The Pocket of Klin: Breakout of a Panzer Division

When the German offensive against Moscow came to a halt on 6 December 1941, the 1st Panzer Division was located at a point fifteen miles north of the Russian capital. It was immediately ordered back to Klin with the mission of keeping that town open for the withdrawal of other German armored forces. Deep snow obstructed every movement, and the highway running through Klin was the only route over which the withdrawal of mechanized and motorized columns could be effected.

The division reached Klin, after fighting the elements as well as the enemy, and succeeded in holding that important junction against persistent Russian attacks until the retrograde movements of other German units through the town were completed. At that point, however, as the division was ready to break contact and withdraw in the direction of Nekrasino, it found itself completely surrounded by strong enemy forces. The division was ordered by higher headquarters to abandon its vehicles if necessary, and to break through to Nekrasino where it would be able to link up with other German forces.

During the days of heavy fighting that preceded the entry of the division into Klin, the road to Nekrasino had been cut by the enemy on several occasions. In these engagements other German units lost numerous vehicles by enemy action and collisions. Wrecks had piled up all along the road and left no more than a narrow lane between them.

By reconnaissance in force, the encircled division discovered that enemy resistance was weakest southeast of Klin, and that a breakout in this direction would be most likely to succeed. The terrain, however, was such that practically all vehicles would have to be left behind. There were from 800 to 1,000 wounded in Klin who could not be evacuated without transportation. Furthermore, despite considerable loss of equipment, the encircled force was still well provided with vehicles and not inclined to give them up, if that could possibly be avoided.

After short deliberation it was agreed that the division, in order to retain its mobility, would have to break out along the road to Nekrasino, although that road itself was held by enemy forces in considerable strength. Chiefly responsible for this decision was the large number of casualties that were to be evacuated at any cost.

In preparing for the breakout, the division made use of its experiences during a previous encirclement at Kalinin. There, after executing a feint in a different direction which diverted some of the hostile forces, the division had succeeded in making a surprise breakout, losing no equipment and suffering few casualties. The great flexibility of the artillery had been of decisive importance. Shifting their fire rapidly from one target to the other, all pieces were able to support the diversionary attack as well as the actual breakout. Equally important had been the possibility of throwing all the tanks that survived the diversionary maneuver into the main effort.

After a careful survey of the situation around Klin, a plan was adopted. All available tanks, one company of armored infantry and one rifle battalion were to conduct a diversionary break-through north of Klin, and then to proceed in a westerly direction toward the town of Golyadi. Turning sharply south after reaching Golyadi, these forces were to initiate an attack in the direction of the main road. The artillery was to remain in position around the railroad station of Klin. The main breakout toward Nekrasino was to take place as soon as the Russians reacted to the threat near Golyadi and began to divert their forces from the main road. The Germans calculated that the turning movement at Golyadi would force the enemy to shift his front toward the north in order to avoid envelopment from that direction. Initially, the entire German artillery and all available antiaircraft weapons were to support the forces carrying out the feint.

While all remained quiet in the area designated for the main effort, the German units were assembled in proper order inside the encircled city. H Hour for the diversionary maneuver—actually an attack with limited objective—was set for dawn. The time of the main break-through depended on the development of the situation.

The intended deception of the enemy was accomplished with full success. A well-organized German task force fell upon the Russians at Golyadi and caught them by surprise. At the appearance of German tanks the Russians immediately shifted their reserves to meet the diversionary attack which they assumed to be the main German breakout. The attacking German troops, incidentally, had not been informed that their effort at Golyadi was no more than a feint. It was felt that they would not fight with quite the same zeal if they knew that they were merely trying to deceive the enemy. Only the division artillery commander was entrusted with the full details of the plan, including the code word for shifting fire to his new targets on either side of the Klin-Nekrasino road. The German task force took Golyadi and pivoted south. As expected, the enemy began to pull out from the area of the main road and to move north across the railroad line, determined to counter the threat of envelopment.

