The Attack on Pearl Harbor

The American flag, battered and torn, flying at the Hickam Field barracks during the Pearl Harbor attack, 7 December 1941. This was one of the most published wartime flag photos until Joe Rosenthal’s Iwo Jima photo.


It was early morning, 7 December 1941. As the sun was just beginning to rise in Oahu, Hawaii, a fleet of Japanese naval air forces were taking off from their respective aircraft carriers in various locations in the Pacific Ocean. Just as many of the islanders were waking up for breakfast, it happened. The Japanese air fleet had arrived with a vengeance. No one was prepared for what was occurring. Pearl Harbor, the United States’ center for military action in the Pacific Ocean, was almost completely destroyed. Anger toward the Japanese spread quickly throughout the entire country, and this anger led to the United States’ entry into World War II.

Events Leading Up to the Attack

Before entering World War II, Japan had many other problems to deal with. It had begun to rely more and more for raw materials (especially oil) from outside sources because their land was so lacking in these. Despite these difficulties, Japan began to build a successful empire with a solid industrial foundation and a good army and navy. The military became highly involved in the government, and this began to get them into trouble. In the early 1930’s, the Japanese Army had many small, isolated battles with the Chinese in Manchuria. The Japanese Army prevailed in the series of battles, and Manchuria became a part of the Japanese political system. In 1937, the conflicts began again with the Chinese in the area near Beijing’s Marco Polo Bridge. Whether or not these conflicts began inadvertently or whether they were planned is unknown. These led to a full-scale war known as the second Sino-Japanese War. This was one of the bloodiest wars in world history and continued until the final defeat of Japan in 1945.

In 1939, World War II was beginning with a string of victories by German forces. Germany’s success included defeats of Poland and France along with a seizure of England. Many of the European nations that Germany now controlled had control over important colonial empires such as the East Indies and Singapore in Southeast Asia. These Southeast Asian countries contained many of the natural resources that Japan so desperately needed. Now that these countries were worried about matters over in Europe, Japan felt that it should seize the opportunity to take over some of them.

At the same time in the United States, President Franklin D. Roosevelt wanted to halt the expansion of Germany and Japan, but many others in the government wanted to leave the situation alone. The United States began to supply materials to the countries at war with Germany and Japan, but it wanted to remain neutral to prevent an overseas war. Meanwhile, Germany, Italy, and Japan formed the Axis Alliance in September of 1940. Japan was becoming desperate for more natural resources. In July of 1941, Japan made the decision to secure access to the abundance of the much needed resources in Southeast Asia. It was afraid that it could not defeat the larger and stronger Western powers. It needed to build up its armies in order to stay in the war. It also had to worry, though, about the United States’ reaction to their plans to seize Southeast Asia.

Japan began their seizure with southern Indochina. (They already controlled northern Indochina.) The United States was in strict opposition to Japan’s plans, and began their reaction with an embargo on the shipment of oil to Japan. Oil was necessary to keep Japan’s technology and military progressing. Without it, Japan’s industrial and military forces would come to a stop in only a short time. Japan’s government viewed the oil embargo as an act of war.

Throughout the next few months of 1941, the United States tried to come to some kind of resolve with Japan to settle their differences. Japan wanted the United States to lift the oil embargo and allow them to attempt a of China. The United States refused to lift the embargo until takeover Japan would back off of their aggression with China. Neither country would budge on their demands, and war seemed to be inescapable.

The United States regarded Japan’s adamant refusal to budge on their stance as a sign of hostility. They too realized that war was inevitable. They responded to this potential war with Japan by adding to the military forces stationed in the Pacific. General Douglas MacArthur and his ground forces in the Philippines began to organize into a formidable army. The B-17 was just arriving at many air force bases throughout the country, and was a great confidence to MacArthur upon its arrival. MacArthur became so confident in his forces stationed in the Philippines that on 5 December 1941 he said, “Nothing would please me better than if they would give me three months and then attack here.”

