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| Infantrymen man their .30 caliber machine gun, 84th Infantry Division, Odrimont, Belgium, 6 January 1945. |
by Theodore Draper, Sergeant, U.S. Army
If we did nothing else
in the Ardennes, we destroyed the myth that the woods and hills of that
historically famous battle region are “impenetrable.” The Germans began the
demonstration in 1940 but their feat was too one-sided to be convincing.
They proved it was possible for an army to go through the Ardennes but they did
not prove it was possible to fight through it. They met real opposition only
twice and both times it was a fight of a few hours in clearings within the
forest. Above all, the Germans carefully chose the very best time of the year,
in May, as if to emphasize that special conditions were necessary. In January
1945, however, we had to fight for practically every hill, wood, village, and
road, in the very worst time of the year, on ice as slick as grease and in snow
waist-high, against skillful and stubborn opposition.
The classic, offensive
campaign of the Ardennes has been fought and we fought it. Nothing that happened
in 1940 (or 1914) can be compared to it.
The terrain in the
Ardennes is like a jigsaw puzzle. Somehow all of it fits together but somehow
all of it can be taken apart and the pieces fall into the oddest shapes. Each
hill and wood is like a separate compartment and tactically each one becomes
a distinct problem.
In this rolling
country, there is commanding high ground in almost every mile so that an overnight
withdrawal from one hill of defense to the next is relatively easy. The
villages and fragments of villages (the toughest “village” to take in our offensive
had a single house) are invariably astride the roads and inevitably
become enemy strong points. The woods might have been planned by a master
strategist to hold pockets of resistance. A continuous offensive or
defensive line is impossible. Strong points and pockets of resistance are
everything. That is why the battle had such a cut-up, piecemeal character.
The German bulge was
hit from three sides. The Third Army came up from the south, from Bastogne.
The First Army came down from the north, from both sides of Manhay. A British
corps attacked from the west, from Marche. To get the whole story, then, at
least three large phases have to be covered.
The main effort,
however, was made by the First Army, from the north. The Third Army’s progress
was aided by the pressure the First Army exerted from the north. The British
were stalled at the most difficult stage of the drive.
In the First Army’s
sector, four divisions were involved: the 84th and 83rd Infantry Divisions and
the 2nd and 3rd Armored Division. In its conception, the action was an
armor-infantry job … the 84th Infantry Division was teamed with the 2nd Armored,
the 83rd with the 3rd Armored. But the main effort was assigned to the 2nd
Armored and 84th Infantry Divisions … both Laroche and Houffalize were in
their zone of advance.
This offensive from the
north was launched between two rivers, the Ourthe and the Salm. By re-taking
the ground between these two rivers as far as Houffalize, we would hammer a
huge wedge through two-thirds of the bulge. The area between the Ourthe and the
Salm was cut almost exactly in half by the road which ran from Manhay to Houffalize
(for convenience, it will be called the Houffalize Road). This road was the
boundary between the 2nd Armored/84th Infantry team and the 3rd Armored/83rd
Infantry team, with the first of these teams on the west near the Ourthe, the
second on the east near the Salm.
We, the 2nd Armored
Division and the 84th Infantry Division, were attacking on a front about nine
miles wide. The first series of enemy strong points were strung out just below
the road from Hotton to Manhay. These strongpoints were Trinal, Magoster,
Armonines, Lamormenil, Freyneux, Odeigne; less than fifty houses in the
largest place. Our objective was Houffalize, about 16 miles to the southeast.
The Third Army, in order to get Houffalize from the bottom of the Bulge, had
about half as far to go.
Our zone between the
Ourthe River and the Houffalize Road was cut in half by a small stream, the
Aisne. As a result, at least in the first six days, there were two distinct
sectors and the 2nd Armored Division started the attack with two combat commands
abreast … Combat Command A extending from the Ourthe to the Aisne, Combat Command
B from the Aisne to the Houffalize Road. In turn each combat command was made
up of three task forces. The set-up was complicated, evidence that the terrain
was complicated.
