Parachuting into Estonia

by Ted Koppel

With the launching of the German Operation BARBAROSSA against Russia on 22 June 1941, Estonians in Finland (either volunteers who had fought in the Russo-Finnish ‘Winter War’ or later escapees when Russian forces had taken over Estonia in June 1940) immediately planned a return to their occupied homeland to help in its liberation.

On 23 June a special group, code-named “Erna,” was authorized and immediately began the training and orientation of Estonian volunteers. About sixty-five men were selected, including some specially trained radio operators.

At the start of July, the initial group was sworn in (in Helsinki) and departed for their launching point on an island in the Gulf of Finland. After about a week’s delay due to bad weather and enemy naval movement, the main component landed their boats on the Estonian coast and moved inland with no enemy contact.

Two attempts to land four more boatloads of men, escorted by Finnish torpedo boats, were intercepted by Soviet naval patrols and turned back by gunfire.

A new Estonian officer was put in charge of the remaining “Erna” men, as their original leader was now in action with the main group. A brief parachute familiarization course was conducted, jump gear was assigned, and the sixteen men left Helsinki in an aircraft on the night of 28 July. The drop into Estonia, behind Russian lines, was successful, although two of the four supply containers were lost in the dark. Joining the main “Erna” group, these parachutists saw action within days, ambushing a Red Army convoy.

Meanwhile, for more than a week, the main group had received airdrops of Finnish arms, ammo and supplies for the increasing number of partisans who joined “Erna” or established contact with it. Soon these numbered over 2,000 men. The groups called themselves Forest-brothers (or ‘buabrangers’) and consisted of individuals who had taken to the forests at the initial Soviet occupation or, mostly, with the mobilization and mass deportations ordered by the Russians when Germany invaded. These latter included components from military units, which in time formed irregular forces fighting independently or alongside (or ahead) of the rapidly advancing Germans. These initially isolated groups, deep within enemy controlled territory, had conducted ambushes and harassment which helped disorganize the Russians even further. At the front lines, they became armed recon and regular combat units.

Further “Erna” teams, usually two men with communications equipment, were parachuted from light aircraft into widely scattered areas still under Russian control. They formed links with the various resistance groups and, through Helsinki, arranged for further drops of equipment and arms. For example, a typical parachute load would be ten rifles with ammo.

On 31 July the Germans ordered the Finnish supplies stopped—apparently to prevent the Estonians from freeing too much of their own land and thereby undermining the political power of the Germans as the new occupying force.

These volunteers, later reorganized and expanded as the “Erna II” Battalion, took part with other Estonian units in the battles at the end of August to liberate the capital, Tallinn, and the Estonian islands in September 1941. By then the Germans were totally in control and for the next three years would remain so.

 

Six Hours at Balta: C Company, 744th Engineer Regiment on the Russian Front, 3 August 1941

Assault Pioneers on patrol.

by David A. Fastabend

The U.S. Army has long realized the significance of that intangible asset known as combat initiative. Initiative at all levels of command is highly touted as the great equalizer, capable of reversing unfavorable balances of men and equipment. However, there are few detailed analyses of this elusive combat quality.

The following account is condensed from the U.S. Army Historical Series on the Russian Campaign, 1941-1945. The account illuminates several aspects of initiative in combat. It is possible to assess several factors that enhance combat initiative and to reach tentative conclusions on the potential performance of the U.S. Army in combat.

At 0600, 3 August 1941, the Germans of Company C, 744th Engineer Regiment, were resting and seeking cover from sporadic Russian shellings. Company C had just successfully supported the assault crossing of the Kodyma River by the 239th Division. Events of the last few hours, however, were of mounting concern to First Lieutenant Ehrhardt, the engineer company commander. He knew that the remainder of his parent unit, the 744th Engineer Regiment, had been assigned the task of capturing Balta, 11/2 miles to the east.

For the last two hours, the sounds of battle had increased in the vicinity of the 744th assembly area north of Balta. At 0530, Ehrhardt had observed 15 Soviet planes bomb and strafe that assembly area. The 744th attack was scheduled for 0600, but the ominous silence that prevailed in Balta confirmed his fear that the 744th attack was seriously delayed.

