Allied Interoperability Between the Wars

[There are photographs in the Phoney War Album in my "World War II In View" Flickr collection.]

by Benjamin Franklin Cooling and John A. Hixson

It appears that the Allies of World War I learned very little in the way of military cooperation during the twenty years of relative peace on the European continent. On the eve of World War II, the interoperability lessons learned in war had been "unlearned" again. Differences in language, political views, personalities, organization, equipment, doctrine and perceptions of the objective are problems in any coalition force, but the paramount problem, through the ages, has been the failure to develop cooperation and measures at the operational level during peacetime.

     Both Entente and Central Powers coalitions found that wartime alliances were far different from peacetime plans and promises. Yet, when World War I ended in 1918, the victors, as well as the vanquished, remembered nothing and forgot nothing as far as lessons of interoperability were concerned.

     For one thing, it was never supposed to happen again; the League of Nations would see to that. For the next twenty years, Europe rested its hopes on a comparatively tranquil international scene, war weariness, disarmament hopes and "collective security." The latter policy meant anything but allied interoperability in peacetime. Distance, language and non-supportability reduced France's Eastern alliances to surround Germany to a sham. Only in the West might it theoretically count upon partners such as Belgium and Great Britain.

     Until the advent of Mussolini and Hitler in the wake of world economic depression, there literally was no need for anything beyond promises and naive expectations of continued peace. Britain's focus was imperial not continental. France based its hopes on the fact that 1914 could be repeated once again in some hour of need. Germany might enjoy a brief honeymoon with Russia in order to use the latter's Lebensraum for German rearmament, but neither Hitler nor Stalin truly trusted another dictator. Mostly, however, the citizenry from America to the Rhineland was disillusioned by arms races, the death toll from the trenches and their leaders' diplomatic machinations gone sour. National rivalries, only dimly sublimated by necessity from 1914-18, once more raised their heads in peacetime.

     Mussolini's incursion into Abyssinia, as well as Hitler's bluff over the Rhineland in 1935 and 1936, led to resumption of military staff consultations between Great Britain and France. Even then, "these were rigorously confined to a low level of exchange of information by military attaches and consequently were of very little use" in British eyes.

     It was all a repetition of the pre-World War I scene. Random crises generated cursory, discontinuous "staff consultations." As always, the official British government policy tried to avoid any formal Continental commitment. There was a diplomatic problem that Britain and France as signatories of the Locarno Treaty were not supposed to hold secret conversations without informing Germany and Italy. This became increasingly transparent after 1935. More importantly, Britain's military leaders shunned notions of staff talks with the French while, paradoxically, increasing their conviction that an expeditionary force should be re-created and that it would be employed on the European continent.

     As Major General Sir Henry Pownall, the director of military operations, put it in April 1938 when low-level staff talks were again being arranged:

     We never wanted formal Staff Conversations, but we do want an interchange of information so that we can settle the administrative problems that would occur if British troops had to be landed in France. That could easily be put in hand without any sort of pledge whatever.

     Such "administrative problems" were not "easily put in hand" as Brigadier (later Major General) L. A. Hawes discovered later in 1938 when he headed a War Office action team on this problem. Hawes instituted a series of cross-channel visits, clandestine negotiations with local as well as military officials in France and even studied the plans and war diaries of the 1914-18 war in order to complete his mission. "Overt action was expressly forbidden," he recalled, and the British brigadier circumvented this traditional myopia of the home government by instituting correspondence and questionnaire liaison with the French. As before World War I, a small group of staff planners, as well as the chiefs of the services, handled the whole scheme of pre-war interoperability in the Anglo-French sphere.

     It was the same for other partners such as Belgium, France, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Only the top government officials, civilian and military, plus their military staffs carried out allied liaison. Always, they were frustrated or channelized by shifting diplomatic policies and national priorities. For instance, France and England drew closer militarily at a time when Leopold, king of the Belgians, and his chief military adviser, General Robert van Overstraeten, were drawing tight the restraints of Belgian neutrality, including the breaking off of recognized military communication channels through general staffs and defense ministers.

Political Differences

Ambiguities of domestic politics in Britain, France and Belgium, the impracticability of Western support for Eastern "allies" like Poland and Czechoslovakia (as well as alliance credibility once the latter "fell" to the Germans as a result of Munich) and the pitiful state of military preparedness in all the countries combine with divergent personalities impacting on the course of events. The roles of politicians like Neville Chamberlain and his secretary of state for war, Hore-Belisha, or military chieftains such as French General Maurice Gamelin and the British Lord John Gort leap from the historical record because, in each case, they affected the direction and character of inter-allied operability. It was not until 29 March 1939—barely six months before Hitler's panzers rolled into Poland—that French and British staffs could get down to the serious business of concerted planning for defense in the West.

     Even then, differences of national aim, command and control, strategy and logistics clouded the picture. The French naturally emphasized pre-eminently defense of French soil. The British took a somewhat broader view. Still, British leverage on policy and strategy was limited since the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) would only put four divisions into line in the event of war. Gort, as chief of the Imperial General Staff, was determined that there should be no repetition of the friction that characterized Anglo-French military relations in the Great War when an Allied supreme commander was not appointed until the spring of 1918. The BEF commander would be no more than an army commander under French supreme command in the next war except that he would have an escape valve through appeal to the home government.

     On the other hand, British air and sea forces, its major contributions to the alliance, were to be under independent national command. Lacking, however, were sufficient French airfields to handle major fighter and bomber squadrons of the Royal Air Force. The naval effort was overwhelmingly British.

     The policies, resources and military forces of the Belgians (the Netherlands having been virtually written off as unsupportable) remained nebulous. The Belgians remained suspicious of subordination to the French in the event of war and, despite professed neutrality, projected at least a tepid enthusiasm for informal liaison with the British through contacts in the Belgian royal household. But the direction of prevailing political winds in Belgian foreign policy rendered it quite difficult for Anglo-French planners to congeal that aspect of alliance negotiations.

     Subtly pervading the scene in all camps were memories of the direction and nature of alliance fighting in World War I. Several British generals later noted that nearly everyone at the rank of lieutenant colonel in the 1939 BEF had fought in France in the Great War. Thus, terrain, allies and cultural features were all quite familiar—the sense that "we had seen it all before."

     But, of course, this was a mixed bag. They remembered both the good and the bad of their French civilian and military friends, the engendered complacency of passing the same way twice, the arrogance of playing second fiddle to any ally. Such factors blinded all partners to nationalistic differences between the poilu and the Tommy of 1914 and 1939, as well as their differing equipment, doctrine and purpose.

     For example, French intelligence estimates of German intentions remained fixed upon an exact repetition of the 1914 offensive despite strong indications of other options open to the Wehrmacht. Whether or not British officers really knew or understood the nature of the French military in 1939 remains unclear. Equally unclear is the French knowledge of its ally.

     One of the most perceptive students of the Anglo-French alliance in 1939-40, Brian Bond, emphasizes four points about Allied interoperability prior to the outbreak of the war. First, he says, the British government's dilatory policy on re-armament and acceptance of a Continental military commitment was bound to have serious political and military repercussions. It lessened British credibility in the eyes of French public opinion, reinforced French Army feelings of supremacy and, coupled with Belgium's ambiguity, failed to provide a counterweight to French influence.

     Secondly, Anglo-French contingency planning in the summer of 1939 was badly adapted to meeting the realities of the political and strategic situation which unfolded in September. Poland received no support due to Anglo-French underestimation of the power and skill of the blitzkrieg. Lack of understanding with the Soviet Union rendered economic warfare as well as Allied policies impotent in Eastern Europe. Ironically, underestimation of the decisive possibilities of blitzkrieg combined with an overestimation of Germany's abilities and intention to launch an aerial blitzkrieg on Paris and London. Consequently, the Allies neglected their other offensive instrument of strategic bombing at the outset of the war for fear of devastating retaliation.

     Thirdly, observed Bond, Belgium's neutrality caused recriminations and lack of confidence both in Britain and France. Gamelin's dilemma of how to stop a German attack well forward in Belgium in the absence of prior joint Anglo-French-Belgian planning and the knowledge that the French would be invited in only after the onset of the attack was an unresolved problem during the pre-war and subsequent "phony war" periods.

     Finally, interwar differences in British and French defense and foreign policies were submerged, and no attempt was made to reach an accord. Such delicate matters were scarcely discussed during the few months of the alliance's wartime existence.

More Failures

In any event, the Western allies might have better used the last six months before the invasion of Poland to solidify their coalition. True, British division and corps commanders like Sir John Dill, Maitland Wilson and Harold Alexander visited the French capital and toured the Maginot Line in May 1939. Late that summer, Gamelin paid a return visit to the British tattoo at Aldershot.

     "The greatest cordiality obtained on both sides," observed one of Alexander's biographers, "but in the event it was to be shown that cordiality alone is a poor weapon in modern total warfare." Top-level coordination obscured the true state of conditions within the various national military forces as well as the operational weaknesses between them. Still, the nine-month "phony war" or drôle de guerre in the West after September 1939 might have permitted rectification of many problems.

     When war finally came in September 1939, the Western allies were able to collect Anglo-French forces in northern France while Hitler's armies subdued Poland. The subsequent winter of quiet permitted France, Britain and the Low Countries to prepare for the eventual invasion by Germany.

     That their preparations proved inadequate or misdirected in May and June 1940 was due, in part, to serious chinks in the alliance. Despite Belgian neutrality, some intelligence information was shared by that country with both the French and British military commanders, and clandestine visits by key British generals to Belgium to prepare for the inevitable push forward to battle the Germans on the frontier permitted a modicum of learning about defenses, roads, lakes, forests and artillery positions. Even so, there remained much ignorance on the parts of the British and French as to Belgian operational plans, defensive obstacles and military installations.

     Part of the fault lay with the Belgians and their neutrality, part with faulty intelligence work, poor liaison between British and French headquarters and excessive secrecy. Most Frenchmen at general head-quarters had no idea how the Belgian Army's fuel supply service was organized.

     How far official staff conversations might have alleviated such problems must remain speculative. In fact, major imbroglios might have been prevented, particularly between the British and the Belgians over road use on the outskirts of Brussels when both armies were rushing forward to fight the Germans in May. Elsewhere, French headquarters permitted the meager BEF (sandwiched between the First and Seventh French Armies in the northeast army group) to send smaller units to get "bloodied" on outpost duty before the Maginot Line. Cooperation and coordination were obviously varied.

     It was not enough that French Army commander Gamelin and his subordinates had signally failed to see the true intent of German plans despite accumulated intelligence reports. But the Allies also were handicapped from the start by "an incredibly cumbersome command and staff structure," by inadequate liaison arrangements and by poor political as well as military communication arrangements. Furthermore, senior French Generals Gamelin and Georges enjoyed strained relations, and the French premier wanted to sack the latter.

     Distrust among the Dutch, Belgians, French and British due to numerous false alarms from November to April "had created a fund of ill-will and prejudice which would be speedily drawn upon when things began to go wrong." It did not help that Belgian King Leopold's warmth was offset by his army chief Overstraeten's earned reputation as "evil genius" among his peers of the Anglo-French contingent.

     When the Germans did strike in May, the Allied move into Belgium took place fairly smoothly. True, the British and Belgians hassled about roads; General Alexander played a game of linguistic and diplomatic contretemps with Overstraeten in an interview with King Leopold; and division commander Bernard Montgomery showed his usual pluck when faced with a touchy situation whereby his own division and a Belgian division were both situated in the same sector and interfaced one another. Montgomery placed himself initially under the Belgian's direction, knowing full well how to get the ally out:

     When the Germans came within artillery range and shelling began I had no difficulty in taking over the front from the Belgian division; it moved into reserve and then went northwards and joined up with the main body of the Belgian Army.

     Still, the British maintained at least five army-level liaison teams, as well as Major General Sir Edward Spears as Prime Minister Winston Churchill's personal representative with French Prime Minister Paul Reynaud. Obviously, the French tongue was no barrier at that level, and, indeed, even division commanders like Alexander had no difficulty speaking and understanding that language—much to the consternation of "allies" like General van Overstraeten.

Seeds for Defeat

The unexpected breaching of French lines on the Meuse, complete collapse of French morale, the precipitous surrender of the Belgians and the unilateral withdrawal of the BEF from Dunkirk all led to months, even years, of squabbles and recriminations between erstwhile allies. The seeds for the defeat of Belgium, France and even all of Western Europe, but Great Britain lay in the pre-war years of neglect, political chaos and traditional nationalism.

