Carlson’s Patrol

Native guides lead 2nd Raider Battalion Marines on a combat/reconnaissance patrol behind Japanese lines, November 1942, on Guadalcanal. The patrol lasted for less than a month, during which the Marines covered 150 miles and fought more than a dozen actions.

Carlson’s patrol, also known as The Long Patrol or Carlson’s long patrol, was an operation by the 2nd Marine Raider Battalion under the command of Evans Carlson during the Guadalcanal Campaign against the Imperial Japanese Army from 6 November to 4 December 1942. In the operation, the 2nd Raiders attacked forces under the command of Toshinari Shōji, which were escaping from an attempted encirclement in the Koli Point area on Guadalcanal and attempting to rejoin other Japanese army units on the opposite side of the U.S. Lunga perimeter.

In a series of small unit engagements over 29 days, the 2nd Raiders killed almost 500 Japanese soldiers while suffering only 16 killed, although many were afflicted by disease. The raiders also captured a Japanese field gun that was delivering harassing fire on Henderson Field, the Allied airfield at Lunga Point on Guadalcanal.

Background

On 7 August 1942, Allied forces (primarily U.S. Marines) landed on Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Florida Islands in the Solomon Islands. Their mission was to deny the Japanese use of the islands as bases for threatening the supply routes between the U.S. and Australia, and to secure the islands as starting points for a campaign to isolate the major Japanese base at Rabaul while also supporting the Allied New Guinea campaign. The landings initiated the six-month-long Guadalcanal Campaign.

The Japanese were taken by surprise, and by nightfall on 8 August the 11,000 Allied troops—under the command of Lieutenant General Alexander Vandegrift—secured Tulagi and nearby small islands as well as an airfield under construction at Lunga Point on Guadalcanal. The Allies later renamed the airfield Henderson Field. To protect the airfield, the U.S. Marines established a perimeter defense around Lunga Point. Additional reinforcements over the next two months later increased the number of U.S. troops at Lunga Point to more than 20,000.

In response to the Allied landings on Guadalcanal, the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters assigned the Imperial Japanese Army’s 17th Army—a corps-sized command based at Rabaul and under the command of Lieutenant-General Harukichi Hyakutake—with the task of retaking Guadalcanal. Units of the 17th Army began to arrive on Guadalcanal on 19 August to drive Allied forces from the island.

The first Japanese attempt to recapture Henderson Field failed when a 917-man force was defeated on 21 August in the Battle of the Tenaru. The next attempt took place from 12–14 September, ending in the defeat of the 6,000 soldiers under the command of Major General Kiyotake Kawaguchi at the Battle of Edson’s Ridge. Kawaguchi and the surviving Japanese troops then regrouped west of the Matanikau River on Guadalcanal.

Between 1 and 17 October, the Japanese delivered 15,000 troops to Guadalcanal, giving Hyakutake 20,000 total troops to employ for his planned offensive. After his staff officers observed the American defenses around Lunga Point, Hyakutake decided that the main thrust of his planned attack would be from south of Henderson Field. His 2nd Division (augmented by troops from the 38th Division), under Lieutenant General Masao Maruyama was ordered to march through the jungle and attack the American defenses from the south near the east bank of the Lunga River. The 7000-member 2nd Division was split into three units; the Left Wing Unit under Major General Yumio Nasu containing the 29th Infantry Regiment, the Right Wing Unit under Kawaguchi consisting of troops from the 230th Infantry Regiment (from the 38th Infantry Division), and the division reserve led by Maruyama comprising the 16th Infantry Regiment.

On 23 October, Maruyama’s forces struggled through the jungle to reach the American lines. Kawaguchi—on his own initiative—began to shift his right-wing unit to the east, believing that the American defenses were weaker in that area. Maruyama, through one of his staff officers, ordered Kawaguchi to keep to the original attack plan. When he refused, Kawaguchi was relieved of command and replaced by Colonel Toshinari Shōji, commander of the 230th Infantry Regiment. That evening, after learning that the left and right-wing forces were still struggling to reach the American lines, Hyakutake postponed the attack to 19:00 on 24 October. The Americans remained completely unaware of the approach of Maruyama’s forces.

Finally, late on 24 October, Maruyama’s forces reached the U.S. Lunga perimeter. Over two consecutive nights Maruyama’s forces conducted numerous unsuccessful frontal assaults on positions defended by troops of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines (1/7) under Lieutenant Colonel Chesty Puller and the U.S. Army’s 3rd Battalion, 164th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert Hall. U.S. Marine and Army rifle, machine gun, mortar, artillery and direct canister fire from 37 mm (1.46 in) anti-tank guns “wrought terrible carnage” on the Japanese. More than 1,500 of Maruyama’s troops were killed in the attacks while the Americans lost about 60 killed. Shōji’s right wing units did not participate in the attacks, choosing to remain in place to cover Nasu’s right flank against a possible attack in that area by U.S. forces that never materialized.

At 08:00 on 26 October, Hyakutake called off further attacks and ordered his forces to retreat. Maruyama’s left wing and division reserve survivors were ordered to retreat back to the Matanikau River area while the right wing unit under Shōji was told to head for Koli Point, 13 mi (21 km) east of the Lunga River. Shōji and his troops began arriving at Koli Point on November 3.

At 05:30 on 4 November, two companies from the 2nd Marine Raider Battalion—commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Evans Carlson, landed by boat at Aola Bay, 40 mi (64 km) east of Lunga Point. Carlson’s raiders—along with troops from the U.S. Army’s 147th Infantry Regiment—were to provide security for 500 Seabees as they attempted to construct an airfield. The Aola Bay airfield construction effort had been approved by William Halsey, Jr.—commander of Allied forces in the south Pacific area—acting on a recommendation by Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner, U.S. naval commander of amphibious forces for the south Pacific.

The 2nd Marine Raider Battalion was a unique unit in the Marine Corps. The battalion’s original organization and tactics were based around Communist Chinese precepts Carlson had witnessed while serving as an observer with the Communists during the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937-1938. These precepts included promoting equality between officers and enlisted men and making decisions through collective consensus. Unlike the 1st Marine Raider Battalion, which focused on commando tactics, the 2nd Battalion trained to operate as a guerrilla force. The training included an emphasis on infiltration tactics and often involved tactical exercises conducted at night. The battalion was organized into six self-contained rifle companies and a headquarters company. Before landing at Guadalcanal elements of the battalion had seen action as part of the garrison of Midway Atoll during the Battle of Midway in May 1942 and the near disastrous Makin Island raid in August.

