The Commander in Chief
of the
United States Asiatic Fleet (Yarnell)
to the Secretary of the Navy (Swanson)
December 23, 1937
[Received 1:15 a.m.]
The following are finding[s] of facts of the Court of Inquiry ordered to investigate the bombing and sinking of the U.S.S. Panay.
The Court was composed of Captain H. V. McKittrick, Commander M. L. Deyo, Lieutenant Commander A. C. J. Sabalot, members, and Lieutenant C. J. Whiting, Judge Advocate. The findings are approved.
The record of the Court will be forwarded to the Department by airmail leaving Manila about 29 December.
The Court finds as follows:
(1) That on December 12, 1937, the U.S.S. Panay, a unit of the Yangtze Patrol of the United States Asiatic Fleet, was operating under lawful orders on the Yangtze River.
(2) That the immediate mission of the U.S.S. Panay was to protect nationals, maintain communication between the United States Embassy, Nanking, and office [of] the Ambassador at Hankow, provide a temporary office for the United States Embassy staff during the time when Nanking was greatly endangered by military operations and to afford a refuge for American and other foreign nationals.
(3) That due to intensive shell fire around Nanking the U.S.S. Panay had changed berth several times to avoid being hit and, on the morning of December 12, 1937, formed a convoy of Socony Oil Company vessels, principally the S. S. Meiping, Meihsia and Meian, and proceeded upriver.
(4) That adequate steps were taken at all times to assure that the Japanese authorities were informed of the movements of the U.S.S. Panay.
(5) That in addition [to] her regular complement the U.S.S. Panay had on board at this time four members of the American Embassy staff, four American nationals and five foreign nationals.
(6) That at zero nine forty while standing upriver, the U.S.S. Panay stopped in response to a signal from a Japanese landing boat; a Japanese Army boarding officer with guard went on board and was informed that the U.S.S. Panay and convoy were proceeding to anchorage 28 miles above Nanking; no warning was given of any danger likely to be encountered.
(7) That at about eleven hundred December 12, 1937, the U.S.S. Panay and convoy anchored in the Yangtze River in a compact group at about mileage two hundred twenty-one above Woosung, twenty-eight miles above Nanking.
(8) That the U.S.S. Panay was painted white with buff upper works and stacks and displayed two large horizontal flags on her upper deck awnings plus large colors at her gaff.
(9) That the Socony Vacuum ships Meiping, Meihsia and Meian each displayed numerous horizontal and vertical American flags all of large size.
(10) That at thirteen thirty the crew of the U.S.S. Panay were engaged in normal Sunday routine and were all on board except a visiting party of eight men on board the S. S. Meiping.
(11) That at about thirteen thirty eight, three large Japanese twin-motored planes in a vee formation were observed at a considerable height passing overhead downriver. At this time no other craft were in the near vicinity of the Panay and convoy and there was no reason to believe the ships were in a dangerous area.
(12) That without warning these three Japanese planes released several bombs, one or two of which struck on or very close to the bow of the U.S.S. Panay and another which struck on or very close to the S. S. Meiping.
(13) That the bombs of the first attack did considerable damage to the U.S.S. Panay, disabling the forward three-inch gun, seriously injuring the Captain and others, wrecking the pilothouse and sick bay, disabling the radio equipment, the steaming fireroom, so that all power was lost and causing leaks in the hull which resulted in the ship settling down by the head and listing to starboard, thereby contributing fundamentally to the sinking of the ship.
(14) That immediately thereafter a group of six single-engined planes attacked from ahead, diving singly and appearing to concentrate on the U.S.S. Panay, a total of about twenty bombs were dropped many striking close aboard and creating by fragments and concussions great damage to ship and personnel. These attacks lasted about twenty minutes during which time at least two of the planes attacked also with machine guns, one machine gun attack was directed against a ship’s boat bearing wounded ashore causing several further wounds and piercing the boat with bullets.
(15) That during the entire attack the weather was clear with high visibility and little if any wind.
(16) That the planes participating in the attacks on the U.S.S. Panay and its convoy were unmistakingly identified by their markings as being Japanese.
(17) That immediately after the first bomb struck air-defense stations were manned, the 30-caliber machine guns battery opened fire and engaged the attacking planes throughout the remainder of the attack. The three-inch battery was not manned nor were any three-inch shells fired at any time. This was in accordance with the ships air-defense bill.