Studying his map, the German company commander perceived a potential crisis. The enemy force in Balta was estimated as a battalion force of unknown capability. In the absence of the 744th Engineer Regiment’s neutralizing attack, this element was free to turn east and sever the bypass movement of the 239th (see Figure 1).

In the absence of any missions from his unit of attachment or the 744th, Ehrhardt assumed the responsibility to cancel this threat. He assembled his platoon leaders and announced his intention to attack Balta from the east. He assigned platoon sectors of responsibility and directed immediate reconnaissance patrols of those sectors. One squad was sent to secure the road leading from Balta while another was directed to guard the 239th crossing site.

These measures proved to be timely. At 0635, two Russian tanks sallied forth from Balta and commenced firing on the Kodyma crossing operation. The road block security force aggressively engaged the tanks, setting one on fire with fragment grenades and screening the other with smoke. This delaying action gained time while an artillery battery at the crossing hastily unlimbered a howitzer. The howitzer rapidly dispatched the burning tank and forced the other tank to retreat to Balta (see Figure 2).

While company attack preparations resumed, Ehrhardt sought out the artillery battery commander and secured the “loan” of a howitzer and crew—“insurance” against further enemy armored activity. Messages were dispatched by motorcycle to higher headquarters. As reconnaissance patrols started returning around 0715, the attack plan crystallized.

At 0730, Ehrhardt issued the operations order for the attack. He explained to his platoon leaders that his general objective was three-fold:

To assist the attack on Balta by the 744th from the north.

To seize the southern half of Balta to prevent the escape of Russian forces.

To seize the vital 24-ton bridge site in southern Balta and expedite its restoration.

To accomplish this, the 1st and 2nd Platoons would move to a jump-off point at an abandoned farmhouse on the outskirts of Balta. A covered and concealed route discovered by the 1st Platoon patrol would be used. Upon initiation of the attack, the 3rd Platoon would make a visible feint across the large sunflower field and attempt to tie down as many defenders as possible. Ehrhardt chose to move with the 1st and 2nd Platoon accompanied by the howitzer section chief who would serve as forward observer for the howitzer crew.

At 0740, the platoons were en route to their jump-off points. By 0830, the platoons were in position. From the farmhouse, Ehrhardt could observe a light field gun, mortars and heavy machine guns in the main street of Balta. Many Russians were moving across the Kodyma at a ford to their southwest. Turning to his platoon leaders, Ehrhardt gave them their immediate objectives: the 1st Platoon would seize the buildings housing the heavy weapons in Balta; the 2nd Platoon was directed to seize the ford crossing on the Kodyma. As the howitzer opened fire on the weapons concentrations in Balta, the attack commenced.

The 2nd Platoon was about to leave its concealed position at the farmhouse when a large group of Russian riflemen approached the building. Holding its fire until the last possible moment, the platoon wiped out the detachment at near point-blank range. The 2nd Platoon rushed on toward the ford and soon was engaging the Russian security element there.

The 1st Platoon held its attack while the howitzer crew systematically destroyed the Russian weapon positions. It then rushed forward and overcame the survivors in hand-to-hand combat.

Farther north, the 3rd Platoon had met unexpectedly light resistance to its demonstration across the sunflower field. The platoon leader elected to push on into Balta and exploit any opportunities. A particularly stubborn house near the first intersection repelled all frontal assaults. While two engineers prepared to breach into the building from an adjoining wall, the Russians pre-empted this effort by setting off their own explosion. The German engineers were buried by the collapsing wall but were recovered when the 3rd Platoon secured the house after a brief melee.

Company C was attempting to consolidate its initial gains when a flurry of red flares erupted over the 2nd Platoon sector. Rushing to a vantage point, Ehrhardt was able to observe a company-sized counterattack in progress against the 2nd Platoon. Frequent flamethrower bursts and the detonation of expedient explosives emphasized the urgency of the 2nd Platoon situation. Ehrhardt promptly directed the 1st Platoon to move against the flank of the Russian counterattack, leaving one squad to secure their hard-earned objectives in Balta. After a 30-minute fire-fight, the Russians retreated with heavy losses.

