The Commander in Chief
of the
United States Asiatic Fleet (Yarnell)
to the Secretary of the Navy (Swanson)
December 23, 1937
[Received 1:15 a.m.]
The following are
finding[s] of facts of the Court of Inquiry ordered to investigate the bombing
and sinking of the U.S.S. Panay.
The Court was
composed of Captain H. V. McKittrick, Commander M. L. Deyo, Lieutenant
Commander A. C. J. Sabalot, members, and Lieutenant C. J. Whiting, Judge
Advocate. The findings are approved.
The record of the
Court will be forwarded to the Department by airmail leaving Manila about 29
December.
The Court finds as
follows:
(1) That on
December 12, 1937, the U.S.S. Panay, a unit of the Yangtze Patrol of the United
States Asiatic Fleet, was operating under lawful orders on the Yangtze River.
(2) That the
immediate mission of the U.S.S. Panay was to protect nationals, maintain
communication between the United States Embassy, Nanking, and office [of] the
Ambassador at Hankow, provide a temporary office for the United States Embassy
staff during the time when Nanking was greatly endangered by military operations
and to afford a refuge for American and other foreign nationals.
(3) That due to
intensive shell fire around Nanking the U.S.S. Panay had changed berth several
times to avoid being hit and, on the morning of December 12, 1937, formed a
convoy of Socony Oil Company vessels, principally the S. S. Meiping, Meihsia
and Meian, and proceeded upriver.
(4) That adequate
steps were taken at all times to assure that the Japanese authorities were
informed of the movements of the U.S.S. Panay.
(5) That in addition
[to] her regular complement the U.S.S. Panay had on board at this time four
members of the American Embassy staff, four American nationals and five foreign
nationals.
(6) That at zero
nine forty while standing upriver, the U.S.S. Panay stopped in response to a
signal from a Japanese landing boat; a Japanese Army boarding officer with
guard went on board and was informed that the U.S.S. Panay and convoy were
proceeding to anchorage 28 miles above Nanking; no warning was given of any
danger likely to be encountered.
(7) That at about
eleven hundred December 12, 1937, the U.S.S. Panay and convoy anchored in the
Yangtze River in a compact group at about mileage two hundred twenty-one above
Woosung, twenty-eight miles above Nanking.
(8) That the U.S.S.
Panay was painted white with buff upper works and stacks and displayed two
large horizontal flags on her upper deck awnings plus large colors at her gaff.
(9) That the Socony
Vacuum ships Meiping, Meihsia and Meian each displayed numerous horizontal and
vertical American flags all of large size.
(10) That at
thirteen thirty the crew of the U.S.S. Panay were engaged in normal Sunday
routine and were all on board except a visiting party of eight men on board the
S. S. Meiping.
(11) That at about
thirteen thirty eight, three large Japanese twin-motored planes in a vee
formation were observed at a considerable height passing overhead downriver. At
this time no other craft were in the near vicinity of the Panay and convoy and
there was no reason to believe the ships were in a dangerous area.
(12) That without
warning these three Japanese planes released several bombs, one or two of which
struck on or very close to the bow of the U.S.S. Panay and another which struck
on or very close to the S. S. Meiping.
(13) That the bombs
of the first attack did considerable damage to the U.S.S. Panay, disabling the
forward three-inch gun, seriously injuring the Captain and others, wrecking the
pilothouse and sick bay, disabling the radio equipment, the steaming fireroom,
so that all power was lost and causing leaks in the hull which resulted in the
ship settling down by the head and listing to starboard, thereby contributing
fundamentally to the sinking of the ship.
(14) That
immediately thereafter a group of six single-engined planes attacked from
ahead, diving singly and appearing to concentrate on the U.S.S. Panay, a total
of about twenty bombs were dropped many striking close aboard and creating by
fragments and concussions great damage to ship and personnel. These attacks
lasted about twenty minutes during which time at least two of the planes
attacked also with machine guns, one machine gun attack was directed against a
ship’s boat bearing wounded ashore causing several further wounds and piercing
the boat with bullets.
(15) That during
the entire attack the weather was clear with high visibility and little if any
wind.
(16) That the
planes participating in the attacks on the U.S.S. Panay and its convoy were
unmistakingly identified by their markings as being Japanese.
(17) That
immediately after the first bomb struck air-defense stations were manned, the
30-caliber machine guns battery opened fire and engaged the attacking planes
throughout the remainder of the attack. The three-inch battery was not manned
nor were any three-inch shells fired at any time. This was in accordance with
the ships air-defense bill.
