisioned life raft at right.

USS Evans, believed to be at the Majuro anchorage in 1944, seen in a home-made quality 7d pattern.

Casualties from USS Evans (DD-552) are brought aboard USS PCER-855 from USS Ringness (APD-100), after Evans was damaged by Kamikaze attacks while on radar picket duty off Okinawa on 11 May 1945. Photographed from on board PCER-855.

Evans was damaged while stationed at RP 15 on the morning of 11 May 1945, by four hits or near-misses, one of which carried a bomb that passed down through her galley and into the forward fireroom, where the explosion demolished both boilers. The photograph, taken at Kerama Retto from a repair ship alongside, shows the starboard bulkhead of the galley blown out, allowing the electric range to be seen along with other cooking equipment.

Broadside view of the USS Evans (DD-552) showing her battle damage upon arrival at Mare Island on 28 July 1945. She is berthed at the yards ammunition depot.

Broadside view of the USS Evans (DD 552) showing her battle damage upon arrival at Mare Island on 28 July 1945.

 

USS Hugh W. Hadley (DD-774): Bomb and Kamikaze Damage Off Okinawa 11 May 1945

Photo 12-3: Hugh W. Hadley (DD-774). After torpedo mount, frame 163, showing fragment damage. Foam used in fighting fire is in foreground.

 

Class

SUMNER (DD-692)

Commissioned

November 1944

Displacement (Standard)

2200 tons

Displacement (Before Damage)

2950 Tons

Length (O.A.)

376 Ft. 6 In.

Beam (Extreme)

40 Ft. 10 In.

Draft (Mean, Before Damage)

13 Ft. 4 In.

References:

 (a) C.O. HUGH W. HADLEY ltr. DD774/A16/al, Serial 066 of 15 May 1945 (Action Report)

 (b) C.O. HUGH W. HADLEY ltr. DD774/A16/al, Serial 069 of 22 May 1945 (Damage Report)

 (c) C.O. HUGH W. HADLEY ltr. DD774/A16-3/sk, Serial 094 of 6 July 1945 (Damage Report)

 (d) C.O. HUGH W. HADLEY ltr. DD774/A16-3/sk, Serial 095 of 7 July 1945

 (e) ComSerDiv 104 CSD104/L9-3/71:ht Serial 0845 of 26 August 1945

PHOTOGRAPHS 12-1 through 12-10 (Furnished by CO. HUGH W. HADLEY and ComSerDiv 104)

U.S.S. HUGH W. HADLEY (DD774)

12-1: HUGH W. HADLEY with EVANS (DD552) participated in a notable engagement with Japanese aircraft on 11 May 1945 while on radar picket duty northwest of Okinawa. During the action approximately 100 enemy planes were destroyed through the coordinated efforts of the combat air patrol and the picket ships under the direction of the Fighter Director Team embarked in HADLEY. Both destroyers were severely damaged and immobilized by Kamikaze attacks. Following the action, accompanying small craft towed both ships to the lee of Ie Shima. After temporary repairs in the forward area, HADLEY was towed back to the United States and later stricken from the Navy list. Her initial report stated that the major damage had been caused by a Baka or piloted bomb, but subsequent information obtained after the vessel was docked did not indicate that this weapon was involved. Nevertheless, HADLEY's case is of more than usual interest because it was one of the most strenuous tests of the powers of survival of our 692 Class destroyer.

12-2: On the morning of 11 May 1945, HADLEY and EVANS were assigned with three LCS(L)'s and one LSM(R) to a radar picket station about 30 miles northwest of Ie Shima. The sea was calm with a light breeze, visibility unlimited to the north and east but obscured with mist and clouds in other quadrants. Large groups of enemy aircraft approaching from the north were picked up by radar about 0740. General Quarters stations were manned, Material Condition ABLE set and speed increased to 27 knots. Starting about 0745 five large raids totaling about 150 aircraft commenced attacks which lasted until 0930. Despite the heroic efforts of outnumbered Marine fighter pilots who continued to break up attacks after all their ammunition was expended, several Kamikazes finally scored hits on these two destroyers. About 0920 an enemy plane tore through HADLEY's rigging and crashed close aboard to port. A few minutes later a second Kamikaze, apparently the one mistaken for a Baka bomb, crashed into the starboard side at the waterline in way of the after fireroom (Photo 12-4, 12-5). The second plane's bomb apparently passed under the bottom and detonated some distance below the keel. A heavy explosion occurred simultaneously without smoke, flash or noise other than a dull thud. Extremely severe flexural vibrations ran through the ship for 20 seconds following the hit.