Although our ultimate
objective was Houffalize, a midway objective was the road from Laroche to the
vital intersection with the Houffalize Road (we will call this other road the
Laroche Road). The decisive phase of the battle was fought out above the
Laroche Road in the first week of our attack. By getting to Laroche and
especially to the all-important intersection, we would deprive the enemy of
the only two good roads which he could use to salvage his forces in the bulge.
The mouth of his bulge would be reduced to the danger point at Laroche to disaster
at Houffalize.
The only division in
the entire drive which I was able to watch at close range was the 84th Infantry
Division, but it happened to be placed at the very center of the main effort.
One of its regiments drove down to Laroche and another to Houffalize. And there
is something else that must be emphasized. Although originally planned as an
armored offensive, with the infantry in support, the battle of the Ardennes
bulge quickly became an infantry attack primarily, with the armor used only as
the ground permitted. To that extent, this may be a contribution to the story
which is not only typical of the rest but which also traces the line of the
main thrust.
D-day was 3 January
1945. H-hour was 0830. The 2nd Armored Division, to which our 335th Infantry
was temporarily attached, attacked to the southeast. The enemy was surprised.
Some prisoners were captured asleep. Until noon, we forged ahead steadily.
The enemy’s outpost line was broken through without much difficulty. The enemy’s
front was held by three divisions: the 2nd SS Panzer Division on the right near
the Ourthe; the 560th Volksgrenadier Division in the center; and the 12th
Volksgrenadier Division on the left near the Houffalize Road.
But that morning, in a
more important way, our luck ran out. It snowed. Sleet and rain fell in spasms.
From early morning the roads were icy. The temperature shot down till the
ground was like steel. Tank treads slipped and slid as if the tanks were drunk.
Every time a tank skidded, a column was held up. Sometimes the tanks skidded
just far enough to block the road.
Trinal was easy. We
went in by 0930. By noon, however, resistance was more highly organized and
effective. Magoster was harder to crack. After our tanks were held up at
several points by enemy bazookas and anti-tank guns, we were able to move in
and pass through. The main objective that day was Devantave. Between Magoster
and Devantave were a cluster of woods and a hill. The tanks could not get
through the woods and our infantry had to push ahead. We got through the woods
safely and one company stepped out to cross the hill. Eighty-eights were
waiting for them. Eighty-eights and rockets and mortars swept the hill and
crashed into the woods. We had to pull back. Light tanks were used to evacuate
the wounded; nothing else was possible in the snow. At 1500, we again tried to
take Devantave but again we could not get over the hill. We withdrew for the
night east of Magoster.
Farther west that day,
it was the same. One company went into Beffe but had to withdraw at night to
high ground above the village. Only on the left flank, between the Aisne and
the Houffalize Road, was our progress easier. By night, we cleaned out the
woods above Odiegne. There was no resistance.
In general, then, the
result of the first day’s fighting was inconclusive. We had advanced from
1,500 to 2,000 yards, but the enemy’s strongpoints at Beffe and Devantave had
frustrated us. It was clear that the enemy was making his main defensive
effort on our right flank, between the Ourthe and the Aisne, and his heaviest
opposition was reserved for the right sector of the right flank, the hills,
woods and villages nearest the Ourthe. This showed that Laroche was the German
commander’s most sensitive point.
It was still snowing.
That was more important than anything else. The roads were bad enough. Icy
roads were almost impossible. The hills and woods were formidable obstacles.
Knee-deep snow on the hills and wood threatened to give us more trouble than
anything the enemy could muster.
For four days, we
tugged and pulled around Beffe and Devantave. They were the hardest four days
the men in this action had ever spent and most of them were veterans of many
actions. Then we began to cash in.
The problem of Beffe
was typical. It was not so much that the enemy had left strong forces in Beffe
itself. It was rather that he was able to pour a deadly fire into Beffe from
very favorable positions … from the Consy ridge, about 1,000 yards to the
southeast, from the Moulin de Bardonive, about 1,000 yards to the southwest,
and from the direction of Rendeux Bas, a tiny village on the other side of the
Ourthe in the British sector. His trump card was direct and observed fire. Although
much of the heaviest fighting went on for Beffe itself, the basic problem of
this phase of the attack was really the Consy ridge.