In early November, Vandegrift, fearing that the Japanese were planning an assault on the Lunga perimeter from the east using Shōji’s forces plus additional reinforcements, launched an operation against the Japanese units at Koli Point. Beginning on 4 November, two battalions of U.S. Marines and two battalions of U.S. Army troops attacked and attempted to encircle Shōji’s men at Gavaga Creek near the village of Tetere in the Koli Point area.

As the American troops were attempting to destroy Shōji’s force, Vandegrift ordered Carlson’s raiders to march overland from Aola Bay toward Koli Point to cut off any of Shōji’s forces that escaped the encirclement attempt. On 5 November, two transport ships headed for Espiritu Santo to pick up three companies from Carlson’s battalion while Carlson prepared his two companies already on Guadalcanal to march overland towards Koli Point. Carlson arranged for rear echelon personnel at Aola to resupply his patrol with rations every four days at a prearranged point on the coast. A patrol with native carriers would meet the boat and man-pack the supplies inland to Carlson’s patrol base.

Patrol

Initial Actions

At first light on 6 November, Carlson and his command group, two of his companies, and a group of native scouts and carriers commanded by Major John Mather of the Australian Army and Sergeant Major Jacob C. Vouza of the Solomon Islands Police Force set out from Aola on the patrol. The group marched along a jungle trail northwest to the Reko River, arriving on 7 November. At the Reko, Carlson learned that the local Christian mission had recently been raided by Japanese troops who had killed two of the missionaries before moving west. Pushing across the river with one platoon of troops, Carlson encountered a small group of Japanese who shot and severely wounded the native scout leading the Marine column. Returning fire, the Marines killed two Japanese soldiers and drove off another three or four. Carlson’s main body then arrived and the column bivouacked for the night.

On 8 November, the column continued through the jungle to the northwest, striking the coast at the Kena River, and made camp at the village of Tasimboko, 15 mi (24 km) from Aola Bay. The next day they crossed the Berande and Balasuna rivers and reached the village of Binu—10 mi (16 km) southwest of Tasimboko—in the afternoon. At Binu, about 3 mi (4.8 km) southeast of Koli Point, Carlson established his base camp and prepared to block the movement of any Japanese forces from Koli to the east and south.

The other three raider companies arrived at Aola on 8 November. On 9 November, they moved by landing craft to Tasimboko and, on 10 November marched overland—guided by native scouts—toward Binu. On the way, the raiders encountered a small group of Japanese soldiers and killed three of them before arriving at Binu in the afternoon of the same day.

In the meantime, Hyakutake ordered Shōji to abandon his positions at Koli and rejoin Japanese forces at Kokumbona in the Matanikau area. Although American forces had almost completely encircled Shōji’s troops along Gavaga Creek at Koli, a gap existed by way of a swampy creek in the southern side of the American lines. Taking advantage of this route, Shōji’s men began to escape. The Americans closed the gap in their lines on 11 November, but by then Shōji and between 2,000 and 3,000 of his men had escaped into the jungle to the south.

On 11 November, Carlson sent four of his battalion’s companies—”C,” “D,” “E,” and “F”—to fan out and patrol the area to the north and west of Binu. The remaining company, “B,” stayed behind to provide security for the Binu base camp. At 10:00, Company C, which had marched directly west toward the village of Asamana, encountered a large body of Shōji’s troops camped near the Metapona River and were quickly pinned down by rifle, machinegun, and mortar fire. Carlson responded by directing Companies D and E to come to C’s aid, attacking the Japanese forces from two different directions.

As Companies D and E moved in C’s direction, both encountered large concentrations of Shōji’s soldiers and, by 12:30, were involved in intense firefights. At 15:00, Company D commander Captain Charles McAuliffe—with nine of his men—unexpectedly marched into the Binu base camp. McAuliffe reported to Carlson that soon after he had made contact with the Japanese forces, he and one of his squads had become cut off from the rest of his company. After extricating themselves with difficulty, McAuliffe and the men with him had decided to retreat back to the base camp. McAuliffe reported that, as far as he knew, the rest of his company had been annihilated. A short time later, however, the rest of D Company arrived at the base camp, led by Gunnery Sergeant George Schrier, after successfully disengaging from the firefight. Carlson summarily relieved McAuliffe for what he later described as “total ineptitude for leadership in battle” and placed Captain Joe Griffith in command of Company D.

Along with Company F, which had returned to the base camp, Carlson proceeded to the area where Company C was engaged, arriving at 16:30. Carlson ordered Company F to attack the Japanese positions facing Company C at 17:15. In the meantime, the Japanese troops departed the area, which Company F soon confirmed. Leaving Company F at the scene, Carlson returned to Binu with Company C, arriving at 22:00. Company E arrived at Binu about the same time and reported that they had caught a Japanese company crossing a river in the open and killed many of them before withdrawing. Carlson then took Company B and returned to the area that Company F was guarding, arriving at daybreak on 12 November. The Marines had suffered 10 killed in the day’s actions and estimated that they had killed 120 Japanese soldiers.

Carlson and the two companies, with Company B leading, marched west towards the village of Asamana on the Metapona River. While crossing the river, the Marines captured two Japanese soldiers and killed a third who happened by in a native boat, then attacked and occupied Asamana, surprising and killing several Japanese soldiers in the village. Signs in Japanese in the village indicated that it was being used as a rallying location for Shōji’s forces. Occupying defensive positions around the village and river crossing, the raiders killed 25 Japanese soldiers that approached the village during the remainder of the day.

The next day, when a company-sized column of Japanese soldiers approached Asamana, the raiders called in 75 mm (2.95 in) artillery fire from the 1st Battalion, 10th Marine Regiment, killing many of the Japanese and causing the rest to scatter and retreat away from the village. Carlson and the Marines with him returned to Binu on 14 November to rest and re-provision. In the same day, a patrol from the raiders Company F wiped out a 15-man Japanese encampment discovered by the native scouts.

On 15 November, Carlson’s battalion changed their base camp from Binu to Asamana. By this time, however, Shōji’s units were no longer in the area, having continued their march deep into the interior of Guadalcanal en route to the Matanikau. Raider patrols around Asamana over the next two days found and killed a few scattered Japanese stragglers.