     In the end, liaison missions, a common enemy and whatever measure of Allied interoperability was effected in the chaos of a six weeks' war could not overcome Anglo-French-Belgian unpreparedness, superior German martial proficiency and the reluctance of a third Great War ally—the United States—to rejoin the effort to effect an outcome on a Continental battlefield.

     Actually, there was little that America could have done at the time. Committed politically to isolationism in a presidential and congressional election year, possessing an under-strength and half-prepared Army and Pacific-oriented Navy, the United States, like Great Britain, had waited too long behind a maritime moat. Like the British, American senior service colleges had spent little time studying the practicalities of alliances, particularly the lower operational experiences of the past. The few lectures at the Army War College during the interwar period, for instance, had been delivered largely by Major General Fox Conner, and we know his attitude on allies.

     Still, Conner's comments in 1939 were fairly typical of professionals around the world. Scarcely a year and a half later, across the Atlantic, other Anglo-Saxons were breathing similar sentiments. Even George VI, king of England, wrote after Dunkirk: "Personally I feel happier now that we have no allies to be polite to and pamper." Ironically, within the year, Great Britain was once more back into an alliance of sorts, however informal or clandestine that was prior to December 1941. But, then, that was right and proper—after all, Americans spoke the same language and agreed that defeat of Germany and preservation of the United Kingdom was of highest priority.

     The warring powers of 1941-45 learned the lessons of World War I all over again. Neither Axis allies nor the Grand Alliance of Russia, Britain and the United States experienced anything new with inter-allied operability. It was all there in the historical record. After World War II, the unsettled conditions of the Cold War negated a return to 1920s-style "normalcy."

     A study of the historical tableau, then, suggests the following conclusions:

That the impact of language differences; personal, regional and national animosities; individual and national political views; personalities; organizational, equipment and doctrinal differences; and perception of objective will vary in direct proportion to the number of allies in the coalition.

          That little in the way of measures to effect functional-level military cooperation was ever developed and/or adopted by any coalition prior to the commencement of hostilities.

          That practical military cooperation among allied units will be effected in some manner because of basic necessity, regardless of higher level agreements.

          That military cooperation in the past has occurred on the ground during the conduct of operations because the nature of these operations has generally determined their form and effectiveness.

          That prior study of coalition warfare problems and a detailed knowledge of allied capabilities and limitations could have measurably reduced these problems.

          That the more allied armies resemble each other in organization and equipment, the more likely they are to agree on doctrine although tactical methods will differ even when the allied forces are similar in organization, equipment and military thought.

          That coalition warfare will require an increase in liaison with team personnel carefully chosen on the basis of language proficiency, tact and military knowledge of the allies. Such requirements would seem highly advisable for all echelons of any national military organization working in an allied force environment.

          That commanders will not readily give up control over their logistics and signal communications has been a "lesson" of two world wars in this century, but not comprehended by peacetime allied planners.

          That allied cooperation in the initial stages of a coalition effort will be characterized by confusion, misunderstanding and hard feelings. A major catastrophe befalling one of the coalition members, especially a weaker one, may have a radical political and military effect on the entire coalition.

          That although a coalition may intend to conduct operations with each national force having its own separate zone of operations, the demands of prolonged combat, especially defensive combat, will cause the allied force to become progressively more integrated in its composition.

          That the primary factors contributing to the effectiveness of Anglo-American cooperation at all levels in two world wars were: a common language, clearly defined goals and a traditional cultural and political heritage.

          That national political and military sovereignties and policies determine and limit what actions can be taken in peacetime to effect closer military cooperation among allied forces. But the dominant factor in developing effective military cooperation—available lead time for problem solving—is only truly available in peacetime and should be exploited accordingly.

     Since 1941, the U.S. military forces have performed mainly as part of an allied team. The fields of Flanders, as well as the steppes of Russia, have been strewn with the flotsam and debris of wrecked coalition armies which failed to heed in peace the wartime lessons of allied interoperability.

 

 

 

Germany Between Two Wars

[Thousands of photographs and illustrations of World War II are in my World War II In View Flickr collection.]  

by Floyd A. Cave

Published in 1948

Current debate over Germany's war guilt in the Second World War ranges between theories attributing a de­lib­er­ate plan on the part of Germany's Nazi leaders to plunge the world into another holocaust and those em­pha­siz­ing ultimate geographic, economic, and cultural factors which determined the course of German foreign policy. Probably there is a measure of truth in both of these conceptions. Certainly the geographical cir­cum­stances of the life of the German nation are closely integrated with the character of the German people and fused together they create those unique qualities which have made Germany what she is.

     The conditions of geographical space have placed Germany in the center of Europe where her energetic and highly efficient people have naturally assumed leader­­ship—scientific, cultural, and military. Ger­many's rapidly expanding population and industrial su­pe­ri­or­ity seemed to justify her statesmen in seeking additional "living space" or at least control over trade relationships with neighboring nations. The unified Reich achieved in 1871 by Bismarck, although much stronger than preceding confederations, was limited in space, arable land, and raw materials. The relative pros­per­ity of the pre-World War I period, however, rather than satisfying German ambitions, gave definite impetus to her imperial quest. A desire for a higher stan­dard of living does not, therefore, seem to have con­sti­tuted a determining factor in Germany's attempt to break through the iron ring which encircled her.

     Attention, too, must be given to the basic elements in Germany's rise to power as a great nation. Prussia's military successes against Denmark in the Danish War (1864), in the Six Weeks War (1866), and in the Franco-Prussian War (1870), the military traditions of the Junker class, and the existence of a warrior class headed by the German General Staff helped to mold a military tradition and develop the habit of resorting to war as a means of successfully achieving the national ambitions of the German people. When to this is added the fact that no well-established traditions of popular sovereignty and self-government existed among the Ger­man people, the reasons for support of the Nazi move­ment and the resort to the arbitrament of war be­come clearer. Generations of indoctrination and usage accustomed Germans to strong government and one-man rule. Successes in previous wars and contempt for the military prowess of her opponents made entry into a new war less difficult for the Nazis to engineer.

     The peace treaties deprived Germany of con­sid­er­a­ble territory both in the East and the West, leaving her with a homeland of approximately 181,668 square miles and a population, in 1939, of nearly 70,000,000 people. The pressure of the Slav populations on her east­ern flank was intensified after the war because of the recreation of Poland and Czechoslovakia, and the rapid growth of Slavic populations in this area com­pared with that of the German population. In the West, France, greatly strengthened by Germany's defeat on the war, endeavored to consolidate her temporary conti­nen­tal supremacy through a system of alliances with the Succession States whose interests were at odds with those of Germany. Across the English Channel, the British navy stood guard over the sea lanes of the Baltic and North Seas.

     Blocked by her powerful neighbors in the East, West, and North from normal expansion in those di­rec­tions, the slowly recuperating German nation seemed destined to collaborate with the Anglo-French Allies and to direct, with their approval, its ex­pan­sion­ist activities southward over Austria and down the Dan­ube Valley. In this region, the Western Allies hoped Germany would run afoul of Russia once more and spend her rising energies in such a contest, thus removing the threat of German pressures in the West.

     In German eyes, European hegemony rightfully be­longed to the Reich as the most powerful state in Eu­rope with the most productive industrial plant, the most efficient army, and the most highly skilled and cultured population. Conceiving of Germany as having been betrayed and ruined by the Entente nations who added insult to injury by attaching to the German peo­ple the burden of "war guilt," leaders of the Reich saw Germany's position as one of being thwarted by her jealous neighbors from achieving her rightful place in the European family and her natural development as a great nation. Undoubtedly, many factors contributed to Germany's decision once again to put her fate to the test of battle, but most important among them was the pride of the German people in themselves as a great and warlike nation to whom European leadership right­ fully belonged, and their lust to regain Germany's for­mer dominance. Fear of the encroaching Slavs, jeal­ousy off the prosperity of the Western powers, hatred of the peace settlement which tried to reduce Germany to a condition of permanent inferiority, and pride in Germany's past military successes all played their part; but none or all of them imposed an inescapable choice upon Germany. Her fateful decision was deliberately and freely made by her leaders and supported by her people.

     Plans were carefully drawn up far in advance by Germany's political and military leaders. The peaceful period between two World Wars was employed as a time to recuperate and plot further attempts to destroy her enemies. Hitler talked of Lebensraum (living space), conceiving of it not only as more land whose usufruct would replenish German larders, but as more adequate space in which Germany might expand her political and military power to a maximum. The cau­tious and clever policies followed by the Führer in the earlier years of his regime were accompanied by amaz­ing successes. The crumbling power of the states op­pos­ing his advances revealed the enormous pos­si­bil­i­ties for a German victory not only over Europe but over the entire world. The stakes were immensely val­u­able and, in Hitler's view, well worth the risks.

Crisis at the End of World War I

The surrender of their principles of pacifism and in­ter­national brotherhood at the outbreak of World War I in favor of the Fatherland in its hour of peril did not blind the Socialists and other radical parties to the anti-democratic features of the government, particularly as exaggerated by the exigencies of wartime. At best, the government of the German Empire before the war was upper-class and reactionary. The Kaiser himself was entrenched in a very powerful position through his con­trol over the Chancellor and his cabinet, and his abil­ity on his own volition to make war. These auto­cratic powers were reinforced by the Emperor's po­si­tion as King of Prussia, whose territory and population constituted more than half of the area and population of the Reich.

     Through his autocratic position as King of Prussia, the Kaiser not only dominated the greater part of the Empire but was able, by means of his control over the Prussian delegation to the Bundesrat, to dictate the pol­icies of that body. The Bundesrat, representative of the ruling house of the German states, preponderated in lawmaking and the determination of state policies. The lower house, the Reichstag, though based upon the male electorate, lacked control over the executive and the budget and had little to do with legislation. In con­sequence, the government was irresponsible and gave little heed to the wishes of the common man.

     To this unsatisfactory condition was added the ex­tension of powers over the government by the General Staff during the war. Acting under legal provisions regard­ing a state of siege, the army authorities took con­trol of affairs. Executive powers were turned over by civil authorities to military representatives in the various districts. These military officials functioned under General Ludendorff who in turn owed responsibility to the Kaiser. Decree-making powers conferred upon the Reich Government in 1914 were so extensive that they virtually made the existence of the legislative branches of the government unnecessary. The military dic­ta­tor­ship thus imposed upon the German people was ad­min­is­tered with little regard for the social pressures build­ing up from below, and the policies pursued were upper-class, imperialistic, and anti-liberal. Many So­cial­ists, therefore, who at the war's beginning had sup­ported the government, began, as the struggle pro­ceeded, to shift their position.

     The effect of this was to split the party. As early as 1915 a minority of the Majority Socialists took their stand against extension of war credits and, by 1917, they had organized the Independent Social Democratic Party which favored immediate peace by offering to forswear any claims to territorial gains made during the war. Extreme radicals, still further to the left, fol­lowed the lead of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Lux­em­burg, becoming known as Spartacists. Openly communistic, the Spartacists advocated immediate peace and the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat. Socialist agitation for peace found ready acceptance among the masses of the war-weary population, starved by the effects of the Allied blockade and poor harvests, and disillusioned by German re­verses. By the spring of 1917, moderate parties took up the peace cry and in June 1917, the Catholic Centrists, Progressives, and Socialists in the Reichstag voted a Peace Res­o­lu­tion, calling upon the government to end the war. Al­though the army-dominated regime refused to respond, the continued loss of popular morale finally forced a shift of chancellors from Michaelis to Hertling to Prince Maximilian of Baden.

     Under the first two, the Army High Command made few concessions and at Brest-Litovsk forced a con­queror's peace upon the Bolsheviks. The Russian Revolution, however, which took Russia out of the war, had a tremendous effect upon the German people, and the urge to end the war was given great mo­men­tum by Bolshevik propaganda which, added to Allied efforts in this field, made great inroads upon the Ger­man will-to-war. Spreading strikes and labor sabotage marked the dying struggles of the Hohenzollern Em­pire. Under Prince Maximilian, a coalition cabinet was formed which included in its membership two Ma­jor­ity Socialists, Philip Scheidemann and Gustave Bauer.

