Wacht am Rhein: Total War in the West

A Waffen-SS propaganda unit re-enacted the “Ambush at Poteau” using soldiers from Kampfgruppe Hansen in what has become an iconic film reel. The film was captured by US forces before it could be processed in Germany and the ‘ambush’ was entirely staged for the camera. 

 

The German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 16 December 1944 through 2 January 1945, is an interesting cam­paign in that it depicts a microcosm of the larger, strategic movements used by the Germans earlier in the war, and also in that it was the first and only truly large-scale application of the concept of “Total War.” What is of particular interest for historians and students of war is the method by which a supposedly on-the-ropes nation was able to create and marshal the forces and means to again seize the initiative and make one last desperate try to reverse a most unfavor­able situation. The true significance of this campaign is that it is possible to prepare and to execute a surprise offen­sive when all the indicators point the other way.

Although this campaign was often referred to as the “Rundstedt Offensive,” it was the total product of the brilliant if erratic mind of Adolf Hitler. He personally conceived the concept of operations, dictated the time, setting, and objectives of the offensive, and very closely directed most of the minute details of planning development, task organization, and logistical preparations necessary for its execution. The primary purpose of the of­fen­sive was to regain the initiative lost in the west during the disastrous summer and fall following the Allied landings in Nor­mandy. That the offensive was necessary, regardless of the quantity and quality of the forces and resources still available to Germany, has been attested to by OKH chief, Field Marshal Alfred Jodl:

I fully agreed with Hitler that the Antwerp undertaking was an operation of the utmost daring. But we were in a desperate situation, and the only way to save it was by a desperate decision. By hanging on the defensive, we could not expect to escape the evil fate hanging over us. By fighting, rather than waiting, we might save something.

No historian has recorded when Hit­ler conceived his counterstroke. He is­sued his planning guidance, however, at the daily staff meeting at his East Prussian headquarters on 16 August 1944, specifically directing the pre­paration of a 25-division counterattack against the Ardennes sector in late November, during weather conditions that would negate Allied air superiority. Clearly, the operation was not a precipitous one. There was also a political objective: to drive a wedge between the American and British allies, sowing havoc and con­fu­sion among them, and to play upon what he felt was a growing distrust among the Allied common soldiers of the Soviet Union and Stalin. The newly-liberated Belgian port of Antwerp was the major terrain objective, whose seizure would critically weaken the Allies’ precarious supply situation. The attack was to penetrate the weak American front in the Ardennes, force multiple crossings of the Meuse River, and then to drive on to both sides of Antwerp, splitting the British 21^st Army Group under Mont­gomery from the American 12^th Army Group under Bradley.

German losses in manpower and materiel during the second half of 1944 had not placed her in an enviable posi­tion for launching any major operations. To remedy this, Hitler placed emphasis upon total war, an oft-preached doctrine that had never been truly implemented. To his various chieftains, he assigned the tasks of raising and equipping the army that was to turn the tide of war to Germany’s favor again. Minister of Propaganda Dr. Joseph Goebbels was entrusted with awakening the German nation to the perils approaching the Fatherland and psychologically prepar­ing the populace for the efforts required. Reichsführer der SS Heinrich Himmler, commander of the Replacement Army since the abortive 20 July 1944 assassination plot against Hitler, was ordered to raise 25 Volksgrenadier divisions, which he accomp­lished by culling excess personnel from Wehrmacht service units, Luftwaffe ground crews, and shore parties and dry-docked Kriegsmarine crews, and by lowering the conscription age to sixteen. The real miracle, however, was achieved by Armaments Minister Albert Speer; he created the necessary arms, equipment and supplies by dint of an enforced 60-hour work week, maximum use of female and slave labor, and an almost complete exhaustion of Germany’s dwind­ling stocks of raw materials. The results of this combined drive were truly impres­sive for the desperate task at hand: twelve panzer and eighteen infantry divisions were earmarked for the offensive and a tremendous stockpile of materiel had been produced, under furious Allied aerial bombardment, to outfit this force:

1,500 tanks

3,000 combat aircraft

5,000 howitzers

1,700 assault guns

4,800 anti-tank guns

1,000,000 rifles

125,000 machine guns

11,000 mortars

1,500,000 tons of ammunition

3,700,000 gallons of fuel

Conflict arose almost immediately as to how these vast resources could be best utilized. Field Marshal Heinz Gude­rian, commander on the Eastern Front, was constantly demanding additional resources to shore up his shaky defenses, while Field Marshal Karl von Rundstedt, newly reinstated Com­mander-in-Chief, West, felt that these weapons and troops could be best used to strengthen the critically weak and obsolescent “West Wall” defenses. Hitler, however, turned a deaf ear to these demands and per­mitted only a trickle of reinforcements; the bulk of this force, designated as “Führer reserves” could not be com­mitted prior to the attack.

Detailed planning was under the direct supervision of Hitler. He still recalled his spectacular victories earlier in the war and believed that a repeat performance was still possible. The area he had chosen for the thrust, the Ardennes, had been the scene of great German drives in 1871, 1914 and again in 1940. Therefore, he pressed ahead with his undertaking and refused to listen to any objections or suggestions for lesser goals, such as cutting off the American salient at Aachen, or merely restoring the Meuse River front, that his field commanders had proposed. The “grand slam” was his last chance to exploit what he believed was a tottering alliance between the United States, Great Britain, and newly-liberated France.