New Mission

Carlson’s battalion was ordered to move to the upper Tenaru River and patrol around the Lunga River—south of the Lunga perimeter—to locate the trail the Japanese had used to position their men and materiel for their assaults during the Battle for Henderson Field. Carlson’s raiders were also to seek out and destroy several Japanese artillery pieces that had been delivering harassing fire against Henderson Field for several weeks. The raiders set up the new base camp about 2 mi (3.2 km) southeast of the Lunga perimeter on 20 November and rested and replenished until 24 November.

On 25 November, Carlson’s Company A arrived from Espiritu Santo and joined the raiders. On 27 November, the battalion relocated 4 mi (6.4 km) further up the Tenaru River and established two auxiliary patrol bases 2 mi (3.2 km) upstream and downstream, respectively.

On 28 November, Companies B and D patrolled across the Lunga River and bivouacked in the Mount Austen area, southwest of the Lunga perimeter. The same day, Companies A and F patrolled further south between the Lunga and the Tenaru. On 30 November, the raiders found a Japanese 75 mm mountain gun and 37 mm (1.46 in) anti-tank gun emplaced on a ridge about 4 mi (6.4 km) south of the Lunga perimeter. As one squad of six Marines from Company F patrolled near where the guns were discovered, they entered a hidden Japanese camp and found themselves among about 100 Japanese soldiers resting under shelters with their weapons stacked around trees in the center of the camp. In the resulting melee, the raider squad killed about 75 of the Japanese. The rest escaped.

The raiders rested on 1 December and received some provisions by airdrop. On 2 December, Carlson fanned out his patrols around the Lunga River. Company B discovered 10 Japanese camped by the river and killed all of them. None of the other companies encountered any Japanese, but one discovered another 75 mm mountain gun. Late in the day, Carlson received orders to terminate the patrol and take his troops into the Lunga perimeter the next day.

On 3 December, Carlson sent Companies C, D, and E east towards the Tenaru river while Companies A, B, and F headed west towards Mount Austen. Companies C, D, and E reached the lower Tenaru and entered friendly lines at Lunga Point without incident. Companies A, B, and F, however, encountered a Japanese patrol near the summit of Mount Austen. In a close-quarters fight in the jungle, 25 Japanese were killed and four Marines were seriously wounded, one of whom died later.

The next day, Companies A, B, and F set out with the intention of entering the Lunga perimeter near the Matanikau River. Along the way, the Marine column was ambushed by a Japanese machinegun team that killed four raiders. Seven Japanese were killed in this skirmish. The patrol encountered no further opposition and entered friendly lines at Lunga Point by mid-afternoon.

Aftermath

As Carlson’s battalion was ending its patrol, Shōji and his surviving troops were reaching friendly positions west of the Matanikau. In addition to the losses sustained from attacks by Carlson’s raiders, a lack of food and tropical diseases felled many more of Shōji’s men. By the time Shōji’s forces reached the Lunga River in mid-November, about halfway to the Matanikau, only 1,300 men remained with the main body. When Shōji reached the 17th Army positions west of the Matanikau, only 700-800 survivors were still with him. Survivors from Shōji’s force later participated in the Battle of Mount Austen, the Galloping Horse, and the Sea Horse in December 1942 and January 1943.

During the 29 days of the patrol, Carlson’s raiders hiked approximately 150 mi (240 km) to cover a straight-line distance of about 40 mi (64 km) from Aola Bay to the Matanikau River. Carlson claimed that his troops killed 488 Japanese soldiers and captured or destroyed large amounts of equipment, including two howitzers and various small arms and ammunition.

The 2nd Raiders suffered 16 killed and 17 wounded (plus 2 wounded native guides). Non-battle casualties totaled 225, of which 125 suffered from malaria, 29 from dysentery, and 71 from ringworm or jungle rot. Most of the remaining raiders were also suffering some type of physical ailment. On 17 December, the raiders departed Guadalcanal by ship and arrived back at their home camp on Espiritu Santo on 20 December. At Espiritu Santo, the unit continued to be affected by the lingering tropical diseases many had contracted during the Guadalcanal patrol. In the second week of March 1943, the 2nd Raiders were declared unfit for combat duty, although this finding was never announced in an official document. The 2nd Marine Raiders did not participate as a unit in a combat operation until the Bougainville campaign beginning on 1 November 1943. In spite of the high fallout from disease, Carlson’s troops generally felt that they had performed well as a unit during the patrol and had accomplished their mission. Cleland E. Early—a lieutenant in Carlson’s Company E—described the long Guadalcanal patrol and the effect on his unit: “Enduring the living conditions was worse than the combat. My platoon went in with 30 men, one corpsman and one officer. When we came out we had one officer, one corpsman, and 18 enlisted, all of whom had malaria, worms, diarrhea, jungle rot and high morale.

Carlson’s 2nd U.S. Marine Raider Battalion lands at Aola Bay on Guadalcanal on November 4, 1942.

Major James Roosevelt, son of U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt, was the executive officer of the 2nd Raiders on the Makin Raid and Guadalcanal.

U.S. 2nd Marine Raider Captain Schreir briefs Marines during a patrol on Guadalcanal in November 1942.

U.S. 2nd Marine Raiders cross an open field on Guadalcanal in November 1942.

Imperial Japanese Army field gun captured by U.S. Marine 2nd Raider Battalion on Guadalcanal in November 1942

Solomon Island native scouts display Japanese weapons and flags captured during the patrol.

The “Long Patrol” by Carlson’s U.S. Marine Raiders November-December 1942.

 

Koli Point Action

75 mm pack howitzers of the 1st Battalion, 11th U.S. Marine Regiment fire in support of the U.S. Marine and Army operation against Japanese forces around Koli Point on Guadalcanal in November 1942.

The Koli Point action, during 3–12 November 1942, was an engagement between U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Army forces and Imperial Japanese Army forces around Koli Point on Guadalcanal during the Guadalcanal Campaign. The U.S. forces were under the overall command of Major General Alexander Vandegrift, while the Japanese forces were under the overall command of Lieutenant General Harukichi Hyakutake.

In the engagement, U.S. Marines from the 7th Marine Regiment and U.S. Army soldiers from the 164th Infantry Regiment under the tactical command of William H. Rupertus and Edmund B. Sebree, attacked a concentration of Japanese Army troops, most of whom belonged to the 230th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Toshinari Shōji. Shōji’s troops had marched to the Koli Point area after the failed Japanese assaults on U.S. defenses during the Battle for Henderson Field in late October 1942.