The most powerful and most crucial part of American defense in the Pacific Ocean was that of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Usually, this fleet was stationed somewhere along the west coast of the United States, and made a training cruise to Hawaii each year. With war looming, the U.S. Pacific Fleet was moved to the Pearl Harbor naval base in Hawaii. This was the perfect location for the American forces in the Pacific because of its location, halfway between the United States west coast and the Japanese military bases in the Marshall Islands. The Pacific Fleet first arrived at Pearl Harbor naval base on 2 April 1940, and were scheduled to return to the United States mainland around 9 May 1940. This plan was drastically changed because of the increasing activity of Italy in Europe and Japan’s attempt at expansion in Southeast Asia. President Roosevelt felt that the presence of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii would retard any Japanese attempt at a strike on the United States. Admiral James O. Richardson of the Pacific Fleet was in full opposition to the long stay at Pearl Harbor. He felt that the facilities were inadequate to maintain the ships or crews. Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, was the one who originally made the decision to extend the crew’s stay in Hawaii; and, in spite of Admiral Richardson’s complaints, he maintained that the Pacific Fleet must stay there to keep the Japanese from entering the East Indies. Richardson felt that the Japanese would realize the military disadvantages of being stationed at Pearl Harbor, and would be quick to act on the situation. All of Richardson’s objections, in meetings with both the Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox and the President, got him nothing but a dismissal shortly thereafter.

On 12 November 1940, British torpedo bombers launched an attack on the Taranto harbor in Italy. This sent worry into United States government officials who were afraid that the same thing could happen to Pearl Harbor. On 22 November, Admiral Stark suggested to Richardson the idea of placing anti-torpedo nets in Pearl Harbor. Richardson replied that they were neither necessary nor practical. On 1 February 1941, Richardson was officially replaced by Admiral Husband E. Kimmel. Kimmel also did not like the idea of his fleet at Pearl Harbor; but, after seeing what had happened to Richardson, he was very quiet about his objections. The Pacific Fleet was to be used as a defensive measure to direct Japan’s attention away from Southeast Asia by:

1.  capturing the Caroline and Marshall Islands

2.  disrupting Japanese trade routes, and

3.  defending Guam, Hawaii, and the United States mainland. Kimmel was supposed to prepare his fleet for war with Japan.

Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander-in-chief of Japan’s Combined Fleet, had to be careful of his country’s position in the Pacific. If he concentrated his forces too much in the Pacific islands, then the mainland would be more susceptible to attack from Europe and even the United States. Yamamoto devised a plan that involved an opening blow to the United States Pacific Fleet at the same time as their offensive against British, American, and Dutch forces in Southeast Asia. He planned to cripple the United States while he quickly conquered much of Southeast Asia and gathered their natural resources. He hoped that his attack against the Pacific Fleet would demoralize the American forces and get them to sign a peace settlement allowing Japan to remain as the power in the Pacific. A month after the British attack on Taranto harbor, Yamamoto decided that if war with the United States was unavoidable he would launch a carrier attack on Pearl Harbor. In January of 1941, Yamamoto first began to commit to this strategy by planning out his attack and showing it to other Japanese officials. Yamamoto developed the following eight guidelines for the attack:

·    surprise was crucial

·    American aircraft carriers there should be the primary targets

·    U.S. aircraft there must be destroyed to prevent aerial opposition

·    all Japanese aircraft carriers available should be used

·    all types of bombing should be used in the attack

·    a strong fighter element should be included in the attack for air cover for the fleet

·    refueling at sea would be necessary, and

·    a daylight attack promised best results, especially in the sunrise hours.

Many of Japan’s Navy General Staff were in opposition to Yamamoto’s plan, but they continued to prepare for the attack. All of the necessary training was given to troops, and all of the fighters and submarines were prepared.

The Bombing Begins

There were peace talks occurring up until about 27 November 1941. At that time, negotiations had come to a halt. The United States put its troops on alert. On 6 December 1941, President Roosevelt made an appeal for peace to the Emperor of Japan. Not until late that day did the U.S. decode thirteen parts of a fourteen part message that presented the possibility of a Japanese attack. Approximately 9 a.m. (Washington time) on 7 December 1941, the last part of the fourteen part message was decoded stating a severance of ties with the United States. An hour later, a message from Japan was decoded as instructing the Japanese embassy to deliver the fourteen part message at 1 p.m. (Washington time). The U.S., upon receiving this message sent a commercial telegraph to Pearl Harbor because radio communication had been down.