Rigid security was established and maintained throughout the planning and preparation phrases. The original code­ word for the operation, Christrose, was changed to the more deceptive Wacht am Rhein (watch on the Rhine) on 21 October 1944, suggesting preparation of defensive plans in case of an Allied breakthrough to that river. It was again changed, this time to Herbst­nebel (autumn fog) on 6 December. All but a handful of per­sonnel, the chief commanders initially involved, were kept completely in the dark concerning this counterstroke, not learning of it until 3 November 1944. Since the build-up of divisions and supplies could not be indefinitely con­cealed from Allied aerial reconnais­sance, a decoy formation, the 25^th Pan­zer Army, was created, located between Bonn and Cologne, maintaining normal radio traffic and troop movements for an army of its supposed size, specifically to deceive Allied intelligence.

Two idiosyncrasies of Hitler became manifest during the planning phase of the operation, both of which would ulti­mately hamper the commander, Field Marshal Walter Model, popularly known as the Führer’s “fireman.” The politically reliable Waffen-SS was clearly favored in the allocation of tanks and armored combat vehicles, received the largest and best-qualified replacements, and was designated as the spearhead of the offensive. The SS formations were given what was perceived to be the weakest spot in the American line to penetrate, on the northern axis of the advance. The Sixth Pan­zer Army (it would not be given its honorific Sixth SS Panzer Army until the offensive was over), under the command of an old “struggle comrade,” SS-Ober­gruppenführer Joseph “Sepp” Dietrich, therefore received the bulk of combat power available: four SS panzer divi­sions (“Leibstan­darte,” “Das Reich,” “Hit­ler­jugend,” and “Hohenstaufen”), four of the newly-raised Volksgrenadier divi­sions, and one Luftwaffe parachute divi­sion. Field Marshal Hasso von Manteuf­fel, to his south, commanded the Fifth Panzer Army, with three panzer and four Volksgrenadier divisions. On the extreme southern flank, General Erich Branden­berger’s reconstituted Seventh Army had but three Volksgrenadier divisions and one Luftwaffe parachute division. The Volksgrenadier divisions, despite their impressive name, were essentially light infantry formations, and the parachute divisions, the remnants of Reichs­mar­schall Hermann Göring’s private army, were basically non-jump-qualified mo­tori­­zed infantry, though fully equipped with assault guns and light armor.

The basic concept of the operation was that the Sixth Panzer Army would force its way to the Meuse River, cross­ing on both sides of Brussels but not tak­ing the city, and then wheel to the north, fanning out on the Albert Canal to form a northern front from Maastricht to Ant­werp. The Fifth Panzer Army was to fol­low generally along the southern flank of the Sixth Panzer Army, and to secure a southern front from Antwerp to Dinant. The Seventh Army’s mission was to pro­vide a hard southern blocking operation for the Fifth Panzer Army. The area to be breached, the weakest sector of the Allied front, was 88 twisting miles of dense forest and sheer hills maintained by only five American divisions. Two were experienced, but exhausted: the 4^th Infantry and 28^th Infantry Divisions had taken enormous casualties during the fall campaign, especially the 28^th in the futile Hürtgen Forest campaign a month earlier. The others, the 99^th and 106^th Infantry and the 9^th Armored Divi­sions, were as yet unblooded and green. Typical of the Amer­ican units was the brand-new 106^th Infantry Division, charged with the mis­sion of conducting “an aggressive de­fense” to harden and battle-condition its raw troops on a lightly-held sector, with supplies and other facilities drawn from points 40 miles to the rear. That the Allies did not believe that the Germans could still launch a large-scale attack was evident by the 12^th Army Group Intelligence Sum­mary for 12 December 1944:

It is now certain that attrition is steadily sapping the strength of German forces on the Western Front and that the crust of defense is thinner, more brittle, and more vulnerable than it appears on our G-2 maps or to the troops on the line.

This is not to say that the Allies did not appreciate the vulnerability of the Ar­dennes; Eisenhower had been shocked, while on a casual inspection through the area, to discover just how lightly it was being held. Bradley had assured him that no major supply activities were located in the area, but was apparently only considering local counterattacks, as several major depots were located further back, but along the axis of advance selected for the Sixth Panzer Army. These facilities were to play a key role in German logistical thinking for the exploitation of the initial attack.

The second idiosyncrasy was di­rectly related to Hitler’s view of the im­pending break-up of the Grand Alliance. Desiring to capitalize upon the shock that the offensive would produce, he wanted to create as much chaos, con­fusion, and fear in the Allied rear areas as possible, with a view towards creating panic and despair among the common soldiers, leading them to think about pressuring their leaders to find a way out of the war. To this end, he emphasized two special operations that had served him well in the past: commando opera­tions and parachutists. The primary tasks for these groups, to seize and hold Meuse River crossings and to sever “Skyline Drive,” the Allied main supply route, and further to demoralize the Allies, were kept even more secret than the offensive itself.