The capture of Beffe
was also typical. On 4 January 1945 the village was subjected to an intense
artillery bombardment. At 1105, Company B, 335th Infantry, began to move
in. Meanwhile, Company C, 335th Infantry, retook Magoster and continued on
to Beffe. By 1400, both companies made contact at the southern edge of Beffe
and dug in. The village was practically deserted.
In effect, after
holding us up for a day at Beffe, the enemy was content to give it up, only to
fall back to another easily defended position a thousand yards behind. From the
first, then, his objective was not so much to hold on to any particular
piece of ground at all cost as to delay us and extort the highest possible
price for our gains.
Devantave was another
deserted village. After our first right flank, we organized another attempt,
this time from Amonines on the left. At dawn 6 January 1945, Company I, 335th
Infantry, followed by medium tanks, and Company K, 335th Infantry, followed
by light tanks, jumped off. By 0930, the tanks had reached the edge of
Devantave. At 1100, Company I moved into the western half, Company K the
eastern half. Resistance inside the village was light. By 1210, occupation
was complete.
With the capture of
Magoster, Beffe and Devantave, a deep hole was driven in the crust of the
enemy’s defensive position on the right flank of our zone. The stage was set
for an attack on his most troublesome position, Consy, the “village” with a
single house.
Meanwhile, we were
still progressing easily on our left flank between the Aisne and the Houffalize
Road. The 3rd Battalion, 333rd Infantry, went into action on the second day, 4
January 1945. Company K was sent into Lamormenil, Company L into Freyneux and
Company I into the woods west of Lamormenil. All three were taken without
difficulty. Tanks went into the village before the infantry. At nightfall, 5
January 1945, Company C and the 1st Platoon of Company D, 333rd Infantry,
plus one platoon of a tank battalion, moved out of Le Batty to Odeigne. They
met enemy small arms fire but not artillery. The village was completely taken
by 1300 the next day, 6 January 1945. We did not suffer a single casualty.
By the time we took
Devantave, it was clear that the original plan which gave the infantry a supporting
role was not working out. The terrain and the weather were against it and they
won. The victory of the elements gave the infantry the main job.
The Ardennes is neither
roadless nor rich in roads. A British source has estimated that thirteen separate
first-class roads cross the Ardennes from Germany to France. There are perhaps
three secondary roads for every first-class one and numerous trails. But so
many pass through long stretches of woods, so many teeter on the edge of cliffs
and wind up and down and around the inescapable hills. In May, too, the
possibilities of resistance in the Ardennes would be immense. In January, in
snow that keeps piling up from the ankle to the knee, from the knee to the
waist, only a little effort is necessary to turn possibilities into
realities.
All vehicles have to
stick to roads to get anywhere, only more often than not they cannot stick to
roads because they are constantly sliding off. The next best thing is to
proceed slowly and carefully but then your vehicles may miss the jump-off by
hours and the infantry has gone off alone. Is it curious that a terrain that
is considered too tough for a tank is never considered too tough for a
Doughboy?
As a result of the
problems which arose in the first four days for the armor, after Devantave was
taken, more clearly defined zones for the armor and the infantry began to
emerge. From Devantave, the 2nd Armored Division, with the 335th Infantry still
attached, veered off more sharply to the southeast to get to Samree through
Dochamps, while the 84th Infantry Division assumed responsibility for the drive
southward to Laroche and for the Laroche Road as far as Samree.
One thing stood out
again. When nothing else moved, the Doughboys moved and they moved long and
often. And what was it like for them?
