Sustain the Fight: Logistical Support Won the War

by Christopher S. Barnthouse

Material superiority had to be coupled with seamless delivery and availability on the battlefield in large numbers in order to achieve victory both at the Western Europe and in the Pacific.

"For want of a nail," begins the old saying we all learned in our youth, reminding us that even the smallest detail can have a devastating effect on the outcome of historical events. Unfortunately, few military men ever ponder its meaning. Military staff colleges throughout the world teach maneuver and tactics, and generals scratch worried brows, trying to increase the "tooth to tail ratio" of a fighting force while giving little thought to how the teeth are to sustain themselves.

How little we seem to have learned from history concerning the role logistics plays on the battlefield. From its first recording, history has been filled with heroic tales of brilliant leaders maneuvering brave armies across the globe, altering borders and history; yet, reading between the lines, one is struck by how often the better logistician has won the battle.

The history of the U.S. Army has been filled with stories of logistical privation and the efforts of our military leaders to overcome it. Yet when tactical operations are being planned, logistical support for the soldier in the field is often treated as a necessary evil. Too often, commanders seem to rely on a combination of Divine Providence and an unsupervised staff to keep their forces supplied, giving little personal attention to the matter. A wise commander plans not only his maneuver, but how he will sustain that maneuver throughout the battle and the campaign. It is an unwise commander who plans only his maneuver.

Several examples from World War II illustrate the wise and the unwise.

Germany

On 24 April 1945, Company B, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, commanded by Captain Lloyd W. Engelland, was involved in a movement to contact as part of a regimental pursuit south of Nurnberg, Germany. The company's mission was to cover the right flank of the battalion as it moved from its assembly area in Berlengenfeld to objectives along the Danube River east of Regensburg, 10 miles distant.

The terrain over which it was to travel was hilly and wooded, with only one road usable for supply between its line of departure and the objective. The enemy situation was vague, although intelligence sources indicated that only scattered sniper resistance would be encountered along the route of advance, with probably no more than 40 enemy troops in the entire area between Berlengenfeld and Regensburg. The friendly supply situation was uncertain, with the logistical support elements having a great deal of difficulty keeping pace with the rapid advance of the combat elements.

Company B had three rifle platoons and a weapons platoon with light machine guns and 60-mm mortars. Tank support was promised, but could not be relied upon-the tank platoon that had been assigned to the battalion for this operation would not be able to advance until fuel and other maintenance items could catch up with it.

Because re-supply during the operation would be uncertain at best, the company commander ordered three days' rations and extra ammunition issued to each man. He also loaded his two organic vehicles with as much additional ammunition as he could get, especially 60-mm mortar ammunition.

Within 45 minutes after jumping off at 0830, Company B was in a firefight with an estimated platoon-sized unit. Similar encounters by other units in the battalion indicated that the enemy's strength was far greater than estimated.

By noon, Company B had been involved in two more sharp engagements, expending ammunition and taking casualties. The company soon found itself outside the village of Ponholtz faced by an estimated 25 to 30 enemy engineer troops equipped with an 88-mm anti-tank gun. Confronted with this amount of determined resistance, Captain Engelland requested more support and was promised some tanks that were on their way up from Berlengenfeld (see map).

At 1230, three tanks arrived at Ponholtz and were ordered to advance. The first one to advance beyond the village was immediately engaged by the 88-mm gun and had a tread blown off. The other two tanks then reported that they could not advance in support of the lead tank because one had magneto trouble and the other was nearly out of fuel. Both, in fact, were nearly out of fuel. Even though the logistical support the tank platoon had been waiting for had never arrived, it had been committed to battle anyway. Captain Engelland had no choice but to leave the tanks behind and press the attack without them.

Throughout the rest of 24 April and for the next two days, Company B continued its advance against scattered enemy resistance. During their advance, the soldiers fought four engagements, captured five villages, and forced a crossing of the Danube before going into a defensive position during the night of 26 April. They had been opposed in their advance by an estimated 100 Germans, of which they killed 14 and captured 50. Although the engagements were sharp and Company B relied upon direct fire suppression and the indirect fires of the company mortars to overwhelm the enemy defenders, at no time during the operation was the company re-supplied.