     Yielding to President Wilson's demands for a re­pub­li­can form of government because Germany's lead­ers saw defeat staring them in the face and hoped by this means to make an easier peace, Prince Maximilian was appointed Chancellor, heading a cabinet formed from majority parties in the Reichstag. In October 1918, this ministry enacted legislation creating a re­spon­si­ble, parliamentary form of government. The mu­tiny of naval contingents at Kiel and the staggering defeats inflicted upon the German armies by Allied forces, finally forced Ludendorff, in desperation, to ask for peace. Negotiations were undertaken with the Allies and, on 11 November, the Armistice was signed.

     Meanwhile, the domestic situation rapidly de­te­ri­o­rated into a nation-wide revolution. The Kaiser and his family fled to Holland where, on 28 November, he ab­di­cated. Reigning houses all over Germany followed Wilhelm's example, leaving national and state gov­ern­ments in the hands of hastily improvised republican regimes. At Berlin, a Council of People's Commissars was created consisting of three Majority and three In­de­pen­dent Socialists under the joint chairmanship of Friedrich Ebert and Hugo Haase, the Independent So­cial­ist. Fully confirmed in their Communist position, the Spartacists refused to collaborate and began to ag­i­tate against the temporary government. A split also de­vel­oped between the Independent and Majority So­cial­ists, over the question of the degree and rapidity of the socialization of the government.

     These issues had to be submitted to a decision of the people. The Soldiers and Workers Council that had mushroomed up all over the country held a national congress in December 1918, which excluded Com­mu­nists and rejected the radical stand of the Independent Socialists. Thus the fateful decision was made which diverted Germany away from the road to Communism. The solidity and conservatism of the powerful middle class in Germany turned the tide and killed the hopes of the Bolshevist revolutionaries in the Kremlin who were waiting for Germany to go Communist, and thus open the way into Western Europe for Marxism.

     Unwilling to submit to this decision, the Sparta­cists openly attacked the new governments. In this they were most successful in Berlin where with the aid of armed workmen and ex-service men, they seized, and for a time held, the city government. The Ebert-Haase Government at last was driven to recruiting volunteer forces with which they suppressed the revolt.

The Weimar Constitution

The victory of the moderate elements was confirmed in the elections held 19 January 1919. The military clique and the Junker elements were for a time separated from their dominating positions in the government. The Social Democrats with 163 seats became the larg­est party in the Assembly. The Centrists received 88, the Democrats 75, the Nationalists 42, the Independent Socialists 22, and the People's Party 21 seats. A co­a­li­tion of Social Democrats, Centrists, and Democrats with 346 out of 421 seats, therefore, overwhelmingly controlled the Assembly. When the coalition was formed, the temporary government re­signed its powers to the "Weimar Coalition," which thereupon became the temporary government of Germany and carried on governmental activities while the Assembly was draft­ing the new constitution. Friedrich Ebert, co-chairman of the Commission of Commissars, and a saddle maker by trade, was elected President of the Republic by the Assembly.

     The drafting of the new constitution was expedited by a rough draft prepared by Hugo Preuss, the so-called "father of the constitution" and a member of the Democratic Party. The provisions of this rather lengthy instrument, which was finally promulgated on 11 August, reflect the numerous compromises which had to be worked out to satisfy the requirements of the Socialists, Democrats, Centrists, and advocates of states' rights. The purpose to establish a truly dem­o­cratic, representative republic is reflected in the pro­vi­sions which attribute ultimate political power to the peo­ple. The desire to retain important elements of fed­er­al­ism is shown by the organization of republican states, or Laender. Yet the delegation of greater pow­ers to the national government indicated the cen­tral­iz­ing tendency. Particularly noticeable in this respect were the provisions enabling the federal government to enact legislation upon local matters where they assumed national significance. The socialist influence was apparent in the powers conceded to the federal gov­ern­ment over railways and other forms of trans­por­ta­tion, natural resources, education, and poor relief. The right of the federal government to undertake meas­ures for nationalization of basic industries was included. Nevertheless, the states retained considerable autonomy.

     Legislative authority was vested in a bi-cameral leg­isla­ture composed of the Reichsrat, or upper house, and the Reichstag, or lower house. The Reichsrat consisted of about seventy members representing the states pro­por­tion­ally, roughly on the basis of one for every 700,000 (later every 1,000,000) of population. Prus­sia, however, was limited to two-fifths of the mem­ber­ship. Definitely a secondary chamber, the Reichsrat could exercise a suspensory veto on legislation or refer questionable measures to a popular vote. Otherwise its powers were minimal.

     The Reichstag, composed of over 500 members and elected by universal suffrage under a system of pro­portional representation for a four-year period, was by far the more powerful of the two bodies. Able to overcome a veto of the Reichsrat by a two-thirds vote, the Reichstag could make laws on its own initiative. Moreover, its power to retire the cabinet gave it pow­ers over the government not wielded by the upper house.

     Executive power was vested in a president elected by popular vote for a seven-year term with indefinite privileges of re-election. All authority of an executive nature was nominally conferred upon the president; but through the power of counter-signature, the chancellor and his ministers actually carried on the government. Responsibility of the cabinet to parliament was secured by the requirement of resignation on an adverse vote in the chamber. These provisions seemed to install a par­lia­mentary system of the English type. Yet, the power of the president to dissolve the Reichstag and dismiss the cabinet, gave him a strong check on their actions. More important still, the popular prestige of the pres­i­dent as an elected leader enabled him to adopt an in­de­pen­dent position. Under Article 48, the president in times of national emergency could suspend popular rights and operate the government under decree-powers. The use of decree-powers by the president and the maintenance of cabinets responsible to him rather than to parliament were a prelude to the advent of dic­ta­tor­ship. No provision was made for a vice-president.

     An elaborate Bill of Rights guaranteed the liberties of the people, but these were subject to interpretation by the government. Provisions for initiative and referen­dum in both state and national governments pointed the way to full-scale popular participation in political affairs but, as events transpired, these were not widely used. Representation of workers and employers in lo­cal, regional, and national economic councils, which had power to consider all legislation pertaining to indus­trial matters and to make recommendations to par­lia­ment, marked an innovation in government pro­ce­dures in relation to labor-management relations. This departure, also, failed to develop the importance which the constitution-makers predicted for it. Adopted by the Assembly on 31 July, by a vote of 262 to 75, the new constitution was signed by President Ebert on 11 August, and went into effect three days later. Thus, the new Republic was launched upon its uncertain course.

The Problems Confronting the New Republic

The provisional government had been able with dif­fi­culty to cope with Communist (Spartacist) uprisings throughout the country. Large-scale Communist up­ris­ings in Berlin and Bavaria, where Kurt Eisner, the Ba­var­ian Premier, had been killed and a Soviet republic proclaimed, had threatened for a time the stability of the state but were eventually put down by armed force. The decision of the soldiers' and workers' councils to adopt a moderate course and the results of the election to the Weimar Assembly heavily retarded the radical movement and, by 1920, the Communist threat had sub­sided. Meanwhile, the military clique with its allies the Junkers, Nationalists, Pan-Germanists, and other parties of the extreme right began an undercover campaign to regain control of the government. In March 1920, two irreconcilables, General von Luettwitz and a government official named Kapp, seized Berlin by armed force and installed Kapp as Chancellor. Ebert and his government fled the capital but the insurgents failed to make good their putsch because of lack of sup­port from the army and conservative leaders but prin­ci­pally, perhaps, as a result of a general strike by the labor unions in Berlin, which responded to Ebert's appeal for help. Faced with complete chaos in the city, the Kapp regime collapsed and Kapp fled the country.

     Defeat of the Kapp putsch strengthened the Re­pub­li­can Government and discouraged the conservatives but did not prevent them from continuing their seditious activities. Dissatisfaction of the German people with the hardships they had to face and with the ex­actions of the Allies under the Versailles Treaty gave them fertile ground in which to sow the seed of re­ac­tion. The Ebert regime was blamed for signing the peace treaty and submitting to forced disarmament, heavy indemnities, and loss of territory. Monarchists contrasted Germany's pitiable postwar condition with the glories of the past under the Hohenzollerns and called for restoration of the monarchy. In Bavaria, where the conservatives were strongly entrenched, a concerted attack was made against those responsible for bringing the war to an end. Even assassination was resorted to against Matthias Erzberger, leader of the Centrist Party, and Walther Rathenau, Democrat and Minister of Foreign Affairs.

     The French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923, result­ing from the failure of Germany to meet her rep­a­ra­tions payments, was the occasion for another attempt by army and conservative leaders to seize power. Planned and organized by General Ludendorff and Ad­olf Hitler, the Beerhall putsch, at Munich on 8 No­vem­ber, was put down by force. Hitler was impris­oned but got off with a light sentence. A French plot to separate the Rhineland from Germany, which had been actively promoted for several years, came to a head at this time. With the active encouragement of French military authorities, separatist forces seized a number of critics in the area and proclaimed the "Autonomous Government of the Palatinate." Owing to American, British, and Belgian opposition, the French withdrew their support from the movement where­upon the leaders, discouraged by the failure of many key officials to rally their support, fell to quar­rel­ing among themselves, and the separatist gov­ern­ment collapsed.

Economic Developments During the Twenties

By the end of the war, Germany found herself in a state of economic collapse. This was due partly to unin­tel­li­gent financing of the war under which the gov­ern­ment taxed the people lightly and relied upon bond issues and treasury notes for meeting 95% of war costs. Furthermore, concentration upon production of war materials and the consequent lack of consumers' goods and depreciation of capital equipment during the four years of war left the country in a state of eco­nomic exhaustion. Moreover, exactions of the Allies, particularly the forced contribution of $5,000,000,000 in gold, deprived the Republic of much of its available monetary stocks. To this must be added the losses in raw materials and arable land resulting from the treat­ies, the annual contributions on the reparations ac­count, and the necessity of reconversion of industry to peacetime uses. In the disordered political situation result­ing from the break-up of the Empire and the post-war revolution, these handicaps proved almost insur­mount­a­ble.

Inflation

The vast supply of paper money put into circulation during the war plus the scarcity of goods after hostilities, as soon as war controls were removed, speedily produced inflation. Unsure of itself and still struggling to attain stability, the new government feared to impose a capital levy upon war profiteers and maintained tax rates after the war much lower than those of Great Britain and France. By May 1921, the mark had declined to about one-fifteenth of its pre-war value. The flight from the mark was proceeding at such a rapid rate that on 1 June the government began to buy gold at a premium. Inflation progressed so rap­idly that by November 1922 the mark was worth only about one-thousandth of its former value. Government revenues declined in value because of inability to raise tax rates commensurate with the decline in purchasing power of the mark. In 1923, the monetary crisis reached its peak. The passive resistance policy of the Reich Government against French occupation of the Ruhr called for financial support of the idle workers who refused to labor for the French. In consequence, huge quantities of paper money were printed and dis­trib­uted among German workers in the Ruhr. The result was collapse of all monetary controls and a runa­way inflation. Prices rose to unbelievable heights, with the mark quoted at from 2.5 to 4 trillion to the dollar. Food riots and the refusal of farmers and merchants to exchange their produce for worthless currency indi­cated the imminence of complete economic chaos and called for drastic remedies.

     In desperation, the Cabinet issued a decree in Oc­to­ber 1923, establishing a new bank of issue and a new currency. Hjalmar Schacht, one of Germany's greatest bankers, was appointed special currency commissioner with instructions to restore stability to the monetary system. Orders were immediately issued stopping the printing of the old paper money, and a new currency was issued to circulate at the old value of 4.2 to the dol­lar. The old money was re-purchased at the rate of one to one trillion. Meanwhile, Finance Minister Lut­her by desperate exertions balanced the budget. A loan extended by the Allies under the Dawes Plan in Oc­to­ber 1924 and evacuation of the Ruhr helped to restore financial equilibrium.

Results of the Inflation

The inflation of 1924 had tremendous consequences for the future of the country. Great industrialists of Germany profited immensely from the tremendous rise in prices. Taking advantage of the slower rise in ages and huge bank loans which they could pay back later with cheaper money, they reaped great profits. The borrowed funds were used to purchase new capital assets and retool old plants. On the other hand, the laboring class was reduced to pov­erty and the holdings of the middle class were wiped out. The result was to turn the workers toward Com­mu­nism and the embittered middle class toward na­tional socialism. With their savings, pensions, and insur­ance policies rendered valueless by the rate at which the old currency was redeemed, the desire of the middle class to support the existing order was se­riously undermined.