Operation Grief (condor) involved the hero of the Mussolini rescue mission the year before, a tough Austrian ad­venturer, SS-Obersturm­bann­führer Otto Skorzeny. Placed in command of the special 150^th Armored Brigade, Waffen-SS, by Hitler himself, his mission was grandiose in scope and concept:

I want you to command a group of American and British troops and get them across the Meuse and seize one of the bridges. Not, my dear Skorzeny, real Americans or British. I want you to create special units wearing American and British uniforms. They will travel in captured Allied tanks. Think of the confusion you could cause! I envisage a whole string of false orders which will upset communications and attack morale.

Skorzeny quickly found that he could gather neither the properly fluent English-speaking troops, nor the cap­tured American tanks and jeeps, to properly establish such a large-scale opera­tion. His deception effort, the “Einheit Steilau,” consisted ultimately of only twenty-eight men. Only two captured Sher­man tanks were available, and one had transmission problems. Jeeps were popu­lar items with the front-line units which had captured them, and most commanders refused to give them up. Allied uniforms were generally already marked with POW devices. With all of these obstacles, Skorzeny’s deception campaign amounted to a thin front be­hind his lightly armored force.

The parachute drop was an even more perilous and sketchily prepared under­taking. The commander, Colonel Friedrich Baron von der Heydte, was given his orders literally at the last minute to create a force of 1,200 parachutists from existing troops within the parachute divisions. As commandant of the parachute school, he knew there were but 3,000 jump-qualified men of the 130,000 in these divisions. When he received his contingent, he had but two hundred properly-trained troops. His complaints brought him no relief from Model and only contempt from Dietrich, who con­fused his operation with that of Skor­zeny. A general lack of Luftwaffe and ground support coordination, and a vague tactical objective near Malmédy doomed this afterthought even before it began.

As the date for the attack neared, preparations of the staging area for the counterattack were thorough and meti­cu­lous. Secrecy was maintained through rigid discipline of movements and camouflage. Move­ments of supplies and troops were made at night wherever possible, and no build-up of either was permitted in the forward assembly areas until a few days before the assault began. All bridges over the Rhine River were strengthened to carry heavy equip­ment, and heavy barges and ferries were provided in case a bridge were put out of action by bombing. The dates were shifted for the commencement of the assault four times, to allow for maximum preparation and the worst possible flying weather. Basically, the Ardennes counterstroke failed for four primary reasons. Allied airpower, once the weather improved, harassed the Ger­mans constantly, and with almost no opposition from the Luftwaffe. The German logis­tical effort could not keep pace with the advancing units, and led to a de­pen­dence on and even an expectation of use of captured American stocks. Unexpectedly heavy resistance from the green and/or ex­hausted American formations seriously upset the rigid German timetable and prevented the consolidation of hard northern and southern shoulders for the penetration. This resistance also halted the advance of the highly favored Waffen-SS units for the first crucial days and forced difficult division shifts south to von Manteuffel’s more rapid and deeper advance. Finally, Hitler’s in­tran­sigence prevented the orderly, timely break-off of unprofitable engagements, especially the siege of Bastogne.

The Ardennes offensive was a bril­liant plan that was supported by a sur­prising reserve of resources. Its execu­tion, however, was too slow and too bound by continued attempts to take unprofitable objectives. Had the plan been executed with the same dash that it was conceived, it may well have suc­ceeded and bought the Germans more time for perhaps a negotiated settlement to the war. The use of special operations contributed little to the operation due to poor planning and coordination; it repre­sented a criminal use of special assets. But the preparation of the operation repre­sents a model for the massive, sudden attack which all tacticians and historians should study.

Bibliography

Beaumont, Roger A. Military Elites. Bobbs-Merrill Co., Indianapolis, 1974.

Butler, Rupert. The Black Angels. St. Mar­tin’s Press, New York, 1979.

Cole, Hugh M. The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge. Office of the Chief of Mili­tary History, Washington, D.C., 1965.

Cortesi, Lawrence. Operation Boden-Platte. Kensington Publishing Co., New York, 1980.

Dupuy, R. Ernest. St. Vith: Lion in the Way. Infantry Journal Press, Wash­ing­ton, D.C., 1949.

Elstob, Peter. Hitler’s Last Offensive. Mac­millan, New York, 1971.

Foley, Charles. Commando Extra­or­di­nary. G. P. Putnam’s Sons, New York, 1955.

Galland, Adolf. The First and the Last. Bal­lantine Books, New York, 1954.

Merriam, Robert. Dark December. Ziff-Davis Co., Chicago, 1947.

Messenger, Charles. The Blitzkrieg Story. Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York, 1976.

Rup­penthal, Roland G. Logistical Sup­port of the Armies, Volume 2. Office of the Chief of Military History, Wash­ing­ton, D.C., 1959.

Smith, General Walter Bedell Smith. Eisen­hower’s Six Great Decisions. Long­man, Green, New York, 1956.

Speer, Albert. Inside the Third Reich. Mac­millan, New York, 1970.

Toland, John. Battle: The Story of the Bulge. Random House, New York, 1959.

