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| A German soldier with a captured submachine gun during the Battle of Stalingrad, in Spring of 1942. |
by William L. Howard
The German Army onslaught against the Soviet Union was to
become one of the bloodiest campaigns in history. Russian military battle
deaths alone are estimated at seven million. German losses were considerably
less. Most historians will agree that the turning point in the war was the
battle of Stalingrad in which the entire German Sixth Army was sacrificed. It
need not have been so.
At 0300 on 22 June 1941, Germany attacked the Soviet Union
in Operation BARBAROSSA. The plan called for a five-month campaign whose
objective was the destruction of the bulk of the Red Army in the west to
prevent its withdrawal into the interior, then to pursue the retreating
Russians to the Volga River along three axes. Army Group North would advance
toward Leningrad, Army Group Center would advance toward Moscow, and Army Group
South would advance toward Stalingrad and the Caucasus.
The seizure of Leningrad in the north would effectively turn
the Baltic Sea into a German "lake" and neutralize the Soviet Baltic
Fleet. The capture of Moscow would destroy the seat of communist government and
political power. The drive toward Stalingrad would acquire for Hitler badly
needed wheat and coal from the Ukraine, oil from the Caucasus, and the
industrial complexes of the Donets Basin.
Hitler's generals were of the opinion that the main thrust
should be toward Moscow as it was the center of the Russian railroad system
and, given its political significance, would be defended by the best Soviet
formations. The destruction of the Russian forces around Moscow would be
disastrous for the Communists. As it turned out, Hitler's wishes were not those
of his generals. The capture of Stalingrad became the focus of his attention.
After initial successes in the summer of 1941, the offensive
ground to a halt in the winter, having failed to achieve any of its objectives.
On 6 December 1941, the Russians launched a major counteroffensive. The attack
slowly pushed the Germans back but ran down in late February 1942, because the
German divisions were able to contain the Soviet breakthrough attempts. But the
cost in German men and material was high. Both sides had been exhausted in the
winter campaign and the spring thaw and mud enforced a general truce until May.
But, Hitler badly needed the Caucasus oil to pursue his aims
and decided to launch a summer offensive toward Stalingrad (see Map 1).
The German Army of 1942, which was to launch this attack,
was inferior to the German force that had attacked Russia the summer before.
Army Group South had received the only replacements. But, many of its
formations consisted of German satellite forces from Italy, Romania, and
Hungary, all of questionable reliability. Furthermore, German industry had
failed to adequately replace the material losses from the previous winter
campaign.
The Army Group South plan called for destroying the Russian
forces in the bend of the Don River followed by the seizure of the oil fields
and the capture of Stalingrad (Map 1). Phase one of the operation cost the
Russians 240,000 men and 1,249 tanks. Another one hundred thousand Russians
were lost at Sevastopol on the Black Sea. The poor showing of the Russians up
to that point convinced Hitler that his combined operation, Stalingrad and the
Caucasus, would meet little opposition despite the fact that the Russians
expected them to attack in this area.
The second phase began on 30 June, with the Sixth Army
commanded by General Friedrich Paulus advancing along the Don River in the
direction of Stalingrad and linking up with the Fourth Panzer Army on 7 July.
Army Group South was now reorganized into Army Groups A and B. Army Group A was
commanded by Field Marshal Wilhelm List and was comprised of the Fourteenth
Panzer Army, the First Panzer Army and the Seventeenth Army. Army Group B was
commanded by Field Marshal Fedor von Bock and was comprised of the German
Second and Sixth Armies, the Fourth Panzer Army, the Romanian Third and Fourth
Armies, the Italian Eighth Army and the Hungarian Second Army.
Phase three began on 9 July with the attack of Army Group A.
The attack was a success with many Russian soldiers deserting and Russian units
breaking up. Phase four began on 13 July when Hitler ordered Army Group A to
turn south toward the Caucasus and cross the Don east of Rostov. The Fourth
Panzer Army, minus a panzer corps, was diverted from support of the Sixth Army
to support Army Group A's drive to the Caucasus. The Sixth, along with the
remaining panzer corps from the Fourth Panzer Army, was left alone to continue
the drive on Stalingrad.