(18) That during the bombing many were injured by flying fragments and concussion and all suffered shock on the first bomb. The Captain suffered a broken hip and severe shock; soon thereafter Lieutenant Anders, Executive Officer, was wounded by fragments in throat and hands, losing power of speech; Lieutenant J. G. Geist, Engineer Officer, received fragments in the leg; Ensign Biwerse had clothing blown off and was severely shocked. This included all the line officers of the ship, the Captain being disabled, the Executive Officer carried on his duties giving orders in writing. He issued instructions to secure confidential publications, to get underway and to beach the ship. Extensive damages prevented getting under way.
(19) That at about fourteen hundred, believing it impossible to save the ship and considering the number of wounded and the length of time necessary to transfer them ashore in two small boats, the Captain ordered the ship to be abandoned. This was completed by about fifteen hundred. By this time the main deck was awash and the Panay appeared to be sinking.
(20) All severely wounded were transferred ashore in the first trips, the Captain protested in his own case; the Executive Officer, when no longer able to carry on due to wounds, left the ship on the next to the last trip; and Ensign Biwerse remained until the last trip.
(21) That after the Panay had been abandoned Mahlmann, c. b. m., and Weimers, m. m. first, returned to the Panay in one of the ship’s boats to obtain stores and medical supplies. While they were returning to the beach, a Japanese powerboat filled with armed Japanese soldiers approached close to the Panay, opened fire with a machine gun, went along side, boarded and left within five minutes.
(22) That at fifteen fifty four the U.S.S. Panay, shortly after the Japanese boarding party had left, rolled over to starboard and sank in from seven to ten fathoms of water, approximate latitude 30–44–30 north, longitude 117–27 east. Practically no valuable government property was salvaged.
(23) That after the Panay survivors had reached the left bank of the river, the Captain, in view of his own injuries and the injuries and shock sustained by his remaining line officers and the general feeling that attempts would be made to exterminate the survivors, requested Captain F. N. Roberts, United States Army, who was not injured and who was familiar with land operations and the Chinese language, to act under his directions as his immediate representative. Captain Roberts functioned in this capacity until the return of the Panay’s crew on board the U.S.S. Oahu on 15 December, 1937, performing outstanding service.
(24) That Messrs. Atcheson and Paxton of the United States Embassy staff rendered highly valuable services on shore where their knowledge of the country and language coupled with their resourcefulness and sound advice contributed largely to the safety of the party.
(25) That after some fifty hours ashore during which time the entire party suffered much hardship and exposure somewhat mitigated by the kindly assistance of the Chinese, they returned and boarded the U.S.S. Oahu and H. M. S. Ladybird.
(26) That from the beginning of an unprecedented and unlooked-for attack of great violence until their final return, the ship’s company and passengers of the U.S.S. Panay were subjected to grave danger and continuous hardship; their action under these conditions was in keeping with the best traditions of the naval service.
(27) That among the Panay passengers Mr. Sandro Sandri died of his injuries at thirteen thirty, 13 December; Messrs. J. Hall Paxton, Emile Gassie and Roy Squires were wounded.
(28) That early in the bombing attacks the Standard Oil vessel got underway, Meiping and Meihsia secured to a pontoon at the Kaiyuan wharf and the Meian was disabled and beached further down the river on the left bank. All these ships received injuries during the first phases of the bombing. Serious fires on the Meiping were extinguished by the Panay visiting party of eight men who were unable to return to their ship.
(29) That after attacks on the Panay had ceased the Meiping and Meihsia were further attacked by Japanese bombing planes, set on fire and destroyed. Just previous to this bombing Japanese army units on shore near the wharf attempted to avert this bombing by waving Japanese flags; they were not successful and received several casualties. It is known that Captain Carlson of the Meian was killed and that Messrs. Marshall, Vines, Pickering and Squires were wounded. Casualties among the Chinese crews of these vessels were numerous but cannot be fully determined.
(30) That the following members of the Panay crew landed on shore from the Meiping after vainly attempting to extinguish oil and gasoline fires on board: V. F. Puckett, c. m. m.; J. A. Granes, g. m. first; J. A. Dirnhoffer, seaman first; T. A. Coleman, c.p.h.m.; J. A. Bonkoski, g.m. third; R. L. Browning, g.m. third; J. L. Hodge, fireman first; and W. T. Hoyle, m.m. second. These men encountered Japanese soldiers on shore who were not hostile on learning they were Americans.