It took a good two
hours to get through the frozen crust of earth. It took two or three hours
more to get down as far as three feet. Not only was digging a foxhole a job in
which a whole day’s energies could be consumed, but it was practically
impossible to dig a really good foxhole at least five feet deep. The weather
continued to get colder and colder until it went well below freezing and
stayed there. This meant there was only one thing worse than not sleeping …
and that was sleeping. The quickest way to freeze is to lie still. Men went to
sleep in overcoats, when they had them, and woke up encased in icy boards. It
was practically impossible to bring up supplies and rations in anything but
half-tracks. Water congealed in canteens. Frostbite was as dangerous as all
the Krauts and their guns put together.
The Doughboys who went
into Devantave fought ninety-six hours without a break and they were not
through by a long shot.
We took Consy the way
we took most of the strongpoints … by going around it. When we took Devantave
on 6 January 1945, we outflanked Consy on the left. Then we sent two battalions
into the woods west of Consy and the enemy was squeezed out in the middle. He
did not choose to hold even this commanding position at Consy at all cost. By
7 January 1945, Consy was virtually cleaned out through the woods on the right
flank were not completely safe for another two days.
The turning point of
the entire action probably came on 7 January 1945, not where we had to fight
the hardest but where progress was still relatively easy. On the left flank,
after we took Odeigne on 6 January 1945, the 2nd Battalion, 333rd Infantry, was
sent out the next day to capture the vital crossroads where the Laroche Road
and the Houffalize Road meet. The weather was miserable. A snowstorm whipped
up during the attack. Nevertheless, by 0930, the crossroads were ours.
Prisoners, frozen, hungry, and disorganized, were picked up in small,
wandering groups, They said they were surprised again. An attack in such harsh
weather was completely unexpected. Our interrogators heard that story
almost every day.
As soon as we captured
the crossroads, the enemy was deprived of the only two first-rate roads to the
east, the Laroche Road and the Houffalize Road. From then on, he must have
been inhibited in his intentions, though he would never retire without a fight.
Nevertheless, he always had to consider that his chances of successfully
pulling his forces out of the trap were getting slimmer and slimmer.
Partly because German
resistance above the Laroche Road on our right flank was so much stronger than
on our left, we were able to cut the road first on the extreme left of our zone
at the crossroads. As we gained full control of the road, we continued to move
from left to right. Next, one of our task forces came down from Amonines to
Dochamps and from Dochamps we launched the attack on one of the enemy’s position,
Samree.
The trip from Amonines
to Dochamps was the same old story. The road, though the best in the sector,
was so icy and narrow that the tanks were held up repeatedly. Road blocks,
which took about two hours each to reduce on the average, some small arms fire
but this time very little artillery, represented the enemy’s main effort to
hold us up. Mine fields and trees felled across the road by detonating TNT
charges, anti-tank guns and tanks, were effective sources of enemy resistance.
We took the high ground northwest of Dochamps on the night of 6 January 1945,
and were able to move into Dochamps the next night. One incident was
symbolic. After we had spread out in the village, a German tank with sixty to
eighty infantrymen suddenly pulled out from behind the church and made for
Samree. Our tank destroyers could not fire a shot because their turrets were
frozen, striking example of weather conditions which lessened the effectiveness
of our mechanized equipment and threw the main burden of attack and defense on
our infantry.
Samree was seemingly
impregnable. It was perched on an 1,080-foot hill. First we had to take two
other hills, northeast and northwest of it. Our troops had to move through
1,500 yards of rolling ground in knee-deep snow. The enemy had perfect
observation every inch of the way. To tell the truth, it was hard to see how we
could make it.
At 0630, 9 January
1945, the 3rd Battalion, 335th Infantry, went out of Dochamps to get those
hills. By nightfall, it had progressed to the edge of some woods about 1,500
yards from Samree on the west side of the road and had taken one of the heavily
wooded hills guarding the town. Company L was withdrawn and sent around
through Dochamps to occupy the second hill on the east side of the road. That
night, our artillery concentrated on Samree. Next day, at 0730, the 3rd
Battalion, 335th Infantry, pushed forward to capture the eastern half of Samree
and was joined by the 1st Battalion, 335th Infantry, which aimed at the western
half. This time, tanks went in first, blazing away their guns, a sight a
Doughboy loves best, thinking of all the Doughs it takes to work up that much
firepower. By 0925, the village was cleared. We were pleasantly surprised.