The Sixth Army reached the Volga in September but was not in
possession of the city, though its fall was expected. These expectations were
not realized. Instead, the Germans found themselves slowly bleeding to death
with few replacements coming to the front. The Russians, however, were able to
bring up fresh forces from east of the Volga.
In the battle for the city, Stalingrad was reduced to
rubble. The siege lasted sixty-six days. The fighting was hand-to-hand,
house-to-house, and day-to-day, with neither side scoring a decisive victory.
As the battle for the city was taking place, the Red Army was planning a
counteroffensive to secure the Dnieper River line and to cut off Army Group A
in the Caucasus.
The Russian counteroffensive was planned in three phases.
Phase one was to be the annihilation of the Sixth Army by attacks against the
Romanian-held sectors on the flanks of the Sixth Army. Phase two was to be the
overrunning of the Italian Eighth Army and then advancing to the mouth of the
Don. This would cut off the retreat of Army Group A except by the Kerch Narrows
in the Sea of Azov. Phase three was to be the destruction of the Hungarians
around Kortoyok, thus opening up the road to the Dnieper River (see Map 2).
At 0720 on 19 November, Russian artillery fire deluged the
Romanian positions and by 0850 Russian infantry surged out of the Serafimovich
bridgehead. The Romanian Third Army held until noon but the Russians broke
through with cavalry and tanks and headed for Kalach. On 20 November, the
Russians struck the Romanian Fourth Army which panicked. The Russians broke
through, trapping elements of the Fourth Panzer Army. The northern arm reached
Kalach on the 21st. By the 23rd the trap was closed and the Sixth Army was
encircled (see Map 3).
As the Stalingrad trap was closing, General von Seydlitz,
commanding LI Corps of the Sixth Army, worked out, in conjunction with the
Sixth Army's chief of staff, a plan for a breakout in a southwesterly
direction. He held a conference with General Heitz, commanding VIII Corps;
General Strecher, commanding XI Corps; and General Hube, commanding XIV Panzer
Corps. All of the generals were of the opinion that a breakout should be
effected immediately and Paulus agreed.
Sixth Army then issued the "Flower Order"
effective on Hitler's permission. This plan was a three-phase breakout that had
a ten-to-one chance of success:
Would be withdrawn from the perimeter and massed in waves.
The first breakout wave would have 130 tanks, armored reconnaissance
vehicles, combat vehicles of the 3rd and 29th Motorized Divisions, and 17,000
combat troops.
The second wave would have 4,000 men.
General von Weichs, commanding Army Group B, also believed
it necessary to evacuate the Stalingrad position and ordered Paulus to fight
his way out and, if necessary, abandon his heavy equipment. It still remained
to be seen what Hitler's decision would be.
At 0115, 24 November, General Paulus wired Hitler for
permission to break out.
At OKH, some 1,500 miles from the scene, General Zeitzler,
recently appointed Chief of the German General Staff, was constantly attempting
to convince Hitler of the need to evacuate Stalingrad. Engaging in many heated
conversations, many of them in the middle of the night, Zeitzler almost
convinced Hitler to allow the breakout. He even took the initiative and told
von Weichs and Paulus to be prepared. The order never came because
Reichsmarschall Göring promised Hitler that the Luftwaffe would supply
Stalingrad by air if Paulus could maintain control of the three airfields at
Stalingrad. Göring believed that 500 tons per day (less than was needed) could
be supplied by the Luftwaffe but this was impossible, a fact which was not
evident when Hitler made his decision. Hitler's intention was that the Sixth
Army would stand fast. He intended to supply them by airlift and send relief
forces as soon as possible. In the meantime, he designated them "Fortress
Stalingrad."
The situation at the front was critical, the Russians having
pushed twenty-three divisions through the Romanian Third Army and had
twenty-three more advancing towards the Chir River. Soviet troops in Stalingrad
and to the north of the city were being reinforced from across the Volga. To
meet the threat, the Germans reinforced the Don Army Group under Field Marshal
von Manstein.
Army Group Don was to consist of the Sixth Army with
twenty-two divisions, remnants of the Fourth Panzer Army, and the Romanian
Third and Fourth Armies. The Sixth Army was surrounded, low on food, fuel, and
ammunition and had little hope of replenishing anything. The Sixth Army hold
"Fortress Stalingrad," though subordinate to Headquarters Army Group
Don "on paper," had come under the direct control of the OKH (German
High Command, i.e., Hitler).
