World War 2 In Review: 123rd Infantry Regiment of the 50th German Infantry Division in the Breakthrough Battle for the Parpach Position 8-11 May 1942

Advancing through a small Russian village near Kerch, German soldiers look to secure the adjacent buildings.

by Regimental Commander

This is a reprint of “MS #D-264,” based on a report of the 123rd Regiment’s commander (who is identified simply as “Author No. 408” in the original manuscript), originally prepared for Headquarters European Command, Office of the Chief Historian, Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, Washington, D.C. A copy of the manuscript was obtained from The National Archives, Washington, D.C.

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The Russian Parpach position, located along the neck of the Kerch peninsula, was a ten-kilometer deep, closely-knit defense system with innumerable mine fields and numerous artillery. The terrain was extremely favorable for defensive positions, since Hills 66.3, 66.8, 64.9, etc., rising from a gently rolling terrain, commanded a wide area, while the slopes which separated them were completely bare. Much of the valley was covered with lakes and marshes. The Russians had considerably strengthened their forward infantry position by converting disable tanks, which had been abandoned during previous fighting, into unassailable machine gun nests.

The 123rd Infantry Regiment jumped off at 0315 hours, 8 May, after a brief but concentrated artillery and mortar preparation. After advancing a few hundred meters, the attack was brought to a halt by enemy infantry cross-fire.

From dawn of that day until the end of the fighting in the Kerch area, the regiment received air support unparalleled thus far. Dive bombers, bombers, fighters, and fighter-bombers gained immediate undisputed air supremacy. They flew 12 missions a day and bombed enemy artillery emplacements and command posts.

The 123rd Regiment was committed on the left flank of the three assault divisions, in the center of the isthmus between the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea. After effecting a penetration of about six to eight kilometers, the regiment, as the interior wing, was to pivot northward (to the left) and reduce all enemy forces in the north, which were caught in a pocket that extended far to the west. The 123rd Regiment, which so far had been advancing from west to east, was to turn around Lake Parpach. A small range of dominating hills north of the lake was to be taken as the regiment circled the lake from east to west.

Before this pivoting maneuver could succeed, however, it was necessary to surmount the Parpach anti-tank ditch, which was fortified with bunkers and extended from the Sea of Azov to the Black Sea (large mine fields also existed in front of the ditch). The ditch was located about six kilometers from the regiment’s line of departure. The Russian zone of resistance was fortified with concrete pillboxes and field fortifications, and extended far beyond the ditch.

By afternoon of the first day, the regiment “nibbled” at the first few hundred meters of the enemy defensive zone. A number of critical situations arose, and half a battalion was cut off for several hours, because activity in Russian pockets in our rear had become active again. Heavy losses were incurred. The advance of the adjoining unit relieved this situation, and the regiment was able to mop up the pockets.

The regiment was faced with a particularly difficult task, because the main effort of the breakthrough was located at the extreme right. The regiment was therefore given only a minimum support of artillery and mortar fire. Furthermore, the regiment had only two battalions, since the third one had become division reserve. The sector of attack nevertheless measured 2,000 meters.

In spite of this, the commander of the 3rd Battalion advanced to the anti-tank ditch during the evening, and established a small bridgehead there.

At dawn on 9 May (the second day), the regimental commander moved his command post to approximately 500 meters west of the anti-tank ditch. During the small hours of the morning all essential measures for the continuation of the attack were discussed with the battalion commanders, artillery commanders and commanders of adjacent regiments.

The attack progressed slowly and bogged down in front of the bunkers. The regimental maps did not indicate all of the fortifications as they actually existed, because the aerial photographs were evidently taken from a considerable altitude, and did not, by any means, show all the details.

On the afternoon of the second day, Lieutenant Reimann (mentioned by name in a Wehrmacht communiqué), commanding the 9th Company and temporarily also the 10th Company of 123rd Regiment, very skillfully rolled up the anti-tank ditch including the bunkers from the right flank of the regiment to the lake. This enabled the 3rd Battalion to proceed with the attack along the southern shore of the lake. In the meantime, the 1st Battalion was detached as division reserve, while the 2nd Battalion reverted back to regimental control. By evening both battalions had crossed the anti-tank ditch and their forward elements reached the swampy meadows southeast of the lake. The Infantry Howitzer and Anti-tank Company moved into positions in and beyond the anti-tank ditch.