The enemy was determined to delay us but as long as we showed our determination
not to be delayed, we could always take what we wanted.
The infantrymen who
went into Samree had been fighting steadily for eight days, for 192 hours. They
were certainly helped by the fact that the Laroche Road had been cut three days
earlier. The artillery concentration on Samree was extremely effective. But
in the end, men had to live in some more freezing cold and wade through some
more snowdrifts, now as much as four and five feet high, to get Samree for us.
The battle of Laroche
is a good example of the battle of supply and the battle of stamina which every
battle in the Bulge was.
The roads to Laroche
were particularly bad, the hills particularly high, and the woods particularly
dense. A few tanks and trucks turned the snow on the roads into ice and the
trouble started. The Doughboys depended more than ever on the engineer and
artilleryman.
The main attack was
launched from Devantave by the 1st Battalion, 334th Infantry. The first objective
was Marcouray. Over a hundred guns softened up the village for five minutes.
Then, at 1500, 7 January 1945, the infantry jumped off. The ground was rocky
and steep. It was snowing again. Thirty minutes later, all German resistance
in Marcouray was overrun. We found that the enemy positions were carefully prepared.
Snow was a natural camouflage. Fortunately, we were achieving tactical
surprises and much of the preparation was wasted. As prisoner after prisoner
told us, the weather and terrain were so bad that our infantry was simply not
expected. That is one compensation for “impossible” conditions … they are apt
to lead the enemy to drop his guard. The enemy’s surprise at Marcouray was
shown by the equipment he was forced to leave behind. We picked up thirty-six
vehicles: eight half-tracks, two command cars, six U.S. jeeps, six
civilian-type cars, five six-wheeled reconnaissance vehicles, five U.S.
tanks, two German 1½-ton trucks.
When we took Laroche,
we sealed the fate of the bulge. Yet in no sense did it mean that the fighting
became less difficult. The terrain and weather were still the enemy’s chief
allies. His forces had more and more hills and woods to withdraw to. Above all,
the German command was now fighting for time, time to regroup and reorganize
behind the Siegfried Line, time to meet the overwhelming Russian threat.
There were some
significant differences between the two phases. As long as our main objective
was Laroche, the enemy’s main effort was made on the right flank. As soon as we
took the Laroche Road and Houffalize became our main objective, the enemy’s
main effort was made on the left flank. In the second phase, the 333rd Infantry
was temporarily attached to the 2nd Armored Division. The 84th Infantry
Division was given the right half of the zone, the 2nd Armored Division the left
half. In this phase, we were faced by elements of the 116th Panzer Division and
the 130th Panzer Lehr Division.
As far as the Laroche
Road, the 333rd Infantry had advanced with relative ease. Once beyond the
road, it ran into much more trouble. In Les Tailles and at the edge of the
woods to the south, an estimated enemy battalion was dug in. On the other
side of the Houffalize Road, an estimated reinforced company was holding
Petites Tailles. The 2nd Battalion went out from the Laroche Road to Les Tailles,
the 1st Battalion to Petites Tailles. The experiences of both were significantly
similar.
To get to Les Tailles,
we had to cross some more woods. The German positions were well camouflaged.
The enemy’s fields of fire and barrages were well planned to catch us as we
came out into the open. At 0800, 12 January 1945, Company F and Company G
jumped off. As they came out of the woods north of Les Tailles, they were met
by very heavy fire and were held up. At 1500, they began to move again. Ten
minutes later, Company G and tanks were entering Les Tailles but the opposition
was so sharp that the village was not cleared until 2100. About 140 prisoners
were taken.
This happened again and
again … we had to fight hard for a place but when we took it we gathered in
batches of prisoners. Looked at more closely, however, this phenomenon may
tell us a good deal about a German stratagem in fighting this final phase of
the war.
From Les Tailles, we
had to get to Dinez. To get to Dinez, we had to go through 4,000 yards of
woods. To go through these woods, we faced problems which were typical of the
fighting in the Ardennes forest.
