World War 2 In Review: Russian Campaign

by Ted Koppel

With the launching of the German Operation BARBAROSSA against Russia on 22 June 1941, Estonians in Finland (either volunteers who had fought in the Russo-Finnish ‘Winter War’ or later escapees when Russian forces had taken over Estonia in June 1940) immediately planned a return to their occupied homeland to help in its liberation.

On 23 June a special group, code-named “Erna,” was authorized and immediately began the training and orientation of Estonian volunteers. About sixty-five men were selected, including some specially trained radio operators.

At the start of July, the initial group was sworn in (in Helsinki) and departed for their launching point on an island in the Gulf of Finland. After about a week’s delay due to bad weather and enemy naval movement, the main component landed their boats on the Estonian coast and moved inland with no enemy contact.

Two attempts to land four more boatloads of men, escorted by Finnish torpedo boats, were intercepted by Soviet naval patrols and turned back by gunfire.

A new Estonian officer was put in charge of the remaining “Erna” men, as their original leader was now in action with the main group. A brief parachute familiarization course was conducted, jump gear was assigned, and the sixteen men left Helsinki in an aircraft on the night of 28 July. The drop into Estonia, behind Russian lines, was successful, although two of the four supply containers were lost in the dark. Joining the main “Erna” group, these parachutists saw action within days, ambushing a Red Army convoy.

Meanwhile, for more than a week, the main group had received airdrops of Finnish arms, ammo and supplies for the increasing number of partisans who joined “Erna” or established contact with it. Soon these numbered over 2,000 men. The groups called themselves Forest-brothers (or ‘buabrangers’) and consisted of individuals who had taken to the forests at the initial Soviet occupation or, mostly, with the mobilization and mass deportations ordered by the Russians when Germany invaded. These latter included components from military units, which in time formed irregular forces fighting independently or alongside (or ahead) of the rapidly advancing Germans. These initially isolated groups, deep within enemy controlled territory, had conducted ambushes and harassment which helped disorganize the Russians even further. At the front lines, they became armed recon and regular combat units.

Further “Erna” teams, usually two men with communications equipment, were parachuted from light aircraft into widely scattered areas still under Russian control. They formed links with the various resistance groups and, through Helsinki, arranged for further drops of equipment and arms. For example, a typical parachute load would be ten rifles with ammo.

On 31 July the Germans ordered the Finnish supplies stopped—apparently to prevent the Estonians from freeing too much of their own land and thereby undermining the political power of the Germans as the new occupying force.

These volunteers, later reorganized and expanded as the “Erna II” Battalion, took part with other Estonian units in the battles at the end of August to liberate the capital, Tallinn, and the Estonian islands in September 1941. By then the Germans were totally in control and for the next three years would remain so.

Assault Pioneers on patrol.

by David A. Fastabend

The U.S. Army has long realized the significance of that intangible asset known as combat initiative. Initiative at all levels of command is highly touted as the great equalizer, capable of reversing unfavorable balances of men and equipment. However, there are few detailed analyses of this elusive combat quality.

The following account is condensed from the U.S. Army Historical Series on the Russian Campaign, 1941-1945. The account illuminates several aspects of initiative in combat. It is possible to assess several factors that enhance combat initiative and to reach tentative conclusions on the potential performance of the U.S. Army in combat.

At 0600, 3 August 1941, the Germans of Company C, 744th Engineer Regiment, were resting and seeking cover from sporadic Russian shellings. Company C had just successfully supported the assault crossing of the Kodyma River by the 239th Division. Events of the last few hours, however, were of mounting concern to First Lieutenant Ehrhardt, the engineer company commander. He knew that the remainder of his parent unit, the 744th Engineer Regiment, had been assigned the task of capturing Balta, 11/2 miles to the east.

For the last two hours, the sounds of battle had increased in the vicinity of the 744th assembly area north of Balta. At 0530, Ehrhardt had observed 15 Soviet planes bomb and strafe that assembly area. The 744th attack was scheduled for 0600, but the ominous silence that prevailed in Balta confirmed his fear that the 744th attack was seriously delayed.

Studying his map, the German company commander perceived a potential crisis. The enemy force in Balta was estimated as a battalion force of unknown capability. In the absence of the 744th Engineer Regiment’s neutralizing attack, this element was free to turn east and sever the bypass movement of the 239th (see Figure 1).