By 0945, the German positions on the outskirts of Balta were secure. Although these positions afforded some protection to the vulnerable flank of the 239th Division, Ehrhardt elected to press the attack. As the sound of heavy machine gun and artillery fire to the north signaled the start of the 744th attack, Ehrhardt held another conference of his platoon leaders. The 2nd Platoon was ordered to push along the banks of the Kodyma until it secured the 24-ton bridge site. The 1st Platoon was ordered to continue pushing west until it had sealed off the Russian escape route completely. The 3rd Platoon was directed to strengthen its present positions and attempt a link-up with the 744th attack to the north.

The 1st Platoon immediately seized the next block of buildings but was unable to advance further. Ehrhardt, therefore, directed artillery fire on the stream of Russians he could observe in the western section of the town.

The 2nd Platoon advanced to the 24-ton bridge site and secured it after a lively fire-fight. Its success was threatened immediately by the appearance of two Russian tanks at the ford crossing. Once again, however, the Germans established a heavy smoke screen around the vehicles, rendering them ineffective. A squad leader destroyed one by hand emplacement of an explosive charge. The remaining tank fled south.

By 1100, the 1st Platoon had secured the entire southern half of Balta. Contact was made with the 744th attackers, and a link-up was established. Thus assured of success, Ehrhardt turned his attention to the future of the advance.

The 2nd Platoon was ordered to clear the bridge site and begin preparations for construction of a 24-ton bridge. The clearing operations were severely hampered by intense artillery fire. The accuracy of the fire was suspicious to the alert 2nd Platoon leader who quickly organized a search of the surrounding area. His hunch proved correct when his men captured a forward observer with his radio just a few yards south of the bridge. By 1200, the preparation of the bridge site was well underway. The howitzer crew returned to its battery, and Ehrhardt reported to his battalion commander for his next mission.

Several influences were at work in the Balta operation that measurably enhanced the exercise of combat initiative.

Availability of Intelligence: Ehrhardt was able to make his decisions timely because he knew the complete scope of the German operation. He passed on this information to his subordinates so that they, too, could make personal decisions that augmented the overall effort.

Degree of Control: The German company commander was careful to give his platoons mission-type orders that maximized their freedom of action. Their aggressive pursuit of these missions created further opportunities that were exploited to maintain the momentum of the attack.

Offensive Operations: The blitzkrieg nature of the German offensive in 1941 created a fast-moving situation that afforded many opportunities for the attacking force. Such opportunities do not occur as frequently for defenders who are more bound to strict coordination measures in the execution of the defense. Although defenders can and must exercise initiative, the effects of initiative action are generally limited by requirements to be prepared to reinforce an adjacent sector or withdraw to the next line of defense.

Training: Ehrhardt could launch his attack with confidence because his company was well-trained and prepared to execute the decisions of its leaders. Furthermore, those leaders had been prepared to exercise their own judgment in pursuit of mission objectives. Initiative becomes recklessness for a unit that does not possess the skills needed to transform will into action.

Experience: Skills acquired in training are not fully effective until they have been tempered with experience. Ehrhardt’s men were battle-wise. Every crisis in Balta was met by cool decision, not panic.

Motivation: Motivation at every level of command was the driving force behind the success of the Balta attack. Such motivated performance is the product of a sense of self-worth and purpose in the individual energized by good leadership.

Confidence: Confidence in the ability of himself and his company was the first condition for any action by Ehrhardt. Such confidence is a byproduct of the training and experience of a unit.

Courage: Seizing the initiative often will entail significant risks. Courage is the catalyst that overcomes fear and sets expertise in motion. The men of Company C, 744th Engineer Regiment, exhibited not only the physical courage necessary in close combat, but also the mental courage needed to make decisions and see them through.

Judgment: Judgment is another intangible factor of initiative. The individual must be able to weigh an action and determine if it is a bold, decisive move or merely rash and ill-advised. The distinction is often difficult. Experience and training combined with common sense must be brought to bear on the problem. Judgment can be the difference between stunning success and dismal disaster.

Figure 1: Situation near Balta, 3 August 1941.