The Germans fought off the Russians through the early days
of December but their semi-circle in the city was constantly shrinking. In an
attempt to save the Sixth Army, the Fourth Panzer Army under the code name
"Winter Tempest" attacked from the south in the direction of
Stalingrad on 12 December to link up with and relieve the beleaguered forces in
the city. This attack was to cover 62 miles. Originally the plan called for two
relief attacks, but due to the difficulty of bringing up reinforcements this
was abandoned. By the 19th the Fourth Panzer Army stalled 30 miles short of the
Sixth Army.
Sensing the gravity of the situation and acting on his own,
von Manstein ordered Paulus to prepare to break out. General Paulus refused,
claiming his now-depleted fuel supplies would permit an advance of only 20
miles, 10 miles short of a link-up.
Back at Hitler's headquarters, General Zeitzler was again
trying to convince Hitler of the necessity of breaking out of Stalingrad.
Hitler finally agreed, providing that the Volga River line could still be held.
Word was then received that the Sixth Army lacked sufficient fuel for the
proposed breakout. When Hitler learned of the problem, he ordered Paulus to remain
in the city since he did not want the stranded tanks to become standing targets
in the middle of the steppes.
Conditions within the city were growing worse because the
promised 500 tons of supplies per day were not being flown in. Two hundred and
seventy-eight transport planes were lost in December attempting to land at the
three airfields that were subject to constant artillery fire. Combined with
difficult flying conditions were administrative blunders. One such mistake
resulted in the delivery of one ton of marjoram (a food seasoning), ten cases
of pickles, fifteen typewriters, and a dozen cases of contraceptives.
Most of the artillery and transport horses had been
converted to meat and soup. Finally, dogs, cats, and even mice and rats
disappeared from the streets.
Elsewhere on the front, the Russians had pushed the Germans
back and were preparing for the final annihilation of the Sixth Army. In an
attempt to prevent unnecessary slaughter, General Rokossovsky, Commander-in-Chief
of the Russian Don Front, sent Paulus a message pointing out that he was
surrounded, was unable to receive adequate supplies and could not possibly
except to effect a breakout. Rokossovsky called for an immediate cessation of
hostilities and promised safety, medical treatment, and food for all who surrendered.
Hitler immediately replied that the Sixth Army was to stand
fast, holding to the last man and the last round of ammunition. ("Kampfen
bis zum letzten Mann und bis zur letzten Patrone," the message said.)
The Soviet plan of attack to destroy the Sixth Army was to
break up the large pocket holding the city into several smaller ones, which
they would destroy piecemeal. On 10 January, a two-hour artillery barrage
signaled the approaching attack. At noon the Russians attacked, but due to
stiff German resistance, the main aim of splitting the large pocket failed. By
22 January, the German airlift ceased to operate after the airfields had fallen
into Russian hands (minimal supplies continued to be delivered by parachute).
Paulus' hope for adequate re-supply had vanished and he radioed Hitler for
permission to break out in organized groups to the south. This was again
refused and by 25 January, the Germans were split into two pockets and three
days later into three pockets: the XI Corps holding the northern factory area,
VIII and LI Corps holding the center pocket, and non-descript remnants holding
the area around Paulus' headquarters (see Map 4).
On 31 January 1943, LI Corps could no longer resist and the
central pocket surrendered. In the basement of the Univermag Department Store,
Paulus, newly promoted by Hitler to the rank of field marshal, surrendered to
the Russian generals. On 2 February, the Russians shelled the tractor factory.
Russian tanks arrived but were not fired upon since all German equipment had
been destroyed and the positions vacated. At 1115, XI Corps radioed the Supreme
Command that they had held to the last man. The city of Stalingrad and the
Sixth Army were lost to the Germans.
We have seen how the Germans sacrificed the Sixth Army in a
futile attempt to capture and hold Stalingrad. Having examined the course of
events that led to Paulus' surrender, it becomes impossible to view the battle
without forming a personal opinion. Even the casual observer will concede that
somebody did something wrong. I believe that that somebody was Paulus and the
something wrong was not breaking out of the encirclement immediately, despite
Hitler's orders to stand and fight, and later, not seizing on the second
opportunity when the Fourth Panzer Army fought to within 30 miles of
Stalingrad.