(18) That during
the bombing many were injured by flying fragments and concussion and all
suffered shock on the first bomb. The Captain suffered a broken hip and severe
shock; soon thereafter Lieutenant Anders, Executive Officer, was wounded by
fragments in throat and hands, losing power of speech; Lieutenant J. G. Geist,
Engineer Officer, received fragments in the leg; Ensign Biwerse had clothing
blown off and was severely shocked. This included all the line officers of the
ship, the Captain being disabled, the Executive Officer carried on his duties
giving orders in writing. He issued instructions to secure confidential
publications, to get underway and to beach the ship. Extensive damages
prevented getting under way.
(19) That at about
fourteen hundred, believing it impossible to save the ship and considering the
number of wounded and the length of time necessary to transfer them ashore in
two small boats, the Captain ordered the ship to be abandoned. This was
completed by about fifteen hundred. By this time the main deck was awash and
the Panay appeared to be sinking.
(20) All severely
wounded were transferred ashore in the first trips, the Captain protested in
his own case; the Executive Officer, when no longer able to carry on due to
wounds, left the ship on the next to the last trip; and Ensign Biwerse remained
until the last trip.
(21) That after the
Panay had been abandoned Mahlmann, c. b. m., and Weimers, m. m. first, returned
to the Panay in one of the ship’s boats to obtain stores and medical supplies.
While they were returning to the beach, a Japanese powerboat filled with armed
Japanese soldiers approached close to the Panay, opened fire with a machine
gun, went along side, boarded and left within five minutes.
(22) That at
fifteen fifty four the U.S.S. Panay, shortly after the Japanese boarding party
had left, rolled over to starboard and sank in from seven to ten fathoms of
water, approximate latitude 30–44–30 north, longitude 117–27 east. Practically
no valuable government property was salvaged.
(23) That after the
Panay survivors had reached the left bank of the river, the Captain, in view of
his own injuries and the injuries and shock sustained by his remaining line
officers and the general feeling that attempts would be made to exterminate the
survivors, requested Captain F. N. Roberts, United States Army, who was not
injured and who was familiar with land operations and the Chinese language, to
act under his directions as his immediate representative. Captain Roberts
functioned in this capacity until the return of the Panay’s crew on board the U.S.S.
Oahu on 15 December, 1937, performing outstanding service.
(24) That Messrs.
Atcheson and Paxton of the United States Embassy staff rendered highly valuable
services on shore where their knowledge of the country and language coupled
with their resourcefulness and sound advice contributed largely to the safety
of the party.
(25) That after
some fifty hours ashore during which time the entire party suffered much hardship
and exposure somewhat mitigated by the kindly assistance of the Chinese, they
returned and boarded the U.S.S. Oahu and H. M. S. Ladybird.
(26) That from the
beginning of an unprecedented and unlooked-for attack of great violence until
their final return, the ship’s company and passengers of the U.S.S. Panay were
subjected to grave danger and continuous hardship; their action under these
conditions was in keeping with the best traditions of the naval service.
(27) That among the
Panay passengers Mr. Sandro Sandri died of his injuries at thirteen thirty, 13
December; Messrs. J. Hall Paxton, Emile Gassie and Roy Squires were wounded.
(28) That early in
the bombing attacks the Standard Oil vessel got underway, Meiping and Meihsia
secured to a pontoon at the Kaiyuan wharf and the Meian was disabled and
beached further down the river on the left bank. All these ships received
injuries during the first phases of the bombing. Serious fires on the Meiping
were extinguished by the Panay visiting party of eight men who were unable to
return to their ship.
(29) That after
attacks on the Panay had ceased the Meiping and Meihsia were further attacked
by Japanese bombing planes, set on fire and destroyed. Just previous to this
bombing Japanese army units on shore near the wharf attempted to avert this
bombing by waving Japanese flags; they were not successful and received several
casualties. It is known that Captain Carlson of the Meian was killed and that
Messrs. Marshall, Vines, Pickering and Squires were wounded. Casualties among
the Chinese crews of these vessels were numerous but cannot be fully
determined.
(30) That the
following members of the Panay crew landed on shore from the Meiping after
vainly attempting to extinguish oil and gasoline fires on board: V. F. Puckett,
c. m. m.; J. A. Granes, g. m. first; J. A. Dirnhoffer, seaman first; T. A.
Coleman, c.p.h.m.; J. A. Bonkoski, g.m. third; R. L. Browning, g.m. third; J.
L. Hodge, fireman first; and W. T. Hoyle, m.m. second. These men encountered
Japanese soldiers on shore who were not hostile on learning they were
Americans.