In the engagement, the U.S. forces attempted to encircle and destroy Shōji’s forces. Although Shōji’s unit took heavy casualties, he and most of his men were able to evade the encirclement attempt and escape into the interior of Guadalcanal. As Shōji’s troops endeavored to reach Japanese positions in another part of the island, they were pursued and attacked by a battalion-sized patrol of U.S. Marine Raiders.

Background

On 7 August 1942, Allied forces (primarily U.S.) landed on Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Florida Islands in the Solomon Islands. The landings on the islands were meant to deny their use by the Japanese as bases for threatening the supply routes between the U.S. and Australia, and to secure the islands as starting points for a campaign with the eventual goal of isolating the major Japanese base at Rabaul while also supporting the Allied New Guinea campaign. The landings initiated the six-month-long Guadalcanal campaign.

Taking the Japanese by surprise, by nightfall on 8 August the 11,000 Allied troops—under the command of Major General Alexander Vandegrift and mainly consisting of U.S. Marines—had secured Tulagi and nearby small islands as well as an airfield under construction at Lunga Point on Guadalcanal. The airfield was later named Henderson Field by Allied forces. The Allied aircraft that subsequently operated out of the airfield became known as the “Cactus Air Force” (CAF) after the Allied codename for Guadalcanal. To protect the airfield, the U.S. Marines established a perimeter defense around Lunga Point.

In response to the Allied landings on Guadalcanal, the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters assigned the Imperial Japanese Army’s 17th Army—a corps-sized command based at Rabaul and under the command of Lieutenant-General Harukichi Hyakutake—with the task of retaking Guadalcanal from Allied forces. Beginning on 19 August, various units of the 17th Army began to arrive on Guadalcanal with the goal of driving Allied forces from the island.

Because of the threat by CAF aircraft based at Henderson Field, the Japanese were unable to use large, slow transport ships to deliver troops and supplies to the island. Instead, the Japanese used warships based at Rabaul and the Shortland Islands to carry their forces to Guadalcanal. The Japanese warships, mainly light cruisers or destroyers from the Eighth Fleet under the command of Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa, were usually able to make the round trip down “The Slot” to Guadalcanal and back in a single night, thereby minimizing their exposure to CAF air attack. Delivering the troops in this manner, however, prevented most of the soldiers’ heavy equipment and supplies, such as heavy artillery, vehicles, and much food and ammunition, from being carried to Guadalcanal with them. These high-speed warship runs to Guadalcanal occurred throughout the campaign and were later called the “Tokyo Express” by Allied forces and “Rat Transportation” by the Japanese.

The first Japanese attempt to recapture Henderson Field failed when a 917-man force was defeated on 21 August in the Battle of the Tenaru. The next attempt took place from 12–14 September, with the 6,000 soldiers under the command of Major General Kiyotake Kawaguchi being defeated in the Battle of Edson’s Ridge. After their defeat at Edson’s Ridge, Kawaguchi and the surviving Japanese troops regrouped west of the Matanikau River on Guadalcanal.

As the Japanese regrouped, the U.S. forces concentrated on shoring up and strengthening their Lunga defenses. On 18 September, an Allied naval convoy delivered 4,157 men from the U.S. 7th Marine Regiment to Guadalcanal. These reinforcements allowed Vandegrift—beginning on 19 September—to establish an unbroken line of defense completely around the Lunga perimeter.

General Vandegrift and his staff were aware that Kawaguchi’s troops had retreated to the area west of the Matanikau and that numerous groups of Japanese stragglers were scattered throughout the area between the Lunga Perimeter and the Matanikau River. Vandegrift, therefore, decided to conduct a series of small unit operations around the Matanikau Valley.

The first U.S. Marine operation against Japanese forces west of the Matanikau, conducted between 23 and 27 September 1942 by elements of three U.S. Marine battalions, was repulsed by Kawaguchi’s troops under Colonel Akinosuke Oka’s local command. In the second action, between 6 and 9 October, a larger force of U.S. Marines successfully crossed the Matanikau River, attacked newly landed Japanese forces from the 2nd (Sendai) Infantry Division under the command of generals Masao Maruyama and Yumio Nasu and inflicted heavy casualties on the Japanese 4th Infantry Regiment. The second action forced the Japanese to retreat from their positions east of the Matanikau.

In the meantime, Major General Millard F. Harmon—commander of U.S. Army forces in the South Pacific—convinced Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley—commander of Allied forces in the South Pacific Area—that U.S. Marine forces on Guadalcanal needed to be reinforced immediately if the Allies were to successfully defend the island from the next expected Japanese offensive. Thus on 13 October, a naval convoy delivered the 2,837-strong 164th U.S. Infantry Regiment, a North Dakota Army National Guard formation from the U.S. Army’s Americal Division, to Guadalcanal.

Battle for Henderson Field

Between 1 and 17 October, the Japanese delivered 15,000 troops to Guadalcanal, giving Hyakutake 20,000 total troops to employ for his planned offensive. Because of the loss of their positions on the east side of the Matanikau, the Japanese decided that an attack on the U.S. defenses along the coast would be prohibitively difficult. Thus, after observation of the American defenses around Lunga Point by his staff officers, Hyakutake decided that the main thrust of his planned attack would be from south of Henderson Field. His 2nd Division (augmented by troops from the 38th Division)—under Lieutenant General Masao Maruyama and comprising 7,000 soldiers in three infantry regiments of three battalions each—was ordered to march through the jungle and attack the American defenses from the south near the east bank of the Lunga River. The 2nd Division was split into three units; the Left Wing Unit under Major General Yumio Nasu containing the 29th Infantry Regiment, the Right Wing Unit under Major General Kiyotake Kawaguchi consisting of troops from the 230th Infantry Regiment (from the 38th Infantry Division), and the division reserve led by Maruyama comprising the 16th Infantry Regiment.

On 23 October, Maruyama’s forces struggled through the jungle to reach the American lines. Kawaguchi—on his own initiative—began to shift his right-wing unit to the east, believing that the American defenses were weaker in that area. Maruyama—through one of his staff officers—ordered Kawaguchi to keep to the original attack plan. When he refused, Kawaguchi was relieved of command and replaced by Colonel Toshinari Shōji, commander of the 230th Infantry Regiment. That evening, after learning that the left and right wing forces were still struggling to reach the American lines, Hyakutake postponed the attack to 19:00 on 24 October. The Americans remained completely unaware of the approach of Maruyama’s forces.

