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| Three Fairey Battle bombers of No 218 Squadron over France. K9325 (rear) shot down at St Vith, crew captured, K9324 (center) survived campaign, K9353 (near) shot down over Luxembourg, 12 May, crew killed. |
The popular perception of tactical air power during the Battle of France is one of Ju 87 ‘Stuka’ aircraft acting with absolute freedom against Allied forces, conducting close air support missions across the battlefield in support of the German Army.[1] This misconception has partly arisen from the emphasis placed upon the role played by the Luftwaffe during the crossing of the Meuse river, and has been seen as applicable to the whole battle during May and June 1940. Recent scholarship by the likes of John Buckley has, however, looked to revise the emphasis that has been placed on the role of the ‘Stuka’ and the decisiveness of its impact in the German success.[2] The German tactics in conducting close support were, and continue to be, misinterpreted. The belief that the few close air support attacks conducted by the Luftwaffe were on an impromptu basis was fundamentally wrong as they had been fully pre-planned during discussions the day before.
This misinterpretation, however, provided the driving force for the Royal Air Force (RAF) to develop this capability and enhance their abilities in this area.[3] It is necessary at this time to define several air power specific terms for clarity: close air support is the use of aircraft against front-line enemy troops in conjunction with land operations and require close integration to prevent friendly fire casualties. Battlefield air interdiction is another form of tactical air support and applies to operations conducted by air forces away from, but having a direct tactical influence on the battle. This is achieved through operations that seal off the battlefield from the enemy preventing reserves and materiél from moving up to support operations being conducted. Finally, air superiority battles are fought to gain control of the skies over the battlefield to allow operations to be conducted. This does not, however, mean that enemy air forces will not be conducting operations of their own, but they will be at a severe disadvantage when they do.
Whilst this paper will continue the work done by Buckley et. al., it will explore how the myth of the role of the ‘Stuka’ came to take hold, particularly in Britain, after the Battle of France. The British Army suffered a catastrophic defeat at the hands of the Wehrmacht, this is particularly surprising when it is considered that in both qualitative and quantitative terms, the Allied forces in 1940 outmatched the Germans.[4] The investigations conducted by the British in the wake of France were fundamentally flawed, exaggerating aspects of the fighting where it suited, and looking to justify the doctrine that they had applied. The investigations emphasized the lack of air support, and placed the blame squarely on the shoulders of the RAF.
There are several possible motives behind the British Army’s desire to do this: the army did not fully comprehend the inherent flexibility of air power and the myriad ways in which it could influence a land battle. It was looking to protect itself and the morale of its officers and troops upon its disastrous return to Britain or it was fundamentally misguided that its tactics and doctrine had in fact been sound and they had been beaten by a better opponent. This paper will, however, argue that this move was a deliberate attempt to force the RAF’s hand in terms of army air support, which it felt had been neglected throughout the inter-war and early Second World War periods. Through this calculated attack, tactical air support, particularly close air support, would be given greater emphasis and, as an end result, they would gain an Army Air Arm over which they would have full operational control. This would allow the army to provide to its ground troops the ‘correct’ form of air support to allow it to be successful in the field. It is from the British army’s investigations that we can see the myth of the ‘Stuka’ begin to emerge and which has only recently started to be revised.