Even though Company B was told that enemy resistance between Berlengenfeld and Regensburg would be spotty, Captain Engelland made sure his company was prepared for the worst. Because the company had stockpiled enough food and ammunition to fight for three days without re-supply, when it faced enemy forces delaying in much greater strength and with much greater tenacity than anticipated, Company B was able to press the attack without let-up. Because it had additional rations and ammunition, when the supply situation turned out to be as bad as had been feared, the company was able to operate with the supplies it was already carrying.

In sharp contrast to the infantrymen of Company B was the tank platoon that was sent forward to help them reduce the strongly held German position. Although the tank platoon had been instructed to remain in the rear until re-supplied, once the battalion found itself in heavy contact, the tanks were committed without regard to their condition. The end result was that one tank was severely damaged and the other two withdrawn without affecting the enemy.

Normandy

In the late afternoon of 5 June 1944, Private Donald R. Burgett of the 101st Airborne Division was getting ready for the airborne role in the invasion of Normandy. He later reported that the equipment he carried on the jump consisted of the following:

One suit of O.D.s worn under my jumpsuit-this was an order for everyone-helmet, boots, gloves, main chute, reserve chute, Mae West, rifle, .45-caliber automatic pistol, trench knife, jump knife, hunting knife, machete, one cartridge belt, two bandoliers, two cans of machine gun ammunition totaling 676 rounds of .30-caliber ammo, 66 rounds of .45-caliber ammo, one Hawkins mine capable of blowing the track off a tank, four blocks of TNT, one entrenching tool with two blasting caps taped on the outside of the steel part, three first aid kits, two morphine needles, one gas mask, a canteen of water, three days' supply of K rations, two days' supply of D rations (hard tropical chocolate bars), six fragmentation grenades, one Gammon grenade, one orange smoke and one red smoke grenade, one orange panel, one blanket, one raincoat, one change of socks and underwear, two cartons of cigarettes, and a few other odds and ends.

Private Burgett said his load was so heavy that when he tried to stand up, "I found it impossible to even get to my knees... two men lifted me bodily, and with much boosting and grunting shoved me up into the plane where I pulled myself along the floor and, with the aid of the crew chief, got into a bucket seat."

A few hours after Burgett and his fellow paratroopers jumped into the inky blackness of the early morning sky, Company E, 16th Infantry Regiment, assaulted Omaha Beach. In the assault, each man carried a load similar to that described by Burgett, including three days' rations and four cartons of cigarettes. As soon as the men of Company E left their landing craft, they waded ashore, where they paused at the water's edge to get organized and orient themselves for the assault across the beach.

Enemy fire raked the area, and the company's leaders, realizing that they were in a death trap, ordered their men forward. When the soldiers tried to move, however, they found that sheer exhaustion, rather than enemy fire, prevented anything other than a slow advance. Several non-commissioned officers reported later that after they had advanced only a few steps they had been forced to stop because their legs would no longer support them. It took the company an hour to cross 250 yards of beach.

Not far from where Company E landed, Company M of the 116th Infantry Regiment went ashore. These men were similarly weighted down but managed to make the beach crossing in about 10 minutes. Private First Class Hugo de Santis said of the experience, "We all knew we were carrying too much weight. It was pinning us down when the situation called for us to bound forward. The equipment had some of us whipped before we started. We would have either dropped it at the edge of the beach or remained there with it, if we had not been vigorously led."

Sergeant Bruce Heisley concurred, "I was carrying part of a machine gun. Normally, I could run with it. I wanted to do so now but found I couldn't even walk with it. I could barely lift it. So I crawled across the sand dragging it with me. I felt ashamed of my own weakness. But on looking around, I saw the others crawling and dragging the weights which they normally carried."

Staff Sergeant Thomas B. Turner said, "We were all surprised to find that we had suddenly gone weak, and we were surprised to discover how much fire men can move through without getting hit. Under fire we learned what we had never been told, that fear and fatigue are about the same in their effect on an advance."