Finally, late on October 24 Maruyama’s forces reached the U.S. Lunga perimeter. Over two consecutive nights Maruyama’s forces conducted numerous, unsuccessful frontal assaults on positions defended by troops of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines (1/7) under Lieutenant Colonel Chesty Puller and the U.S. Army’s 3rd Battalion, 164th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert Hall. U.S. Marine and Army rifle, machine gun, mortar, artillery and direct canister fire from 37 mm (1.46 in) anti-tank guns “wrought terrible carnage” on the Japanese. More than 1,500 of Maruyama’s troops were killed in the attacks while the Americans lost about 60 killed. Shōji’s right wing units did not participate in the attacks, choosing instead to remain in place to cover Nasu’s right flank against a possible attack in that area by U.S. forces that never materialized.

At 08:00 on 26 October, Hyakutake called off any further attacks and ordered his forces to retreat. Maruyama’s left wing and division reserve survivors were ordered to retreat back to the Matanikau River area while the right wing unit under Shōji was told to head for Koli Point, 13 mi (21 km) east of the Lunga River.

To provide support for the right-wing units (now called the Shōji Detachment) marching towards Koli, the Japanese dispatched a Tokyo Express run for the night of 2 November to land 300 fresh troops from a previously uncommitted company of the 230th Infantry Regiment, two 75 mm (2.95 in) mountain guns, provisions, and ammunition at Koli Point. American radio intelligence intercepted Japanese communications concerning this effort and the Marine command on Guadalcanal determined to try to intercept it. With many of the American units currently involved in an operation west of the Matanikau, Vandegrift could spare only one battalion. The 2nd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment (2/7)—commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Herman H. Hanneken—marched east from Lunga Point at 06:50 on 2 November and reached Koli Point after dark the same day. After crossing the Metapona River at its mouth, Hanneken deployed his troops along 2,000 yd (1,800 m) in the woods facing the beach to await the arrival of the Japanese ships.

Action

Early on the morning of 3 November, the five Japanese destroyers on the express run arrived at Koli Point and began to unload their cargoes and troops about 1,000 yd (910 m) east of Hanneken’s battalion. Hanneken’s force remained concealed and unsuccessfully attempted to contact their headquarters by radio to report the landing. At dawn, after a Japanese patrol discovered the Marines, combat with mortar, machine gun, and small arms fire began. Soon after, the Japanese unlimbered, and began to fire, the two mountain guns that they had landed during the night. Hanneken, still unable to contact his headquarters to request support, having suffered significant casualties, and running low on ammunition, decided to retreat. Hanneken’s battalion withdrew by bounds, re-crossing the Metapona, and then the Nalimbiu River 5,000 yd (4,600 m) further west, where Hanneken was finally able to establish contact with his superiors at 14:45 to report his situation.

In addition to Hanneken’s report of sizable Japanese forces at Koli Point, Vandegrift’s staff also possessed a captured Japanese document that outlined a plan to land the remainder of the 38th Infantry Division at Koli to attack the Marine Lunga defenses from the east. Unaware that the Japanese had abandoned the plan, Vandegrift decided that the threat from Koli Point needed to be dealt with immediately. Thus, he ordered most of the Marine units currently engaged west of the Matanikau to return to Lunga Point. Puller’s battalion (1/7) was ordered to prepare to move to Koli Point by boat. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 164th Infantry Regiment (2/164 and 3/164) prepared to march inland to the Nalimbiu River. The 3rd Battalion, 10th Marines began to move its 75 mm pack howitzers across the Ilu river to provide artillery support. Marine Brigadier General William Rupertus was placed in command of the operation.

At the same time that the U.S. forces were mobilizing, Shōji and his troops were beginning to reach Koli Point east of the Metapona River at Gavaga Creek. Late in the day, 31 CAF aircraft attacked Shōji’s forces, inflicting about 100 deaths and injuries on the Japanese. Some of the CAF aircraft also mistakenly attacked Hanneken’s men, causing several deaths and injuries to the Marines.

At 06:30 on 4 November, the 164th troops began their march towards Koli Point. Around the same time, Rupertus and Puller’s battalion landed at Koli Point near the mouth of the Nalimbiu River. Rupertus decided to wait for the army troops to arrive before attacking Shōji’s forces. Because of heat, humidity, and difficult terrain the 164th troops didn’t complete the 7 mi (11 km) march to the Nalimbiu until nightfall. In the meantime, the U.S. Navy cruisers Helena, San Francisco, and destroyer Sterett bombarded Shōji’s positions with artillery fire, killing many officers and soldiers from the 9th and 10th Companies, 230th Infantry.

On the morning of 5 November, Rupertus ordered the 164th troops to cross to the east bank of the Nalimbiu and envelop the inland flank of any Japanese forces that might be facing Puller’s battalion. The two battalions crossed the river about 3,500 yd (3,200 m) inland and pivoted north to advance along the east bank. The army troops encountered few Japanese but were greatly slowed by difficult terrain and stopped short of the coast for the night. That same day, the Japanese troops that had been landed by the warships on 3 November, made contact with and joined Shōji’s forces.

The next day, Puller’s battalion crossed the Nalimbiu as the 164th troops resumed their march towards the coast. On 7 November, the Marines and army units joined forces at the coast and pushed east to a point about 1 mi (1.6 km) west of the Metapona, where they dug in near the beach because of sightings of a Japanese Express run heading for Guadalcanal that might land reinforcements at Koli that night. The Japanese, however, successfully landed the reinforcements elsewhere on Guadalcanal that night and these reinforcements were not a factor in the Koli Point action.

Meanwhile, Hyakutake ordered Shōji to abandon his positions at Koli and rejoin Japanese forces at Kokumbona in the Matanikau area. To cover the withdrawal, a sizable portion of Shōji’s forces dug-in and prepared to defend positions along Gavaga Creek near the village of Tetere, about 1 mi (1.6 km) east of the Metapona. The two mountain guns landed on 3 November—in combination with mortars—kept up a constant rate of fire on the advancing Americans. On 8 November, Puller’s and Hanneken’s battalions and the 164th soldiers attempted to surround Shōji’s forces by approaching Gavaga overland from the west and landing by boat near Tetere in the east. In action during the day, Puller was wounded several times and was evacuated. Rupertus, who was suffering from dengue fever, relinquished command of the operation to U.S. Army Brigadier General Edmund B. Sebree.

On 9 November, the U.S. troops continued with their attempt to encircle Shōji’s forces. On the west of Gavaga Creek, 1/7 and 2/164 extended their positions inland along the creek while 2/7 and other 164th troops took positions on the east side of Shōji’s positions. The Americans began to compress the pocket while subjecting it to constant bombardment by artillery, mortars, and aircraft. A gap, however, existed by way of a swampy creek in the southern side of the American lines, which 2/164 was supposed to have closed. Taking advantage of this route, Shōji’s men began to escape the pocket.