In the absence of any missions from his unit of attachment or the 744th, Ehrhardt assumed the responsibility to cancel this threat. He assembled his platoon leaders and announced his intention to attack Balta from the east. He assigned platoon sectors of responsibility and directed immediate reconnaissance patrols of those sectors. One squad was sent to secure the road leading from Balta while another was directed to guard the 239th crossing site.

These measures proved to be timely. At 0635, two Russian tanks sallied forth from Balta and commenced firing on the Kodyma crossing operation. The road block security force aggressively engaged the tanks, setting one on fire with fragment grenades and screening the other with smoke. This delaying action gained time while an artillery battery at the crossing hastily unlimbered a howitzer. The howitzer rapidly dispatched the burning tank and forced the other tank to retreat to Balta (see Figure 2).

While company attack preparations resumed, Ehrhardt sought out the artillery battery commander and secured the “loan” of a howitzer and crew—“insurance” against further enemy armored activity. Messages were dispatched by motorcycle to higher headquarters. As reconnaissance patrols started returning around 0715, the attack plan crystallized.

At 0730, Ehrhardt issued the operations order for the attack. He explained to his platoon leaders that his general objective was three-fold:

To assist the attack on Balta by the 744th from the north.

To seize the southern half of Balta to prevent the escape of Russian forces.

To seize the vital 24-ton bridge site in southern Balta and expedite its restoration.

To accomplish this, the 1st and 2nd Platoons would move to a jump-off point at an abandoned farmhouse on the outskirts of Balta. A covered and concealed route discovered by the 1st Platoon patrol would be used. Upon initiation of the attack, the 3rd Platoon would make a visible feint across the large sunflower field and attempt to tie down as many defenders as possible. Ehrhardt chose to move with the 1st and 2nd Platoon accompanied by the howitzer section chief who would serve as forward observer for the howitzer crew.

At 0740, the platoons were en route to their jump-off points. By 0830, the platoons were in position. From the farmhouse, Ehrhardt could observe a light field gun, mortars and heavy machine guns in the main street of Balta. Many Russians were moving across the Kodyma at a ford to their southwest. Turning to his platoon leaders, Ehrhardt gave them their immediate objectives: the 1st Platoon would seize the buildings housing the heavy weapons in Balta; the 2nd Platoon was directed to seize the ford crossing on the Kodyma. As the howitzer opened fire on the weapons concentrations in Balta, the attack commenced.

The 2nd Platoon was about to leave its concealed position at the farmhouse when a large group of Russian riflemen approached the building. Holding its fire until the last possible moment, the platoon wiped out the detachment at near point-blank range. The 2nd Platoon rushed on toward the ford and soon was engaging the Russian security element there.

The 1st Platoon held its attack while the howitzer crew systematically destroyed the Russian weapon positions. It then rushed forward and overcame the survivors in hand-to-hand combat.

Farther north, the 3rd Platoon had met unexpectedly light resistance to its demonstration across the sunflower field. The platoon leader elected to push on into Balta and exploit any opportunities. A particularly stubborn house near the first intersection repelled all frontal assaults. While two engineers prepared to breach into the building from an adjoining wall, the Russians pre-empted this effort by setting off their own explosion. The German engineers were buried by the collapsing wall but were recovered when the 3rd Platoon secured the house after a brief melee.

Company C was attempting to consolidate its initial gains when a flurry of red flares erupted over the 2nd Platoon sector. Rushing to a vantage point, Ehrhardt was able to observe a company-sized counterattack in progress against the 2nd Platoon. Frequent flamethrower bursts and the detonation of expedient explosives emphasized the urgency of the 2nd Platoon situation. Ehrhardt promptly directed the 1st Platoon to move against the flank of the Russian counterattack, leaving one squad to secure their hard-earned objectives in Balta. After a 30-minute fire-fight, the Russians retreated with heavy losses.

By 0945, the German positions on the outskirts of Balta were secure. Although these positions afforded some protection to the vulnerable flank of the 239th Division, Ehrhardt elected to press the attack. As the sound of heavy machine gun and artillery fire to the north signaled the start of the 744th attack, Ehrhardt held another conference of his platoon leaders. The 2nd Platoon was ordered to push along the banks of the Kodyma until it secured the 24-ton bridge site. The 1st Platoon was ordered to continue pushing west until it had sealed off the Russian escape route completely. The 3rd Platoon was directed to strengthen its present positions and attempt a link-up with the 744th attack to the north.