This was the appropriate time—about noon of the same day—to launch the main breakout along the road to Nekrasino. Upon prearranged signal, artillery and antiaircraft weapons shifted their fire. Only one artillery battalion continued to fire on the old target so as to cover the withdrawal of the diversionary force from Golyadi. Simultaneously, on the road leading out of Klin toward the west, the main attack got under way. The division's armored infantry battalion drove the first gap into the lines of an enemy taken completely by surprise. Dismounted armored infantry and motorcycle troops followed and widened the penetration. Some of the tanks initially engaged in the diversionary maneuver had made their way back to Klin and were now committed on both sides of the road. Under their protection, the wounded on trucks and sleds and accompanied by armored personnel carriers were moved out of the town. By now the artillery was covering the flanks of the break-through column. In the eastern part of the city combat engineers held off the enemy while the evacuation took its course. With the rate of progress determined by the movement of numerous vehicles, and by the need for gradual displacement of the artillery which was in turn covered by tanks and armored cars operating north and south of the road, the entire force fought its way through to Nekrasino, where it was received by other German units.

Undoubtedly the division owed much of its success to the proper employment of its combat elements, but it was primarily the maintenance of strict traffic control that permitted the evacuation of an unusually large number of vehicles and thus determined the outcome of the entire operation. All vehicles that broke down were immediately pushed off the road to keep the column moving without interruption. A large number of officers and non-commissioned officers with minor combat injuries had been added to the military police to assist in the strict enforcement of traffic discipline. The division staff, at first located at the western edge of Klin and later with the main body of the division, directed the initial break-through and the subsequent movements of individual elements with the use of radio and messengers, but without telephone communications.

Substantially intact, the division emerged from the pocket of Klin, taking along its casualties and nearly all of its equipment. Twenty-four hours later, on a different sector of the front, it was again in action against the enemy.

During the autumn of 1941, German SS troops slog along a muddy road near Moscow.

Muscovite civilians were mobilized on October 12, 1941, to prepare the city’s defense against the threat of imminent German attack.

The lack of winter clothing, as seen in this photograph of German troops awaiting orders outside a command post near Moscow in November 1941, hampered the efforts of the Wehrmacht to capture the Soviet capital city.

Wary Soviet infantrymen remain alert as the Germans approach defensive positions in a forest near Moscow in October 1941.

With the front line no more than 20 miles away, newly arrived Soviet tanks roll through the streets of Moscow to bolster the city’s defenses.

Advancing during their successful effort to recapture Klin, Soviet tanks with infantrymen aboard dodge German artillery shells.

With their hands up, German soldiers capitulate to Soviet troops.

Soviet Winter Offensive Operations 6 December 1941 - 7 May 1942 (main map); Battle of Moscow, Russian Offensive, December 1941-February 1942 (inset map). Each map has a red arrow pointing to Klin.

Battle of Moscow October 1941 - January 1942: German tanks (11th Pz. Div.) and infantry during an advance in the Wolokolamsk / Klin area.

Battle of Moscow October 1941 - January 1942: German tanks (11th Pz. Div.) and infantry during an advance in the Wolokolamsk / Klin area.

Battle of Moscow October 1941 - January 1942: German tanks (11th Pz. Div.) and infantry during an advance in the Wolokolamsk / Klin area.

Battle of Moscow October 1941 - January 1942: German tanks (11th Pz. Div.) and infantry during an advance in the Wolokolamsk / Klin area.

Battle of Moscow October 1941 - January 1942: German tanks (11th Pz. Div.) and infantry during an advance in the Wolokolamsk / Klin area.

Battle of Moscow October 1941 - January 1942: German tanks (11th Pz. Div.) and infantry during an advance in the Wolokolamsk / Klin area.

Battle of Moscow October 1941 - January 1942: German tanks (11th Pz. Div.) and infantry during an advance in the Wolokolamsk / Klin area.

Battle of Moscow October 1941 - January 1942: German tanks (11th Pz. Div.) and infantry during an advance in the Wolokolamsk / Klin area.

Battle of Moscow October 1941 - January 1942: German tanks (11th Pz. Div.) and infantry during an advance in the Wolokolamsk / Klin area.

Original wartime caption: “ ‘In a ditch were frozen German corpses’ … what Mr. Eden saw in Russia. ‘Hitler has always liked a war of movement. He is getting it now. We saw what had evidently been the scene of pretty tough fighting some few miles north of Klin. Russian or German tanks were knocked out by the road side. In a ditch were frozen German corpses.’ Mr. Eden, broadcasting the BBC postscript on 4 January. Some of the frozen German corpses seen near Klin by the British Foreign Secretary and Mr. Maisky.”