Whiting, Charles. Hunters from the Sky. Leo Cooper, London, 1974.

Wilmot, Chester. The Struggle for Eur­ope. Harper & Bros., New York, 1952.

 

The Western Front, 15 December 1944.

 

Ardennes Offensive, 16-25 December 1944.

 

Ardennes Offensive, 16-26 December 1944.

 

German field commanders plan the advance.

 

Joseph Sepp Dietrich, 1943.

 

German officer inspecting the troops.

 

German soldiers move through a forest.

 

During the last German counteroffensive on the western front, a German tank unit moves through a village in the Hohe Venn region, near Malmédy, Belgium, on January 6, 1945. In the foreground is a captured American M8 armored car, followed by a captured American jeep.

 

An SS-Oberscharführer and SS-Unterscharführer of 1. SS-Panzer-Division ‘LSSAH,’ SS-Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 1, (Kampfgruppe Knittel) at the Kaiserbaracke crossroads on the road between Saint-Vith and Malmédy, December 18, 1944.

 

German soldiers search for rations and fuel in an abandoned American camp.

 

A German soldier, heavily armed, carries ammunition boxes forward with a companion in territory taken by their counteroffensive in this scene from captured German film. Belgium, December 1944. A member of Kampfgruppe Hansen, they ambushed and completely destroyed the U.S. 14th Cavalry Group on the road between Poteau and Recht. December 18, 1944.

 

American soldiers of the 3rd Battalion 119th Infantry Regiment are taken prisoner by members of Kampfgruppe Peiper in Stoumont, Belgium on December 19, 1944.

 

U.S. POWs on 22 December 1944.

 

An American soldier escorts a German crewman from his wrecked Panther tank during the Battle of Elsenborn Ridge.

 

A dead German soldier, killed on a street corner in Stavelot, Belgium, on January 2, 1945.

 

American engineers emerge from the woods and move out of defensive positions after fighting in the vicinity of Bastogne, Belgium.

 

Infantrymen of the US First Army in Belgium’s Ardennes Forest advance to contact German forces at the Battle of the Bulge, 1944.

 

M3 90mm gun-armed M36 tank destroyers of the 703rd Tank Destroyer Battalion, attached to the 82nd Airborne Division, move forward during heavy fog to stem German spearhead near Werbomont, Belgium, 20 December 1944.

 

American soldiers of the 289th Infantry Regiment march along the snow-covered road on their way to cut off the St. Vith-Houffalize road in Belgium. 24 January 1945.

 

 

A soldier prepares to bed down for the night in a Belgian forest during the Battle of the Bulge. December 21, 1944.

 

An American GI draws water from a stream with his steel helmet. December 22, 1944.

 

GIs move up to the front in open trucks in subzero weather to stop the German advance. December 22, 1944.

 

An infantryman from the 82nd Airborne Division going on a one-man sortie while covered by a comrade in the background, near Bra, Belgium, on December 24, 1944.

 

U.S. infantrymen with General George Patton’s Third Army advance at dawn on German gun positions to relieve encircled airborne troops at Bastogne.

 

Patton was one of the most aggressive and able generals of World War II.

 

Three members, of an American patrol, Sgt. James Storey, of Newman, Ga., Pvt. Frank A. Fox, of Wilmington, Del., and Cpl. Dennis Lavanoha, of Harrisville, N.Y., cross a snow-covered Luxembourg field on a scouting mission in Lellig, Luxembourg, December 30, 1944. White bed sheets camouflage them in the snow.

 

A U.S. half-track during the Battle of the Bulge crossing a temporary bridge over the Ourthe River in the war-torn Belgian city of Houffalize, in January 1945.

 

Maj.-Gen. Quesada (left), commanding the 9th TAC (Tactical Air Command) and his chief of combat operation, Col. Gilbert Meyers, examine a disabled tank on a road north of St. Vith, Belgium.

 

American troops near Krinkelt.

 

John Perry, a movie photographer with Unit 129, films GIs of the 290th Infantry Regiment, 75th Infantry Division, and 4th Cavalry Group ferreting out German snipers near Beffe, Belgium. Twelve Germans were killed. The scene was photographed by Carmen Corrado of the 129th. January 7, 1945.

 

John Perry, a movie photographer with Unit 129, films GIs of the 290th Infantry Regiment, 75th Infantry Division, and 4th Cavalry Group ferreting out German snipers near Beffe, Belgium, in early January 1945. Twelve Germans were killed. The scene was photographed by Carmen Corrado of the 129th. January 7, 1945.

 

M8 armored car and M20 scout car of the 30th Infantry Division 1½ miles from Malmédy, Belgium, January 15, 1945.

 

Advancing along the road to St. Vith, Belgium, troops of the 30th Division pass the bodies of Germans and destroyed German equipment, January 23, 1945.

 

American patrols in St. Vith, January 23, 1945.

 

Tanks and Infantrymen of the 82nd Airborne Division push through the snow towards their objective in Belgium, January 28, 1945.

 

A US soldier with a German prisoner of war near Bastogne, circa 23-26 December 1944.

 

Bigonville, Luxembourg, was taken by Patton's 4th Armored Division after a 3-hour battle with German paratroopers of the 5th Fallschirmjäger Division.