Figure 2: Action at Balta, 3 August 1941. KEY: 1: 0635—Repulse of Russian tank attack. 2: 0800—Movement to attack jump-off points. 3: 0830—2nd Platoon ambush of Russian detachment. 4: 0830—1st and 3rd Platoon attack on outskirts of Balta. 5: 0900—Flank attack by 1st Platoon to relieve 2nd Platoon. 6: 0945—Attack resumes west into Balta. 7: 1015—2nd Platoon repels tank attack at ford. 8: 1100—Bridge and western half of Balta seized. 9: 1130—Enemy forward observer captured near bridge.

Oberstlt. von Boddien discusses the strategic situation in the Balta area.

Supporting the advance in the direction of Balta.

Artillery observers in front of Balta.

Stuka dive bombers devastated Mardarovka railway station on the line Odessa-Balta.

The village is taken, the infantry holds position. 

 

The Battle of New Guinea: January 1942-February 1944

Japanese tanks bogged down at Milne Bay, New Guinea.

Published 1948

From southern China and the Malay Peninsula stretches the vast co­lo­nial empire known as the Dutch East Indies, most of which fell to the Jap­a­nese in the first six months of the war. New Guinea, one of the largest islands in the world, sprawls over a vast area, the western half be­long­ing to the Dutch East Indies, and the east­ern part, known as Pa­pua, belonging to Australia. Pa­pua has a population estimated to be 1,900,000.

The most important harbor on New Guinea is Port Moresby, which faces south and west and which the Japanese planned to take before they made an attempt to invade Aus­tralia. Many attempts were made to capture and occupy Port Moresby, but the enemy failed each time.

On the left flank of the Allied forces as they moved northward up the Solomons-New Guinea ladder, Amer­i­can, Australian and New Zea­land troops under the over­all com­mand of General Mac­Arthur, went from one strategic point to an­other in order to outflank and iso­late the main Japanese base at Rabaul, on New Britain Is­land. Due to the ter­rain, progress was slow. The weight of the fighting in New Guinea was borne by the Aus­tra­lian 6th, 7th, and 9th Divisions and the American 32nd and 41st Di­vi­sions. Par­a­troop­ers were often used to cut off the enemy po­si­tions. The U.S. Fifth Air Force often acted as a service of supply to remote out­posts. General Walter Krueger commanded the Sixth Army com­pris­ing the American units.

By 19 February 1942, the Jap­a­nese struck at New Guinea, bombing Madang, Lae, Salamaua, and Port Moresby, and even striking at and neu­tral­iz­ing the Aus­tra­lian city of Port Darwin. En­emy troops seized Lae and Salamaua on 8 March 1942, driving the Aus­tra­lians back toward Port Moresby. The arrival of American troops in Aus­tralia and the Battle of the Coral Sea stopped the advance of the Jap­a­nese on Port Moresby, and gave Gen­eral Mac­Arthur time to build his forces for a coun­ter­of­fen­sive.

While the Americans were de­cid­ing the fate of Guadal­canal, the hard battle of southeastern New Guinea was being fought by the Aus­tra­lian 6th, 7th and 9th Di­vi­sions and by the American 32nd and 41st Divisions.

The Japanese had landed about 11,000 men at Buna, Gona and Sana­nanda, and had crossed the Owen Stanley Mountains to within about 30 miles of Port Moresby. They were finally stopped by the Aus­tra­lian 6th Division. By the end of Sep­tem­ber 1942 the U.S. Fifth Air Force attacked the Japanese route over the mountains and cut the enemy supply lines. The Aus­tra­lians threatened the enemy fronts and flanks, and in an effort to keep his forces intact he withdrew to well-planned for­ti­fi­ca­tions in the coastal swamps at Buna and Sanananda.

It was while the Japanese were settling them­selves in these coastal defenses, that combat teams of the U.S. 32nd Infantry arrived in New Guinea to support the Australians.

The U.S. 32nd Division, known as the Red Ar­row Division, began its fighting in this war in 1942 in the evil-smelling swamps of New Guinea. In the First World War a French general gave them the name of “Les Terribles,” when the di­vi­sion earned four battle stream­ers and was the first to crack the Hindenburg Line.