The Americans closed the gap in their lines on 11 November, but by then Shōji and between 2,000 and 3,000 of his men had escaped into the jungle to the south. On 12 November, Sebree’s forces completely overran and killed all the remaining Japanese soldiers left in the pocket. The Americans counted the bodies of 450–475 Japanese dead in the area and captured most of Shōji’s heavy weapons and provisions. The American forces suffered 40 killed and 120 wounded in the operation.

Aftermath

As Shōji’s forces began their march to rejoin the main body of Japanese forces west of the Matanikau River, the U.S. 2nd Marine Raider Battalion—under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Evans Carlson, which had been guarding an airfield construction effort underway at Aola Bay, 30 mi (48 km) further east from Koli Point—set off in pursuit. Over the next month, with the aid of native scouts, Carlson’s raiders repeatedly attacked trailing elements and stragglers from Shōji’s forces, killing almost 500 of them. In addition, a lack of food and tropical diseases felled more of Shōji’s men. By the time the Japanese reached the Lunga River, about halfway to the Matanikau, only 1,300 men remained with Shōji’s main body. Several days later, when Shōji reached the 17th Army positions west of the Matanikau, only 700–800 survivors were still with him. Survivors from Shōji’s force later participated in the Battle of Mount Austen, the Galloping Horse, and the Sea Horse in December 1942 and January 1943.

Speaking of the Koli Point action, U.S. Sergeant (later Brigadier General) John E. Stannard, who participated as a member of the 164th Regiment, stated that the battle for Koli Point was “the most complex land operation, other than the original landing, that the Americans had conducted on Guadalcanal up to that time.” He added, “The Americans learned once again that offensive operations against the Japanese were much more complicated and difficult than was defeating banzai charges.” The Americans later abandoned the attempt to construct an airfield at Aola. Instead, the Aola construction units moved to Koli Point where they successfully built an auxiliary airfield beginning on 3 December 1942.

The next major Japanese reinforcement effort failed during the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, undertaken as Shōji and his troops struggled to reach friendly lines near the Matanikau. Although most of Shōji’s troops had escaped from Koli Point, the inability of the Japanese to keep their forces on Guadalcanal adequately supplied or reinforced prevented them from contributing effectively to what turned out to be Japan’s ultimately unsuccessful effort to hold the island or retake Henderson Field from Allied forces.

A U.S. Marine artillery forward observer climbs a tree to get a better view of the battlefield in the Koli Point area of Guadalcanal in November 1942.

U.S. Marines operate a field telephone during the Koli Point action on Guadalcanal in November 1942.

U.S. Marine wounded are evacuated during the Koli Point action on Guadalcanal in November 1942.

Action at Koli Point between U.S. and Japanese forces on Guadalcanal, November 2-3, 1942.

 

Matanikau Offensive

U.S. Marines cross the Matanikau River on Guadalcanal on a raft ferry in November 1942.

The Matanikau Offensive, from 1–4 November 1942, sometimes referred to as the Fourth Battle of the Matanikau, was an engagement between United States (U.S.) Marine and Army and Imperial Japanese Army forces around the Matanikau River and Point Cruz area on Guadalcanal during the Guadalcanal campaign of World War II. The action was one of the last of a series of engagements between U.S. and Japanese forces near the Matanikau River during the campaign.

In the engagement, seven battalions of U.S. Marine and Army troops under the overall command of Alexander Vandegrift and tactical command of Merritt A. Edson, following up on the U.S. victory in the Battle for Henderson Field, crossed the Matanikau River and attacked Japanese Army units between the river and Point Cruz, on the northern Guadalcanal coast. The area was defended by the Japanese Army’s 4th Infantry Regiment under Nomasu Nakaguma along with various other support troops, under the overall command of Harukichi Hyakutake. After inflicting heavy casualties on the Japanese defenders, U.S. forces halted the offensive and temporarily withdrew because of a perceived threat from Japanese forces elsewhere in the Guadalcanal area.

Background

On 7 August 1942, Allied forces (primarily U.S.) landed on Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Florida Islands in the Solomon Islands. The landings on the islands were meant to deny their use by the Japanese as bases for threatening the supply routes between the U.S. and Australia, and to secure the islands as starting points for a campaign with the eventual goal of isolating the major Japanese base at Rabaul while also supporting the Allied New Guinea campaign. The landings initiated the six-month-long Guadalcanal campaign.

Taking the Japanese by surprise, by nightfall on 8 August, the 11,000 Allied troops, under the command of Lieutenant General Alexander Vandegrift and mainly consisting of United States Marine Corps units, had secured Tulagi and nearby small islands, as well as an airfield under construction at Lunga Point on Guadalcanal. The airfield was later named Henderson Field by Allied forces. The Allied aircraft that subsequently operated out of the airfield became known as the “Cactus Air Force” (CAF) after the Allied codename for Guadalcanal. To protect the airfield, the U.S. Marines established a perimeter defense around Lunga Point.

In response to the Allied landings on Guadalcanal, the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters assigned the Imperial Japanese Army’s 17th Army, a corps-sized command based at Rabaul and under the command of Lieutenant-General Harukichi Hyakutake, with the task of retaking Guadalcanal from Allied forces. Beginning on 19 August, various units of the 17th Army began to arrive on Guadalcanal with the goal of driving Allied forces from the island.

Because of the threat by CAF aircraft based at Henderson Field, the Japanese were unable to use large, slow transport ships to deliver troops and supplies to the island. Instead, the Japanese used warships based at Rabaul and the Shortland Islands to carry their forces to Guadalcanal. The Japanese warships, mainly light cruisers or destroyers from the Eighth Fleet under the command of Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa, were usually able to make the round trip down “The Slot” to Guadalcanal and back in a single night, thereby minimizing their exposure to CAF air attack. Delivering the troops in this manner, however, prevented most of the soldiers’ heavy equipment and supplies, such as heavy artillery, vehicles, and much food and ammunition, from being carried to Guadalcanal with them. These high-speed warship runs to Guadalcanal occurred throughout the campaign and were later called the “Tokyo Express” by Allied forces and “Rat Transportation” by the Japanese.