(31) That all of
the Panay crew from the Meiping except J. L. Hodge, fireman first, remained in
one group ashore until the following day when they were rescued by H. M. S.
Bee. Hodge made his way to Wuhu and returned Shanghai via Japanese naval plane
on 14 December.
(32) That, in
searching for and rescuing the survivors, Rear Admiral Holt, R. N., and the
officers and men of H. M. S. Bee and H. M. S. Ladybird rendered most valuable
assistance under trying and difficult conditions thereby showing a fine spirit
of helpfulness and cooperation.
(33) That Charles
L. Ensminger, s. c. first, died at thirteen thirty 13 December at Hohsien,
China, from wounds received during the bombing of the U.S.S. Panay and that his
death occurred in line of duty, not the result of his own misconduct.
(34) That Edgar C.
Hulsebus, coxswain, died at zero six thirty, 19 December at Shanghai, China,
from wounds received during the bombing of the U.S.S. Panay and that his death
occurred in line of duty, not the result of his own misconduct.
(35) That
Lieutenant Commander James J. Hughes, Lieutenant Arthur F. Anders, Lieutenant
(jg) John W. Geist, John H. Lang, c.q.m., Robert R. Hebard, fireman first,
Kenneth J. Rice, e.m. third, Carl H. Birk, e.m. first, Charles Schroyer, seaman
first, Alex Kozak, m.m. second, Peres D. Ziegler, s.c. third, and Newton L.
Davis, fireman first, were seriously injured in line of duty, not the result of
their own misconduct.
(36) That
Lieutenant Clark G. Grazier, m.c, Ensign Denis H. Biwerse, Charles S. Adams,
r.e.m. second, Tony Barba, s.c. third, John A. Bonkoski, g.m. third, Ernest C.
Branch, fireman first, Raymond L. Browning, e.m. third, Walter Cheatham,
coxswain, Thomas A. Coleman, c.p.h.m., John A. Dirnhoffer, seaman first, Yuan
T. Erh, m.a.t.t. first, Fred G. Fichtenmayer, cm. first, Emery F. Fisher,
c.w.t., Michael Gerent, m.m. second, Cecil B. Green, seaman first, John L.
Hodge, fireman first, Fon B. Huffman, w.t. second, Karl H. Johnson, m.m.
second, Carl H. Kerske, coxswain, Peter H. Klumpers, c.m.m., William P. Lander,
seaman first, Ernest R. Mahlmann, c.b.m., William A. McCabe, fireman first,
Stanley W. McEowen, seaman first, James H. Peck, q.m. second, Reginald Peterson,
r.m. second, Vernon F. Puckett, c.m.m., King F. Sung, m.a.t.t. first, Harry B.
Tuck, seaman first, Cleo E. Waxier, b.m. second, John T. Weber, yeoman first,
and Far Z. Wong, m.a.t.t. first, were slightly injured in line of duty, not the
result of their own misconduct.
The Commander in Chief
of the
United States Asiatic
Fleet (Yarnell)
to the Secretary of the
Navy (Swanson)
December 23, 1937
[Received 10:50 a.m.]
0023. The following
is the opinion of the Court of Inquiry ordered to investigate the bombing and
sinking of the U. S. S. Panay. The opinion is approved.
Opinion was that
the U. S. S. Panay was engaged in carrying out the well-established policy of
the United States of protecting American lives and property.
2. That the
Japanese aviators should have been familiar with the characteristics and
distinguishing markings of the Panay as this ship was present at Nanking during
the Japanese aerial attacks on this city.
3. That, while the
first bombers might not have been able on account of their altitude to identify
the U. S. S. Panay, there was no excuse for attacking without properly
identifying the target, especially as it was well known that neutral vessels
were present in the Yangtze River.
4. That it was
utterly inconceivable that the six light bombing planes coming within about six
hundred feet of the ships and attacking for over a period of twenty minutes
could not be aware of the identity of the ships they were attacking.
5. That the
Japanese are solely and wholely responsible for all losses which have occurred
as the result of this attack.
6. That the death
of C. L. Ensminger, sk first and E. W. G. Hulsebus, coxswain occurred in line
of duty and were not the result of their own misconduct.
7. That the injured
and wounded members of the crew of the U. S. S. Panay received their wounds and
injuries in the line of duty and were not the result of their own misconduct.
8. In considering
the case as a whole and attending incidents that the court is of the opinion
that no offenses have been committed nor blame incurred by any member of the
naval service involved. 1735.