A breakout is not an unsound tactic. The U.S. Army covers
this in Field Manual FM 7-20. It states that units must plan for encirclements
and must be prepared to break out if the mission requires. It emphasizes the
need to break out before the enemy can organize an effective containment. The
breakout should have two attacks: a diversionary attack to throw the enemy off
balance and the main attack in the direction of friendly forces.
Paulus had his first chance to break out when the Russian
pincers first closed about him on 23 November. Had Paulus withdrawn his forces
from the city immediately and attacked westward he might have saved his army
from eventual defeat. A decision such as this would, of course, have to be
based on an estimate that the situation would get worse as time went on.
On 24 November, after the Russian pincers first isolated the
Sixth Army, the conditions were ripe for a breakout. Paulus and his subordinate
commanders had planned for it, and issued the "Flower Order." Army
Group B had ordered him to break out. Yet, in the face of the Russian
onslaught, Paulus requested OKH for permission to execute the operation. Also,
General Zeitzler at OKH had taken the initiative and alerted Army Group B and
Paulus to prepare to execute the plan.
Paulus' request to Hitler for permission to break out was an
error in judgment since he knew of Hitler's strong feelings about defending
Stalingrad. In the end, of course, Hitler refused.
At this point, Paulus should have seized the initiative, and
presented the High Command with a fait accompli since the stage had been set.
He had been exposed to enough chaotic blunders to realize "der
Führer" was not a competent tactician and that remaining at Stalingrad was
tantamount to ultimate capitulation. Perhaps one can justify his actions by
saying that he did not realize the gravity of the situation. But surely a man
who rises to the rank of general would have the foresight to realize the
situation was critical enough to warrant a breakout attempt.
By 19 December, the situation within the encirclement had
steadily deteriorated and Paulus was faced with what was to be his last chance
to save the Sixth Army. He would link up with the Fourth Panzer Army or hold
the city to the last man and the last round!
Paulus' offensive power lay in his tanks, approximately one
hundred of which were still serviceable. Their fuel supplies would carry the
only 20 miles, 10 miles short of the relief forces. It was estimated that four
thousand tons of fuel would be required for the 30-mile thrust and it was
impossible to wait until this tonnage could be obtained. The Germans hoped that
the thrust would relieve the pressure on the Fourth Panzer Army, which possibly
would be able to advance the necessary 10 miles.
As Field Marshal von Manstein later suggested, Paulus'
refusal to attempt a breakout at that point was based on valid reasons. But
given that this was the last reasonable opportunity for a successful breakout,
it was Paulus' duty to his troops to try and save them from eventual disaster.
He should have sacrificed some of his offensive tank power and used the fuel
thus saved to enable the remaining tanks to cover the 30 miles. The loss of
offensive power could have been balanced by an increase of combat troops who
would have been fighting for survival. The fact remains that Paulus did not
attempt the breakout and the Germans lost four corps headquarters, thirteen
infantry divisions, a rifle (jäger) division, a Croatian regiment, three panzer
divisions, and three motorized divisions.
Prussian military training forced Paulus to obey Hitler's
orders. If this is so, then we can "pass the buck" and blame Hitler.
Hitler spent World War I in the trenches. World War I was a position war and
the abandonment of terrain was rejected because it would lower the morale of
the defending forces. Writing in 1937, General Balck of the German Army stated
that the principle of defensive war is no longer one of holding of terrain, but
the infliction of casualties on the enemy while preserving their own forces.
The abandonment of shell-torn positions was better than sacrificing men and
material to hold them.
Stalingrad was such a position, and the attempt to hold it
cost the Germans thirty thousand men and their equipment. General Balck was not
alone in his opinions and the new concepts of defense were available to Hitler
before the war.
Assuming that Hitler was aware of these new concepts, it
then became evident that the decision to hold Stalingrad was to further his
personal goals, an unpardonable mistake on the part of any military leader.
No matter whose fault it was, it still remains that the
decision to hold Stalingrad "bis zur letzten Patrone" (to the last
bullet) cost the Germans Stalingrad, and the Sixth Army.