All the units that participated in the invasion of Normandy in June 1944 experienced severe problems because the individual soldiers were overloaded. The paratroopers could not stand up and when actually aboard the aircraft, knelt on the floor so they could rest their heavy loads on their seats. Many reports following the landing indicated that the airborne units were able to regain their maneuverability once they got on the ground, but only because most of the soldiers had abandoned their heavy equipment.

The regular infantry soldiers who went across the beaches were similarly burdened in spite of the fact that the Normandy invasion included the greatest logistical effort in the history of mankind. Although re-supply of the airborne elements would be problematic, the re-supply of the infantry units was, in fact, offshore waiting to be unloaded even as the first wave of troops was hitting the beach. These supplies were in stockpiles on the beach by nightfall.

In addition to the stress of carrying the excessive loads through heavy surf and onto the beach, fear itself caused the soldiers to become weak, further reducing their ability to carry the weight of their equipment.

Most notable is the comparison between performances of Company E, 16th Infantry, which took one hour to cross 250 yards of beach and incurred 105 casualties during the day, only one of which occurred after the company got off the beach, and Company M, 116th Infantry, which managed to push across the beach in 10 minutes to achieve the greatest advance of any unit that landed at Omaha Beach on D-Day.

Brest

From 9 September through 14 September 1944, Company F, 2nd Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment, commanded by Captain George H. Duckworth, fought its way through St. Marc, a suburb of Brest, France, and then through the center of the French port city against heavy opposition. The company had never been involved in fighting in a major built-up area and was largely unprepared, tactically or technically, for that type of combat.

By late afternoon on 9 September, in St. Marc, the company had advanced 1,200 yards; it had been meeting platoon-strength pockets of resistance throughout the day, had taken casualties, and had expended large quantities of ammunition. At 1700, Captain Duckworth called a halt and put his company into a hasty defensive position in a three-block area of the village.

He then ordered his supply sergeant to bring up a jeep that was kept immediately behind the company. It had in its trailer additional ammunition and wire communication equipment, some of it captured German gear. (Captain Duckworth said of this system, "This was not TOE, but it was necessary for the maintenance of good communication within the company.") The ammunition was immediately distributed and the wire communication laid.

While the ammunition was being distributed, the company mess sergeant brought forward a hot meal. It was Captain Duckworth's policy, wherever possible, to serve a hot meal soon after the company had stopped for the night. The food was brought to a central point within the company and was taken forward by porters provided by the platoons.

As soon as the ammunition had been distributed, the supply sergeant and the company executive officer went back to the regimental trains to get more. By company SOP, a jeep trailer full of ammunition was to be in reserve at all times.

During the next four days, in Brest proper, the company found that its radios did not work in the buildings and that it had to use field wire for its communications. This took large quantities of wire, all of which had to be brought up over terrain and in an environment not conducive to re-supply. The company also discovered that fighting in a city led to greater than usual expenditure of ammunition and to a high casualty rate.

To add to its problems, the company discovered that its normal method of re-supply, that of bringing materials forward in a quarter-ton trailer, could not be used. According to Captain Duckworth, "It was sudden death to step into the streets, as we soon learned … the only way the streets could be crossed was by throwing a smoke grenade and dashing quickly from one covered position to another." This was hardly the sort of environment in which a jeep could be expected to survive for very long.

After two days of heavy fighting with notable lack of success, Company F developed the tactic of breaching holes in buildings with demolition charges and using those breaches as supply routes. The sustainment of the company remained a risky matter for service support personnel. On the afternoon of 12 September, for example, "an aidman … was killed by an enemy bullet which pierced the red cross on his helmet."

To prevent additional casualties among service support personnel, the unit decided to re-supply itself, as much as possible, during hours of limited visibility. A plan was then made and implemented whereby ammunition and food would be brought up along the routes blasted through the buildings and stockpiled at the forward positions in such quantities that the attack could be continued throughout the nest day without additional re-supply.