The Period of Prosperity, 1924-1929

The wiping out of old obligations, however, gave a fillip to Ger­many's industry. Relieved of the burden of debts and with her factories in excellent shape because of the op­er­a­tions of the great financiers during the inflationary period, Germany now began to draw ahead of her competitors. Undeterred by the need to reconstruct dev­as­tated regions and aided materially by loans from abroad, German industry expanded production at a rapid ate. In spite of her losses in territory and raw ma­te­ri­als, Germany proved able to overcome these hand­i­caps. Scientific techniques learned during the war were applied to utilize available materials as substitutes for those lacking in Germany and to reduce costs. The extensive fields of brown coal were exploited to pro­duce electric power, petroleum, oils, and other by-products. Water power was harnessed to industry. Steel production was increased in quantity and quality, and a large merchant marine constructed. In addition, German industry was "rationalized," i.e., large-scale corporations were organized for purposes of mass out­put, and extensive efforts were made to secure decreased costs and greater efficiency per unit of manpower.

     During this period American money poured into Germany in the form of private loans. This artificial pump-priming was too good to last. True, the man­ag­ers of German economy expanded markets for Ger­many's goods through conclusion of commercial treat­ies with the trading nations; but on the other hand, they discouraged imports by high protective tariffs and secretly diverted considerable capital and labor to pro­duc­tion of military installations and armaments. With the former free-trade area in Russia blocked by the So­viet dictatorship and Germany's sales abroad impeded by competitive practices and goods of the Western na­tions, this fictitious bubble of prosperity soon burst. Under-consumption of goods resulting from unem­ployment of workers formerly employed in "rationalized" industries, and low prices of agricultural commodities added to the economic unbalance produced by a pleth­ora of goods and absence of markets. Hence, the sud­den withdrawal of American loans in 1929, because of the onset of the depression in the United States, revealed the flimsy character of the German boom and brought about a quick and devastating economic col­lapse.

Politics Under the Republic

Politics under the Republic were characterized by a gradual shift away from liberalism, and control of the Reichstag and cabinet from socialist, liberal, and center parties, toward the parties of reaction. The Reich­stag elected in 1920 yielded a comfortable majority to the moderates and, until 1924, supported a coalition of Socialists, Democrats, and Centrists in the cabinet. Nev­erthe­less, as has been previously indicated, the mil­i­tary, landed, and capitalist forces, while in abey­ance, were well organized and powerfully supported by a backlog of tradition and sentiment among the peo­ple. Anti-republican propaganda, the effects of the inflation, and the French invasion of the Ruhr, pro­duced in the elections of the Reichstag of May 1924 a decided popular swing to the right. This swing had in part been anticipated in 1922 by inclusion of the Ger­man People's Party in the Weimar coalition. Increased strength accorded the Nationalists in 1924, however, made it seem desirable to President Ebert to offer them the chancellorship. Resulting difficulties led Ebert to appoint Wilhelm Marx (Catholic Center Party) again as Chan­cellor over a moderate coalition. Na­tion­alist votes were nevertheless required to implement pro­vi­sions of the Dawes Plan, which were given in return for promises of certain positions in the government. Objections of the other parties to fulfillment of these pledges, however, precipitated a cabinet crisis and resulted in a dissolution of the Reichstag. The ensuing elections provided support for a moderate coalition for a while longer; but in 1925 the Socialists were excluded from the cabinet and a rightist coalition of Cen­trists, People's Party, and Nationalists established itself firmly in the saddle under Dr. Hans Luther.

     The death of President Ebert in February 1925 de­prived the Socialists of control of the presidency. Elected by the Assembly in 1920 as provisional pres­i­dent, Ebert had served the Republic well, guiding it between the dangerous shoals of extreme conservatism and communism. Ebert's death brought into play the constitutional provisions for popular election of the pres­i­dent. The requirement of an absolute majority on the first ballot or the holding of a second election, be­cause of the spread of support among the list of seven candidates in the 29 March election, compelled a sec­ond balloting. Meanwhile, the parties jockeyed for po­si­tion; the Centrists, Democrats, and Social Democrats joining forces behind Wilhelm Marx as their can­di­date, the Conservatives backing Field Marshal von Hin­denburg, and the Communists, Ernst Thaelmann. Non-voters of rightist persuasion, attracted by the rep­u­tation and prestige of the great war hero, Hin­denburg, turned out in such numbers as to give him a majority of nearly a million votes over the candidate of the moderate coalition. Fears of friends of the Re­pub­lic that Hindenburg would repudiate the new regime and welcome a restoration of the monarchy were at least temporarily set at rest by the Field Marshal's oath to support the constitution and his subsequent policy of cooperation with the parliamentary system.

     Yet conflicts between moderates and the Na­tion­al­ists were on the increase. Intra-cabinet friction marked the period between 1925 and 1928. The general prosper­ity during this period saw a temporary reversal of the trend to the right when, in March 1928, the Reich­stag was dissolved and the Social Democrats were re­stored to their original leadership in the Reichstag. Her­mann Mueller, Socialist leader, formed a cabinet which, in 1929, comprised a five-party coalition of Socialists, Democrats, Centrists, People's and Bavarian People's Parties. Unhappily, the moderate resurgence was short-lived owing to the onset of the great de­pres­sion. Unable to secure agreement on budgetary and unem­ploy­ment problems, the Mueller Cabinet resigned in March 1930, and was succeeded by a new gov­ern­ment under the chancellorship of Heinrich Bruening (Catholic Center Party). The new coalition, omitting the Socialists, shifted again to­ward the right.

Reasons for the Downfall of the Weimar Republic

Of the many causes for the failure of Germany's first experiment in democracy, the following are sig­nif­i­cant:

·        The shift in popular support away from the center and liberal parties which framed the Constitution to the conservative parties, which were sym­pa­thetic and even hostile to the Re­public, under­mined its foundations.

·        The civil service and the army were filled with mon­archists and enemies of the Republic. These unfriendly persons occupying positions of lead­er­ship in key government and military posts in many cases used their influence to undermine the new regime.

·        The great inflation wiped out huge numbers of the middle class, the chief supporters of the Con­sti­tu­tion, and turned them toward national so­cial­ism.

     Class conflicts were exaggerated by the monetary crisis and still more by the great depression. These cleavages were intensified by the system of proportional representation, used in the election of members of the Reichstag, which split the par­ties into small "splinters." These pygmy parties manifested a strong tendency to stand rigidly by their programs and by their obstructionist policies prevented necessary cooperation in the cabinet, compelling the President ultimately to take mat­ters into his own hands.

     The existence of Article 48 in the Constitution encouraged the President to use his emergency-decree powers to give stability to the tottering cab­i­nets in the later critical stages. More and more, cabinets were forced to depend upon the President for their continuance in office until fi­nally the ministries were appointed and discussed without regard for majorities in the Reichstag. Thus, popular controls were abrogated and the trend to dictatorship began.

     The forces of reaction and of counter-revolution were able to take advantage of the freedom of speech and press and the library of personal move­ment permitted under the Constitution to ag­i­tate, propagandize, and increase their strength while parties favorable to the Republic main­tained a dangerous attitude of passivity.

     The National Socialists were backed by the great industri­al­ists and army leaders as well as by the Junkers, and were supported by large loans of money which they used to finance their prop­a­ganda campaigns and re­cruit followers.

     Dissatisfaction of the people with the Weimar Re­pub­lic, inflation and de­pression furnished the Na­zis with exceptionally good campaign materials.

     German traditions were authoritarian and the Ger­man people were unfamiliar with parliamentary government and democratic methods. Hence, when they were faced with profound crises threat­en­ing their security and economic welfare, they turned away from weak and divided cabinets to­ ward strong governments.

     The existence of emergency provisions in the Con­sti­tution made it easy to subvert the Republic with­out making any substantial overt changes in the written constitution.

Seizure of Power by the National Socialists

In the three-year period between September 1930, and March 1933, the National Socialist Party increased its membership in the Reichstag from 12 to 288 deputies. The re-election of President von Hindenburg in April 1932 by a substantial popular majority convinced him that the people approved his strong policy of using his decree-powers to maintain cabinets in power regardless of their degree of support in the Reichstag. With the shift of popular support away from the center toward the extreme parties of the right and left, no common ground for cooperation could be found. Hence, presi­den­tial intervention, in Hindenburg's view, could not be avoided; yet he could not ignore the fact that many Majority Socialists had cast their votes for him, and he was bound by his oath of office to uphold the Re­pub­li­can constitution.

     To turn over the chancellorship to Hitler was, as he recognized, in effect to agree to the overthrow of the Republic. The Bruening Cabinet, which had taken office on 30 March 1930, was resolved upon a middle course of balancing the budget, providing agricultural relief, and living up to Germany's international commit­ments. The economic crisis into which the world was plunged, however, revealed the gaps between eco­nomic classes and caused a drastic shift of popular sup­port to the National Socialists on the right and the Com­mu­nists on the left. In the elections of September 1930, called after dissolution of the Reichstag by the President, the Communist Party raised to over 4½ million its popular vote and increased its rep­re­sen­ta­tion in the Reichstag from 54 to 77 seats. Even this alarm­ing result seemed tame, however, in comparison with the National Socialist jump from 12 to 107 seats and from 809,000 to 6,400,000 popular votes. This por­ten­tous change gave a clear indication of the pur­pose of a large section of the people to give the Nazis a substantial voice in Parliament, and they became the second most numerous party in the House, giving place only to the Social Democrats. Yet the vote for Hindenburg showed where the wishes of the majority were. The position of the Cabinet now became vir­tu­ally impossible as far as obtaining majority support in the Reichstag was concerned. Nevertheless, Bruening was maintained in power by Hindenburg's orders.

     The resignation of the Cabinet on 30 May 1932, therefore, was probably due to Hindenburg's dis­ap­proval of Bruening's policies. The President's reasons, however, were not clear. Although the Cabinet was with­out a clear majority in the Reichstag, it had not been defeated. Perhaps pressure on Hindenburg by his Junker friends because of Bruening's proposal to take over and divide into smaller parcels the large landed estates in East Prussia and his disbanding of the Nazi Storm Troops influenced the Field Marshal's decision. In any case, Bruening's fall opened the way for von Pa­pen and a little later, for von Schleicher as Chan­cellor.

     Von Papen was expected to hold the line against the Nazis. Though not a National Socialist himself, his rightist tendencies were well known. Von Schleicher headed a cabinet of aristocrats. He himself endeavored to placate labor and resist Nazi aggression; but lacking support in the Reichstag, his efforts proved unavailing. Hindenburg's selection of these men indicated that he was yielding to rightist pressure though still not ready to accept Hitler. These appointments and the consequent ineffective resistance to Nazism set the stage for the seizure of power by Hitler.

The Von Papen Cabinets

Neither the von Papen or the von Schleicher Cabinet could weld together a supporting coalition in the Reichstag. Hindenburg, there­fore, dissolved the lower house on 4 June, with the election scheduled for 31 July. Meanwhile, the von Papen government repealed the Bruening decrees for the maintenance of public safety, removed the ban on the Storm Troops, and threatened to take over the Gov­ern­ment of Prussia. Alarmed by these moves, the South German states strengthened the prohibitions on the wearing of political uniforms and took greater pre­cau­tions to preserve order. Removal by von Papen of the restrictions against the Brown Shirts and the spe­cial safeguards of private rights stimulated the Nazis to more violent outbreaks. Pre-election conflicts mounted in intensity and precipitated what amounted to a small-scale civil war, with the government favoring Nazi ter­ror­ists in their attacks upon Communists and Jews. In Altona, on 17 July, for example, a large-scale riot broke out, resulting in 15 killed and 70 wounded. These outbreaks compelled the Reich Government to re-establish strict controls over all public gatherings.

The Capture of the Prussian Government

On 20 July, von Papen invoked Article 48 of the Constitution as justification for a decree dismissing the Socialist Min­ister-President of Prussia, Otto Braun, and his gov­ern­ment, and naming himself Reich Commissioner and Prussian Minister of the Interior, with Dr. Bracht acting as his deputy for Prussian affairs. Berlin and the province of Brandenburg were placed under martial law. Officials refusing to submit were arrested. Von Papen's action in staging a coup d'etat in Prussia was without doubt based upon his knowledge of Nazi sup­port, his desire to destroy the last Socialist stronghold, and in particular to take control over the Prussian state police force, a powerful body second only to the Reichs­wehr in strength. Hence, his statement that his action was due to fear that the Prussian Government was unable to deal with the Communists was a pure rationalization.