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| Map 1: Eastern Front, 7 May 1942 – 18 November 1942. |
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| Map 2: Operation Uranus, Soviet Army counterattacking and surrounding German forces at Stalingrad, 19 to 20 November 1942. |
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| Map 3: Stalingrad Cauldron, 22 November 1942 – 2 February 1943. |
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| Map 4: Operation Koltso, 10 January 2 February 1943. |
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| The German 24th Panzer Division moving towards Stalingrad, August 1942. |
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| German armored column approaches Stalingrad, August 1942. |
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| German soldiers on the outskirts of Stalingrad, 1942. |
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| German soldiers at Stalingrad fire a 5-cm Pak 38 anti-tank gun. |
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| Germans with an anti-tank gun on the banks of the river Volga, September 1942. |
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| Commander of the Sixth Army General Paulus with General Moritz von Drebber of the 297th Infantry Division, October 1942. |
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| Two German soldiers look on curiously as captured Soviet soldiers file past. Stalingrad, September 1942. |
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| German soldiers in a trench with an MG 34 machine gun, October 1942. |
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| German soldiers prepare to attack in the outskirts of Stalingrad, taking cover behind a StuG III. |
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| Panzergrenadiers of the 16th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht who came to the bank of the Volga at Stalingrad, 25 August 1942. |
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| A German soldier rests at Stalingrad, 1942. |
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| German soldiers and officers drink water at Stalingrad. This was before the tide turned. Look at the confidence on the face of the soldiers. |
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| On the outskirts of Stalingrad, Germans taking cover. |
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| Germans walk past burnt tram cars on the streets of Stalingrad. |
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| Germans interred at Stalingrad. |
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| German infantrymen at the Red October factory. |
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| Hauptmann Friedrich Winkler at Stalingrad. He was one of the 91,000 German soldiers who surrendered in 1943. He later died in the POW camp at Beketovka. |
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| A German soldier cleans his rifle during a break between fighting, Autumn 1942. |
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| German soldiers at the graves of their fallen comrades in Stalingrad. |
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| German soldiers watch as German guns pound Stalingrad, 1942. |
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| German Ju 87 Stuka dive bombers about to bomb Stalingrad, 1942. |
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| Dead German soldier near Stalingrad, 1943. |
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| General Karl Strecker of the German Sixth Army surrenders to the Russians, 2 February 1943. |
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| Captured German soldiers under a Red Army guard on the Volga, 1942. |
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| Captured German soldiers in a pathetic state at Stalingrad, 1943. |
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| Captured German motorcycles at Stalingrad, 1943. |
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| Dead frozen German soldiers in a trench at Stalingrad, February 1943. |
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| A captured German soldier. The desperate Germans had improvised to survive. |
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| A German sniper captured by Red Army men. |
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| Sixth Army moving in, late September 1942. |
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| German soldiers waiting for orders to attack. |
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| Self-propelled assault guns attack in Operation Wintergewitter. |
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| A column of T-34 tanks in Operation Malyy Saturn. |
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| Soviet infantry on the march toward the Donets River. |
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| Sixth Army survivors march out of Stalingrad under guard. |
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| On the attack at the Stalingrad gun factory. |
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| Rubble provides cover for Soviet soldiers. |
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| Germans fire a 10.5-cm leFH 18 howitzer in the area of the grain elevator, September 1942. |
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| T-34 tanks advancing at speed. |
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| General Friedrich Paulus, commander of the German Sixth Army. (Bundesarchiv Bild 183-B24575) |
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| Panzer III in the southern Soviet Union, 22 December 1942. (Bundesarchiv Bild 101III-Bueschel-090-39) |
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| Soviet troops make contact at Sovietsky during Operation Uranus, 1942. |
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| Soviet troops advance on Kalac in November 1942. |
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| The crew of a Panzer III prepares for action during the winter campaign of 1942-1943 on the Eastern Front. |
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| Soviet T-34 tank during Operation Uranus, November 1942. |
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| Soviet T-34 tanks in action during Operation Uranus, 1942. |
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| Soviet tank general Vasily T. Volsky, commander in chief of the 4th Mechanized Corps, Stalingrad Front, Operation Uranus, 1942. |