Originally composed of National Guardsmen from Wisconsin and Mich­i­gan, the 32nd sailed for the Pa­cific on 22 April 1942, landing at Ade­laide, South Australia. Later they moved to Bris­bane for special jungle training, and were rushed to New Guinea when the Japanese, having crossed the Owen Stanley Moun­tains, were threat­en­ing the vital Allied base at Port Moresby. How did the 32nd arrive at the bat­tle front? Mostly by air, the first large-scale airborne move­ment of combat in­fan­try­men in Amer­i­can military history. Having landed, they took their place along­side the Australian 7th and 9th Di­vi­sions in the jungles sur­round­ing Jap­a­nese-held Buna. It took forty-five minutes to fly across the Owen Stanley Moun­tains, but it took the men of the 2nd Battalion of the 126th Infantry Reg­i­ment of the 32nd Division, forty-nine ag­o­niz­ing days to fight their way across.

The units of the division that fought at Buna suf­fered more cas­u­al­ties from the enemy and from jun­gle diseases than their orig­i­nal strength. With the fall of Sanananda on 22 January 1943, this phase of the cam­paign was officially ended, and the division was returned to Aus­tralia for rest and rehabilitation. We shall come across this division again when, almost a year later, it is fight­ing at Saidor, New Guinea, and then at Ai­tape. From Aitape they will move to Moro­tai, in the Halmahera Islands, and then they will show up at Leyte, in the Philippines, on 14 November 1944.

The Japanese fought a stubborn defensive battle, but Buna fell to the combined forces on 2 January 1943, whereupon a regiment of the Amer­i­can 32nd Division and the Australian 18th Brigade moved on to the Sana­nanda front, where the enemy was entrenched even more firmly than at Buna. The Australian 7th Division assisted by a regiment of the American 32nd Division and later by a regiment of the U.S. 41st Division had been at­tack­ing the enemy positions north­ward around Gona and Sanananda. The Australians had captured Gona on 9 December 1942, but the Jap­a­nese perimeter at Sana­nanda was almost as strong as ever when the units from the Buna front arrived. The combined forces of Aus­tra­lians and Americans over­came all resistance and Sana­nanda fell to them on 23 January 1943.

Although the enemy was forced out of Buna and Sanananda he had no disposition to give up New Guinea. From Rabaul he had been sending re­in­force­ments to his garrisons at Lae and Sala­maua. The con­voys were at­tacked by Allied bomb­ers 6-9 January 1943; and on 2-4 March 1943, the Battle of the Bis­marck Sea resulted in enemy losses of prob­a­bly eighteen ships and 15,000 troops, our Flying For­tresses and Liberators trail­ing and strafing the flee­ing enemy for three days.

The U.S. 41st Infantry Division called them­selves the Jungleers; being the first division to reach the southwest Pacific they had done more jungle fighting than any other American outfit.

Originally composed of National Guardsmen from the U.S. Northwest, the division has for its sign “End of the Oregon Trail,” and its official emblem is a golden setting sun against a crimson background.

The division’s first fight with the Japanese was at Sanananda in December 1942. Owing to inability of supplies to reach them, the men of the division had to rely on scanty rations and when their fighting was over they came out in rags.

Six months later the division went ashore be­low Samanaua for what they later called the “Foxhole Fur­lough,” engaging in seventy-six days of unrelieved jungle fight­ing. And when this par­tic­u­lar campaign was over, the men of the division presented a strange sight. Most of them emerged from the jungle wear­ing Japanese naval uniforms, for their own clothes had long been worn out and only the capture of the enemy and the enemy’s clothes prevented them from having to fight in the raw.

In 1944 after a thirty-six–day fight, the 41st broke the grip that the Japanese had held on New Guinea for two years. In a series of strides up the New Guinea tangled jungle coast the 41st between 23 April and 27 May 1944, smote and conquered the enemy at Aitape, Hol­landia, Wakde, and Biak. And by these ac­com­plish­ments the way to the Philippines was cleared.