     The seizure of Prussia removed a potent check upon Nazi activities and greatly encouraged the Na­tional Socialists while it discouraged and intimidated the Socialist and Center parties. However, instead of taking equally violent counteraction, these parties con­tented themselves with protesting to the government and appealing the case of the ousted Prussian officials to the Supreme Court. The results of the 31 July elec­tion raised from 107 to 230 the number of Nazi seats in the Reichstag. While this was a huge gain over the 1930 result, it was not much larger than the Nazi vote in the April 1932 state elections and the movement seemed to be slowing down. The vote did not give the National Socialists anywhere near a majority in the Cham­ber though it did make them the largest party by nearly 100 votes. The Socialists lost ten seats and the Communists gained twelve, but the combined vote of the middle parties remained superior to the Nazi vote.

The Nazi Bid for Power

In the extremely ad­van­ta­geous situation in which he now found himself, Hit­ler saw his opportunity to gain leadership in the government. Accordingly, he demanded the chancellorship. A coalition with the Center parties was possible and the Centrists seemed willing to par­tic­i­pate. Yet the party strife and mob violence fomented by the Nazis cast a shadow upon his demands, and friends of the Republic feared the consequences of his appointment. Despite renewed bans on mob violence, the Nazis' attacks upon Communists and Jews reached outrageous proportions so that even the pro-Nazi Reich Government was forced to arrest some of the worst per­pe­trators, try them in the emergency courts set up for this purpose, and sentence a few of them to death. In the face of these events, Hitler increased his de­mands for the chancellorship, asking, in addition, for a free hand in the cabinet.

     On 13 August, Hindenburg called in Hitler and of­fered him a place in the cabinet but not the chan­cel­lor­ship. This Hitler refused. The impasse created by this situation necessitated another dissolution of the Reich­stag to enable the people to try to find a way out of the dilemma. Dissolution, strangely enough, was opposed by the anti-parliamentary Nazis, perhaps because Her­mann Göring, the Nazi candidate, was elected Pres­i­dent of the Reichstag on 30 August when it met. Rep­re­sen­ta­tions were made to President Hindenburg to try to persuade him not to dissolve the Reichstag. Owing to inability of Nazis and Centrists to agree, Hin­denburg would not yield. On 12 September, when Parlia­ment reconvened, it was dissolved by order of the President but not before a Communist motion of non-confidence was overwhelmingly ap­pro­ved by the Cham­ber. Elections were set for 6 November.

     During its remaining days in office, the von Papen Government proceeded to enact legislation designed to benefit the business and agricultural classes. Tax-credit certificates were issued enabling the employers to cover part of their back-taxes. Bonuses were given to employers who hired additional workers, and a large public works program was set on foot. On the other hand, von Papen blamed the government's financial trou­bles upon excessive social insurance costs. These policies, plus his seizure of the Socialist Government of Prussia, indicated clearly by his anti-Socialist stand. The aggressive, anti-labor tendencies of the von Papen Cabinet were given somewhat of a check by the de­ci­sion of the Reich Supreme Court on 25 October, declar­ing the suspension of the Prussian Ministry legal under Article 48 but only as regards the administrative functions of the Prussian Cabinet and then only for a limited period. The decision reinstated the Prussian Cab­i­net as far as performance of non-administrative func­tions were concerned but was not recognized in prac­tice by the Reich Government.

Elections of 6 November 1932

The people's re­ac­tion to the political situation at the polls on 6 No­vem­ber failed to solve the fundamental deadlock of the par­ties of the extreme right and left. Nevertheless, the loss of thirty-four seats by the Nazis indicated decline of pub­lic favor and seemed to presage a turn of the tide. The Communist gain of eleven seats, however, was balanced by a loss of twelve deputies by the Social Democrats. The Nationalists, who alone of the parties in the Chamber were supporting the von Papen regime, gained fourteen seats but this could not guarantee sufficient support in the Reichstag to remove the stigma of a president-supported cabinet. Only one conclusion seemed pos­si­ble in the face of this baffling result—the von Papen Government was not supported by the people. When leaders of the other parties were canvassed by von Pa­pen under Hindenburg's instructions, only the People's Party would support the cabinet in addition to the Na­tion­al­ists. Recognizing the futility of trying to carry on under the circumstances, the von Papen Cabinet re­signed on 17 November.

Hindenburg's Negotiations with Hitler

With elec­tion results as they were, a coalition of the parties of the center could not secure a majority without includ­ing the Communists. Yet, Hindenburg had main­tained von Papen by presidential fiat and could have chosen a Social Democrat under the same procedure had he so desired. The fact that he began to dicker with Hitler after the heavy loss of seats by the Nazis indicated clearly his rightist leanings. Being assured by Hitler that he could form a government acceptable to the Reichstag, von Hindenburg instructed him to ver­ify this, subject to certain conditions. He was to for­mu­late an acceptable program of industrial and eco­nomic reform, pledge himself not to restore the autonomy of Prussia, and not to interfere with Article 48 of the Constitution. In addition, Hindenburg de­manded the final word on all ministerial appointments, and the right to appoint the Foreign Minister and Min­is­ter of Defense. Not satisfied with these restrictions which would have seriously crippled his freedom of action, Hitler on 23 November demanded the chan­cel­lor­ship with full power to act. This "all or nothing" re­quest of Hitler was again rejected by Hindenburg, who thereupon named General von Schleicher Chancellor over a presidial government. This, as indicated above, was not the President's only alternative and illustrated his growing tendency to flout the plain terms of the Con­sti­tu­tion.

The Von Schleicher Cabinet

The appointment of von Schleicher was Hindenburg's decision after it be­came clear that von Papen, in whom the Field Marshal had great confidence, could obtain no adequate support either in the Reichstag or among party leaders. The new cabinet made some concessions in its composition to the popular critics of Von Papen but contained many members whose sympathies were pro-Nazi. Von Sch­lei­­cher, however, endeavored to calm the fears of sup­port­ers of the Republic, stating as his platform a pro­gram of providing employment, opposition to dic­ta­tor­ ship, and a middle-of-the-road stand on economic questions. He placated the unions by restoring the so­cial insurance system abolished by von Papen but main­tained a strict silence regarding restoration of parlia­men­tary government, reform of the constitution, and establishment of more authoritative government. As it proved, these moves were deliberately calculated to al­lay public alarm, and pave the way for the Nazi rev­o­lu­tion.

Hitler Takes Over

Greatly encouraged by secret negotiations with the big industrialists, who urged him to modify his stubborn stand regarding the chancellorship, Hitler in January 1933 made a deal with von Pa­pen whereby the latter would persuade Hindenburg to appoint Hitler as Chancellor in exchange for von Pa­pen's appointment as Vice-Chancellor. Accordingly, von Sch­lei­cher's Cabinet was replaced by a Cabinet headed by Hitler. The coalition of National Socialists and Nationalists headed by Hitler lacked a majority in the Reichstag. In consequence, Hitler began nego­ti­a­tions with the Center Party with a view to obtaining Catholic support. When, however, Centrists submitted a series of questions regarding Hitler's program, he broke off relations in a huff and asked Hindenburg to dissolve the Reichstag. Elections for both Reichstag and the Prussian Diet were set for 5 March, although the decision regarding the Diet seemed in violation of the previous decision of the Supreme Court.

     The campaign that ensued was one of terrorism con­ducted by the Nazis against the other parties. It soon became apparent that the Nazis and Nationalists were working hand-in-hand in the government. Through their control of the police, the Nazis were able to pursue their violent tactics unopposed. Hitler persuaded Hindenburg to issue decrees suspending civil rights and imposing severe penalties for political crimes. Terrorist tactics were used to break up the Com­mu­nist Party and labor union organizations. Unsure of their popular support in spite of a huge cam­paign of propaganda, Nazi leaders endeavored to inflame public opinion against the radicals by in­sti­gat­ing the burning of the Reichstag building and accusing the Communists of the deed. On the strength of this, the Nazis secured the total suppression of Communist and Socialist campaign meetings and press. Com­mu­nist party leaders were arrested. Even more drastic was the decree of 28 February 1933, which set aside all provisions of the Constitution guaranteeing private rights. Drastic penalties were invoked against violators and the police were given summary powers to enforce them. In spite of the tremendous advantages in their favor, however, the National Socialists obtained only about 44% of the popular vote in the March elections. With the 8% of the Nationalists, their close allies, how­ever, they commanded a total of 52% of the pop­u­lar vote and won 340 of the 647 seats in the Reichstag. Fearful of the opposition because he had such a narrow majority, Hitler ousted the Communist deputies and reduced the number of Socialists in the Chamber through arrests upon specious pretexts. Warnings and other forms of intimidation were practiced on members of the other parties. It was by means of these unconstitu­tional procedures that Hitler forced the Enabling Act of 24 March 1933, through the Reichstag.

     This law, amplified and substantiated by sub­se­quent legislation, in effect turned over the lawmaking power of the Reichstag in toto to the Hitler Cabinet. Under its provisions, the Reichstag was allowed to con­tinue as a mere shadow of its former self, having no real function except to act as a sounding-board for Hitler's speeches. The position and powers of the pres­i­dent were guaranteed and the Reichsrat was to be con­tin­ued. These promises, however, were soon violated. On the death of Hindenburg, Hitler made himself both Chancellor and Reich president. The Reichsrat was later abolished. Although the Constitution had not been formally overturned, in effect it had become a dead let­ter. With all powers concentrated in the Führer, the Reichsrat eradicated, the Reichstag reduced to a non-entity, and all private rights set aside, the democratic principles upon which the Weimar regime had been founded were no more, and dictatorship and the Brown terror took their place.

     Hitler and his supporters proceeded with dispatch to strengthen their hold on power. The technique of fear and intimidation of the masses was employed on a wide scale. Nazi terrorist tactics, which had immo­bi­lized their opponents during the election campaign, were intensified after the election and followed up by a general attack upon the Jews. On 12 March, Hitler or­dered the Storm Troops to cease their vengeance at­tacks upon radicals and Jews but on 28 March, Nazi headquarters announced a national boycott against Jews in business and the professions on the grounds that German Jews in exile were traducing the German people in foreign countries. Be­cause of the flood of pro­tests against this action from abroad, the Govern­ment intervened and limited the boycott to one day only. The passions released among the Brown Shirts and other party formations by this government-sponsored program, however, resulted in continued vi­o­lence against Jews and radicals for some time af­ter­wards.

     The centers of opposition to the party dictatorship were speedily demolished. All dissident parties were either legally abolished or forced to dissolve by their own action. Labor unions and fraternal bodies, such as the Masonic Order, were ordered disbanded. All news­pa­pers and other channels of communication were brought under strict censorship. Policies advocated by the left-wing of the Nazi Party to destroy the "tyranny" of Versailles, curb the great corporations, redistribute the land, and eliminate unemployment, were used to convince the people of the liberal in­ten­tions of the "New Order." The terror against Jews and Communists was instituted to divert public attention and give the Nazis a scapegoat on which to blame their own lawless actions. Bodies representative of public opinion, including state, provincial, and local leg­is­latures, were eliminated, and dictator-appointed repre­sent­atives sent to replace them. Plans were made to bring the Churches under control so that they could be used to help induce conformity to the Nazi program. Thus, German fascism was much more thorough-going in its attempts to achieve the totalitarian state than its Italian prototype.

The National Socialist Party

Origin

The amazing success of the Nazi revolution was due in large part to the work of the National So­cial­ist Party, and some attention to that movement must now be given in order to gain a better conception of its place in the pattern of events. The NSDAP had its origin in the early efforts of the Army and irrec­on­cil­a­ble Nationalists to overthrow the Weimar Republic. The German Workers Party organized by Drexler in January 1919 was pro-labor at first, but the direction of its policies was soon changed by the addition to its ranks of large numbers of ex-service men, particularly officers, who had been thoroughly indoctrinated in national­ist ideology and passionately desired Germany's restoration as the greatest power in Europe. In July 1919, Adolf Hitler, an ex-serviceman and house painter, seeking means of overcoming his frustrated am­bi­tions, joined the party and became the seventh mem­ber of the party committee. Hitler's abilities as a public speaker and agitator attracted public support and greatly stimulated the party's growth. Rabidly anti-unionist and anti-Marxist from his youth, Hitler be­came an ardent nationalist after the war. Hatred of the Jews and Communists whom he identified as enemies of Germany's national life, and of the Churches which preached doctrines of pacifism and non-resistance, be­ came an obsession with him.