The Air Fighting in France
The role of tactical air power during the Battle of France has been greatly over exaggerated. The traditional image of dive-bombing ‘Stukas’ attacking enemy troops with the ‘Jericho Trumpets’ wailing was only applicable to one small section of the front during the crossing of the Meuse at Sedan. Whilst this was an overwhelming success, it was only possible through the attaining of air superiority over this section of the Meuse in the days preceding the German Army’s advance. This was achieved through air interdiction missions that destroyed many Allied aircraft on the ground, combined with the diversionary attack mounted to draw the Allied forces into Belgium, which the Allied plan called for anyway.[5] Other crossings of the Meuse were achieved with no air support whatsoever. A major example of this was Rommel’s 7th Panzer Division.[6]
The RAF’s tactical air support force had undergone substantial reorganization whilst it was in France. It was originally two separate forces, the Advanced Air Striking Force (AASF) and the RAF Component of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF). These forces had two distinct roles, the AASF was to use the advanced airfields in France to conduct strategic bombing raids against the German homeland, while the RAF Component was to provide support to the BEF through interdiction missions, a role which had been agreed by the army. This was also the role which they had argued the RAF should play throughout the inter-war period and prior to the German invasion of France and the Low Countries.[7] After much discussion, these forces were combined to form the British Air Forces in France (BAFF), under the command of Air Marshal Sir Arthur ‘Ugly’ Barratt. BAFF was responsible for all air support conducted by the RAF in France and this support was not to be limited to British sections of the line.[8] Barratt was the most senior RAF officer versed in air support, and had previously been an artillery officer and had been key in developing co-operation between artillery batteries and aircraft during the First World War.[9] He had attended the army’s Staff College at Camberley and been the Commandant of the RAF’s School of Army Co-operation during the inter-war period.[10] The German invasion saw the implementation of the Allied Dyle plan designed to secure the French industrial region and allow the fighting to take place as far in front of French soil as possible. It was in this region and not in the Ardennes Forest that the RAF conducted its interdiction missions. Whilst this was conducted ably by the RAF, there were problems in coordinating this with the BEF, as whilst the advanced headquarters of BAFF was closely located with the local French Commander at Chauny, it was not near the BEF’s headquarters as had been laid down in inter-war doctrinal publications.[11] The Allied forces had recognized the German thrust across the Meuse against Sedan as the main point of their attack on 12 May, two full days after the Germans had begun their drive through the Ardennes Forest.[12]
The major action of the RAF at the Meuse came on 14 May when the Germans had had ample time to prepare anti-aircraft defenses in the region. This anti-aircraft defense took the form of a protective umbrella of Messerschmitts.[13] It had been decided on 13 May by Generals Georges and Gamelin that attacks would be made on the pontoon bridges spanning the Meuse the following day. The RAF were to conduct the first waves of attacks in the morning followed by the French later that afternoon.[14] The results of the morning attack were extremely poor: out of four waves of bomber attacks only one hit was claimed.[15] The French Armée de l’Air was unable to provide the resources necessary to conduct the afternoon attacks and so the burden fell again to the RAF. Barratt was aware that after the morning’s attacks the enemy would be on full alert and that he would be ordering his men on a suicide mission. Due to this, he approached the light bomber crews and asked for volunteers. All of the crews on duty that afternoon stepped forward. The effect this attack had on Barratt has been described by Victor Bingham: ‘Even if not said in so many words, the sacrifices were made to prevent any further invasion and to save Allied forces. Barratt knew it when he committed his BAFF forces, but he had little option. It has been said that it almost broke him’.[16] The attacks of that afternoon were an unmitigated disaster. Many of the Fairey Battle crews were set upon by ‘hordes of Messerschmitts … and destroyed. Others fell to Flak and many more were shot out of the sky on the way home’.[17] Of the seventy-one aircraft who conducted the operation only thirty-one returned. In the five days of daylight operations conducted by the RAF they had lost half their bombers stationed in France.[18]
The Allied forces would never recover from the initial shock they had received across the Meuse. Further interdiction missions were flown by the RAF, attacking the extending German supply and communication lines but, these attacks were nothing more than a nuisance and could not prevent the rolling advance of the German Panzer divisions. During this advance the Luftwaffe returned to providing an interdiction role acting as guards for the open German flanks.
The British Investigations
The investigations into the disastrous fighting began while the commanders of the RAF, Barratt, and the BEF General Lord Gort were still in France. Both had written lengthy despatches on the fighting and these documents highlight the differential thinking that existed between the two forces. Gort’s despatch also highlights how the army would use air support as a means to excuse their defeat. In Barratt’s opinion, the framework for conducting air support was theoretically sound but needed improvement in terms of centralization and having an air force commander in overall operational command of all air forces in a given theatre.[19] Gort, however, felt that only a protective umbrella of fighters could have prevented the isolated attack of British ground forces.[20] This idea was pushed further with the full investigation launched by the British Army in June 1940 conducted by General William Bartholomew.