On 28 February 1945 the division landed at Pala­wan, Philippine Islands. After Palawan, then Min­danao, than Basilan Island, then to the tip of Tawitawi where they destroyed the enemy forces.

The success of the Allied forces in the Papuan cam­paign could not have been won had it not been for the cooperation of the U.S. Fifth Air Force which ferried supplies and reinforcements over the mountains to the combat zone. The Allies were now well on their way back toward the Philippines.

The Battle of the Bismarck Sea, 2-4 March 1943

The most disastrous naval defeat of the war up to that time was suffered by the Japanese from 2 to 4 March 1943 during the Battle of the Bismarck Sea. The op­er­a­tion was so called because it took place in the waters surrounding the Bismarck Archipelago, extending over 300 miles between Japanese-held Rabaul on northern New Britain and the Japanese base at Lae in eastern New Guinea. Just south of Lae was another strong Japanese garrison at Sala­maua on the New Guinea coast. All of the southern Papuan Pen­in­sula was now in American hands, following the battle for Buna in January 1943, and the Japanese must reinforce their troops at Lae and Sala­maua or they would starve. It was only this dire ne­ces­sity of supplying these indigent garrisons that finally brought the elusive Japanese Navy out from the harbor at Rabaul into the open where our air power could reach and smash it.

The island of New Guinea is shaped a little like some ungainly prehistoric fowl or beast, its head stretch­ing toward the west, with a cum­ber­some tail extending to­ward the south and east forming the Pa­puan Peninsula. On the western coast of this ap­pend­age at Port Moresby, was the headquarters of Lieu­ten­ant General George C. Kenney’s Fifth Air Force, which was assigned (together with our Brit­ish, Dutch, and Australian allies) to cover air ac­tiv­ity over New Guinea in the winter of 1942-43. Gen­eral Kenney was placed at the head of the Allied Air Command in the Southwest Pacific, which was under the over­all com­mand of General Douglas MacArthur. From Port Moresby our airmen flew thousands of ground troops to engage in the fighting for Buna, which ended with the fall of Buna Mis­sion. From Port Moresby also our fliers frequently made dangerous missions across the Owen Stanley Range to strike at the Japanese in­stal­la­tions at Ra­baul and other bases. Rabaul, a great air and naval base, provided a deep-water harbor which offered excellent protection for units of the Jap­a­nese Fleet.

Our first hint of the opportunity shaping up for our airmen came on 27 February 1942, when a lonely patrol plane, winging its way homeward from a rou­tine flight over New Britain suddenly caught sight of eight Japanese transports sailing in a west­erly di­rec­tion. For two days our planes attempted to relocate the convoy, but the Jap­a­nese were moving under the pro­tec­tion of a storm proph­e­sied by their weather experts, which had induced them to make this desperate attempt to relieve Lae. The con­voy appeared briefly again on 1 March, now off Cape Gloucester, the west­ern tip of New Britain. It now included thirteen ves­sels, two cruisers and five de­stroy­ers. Early the next day a squadron of B-17s sup­ported by P-38s managed to break through the clouds, and at­tack­ing in three waves, sank four of the enemy trans­ports. That afternoon two more were sunk.

The convoy was now nearing the Vitiaz Strait, sep­a­rat­ing New Britain and New Guinea. Here the Jap­a­nese must make a decision—either to sail on to Wewak and Madang on the northern New Guinea coast, or to turn south and head through the strait for Lae. They decided to attempt a ruse, turning first as if to head for Wewak, and then at night suddenly changing their course, steamed southward toward the strait and Lae.