The 1st Platoon immediately seized the next block of buildings but was unable to advance further. Ehrhardt, therefore, directed artillery fire on the stream of Russians he could observe in the western section of the town.

The 2nd Platoon advanced to the 24-ton bridge site and secured it after a lively fire-fight. Its success was threatened immediately by the appearance of two Russian tanks at the ford crossing. Once again, however, the Germans established a heavy smoke screen around the vehicles, rendering them ineffective. A squad leader destroyed one by hand emplacement of an explosive charge. The remaining tank fled south.

By 1100, the 1st Platoon had secured the entire southern half of Balta. Contact was made with the 744th attackers, and a link-up was established. Thus assured of success, Ehrhardt turned his attention to the future of the advance.

The 2nd Platoon was ordered to clear the bridge site and begin preparations for construction of a 24-ton bridge. The clearing operations were severely hampered by intense artillery fire. The accuracy of the fire was suspicious to the alert 2nd Platoon leader who quickly organized a search of the surrounding area. His hunch proved correct when his men captured a forward observer with his radio just a few yards south of the bridge. By 1200, the preparation of the bridge site was well underway. The howitzer crew returned to its battery, and Ehrhardt reported to his battalion commander for his next mission.

Several influences were at work in the Balta operation that measurably enhanced the exercise of combat initiative.

Availability of Intelligence: Ehrhardt was able to make his decisions timely because he knew the complete scope of the German operation. He passed on this information to his subordinates so that they, too, could make personal decisions that augmented the overall effort.

Degree of Control: The German company commander was careful to give his platoons mission-type orders that maximized their freedom of action. Their aggressive pursuit of these missions created further opportunities that were exploited to maintain the momentum of the attack.

Offensive Operations: The blitzkrieg nature of the German offensive in 1941 created a fast-moving situation that afforded many opportunities for the attacking force. Such opportunities do not occur as frequently for defenders who are more bound to strict coordination measures in the execution of the defense. Although defenders can and must exercise initiative, the effects of initiative action are generally limited by requirements to be prepared to reinforce an adjacent sector or withdraw to the next line of defense.

Training: Ehrhardt could launch his attack with confidence because his company was well-trained and prepared to execute the decisions of its leaders. Furthermore, those leaders had been prepared to exercise their own judgment in pursuit of mission objectives. Initiative becomes recklessness for a unit that does not possess the skills needed to transform will into action.

Experience: Skills acquired in training are not fully effective until they have been tempered with experience. Ehrhardt’s men were battle-wise. Every crisis in Balta was met by cool decision, not panic.

Motivation: Motivation at every level of command was the driving force behind the success of the Balta attack. Such motivated performance is the product of a sense of self-worth and purpose in the individual energized by good leadership.

Confidence: Confidence in the ability of himself and his company was the first condition for any action by Ehrhardt. Such confidence is a byproduct of the training and experience of a unit.

Courage: Seizing the initiative often will entail significant risks. Courage is the catalyst that overcomes fear and sets expertise in motion. The men of Company C, 744th Engineer Regiment, exhibited not only the physical courage necessary in close combat, but also the mental courage needed to make decisions and see them through.

Judgment: Judgment is another intangible factor of initiative. The individual must be able to weigh an action and determine if it is a bold, decisive move or merely rash and ill-advised. The distinction is often difficult. Experience and training combined with common sense must be brought to bear on the problem. Judgment can be the difference between stunning success and dismal disaster.

Figure 1: Situation near Balta, 3 August 1941.

Figure 2: Action at Balta, 3 August 1941. KEY: 1: 0635—Repulse of Russian tank attack. 2: 0800—Movement to attack jump-off points. 3: 0830—2nd Platoon ambush of Russian detachment. 4: 0830—1st and 3rd Platoon attack on outskirts of Balta. 5: 0900—Flank attack by 1st Platoon to relieve 2nd Platoon. 6: 0945—Attack resumes west into Balta. 7: 1015—2nd Platoon repels tank attack at ford. 8: 1100—Bridge and western half of Balta seized. 9: 1130—Enemy forward observer captured near bridge.