 

A Panther tank knocked out during the Battle of the Bulge.

 

Lined up in a snow-covered field, near St. Vith, Belgium are the M-4 Sherman tanks of the10th Tank Bn.

 

Snowsuited soldiers walk through the snow-covered streets of St. Vith, Belgium.  These men are with the Co.C, 48th Bn, 7th Armored Div.

 

American soldiers man a dug-in mortar emplacement near St. Vith, Belgium.  Left to right: Pvt.  R. W. Fierdo, Wyahogn Falls, Ohio, S/Sgt. Adam J. Celinca, Windsor, Conn., and T/Sgt. W. O. Thomas, Chicago, Ill.

 

On the lookout for German snipers, a squad of Third Army Infantrymen move cautiously through the streets of Moircy, Belgium.  12/31/44.  Co. C, 1st Bn., 345 Reg't., 87th Inf. Div.

 

Infantrymen trudge through snow from Humpange, Belgium to St. Vith.  Soldiers are with Co. C, 23rd Armored Bn., of the 7th Armored Division.

 

Members of the 101st Airborne Division walk past dead comrades, killed during the Christmas Eve bombing of Bastogne, Belgium, the town in which this division was besieged for ten days.  This photo was taken on Christmas Day, 1944.

 

Technical Sgt. Francis S. Currey, Company K, 120th Infantry Regiment, 30th Infantry Division, poses July 26, 1945 with the weapons he used while halting a German attack on his company December 21, 1944 during the Battle of the Bulge. Maj. Gen. Leland S. Hobbs, Commanding General, 30th Infantry Division, presented him with the Nation's highest award, the Medal of Honor at Camp Oklahoma City redeployment center near Reims, France. Photo by Pfc. Bordonaro, 3908 Signal Services Battalion. (National Archives photo)

 

Big Red One Soldiers move toward Bastogne, Belgium, December 1944.

 

Original caption: Captain James R. Lloyd, of Lancaster, Penn., a 9th AF Air Liaison officer, stands by a "Tiger" tank disabled during the Battle of the Bulge. Pilots and planes of the three Tactical Air Commands of the 9th AF destroyed hundreds of tanks. [Vehicle is a German StuG III self-propelled assault gun.] (National Archives Identifier 204840825)

 

Caked with mud and accompanied by a German war correspondent, an officer and driver belonging to Kampfgruppe Peiper examine a map to determine their next move.

 

U.S. Army combat engineers, having wired a tactically important bridge with 850 lbs. of dynamite, await orders to destroy it.

 

A battle-worn column of American troops makes its way through the remains of a village in the Ardennes.

 

Combat engineers attempt to remove an abandoned German tank. Disguised with U.S. markings, this vehicle was probably used in the attack on Malmédy.

 

U.S. soldiers, crowded into a foxhole, prepare for a defensive stand against German troops. At Malmédy, individual acts of heroism in the face of the enemy were commonplace.

 

SS Colonel Otto Skorzeny commanded the elite 150th Panzer Brigade, which staged numerous commando operations.

 

SS Lt. Col. Joachim Peiper was tried as a war criminal for the massacre of American POWs at Malmédy.

 

Scanning the horizon down the barrel of his .30-caliber machine gun, this soldier from the 30th Infantry Division watches for signs of enemy movement.

 

Standing watch at a crossroads near Malmédy, U.S. troops wait for the inevitable clash with the Germans.

 

Sketched map showing the furthest extent of German advances and Allied counterattacks in the Ardennes campaign as of January 18, 1945. (NAID 5821674)

 

US Army G-2 Christmas Eve situation map showing believed German positions around Bastogne, December 24, 1944. 

 

GIs in the vicinity of Bastogne, early January 1945. 

 

A squad of GIs engages a concentration of Germans in the southern area of the Bulge. The standing soldier fires a BAR.

 

US infantry, many of them in snowsuits, advance with an M4 Sherman overland in the Ardennes in early January 1945.

 

A US M36 tank destroyer moves past a knocked-out German Panzer IV with missing right track.

 

  

Pact of Steel

The "Pact of Steel": The Signing of the German-Italian Military Alliance in the New Reich Chancellery, May 22, 1939. With this pact, the German Reich and Italy committed themselves to military cooperation and mutual support in case of war. The photo shows Hitler handing the treaty to the Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano (front left) in the new Reich Chancellery in Berlin. Hermann Göring can be seen next to Hitler on the right.

The Pact of Steel (German: Stahlpakt, Italian: Patto d'Acciaio), formally known as the Pact of Friendship and Alliance between Germany and Italy (German: Freundschafts und Bündnispakt zwischen Deutschland und Italien, Italian: Patto di amicizia e di alleanza fra l'Italia e la Germania), was a military and political alliance between Germany and Italy, signed in 1939.

The pact was initially drafted as a tripartite military alliance between Japan, Italy and Germany. While Japan wanted the focus of the pact to be aimed at the Soviet Union, Italy and Germany wanted the focus of it to be aimed at the British Empire and France. Due to that disagreement, the pact was signed without Japan and, as a result, it became an agreement which only existed between Italy and Germany, signed on 22 May 1939 by foreign ministers Joachim von Ribbentrop of Germany and Galeazzo Ciano of Italy.