According to Captain Duckworth, this was no small accomplishment. "In the darkness," he later reported, "it was difficult to get food and ammunition to the two forward platoons, as many doorways, passages, and hole shad to be traversed before reaching their positions. Parties from the company headquarters and the support platoon worked far into the night carrying the necessary supplies." Because the support platoon and parties from the company headquarters brought the ammunition forward, no porters had to be taken from the infantry platoons. This allowed for the infantrymen to sleep during the night and to wake up in the morning rested, re-supplied, and ready to carry the fight to the enemy.

Although the type of combat the company encountered in Brest was new to its soldiers, Captain Duckworth and his subordinates were able to modify their previous SOPs to meet the new requirements. By trial and error, they learned that the best way to advance in a city was by using demolitions to breach holes in walls, thereby avoiding the murderous fire in the streets. In this process, however, the company's leaders did not lose sight of the fact that somehow the company would have to sustain itself.

Thus, they produced and implemented a plan by which they projected the amount of ammunition the platoons would expend during each 24-hour period and moved that amount forward during each night. They used the routes cleared and held open by the infantry, and used service support and headquarters personnel to get the sup-plies forward. In this way, they were able to get needed supplies up in a timely manner while reducing the exposure time of the support personnel to enemy fires and allowing the infantrymen to get as much rest as possible. The key to the company's sustainment during this operation was the ability of the commander and his subordinates to meet new supply problems and to produce a plan for overcoming them.

Conclusions

In reviewing these and similar military operations, one is struck by the similarity in the logistical procedures used by the units that succeeded and the similarity in the lack of sustainability shared by those that did not.

The guiding principle among the victors was a well-defined plan, not merely for the tactical disposition of combat and combat support elements for the battle at hand but for the disposition of combat service support personnel as well. Additionally, those units that were successful on the battlefield had consistently looked beyond the current engagement to those ahead and had carefully projected when, where, and in what quantity re-supply would be accomplished.

The units that were unsuccessful had looked only to the maneuver of combat elements, trusting in some unseen and misunderstood "system" to sustain them. When that system failed, so did the mission.

When supplies were being pushed forward on a regular basis, as in Brest, the prudent commander planned for a lower on-hand stockage rate and a more frequent re-supply of critical items. But he still kept a readily available emergency stock in his company trains to rapidly re-supply his forward elements if necessary. When he could not be sure supplies could be brought forward in a timely manner, the prudent commander stocked enough supplies to sustain his unit for an extended period without re-supply, relying upon the capacity of his company vehicles and the strength of his soldiers to transport the required supplies.

The imprudent commander, on the other hand, stocked too few supplies for a given operation or went to the other extreme and stock too many.

The rule of thumb among mule packers, when mules were still the standard means of moving supplies to the front, was that one animal should not have to carry a load weighing more than one-third of its body weight. In the U.S. infantry, however, soldiers have often been required to carry into combat one-half to two-thirds of their body weight.

This is unfortunate and also often unnecessary, as it was during the Normandy invasion.

Although no records exist of sustainability training in most of the units mentioned in this article, it is apparent that some of them, most particularly Company F, 23rd Infantry, under Captain Duckworth, had some extremely well-entrenched SOPs. Company administrative personnel-most notable the executive officer, the first sergeant, and the supply sergeant-were in charge of keeping the company supplied, and a vehicle with critical supply items was kept in the combat trains, available on a moment's notice.

Military history teaches that the most brilliant tactician faces ignominious defeat if he cannot sustain the fight.

 

"We're moving up!" … keep those supplies coming! Wartime poster.

The General Depot at Ashchurch, north of Cheltenham, England. Originally developed as a British automotive depot, it was transferred to the U.S. Army in 1942. It consisted of 158 buildings, including 10 hangars and three warehouses. About 5,000 US personnel worked there.

Part of the Normandy invasion fleet, massed of the Isle of Wight, prior to steaming toward Normandy.

The logistical support to an army is the difference between winning and losing. Here is a picture of the epic inload of freight during D Day.

Jerrycan filling site.