At 6 a.m. (Hawaiian time) on 7 December 1941, the first Japanese attack fleet of 183 planes took off from aircraft carriers 230 miles north of Oahu. At 7:02 a.m., two Army operators at a radar station on Oahu’s north shore picked up Japanese fighters approaching on radar. They contacted a junior officer who disregarded their sighting, thinking that it was B-17 bombers from the United States west coast. The first Japanese bomb was dropped at 7:55 a.m. on Wheeler Field, eight miles from Pearl Harbor. The crews at Pearl Harbor were on the decks of their ships for morning colors and the singing of The Star Spangled Banner. Even though the band was interrupted in their song by Japanese planes gunfire, the crews did not move until the last note was sung. The telegraph from Washington had been too late. It arrived at headquarters in Oahu around noon (Hawaiian time), four long hours after the first bombs were dropped.

Aftermath of the Bombing

Of the approximately one hundred U.S. Navy ships present in the harbor that day, eight battleships were damaged with five sunk. Eleven smaller ships including cruisers and destroyers were also badly damaged. Among those killed were 2,335 servicemen and 68 civilians. The wounded included 1,178 people. The U.S.S. Arizona was dealt the worst blow of the attack. A 1,760 pound bomb struck it, and the ammunition on board exploded killing 1,177 servicemen. Today, there is a memorial spanning the sunken remains of the Arizona dedicated to the memory of all those lost in the bombing.

News of the attack was a shock to the entire nation. The bombing rallied the United States behind the President in declaring war on Japan. On 11 December, Germany and Italy declared war on the U.S., bringing about a global conflict. The United States would later drop two atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing Japan to complete surrender on 14 August 1945.

 

P-40 fighters and hangars burning at Wheeler Field, 7 December 1941; photo taken from a Japanese aircraft.


This photo shows the rear view of Hangar #11 after the attack. Notice the damaged Douglas B-18 Bolo to the right.


Photo shows a scene from shortly after the bombing of Hawaii by Japanese forces on December 7, 1941. The impromptu machine gun nest was built in a bomb crater and reinforced with salvaged aircraft motors.


A damaged battleship in the background days after the attack on Pearl Harbor.


Wreckage at Wheeler Field.


Bomb damage to Hangars 15-17 and 11-13 at Hickam Field, Oahu, at 1700 on 7 December 1941; note B-18 bomber in hanger.


Destroyed hangar at Hickam Field on 7 December as fire fighters get the blaze under control.


The wreckage of a drugstore smolders in Waikiki.


Out of the Loop: Japan’s Envoys Unaware of Pearl Harbor Attack

From Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 12,

Exhibits of the Joint Committee, pages 213-14

While Secretary Hull may have berated Nomura and Kurusu after reading the “Fourteen-part Message” on 7 December, this document shows that they weren’t really “in the know” about Japan’s plans. (Italics added.)

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

1 December 1941

(Purple) #1227

Indications are that the United States desires to continue the negotiations even if it is necessary to go beyond their stands on the so-called basic principles. However, if we keep quibbling on the critical points, and continue to get stuck in the middle as we have been in the past, it is impossible to expect any further developments. If it is impossible from the broad political viewpoint, to conduct a leaders’ meeting at this time, would it not be possible to arrange a conference between persons in whom the leaders have complete confidence (for example, Vice President Wallace or Hopkins from the United States and the former Premier Konoye, who is on friendly terms with the President, or Adviser to the Imperial Privy Council Ishii). The meeting could be arranged for some midway point, such as Honolulu. High army and navy officers should accompany these representatives. Have them make one final effort to reach some agreement, using as the basis of their discussions the latest proposals submitted by each.

        We feel that this last effort may facilitate the final decision as to war or peace.

        We realize of course that an attempt to have President Roosevelt and former Premier Konoye meet, failed. Bearing in mind the reaction to that in our nation, it may be to our interest to first ascertain the U.S. attitude on this possibility. Moreover, since we have no guarantee either of success or failure of the objectives even if the meeting is held, careful consideration should first be given this matter.