The next day, 3 March, the storm was over and the weather clear as our planes gathered for the attack. The convoy steaming south presented a beau­ti­ful target for our eager aviators. There were now sixteen vessels, of which three were cruis­ers and seven destroyers, mak­ing twenty-two vessels in the convoy counting the six already sunk. The Japanese Zeros flew overhead offering protection for the convoy. Our planes had been care­fully laid since sus­pi­cions of the Japanese attempt were first aroused, and we hit them with every plane avail­a­ble and all the dif­fer­ent tactics known to our airmen. Wave after wave of bomb­ers struck the ships, which wheeled and maneuvered des­per­ately below. B-17s, B-25s, A-20s, Beaufighters, P-40s, P-39s, and P-38s joined in the attack, the pursuit ships engaging the Japanese Zeros, while the bombers blasted the convoy. Al­to­gether 136 American planes took part in the three-day battle. Our bombers came in low and released their bombs, which bounced against the sides of the ships and then exploded underwater where they did the most damage. Skip-bombing, as it was called, was an innovation perfected under Gen­eral Ken­ney’s guid­ance. Because of the accuracy of this type of bombing, and because the bombs pursued almost a hor­i­zon­tal course over the waves toward the ships, the Jap­a­nese later said that they thought they were being tor­pe­doed.

Following the main attack on 3 March, almost every Japanese ship could be seen in flames and sink­ing. One of our planes was hit, and as the crew par­a­chuted toward the water, Japanese Ze­ros dived in and shot them down. Seized by an avenging wrath that seemed to grip them all, our fliers pro­ceeded to strafe every lifeboat and raft in sight.

Mopping up operations continued on 4 March, and when the sun rose on 5 March, every Jap­a­nese ship was under the water. Not one got through to Lae. Of the Japanese troops, General MacArthur’s com­muni­qué said: “There was scarcely a survivor, so far as is known.”

Among those playing a gallant part in the battle was Captain Ray Holsey of Altus, Okla­homa, whose story is told by Major H. T. Has­tings in the 22 May 1943 Sat­ur­day Evening Post. His whole plane burst into flames when hit by fire from a Japanese Zero. The crew luckily man­aged to beat out the flames and Cap­tain Hol­sey brought the ship safely home to its base 350 miles across the mountains.

This Bismarck Sea operation earned for Gen­eral Kenney, five-foot-six, energetic, truculent, and in­tensely proud of his men, the title “Victor of the Bis­marck Sea.” It meant that the Japanese threat against Australia was considerably re­duced, and paved the way for our push later up the New Guinea coast.

More than any descriptive adjectives or adverbs, the casualty figures tell the story of this remarkable victory of air power over sea power: On the Jap­a­nese side, twenty-two ships were lost, includ­ing three cruis­ers, seven de­stroy­ers, twelve transports and cargo ships, amount­ing to 90,000 tons of shipping, 15,000 Jap­a­nese troops aboard the trans­ports were killed, as well as thousands of naval personnel on the war­ships, and ninety-five airplanes were lost. Against this, the American losses were four planes (one bomber and three fighters) and twelve men. As a matter of fact, the Japanese them­selves say that the American official count was greatly under­es­ti­mated. A captured Jap­a­nese admiral remarked that there were probably thirty to forty ships sunk instead of twenty-two. The Japanese could never have planned a better way to commit mass suicide than by precipitating the Battle of the Bis­marck Sea.

The Japanese continued to increase their air strength at Rabaul and it was reported they had twice as many planes in this area as the U.S. Fifth Air Force. The Allied supply depots at Port Moresby, Oro and Milne Bay in New Guinea and at Port Darwin in Australia, were struck by flights of as high as one hundred enemy planes between 15 March and 2 May 1943. Our Fifth and Thir­teenth Air Forces, augmented by our carrier force planes, finally wore down the enemy strength centered at Rabaul, through the winter and spring of 1943.

While the two-pronged drive toward Rabaul con­fused the enemy, we made surprise landings without op­po­si­tion, and took possession of air­strips on the Woodlark and Trobriand Islands on 30 June 1943, these islands lying between the Solomons and New Guinea. From their base at Salamaua, how­ever, the enemy had penetrated into the Bulolo Valley in lower New Guinea. The Aus­tra­lian 6th Division flew troops into the jun­gle and turned the Japanese back, and after nine months pushed them from Wau to the coast on 29-30 June 1943. The Amer­i­cans now landing to the south at Nassau Bay flanked the enemy at Salamaua as the Australians landed at Tambu Bay. After severe fighting over land, the Amer­i­cans and Australians succeeded in investing Sala­maua and occu­pied that base on 11 September 1943.