The War on the Russian Front: 19 September to October 1944

by Colonel Conrad H. Lanza

Published in 1944

Finland

On 19 September the German forces in Finland, estimated at seven divisions, were divided into south and north groups. The south force was withdrawing north from a line along the Oulung River (Oulungjoki), the north one was holding a north-south line extending south from the east shore of the Rybachi (Fisher) peninsula. A Finnish army was about to attack the south force, and a Russian army had already commenced an attack against the north one. The Germans had no intention of resisting; they were evacuating Finland.

No serious fighting took place during September. By the end of the month the south force had withdrawn to north of Kemi, where it made a stand and repulsed the Finns who were following. It is not yet known whether these Germans were seeking to embark on transports at the port of Tornio, but this appears to have been the intention. This was stopped by a Finn amphibious expedition, which unexpectedly landed in Tornio on the night preceding 1 October.

A series of sharp clashes then occurred in which the Germans sought to retake Tornio. The German attack failed, the Finns managing to hold on to the seized port. At the same time they attacked along the shore road northward from Kemi.

The Germans thereupon gave up the attempt to take Tornio, but held on to the surrounding country until after their troops from Kemi had cleared the Tornio sector. Thereafter the Germans withdrew northward. They are apparently headed for north Norway, the nearest German base being about 300 miles away, beyond a barren intervening country. Due to the early winter the ground is generally frozen early in October, facilitating movements of vehicles.

On 7 October the Russians launched an attack against the north German front, previous operations having been restricted to exploratory raids. The initial Russian attacks, although strongly pressed, failed to make substantial progress. To speed the advance an amphibious expedition was sent from Murmansk, which landed on 10 October on Rybachi peninsula in rear of the German lines.

The Russians failed to encircle the Germans but they forced the abandonment of their positions. The Germans fell back to before Petsamo. The Russians followed closely.

Superior in strength to the Germans, the Russians now sought to encircle their positions from the south. The Germans avoided this by abandoning Petsamo which was entered by the Russians on 15 October. According to German reports the Russians have used very large air forces in this campaign and have had an unusual number of planes downed. This runs from fifty to eighty a day, and in general exceeds all other claimed Russian air losses over the remainder of the very long front.

On 18 October the line was in south Finland, almost just on the Arctic Circle; in north Finland, a north-south line just east from Kirkenes.

The Germans have a highway from Kirkenes to north Norway. There is no regular road available for the south force.

The Baltic States

On 19 September the line was Johvi (German) – Iiasaku (G) – Lake Peipus – Ema River – Lake Virts – Valga (G) – Smiltene (G) – Jaungelgava (Russian) – Jelgava (R) – Zagare (R) – Siauliai (R) – Raseinai (R) – Vilkaviskis (R).

Germany’s loss of three allies (Finland, Romania, and Bulgaria) and her reverses in France resulted in a new plan of defense against the converging attacks of the Americans and British on the west and the Russians on the east. The decision was to evacuate large areas in order to secure a shorter line which might be held by the number of German divisions now available. This included a withdrawal from France and from the Balkans (including the Aegean Islands). It further included abandonment of the three small Baltic States, less some small areas.

The retreat from Estonia began in early September, largely by water transportation. It seems to have escaped Russian observation for a time. On 16 September the Russians had started a large scale offensive on a 160-mile front between Lake Peipus and the Daugava (Dvina) River, with forty infantry divisions in line plus an unascertained number of armored troops and artillery divisions. When this account opens the Russians had reached the line indicated above, with the 3rd Baltic Army Group (Col. Gen. Ivan S. Maslanikov) on the north and the 2nd Baltic Army Group (Gen. Andrei I. Yeremenko) on the south.

Simultaneous with the above offensive the 1st Baltic Army Group (Col. Gen. Ivan C. Bagramian) which was south of the Daugava River was attacking in south Latvia and in Lithuania.