At 1800 hours it began to rain. The rain continued through the night of the second to the third day, and turned the terrain into a quagmire within a few hours. The Russian trenches and foxholes, where our troops and command posts were now located, abounded in knee-deep liquid mire. The swampy meadows in particular were so wet that the companies located in craters and foxholes were actually lying in the water. Because of the mine fields, most movements could only proceed along the roads. However, the roads became so soft, that even the German-type jeeps [Kübelwagen], which had cross-country mobility, were stalled completely during the night. Only prime movers with caterpillar tracks, with which rocket launcher units were amply equipped, could get through. Two-wheeled ammunition and weapons carts had to be pulled by as many as four and six horses.

The terrain adjacent to the roads became so soft, that every footstep was an effort, because feet had to be pulled out of the sticky clay. Walkie-talkies soon failed completely because the rain penetrated their housing. Only large radio sets (which connected regiment and division) continued to operate. Tracked vehicles had destroyed almost all telephone wires and had scattered them in the muck. Everything was covered with wet clay-maps, telephone cranks, rations, etc.

Everybody was covered with a thick layer of clay from head to toe. Machine guns and rifles were so full of mud that some could not be fired at all, while others failed to function after reloading, because the muddy hands of the gunners smeared mud all over the cartridges. In short, enormous difficulties had to be surmounted by the troops and the staff.

The night from the second to the third day was marked by other unfavorable disturbances. The Russians launched a strong tank-supported counterattack against the adjacent unit on the right. The attack was repelled. During the entire second and part of the third day the whole regimental zone came under heavy artillery fire.

The rains stopped on the third day of the operation. The attack around the lake could not be continued until noon, because of the mud which persisted through the fourth day.

After regrouping the supporting artillery, the 3rd Battalion, in coordination with the 2nd Battalion, was to launch the attack along the lake shore at 1400 hours. The time was later changed to 1300 hours. The attack failed to carry around the eastern edge of the lake. The battalion commander was killed and his adjutant critically wounded.

In the morning of the fourth day of fighting, the regimental commander shifted his command post into a Russian bunker, about 500 meters south of the center of the lake. At long last a command post had been found, which afforded excellent view of the area and the attack objectives. During the early morning it was still possible to confer personally with the commander of the 2nd Battalion regarding the conduct of the attack and the measures necessary to support it. In the morning, the adjoining unit attacked with assault guns and took Hill 63.2.

At the same time the 2nd Battalion, spearheaded by the 6th Company, launched an attack around the lake. After many hours of fighting, during which each and every one of the numerous trenches had to be taken and cleared individually, it was possible to advance to the northwestern edge of the lake and reach the strategic elevations known as “the three mushrooms.” The attack received excellent fire support from artillery, infantry howitzers, and mortars. Their fire was directed from regimental and other fire direction centers.

In the course of the fourth day, enemy artillery activity decreased noticeably, since the Russians began to feel the effects of the enveloping movement of the adjacent divisions on the right. It was an awesome sight to observe large masses of Russian forces stream back from the northern part of the front, north of Lake Parpach. Divisions streamed back to the east with their tanks, trucks, and artillery. They were engaged with machine gun and artillery fire of the regiment and the enveloping division on the right and partly annihilated.

The 2nd Battalion had taken the three vitally important mushroom-shaped hills along the elevations north of the lake between 1400 and 1500 hours. The troops were completely exhausted and the regimental and battalion commanders were of the opinion that the conquest of the remaining 1,000 meters toward the west, up to the village and along the anti-tank ditch would have to be postponed until the next morning. Division and regiment felt that further attacks would meet with resistance in the north, despite the withdrawal of disorganized enemy forces there. However, contrary to expectations, the crew of this fortified hill deserted in small groups. In less than two hours the entire ridge was in German hands.

During the night the fighting for the 123rd Regiment came to an end, as elements probed two kilometers to the north and reached the railroad line at Ak-Monaj. The great success of the battle was wrought at the price of tremendous sacrifices. Casualties numbered 97 dead, including one battalion commander, three company commanders, and 342 wounded.