     After failure of the Kapp putsch in 1920, Hitler was elected president of the German Workers Party. His study of Allied propaganda methods during World War I and his application of them in party campaigns, as well as his skillful management of the party, aug­mented its strength. Negotiations with the Free Corps, later renamed the Storm Troopers, under Göring's lead­er­ship, resulted in an alliance, and plans were made for another attempt at a coup d'état. The insur­rec­tion was launched at Munich on 9 November 1923, but was crushed by loyal Republican troops, and Hitler was imprisoned. Defeat of the Beerhall putsch dem­on­strated to Hitler that the Republic could not be over­thrown as long as the masses of the people and the bulk of the army remained loyal. In consequence, he directed his efforts in later years toward winning sup­port of the Army and, in particular, the General Staff, whose purposes he recognized were basically the same as his own. With the cooperation of influential Army officers, he devised new and more effective terroristic methods. Em­ployed by groups privately raised and armed, these revolutionary propagandist techniques, copied from the Bolsheviks and the Allies, could be under­taken under the forms of law with maximum effect.

     Hitler's release from prison, where he had spent his time writing Mein Kampf (My Struggle), saw the German Workers Party disunited and on the verge of dissolution. Hence, Hitler decided to start afresh with a new party originated by himself and under his di­rec­tion but with the aid of many of his old associates. Ea­ger to support a movement which might bring the threat of communism to an end, several great indus­trial leaders furnished Hitler with ample funds while Army officers aided him in organizing Brown Shirt con­tin­gents, and the Elite Guard, a specially selected unit chosen to act as Hitler's bodyguard. Though nation­al­is­tic sentiment had risen steadily during the 1920s, it was still in a small minority until the advent of the great depression in 1929 induced many middle-class people to shift their votes to Hitler. To these were added many farmers, war veterans, and doubtful nationalists and militarists, who swung over to the Na­tional Socialist side and made it one of the major par­ties. Hitler's appeals to revenge the defeat of 1918, the disgrace of the Versailles Treaty, and the feeble pol­i­cies of the Weimar regime in dealing with large-scale unemployment were also effective in converting many youths, students, professional men, and businessmen to his cause.

     Hitler's complete victory in March 1933, and his subsequent establishment of a dictatorial regime could not be made permanent without the full consent and cooper­a­tion of the Army General Staff. This was made clear later in the year when friction between Brown Shirt leaders and the high command of the regular Army reached disconcerting heights. Undercover ne­go­ti­a­tions ensued in which Hitler agreed to rid the party and the Brown Shirts of its radical elements in exchange for Army support. The agreement was duly carried out in the blood purge of 30 June 1934, when several hundred subordinates of Hitler, including Cap­tain Ernst Roehm, leader of the anti-Hitler elements sin the Brown Shirts, were assassinated. By this brutal act, a close alliance of Army and Party was insured, and Hitler's security against internal Party dissension was safeguarded. Removal of Army opposition left Hit­ler unimpeded in his drive to achieve totalitarian unity within and pursue his external objective of con­quest of Europe and the world. The elimination of the left-wing leaders, however, gave the Party an ori­en­ta­tion still further to the right.

Organization of the Party

In imitation of the one-party systems of Italy and Soviet Russia, Nazi leaders endeavored to maintain loyalty and discipline by frequent purges, but admission to the Party was more akin to the Italian than the Russian model. The py­ram­i­dal form of the organization, with Hitler as supreme leader at the top of the pile, was admirably conceived for purposes of concentrated control and singleness of purpose. Attached to the Führer's office was a party chancellery through which all routine business passed. Hitler's chief subordinates consisted of a deputy leader aided by a staff of four members, whose duty it was to supervise Party affairs under Hitler's direction. A nineteen-member Party cabinet advised the principal leaders and, in their capacities as heads of various Party agen­cies, managed the affairs of the Party. Regionally, the Party organization was based upon the thirty-two Gaue or dis­tricts into which Germany was divided. District lead­ers were subordinate to Party headquarters and the entire system took its orders from Hitler.

     At Berlin, Munich, and other principal Party seats, elaborate quarters were maintained in which the of­fi­cers and their staffs, and Party military formations were housed. A number of auxiliary associations added strength to the Party. These included professional peo­ple, public officials, teachers, and the German Labor Front. Women's and youth's groups were included in the Party hierarchy. Annual congresses held at Nu­rem­berg helped to keep alive the spirit of the Party.

Relation of the Party to the State

In July 1933, all competing parties were legally dissolved and it was made unlawful to form new political parties. Party and State were integrated into closer unity by an act of 1 December 1933. Under this law, the Party was said to be the "bearer" of the German Government and an insepa­ra­ble part of it. As the "leading and moving power of the National Socialist State," the Party gained a unique place in affairs and its members were given a special status in relation to the law, the courts, and the police. Public officials were required to cooperate with Party members and Storm Troops in the performance of their duties. The Party and its affiliates were de­clared to be a "corporation of public law," with its mem­bers removed from the jurisdiction of the penal courts and placed under Party rules enforced by special Party courts. Though the logical relationships es­tab­lished by the law were by no means clear, the purport of the statue was to make the Party independent of po­lit­i­cal control because it was above the law and in a po­si­tion to issue orders to all government officials. Hit­ler, because of his position as absolute head of the Party, thus became master of the government even if he had not made himself head of the executive as well. Occupancy of all principal government positions by Party members gave assurance that the Führer's orders were to be carried out.

National Socialist Doctrines

Unlike the Italian fascists, Nazi theorists had ample time before the Party took power to formulate a body of doctrines fairly convincing to the German mind. Their principal apologists, E. R. Huber, F. A. Beck, and Arthur Rosenberg, created little that was original, obtaining their ideas in large part from idealists, race theorists, biologists, and economists of the 19th cen­tury such as Herder, Hegel, von Humboldt, List, Go­bi­neau, H. S. Chamberlain, and others. Cleverly se­lect­ing ideas generally accepted by the German masses, these writers gave powerful aid to the expan­sion­ist aims of Germany, and the desire of the people for efficient political leadership and strong gov­ern­ment. Among their most important doctrines may be listed:

The Doctrine of the "Folk"

Nazism based its the­ory of organic nationalism upon a blood relationship rather than upon a spiritual unity of the people. To the Nazis the "Folk" (National Community) is the basic human entity whose members are linked together in blood brotherhood (tribal concept). Out of the "Folk" emerges the State which functions as an in­stru­men­tal­ity for securing the ends of the "Folk." A product of emergent evolution based upon race, soil, and cultural changes, the "Folk" has a single will and is aware of its solidarity of purpose. The blood link makes all Ger­mans everywhere a part of the German "Folk" re­gard­ less of their legal membership in other states.

The Principle of Racial Supremacy

Ac­cording to the Nazi doctrine, races vary greatly in their native ca­pac­i­ties and adaptability to modern culture. These natu­ral distinctions necessitate the assigning to each race its place according to its capacities. All indications, Nazi writers assert, point to the Aryan race as the mas­ter race. Among all Aryans, the Germans are the most intelligent, efficient, and culturally superior. Other Ar­yan races may be classed as associates but non-Aryans are definitely inferior and should be prohibited from inter-marrying with Aryan stock. Racial inferiors should be relegated to their proper status by law if re­sid­ing within Germany. Those inhabiting territory needed by the master race for lebensraum should be destroyed or subjected to the will of their racial su­pe­riors. Of all non-Aryans, the Jews were looked upon as the lowest and most despicable, good only for depor­ta­tion, degradation, or slaughter. The race theory was designed by Nazi apologists to nullify the Marxian the­ory of world brotherhood of the workers while the at­tack upon the Jews was intended to shift working-class hatred for the employers to the Jews. programs against Jews were also used to justify German expansion into so-called Jewish-dominated states and National So­cial­ist attacks upon the Christian Churches whose creeds were drawn from Jewish sources.

The Leadership Principle

The Nazi doctrine of a supreme leader conformed to German traditional ideas. Dictatorship was rationalized by making the Führer the living embodiment and expression of the basic aims and purposes of "Folk." His declarations expressed the will of the "Folk" and, hence, were always right and entitled to unquestioning obedience.

The Principle of Hierarchy

In the Nazi ideology, political society must be organized hierarchically with the leader at the top, and descends through various lev­els of authority until the masses of the people are reached. This idea, too, was in accord with German ideas of strong and orderly government. Both Army and civilians readily accepted the idea which, when im­ple­mented in fact, gave the Nazis an unbreakable hold on power.

The Principle of an Elite

Nazi doctrine sponsored a trinity of people, Party, and leader or, functionally speaking, supporting class, leading class, and creative class. In this three-fold relationship, the Party fur­nishes the connecting link between people and leader. In theory selected for their loyalty and devotion to the Party cause, members of the Party were required to dem­on­strate zeal for their task and unquestioning obe­di­ence to the leader. The two principal functions of the Party were to (1) furnish political leadership, and (2) regiment the masses behind the leaders. As ra­tion­al­ized by Nazi spokesmen this meant promoting in the people an interest in political affairs, teaching the prin­ci­ples of Nazism, and securing full support for the pur­poses of the "Folk" as stated by Hitler. The impor­tance of these tasks explains why the Party was placed above and independent of the state and yet able to di­rect it into proper channels.

The State as a Total Unity

Hierarchy, in Nazi thinking, was not enough. The state must be organized in such a way as to achieve a total effort carried to the point of maximum efficiency. This meant the removal of all hindrances, the subordination of all political, eco­nomic, and social categories within the state and the organization of the state as a total unity to secure the ends proclaimed by the leader. After the Nazi rev­o­lu­tion, Hitler decided himself to securing this to­tal­i­tar­ian state in preparation for the larger objectives to come later.

The Ends of the State

These were for Nazi pur­poses adequately expressed under the broad term of wel­fare of the "Folk." This included, however, social and economic well-being to be secured through proper utilization of resources immediately available and ex­pan­sion of territory to permit securing of additional resources, thus permitting a rise in the standard of liv­ing. This doctrine definitely stated the Nazi purpose to seize territory of the neighbors of Germany. The justifica­tion for it could be found not only in the welfare doctrine but in the doctrines of racial and cultural su­pe­ri­or­ity. However, Nazi aims did not stop with ac­qui­si­tion of adjacent territory. Their goals were conquest of Europe and the world.

The Program of the Party

Strong appeals for mass support based upon promises to secure needs long desired by the people, were put forward enticingly in the Party program. Radical prom­ises were made to redistribute the land of the great landed proprietors among the peasants, relieve the poor of the burden of interest and profits, na­tion­al­ize the trusts, impose a capital levy on unearned incomes and fortunes swollen as a result of war prof­its, set up adequate old-age security provisions, and safe­guard the interests of the small businessman. The platform, moreover, called for abolition of the Ver­sailles Treaty, degradation of the Jews, expulsion of aliens, and conceding of equality of rights and duties for all citizens. Put forth as bait to attract votes, very few of these promises were ever made good. On the contrary, the large landed estates were left intact, the workers were deprived of their freedom, and the great corporations became more powerful than ever.

Government Institutions Under National Socialism Legal Basis

In legal form, at any rate, Hitler could claim that his regime rested upon the existing con­sti­tu­tion. Hitler's appointment as Chancellor by Hin­den­burg made his position legal. The Enabling Act, which was later passed giving the leader and his cab­i­net extraor­di­nary law-making powers, was duly en­acted by the Reichstag in conformity with con­sti­tu­tional pro­ce­dure. This was true, also, of the act passed after Hin­denburg's death unifying the offices of Chancel­lor and Reich President.

     In fact, however, the spirit of the constitution was brutally violated. Transfer of all powers to the cabinet in effect set aside the constitution and made the will of the Chancellor the absolute law of the land. Hitler's powers were dictatorial in extent and became more so as time went on. All political power was vested in him. In theory, Hitler was the sole interpreter of the national will and the only one who "knew the way." Equipped with this awe-inspiring function, the Führer could command absolute obedience from all Germans. This was even more true of Hitler's relation to the Party, whose members had sworn implicit loyalty to him under threats of severe penalties for breaches of discipline. As head of the Cabinet and in a position to secure obedience from its members, Hitler had final authority over all law- and decree-making and as both Reich President and Chancellor, he directed the vast machinery of the Army, the bureaucracy, the police, and local government. These powers were self-expanding since the dictator's authority to increase his own prerogatives were unlimited and were constantly added to until, as the war neared its end, powers of life and death over all citizens and the right to seize pri­vate property were conferred upon him.