The Germans did not seriously contest these offensives. The terrain was much cut up by lakes and streams which restricted advances to certain spaces. There was much forest in the land. By destroying bridges, felling trees over roads, planting extensive mine fields, and by the judicious use of rear guards the Germans managed to withdraw their main bodies without serious losses. Special attention was given to anti-tank protection, as Russian spearheads were habitually largely composed of armored troops. A tank disabled about a bridge or in a narrow road, became a temporary road block. When the situation appeared favorable a certain number of German counterattacks were delivered. This was especially the case in the area around Jelgava, where the Germans had only a 15-mile corridor along the Gulf of Riga as the only land connection to Riga and beyond. It was essential to German plans to keep this open until after the rear guards had cleared Riga. Much of the German withdrawal was by water, however.

The Russians extended their attack on the north to include the isthmus between the Gulf of Finland and Lake Peipus. This sector was occupied by the Leningrad Army Group (Marshal Leonid Govorov). Pushing straight ahead this force reached the port of Tallinn (Reval), which was also the capital of Estonia, on 22 September.

By 27 September the Russians had reached the sea from Tallinn west and south to north of Riga. They had secured some booty, but less than usually taken and very few prisoners. There had been no substantial change in the line south of Riga. Along the entire front since the commencement of the offensive on the 15th, about a hundred Russian divisions had been in line. According to German reports their tank losses exceeded one thousand, or an average of eighty a day. This is probably a moderate loss for a front of 225 miles under modern conditions.

On 3 October the Russians started to occupy the islands across the entrance to the Gulf of Riga. The first island, Dago (Dagoe or Hiiu), was taken without difficulty on that day.

On 5 October the 1st Baltic and 3rd White Russian Army Groups started a large scale offensive due west from Siauliai on a 130 mile front with a view of driving to the coast and separating the German forces around Riga from their home country. An attack on Riga was continued at the same time. That city was fortified; progress against it was slow. At the same time the attack against the Riga Bay islands continued. An amphibious expedition landed on the north end of Oesel Island on the 6th. The German garrison retreated slowly southward, abandoning the island except the Svorbe peninsula at the south end. This contains batteries controlling the main ship channel to Riga. The Russians have since repeatedly attacked this peninsula, and have attempted to land troops in rear of the German land defense line. None of these efforts has succeeded.

On 10 October the Russians reached the Lithuanian coast at Palanga, about 16 miles north of Memel. At this date the attack on Riga was still being held by the enemy and the German corridor along the south side of the Gulf of Riga was open. Sea communication to Riga was available due to the Germans’ holding the south end of Oesel. From Palanga the Russian line extended almost in a straight line to Jelgava to the northeast, while to the south it ran close to and parallel to the frontier of East Prussia. This was found to be heavily defended, with indications that the enemy intended to hold it.

Riga fell on 13 October. At date of writing it appears that the Germans withdrew partly by sea, and partly by the corridor. As there was no further use for the corridor the Germans immediately withdrew westward from that sector, as far as the Lielupe River.

On 18 October the line was Lielupe River – Jelgava (R) – Zagare (R) – Mazeikiai (R) – a point on the sea 12 miles south of Liepaja (Libau). German beachhead on south (Svorbe) peninsula of Oesel Island.

The area north of the above line constituted a large German beachhead about the ports of Liepaja and Ventspils (Windau).

The line continued on along sea coast from south of Liepaja to Palanga (R) – Taurage (R) – Sakiai (R) – Vilkaviskis (?) – Suvalki (G).

Poland

On 19 September the line was Suvalki (G) – Augustow (G) – Osovets (R) – Narew River to vicinity of Warsaw, with small Russian and German bridgeheads at various points – Praga (R) – Vistula (Wista) River (with Russian bridgeheads south of the Pilica and in vicinity of Sandomierz) – Mielec (R) – Rseszow (R) – Jaslo (G) – Duklo (G).

The Polish front has been relatively tranquil.

In Warsaw there was a Polish insurrection in progress under Gen. Boromorowski (usually called “Bor” for convenience). On 21 September the Russians made an attempt to cross the Vistula at Warsaw. This was a complete failure. Thereafter the reduction by the Germans of the Poles proceeded methodically. On 2 October they surrendered with the honors of war.

In early October the Germans commenced operations to reduce a Russian bridgehead near Pultusk, while the Russians attempted to reduce a German one near Warsaw. Neither attempt was fully successful.