General Bartholomew was an unusual choice to head an investigation such as this, unless the army was looking for someone to find the ‘correct’ reasons for their defeat. He was vehemently against the idea of an independent air force and joint operations. These views had also seriously affected his career prospects. It was believed that Bartholomew was one of the front runners to become Chief of the Imperial General Staff during the inter-war period but was transferred to India instead in order to avoid a total collapse in relations between the RAF and army. The Bartholomew Committee Report was flawed in several respects: it took evidence from only one RAF officer, those who formed the Committee demonstrated a lack of understanding of air power terms and how these related to operations in the field and a misreading of German tactics and operational doctrine.[21] The report’s focus and indeed one of its conclusions demonstrated the blinkered way in which the army viewed air support. The report fundamentally misunderstood the interdiction operations conducted by the RAF and stated that the ground troops in France felt they had received no air support as they had only seen enemy aircraft in the skies above the front lines. The recommendation of the report was that the RAF must fly the flag: that is they must be seen by friendly ground troops in order to boost morale, particularly if they were under attack from enemy aircraft. In the opinion of the Committee this should be done at the expense of other tasks. In the view of the Committee, the RAF was not conducting the correct form of air support by conducting interdiction missions. The report also believed that the air support attacks conducted by the Luftwaffe were impromptu and a reaction to the operational situation faced as the drive to and across the Meuse unfolded. The Committee also fundamentally misunderstood German land tactics, particularly how the new ‘Blitzkrieg’ method of waging war looked to bypass major obstacles and probed the enemy’s line looking for weak spots through which it could pass. It is difficult to discern if this misunderstanding was deliberate or not, however, it did allow the report to pronounce that British tactics were sound.[22]
The only air officer to give evidence to the Committee was Air Vice-Marshal C.H.R. Blount who commanded the Air Component of the BEF during the fighting in France. There is no evidence that the testimony given had any bearing on the conclusions reached. Barratt was not consulted and there are several possible reasons for this. As the head of all RAF forces in France, he may have been too distant from the tactical situation on the ground to be aware of how the air support system actually functioned in the heat of battle, as an RAF commander, the potential of bias may have colored his view of the performance of the RAF or, as this was primarily a land battle, one voice from the RAF was deemed to be enough. Despite these possible reasons, it is my opinion that the main reason behind Barratt’s omission from giving evidence was that the army, aware of the content of his despatch from France, did not want a senior RAF commander giving evidence that may implicate the BEF and its tactical and operational doctrine as the fundamental reason behind its defeat. The Bartholomew Report itself does not state whether they looked in detail at Barratt’s despatch, but it is fair to assume that they were aware of the conclusions presented in it at least.[23]
The Impact of the Bartholomew Report on the Development of Tactical Air Power in Britain
The Bartholomew Report forced the RAF in Britain into a difficult political position with regards the development of tactical air support and its future relations with the army. The RAF now felt it had to at least be seen to be developing a more robust and influential air support capability. The RAF’s major fear if they did not at least appear to be taking air support more seriously was that the army would continue to push for, and eventually gain, their own army air arm, over which they would have full control. This desire was based on the army’s misunderstanding that the Luftwaffe was subordinate to the German army. If this situation occurred, it would likely lead to calls for the RAF to be disbanded as an independent force and for air resources to be reorganized into the system that had prevailed during the First World War where there was a Royal Flying Corps attached to the army and a Royal Naval Air Service attached to the Royal Navy. In order to prevent this from happening, discussions took place in the autumn of 1940 between the RAF and army over the best way to enhance the air support capabilities of the RAF, and improve the extremely strained relations between the two services.
The result of these discussions was the creation of Army Co-operation Command, with Barratt as the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief (AOC-in-C). The army were happier with the appointment of Barratt than the RAF as he was deeply unpopular amongst the higher commanders of the RAF.[24] The army actively worked against the RAF to keep Barratt as the AOC-in-C of Army Co-operation Command when first the RAF and second Winston Churchill attempted to remove him from his position in 1941.[25] The remit for this new Command was to work closely with the army, not only to improve its understanding of the various roles air power could play at the tactical level of war, but to develop an air support capability that would give the army the confidence needed to conduct operations when it returned to the continent. The idea of Army Co-operation Command was a War Office and not an Air Ministry idea but, through its creation, it would allow the RAF to appear to be taking air support more seriously, whilst still allowing it to prosecute the air war in what they believed to be the correct use of air power: a strategic campaign against the German homeland.