        We feel, however, that to surmount the crisis with which we are face to face, it is not wasting our efforts to pursue every path open to us. It is our opinion that it would be most effective to feel out and ascertain the U.S. attitude regarding this matter, in the name of the Japanese Government. However, if this procedure does not seem practical to you in view of some internal condition, then how would it be if I were to bring up the subject as purely of my own origin and in that manner feel out their attitude. Then, if they seem receptive to it the government could make the official proposal.

        Please advise me of your opinions on this matter.

25727

JD-1: 7055 (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (1)

 

United States Note to Japan: 26 November 1941

From Department of State Bulletin,

Volume V Number 129, 13 December 1941

The text of the document handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador on 26 November 1941, which consists of two parts, one an oral statement and one an outline of a proposed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan, reads as follows:

Oral

Strictly confidential

November 26, 1941

The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the Government of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months informal and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a settlement if possible of questions relating to the entire Pacific area based upon the principles of peace, law and order and fair dealing among nations. These principles include the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment; and the principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

        It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been made in reference to the general principles which constitute the basis of a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Recently the Japanese Ambassador has stated that the Japanese Government is desirous of continuing the conversations directed toward a comprehensive and peaceful settlement of the Pacific area; that it would be helpful toward creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcome of the conversations if a temporary modus vivendi could be agreed upon to be in effect while the conversations looking to peaceful settlement in the Pacific were continuing. On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the Secretary of State proposals in regard to temporary measure to be taken respectively by the Government of Japan and by the Government of the United States, which measures are understood to have been designed to accomplish the purposes above indicated.

        The Government of the United States most earnestly desires to contribute to the promotion and maintenance of peace and stability in the Pacific area, and to afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussion with the Japanese Government directed toward working out a broad-gauge program of peace throughout the Pacific area. The proposals which were presented by the Japanese Ambassador on November 20 contain some features which, in the opinion of this Government, conflict with the fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under consideration and to which each Government has declared that it is committed. The Government of the United States believes that the adoption of such proposals would not be likely to contribute to the ultimate objectives of ensuring peace under law, order and justice in the Pacific area, and it suggests that further effort be made to resolve our divergences of view in regard to the practical application of the fundamental principles already mentioned.

        With this object in view the Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of a program which this Government envisages as something to be worked out during our further conversations.

        The plan therein suggested represents an effort to bridge the gap between our draft of June 21, 1941 and the Japanese draft of September 25 by making a new approach to the essential problems underlying a comprehensive Pacific settlement. This plan contains provisions dealing with the practical application of the fundamental principles which we have agreed in our conversations constitute the only sound basis for worthwhile international relations. We hope that in this way progress toward reaching a meeting of minds between our two Governments may be expedited.

Strictly confidential, tentative and without commitment

November 26, 1941

Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement Between

the United States and Japan

Section I

Draft Mutual Declaration of Policy

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area, that they have no territorial designs in that area, that they have no intention of threatening other countries or of using military force aggressively against any neighboring nation, and that, accordingly, in their national policies they will actively support and give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon which their relations with each other and with all other governments are based:

1.        The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.

2.        The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

3.        The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.

4.        The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

        The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will actively support and practically apply the following principles in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples:

  1. The principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.
  2. The principle of international economic cooperation and abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.
  3. The principle of non-discriminatory access by all nations to raw material supplies.
  4. The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations as regards the operation of international commodity agreements.
  5. The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international finance as may lend aid to the essential enterprises and the continuous development of all countries and may permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of all countries.

Section II

Steps To Be Taken by the Government of the United States

and by the Government of Japan

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose to take steps as follows:

1.        The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggres­sion pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States.

2.        Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherland and Thai Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indochina and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indochina, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question. Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indochina and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indochina.

3.        The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indochina.

4.        The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support—militarily, politically, economically—any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.

5.        Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British and other governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China, including right in international settlements and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

6.        The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.

7.        The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States and on American funds in Japan.

8.        Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.

9.        Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.

        Both Governments will use their influence to cause other governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political and economic principles set forth in this agreement.