12-3: The three after engineering spaces flooded immediately to the waterline. The ship lost headway and commenced to take a starboard list, settling by the stern. Soon afterward, a third Kamikaze approached from astern, dropped a small bomb which struck in way of No. 4 40mm mount and then crashed into the superstructure abaft No. 2 stack, starting an intense fire in way of officers country aft and the 40mm clipping rooms (Photos 12-1, 12-2, and 12-3). Shock, fragment damage, blast and smoke rendered the ship's 5-inch and 40mm batteries entirely inoperable. Flooding spread to the shaft alleys and the machine shop (starboard side aft, first platform). As the starboard list increased, the Commanding Officer, fearing capsizing, ordered: "Prepare to abandon ship." The SG and SC radars, ECM and IFF gear were thereupon rendered inoperative and the registered publications were weighted and jettisoned.

12-4: Damage control personnel gave first attention to the fire. Employing all available pumps, portable and installed, eleven hose streams were directed on the flames. LCS(L)83 and LSM(R)193 came alongside to starboard and to port, respectively, and assisted with their firefighting facilities, putting seven additional hose streams on the fire and providing additional foam, pumps, axes, etc., to HADLEY personnel. The fire was brought under control by 0945 and abandon ship preparations were then secured. The fire was finally extinguished about 1030.

12-5: As soon as the fire was under control, attention was focused on reducing the 7-degree starboard list which had increased from an initial 5 degrees. Fresh water in the starboard wing tanks B-7-W and B-9-W with an off-center moment of approximately 380 foot-tons was pumped overboard and depth charges along the starboard side were jettisoned. All torpedoes were also jettisoned and ammunition was thrown overboard as fast as it could be brought topside. Neither the total weight jettisoned nor the effect these measures had on the list or the freeboard was reported. However, after these steps were taken the danger of capsizing was no longer a matter of concern to the ship.

12-6: Unsuccessful efforts to reduce flooding were undertaken during the morning. Five submersible pumps were rigged to take suction in the machine shop and after engineroom through holes burned in the main deck. Very little progress was made, however, until after the ship anchored that evening in the lee of Ie Shima. Meanwhile, TAWAKONI (ATF114) came alongside to port at 1355 and sent a well-equipped salvage crew aboard. LSM(R)193 began towing from ahead at 1403 with the ships alongside assisting in controlling the tow. About 1700 DELIVER (ARS23) came alongside to starboard relieving LCS(L)83 and sent her salvage party to assist HADLEY.

12-7: After anchoring in Ie Shima about 1900, bulkheads 92-1/2 and 148 were heavily shored. To raise the stern, C-7-F, C-8-F, C-9-F and C-10-F were pumped out. The hatch in the machine shop leading to the starboard shaft alley was shored shut and the machine shop then pumped dry with a P-500 pump. The port shaft alley was also pumped out. On 14 May TAWAKONI towed HADLEY thirty-seven miles to Kerama Retto for docking and underwater repairs. During the six weeks before a dock became available, divers installed soft-patches and other flooded spaces were pumped out; details of this work have not been reported, but drafts reported when HADLEY docked were normal, indicating much of the flood water had been removed.

12-8: HADLEY docked in ARD28 on 24 June and remained in dock until 27 July. During this period ARD28 was towed 50 miles to Buckner Bay with HADLEY on the blocks. The unusual extent of the structural repairs required had not been anticipated despite the extensive underwater work accomplished prior to docking. Virtually complete restoration of longitudinal strength in the shell and longitudinals from frame 90 to 135 was necessary (Photos 12-8, 12-9 and 12-10). This work was accomplished by the ship repair unit personnel in ZANIAH (AG70). The excellence and thoroughness of these repairs were proved later when HADLEY safely rode out typhoon winds and seas while proceeding under tow to Saipan.

12-9: The character of the missile which caused the major damage in HADLEY will never be established with certainty. Reference (a) quite specifically identified it as a Baka bomb, stating that the bomb was observed to be released from a BETTY astern at an altitude around 600 feet and struck the starboard side at about frame 105. The following data subsequently discounted this information:

(a) Debris found in way of where the Baka was reported to have struck included an aircraft engine.

(b) The impact damage indicated the approach had been from forward of the beam rather than from astern.

(c) Baka releases were normally made at high altitudes, 20,000 feet or higher, so that the glide approach of the Baka could be made at a speed exceeding that of intercepting aircraft and such as to throw off the control of anti-aircraft fire.

Reference (d) stated that the damage was caused by a suicide plane and its bomb. A 12-inch diameter fail assembly was recovered from the wreckage, representing a bomb which the reference estimated to weigh about 500 pounds. The 12-inch diameter tail assembly corresponds to that carried by a 63 Kg GP bomb, but the extent of structural damage incurred greatly exceeded the disruptive powers of even the 250 Kg GP type.