The first Japanese attempt to recapture Henderson Field failed when a 917-man force was defeated on 21 August in the Battle of the Tenaru. The next attempt took place from 12–14 September, with the 6,000 soldiers under the command of Major General Kiyotake Kawaguchi being defeated in the Battle of Edson’s Ridge. After their defeat at Edson’s Ridge, Kawaguchi and the surviving Japanese troops regrouped west of the Matanikau River on Guadalcanal.

As the Japanese regrouped, the U.S. forces concentrated on shoring up and strengthening their Lunga defenses. On 18 September, an Allied naval convoy delivered 4,157 men from the U.S. 7th Marine Regiment to Guadalcanal. These reinforcements allowed Vandegrift, beginning on 19 September, to establish an unbroken line of defense completely around the Lunga perimeter.

General Vandegrift and his staff were aware that Kawaguchi’s troops had retreated to the area west of the Matanikau and that numerous groups of Japanese stragglers were scattered throughout the area between the Lunga Perimeter and the Matanikau River. Vandegrift, therefore, decided to conduct a series of small unit operations around the Matanikau Valley.

The first U.S. Marine operation against Japanese forces west of the Matanikau, conducted between 23 September and 27 September 1942 by elements of three U.S. Marine battalions, was repulsed by Kawaguchi’s troops under Colonel Akinosuke Oka’s local command. In the second action, between 6 October and 9 October, a larger force of U.S. Marines successfully crossed the Matanikau River, attacked newly landed Japanese forces from the 2nd (Sendai) Infantry Division under the command of generals Masao Maruyama and Yumio Nasu and inflicted heavy casualties on the Japanese 4th Infantry Regiment. The second action forced the Japanese to retreat from their positions east of the Matanikau.

In the meantime, Major General Millard F. Harmon, commander of United States Army forces in the South Pacific, convinced Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, commander of Allied forces in the South Pacific Area, that U.S. Marine forces on Guadalcanal needed to be reinforced immediately if the Allies were to successfully defend the island from the anticipated Japanese offensive. Thus on 13 October, a naval convoy delivered the 2,837-strong 164th U.S. Infantry Regiment, a North Dakota Army National Guard formation from the U.S. Army’s Americal Division, to Guadalcanal.

Battle for Henderson Field

Between 1 October and 17 October, the Japanese delivered 15,000 troops to Guadalcanal, giving Hyakutake 20,000 total troops to employ for his planned offensive. Because of the loss of their positions on the east side of the Matanikau, the Japanese decided that an attack on the U.S. defenses along the coast would be prohibitively difficult. Therefore, Hyakutake decided that the main thrust of his planned attack would be from south of Henderson Field. His 2nd Division (augmented by troops from the 38th Infantry Division), under Lieutenant General Masao Maruyama and comprising 7,000 soldiers in three infantry regiments of three battalions each was ordered to march through the jungle and attack the American defenses from the south near the east bank of the Lunga River. To distract the Americans from the planned attack from the south, Hyakutake’s heavy artillery plus five battalions of infantry (about 2,900 men) from the 4th and 124th Infantry Regiments under the overall command of Major General Tadashi Sumiyoshi were to attack the American defenses from the west along the coastal corridor.

Sumiyoshi’s forces, including two battalions of the 4th Infantry Regiment under Colonel Nomasu Nakaguma, launched attacks on the U.S. Marine defenses at the mouth of the Matanikau on the evening of 23 October. U.S. Marine artillery, cannon, and small arms fire repulsed the assaults and killed many of the attacking Japanese soldiers while suffering only light casualties to themselves.

Beginning on 24 October and continuing over two consecutive nights, Maruyama’s forces conducted numerous, unsuccessful frontal assaults on the southern portion of the U.S. Lunga perimeter. More than 1,500 of Maruyama’s troops were killed in the attacks while the Americans lost about 60 killed.

Further Japanese attacks near the Matanikau on 26 October by Oka’s 124th Infantry Regiment were also repulsed with heavy losses for the Japanese. Thus, at 08:00 on 26 October, Hyakutake called off any further attacks and ordered his forces to retreat. About half of Maruyama’s survivors were ordered to retreat back to the area west of the Matanikau River while the rest, the 230th Infantry Regiment under Colonel Toshinari Shoji, was told to head for Koli Point, east of the Lunga perimeter. The 4th Infantry Regiment retreated back to positions west of the Matanikau and around the Point Cruz area while the 124th Infantry Regiment took up positions on the slopes of Mount Austen in the upper Matanikau Valley.

In order to exploit the recent victory Vandegrift planned another offensive west of the Matanikau which would have two objectives: to drive the Japanese beyond artillery range of Henderson Field and to cut off the retreat of Maruyama’s men towards the village of Kokumbona, location of the 17th Army’s headquarters. For the offensive, Vandegrift committed the three battalions of the 5th Marine Regiment, commanded by Colonel Merritt Edson, plus the augmented 3d Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment (called the Whaling Group) commanded by Colonel William Whaling. Two battalions of the 2nd Marine Regiment would be in reserve. The offensive was supported by artillery from the 11th Marine Regiment and the 164th Infantry Regiment, CAF aircraft, and gunfire from U.S. Navy warships. Edson was placed in tactical command of the operation.

Defending the Matanikau area for the Japanese were the 4th and 124th Infantry Regiments. Nakaguma’s 4th Infantry defended the Matanikau from the shore to about 1,000 yards (914 m) inland while Oka’s 124th Infantry extended the line further inland along the river. Both regiments, which on paper consisted of six battalions, were severely understrength because of battle damage, tropical disease, and malnutrition. In fact, Oka described his command as at only “half strength.”

Action

Between 01:00 and 06:00 on 1 November, U.S. Marine engineers constructed three footbridges across the Matanikau. At 06:30, nine Marine and U.S. Army artillery batteries (about 36 guns) and U.S. warships San Francisco, Helena, and Sterett opened fire on the west bank of the Matanikau, and U.S. aircraft, including 19 B-17 heavy bombers, dropped bombs in the same area. At the same time, the 1st Battalion (1/5) of the 5th Marine Regiment crossed the Matanikau at its mouth while the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines (2/5) and the Whaling Group crossed the river further inland. Facing the Marines was the Japanese 2nd Battalion, 4th Infantry under Major Masao Tamura.

The 2/5 and the Whaling Group encountered very little resistance and reached and occupied several ridges south of Point Cruz by early afternoon. Along the coast near Point Cruz, however, the 7th Company from Tamura’s battalion fiercely resisted the U.S. advance. In several hours of fighting, Company C, 1/5 suffered heavy casualties, including the loss of three officers, and was driven back toward the Matanikau by Tamura’s troops. Assisted by another company from 1/5 and later by two companies from the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines (3/5), plus determined resistance by Marine Corporal Anthony Casamento, among others, the Americans were successful in stopping the retreat.