At 0800, 13 January
1945, the 2nd Battalion, 333rd Infantry, jumped off from Les Tailles for the
third time in two days. After taking Collas, a little village southwest of Les
Tailles, at 1000, it struck out for the woods. Immediately, the terrain became
worse than the enemy, though the latter did his best to help. The roads were
terrible, barely more than trails. Under the snow, which now had ten days to accumulate,
they were invisible. By 1200, the enemy’s activity became more stubborn.
By the end of the day, we had penetrated only 500 yards.
The problem of getting
through the woods was faced that night. Two narrow trails ran through the woods
to Dinez and two special task forces were formed to get through those trails.
Both started out at 0800 the next day, 14 January 1945.
The woods, snow, cold
and narrow trails made supply evacuation, contact, control and communication
a battle of nerves. The only supplies came in with half-tracks. Mortar ammunition
had to be carried by hand over two miles. In Odeigne, the 2nd Battalion had
captured an enemy horse and sled. They held on to them and in these woods the
horse and sled were their only means of evacuating the wounded. Radios would
not work in the woods as it was impossible to lay wires. Visibility was so poor
that it was always like night in the middle of the day. Since a small group of
five or six infantrymen worked with one tank it was hard to put a company or
even a platoon together … a troublesome problem for the infantry whenever
they work with armor.
Companies F and G rode
light tanks part of the way but progress was too slow that way because the
tanks were held up so much of the time. By pushing themselves to the limit,
both task forces were able to move through the entire woods by 1600. Without
stopping once the woods were cleared, Company F attached Dinez and Company E
attacked Wilogne. Surprise paid off again. Both were captured before the night
was over and about a hundred prisoners were taken in Dinez. Most of our casualties
resulted from shell fire and frostbite. We were about 4,500 yards from Houffalize.
Meanwhile, on the right
flank, in the 84th Infantry Division zone, the enemy was wedged in between
the Laroche Road and the Ourthe River. On the whole, progress was much easier
but one minor crisis resulted in perhaps the most unusual experience of the
campaign.
The first important
objective was Berismenil. At 0730, 13 January 1945, the 1st Battalion, 334th Infantry,
moved out from the Laroche Road to take a hill about 1,500 yards north of Berismenil.
Only sniper fire was encountered and the objective was taken by 1100. At 1415,
the 1st Battalion went forward again to take another hill about 750 yards
northeast of Berismenil … one of our battalion commanders once said
wistfully, “Every time I see a hill, I know it’s going to be our next objective.”
By 1800, the 1st
Battalion had taken its second hill against light resistance. Nevertheless, the
situation was confused because orientation in the dark was difficult. When a
patrol carrying blankets was fired on from the rear, it was clear that the
battalion was almost entirely surrounded by the enemy. Later that night, a reconnaissance
patrol was sent to investigate the enemy’s position south of the hill but
failed to return. Then the battalion commander, Major Roland L. Kolb, decided
to see for himself. Leading another patrol, he suddenly observed a German
command car pull up to the base of the hill and halt. Two men stepped out and
began to walk up the hill. When the pair approached near enough, the patrol
jumped out of hiding.
One of their prisoners
turned out to be Captain Hanagottfried von Watzdorf, commander of the 1st
Battalion, 60th Panzergrenadiers, 116th Panzer Division. Unaware that his
main line of resistance had been penetrated to a depth of more than 1,000
yards, the German commander was out on a tour of inspection. In perfect
English, he exclaimed, “I am astonished.” The commander of one battalion had personally
captured the commander of the enemy’s battalion opposite him and he had to
keep him all night before he could deliver him safely.
Berismenil itself was
captured by the 2nd Battalion, 335th Infantry. It covered 3,000 yards of
trails, thereby achieving a considerable degree of surprise but giving up all
possibility of using any vehicles to back up the attack. As a result,
Berismenil was captured almost without opposition. By the end of the day, 13
January 1945, the enemy had been cleared out of approximately half the 84th
Infantry Division’s zone.