Despite the restrictions faced by Army Co-operation Command caused by the way in which it was created by the RAF, there were some developments in tactical air support achieved in Britain.[26] The Command worked closely with the School of Artillery to develop the Air Observation Post concept, where aircraft located in friendly territory would spot and correct the fall of shot for artillery batteries on the ground.[27] A system that allowed front line troops to request impromptu air support was also developed, refined and codified into doctrine. This system also allowed those allocating the support to advise the various formations if they would or would not be receiving the support requested. This theoretical system would then be further refined in the light of operational experience gained through fighting in the Western Desert and North Africa. Army Co-operation Command also worked closely with the army in Britain, greatly improving relations between the two services to a level that could not have been imagined in June 1940. The restrictions faced by Army Co-operation Command, however, meant that the army was still frustrated in its desire for an operational air support force. Army Co-operation Command was an experimental and developmental Command and could not test its ideas in battle. This meant that it was always last in the order of priority for resources when these demands were placed against those of the operational RAF Commands.[28]
Conclusion
The BEF looked to place the blame for their defeat in France squarely on the shoulders of the youngest British service, the RAF. That they were largely successful in this is reflected in how tactical air power is seen to have impacted upon the Battle of France. Until recently, the view of historians in this area was the same as that largely held by the general public: close air support as delivered from specialist aircraft was a major factor not only in the speed of the German advance but also the completeness of their victory. This view has taken hold due to the actions of the British Army in the wake of the Battle of France through their false emphasis on the impact of tactical air power during the fighting. As this paper has, however, demonstrated, this was a deliberate misunderstanding by the army in order to place the blame for the defeat away from them and the methods employed during the fighting. This put the RAF under great political pressure to create an organization they were not comfortable with in Army Co-operation Command. Whilst the creation and work of Army Co-operation Command improved the relations between the RAF and army, which were extremely strained in the wake of the Battle of France, there were still huge disagreements between the two services over fundamental air support issues. This included the best organization to conduct air support when the army returned to the continent. The army felt that the natural home for any operational air support force was Army Co-operation Command, whereas the RAF argued it should be created and developed within Fighter Command. This was where the new tactical air support force, 2nd Tactical Air Force, was eventually created and developed.[29]
[1] A detailed history of the ‘Stuka’ can be found at Alfred Price, ‘The Rise and Demise of the Stuka’, Air Power Review, 3: 4 (Winter, 2000), pp.39-54.
[2] John Buckley, ‘The Air War in France’, in Brian Bond and Michael D. Taylor (eds), The Battle for France and Flanders 1940: Sixty Years On (Leo Cooper: Barnsley, 2001), p.111.
[3] Matthew Powell, Army Co-operation Command and Tactical Air Power Development in Britain, 1940-1943: The Role of Army Co-operation Command in Army Air Support (PhD Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2013), p.95.
[4] Ernest R. May, Strange Victory: Hitler’s Conquest of France (I.B. Tauris: London and New York, 2000), pp.5-6.
[5] Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World At Arms: A Global History of World War II (2nd Edition) (Cambridge University Press: New York, 2005 [1994]), pp.123-4.
[6] Buckley, ‘The Air War’, p.123.
[7] David Ian Hall, Strategy for Victory: The Development of British Tactical Air Power, 1919-1943 (Praeger Security International: London and Westport, Connecticut, 2008), pp.43-8.
[8] The National Archives (TNA) AIR 24/681, Minutes of a Conference held at General Headquarters on 17 January 1940 to discuss certain aspects in connection with the Royal Air Force in France and the Appointment of an Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, the British Air Forces in France.
[9] Charles Carrington, Soldier at Bomber Command (Leo Cooper: London, 1987), p.7.
[10] http://www.rafweb.org/Biographies/Barratt.htm. Accessed 11 September 2014.