Reviewing the situation at the end of the day, Edson, along with Colonel Gerald Thomas and Lieutenant Colonel Merrill Twining from Vandegrift’s staff, decided to try to encircle the Japanese defenders around Point Cruz. They ordered 1/5 and 3/5 to continue to press the Japanese along the coast the next day while 2/5 wheeled north to envelop their adversaries west and south of Point Cruz. Tamura’s battalion had taken heavy losses in the day’s fighting, with Tamura’s 7th and 5th Companies being left with only 10 and 15 uninjured soldiers respectively.

Fearing that the U.S. troops were on the verge of breaking through their defenses, Hyakutake’s 17th Army headquarters hurriedly sent whatever troops could be found on-hand to bolster the 4th Infantry’s defensive efforts. The troops included the 2nd Anti-Tank Gun Battalion with 12 guns and the 39th Field Road Construction Unit. These two units took position in pre-prepared fighting emplacements around the south and west of Point Cruz.

On the morning of 2 November, with the Whaling Group covering their flank, the men of 2/5 marched north and reached the coast west of Point Cruz, completing the encirclement of the Japanese defenders. The Japanese defenses were centered in a draw between a coastal trail and a beach just west of Point Cruz and included coral, earth, and log bunkers as well as caves and foxholes. U.S. artillery bombarded the Japanese positions throughout the day on 2 November, causing an unknown number of casualties to the Japanese defenders.

Later in the day, Company I of 2/5 conducted a frontal assault with fixed bayonets on the northern portion of the Japanese defenses, overrunning and killing the Japanese defenders. At the same time, two battalions from 2nd Marine Regiment, now committed to the offensive, advanced past the Point Cruz area.

At 06:30 on 3 November, some Japanese troops attempted to break out of the pocket but were beaten back by the Marines. Between 08:00 and noon, five Marine companies from 2/5 and 3/5, using small arms, mortars, demolition charges, and direct and indirect artillery fire, completed the destruction of the Japanese pocket near Point Cruz. Marine participant Richard A. Nash described the battle:

A jeep wheeled up towing a 37-mm anti-tank gun and Captain Andrews of D Company put a crew of men to setting the thing up to fire into the palm grove. Then I heard it—just before the gun began firing—a weird wailing and moaning, almost a religious chant...coming from the trapped Japanese soldiers. Then the gun fired canister shot into them, again and again, and after a while the chanting stopped and the firing stopped and for a moment it was all-quiet. Some of us went among the palm trees to look, and there, row on row, were the torn and shattered bodies of perhaps 300 young Japanese soldiers. There were no survivors.

The Marines captured 12 37mm anti-tank guns, one 70 mm field artillery piece, and 34 machineguns and counted the dead bodies of 239 Japanese soldiers, including 28 officers.

At the same time, the 2nd Marines with the Whaling Group continued to push along the coast, reaching a point 3,500 yards (3,200 m) west of Point Cruz by nightfall. The only Japanese troops left in the area to oppose the Marines’ advance were the remaining 500 soldiers of the 4th Infantry augmented by a few frail survivors from units involved in the earlier Tenaru and Edson’s Ridge battles plus malnourished naval troops from the original Guadalcanal garrison. The Japanese feared that they would be unable to prevent the Americans from taking the village of Kokumbona, which would cut-off the retreat of the 2nd Infantry Division and seriously threaten the rear-area support and headquarters units of Japanese forces on Guadalcanal. In despair, Nakaguma discussed taking the regimental colors and seeking death in a final charge at the U.S. forces, but was dissuaded from doing so by other officers on the 17th Army’s staff.

A significant event now occurred which granted the Japanese forces a reprieve. Early on 3 November, Marine units near Koli Point, east of the Lunga Perimeter, engaged 300 fresh Japanese troops that had just been landed by a Tokyo Express mission of five destroyers. This, plus the knowledge that a large body of Japanese troops was in the process of relocating to Koli Point after the defeat in the Henderson Field battle, led the Americans to believe that the Japanese were about to conduct a major attack on the Lunga Perimeter from the Koli Point area.

To discuss these developments, the Marine leaders on Guadalcanal met on the morning of 4 November. Twining recommended that the Matanikau offensive continue. Edson, Thomas, and Vandegrift, however, urged the abandonment of the offensive and a shift of forces to counter the Koli Point threat. Thus, that same day the 5th Marines and the Whaling group were recalled to Lunga Point. The 2nd Marine’s 1st and 2nd Battalions, plus the 1st Battalion, 164th Infantry took up positions about 2,000 yards (1,829 m) west of Point Cruz with plans to hold in that location. With their route of retreat still open, the Sendai (2nd) Division survivors began to reach Kokumbona this same day. Around this time, Nakaguma was killed by an artillery shell.

Aftermath

After chasing away the Japanese forces at Koli Point, the U.S. renewed the western offensive towards Kokumbona on 10 November with three battalions under the overall command of U.S. Marine Colonel John Arthur. In the meantime, fresh Japanese troops from the 228th Infantry Regiment of the 38th Infantry Division landed by Tokyo Express over several nights beginning on 5 November and effectively resisted the American attack. After making small advances, at 13:45 on 11 November Vandegrift suddenly ordered all the American forces to return to the east bank of the Matanikau.

Vandegrift ordered the withdrawal because of the receipt of intelligence from coastwatchers, aerial reconnaissance, and radio intercepts that a major Japanese reinforcement effort was imminent. Indeed, the Japanese were in the process of attempting to deliver the 10,000 remaining troops from the 38th Division to Guadalcanal in order to reattempt to capture Henderson Field. The resulting efforts by the Americans to stop this reinforcement attempt resulted in the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, the decisive naval battle of the Guadalcanal campaign, in which the Japanese reinforcement effort was turned back.

The Americans recrossed the Matanikau and attacked westward again beginning on 18 November, but made slow progress against determined resistance from Japanese forces. The U.S. attack was halted on 23 November at a line just west of Point Cruz. The Americans and Japanese would remain facing each other in these positions for the next six weeks, until the ending stages of the campaign when U.S. forces began their final, successful push to drive Japanese forces from the island. Although the Americans had come close to overrunning the Japanese rear areas in the early November offensive, it would not be until the final stages of the campaign that the U.S. finally captured Kokumbona.