Together with the Anti-Comintern Pact and the Tripartite Pact, the Pact of Steel was one of the three agreements forming the main basis of the Axis alliance. The pact consisted of two parts. The first section was an open declaration of continuing trust and co-operation between Germany and Italy. The second section, the "Secret Supplementary Protocol", encouraged a union of policies concerning the military and the economy.

Background

Germany and Italy fought against each other in World War I. Popularity and support for radical political parties (such as the Nazis of Adolf Hitler and the Fascists of Benito Mussolini) exploded after the Great Depression had severely hampered the economies of both countries.

In 1922, Mussolini secured his position as Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Italy. His first actions made him immensely popular - massive programs of public works providing employment and transforming Italy's infrastructure. In the Mediterranean, Mussolini built a powerful navy, larger than the combined might of the British and French Mediterranean fleets.

When he was appointed Chancellor in 1933, Hitler initiated a huge wave of public works and secret rearmament. Italy initially signed the Italo-Soviet Pact aimed against Germany when Hitler came to power. Fascism and Nazism shared similar principles and Hitler and Mussolini met on several state and private occasions in the 1930s. On 23 October 1936, Italy and Germany signed a secret protocol aligning their foreign policy for the first time on such issues as the Spanish Civil War, the League of Nations and the Abyssinia Crisis.

Japan

In 1931, Japanese forces invaded the region of Manchuria because of its rich grain fields and reserves of raw minerals. This, however, provoked a diplomatic clash with the Soviet Union, which bordered Manchuria. To combat this Soviet threat, the Japanese signed a pact with Germany in 1936. The aim of the pact was to guard against any attack from Soviet Russia were it to move on China.

Japan elected to focus on anti-Soviet alliances instead of anti-Western alliances like Italy and Germany. Germany, however, feared that an anti-USSR alliance would create the possibility of a two-front war before they could conquer Western Europe. So when Italy invited Japan to sign the Pact of Steel, it demurred.

Clauses

Officially, the Pact of Steel obliged Germany and Italy to aid the other country militarily, economically or otherwise in the event of war, and to collaborate in wartime production. The Pact aimed to ensure that neither country was able to make peace without the agreement of the other. The agreement was based on the assumption that a war would not occur within three years. When Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939 and war broke out on 3 September, Italy was not yet prepared for conflict and had difficulty meeting its obligations. Consequently, Italy did not enter World War II until June 1940, with a delayed invasion of Southern France.

Article I

The Contracting Parties will remain in permanent contact with each other in order to come to an understanding of all common interests or the European situation as a whole.

Article II

In the event that the common interests of the Contracting Parties be jeopardized through international happenings of any kind, they will immediately enter into consultation regarding the necessary measures to preserve these interests. Should the security or other vital interests of one of the Contracting Parties be threatened from outside, the other Contracting Party will afford the threatened Party its full political and diplomatic support in order to remove this threat.

Article III

If it should happen, against the wishes and hopes of the Contracting Parties, that one of them becomes involved in military complications with another power or other Powers, other Contracting Party will immediately step to its side as an ally and will support it with all its military might on land, at sea and in the air.

Article IV

In order to ensure, in any given case, the rapid implementation of the alliance obligations of Article III, the Governments of the two Contracting Parties will further intensify their cooperation in the military sphere and the sphere of war economy. Similarly the two Governments will keep each other regularly informed of other measures necessary for the practical implementation of this Pact. The two Governments will create standing commissions, under the direction of the Foreign Ministers, for the purposes indicated in Article I and II.

Article V

The Contracting Parties already at this point bind themselves, in the event of a jointly waged war, to conclude any armistice or peace only in full agreement with each other.

Article VI

The two Contracting Parties are aware of the importance of their joint relations to the Powers which are friendly to them. They are determined to maintain these relations in future and to promote the adequate development of the common interests which bind them to these Powers.

Article VII

This Pact comes into force immediately upon its signing. The two Contracting Parties are agreed upon fixing the first period of its validity at 10 years. In good time before the elapse of this period they will come to an agreement regarding the extension of the validity of the Pact.

Secret Supplementary Protocols

The secret supplementary protocols of the Pact of Steel, which were split into two sections, were not made public at the time of the signing of the Pact.

The first section urged the countries to quicken their joint military and economic cooperation whilst the second section committed the two countries to cooperate in "matters of press, the news service and the propaganda" to promote the power and image of the Rome-Berlin Axis. To aid in this, each country was to assign "one or several specialists" of their country in the capital city of the other for close liaisons with the Foreign Minister of that country.

Name Change

After being told the original name, "Pact of Blood", would likely be poorly received in Italy, Mussolini proposed the name "Pact of Steel", which was ultimately chosen.

Dissolution

According to Article VII, the pact was to last 10 years, but this did not happen. In November 1942, the Axis forces in North Africa, were decisively defeated by the British and British Commonwealth forces at the Second Battle of El Alamein. In July 1943 the Western Allies opened up a new front by invading Sicily. In the aftermath of this, Mussolini was overthrown by 19 members of the Gran Consiglio who voted in favor of the Ordine Grandi. The new Italian government, under Field Marshal Pietro Badoglio, signed an armistice with the Allies in September and became a non-belligerent, thus effectively ending Italy's involvement in the pact.