[11] TNA AIR 35/354, BAFF Barratt’s Despatch, Appendix N Summary of Dispositions and Operations of BAFF during Various Phases of the Land Battle, First Phase 10-15 May 1940, Dispositions of BAFF, July 1940. TNA AIR 10/1794, Army Co-operation Report 1930, Part I.
[12] Powell, Army Co-operation Command p.93.
[13] Bryan Perett, A History of Blitzkrieg (Stein and Day: New York, 1983), p.94.
[14] L.F. Ellis, The War in France and Flanders (The Naval and Military Press: Uckfield, East Sussex, 2004 [Her Majesty’s Stationery Office: London, 1953]), p.55.
[15] TNA AIR 41/21, The Campaign in France and the Low Countries September 1939-1940, Military Summary, Bombing Operations near Sedan, 14 May. Brian Cull and Bruce Lander with Heinrich Weiss, Twelve Days in May: The Air Battle for Northern France and the Low Countries, 10-21 May, As Seen Through the Eyes of the Fighter Pilots Involved (Grub Street: London, 1995), pp.122-3.
[16] Victor Bingham, Blitzed: The Battle of France May-June 1940 (Air Research Publications: New Malden, Surrey, 1990), p.64.
[17] J.E. Johnson, Full Circle: The Story of Air Fighting (Cassell Military Paperbacks: London, 2001 [Chatto and Windus: London, 1964]), p.116.
[18] Ibid.
[19] TNA AIR 35/354, BAFF Barratt’s Despatch, July 1940, Part V – Conclusions and Recommendations, Command.
[20] TNA CAB 106/246, Despatches of the Operations of the British Expeditionary Force, 3 September 1939-19 June 1940.
[21] Powell, Army Co-operation Command p.113. T. Harrison Place, ‘British Perceptions of the Tactics of the German Army, 1938-1940’, Intelligence and National Security, 9: 3 (July, 1994), pp.495-519.
[22] TNA CAB 106/220, The Bartholomew Committee Final Report, 1940.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Imperial War Museum Carrington Papers 81/11/6.
[25] Powell, Army Co-operation Command pp.148-52.
[26] Matthew Powell, ‘The Battle of France, Bartholomew and Barratt: The Creation of Army Co-operation Command’, forthcoming Air Power Review 17: 3, (Autumn/Winter 2014).
[27] Matthew Powell, ‘A Forgotten Revolution?: Army Co-operation Command and Artillery Co-operation, 1940-42’, Canadian Military History, 23: 1 (Winter, 2014), pp.71-88.
[28] Powell, Army Co-operation Command p.169.
[29] 1st Tactical Air Force referred to the force used to conduct air support operations in the Western Desert and North Africa.
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| Hawker Hurricane Mark I, N2358 'Z', of No. 1 Squadron RAF is refueled while undergoing an engine check at Vassincourt. |
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| Blenheims taking off, France, 1940. |
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| Mechanics of No. 226 Squadron RAF overhaul the engines of their Fairey Battles in a hangar at Reims. |
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| Officers of No. 103 Squadron RAF lined up in front of a Fairey Battle at Betheniville. They are, (left to right): Squadron Leader H G Lee (wounded, 9 June), Pilot Officer V Cunningham (killed, 14 May), Flying Officer J R Hayes, Flying Officer G B Morgan-Dean (killed, 12 May), Flying Officer D D A Kelly, Flying Officer T B Fitzgerald, Pilot Officer T Pugh, Flight Lieutenant J A Ingram (commander, 'A' Flight), Pilot Officer Taylor (Equipment Officer), Wing Commander T C Dickens (Commanding Officer), Flight Lieutenant C E R Tait (commander, 'B' Flight), Flying Officer "Doc" Mahon (Medical Officer), Flying Officer A L Vipan, Flying Officer W Rayne, Flying Officer Rhys Price (Officer i/c Servicing Flight), Flying Officer M C Wells (prisoner of war, 10 May), Flying Officer MacDonald (Intelligence Officer), Flying Officer J N Leyden (prisoner of war, 26 May), Pilot Officer E E Morton (killed, 12 May), Pilot Officer K J Drabble (killed, 10 May), Flight Lieutenant Fallowfield (Intelligence Officer) and Pilot Officer J C F Hayter. |
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| Fairey Battle, K9204 'QT-Q', of No. 142 Squadron RAF, in a camouflaged 'hide' at Berry-au-Bac. K9204 survived the Battle of France, eventually joining the RCAF in 1941 as a training aircraft (2100). |
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| Bristol Blenheim Mk I in flight. |
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| Bristol Blenheim Mark IV, N6227 'XD-M', of No. 139 Squadron RAF, undergoes an engine overhaul at Plivot. Note the armorer (foreground) who has just removed the forward-firing .303 machine gun from its mounting in the port wing for examination. |
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| Bristol Blenheim Mk IV with crew and ground crew. |