The Office of the Führer

Not even the check of a definite term of office was set up as a safeguard against the delegation of these vast powers to the Füh­rer. Presumably his term was for life, although his pow­ers were extended from time to time. The leader appointed his own successor. Needless to say, the con­fer­ring of such vast powers upon one man did not mean in fact that he could exercise them in detail. In practice, Hitler, who hated the routine handling of gov­ern­ment affairs, left the details to his subordinates and confined his own work to occasional intervention to adjust mistakes or prevent conflicts between admin­is­tra­tors. This left Hitler free to concentrate upon mil­i­tary affairs and foreign policy in which he prided him­self on his proficiency. His confidence in himself seemed to be borne out by his singular diplomatic tri­umphs between 1933 and 1939, which, together with his military victories in 1940-1941, gave him tre­men­dous popular prestige. His defeats in the Russian cam­paigns and reversals in the latter stages of the war, how­ever, shattered the myth of his invincibility and turned both the public and the Army against him.

The Führer's Personal Staff

Three im­portant bu­reaus handled Hitler's personal business. These were the Chancellery of the Reich, the Chancellery of the President, and the Chancellery of the Leader of the Party. The first agency canvassed the news and kept track of legislative proposals emanating from the various ministries. The second office specialized on dip­lo­matic and personnel questions, while the third bureau handled all Party matters needing attention by the leader, as well as economic problems arising in the Na­tional Defense Council.

The National Defense Council

Created in August 1939, this body was headed by Göring and included top-ranking officials representing the Party, the Army, and economic affairs. Having as its chief re­spon­si­bil­ity, the overall planning for the nation's defense, the Council was given broad powers to coordinate civil, political, economic, and military operations to secure this end. Full legislative and executive powers to deal with these matters were delegated to this body by Hit­ler, and they could be exercised without specific approval from him. Individual members of the Council could issue decrees within their own spheres of action. Defense districts headed by Reich Defense Com­mis­sioners were set up throughout the Reich to administer the program in detail.

The Cabinet

The coalition cabinet formed by Hit­ler under Hindenburg's direction in 1933 was grad­u­ally converted through dismissals and new appoint­ments into a completely Nazi organization. The new Ministries of Propaganda and Public Enlightenment, Air, Church affairs, and Science and Education were added in 1933-1934. The Ministry of Economics and Agriculture was divided into two separate agencies. By January 1945, fifteen Cabinet Ministries were in ex­ist­ence. These were: Interior, Foreign Affairs, Justice, Propaganda, Economics, Food and Agriculture, Fi­nance, Labor, Education, Church Affairs, Transport, Ports, Air, Armaments, and War.

     Added to the cabinet, also, were the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, the Deputy Leader, the Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces, the Delegate in charge of the Four-Year Plan, and other top-ranking officials appointed by Hitler. The Deputy Leader (Rudolph Hess) flew to England in 1942 where he was captured and interned. The Chief of Cabinet of the Dep­uty Leader (Martin Bormann) was therefore des­ig­nated to replace him. The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces became the ministerial rep­re­sen­ta­tion of all military and naval formations. The Del­e­gate in charge of the Four-Year Plan was chairman of the War Council and, therefore, director of all non-military war activities. Indeed, Göring, by Hitler's com­mand, could issue orders to all departments in respect to matters affecting the war effort.

     Under the Nazi regime, the cabinet, as such, lost its controlling position in the government and de­vel­oped into a mere group of department heads taking or­ders from an all-powerful dictator. Having lost its cor­po­rate power to determine policy and guide administration, the cabinet became an advisory body only. Its deliberative functions were taken over largely by the War Council. Meetings were infrequently held, and Hitler, by consulting ministers individually, caused it to disintegrate still further. On the other hand, Hitler's tendency to delegate power plus the ne­ces­si­ties of the case, enabled more capable executives to create powerful personal machines within their de­part­ments over which they exercised unquestioned sway. Interdepartmental rivalries between department heads ambitious for power, resulted in ups and downs for various ones with Göring, Goebbels, Ribbentrop, and Himmler fighting it out for precedence. Ultimately Himmler, as head of the Gestapo and the SS Elite Guard, won his way to top place at the end of the war.

The Civil Service

In order to induce the measure of cooperation found lacking in the civil service under the Weimar Government, the party dictatorship launched a thorough-going purge of the government services. Under the act of 7 April 1933, as sub­se­quently amended, all Jewish employees of the gov­ern­ment were made subject to demotion or dismissal. Jews were also barred from seeking employment with the government. Jews, Communists, and recent appoint­ees when dismissed were ineligible to receive dismissal ages. The purge of Jews and radicals was applied to all levels of the teaching profession as well as other government positions. In January 1937, new regulations were introduced stipulating five essentials for office-holding:

1.     Special preparation for the position.

2.     Proven loyalty to the Nazi regime.

3.     Aryan parentage.

4.     Performance of required labor and military serv­ice.

5.     An oath of allegiance to Hitler.

     The drastic legal provisions placed on the statute books did not, however, secure the thorough cleansing de­sired by the Nazis. The need to retain competent pub­lic servants compelled retention of non-Nazis on all lev­els. More effective at the higher levels, the purge failed to operate effectively in the middle and lower strata of government officials. In consequence, con­sid­er­a­ble friction developed between party and bu­reau­cracy owing to the independent attitude assumed by the latter.

The National Legislature

As has been noted, the Reichsrat was finally abolished by the Nazi "New Or­der." This left only the Reichstag, which Hitler was pledged to preserve. True, the Reichstag was con­tin­ued but stripped of the great powers it possessed under the Republic. Deputies continued to be elected but the elections became a farce. Lists of candidates were pre­pared by the Nazi Minister of the Interior and no com­pet­ing candidates were permitted to run. Hence, the peo­ple had no choice even if they had been allowed to vote freely. The result was the election of Reichstags composed almost entirely of Nazis. Since all legislative powers had been delegated to the cabinet, the Reich­stag had little to do. Consequently, the lower house met infrequently and occupied its time in approving al­ready consummated acts of government or in rubber-stamping some notable achievement of the Führer. Be­tween 1933 and 1938, four elections to the Reichstag were held. Deputies continued to draw their salaries though largely deprived of their functions. Thus the peo­ple lost the only remaining vehicle for effectuating popular desires.

Changes in the Judiciary

Establishment of the dic­ta­tor­ ship made Hitler the source of all law and jus­tice in the Reich, both in law and fact. By various decrees the judicial system was brought under his con­trol. Non-Nazi judges were purged and loyal party men named in their places. Courts on all levels were cautioned to cooperate with the regime in its business of law enforcement. The nationalization of all courts and the making of their judges national officials appoint­ive by Hitler or his deputy brought the entire judicial system under control of the party leaders. The organization of the courts, however, was not greatly changed. It was the personnel at which the Nazis aimed. Administrative courts were allowed to remain but their power to review administrative decrees and try officials for offenses against citizens was greatly curtailed. Civil, criminal, and political cases were made the subject of particular party concern and party policies in regard to such cases were forced upon the courts. However, in the sphere of private property the courts asserted established rules of law and resisted Nazi encroachments upon legal principles recognized in this area.

     The legal system was changed to facilitate Nazi pur­poses. The criminal code was amended to embrace a wide range of newly defined political offenses, punishments for criminal offenses were increased, and the theory of retributive justice restored. The People's Courts set up to try political offenders were given sum­mary powers to deal with such cases, and the bru­tal concentration camps were established to receive the condemned. Labor cases were handled by Special Honor Courts created under the new labor and pro­fes­sional codes. Finally, a complete system of Party courts was erected to try offenses of Party members against the special Party code. Because they were ex­empt from the ordinary laws, this was the only way in which Party members could be brought to justice. Al­though theoretically the entire legal system was, by these means, made the creature of the "prerogative state," in actuality the continued assertion of the prin­ci­ples of established law by some of the German courts prevented establishment of totalitarian controls over the legal and judicial system. Nevertheless, a sub­ser­vi­ent judiciary was the rule under the Nazis.

Centralization of Power in the National Gov­ern­ment

Proceeding rapidly, the Nazis overthrew con­sti­tu­tional safeguards of autonomy of the states and concentrated all political powers in the Berlin Government. Between 1933 and 1935, a series of decree-laws transferred the legal authority of the states to the Reich, abolished the representative state leg­is­la­tures, and conferred upon appointive state cabinets all necessary powers to legislate in the form of decrees, subject to review by the national minister concerned. The Office of National Governor was created and one such official assigned to each of the states. Appointed and dismissed by Hitler and supervised in the exercise of their powers by the Reich Minister of the Interior, the governors gradually lost importance as more and more power was concentrated in the cabinet, the war council, and the Army. They were given three func­tions of importance:

1.     To expedite enforcement of national laws within the states.

2.     To review the work of state cabinets.

3.     To promulgate laws decreed by state cabinets.

     Because of Prussia's size and importance, Hitler ex­er­cised direct control over the Prussian Government through the head of the Prussian Cabinet. Prussian pro­vin­cial governors were also appointed by Hitler.

Reorganization of Local Government

A new Mu­nic­i­pal Code, adopted in 1935, placed all com­munes under control of the Reich Minister of the In­te­rior. City charters could still be locally prepared but had to be approved by this official. All representative local councils were eliminated and advisory bodies, com­posed of members selected jointly by the local Party agent and the mayor, took their places. In the larger cities, the mayors were made chief executive of­ficers with broad powers. These officials were selected by the National Governor or the Minister of the In­te­rior from a list of professionally trained persons al­ways carefully checked by the local agent of the party. All essential local functions were supervised by the Min­is­ter of the Interior.

The Treatment of the Jews

The Nazis' attack upon the Jews stemmed not only from their desire to destroy the socialist theory of the world brotherhood of workers, and transfer the blame for German ills from capitalists to another scapegoat. Hitler's ingrown hatred for the Jews was also a factor in intensifying the anti-Jewish campaign. The per­se­cu­tion of the Jews was deliberately undertaken and car­ried out with ruthless efficiency. Along with the purge of Jews from the civil service went measures to exclude them from the professions. In the schools, Jew­ish children were segregated and their numbers lim­ited on higher educational levels to 1.5% of total student enrollments. Jews were excluded from po­si­tions on newspapers and the works of Jewish artists were banned.

     An attempt was made in the Nuremberg laws of 1935 to distinguish Jews from the rest of the pop­u­la­tion and prevent them from intermarrying. Jews were defined as persons with three or four grandparents, or with only two if married to a Jew or professing the Jew­ish religion. Marriage or sexual intercourse be­tween Jews and Germans was strictly forbidden. Per­sons of mixed parentage were required to marry Ar­y­ans. In this way, the Nazis tried to purify the Aryan blood of the German community. Those classified as Jews lost their citizenship and civil rights and were de­prived at first of the honor of performing military serv­ice. Attacks upon Jews were encouraged by the gov­ern­ment and carried out by Party men, the Brown Shirt militia, and the Gestapo. Soon it became ap­par­ent that the plan of the Nazis was to destroy all Jews in Germany. Boycotts and beatings were followed by se­ques­tra­tion of property and deportation to Poland.

     Deprived of their property and their right to work, the Jews were exposed to the most brutal terrorism. The assassination by a Polish Jew of a member of the German legation in Paris let loose a program openly sponsored by the Party and its supporters, which liq­ui­dated what was left of Jewish-held property and erad­i­cated all vestiges of Jewish culture. Thousands were thrown into murder camps. A capital levy assessed against the Jews by the government confiscated their property, thus securing large revenues without need to impose unpopular taxes upon the general population. By subsequent decrees, Jews were prohibited from own­ing any kind of business and excluded from poor relief, and from Aryan schools. Deportations, small at first, were increased until, by 1943, all but a few thou­sand Jews had been deported to death camps in Poland where they were exterminated. Allied occupying troops in 1945 found only a few thousand Jews re­main­ing in the whole of Germany.