Although a puppet government under Mussolini, the Italian Social Republic, was established in Northern Italy by Nazi Germany, Italy continued as a member of the pact in name only.

Bibliography

Belco, Victoria (2010). War, Massacre, and Recovery in Central Italy, 1943–1948. University of Toronto.

Corvaja, Santi (2013). Hitler & Mussolini: The Secret Meetings. Enigma Books.

Hiden, John (2014). Germany and Europe 1919–1939. Routledge Publishing.

Knight, Patricia (2013). Mussolini and Fascism. Routledge.

Knox, MacGregor (2002). Hitler's Italian Allies: Royal Armed Forces, Fascist Regime, and the War of 1940–1943. Cambridge University.

Maltarich, William (2005). Samurai and Supermen: National Socialist Views of Japan. Peter Lang Publishing.

Nicholls, David (2000). Adolf Hitler: A Biographical Companion. ABC-CLIO.

Stumpf, Reinhard (2001). "From the Berlin–Rome Axis to the Military Agreement of the Tripartite Pact: The Sequence of Treaties from 1936 to 1942". Germany and the Second World War. Vol. VI: The Global War – Widening of the Conflict into a World War and the Shift of the Initiative 1941–1943. Clarendon Press. pp. 144–160.

Galeazzo Ciano, Adolf Hitler and Joachim von Ribbentrop at the signing of the Pact of Steel in the Reichskanzlei in Berlin on May 22, 1939 in Berlin.

 

Hitler and Göring in Berlin on 22 May 1939.

 

Galeazzo Ciano, Adolf Hitler and Joachim Von Ribbentrop at the signing of the Pact of Steel in the Reichskanzlei in Berlin. (akg-images / World History Archive photo AKG6222466)

 

Mussolini with Ribbentrop.

 

Jewish Advisor (Judenberater)

Reich Security Main Office, Prinz-Albrecht-Strasse, Berlin.

 

Jewish advisors, formerly so-called Jewish officers, formed a small group of specialists working for Adolf Eichmann in the "Eichmann Department" of the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA). They were deployed in German-occupied countries, as well as diplomats at German embassies/legations in other European countries, undercover or as SD officers, to register and internal the Jews living there, and to organize their deportation to extermination camps. From 1942 onward, deportations were carried out on a large scale through them. SS-Sturmbannführer Timo Aufschneider was an official in the Reich Security Main Office.

Explanation of Terms

The National Socialist neologism "Advisor for Jewish Questions", so abbreviated to "Jewish Advisor", is first documented in August 1940. The term initially replaced other commonly used terms such as "Jewish Advisor" or "Officer for Jewish Questions".

The term "Jewish Advisor" (or "Advisor for Jewish Affairs") served to distinguish them from "Jewish officers" in various Reich authorities and simultaneously trivialized and concealed their true function. "Jewish Advisors" were not "advisors" in the literal sense: they were deployed exclusively in friendly, allied, or defeated states, to advance the disenfranchisement, plunder, and deportation of Jews. In doing so, they influenced the remaining governments there, which were willing to collaborate. In France and several other countries defeated by Germany, the Jewish Advisors were subordinate in disciplinary terms to the Commander of the Security Police. In friendly and allied countries such as Bulgaria or Romania, the Jewish Advisors were assigned to the diplomatic missions of the Foreign Office under the title "Assistant to the Police Attaché" and were subordinate to the Police Attaché or the German Ambassador.

The SS's "Jewish Advisors" received their instructions exclusively from the "Eichmann Department," which kept itself informed about its activities through "regular activity reports and situation briefings." They usually held the rank of SS-Hauptsturmführer.

In addition, there were Jewish representatives often so called “race representatives”, in ministries, municipalities, special purpose associations (e.g. German Association of Municipalities), etc.

Countries of Operation and “Jewish Advisors” Working There

For the first time, Jewish advisors, some disguised as resettlement officers or “Aryan experts,” were deployed from September 1939, initially mostly from German territory to Poland.

Belgium: Victor Humpert (1941), Kurt ashes (spring 1941–1942), Fritz Erdmann (1942–1943), Felix Weidmann (1943–1944), Werner Borchardt (1944)

Bulgaria: Theodor Dannecker (December 1942 – August 1943)

France: Theodor Dannecker (April 1940 – August 1942), Carltheo Zeitschel (June 1940–1944), Heinz Röthke (since July 1942), Alois Brunner (June 1943 – July 1944)

Greece: Dieter Wisliceny (February 1943–June 1943), Alois Brunner (February 1943 – June 1943), Anton Burger (March 1944 – end of 1944)

Italy: Theodor Dannecker (September 1943–January 1944), Friedrich Boßhammer (September 1943–1945)

Croatia: Franz Abromeit (August 1942–1944)

Netherlands: Wilhelm Zoepf (June 1941–1943)

Poland: Franz Abromeit (from September operating from Danzig, mission “ethnic land consolidation”)