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| Air Officer Commander-in-Chief Air Marshal A S Barratt, Air Officer Commanding British Air Forces in France and Air Vice-Marshal P H L Playfair, Air Officer Commanding the Advanced Air Striking Force, photographed together for the first time while inspecting No. 73 Squadron RAF at Rouvres. |
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| Blenheim Mark IV, L8756 ‘XD-E’ of No. 139 Squadron RAF, based at Plivot, France, in flight over northern France; mid-April 1940. |
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| Bristol Blenheim Mark IVs of No. 139 Squadron RAF about to take off from Betheniville on reconnaissance sorties. |
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| Blenheims of No 139 Squadron, Royal Air Force, part of the Advanced Air Striking Force, in flight over France during an unescorted aerial photography mission. |
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| Bristol Blenheim Mark IV, L8760 'XD-D', of No. 139 Squadron RAF taxies to a halt at Betheniville after a sortie. |
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| Three Bristol Blenheim Mark IVs of No. 139 Squadron RAF based at Plivot, flying eastwards over Northern France to survey enemy fortifications. |
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| Two Bristol Blenheim Mark IVs of No. 139 Squadron RAF based at Plivot, in flight over northern France. |
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| Ground crew working on a Fairey Battle of No. 218 Squadron at Auberive-sur-Suippes. Note the attempt to camouflage the site with cut fir saplings |
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| Mechanics service the Rolls Royce Merlin engine of a Fairey Battle of No. 142 Squadron RAF at Berry-au-Bac. |
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| Three Fairey Battles of No. 103 Squadron RAF overfly Betheniville, watched by ground crew servicing K9408 'PM-N', another aircraft of the Squadron. |
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| Fairey Battles of No. 88 Squadron RAF being prepared for action on the snow-covered airfield at Mourmelon-le-Grand. |
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| A Fairey Battle Mark I of No. 226 Squadron RAF being prepared for a night flight at Reims-Champagne in 42.5 degrees of frost. |
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Armorers unloading 250-lb GP bombs from a trolley in front of a Fairey Battle of No. 226 Squadron, in the snow at Reims-Champagne. |
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| A Fairey Battle of No. 226 Squadron RAF takes of from the snow-covered airfield at Reims-Champagne. |
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| Ground crews attempting to start the engine of a Fairey Battle of No. 226 Squadron RAF in the cold weather at Reims-Champagne. |
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| Airmen of No. 226 Squadron RAF present cheerful faces for the photographer while pushing one of their Fairey Battles through the snow to its hangar at Reims. |
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| Fairey Battle aircrew walk to their aircraft on a snow-covered airfield. They wear a mixture of flying clothing including 1930 Pattern, and Irvin, flying suits. |
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| Three Fairey Battles of No. 88 Squadron RAF based at Mourmelon-le-Grand, flying in 'vic' formation over the snow-covered French countryside. Another 'vic' of Battles can be seen at extreme upper right. |
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| Six Fairey Battles of No. 88 Squadron RAF based at Mourmelon-le-Grand, flying in starboard echelon formation over the snow-covered French countryside. |
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| The Royal Air Force in France 1939 - 1940: A mechanic at work on a snow covered Fairey Battle fighter bomber during the winter of 1939 - 1940. |
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| Fairey Battles of No 218 Squadron, Royal Air Force on patrol in France. These aircraft were regarded as being advanced when they first went into service in 1937, but in May 1940 they were too slow and lightly armored and consequently suffered heavy losses in the Battle for France. |
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| Gracie Fields entertaining RAF personnel in France, December 1939. |
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| Hurricane pilots of No 73 Squadron entertain a Greek newspaper correspondent at their base at Rouvres, December 1939. |