On 10 October a general Russian attack began along the Niemen River, with center opposite Rozan, just south of which the Russians had a bridgehead on the north side of the river. On the first two days only small gains were made, and fresh divisions were sent in on the 12th with very strong artillery and air support. The Germans also employed large air forces whose mission was to relieve the ground troops by suitable attacks on advancing enemy parties. This battle died down temporarily after the 13th, without having materially changed the front. It restarted on the 15th.

Next day a new attack was launched. It was apparently a diversion for a more important one just north of Suvalki. This had a front of only 25 miles but was in great force. This made progress, although it was slow. On 18 October this attack had reached the border of East Prussia.

With this exception, the line had not substantially changed during the period.

Hungary

A very determined effort has been made by the Russians to eliminate Hungary from the war. The shift of Romania from the Axis to the Allies had given the Russians twelve Romanian divisions, and a new front along the south side of Hungary. First measures were to clear the enemy out of Transylvania.

The 4th Ukraine Army Group (Col. Gen. Ivan Y. Petrov) was in line on the east of Hungary, and the 2nd Ukraine Army Group (Marshal Rodio Y. Malinovsky) was on the south. The enemy were mixed Hungarians and Germans. The line on 19 September was Dukla (?) – Jasliska (R) – Dolina (R) – Nadworna (R) – Delatyn (R) – Kuty (R) – Radauti (G) – Suceava (R) – Falticeni (R) – Gheorgheni (R) – Odorhei (R) – Targul Mures (G) – Turda (G) – Huedin (G) – Beius (G) – Ineu (?) – Arad (G).

The general form of the front was a German salient occupying a large part of Transylvania.

At the beginning of the period about thirty Russian and Romanian divisions were engaged in an offensive between Turda and Gheorgheni, both inclusive on a front of about 125 miles. A secondary effort was an attack against the Dukla and adjacent passes, on the opposite side of Transylvania.

Notwithstanding continuous attacks the Russian advance was for a time slow. Romanian troops entered Targul Mures on 28 September, thereby opening a route across the Muresul River. They then pushed on at once with main effort toward Reghin further up the valley. The Russian offensive was now extended westward along the entire line to Arad. Due to the terrain, and partly to lack of troops, this front was not entirely continuous; the battles centered about the main lines of communication. Main Russian efforts were toward Reghin, Cluj, Oradea, and Bekescaba.

After considerable minor fighting the Russians launched a major offensive on 3 October in the sector from Arad to Oradea. At the time the frontier between Hungary and Transylvania was entirely in Axis hands. German and Hungarian troops met the attack by strong counterattacks particularly in the vicinity of Oradea, where the terrain was suitable for operations of armored troops. For three days there was heavy fighting, with the Russians gaining west of Arad only. On 6 October their incessant attacks began to make appreciable progress. Next day the advance in the center reached the line Oroshaza – Bekescaba. The flanks had not kept up and were in rear.

The Axis commander now ordered a retreat to in rear of the Koeroes River, which involved withdrawal of his right and center but not his left, which at Oradea was already on this line. This maneuver tended to cover Budapest, which it seems was presumed to have been the Russian objective.

Next day—the 18th—the Russians forced a crossing of the Koeroes River west of Oradea. Armored troops dashed across. Instead of marching toward Budapest they went north toward Debreczen. They arrived opposite that city on the 9th.

There were strong German and Hungarian armored forces in this area, which is generally flat and excellent for maneuvers of motorized forces. These intercepted the Russians southwest of Debreczen. A long battle resulted with both armored forces seeking to encircle its opponent.

Other Russian forces reached the line of the Koeroes River on the 9th and established a bridgehead on the west bank south of Csongrad. The Axis managed to find troops to seal this operation. German GHQ issued orders for the evacuation of all of Transylvania, where there was a large German-held salient. It seems probable that the line to which the withdrawal was directed was the Tisza (Theiss) River. This would shorten the front by 175 miles, and release fifteen or more divisions. At this time most of the salient was under daily Russian attack, and some withdrawal had already been forced.