12-10: Possibly the missile identified as a Baka was an influence torpedo, or a very large bomb perhaps as great as 800 Kg which detonated deep under the ship simultaneously with the suicide crash. EVANS reported narrowly avoiding one torpedo about 20 minutes before HADLEY was disabled. In any event the explosive charge involved was at least in the order of 600 pounds of TNT and was so fuzed that the detonation occurred at a considerable distance below the keel. This was evidenced by the absence of a large hole or even fragment holes in the bottom. The keel was hogged, however, to a maximum height of 55 inches near frame 114, the hogging extending a length of nearly 100 feet in the midbody (Photos 12-6 and 12-7). MAYRANT (1500 tons standard displacement), suffered damage of nearly equal severity following a near miss by a 500 Kg GP German bomb. Gases of comparable damage in heavier destroyers include MEREDITH (DD726) [German contact mine, English Channel, 8 June 1944], WAD LEIGH (DD689) [Japanese contact mine, off Palau, 16 September 1944], CHAS. J. BADGER (DD657) [Depth charge from suicide boat, off Okinawa, 9 April 1945] and RENSHAW (DD499) [Japanese submarine torpedo, off Mindanao, 21 February 1945], all involving heavy underwater ordnance.

12-11: The bomb which detonated at frame 145 in way of the No. 4 40mm mount was probably the usual 63 Kg GP type. The planes which crashed HADLEY were not identified other than being single engine types. Many types were present. EVANS identified among her attackers ZEKE, VAL, OSCAR, JILL, KATE and TONY.

12-12: The structural damage critically reduced the strength of the hull girder. The impact of the second Kamikaze tore a hole 9 feet high and 12 feet long in the starboard side with its upper edge about 6 feet below the main deck in way of bulkhead 110. The shock of the underwater explosion hogged and buckled the shell amidships in what appeared to be a compression failure. The ship was reported "to jump out of the water." This explosion amidships under the bottom set up a flexural vibration that caused shell failure in line with the after end of the skeg. Here the discontinuity of hull structure was manifested in circumferential buckling between frames 180 and 190. The main deck and superstructure around frame 56 also showed buckling. Ripples were noted in the main deck from frame 66 forward and from frame 80 to 170. Bulkhead 110 and 130-1/2 suffered compression failure and resultant buckling, as well as ruptures in way of the shafting which whipped. [This casualty also occurred in cruisers. See War Damage Report No. 53 on HOUSTON (CL81) and War Damage Report No. 54 on CANBERRA (CA70).] The starboard shaft sheared two forward couplings permitting the propeller to slide back until it jammed against the starboard rudder. The port shaft also parted at a forward coupling and slid aft 4 inches. Both after struts were thrown out of line due to the sag of the stern. The deckhouse between frames 114 and 170 was largely demolished by the impact, blast and fire following the third Kamikaze hit.

12-13: While the slowly increasing starboard list caused considerable alarm as to the stability characteristics of the ship, the 2200-ton class may be considered a four-compartment ship; that is, four main compartments may flood to the waterline, yet the ship retain appreciable positive GM and freeboard. No exact computation of the GM in HADLEY after damage is practicable due to incomplete data; however, an approximation using pessimistic assumptions for missing data, gives 1.2 feet positive. For the ship before damage, GM was approximately 3.3 feet. The 5-degree initial list was due to off-center flooding and was not unusual. Possibly the increase to 7 degrees was due to* the free surface effect of firefighting water which may have collected on the first platform deck aft. The danger of capsizing, however, was at no time serious.

12-14: About 1900 on the day HADLEY was damaged the wind suddenly became gusty, but the ship by this time was fortunately in the lee of Ie Shima. Had she still be in unprotected waters the working of the weakened structure would have been extremely hazardous and would very likely have led to complete failure of the ship's girder with resultant loss of the ship.

12-15: The firefighting problem was greatly simplified by the availability of the two emergency electric fire pumps operated by the emergency Diesel generators. The forward one fed two 2-1/2-inch hoses and three 1-1/2-inch, while the after pump fed two 2-1/2-inch streams. In addition, two 1-1/2-inch hoses were led from the P-500 pump and one also from each of two handy-billies. The fire was mainly fed by gasoline from the Kamikaze crash, 40mm ready service ammunition and clothing and bedding in officers' quarters aft. Foam was extensively used in the firefighting. Assistance from the vessels alongside was extremely helpful since access fore and aft in HADLEY was cut off. The expeditious action of the firefighters undoubtedly prevented the conflagration from spreading disastrously to adjacent magazines, torpedoes and depth charges. This was accomplished despite extensive ruptures in the firemain in way of the after engineering spaces. It should also be noted that the volume of water applied to this fire was very large, being several times that employed in any other case in this report.