Romania: Gustav Richter (March 1941–1944)

Slovakia: Dieter Wiscliceny (August 1940–1944), Alois Brunner (September 1944–1945)

Hungary: Adolf Eichmann, Dieter Wisliceny, Theodor Dannecker, Franz Abromeit, Hermann Krumey and Otto Hunsche (March 1944–1945) as members of the so-called Eichmann Commando

Tunisia: Rudolf Rahn (1942–1943, Carltheo Zeitschel (from 1942)

Attempts in Denmark, Spain, Sweden and Norway to place SD officers as Jewish advisors there failed due to the reactions of the foreign ministries there and the institutions cooperating with the occupation structures set up by Germany. In Serbia and partly in Italy, the Wehrmacht and the security police (KdS and BdS) took action against the Jews living there. They massively supported the deportation efforts on the ground. In Luxembourg, Alsace-Lorraine and the conquered Soviet territories, no "Jewish advisors" were necessary because they were completely under German control. In Greece, Italy and Hungary, the deployment of "Jewish advisors" was delayed. In order to be able to start the deportations there more quickly, the "Jewish advisors" were assigned an 8 to 15-man task force.

Open Profiles

Most of the perpetrators who later rose to become "Jewish advisors" were born between 1905 and 1913, had joined the Nazi party before 1933, only found a secure position upon joining the SS, and quickly advanced to positions where they could exercise power. Most of them had undergone extensive academic training at German and foreign universities after graduating from school, which they also successfully completed. They generally experienced their "radicalization" during their apprenticeship, university studies, or traineeships as members of National Socialist formations of the SA and SS, but primarily through Nazi student organizations. For example, Boßhammer joined an SA formation in 1933 and was active there. Dannecker became a member of the SS in the summer of 1932 and the Nazi Party a few weeks later. Dieter Wisliceny joined the Nazi Party and an SA formation in 1931 after abandoning his theology studies. He joined the SS in 1934. Their structural integration and content orientation were provided by the departments IV and VII B 2 at the RSHA, as well as by the Germany Department, Domestic Group II, in the Reich Foreign Ministry.

According to Claudia Steur, the "Jewish advisors" can be divided into two groups. The group with Dannecker, Wisliceny, Brunner, and also Boßhammer and Abromeit, as close confidants of Eichmann, served as role models for the other "Jewish advisors." The others were initiated into plans to murder the Jews relatively late. Their "striving for power, prestige, and social advancement" was an important motive for their later participation in the Holocaust. They "slowly grew into an increasingly brutal role, which they then fulfilled unscrupulously and consistently until the end of the war, without questioning the correctness of the orders given to them."

Jewish Affairs Officer at the Federal Foreign Office

The Foreign Office (AA) introduced SS officers (listed via the SD Main Office), often disguised with diplomatic service titles, to German embassies abroad. They were to be called Jewish Representatives and had essentially the same duties as the persons sent by the RSHA. However, after the war, most of these people and the Foreign Office itself read to conceal their active participation in the murder of Europe's Jews. In the obligatory denazification proceedings, the majority of them attested to each other with affidavits that they had been "uninvolved". Some of them even managed to take up public office again in the Federal Republic of Germany. For example, the Jewish Representative of the Paris Embassy, ​​Peter Klassen, headed the "Political Archives of the Foreign Office" for many years after 1945. He sifted through and cleaned the files there to his worldview or moved them to unfindable corners. The study of this group of people still requires comprehensive research.

What is known so far is a joint conference of the AA and RSHA, the "Working Conference of the Jewish Representatives of the German Missions in Europe" in Krummhübel from April 3 to 5, 1944, which marked the launch of the upcoming "Anti-Jewish Action Abroad." However, for reasons that remain unclear today, the RSHA sent a low-level delegation to this meeting at short notice. Franz Alfred Six, as a speaker, loudly proclaimed: The physical elimination of Eastern Jewry would deprive Judaism of its biological resources.

Only small parts of the Foreign Office's personnel policy with "Jewish advisors" during the Holocaust are known so far, following the return of German files that the Allies had taken into custody after May 1945. Publicly and internally, the title "Jewish advisor" in the Foreign Office was successively borne by Emil Schumburg, Franz Rademacher, and from 1943 onwards by Eberhard of Thadden.

Bibliography

Eckart Conze, Norbert Frei, Peter Hayes, Moshe Zimmermann: The Office and the Past. German Diplomats in the Third Reich and in the Federal Republic. Karl Blessing Verlag, Munich 2010 (also series, vol. 1117, of the Federal Agency for Civic Education, Bonn 2011). pp. 196ff. (See p. 197ff., Conference of the "Jewish Advisors" 1944).

Claudia Steur: Eichmann's Emissaries. The "Jewish Advisors" in Hitler's Europe. In: Gerhard Paul, Klaus-Michael Mallmann (eds.): The Gestapo in World War II. The "Home Front" and Occupied Europe. Scientific book company, Darmstadt 2000, pp. 403–436.

Astrid M. Eckert: The Battle for the Files. The Western Allies and the Return of German Archival Material after World War II. Franz Steiner, Wiesbaden 2004.