In the meantime the great tank battle south of Debreczen continued. Each side claims to have inflicted extraordinary tank losses on the opposite side. There was no decision. The Russians could not take Debreczen, and the Germans were unable to drive them off. It became a battle of attrition.

On 12 October the Russians organized a new attack to turn Debreczen from the south. This forced a crossing of the Koeroes River 45 miles southwest of Debreczen, when armored troops dashed 35 miles forward to Abadszalok on the Tisza River before being intercepted.

The Russian left captured Szeged on the 11th, affording another bridgehead over the Tisza River. Until 18 October there was no further material change in the line, although the great tank battle, near Debreczen kept on. The German retreat from Transylvania, according to their accounts, proceeded without interference.

The line at the end of the period was Dukla Pass (G) – southeast along the Carpathian Mountains with all passes in Russian hands to Raho (Rachov) (G) – Sighet (?) – Baia Mare (G) – Valea-lui-Mihai (?) – Debreczen (G) – Hajduszoboszlo (R) – Abadszalok (R) – Mezoetur (G) – Koeroes River – Tisza River (with Russian bridgeheads south of Csongrad and at Szeged).

Yugoslavia

At the beginning of the period the line was Arad (G) – Timisoara (G) – east boundary of Yugoslavia to include the Bulgarian frontier.

The Russian forces belonged to the 3rd Ukrainian Army Group (Gen. Feodor Tolbukhin). He was aided by a large force of Yugoslav Partisans belonging to Marshal Tito’s command, and by the regular Bulgar Army, which had recently shifted sides in the war.

At the beginning of September, the Germans had commenced to evacuate Greece and the Aegean Islands. Much of this movement passed through Salonika. From there the line of communications lay via the Vardar and Morava valleys through Belgrade. There were a good road and a railroad. An alternative route diverged at Skoplje to the northwest, and with both road and railroad passed through Sarajevo and on into Germany. On account of mountain grades this was a less desirable line, but it was practicable. Yugoslav partisans often attacked this line, but had never succeeded in closing it. The Russian mission was to close the main German line of communications, and if possible cut off all German forces to the south.

The Russians were not immediately prepared to undertake a serious offensive. They did not move until 27 September, when they started to force a crossing of the Danube River in the vicinity of Orsova. At this point a large bend in the river extends into Romania. It was possible for the Russians to attack three sides of this salient, and they effected their crossing, although not without considerable losses. It took until the 30th before the Russians were solidly across.

This offensive was supplemented by another which on 2 October attacked westward north of the Danube toward the line Vrsac – Bela Crkva. The latter point was taken on the first day. This Russian force contained numerous motorized troops and their objective was Belgrade (Beograd). The south attack contained mountain troops. It advanced almost due south following a railroad, and reached Zajecar on the 6th. On the same day the north attack not having met strong resistance arrived within 10 miles of Belgrade, on the north side of the Danube.

German reinforcements counterattacked in both areas on the 9th without making any gains. Some of the fighting was savage.

The south Russian attack shifted its main effort to its right. This advanced across country and cut the Belgrade and Nish railroad near Palanka (well north of the junction where the German alternate line turns off). At the same time the Russians continued to push their left toward Nish. Bulgar forces now joined and extended the Russian left to east of Nish. Other Bulgar forces assumed the offensive along each pass on their west border.

The south Russian attack continued to expand; its right came opposite to Belgrade on the south side of the Danube on the 14th. The north attack had in the meantime not made progress. On the same day Bulgar forces entered Nish but did not clear it until the 16th.

On 15 October the Russian south attack entered the south part of Belgrade. The north attack spread northward in the area south of Szeged.

On 18 October the line was Szeged (R) –Subotica (R) – Senta (R) – Tisa River – Belgrade (?) – Morava valley to Nish (R) – Leskovac (G) – Kriva Palanka (?) – Stip (G) – Strumica (Strumnitza) (G) – Kilkis (G) – Stavros (G).

This left the Germans the use of the alternate line of communications from Salonika to the north via Skoplje and Sarajevo.