The Nazi Attack on the Churches

The quarrel of the Nazi leaders with the Christian churches in Germany arose mainly because of their fear that the churches would oppose the drive for a totalitarian regime. The attack upon Christian theology was prompted both by the Jewish origin of the Chris­tian creed and by the conflicts in Christian doctrine with Nazi objectives and ideological teachings. Such Christian conceptions as the brotherhood of man and the fatherhood of God, love of one's fellow-man, forgiveness, humility, and mercy for defeated enemies were all contrary to the Nazi desire to glorify war and encourage racial and national antipathies. For this rea­son, Rosenberg and his fellow-theorists advocated com­plete reorganization of the churches and the sup­plant­ing of Christian theology with Nazi race doctrines and the myths of Germany's pagan past. If the churches could be persuaded to act as dispensers of Nazi propaganda, the Party program would be immensely expedited. Religious institutions would thus become a part of the machinery of the Party using Mein Kampf as their bible and preaching National So­cial­ism as their religion.

     In order to further this plan, an organization of "German Christians," sponsored by the Nazi Party lead­ers and aiming to convert the churches to Nazi ends, secured control over the Church Synods. Wran­gling over the heretical doctrines of the German Chris­tians resulted in a split in the Lutheran Church, partic­u­larly because of Nazi persecution of the Jews. Orthodox pastors, who refused to compromise their Chris­tian beliefs, established the "Confes­sional Synod of the German Evangelical Church," and in spite of per­se­cu­tion by the government resisted for a time Nazi attempts to unify the churches. In 1935, the Reich Gov­ern­ment created a National Department for Church Affairs with legal control over both Protestant and Cath­o­lic Churches. Except for a few pastors, the Lu­theran Churches finally submitted and were brought under government control. Lutheran youth groups were consolidated with the Hitler Youth movement and Nazism had its way.

     In the case of the Catholic Church, the Concordat of 1933, intended by church leaders to protect the rights of the Catholic Churches in Germany, was disregarded by the Nazis. Because of the resistance to Nazi attempts to dominate the Church, Catholicism was attacked as a foreign political movement. Through the use of force, Catholic youth groups were fused with the Hitler Youth. Wide-scale persecution of Cath­o­lic clergy was instituted, and many churches and re­lig­ious orders were forced to close. Nevertheless, the Catholic clergy rejected state control and resisted vig­or­ously application of Nazi measures of sterilization and suppression of the Catholic press, schools, youth groups, and religious associations. In this stand, the German Catholics were powerfully supported by the Pope who denounced the trend to paganism in Ger­many. Yet, in spite of all resistance by the churches, the Nazis were able to win control over the young peo­ple of Germany and begin the work of indoctrination in the theories of force and conquest. Nevertheless, courageous clerics, both Protestant and Catholic, stood firm against the Nazi tide. Men like Karl Barth and Pas­tor Niemoeller cooperated with Catholic priests in keeping up the struggle.

Reorganization in Agriculture

At the heart of Nazi plans for agriculture was the pur­pose of making Germany self-sufficient in foodstuffs and raw materials so as to defeat an Allied blockade in time of war. Loans to farmers and price-fixing were used to induce larger production. Rationing of food was instituted as early as 1935. In 1933, the He­red­i­tary Farm Act was passed with the object of relieving farmers of heavy debt burdens, giving them greater se­cu­rity in the future, and preventing further reduction in the size of farm holdings. Under its provisions all farms of under 300 acres were made hereditary home­steads which could not be sold or mortgaged by their owners or attached by creditors. Ownership des­cended from father to first-born son.

     Overall organization and planning control were se­cured by creation of an Agriculture Estate. All farmers were required to be members. At the head of this agency a Reich Peasant's Leader was established who administered the Estate under supervision of the De­part­ment of Agriculture. A Farmer's Council advised the leader. On provincial and local levels, leaders and farmers' councils performed similar functions. The Ag­ri­cul­ture Estate also included all food producers and processors organized in associations according to the type of production. Although it looked good on paper, this plan did not accomplish the expected results. Hit­ler was unable to fulfill his promises to redistribute the land because of his fear of antagonizing the Junkers and powerful Army commanders who were associated with them. Hence, only about half the farming area was affected by redistribution policies. At­trac­ted by high wages in the cities, peasants left the farms in large numbers, thus reducing output. Increased prices raised farm incomes but Nazi interference was resented by the peasants.

Nazi Politics in Industry

The major Nazi purpose in the reorganization of indus­try was to increase production and prepare the nation for war. In the Nazi economic system, the property in­ter­ests of the wealthy industrialists, Junkers, Army lead­ers, and upper classes generally were safeguarded while the working classes were deprived of their rights and their unions, and regimented in their jobs with the object of securing greater productive effort from them. Private enterprise was allowed to continue but was sub­ject to increasing government controls. Although the Nazis prided themselves on this feature of their sys­tem, which they said distinguished them from the Communists, in time, most private enterprise was sub­jected to more and more detailed regulation, while gov­ernment-owned or sponsored cartels took over ever-increasing areas of business. By 1940, the Na­tional Socialist regime in Germany had begun to re­sem­ble in a number of ways the system of Soviet com­mu­nism.

     The business community as a whole was unified under national controls. Business associations on all levels were nationalized and their officers subjected to supervision by the Reich Minister of Economics. Na­tional business associations were joined together into national groups. Membership on the part of busi­ness­men in these associations was compulsory. Crowning the business edifice was a Reich Economic Chamber to which delegates from all business associations and Cham­bers were sent. Through this body, the Reich De­part­ment of Economics exercised general controls over German industry on national, regional, and local levels. By means of this structure of business, the Nazi regime was able to control, aid, and indoctrinate busi­ness­ men so as to secure their conformity to overall Na­tional Socialist plans. Even the handicrafts were inte­grated in similar fashion.

     By 1938, German industrial output was at its peace­time maximum but Nazi war plans called for greater production, especially of armaments. Ac­cord­ingly, a Four-Year Plan organization, headed by Her­mann Göring, was instituted. This body was given extraor­di­nary powers over all other agencies of gov­ern­ment to control production: allocation, exchange, and prices of raw materials; manpower; agricultural commodities; and foreign exchange. In fact, all trans­ac­tions having to do with war preparations were under its control. The plans worked out by the Göring agency were implemented in detail by the Ministry of Economics, which gradually encroached upon the func­tions of the Göring organization. Special agencies were created to expedite production of selected com­mod­i­ties, such as coal, steel, oil, etc.

     When the war broke out, the Planning Agency was replaced by a Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich, with Göring at its head. Manned by key minis­ters and Party representatives, this agency be­came virtually a War Cabinet with tremendous powers to direct the German war effort. Subordinate to this agency was a General Council, composed of under­sec­re­tar­ies, also under Göring, which coordinated war efforts on lower levels. In addition, Reich Com­mis­sion­ers were em­ployed as agents of the government on national and regional levels to increase industrial pro­duction. Progress of the war revealed a scarcity of ca­pa­ble public officials with the result that government regulation of business was relaxed and businessmen re­gained their former dominating positions. Huge cartels sponsored by the government absorbed much of Ger­man business and ramified out over occupied Europe.

The Labor Front

Hitler's victory in 1933 enabled the Nazi juggernaut to crush the independent labor unions. A government-sponsored Labor Front was instituted in place of the free unions. Both workers and employers were rep­re­sented in this organization, yet workers were excluded from representation in the new Estate of Industry and Trade. Dr. Robert Ley and all of its leaders were Party zealots so that Hitler could feel confident of results. Though membership was not compulsory in theory, in fact it was because non-members were prevented from obtaining employment. At the base of the structure were the workers and employers of a single firm or­gan­ized into an association. Plant units were combined into some 15,000 local groups. District, regional, and national associations linked these bodies together into a highly integrated system under Party controls. Ac­tu­ally, the Labor Front was not a substitute for the free labor unions since it confined itself to reconciliation of differences between employers and employees, and pro­mo­tion of educational, social insurance, and rec­re­a­tional benefits to its members. Collective bargaining by this agency was prohibited.

The Labor Code and the Labor Trustees

By the Act to Regulate National Labor of 1934, strikes and lockouts were outlawed. The employer of each busi­ness was authorized to fix wages, hours, and working conditions, subject to advice of a plant council. This agency was elected by the employees from a list made up by the employer (Plant Leader) and the chief Party representative in the plant. The advantages to the em­ployer in these arrangements are obvious. Labor disputes were handled by Labor Trustees established in 14 districts. Appeals from plant employees were reviewed by the Trustees who had power to establish general principles for collective agreements, approve dismissals where several employees were involved, and establish emergency wage-scales. Functioning in conjunction with the Trustees were Industrial Honor Courts with power to review cases of injustice involv­ing workers. Powers of the Trustees were broadened in 1939 to include supervision over collective agree­ments and setting of maximum wages. In consequence, the Nazi Government determined the conditions of work and the workers were deprived of a voice in such matters. Hence, their status approximated a condition of involuntary servitude.

Labor Service

Compulsory labor service as well as compulsory military service characterized the Nazi regime. Universal labor service was imposed upon all boys and girls between the ages of 18 and 25. The term was for six months and the service was at tasks useful to the nation. In this way, an immense volume of valuable labor time was contributed at very small cost. Young men were conditioned by this work for mil­i­tary service later on. Another form of compulsory service was in time of national disaster. All persons were made liable for this. The growing shortage of la­bor resulted in general labor conscription in 1938, under which any individual might be drafted for any length of time and sent where needed. The exigencies of war led to issuance of decrees in January 1943, re­quir­ing registration of all unemployed, men from 16 to 65 and women from 17 to 45 for defense work. After 1938, women could be forced to work on the farms. Strict discipline was applied to workers on the job, and quitting without permission was forbidden. Child labor laws were suspended and children of school-leaving age were required to register for work or training.

Results of Nazi Labor Policy

As to the effects of Nazi labor policies on the workers, opinions vary widely. The conservative writer, Guillebeaud, agrees that the high wages and excellent working conditions enjoyed by the workers up to 1939 more than balanced the loss of freedom caused by abolition of the free unions, regimentation by employers and the gov­ern­ment, and strict surveillance by the Gestapo. More rad­i­cal writers stress the absence of freedom of the work­ers and emphasize the lowering of labor standards after 1939, and the progressive deterioration of the work­ers lot.

Bibliography

Books

·        Brecht. Prelude to Silence. Oxford University Press, New York, 1944. Ably describes the events leading up to and following the fall of the Weimar system.

·        W. Ebenstein. The Nazi State. Farrar and Rinehart, 1943. An excellent exposition of the government and politics of the Third Reich.

·        E. Fraenkel. The Dual State. Oxford University Press, New York, 1941. Discusses authoritatively the effect of Nazism upon German law and courts.

·        K. Heiden. A History of National Socialism. Knopf, 1935. A "must" on Nazi Party history.

·        H. Lichtenberger. The Third Reich. Greystone, New York, 1937. An able treatment of the earlier pe­riod of the Nazi regime. Contains valuable doc­u­ments in appendices.

·        N. Micklem. National Socialism and the Roman Cath­o­lic Church. Oxford University Press, London, 1939. An excellent detailed account of relations between the Na­zis and the Catholic Church.

·        R. E. Murphy, et al. National Socialism. U.S. Gov­ern­ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1943. Nazi the­o­ries summarized. Well doc­u­mented.

·        Otto Nathan. The Nazi Economic System. Duke Uni­ver­sity Press, 1944. Complete and dependable.

·        S. Neumann. Permanent Revolution. Harper, 1942. A pen­e­trating analysis of the Nazi Party and dic­ta­tor­ship.

Articles, Booklets, Pamphlets

·        G. Brunner. "Failure of Hitler's Population Policy." Con­tempo­rary Review, 16, May 1942, pages 297-300.

·        L. Domeratzky. "The Industrial Power of the Nazis." For­eign Affairs, 19, April 1941, pages 641-654.

·        C. W. Guillebeaud. The Social Policy of Nazi Ger­many. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1941.

·        L. Hamburger. How Nazi Germany Has Mobilized and Con­trolled Labor. Brookings Institution, Wash­ing­ton, D.C., 1940.

·        G. Hutton. "German Economic Tension, Causes and Results." Foreign Affairs, 17, April 1939, pages 524-537.

·        E. Klein. "Women in National Socialism." Fort­nightly, 151, April 1942, pages 285-292.

·        J. B. Mason. "The Judicial System of the Nazi Party." Amer­ican Political Science Review, 38, February 1944, pages 96-103.

·        J. K. Pollock and H. J. Heneman. The Hitler Decrees. Wahr, Ann Arbor, 1934.

·        H. Rauschning. "Hitler Could Not Stop." Foreign Af­fairs, 18, October 1939, pages 1-12.

·        V. "The Destruction of Capitalism in Germany." For­eign Affairs, 15, July 1937, pages 595-60.