(31) That all of the Panay crew from the Meiping except J. L. Hodge, fireman first, remained in one group ashore until the following day when they were rescued by H. M. S. Bee. Hodge made his way to Wuhu and returned Shanghai via Japanese naval plane on 14 December.
(32) That, in searching for and rescuing the survivors, Rear Admiral Holt, R. N., and the officers and men of H. M. S. Bee and H. M. S. Ladybird rendered most valuable assistance under trying and difficult conditions thereby showing a fine spirit of helpfulness and cooperation.
(33) That Charles L. Ensminger, s. c. first, died at thirteen thirty 13 December at Hohsien, China, from wounds received during the bombing of the U.S.S. Panay and that his death occurred in line of duty, not the result of his own misconduct.
(34) That Edgar C. Hulsebus, coxswain, died at zero six thirty, 19 December at Shanghai, China, from wounds received during the bombing of the U.S.S. Panay and that his death occurred in line of duty, not the result of his own misconduct.
(35) That Lieutenant Commander James J. Hughes, Lieutenant Arthur F. Anders, Lieutenant (jg) John W. Geist, John H. Lang, c.q.m., Robert R. Hebard, fireman first, Kenneth J. Rice, e.m. third, Carl H. Birk, e.m. first, Charles Schroyer, seaman first, Alex Kozak, m.m. second, Peres D. Ziegler, s.c. third, and Newton L. Davis, fireman first, were seriously injured in line of duty, not the result of their own misconduct.
(36) That Lieutenant Clark G. Grazier, m.c, Ensign Denis H. Biwerse, Charles S. Adams, r.e.m. second, Tony Barba, s.c. third, John A. Bonkoski, g.m. third, Ernest C. Branch, fireman first, Raymond L. Browning, e.m. third, Walter Cheatham, coxswain, Thomas A. Coleman, c.p.h.m., John A. Dirnhoffer, seaman first, Yuan T. Erh, m.a.t.t. first, Fred G. Fichtenmayer, cm. first, Emery F. Fisher, c.w.t., Michael Gerent, m.m. second, Cecil B. Green, seaman first, John L. Hodge, fireman first, Fon B. Huffman, w.t. second, Karl H. Johnson, m.m. second, Carl H. Kerske, coxswain, Peter H. Klumpers, c.m.m., William P. Lander, seaman first, Ernest R. Mahlmann, c.b.m., William A. McCabe, fireman first, Stanley W. McEowen, seaman first, James H. Peck, q.m. second, Reginald Peterson, r.m. second, Vernon F. Puckett, c.m.m., King F. Sung, m.a.t.t. first, Harry B. Tuck, seaman first, Cleo E. Waxier, b.m. second, John T. Weber, yeoman first, and Far Z. Wong, m.a.t.t. first, were slightly injured in line of duty, not the result of their own misconduct.
The Commander in Chief of the
United States Asiatic Fleet (Yarnell)
to the Secretary of the Navy (Swanson)
December 23, 1937
[Received 10:50 a.m.]
0023. The following is the opinion of the Court of Inquiry ordered to investigate the bombing and sinking of the U. S. S. Panay. The opinion is approved.
Opinion was that the U. S. S. Panay was engaged in carrying out the well-established policy of the United States of protecting American lives and property.
2. That the Japanese aviators should have been familiar with the characteristics and distinguishing markings of the Panay as this ship was present at Nanking during the Japanese aerial attacks on this city.
3. That, while the first bombers might not have been able on account of their altitude to identify the U. S. S. Panay, there was no excuse for attacking without properly identifying the target, especially as it was well known that neutral vessels were present in the Yangtze River.
4. That it was utterly inconceivable that the six light bombing planes coming within about six hundred feet of the ships and attacking for over a period of twenty minutes could not be aware of the identity of the ships they were attacking.
5. That the Japanese are solely and wholely responsible for all losses which have occurred as the result of this attack.
6. That the death of C. L. Ensminger, sk first and E. W. G. Hulsebus, coxswain occurred in line of duty and were not the result of their own misconduct.
7. That the injured and wounded members of the crew of the U. S. S. Panay received their wounds and injuries in the line of duty and were not the result of their own misconduct.
8. In considering the case as a whole and attending incidents that the court is of the opinion that no offenses have been committed nor blame incurred by any member of the naval service involved. 1735.