12-16: No flooded spaces were unwatered until after the ship was anchored. The measures taken underway to pump out flooded spaces were ineffectual. In addition to the ship's five submersible pumps, large capacity Diesel and gasoline salvage pumps with eductors provided by TAWAKONI and DELIVER were employed in an effort to reduce the water level in flooded compartments. It was finally determined that the pumps were merely circulating sea water and pumping efforts were suspended until after anchoring. At that time the hatch in the machine shop deck was shored shut and the space was then readily pumped out with a P-500 pump. The port shaft alley was pumped dry soon after. Subsequently, while at Kerama Retto, diving parties succeeded in securing soft patches which apparently permitted all flooded compartments to be pumped out, thereby improving trim and reserve buoyancy prior to docking.

12-17: Machinery damage obviously was so severe as to be beyond the scope of casualty control. The forward fireroom remained intact; however, the other three engineering spaces were not only flooded immediately, but machinery therein was damaged by shock to such extent that little was repairable except in the after engineroom. All bearings were completely wiped and journals badly scored on the forward main turbines. The forward reduction gears were stripped and galled, all bearings wiped and journals scored and the casing sprung. Starboard shafting was sprung, spring bearings were pulled off their foundations and stuffing boxes pulled out of the bulkheads. The port unit was apparently undamaged, however, except for submergence. Small diameter piping was extensively fractured and distorted. The master gyro was thrown heavily against its dome which was shattered by the concussion. The ship's service electric power generation and distribution system was completely knocked out, but both emergency Diesel generators supplied power through the emergency boards.

12-18: Ordnance equipment throughout the ship was thrown out of alignment and damaged by the violent flexural vibrations. Hydraulic piping in all 5-inch mounts developed numerous leaks. The two after 40mm quads were demolished by direct hits. Torpedoes in the after mount did not add to the conflagration despite heavy fragment attack and severe roasting (Photo 12-3).

12-19: Radio equipment suffered extensively from shock. TBK, TBL and TAJ antenna were carried away by the first Kamikaze crash. Only the battery operated SCR610 remained operable after the attack. The ship was not specially fitted for picket duty except for the portable gear transferred from BROWN (DD546) by the Fighter Director Team a few days before the action.

12-20: HADLEY was so severely damaged that her fighting effectiveness was almost completely destroyed. Her hull strength amidships was reduced in such degree that structural failure was a major hazard. Restoration of either propulsion plant required several months work in a shipyard. An intense gasoline fire which cut off access fore and aft had to be combatted despite extensive damage to the firemain and submergence of most of the pumps. Nevertheless the ship survived. Many destroyers with much less damage have been lost. The most important factors in HADLEY's survival were probably the following:

(a) An adequate reserve of buoyancy, stability and hull strength.

(b) An adequate duplication of essential services and dispersion of vital equipment.

(c) Confident, competent firefighting personnel who had adequate equipment with which to work.

(d) Satisfactory subdivision and maintenance of watertight integrity.

(e) Prompt and effective assistance from salvage and repair facilities.

USS Hugh W. Hadley (DD-774) Bomb and Suicide Plane Damage, 11 May 1945.

Photo 12-1: Hugh W. Hadley (DD-774). View of midship deckhouse, frames 130 to 150, in way of third Kamikaze crash and ensuing fire. Plane hit at base of director tower, left center, bomb at 40mm mount No. 4, lower right.

Photo 12-2: Hugh W. Hadley (DD-774). Close-up view of deckhouse top at frame 140 in way of plane crash and fire, looking down into officers' quarters aft.

Photo 12-4: Hugh W. Hadley (DD-774). Starboard side looking aft at frame 105 from fantail of salvage tug during diving operations.

Photo 12-5: Hugh W. Hadley (DD-774). Starboard side looking forward from frame 115 in dock at Kerama Retto. Partial structural repairs have been completed in way of the hole made by the second Kamikaze.

Photo 12-6: Hugh W. Hadley (DD-774). Ruptured keel and garboard plating about frame 115 looking aft and to port from keel blocks in ARD28.

Photo 12-7: Hugh W. Hadley (DD-774). View aft along keel blocks abaft frame 115. Note extent of hogging.

Photo 12-8: Hugh W. Hadley (DD-774). Starboard side from about frame 90 aft showing temporary repairs installed in ARD28 by ZANIAH personnel. Note depth and length of external longitudinals.

Photo 12-9: Hugh W. Hadley (DD-774). Port bottom shell looking aft following temporary repairs in ARD28.

Photo 12-10: Hugh W. Hadley (DD-774). Port side looking aft following repairs in ARD28.