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| Sir Kingsley Wood, Secretary of State for Air, accompanied by Air Vice-Marshal P H L Playfair, Air Officer Commanding the Advanced Air Striking Force (left), passes the boiler and bath quarters of an RAF unit billeted in France. |
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| An engine tent is erected around the engine of a Bristol Blenheim Mark IV of No. 139 Squadron RAF at Betheniville to protect it from the weather. |
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| Ground crew servicing the starboard engine of a Bristol Blenheim Mark IV of No. 139 Squadron RAF, covered with camouflage netting and snow, at Betheniville. |
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| Airmen wheel away a mobile petrol unit after refueling a Bristol Blenheim Mark IV of No. 139 Squadron RAF in the snow at Betheniville. Note the attempt to camouflage the aircraft with cut spruce saplings. |
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| King George VI watching bombs being hand-winched into the bomb-bays of a Fairey Battle, during his tour of the Western Front. |
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| Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril Newall, Chief of the Air Staff (third left), accompanied by Air Commodore Lord Londonderry and Air Vice Marshal P H L Playfair, Air Officer Commanding the Advanced Air Striking Force (first left), on an airfield during his tour of RAF units in France. |
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| A French schoolboy listens to the volunteer band of No. 71 Wing RAF as it practices in a courtyard at Rouvres. |
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| Fairey Battle crews of No. 12 Squadron RAF check their maps on the snow-covered airfield at Amifontaine. |
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| A crew tent and Fairey Battles of No. 12 Squadron RAF on a snow covered airfield at Amifontaine. |
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| The pilot of a Fairey Battle, wearing a Type B helmet and Irvin flying suit on a snow-covered airfield in France. |
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| Officers of No. 1 Squadron RAF standing outside their mess, the Mairie at Neuville-sur-Ornain: (left to right), Flying Officers W Drake and L R Clisby, Pilot Officer L Lorimer, Flight Lieutenant P P Hanks, Flying Officer P W O "Boy Mould, Squadron Leader P J H "Bull" Halahan (Commanding Officer), Lieutenant Jean "Moses" Demozay (French Air Force interpreter), Flight Lieutenant P R "Johnny"Walker, Flight Lieutenant D M "Doc" Brown (Medical Officer), Flying Officers P H M Richey and I J "Killy" Kilmartin, Pilot Officer Mitchell and Flying Officer C D "Pussy" Palmer. |
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| The Under-Secretary of State for Air, Captain H H Balfour, questions an Air Commodore about 250-lb GP bombs, which are about to be loaded into a Bristol Blenheim Mark IV of the Advanced Air Striking Force on a snow-covered airfield in France. |
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| Fairey Battle aircrew parade near their aircraft on a snow-covered airfield. They wear a mixture of flying clothing including 1930 Pattern, and Irvin, flying suits. |
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| Ground crew use a combination of netting and frames of tree branches in an attempt to camouflage Fairey Battle, L4937, of No. 142 Squadron RAF on the snow-bound airfield at Berry-au-Bac. |
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| Pilots of No. 607 Squadron RAF are briefed on the day's patrol route by their Commanding Officer, Squadron Leader L E Smith (second left), at Mourmelon-le-Grand. Behind them is one of the Squadron's Gloster Gladiators, shortly to be relinquished in favor of Hawker Hurricanes. |
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| Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril Newall inspecting a Fairey Battle aircraft in France. Air Commodore Lord Londonderry is looking on whilst Air Vice-Marshal Patrick Playfair, the Commander of the Advanced Air Striking Force, is to be seen on the right. December 1939. |
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| A Fairey Battle fighter bomber at a forward airfield in France. |
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| Fairey Battle fighter bomber at a snow covered airfield in France during the winter of 1939 - 1940. |
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