The Australian 9th Division sent airborne and am­phib­i­ous troops across the Gulf of Huon and captured Lae on 16 September 1943. Fin­schhafen, the next ob­jec­tive, lying at the eastern end of the Huon Peninsula, was captured by Allied amphibious forces on 2 Oc­to­ber 1943. The enemy then took cover in the mountains and jun­gles of the interior, and it took three months of bitter fighting to drive them out of Huon. The Aus­tra­lian 7th Division driving down the valley and the Australian 9th Di­vi­sion pushing up the coast from Lae on 1 September 1943, succeeded in entrapping large numbers of the enemy in the Markham River Valley. The Amer­i­cans and Aus­tra­lians finally cornered the Japanese in the foot­hills of the Finisterre Range before Ma­dang. The enemy made a stubborn and prolonged stand. Units of the U.S. 32nd Division landed with­out loss at Saidor on 2 January 1944, 55 miles be­low Madang, and met Australian troops pushing up the coast from Finschhafen and Sio on 14 Feb­ru­ary 1944. This enabled Allied forces to complete the conquest of the Huon Peninsula. On 12 Feb­ru­ary 1944, Allied forces occupied Umboi Island, and covered the flank of the American troops moving into western New Britain. The approach overland was made by land­ings some 250 miles west, first at Arawe and then at Cape Gloucester, and by 15 December 1943 the Amer­i­cans had control of west­ern New Britain.

Preceded by a bombardment of 650 tons of bombs on Arawe, units of the U.S. Sixth Army within five days of their landing had cleared the enemy out of the Arawe Peninsula. On 26 Decem­ber 1943, the First Marine Division, vet­er­ans of Guadalcanal, now under General William H. Ru­pertus, landed at points east and west of Cape Glouces­ter, after Allied bombers had pre­pared the way. The Marines drove east to Borgen Bay, cap­tured Hill 660 on 14 January 1944 in a ten-day bat­tle and joined the infantry driving inland from Arawe to com­plete the conquest of western New Brit­ain on 24 Feb­ru­ary 1944.

GI with M1 rifle stalking his prey in the jungle.

Australian engineers building a suspension bridge over a wild jungle stream, New Guinea, September 1942.

Australian and American engineers building a bridge near Kokoda in the Owen Stanley range, New Guinea, September 1942.

Natives acting as carriers for supplies crossing a jungle torrent in New Guinea, September 1942.

A New Guinea native who won the Military Medal (MM) in action against the Japanese.

The Owen Stanley mountains in New Guinea. The “vehicle” in the foreground is a child’s toy car.

The Japanese airfield at Gasmata, New Guinea, after the Fifth Air Force got through with it.

U.S. troops reach New Guinea. Toting barracks bags, personal equipment, and ammunition, American soldiers arrive at Port Moresby.

Australian 39th Battalion at Menari on its return to Port Moresby, New Guinea, in September 1942, almost finished as a fighting unit.

General MacArthur on his first visit to New Guinea is met at the airdrome by General Sir Thomas Blamey (right) and Australian Minister for the Army Right Honorable F. M. Forde (left).

Wounded Australian is carried past an Australian tank by a buddy at Satelberg, New Guinea.

Japanese prisoner of war in New Guinea with Australian guards.

Major General George A. Vasey, left, and Lieutenant General Edmund F. Herring, right, sitting outside Brigadier George F. Wootten’s tent at Sanananda. Within are Brigadier Wootten, right, and Brigadier J. R. Broadbent, corps quartermaster.

Australians crossing the Kumusi in mid-November 1942. New Guinea.

Weary, gaunt American troops passing through Hariko, New Guinea, on their way to the 21 November 1942 attack on Cape Endaiadere.

Wounded American and Australian soldiers wait on stretchers, in the Cape Endaidere area, New Guinea, to be carried to the rear by Papuan bearers. Of the 13,645 American troops taking part in the Papua Campaign, 671 were killed, 2,172 wounded, and about eight evacuated sick.

Wounded Australian soldier, near Old Strip, New Guinea, on Christmas Day, 25 December 1942, being guided by a Papuan boy.

Dead Japanese lying in front of a smashed bunker at Giropa Point, New Guinea, January 1943.