The other half was
rapidly cleaned out the next day. Nadrin was occupied by the 1st Battalion,
334th Infantry, at 1130, 14 January 1945. Only some machine guns and small
arms resistance was encountered. At the same time, the 3rd Battalion, 334th
Infantry, attacked Filly, about a mile southeast of Nadrin. Tanks and tank destroyers
could not use the roads because they were heavily mined and the infantry went
on alone. Filly was entered at 1530 without any artillery preparation and
fully occupied a half-hour later. The 3rd Battalion went on to take the last
two objectives, Petite-Mormont and Grande-Mormont by 1915.
By this time, the Bulge
was practically a memory and the chief interest of every commander (company,
battalion, regiment, and division) was how to send out the patrol to make
the first contact with the Third Army.
We made Houffalize
completely untenable on 15 January 1945. At 1100, the 1st Battalion, 333rd Infantry,
jumped off from Dinez and captured the village of Mont, midway between Dinez
and Houffalize, by 1400. Tanks, infantry, and artillery worked together smoothly.
At 1600, the advance was renewed to Hill 430, overlooking Houffalize. It was
taken by 1730 without opposition.
Credit for going into
Houffalize went to the 2nd Armored Division. The 1st Battalion, 333rd Infantry,
held Hill 430 until 1700, 16 January 1945, when it was relieved by a
reconnaissance element of the 2nd Armored Division. By 1745, 16 January 1945,
elements of the 2nd Armored Division held the northern part of Houffalize,
while elements of the 11th Armored Division held the southern portion.
When was the Bulge
wiped out? That may never be decided to everyone’s satisfaction because a
number of patrols were frantically trying to make contact with a number of
other patrols at the same time. I can merely report how and when the 84th Infantry
Division closed the Bulge for itself.
A thirty-three man
patrol, led by Lieutenant Byron Blankenship, representing the 334th Infantry,
left Filly at 1100, 15 January 1945. At 1145 they crossed the Ourthe in two
400-pound rubber boats, which they carried. The rest of the afternoon they
spent in an old mill on the other side of the Ourthe. Just before dark,
Lieutenant Blankenship led a small patrol into the village of Engreux, about
1,000 yards from the Ourthe, where he expected to meet a patrol from the Third
Army. He found the village free of the enemy but he found no sign of the Third
Army’s patrol.
Late that night,
Lieutenant Blankenship received word that the rendezvous had been changed.
Starting off again at midnight, the patrol moved out across some more woods
and over a 1,200-yard ridge. At 0220, 16 January 1945, in the dead of night,
they stopped at a small Belgian farmhouse. The whole family, papa, mama, a son
and a daughter of twenty-two turned itself into a reception committee. There were
bread, butter, and hot coffee. The patrol decided the rendezvous had been
changed for a good reason.
That morning, at 0930,
Private First Class Rodney Himes, second in command of the patrol, spied a
soldier walking outside the farmhouse. Since the patrol had been ordered to
stay inside the house, Private First Class Himes began to “bawl him out” and
asked him what outfit he was from.
The answer was a
platoon of cavalry from the 11th Armored Division, U.S. Third Army.
The junction was
officially achieved at 0945, 16 January 1945, by Lieutenant Blankenship of the
334th Infantry and Lieutenant Lucas of the Cavalry. The Bulge was wiped out
after thirteen days of hard, continuous fighting.
The battle of the Bulge
was one of the hardest, if not the hardest, fight of the Allied armies in
Europe. The weather, the terrain, and the enemy combined to make a campaign of
peculiar and bitter difficulty.
 |
| M36 gun motor carriage of Battery C, 702nd Tank Destroyer Battalion, 2nd Armored Division, dug in near the Roer River, Belgium, 16 December 1944. |
 |
| A dead German soldier, killed during the German counter offensive in the Belgium-Luxembourg salient, is left behind on a street corner in Stavelot, Belgium, on January 2, 1945, as fighting moves on during the Battle of the Bulge. |
